ESPON 2006 Programme Action 1.1.4: THE SPATIAL EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND MIGRATION
Migration in the 21 st century: a third demographic transition in the making? Plenary Address to the...
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Transcript of Migration in the 21 st century: a third demographic transition in the making? Plenary Address to the...
Migration in the 21st century: a third demographic transition in
the making? Plenary Address to the British Society for Population Studies
Annual Conference, Leicester, 13 September 2004.
David Coleman
Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of Oxford
Outline
• Migration marginalised? migration study in broader context of demography.
• Migration paramount? the importance, or insignificance,of migration in demographic change past and present.
• Migration as the motor of a ‘third demographic transition’?
Why (most) demographers don’t do migration
• A fuzzy category: repeatable, reversible• Terrible statistics –defined by 57 varieties
of laws.• Big errors in both directions.• The ‘weak sister’ of demography – or is it?• Theory and prediction even more difficult
than in fertility and mortality.• Politicised and unappealing.
Duff statistics- some examples
• Most ‘migration’ data isn’t.
• Invisible ‘foreigners’.
• You pay your money…..three examples.
• Bondi beach and ‘unattributable demographic change’: a plague on both houses.
Most ‘migration’ data isn’tNet 'migration', selected countries, 1960-2001
(thousands). Source: Eurostat. Note time-scale.
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 1996 1999 2000 2001
Greece France Italy Austria Portugal
The Amazing Disappearing 'Foreigners' 1991-2001 (thousands)
Source OECD (2004) Tables B.1.4, B.1.5
0200400600800
10001200140016001800
Den
mar
k
Fin
land
Net
her
land
s
Nor
way
Sw
eden
Foreigners 1991 Foreigners 2001 Immigrants 1991 Immigrants 2001
Netherlands: foreigners and persons of
foreign origin. Source: Statistics Netherlands Foreign citizen and foreign origin population, Netherlands 1950-2003
(thousands)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
Foreign citizens
All foreign origin
First generation
Second generation
Additions to the British labour force through immigration, 1991
– four definitions. Source: Salt 1992 UK SOPEMI Report
Work Permit 28978
Labour Force Survey 50500
International Passenger Survey 75000
Dept of Social Security 81503
Foreign workforce in Germany - two estimates (thousands).
Sources: Social Security, Microcensus.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002Microcensus - includes unemployed and self employed. OECD 2003 table A.2.3. Social Insurance statistics. employed foreigners liable for social insurance (Salt 2003 table 11)
Lost en route - immigration within the EU, late 1980s.
Source : Poulain 1990.
Total possible sets of data on migration between EC countries (in 1990)
132
Sets of data available on immigration
96
Sets of data available on emigration
88
Number of possible comparisons
62
Comparisons where data match
6
Demography rules OK – 2001 Census versus IPS
Net Immigration to UK, thousands (3 estimates) 1981-2002. Source: ONS
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
thou
san
ds
Net balance corrected Census-based (1, interim) Census-based (2)
‘Unattributable Demographic Change’: The New ONS Miracle Ingredient!
or ‘Honey, I shrunk the migration estimates’.
• Amaze your audiences!• Lose 290,000 people per decade!• Shrink your migration estimates overnight!• Banish that annoying population growth!• Remove those awkward inconsistencies!• Keep the 2001 Census (nearly) infallible!•
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/methodology_by_theme/revisions_to_population_estimates/implications.asp
Migration paramount – Palaeolithic globalization
Globalisation of people, cultures, disease.Migration essential survival strategy for animal populations
Universal early human characteristicConstant movement of most hunter-gatherers, transhumance of
pastoralists.Colonisation of the Earth – ‘Out of Africa’; wave of advance’Human racial variation from lack of migration – isolation by
distance.Volkerwanderung period up to 15th century (?)
Can ancient migration be reconstructed?
• Migration perpetual; everyone a migrant? – up to a point.
• Large scale. Most modern European mtDNA variation from European Upper Palaeolithic, latest Neolithic 6500 BC
• Anglo-Saxons: Genetics and language favours ‘mass migration’ over ‘elite dominance’, but little Y -genetic evidence for later contributions.
• Ancestry of most European populations lies in ‘remote past’.
Migration marginalised?
• Eurocentric view – migration minor between settled wealthy states in peacetime Europe from 15th c; within EU in late 20th.
• A residual category - migration activity mostly outside Europe; partly European emigration.
• ‘Macrocentric’ view – migration effects dominant at local level: but a question for geographers?
• In 19th , 20th centuries, migration effects mostly overwhelmed by birth / death differentials of first demographic transition.
The end of immigration, 1960-84. Source : Eurostat
EU 15 net foreign immigration to EU 1960 - 1984 (thousands)
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
tho
usa
nd
s
Migration paramount (2); the present and future.
• Renewed population growth post-1980s: main source of growth in most developed countries, change of trend in population.
• Migration expected to increase.• Modest changes in age-structure,
substantial changes in composition.• New populations of mixed origin.
UK Population projections 2002 - 2050. Source GAD 2002- based projections
UK population projections 2002 - 2051 (thousands). Source: GAD 2002-based projections
48,000
50,000
52,000
54,000
56,000
58,000
60,000
62,000
64,000
66,000
68,000
70,000
72,000
2002
2006
2011
2016
2021
2026
2031
2036
2041
2046
2051
2002 Principal Projection
2002 Natural Change
2002 163k migration
Projected population growth by component,
United Kingdom, 2002-2031, thousands. Source:
GAD 2004.High
migration variant
Principal projection
Low migration
variant
Total population increase 2002 - 2031 (thousands) 7,822 5,606 3,389
Assumed net migration 5,500 3,790 2,080
Natural change with no migration 966 966 966Additional natural change from
net migration 2,139 1,633 1,126Other changes (UDC) -783 -783 -783
Migration effect (%) 97.7 96.7 94.6Migration effect without UDC 88.8 84.9 76.8
Resulting from:
Projected effect of immigration on US population growth 1999 - 2100 .
Source: US Bureau of the Census.
US Population Projections 1999 - 2100. Middle Series and Zero Migration (millions)
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
1999
2003
2007
2011
2015
2019
2023
2027
2031
2035
2039
2043
2047
2051
2055
2059
2063
2067
2071
2075
2079
2083
2087
2091
2095
2099
Middle
Zero migration
Population projections, Sweden, 2004 - 2050,
(millions); standard and zero-migration. Source: Statistics Sweden
Population projections, Sweden 2004-2050, standard and zero migration. Source: Statistics Sweden.
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
10.5
11.0
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024
2026
2028
2030
2032
2034
2036
2038
2040
2042
2044
2046
2048
2050
Zero-migration projection (millions)
Standard projection (millions)
Population projections, Netherlands 2003-2050,
medium variant and zero-migration (millions). Source: Statistics Netherlands
Netherlands 2003-2050 projections, medium variant and zero-migration (millions). Source: Statistics Netherlands.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
total-medium variant total-zero migration native - zero migration
Why migration may continue to increase: the UK example.
• Hydraulic ‘lavatory cistern’ model should be rejected but - • Upward trend in most components.• UK government policy to expand migration e.g. increase
work permits: aim 200,000, actual 129,000 in 2002.• Growth of political influence of ethnic minority populations.• Growth of marriage migration with growth of ethnic minority
populations, and other chain migration.• Some new inflow from EU Accession countries.• New diversity-oriented policy (e.g working holidaymakers)• Amnesties (see Demography 2003)
• But asylum claims declining in 2004.
GAD Net immigration assumptions, and reality, 1996 - 2002 (thousands).
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2019
2022
2025
2028
2031
2034
2037
2040
2043
2046
2049
GAD PP 1996
GAD PP 1998
GAD PP 2000
Actual (pre-2001 census)
Actual (post-2001 census)
GAD 2002-based
GAD Net immigration assumptions, and reality, 1996 - 2002
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2019
2022
2025
2028
2031
2034
2037
2040
2043
2046
2049
GAD PP 1996
GAD PP 1998
GAD PP 2000
Actual (pre-2001 census)
Actual (post-2001 census)
GAD 2002-based
Fitted logarithmic curve to actual post-census data (r2=0.83)
Another (semi) official view (Home Office RDS Occasional Paper no 67).
More work permit migration from outside EU
Work permits holders and dependants admitted, UK 1973-2003. Source: Home Office
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
≥12 months <12 months dependants total
Family and dependent migration
• Main reason for growth of immigrant populations in Europe, N. America post 1970s.
• Marriage migration overtakes ‘family reconstitution’ migration from 1980s.
Components of gross immigration inflows to
Western Europe (blue is family; OECD 2003)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Australia 2
Switzerland
United Kingdom 3
Portugal
Canada
Norway 4
Denmark
France 5
United States 6
Sweden 7
Workers Family reunification Refugees
Spouse migration to the UK 1973 - 2001 (gross inflow).
Spouse migration by sex and NC origin, UK 1973-2003. Source: Home Office acceptances for settlement.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
All husbands All wives NC wives NC husbands
Displacement of family re-constitution migration by family formation migration UK 1982 - 1996
Entry clearance for wives from the ISC by length of marriage 1982-96, percent. Source: Home Office Control of Immigration Statistics table 2.12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Up to 1 year
1 to 10 years
Over 10 years
Growth of male South Asian ethnic minority populations of marriageable age, and entry-clearance
applications for wives/fiancees 1981-2001.Trends in age-group size and spouse entry applications from Indian sub-
Continent, Great Britain 1981-2001. Source: LFS, Census, Home Office.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
Wives/fiancees entry clearance applications, ISC South Asian Males 15-24 / 10
Family re-unification migration and family formation migration, Netherlands 1995, 2002
Non-asylum immigration to the Netherlands by purpose, percent, 1995, 2002.
Source: Statistics Netherlands.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70M
oroc
co 1
995
Mor
occo
200
2
Tur
key
1995
Tur
key
2002
perc
ent o
f no
n-as
ylum
tota
l
Labour Family re-unification Union formation Dependants accompanying core family member
Other transformations: ethnic groups of mixed origin, England and Wales 2001.
Source: 2001 Census.
All born in born born in born % of % of
birth- UK overseas UK overseas total non-white
places (1000s) (1000s) (1000s) (1000s) pop. pop.
All Mixed groups 661.0 524.3 136.7 79.3 20.7 1.3 14.6W/ Black Caribbean 237.4 222.9 14.5 93.9 6.1 0.5 5.3W/ Black African 78.9 52.9 26.0 67.1 32.9 0.2 1.7W/Asian 189.0 144.5 44.6 76.4 23.6 0.4 4.2Other mixed 155.7 104.0 51.7 66.8 33.2 0.3 3.4
Births of mixed origin by ethnic group of mother, Great Britain 1992 - 2000 (LFS)
40.7
35.3
16.6
12.8
8.9
4.11.5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45C
hine
se
Car
ibbe
an
Bla
ck-
Afr
ican
Indi
an
Pak
ista
ni
Ban
glad
eshi
Whi
te
Ethnic Group of Mother
% M
ixed
Birt
hs
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, 1992-2001 (Autumn Quarters)
Current marriages / unions outside own group, Great Britain 1981, 1991 (percent)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Mix
ed/O
ther
Wes
t Ind
ian
Afr
ican
Oth
er
Chi
nese
Indi
an
Ban
glad
eshi
Pak
ista
ni
per
cen
t m
arry
ing
outs
ide
own
gro
up
Females 1981 Females 1991 Males 1981 Males 1991
Current unions outside own group, Great Britain 1991-96, 1997-02 (percent).
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Black-Caribbean
Black-African Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese
perc
ent
Women 1991-1996 Women 1997-2002 Men 1991-1996 Men 1997-2002
Population of mixed Caribbean origin compared with all Caribbean origin (numbers
and percent), England and Wales 2001.(source 2001 Census).
Unmixed Caribbean origin and Mixed Caribbean origin population, England and
Wales 2001 (thousands).
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0-4
10-1
4
20-2
4
30-3
4
40-4
4
50-5
4
60-6
4
70-7
4
80-8
4
90 +
Unmixed Caribbean origin Mixed white/Caribbean
Mixed and non-mixed population as percent of total Caribbean ethnic population, England
and Wales 2001
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0-4
10-1
4
20-2
4
30-3
4
40-4
4
50-5
4
60-6
4
70-7
4
80-8
4
90 +
Mixed as percent of all Caribbean origin
Non-mixed as percent of all Caribbean origin
A new demographic transition in the ‘West’?
• First transition - vital rates
• Second transition (?) - family, living arrangements
• Third transition - population composition?
- new ethnic groups of mixed origin
- possible replacement of ‘majority’ group
Dirk van de Kaa’s model of the ‘Second
Demographic Transition’. Source: European Journal of Population 15, p. 313, 1999.
Ethnic change in the USA, projected 1999 - 2100
US population 1999 - 2100 Middle Series, ethnic group. Source; US Bureau of the Census 2000.
0.000
50.000
100.000
150.000
200.000
250.000
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
2017
2020
2023
2026
2029
2032
2035
2038
2041
2044
2047
2050
2053
2056
2059
2062
2065
2068
2071
2074
2077
2080
2083
2086
2089
2092
2095
2098
Hispanic White non-Hispanic Black NH American Indian NH Asian and Pacific NH
US 1999 - 2100: projected percentage of all ethnic minorities
US Population 1999-2100 Middle series projection. Total, and percent ethnic 'minority'. Source: US Bureau of the Census 2000.
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
199
9
200
2
200
5
200
8
201
1
201
4
201
7
202
0
202
3
202
6
202
9
203
2
203
5
203
8
204
1
204
4
204
7
205
0
205
3
205
6
205
9
206
2
206
5
206
8
207
1
207
4
207
7
208
0
208
3
208
6
208
9
209
2
209
5
209
8
po
pu
lati
on
(m
illio
ns
)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
pe
rcen
t e
thn
ic m
ino
rity
Total population
Ethnic minority percent
US 1999 - 2100: projected proportion of immigrant-origin minorities onlyUS population 1999-2100 Immigrant minorities only.
Source: US Bureau of the Census 2000 NP-T6-A
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
1999
2004
2009
2014
2019
2024
2029
2034
2039
2044
2049
2054
2059
2064
2069
2074
2079
2084
2089
2094
2099
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Total population
Immigrant minoritypercent (excludingBlack and AmericanIndian)
Percent of population foreign, Netherlands 2003 – 2050; medium variant and zero-
migration projections. Source: Statistics Netherlands.
Netherlands 2003-2050. Percent of population foreign, medium variant and zero-migration projections. Source: Statistics Netherlands.
10
15
20
25
30
35
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Percent population foreign - medium variant percent population foreign - zero migration
Foreign -born and foreign origin population in Sweden, 1980 - 2002, percent of total population. Source: Statistics Sweden 2003
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Foreign birthplace
Foreign background
Projected growth of population of foreign origin 2000-2050, selected countries, as % of total
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
perc
ent
Germany medium variant
USA medium variant (excludes black population)
Netherlands base scenario
Denmark 2002- based medium variant
Austria: Restricted immigration: percent foreign origin with no naturalisation.
Sweden percent population of foreign background 2004 based
Ethnic replacement:
• Continued migration from one population, into another with sub-replacement fertility, must eventually replace one with the other.
• If incoming populations have higher fertility, the process will be accelerated.
• Migration, not differential fertility, dominant effect.
British Pakistani population projections 2001-2051 (thousands)
700
900
1100
1300
1500
1700
1900
2100
2300
2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051
S 6 No mig, TFR 1.75 2016 S 8 Mig 12k, TFR 1.75 2016
S 9 No mig, TFR 2.05 2046-51 S 10 Mig 12k, TFR 2.05 2046-51
Migration can go down as well as up… (EU, Germany)
Migration to Germany 1954 - 2003, by citizenship. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. Up to 1990 German Federal Republic only.
- 300 000
- 200 000
- 100 000
-
+ 100 000
+ 200 000
+ 300 000
+ 400 000
+ 500 000
+ 600 000
+ 700 000
+ 800 000
1954
2)
1956
2)
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Net migration Germans including aussiedler Foreigners
Growth of foreign-origin population in Denmark, three projections, showing projected consequences
of recent restrictions (green line). Source: Statistics Denmark
Denmark - percent population foreign origin ; three projections. Source: Statistics Denmark
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
2002-based 16 - 12k migration 2004 based 1997-based zero migration 1997 - based 13.2k migration
Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000 - 2050 as percent of total population, with zero net
migration
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
perc
ent
Germany medium variant USA medium variant Denmark base scenario
Germany zero mig US zero mig Denmark zero mig
Why is it interesting?
• A new development, and asymmetrical• parallels abroad attract attention• change of direction in total pop trend• cultural, political change incl. foreign policy• what happens to original ‘dominant majority’• implies major change of social traditions, identity• a future of mixing or segregation or both• Sensitive to policy change
Really a transition?
• Not yet - only in early/middle stages
• Reversible? Most new populations permanent; and inter-ethnic unions create new populations
• Universal? Only in developed countries. Elsewhere minorities diminishing , especially white and ‘dominant’ minorities;
• New? Displacement not new; pervasive in first millennium and earlier; extreme in colonisation of ‘New Worlds’; deportations , ethnic cleansing of WW2 and later.
• Novelty is peaceful change, with (partial) acquiescence
Migration to Netherlands 2000-2050Year First
generationSecond
generationTotal
Total Foreign Origin 2000 1431 1445 27762050 2637 3268 5904 2000 545 822 1367Total ‘Western origin’ 2050 833 1178 20112000 886 523 1409Total ‘non-Western origin’
including: 2050 1804 2090 38942000 178 131 309 Turkey2050 201 304 5052000 153 110 262 Morocco2050 237 333 5702000 102 50 151 Africa2050 278 318 5962000 169 57 226 Asia2050 696 614 8872000 33 18 51 Latin America2050 102 136 238
Source: Alders 2001 page 30.
Some conclusions
• Union migration biggest open-ended migration channel, may define national ethnic composition.
• Trends in partner choice a major factor in future migration flows, and isolation / assimilation of ethnic populations.
• Inter-ethnic union may diminish or increase group size, but will generate in the long run a variety of new populations of mixed origin.
• Utility and propriety of ethnic classification may be questioned.
Why does it matter?• Ethnic replacement would attract attention elsewhere
(Estonia, Latvia, Amazon)
• Demographic, cultural, political implications in the marginalisation of formerly majority traditions.
• Does this infringe human rights of natives?
• Trend is mostly policy-driven, and at least potentially controllable (e.g. Denmark).
• Implies a future of mixing or segregation or both
• No remaining ‘nature reserve’ for populations concerned.
Really a transition?
• Only in early/middle stages, but elements can be projected.
• Reversible? Most new populations permanent; inter-ethnic unions create new populations.
• Universal? Only in developed countries. Elsewhere minorities diminishing , especially white and ‘dominant’ minorities;
• New? Displacement not new; pervasive in first millennium and earlier; extreme in colonisation of New worlds; deportations , ethnic cleansing of WW2 and later.
• Peaceful change, with (partial) acquiescence