Migrationand integration from theperspectiveof theWesternBalkans.(EmilioCocco)LadiesandGentlemen,distinguishedcolleagues,I am pleased to be here and I would like to thank our hosts. Thank you forcomingtolistentomyspeech,althoughIsuspectthereasonsyouaresittinghereinthisroommightdependonthefreshnessgivenbytheairconditioninginsuchahotday.ButIdohopeisnottheonlyreasonandIamsureyouaregoingtobeanextremelyinterestedaudience.Wehaveherearepresentationofyoungleadersofthecivilsocietysector,whowill probablyprovide someof the futurepolitical leadersof this country. ThetopicIamdiscussingtodayisstrategicbothforcivilsocietyandpoliticalsector.However,byreadingnewspapersandwatchingtelevisiononemayassumethattheissuesofmigrationandcitizenshipstillportraysomeambiguoustopic,whichis not clear in its boundaries. Moreover, although European countries do faceeffects and consequences of migration everyday, no real model or easy‐madesolutionisavailablefordecisionmakers.Given the above, my intention today is to shed some light on the issues ofmigrationandintegrationasseenfromtheWesternBalkansperspective.Thereasonismultifold.First,thisisaregionwheremigrationisanessentialpartof nation‐building and identity‐making. No single nation of the area is livingtodaywhere itused tobecenturiesago,and this isoneof the reasonwhy thestate‐borders are sucha complicatedquestion in theBalkans. Secondly, this istheonly arewhereEuropeanEnlargement is goingon: Croatia recently joinedthe EU and all the former Yugoslav countries plus Albania are part of the EUintegration process. The outputs of this process would affect consistently themovement of people n Europe. Finally, the Balkans are at the crossroad ofEurope,MiddleEast and the largerMediterranean.TheAdriatic Sea resemblestheBalticoneformanygeopoliticalfactorsbutitscontextismorecomplicated.TheBalkanregionisthusatransitionareabutalsoatransitarea,whichmeansitworks as a stage to perform larger and more complex political games.Transnationalcrimeandillegalmigrationarealsopartofthisgame.Myspeechwilltacklethreemainissues.FirstIwillsketchoutsomeaspectofthemigrationphenomenon, generally speaking, clarifying its social nature and theclassicwaysinterpretit.Secondly,IwilltalkofBalkanmigrationsinceIIWWtillpresent days. Eventually, I will say a few words about the problems ofintegrationandcitizenshipMigrationApproaches.Migration is essentially a social phenomenon, that is to say its entails socialrelationsandhistoricallyproducednetworksofpeople.Althoughthedecisiontomigratecanbeanindividualone,migrationcannotbereducedtoapsychologicalmatter.Also,itcannotbejustquantifiedintermsoffiguresandarchivesforeven

when labormigration is at stake, there are always peoplewith their relationsinvolved(i.e.families,friends,etc.)Inspiteof itssimilaritywithothermobility forms,suchastourism,wandering,explorations,expatriations(i.e.diplomacy),migrationisaspecificphenomenonthat involves a temporary detachment ‐ e‐migration ‐ from a socio‐culturalterritorially defined environment (whose borders donot need to be official oradministrative) and a temporary installment into a second environment – im‐migration.Thus,themigrantisnecessarilya“foreigner”,whocomesandmightonedaygoaway(followingthedefinitionofforeignerbyG.Simmel).Thisiswhy“return”migration isalsopartof thephenomenon,although this isagenerallylessspokenside.Differently,themovementofpeopleproducedbycolonialismisnotexactlymigration for thesepeopleweremoving to stay forever intoanewcountry, a country of new foundation. On the other side groups asmerchants,nomadicpeople,universitystudentsdoresemblemigrantsalot.

After Second World War (IIWW) migration in Europe becomes a massphenomenonforeconomicreasons.Labormigrationsstarttoshape,sociallyanddemographically, many European countries that were accepting thousands ofguest workers from other European countries or former colonies. Notsurprisingly,economictheorieswerethefirsttoexplainthephenomenon.Someof them stressed the “macro” level, by underlining the differences betweencountries in terms of GDP, technology and accumulation. Some others, wheremore eager to note the “micro” differences that made the rational choice ofmigrationpossible:namelywagedifferentialorbettereconomicconditions.Later,anewsetofapproaches,namedthe“neweconomics”ofmigrationpointedouttheimportanceofsocio‐culturalfactorsbydiscussingtheimportanceofso‐called“othermarkets”thanlaborsuchastheoneofsecuritycondition.Thus,inmore recent times, social science acknowledged the relevance of factors like

family bonds, friendship, cultural fascination and so on and so forth in themaking of migration. For instance, the effect of cumulative causation thatexplainswhymorepeople fromasingleplacetendstomovetowardsasecondplace,structuringawelldefinedflow,isexplainedbytheroleofpioneers.Thatistosay,firstmigrantsthatinstallandthancallfamilymemberstojointhem.Themostknownmodel todescribemigrations is theso‐called “PushandPull”model thatspellsout factorsofexpulsion(push) fromoneplaceand factorsofattraction(pull)towardsanotherplace.Pushfactorsthatmakeyouwanttoleaveaplacecanbe:

• Economicfactors:Lack of employment, economic breakdown caused by natural disasters(earthquakes,floods,etc.),lackoffoodorshelter,lowerstandardofliving

• SocialFactors:

Lackofhealthcare, culturalmarginality, lackofeducationalopportunities, lackofreligioustolerance.

• PoliticalFactors:Unfairlegalsystem,politicalrepression,warandterrorismPullFactors—Factorsthatdrawyoutoliveinaplacecanbe:

• EconomicFactors:Hope forbetteremployment,betterwagesandmore food,bettershelter,hopeforfamilytoreachahigherqualityoflife.

• SocialFactors:Encouragementfromfamilyandfriendsalreadysettledthere,betterhealthcare,bettereducationalopportunities,religioustoleranceandculturalintegration.

• PoliticalFactors:Togainprotectionunder the law, right tovoteand freedom frompersecution,SafetyAlthoughthemodelisquiteusefultodescribethemigrationphenomenonstillisnot enough to predict how andwheremigration flows occur. To determine inadvance direction and intensity of migration is not an easy task as too manyfactors intervene to shape the social relations involved. For instance, somefactors of repulsion for a country may play a role whereas some other ofrejectioncreate invisibleobstacle.Thus, therearecountries thatseekmigrants

but do not receive enough of them because they are not attractive (i.e. badweather, bad connections, difficult language, etc..),whereas countries targetedbymanymigrantsactuallyrejectthem,althoughseeminglytheyarenotdoingit(i.e.bureaucraticobstacles,nopoliciesformigrants,etc.).BalkanmigrationsinthedecadesofthecoldwarAfter the IIWWmigrations fromtheBalkanshadtwomainreasons.Firstofallthey were ethnic migrations: people living in territories that changedsovereignty or political system (i.e. Communist regimes) moved out to their“mother‐countries”orsaferplaces.(tab.1)

Fromthe1960s,economic reasons take theupperhand. InYugoslavia, strongeconomic motives and supportive policies, made the country one of the firstexporters ofmigrants towardsWestern Europe. The trend of emigration fromYugoslaviatoWesternEuropegrewtillthe1970swithapeakin1973(850.000migrants toWestern Europe: Germany, Austria, Switzerlandmostly). In 1975‐1985 there is a reverse trend for the restrictive policies of hosting countries(drop to500.000 in1985). In1985‐1990anewgrowth for thepolitical, socialandeconomicdeteriorationofinYugosalvia(550.000in1990).Butifweconsiderfamilymembers/inactivepopulation(countriesofdestinationstatistics)thefigurereaches1.3million!TheConflictingrepresentationsdependingonthemethodologyandthewaytheproblemisapproached.

Forinstance,theindexcalled“netmigrationrate”iscalculatedonthestatisticsofreceivingcountries.Whereastheonecalled“netmigrationrateasresidual”isthe result of a balance between the total growth of the population and thenatural balance (birth/death). Therefore, the second index is based on thestatisticsof theorigincountriesandreveal thatactuallymorepeoplemigratedthan theywere actually registered.Moreover, theway peoplewere registered(active,inactive,etc.)alsovariesandcreateddifferencesintherepresentations.(tab.2)

Balkanmigrationsinthe1990sThe phenomenon of migration from the Balkans and more precisely formerYugoslavia,takesaquitedifferentoutlookbythe1990s.First of all, because the break‐up of Yugoslavia and the occurrence of ethnicconflicts produced a number of forced migrations. (displacements, refugees,asylumseekers,etc.).Secondly, new “spontaneous”migration flows emerged and they differed a lotfromtheonespreviouslycontrolledbythestate.Thirdly,Yugoslaviabecamenotonlyan“origin”butalsoa“transit”country.Thefactorsbrieflyoutlinedabove,describeasubstantialchangeinthetypesofmigration flow from former Yugoslavia towards Europe. Particularly, a newstrategicroleisplayedbytheillegalandinformalnetworks.Moreover,thelackof reliable statistics becomes a recurrent event. Eventually, new negativestereotypes emerge, such as the term “Yugo” that once had quite positiveconnotationandlatelybecomessynonymofpoorrefugee,Balkanviolence,etc.

The following tables give a statistical picture of the Balkanmigration towardsWesternEuropeafterthe1990s.(Tab.3‐4‐1bis)

Tab.1bis

Inconclusion,onecannotethat:

• BiHhadgreaterlossesin1990‐1995(almost1millionoutof4,3millions)partlyrecoveredin1995‐2000.

• Albania700.000“losses”inthe1990s• SloveniaandCroatiahavepositivetrends(countriesofimmigrationinthe

1990s)• Macedonia and Serbia‐Montenegro alternates positive and negative

trends.So,aquitediversifiedpicture,wheretheissueofdisplacementandrefugeesplayacrucialrole.IntegrationandcitizenshipEventually, only a few words about integration and citizenship for time isrunning.Iwouldliketopointouttwoaspects.First, the issueof “secondgeneration” that calls in thedebateon “IusSoli” and“Ius Sanguinis”. Although, for many years labor migration from formerYugoslavia was treated as an economic question, nowadays many formerYugoslavs live inWesternEuropewith their families and sons.This is a factorthateventuallyshapesthesocialpictureofWesternEuropeancountriesinmanyways.Particularly,onecannottalkanymoreofgustworkersbutshouldconceivethesebilingual(ortrilingual)andmulti‐nationalpeopleastrulypartofthepolity.Whatarethedutiesandtherightsofthesepeople?Whenandhowonecantrulybecome Austrian, German, Italian or Swiss citizen? Is it enough to be bornsomewhere tobecomecitizenwhen theEuropean juridical systemsaremostly

stressing thebloodkinship? Ipersonally think this iswhereEUshould test itsinfluenceandpower.Secondly, the problem of returning immigrants. Many Western European ofYugoslavdescentwouldliketogobackoratleasttokeepsomeaffiliationwiththeircountry,whichinsomecasedoesnotexistanymore.Arethesepeoplegoingtobe treatedas truenationalsorsecondclasscitizens?Or,alternatively,whendiasporaismanipulatedforpoliticalpurposesandgrantedmorerights–foritsethnic“purity”–thantotheregularresidents?.Thesearequestionstobetackledtogethertoreachacitizenshipbalance.ThankyouBibliographicalreferences. AA.VV. Direzione generale dell’immigrazione, L’immigrazione per lavoro in Italia, evoluzione e prospettive, Roma, 2011 Bonifazi C.,Mamolo M., “Past and Current Trends of Balkan Migrations”, Espace, populations, societies, 2004/3: 519-531 Conti C., Conflitti, Migrazioni forzate e rischi ambientale nella Ex-Jugoslavia. W.P. 2/2000, progetto strategico “Ambiente e territorio”, 2000. Koser K., International Migration, Oxford Universitty Press, Oxford, 2007 Lebhart G., Marik-Lebek S., Migration from the Balkans to Austria. Recent patterns and present impact, Directorate Population Statistics, Austria, 2009 Tamas K., Palme J., Globalizing Migration Regimes. New Challenge to transnational cooperation, Aldershot, 2006 World Bank, Migration And Remittances. Factbook 2011, Washington D.C.