Michael Peck Energy Geop Theory

8/2/2019 Michael Peck Energy Geop Theory

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Page 2 of 29 Michael Peck

Despite all the talk of geopolitics, the rampant materialism of much theory,

and ambient breathless excitement about the marvel and perils of

contemporary technologies, the role of material-contextual factors andarguments in ... international political theory is remarkably truncated and

unsystematic. We think and act as if technologies are just our handy tools

and as if nature has somehow been left behind (Deudney 2007:xii).

Introduction

Although its importance is frequently invoked the meaning of energy security is far

from clear. According to von Hippel (1998:15), the literature on energy security

demonstrates that the concept is ill-defined and few works have made a serious attempt to

clarify the concept of energy security. Chesters (2009:887) analysis of definitions of energy

security concluded the concept was inherently slippery because it is polysemic in nature,

capable of holding multiple dimensions and taking on different specificities depending on the

country (or continent), time frame or energy source to which it is applied. One approach to

addressing this gap in the security literature would be to place energy security on a sound

theoretical foundation.

Nakamura (2002) identifies two contemporary approaches to energy security: market

analysis and geopolitical. In both, energy is represented largely by oil. The market analysis

approach is characterised by its close focus on economics, faith in market mechanisms to

meet oil demand, and suspicion of government intervention (Nakamura 2002:12-16). It

regards oil as a commodity easily purchased at any time, and takes an optimistic view of the

potential for technology to deliver higher oil production and counteract its environmental

impacts. In this approach, energy security and national security are seen as distinct.

However, Morse (1999) and Chapman (2009) observe that in practice market forces

have never been given free rein, and domestic pressure for low energy prices has motivated

states to push the burden of adjustment onto other parties. The history of the oil business

(Painter 1991, Randall 2005, Yergin 2008) and the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the

United States (Lippman 2005, Bronson 2006, Ottaway 2008) is replete with examples of state

intervention in the oil market on the grounds of national interest. Today the Organisation of

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) manages oil production such as to maintain prices,

just as the Texas Railroad Commission once controlled US production (Yergin 2008:249). A

market analysis approach flies in the face of the historical record.


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Nakamura argues that in debates on energy security the geopolitical approach, where

the pursuit of national interest is a priority, is becoming more important (2002:12).

Illustrating this approach with the American Energy Self-sufficiency Plan Nakamura

observes that

The US is maintaining an energy strategy which would minimize the effect

of a halt in petroleum from the Middle East ... the US would not be

affected even if the flow of crude oil through the Straits of Hormuz came

to a complete stop. It is not an exaggeration that while promoting the

general theories of economic globalization and international markets, the

US maintains a firm hold on a structure of self-sufficiency (Nakamura

2002:16) .

By geopolitical Nakamura is essentially referring to a realist approach privileging nationalsecurity and in which geographical factors are taken into account. Geopolitics is generally

understood to concern the impact of geography, chiefly through its locations and features, on

the international relations of states (Mamadouh 1988:238).

Daniel Deudney offers geopolitics as a theory, an innovative approach which may

offer a fresh perspective on energy security. Deudney (1997:93) complains that few words in

the study of world politics are as widely used and vaguely defined as the term geopolitics

(Deudney 1997:93). Observing the atrophy of geopolitical theory since the 1960s which

has left international relations theory without ... a robust theory of system change Deudney

(1997:99) revisited earlier geopolitical theory to develop a social science model explaining

change in states security practices through shifts in material contexts (geography and

technology).

Deudney advanced this new, materialist approach in his 1997 essay Geopolitics and

Change. For simplicity, this theory is here termed security materialism, although Deudney

referred to it variously as neoclassical geopolitics, historical security materialism,

historical protection materialism, and most descriptively as structural-functional security

materialism (Deudney 1997, Deudney 2000, Deudney 2007). The approach was further

developed in the article Geopolitics as theory: historical security materialism (Deudney

2000) and its intellectual lineage more deeply explored inBounding Powerwhere it forms the

basis of republican security theory (Deudney 2007) 1.

1 InBounding PowerDeudney utilises the same historical materialist approach as in the 1997 essay and 2000paper, presented as a recovery and extension of arguments from antiquity and from 19th-20th century geopolitics

about achieving security in domestic and international anarchic and hierarch contexts, but drops the Marxistterminology and renames the approach republican security theory (Deudney 2007).


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Security materialism offers a theory of system change grounded in material factors as

well as explaining how security practices and structures arise. It should be adaptable to the

security of energy supplies since this arises from inherently material factors: the fundamental

mismatch between the geological extent and geographical distribution of energy resources on

one hand, and the distribution of the sites (or populations) of technologies converting those

resources to useful energies (mechanical, electrical) on the other.

Security materialism is developed from two neglected strands of political theorising.

The first stretches from the ancient Greeks to Montesquieu, and includes geographic factors

like climate, soil fertility, topography and land-sea interactions (Deudney 2007:18) in

arguments explaining the origins of various political forms. However, these arguments

faltered in explaining change in political structures over time. The second, extending from the

mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, addressed this question of change

and sought to understand how the new capabilities of transportation,

communication and destruction produced by the industrial revolution ...

when interacting with the largest-scale geographic features of the earth,

would shape the character, number, and location of viable security units in

the emerging global-scope security system (Deudney 2007:19).

These arguments viewed technology and its interaction with geography as a source of change

in international politics.

Among the scholars of this period Deudney identifies Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford

Mackinder, H. G. Wells and the German Geopolitikschool as the first globalists and

suggests that the association of materialist geopolitics with the crimes of Nazi Germany

made Anglo-American Realists of the era eager to distance themselves from this literature

(Deudney 2007:19). 2 Deudney recovers these lost arguments and formulates a new theory

using an historical materialist framework, a functional model of causation, and some concepts

borrowed from Marxism.

This paper introduces the key concepts and features of Deudneys security

materialism. Following an overview of the approachs core propositions, its assumptions,

definitions and terminology are outlined. A brief analysis of some key aspects of the theory

follows. Finally, modifications of the theory are proposed for its application to energy supply

security and some preliminary research findings are outlined.

2 Deudney also observes that the neglect of this literature led to the unwarranted view that idealism dominatedinternational relations theory before World War II and the emergence of Realism (Deudney 2007:19-20).


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Core propositions

Material contexts, technology and security

The core proposition of security materialism is that security institutions are practical

mediations between the unchanging natural need for human security and the changingconstraints and opportunities of the natural environment (Deudney 1997:100). 3 The security

practices that emerge are not part of nature but rather are created by humans engaged in

practical problem solving (Deudney 1997:100). While nature, aside from its perturbations

such as extreme weather and geological events, can effectively be considered a constant,

human activities can reveal new possibilities within it, as well as adding to nature through

technology.

In security materialism technology is considered an important source of change.

Although it is generally considered to be derivative of human and political choice socially

determined rather than socially determining (Deudney 1997:105), a more nuanced

appreciation reveals this is not so. Scientific research and knowledge, and technology and

technics are all typically conflated as technology (Deudney 1997:106). Technology is

engineering practical knowledge about utilising natural materials and principles to achieve

specific tasks, and is intangible, whereas technics are the products of scientific research and

knowledge, and technology and human labour they are physical machines and devices,

possessing materiality and interacting with nature (Deudney 1997:106).

Technologies of transport, communication and violence both extend the scope of

interaction between human collectivities as well as the size of political units. The material

context which humans inhabit is composed of the interaction of geography and technology

and the changes so produced may pose new security problems while eliminating or

ameliorating others (Deudney 1997:100). Thus humans are condemned to seek security in

circumstances both socially produced and natural material not of their own choosing

(Deudney 2000:88).

Causal relationship

In Deudneys model the causal relationship is functional. The viability of the

security practices and the political structures which are the product of human agency, is

3 In his 1997 essay, Deudney occasionally uses the term human security however this does not refer to theconcept that has evolved from critical security theory. It is merely one aspect of distinguishing (albeit withunnecessary over-emphasis) between the non-human material (natural) world and that of human ideas and actions.The full quotation is as follows: The model posits that human security institutions are practical mediations

between the unchanging natural need for human security and the changing constraints and opportunities of thenatural environment.


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determined by their fit with the constraints and opportunities of the material environment in

which they must function (Deudney 2000:88). 4 While the material context does not

determine the security practices which human agency may create, it does determine whether

or not these particular structures and practices are functional in that context.

A set of security practices and structures a security order will either meet, or fail

to meet, the fixed security objectives in a particular material context. Security practices may

become dysfunctional as material forces alter security problems, and in response, human

agency will either adapt them or devise new ones, to create a new functional form, or fail to

adapt them causing the security order to crash. But while human agency determines which

security practices and structures come into being, it has no influence over whether they are

functional or dysfunctional that is determined purely by the material context. A simple

diagram of Deudneys model illustrating these key features is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Simplified model of security materialism

Source: Deudney (1997:101). Note: telos is the end term of a goal-directed process

Historical materialist framework

The development of security materialism was seeded by an insight from John Herz

who, using the concepts and language of Marxism, suggested that Within the sphere of

international relations, it might be said that political developments constitute a superstructure

over the system and the development of the means ofdestruction (Herz 1951 cited in

4 According to Deudney, Social science functionalism has many variants, but the basic idea is that the persistenceof a particular social or political arrangement can be explained by its superior fit with the constraints and

opportunities of the context, both natural-material, technological-material, and purely social, within which itoperates (Deudney 2007:197).


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Deudney 2000:88). Deudneys security materialism is based on a historical materialist,

although not Marxist framework, in which forces of destruction are analogous to Marxs

forces of production, and it is these forces that condition the viability of different modes of

protection and the superstructure of political authority structures (Deudney 2000:80). The

forces of destruction are found in the material context composed of geography and technics,

and the basic nature of the causal relationship between material contexts and political

outcomes is functional (Deudney 2000:82). This formulation allows the important and

practical question: What mode of protection (security practices and structures) will be

functional for security in a given material context?

Forces of destruction are constituted from the interaction of nature, particularly

geography, and technology, as both the revelation of natural possibilities, and as embodied

destructive capability (Deudney 2000:88-89). The material context is the source of the forces

of destruction which are considered the decisive material reality and the driving and

variable factor in security materialism (Deudney 2000:88). These forces of destruction

arising from the material context are expressed through violence interdependence the

independent variable defined as a rough and basic measure of the capacity of actors to

wreak destruction upon one another (Deudney 2007:18) while security practices and

structures are the dependent variables. The material context is composed of particular

geographies and technologies and importantly, communication and transportation are as

integral to the forces of destruction as are specifically destructive technologies in shaping

both the velocity and volume of violence available in particular material contexts (Deudney

2000:89).

Validating the theory

Validating security materialism requires firstly, confirmation that a change in the

material context results in a change in security practices and structures. The theory is verified

if, secondly, following a material contextual change, a hypothesised adjustment or crash

occurs. It is falsified if a non-hypothesised persistence or a non-hypothesised adjustment is

the outcome (Figure 2). However, one possibility is that the security order remains constant in

the face of a material-contextual change. If it cannot be demonstrated that this is due to the

practices and structures being security-functional in both material contexts, then the theory

would be falsified.


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Figure 3 Historical Materialism, Classical Marxism and Deudneys Geopolitics

Source: Deudney (2000:89).

Periodisation of history

A central claim of historical materialist theories is that history can be demarcated into

distinct periods on the basis of different stages in the material conditions of production, and

posit that the viability of different economic, political and cultural systems is determined by

their fit with these material contexts (Deudney 2000:87). In security materialism,

periodisation stems from historically observable substantive variations in the forces of

destruction. Deudney (2000:90) notes that this is a complex and problematic undertaking

since the material environment is often constituted by a heterogeneity of geographical and

technological features, which impose conflicting constraints and opportunities. Nevertheless

Deudney proposes the following four periods:

Pre-modern to 1500: dominated by human and animal muscle power,

augmented by sails and simple weapons such as catapults and bows and

arrows


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Early modern (1500 1850): as for the pre-modern but enhanced by

oceanic navigation and gunpowder 5

Global industrial (1850 1945): advances in mobility through steel-hulled

ships with coal or oil-fired steam engines and later, diesel engines; railways,

piston-engine aircraft, motor vehicles, telegraph, radio and high explosives6

Late Global or Planetary-Nuclear (post 1945): jet (gas turbine) aircraft,

rockets, missiles, satellites and nuclear weapons (based on Deudney

2000:90).

Each of these historical periods represents a different intensity of violence interdependence

(or different forces of destruction), and correspondingly the viability of different modes of

protection (Figure 4).

Figure 4 - Protection mode viability and historical periods

Source: Deudney (2000:95)

Modes of protection: real-state and federal-republican

Modes of protection are clusters of related practices and constitute the means

through which violence capacities and authorities over violence capacity are institutionally

regulated or unregulated (Deudney 2000:91). When such practices are sustained, structures

are generated. Such patterns of political authority both support and reinforce these

practices (Deudney 2000:91-92). Herein lays the generative mechanism for security

5 Deudney does not explain his assignment of gunpowder to this period. Gunpowder was invented in China in the9th century, the earliest known illustration of gun dates to 1326, and gunpowder was quite extensively tradedinternationally in the mid-late 16th century (Buchanan 2006).6 Geels (2002) notes that steamships were insignificant in number until about 1860, with their tonnage onlyoutpacing sailing ships in the early 1880s.


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structures which Deudney claims realist IR theories lack. While noting that feudalism may

have been a pre-modern security mode, Deudney identifies two modern modes of protection:

real-state andfederal-republican.

The essential qualities that distinguish these modes are illustrated by their contrasting

domestic and international characteristics (Deudney 2000:91-94). The real-state mode avoids

internal anarchy through establishing hierarchy, but avoids external hierarchy which would

represent, for example, subordination to imperial rule. The federal-republican mode

restrains internal hierarchies to avoid both anarchy and hierarchy, while externally this is

replicated to produce political arrangements for mutual restraint between other political

societies.

Internally (domestically) The real-state mode presupposes and seeks to produceobedient subjects while the federal-republican mode entails citizens acting according to

elaborate sets of norms (Deudney 2000:94). This mode also carries the risk of the extensive

violent predation of some governments upon their own people (Deudney 2007:30).

Externally (internationally) the real-state mode represents Westphalian sovereignty with its

undivided internal sovereignty and mutually recognised autonomy while the federal-

republican mode emphasises internal popular sovereignty and external pooled, divided and

circumscribed patterns of legitimate authority (Deudney 2000:94). These modes may also

exist in hybrid forms.

Deudney argues that the real-state mode is functional for security in material contexts

of low violence interdependence, while federal-republican modes are viable in high violence

interdependence contexts (Deudney 2000:94-97). This argument is fully developed in

Bounding Powerwhere Deudney claims that federal-republican world government is the only

viable mode of protection in the contemporary planetary-nuclear material context (Deudney

2007).

Security and mode viability

According to Deudney, the key to relating material contexts to security viability is

restraint on violence and

In the broadest terms, security results from the presence of restraint on

violent power, and insecurity results from the absence of restraint on

violent power. Given this, there are logically only two possible sources of

restraint either in the limits posed by the material context, or in socially

constructed limits generated by security practices and their attendant

political structures (Deudney 2000:94).


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Deudney proposes that which mode is viable in which context can be determined By

examining the ways in which different material contexts provide or fail to provide

restraints, and the ways in which different modes of protection and their attendant structures

provide or fail to provide restraints ... (Deudney 2000:94).

Ancillary propositions and prediction

Two particularly useful features of Deudneys model derive from its ancillary

propositions (Deudney 1997:111-117). These consist of a set of eight factors determining

how a particular security order is likely to respond to material-contextual changes, and four

indicators of a security orders state of adjustment (fit or misfit) to its current material

context. The former enable assessment of whether a particular security order is susceptible to

failure (crash), delayed adjustment (lag) or will quickly adapt to changes. The latter can alert

impending failure of a security order that is in an emerging state of misfit or fundamental

contradiction to the material context. Together they potentially constitute a set of analytical

tools for the assessment of stability and viability of security orders.

Analysis

Functional explanations

Deudney only briefly discusses his model of causation, distinguishing it as a

functionality argument as opposed to functionalist on the basis that security materialism

does not posit that security arrangements functional in a specified material context will

necessarily arise (Deudney 2007:60). Functional arguments have long been criticised for

lacking explanatory power (Gregor 1968, Mclachlan 1976, Haggard and Simmons 1987,

Becker 1988). Becker (1988:865-66) observes that The times when social scientific writing

was largely dominated by some pattern of functional reasoning are over but nevertheless

argues that application of an open functional logic is valid when some objective pressure to

generate a particular pattern of social rationality can be identified. He notes that functional

logic originates in intentional contexts with the implication that

functionalist theories must not only demonstrate the existence of some

objective mechanism establishing the functions, but also and more

importantly the existence of apoint of reference that sets in motion

objective processes characterised by functional logic (Becker 1988:866,

emphasis added).

Open means the fulfilment of needs is not inferred from the needs themselves, and


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This instance refers to general existential necessities of social life, existing

independently of human knowledge and of special interests, and involving

certain functional exigencies people are forced to meet. And only these

general existential necessities can be considered as objective points of

reference in functional logic. But because these necessities can only be metby social practice (which may fail), there is no guarantee that they will

prevail (Becker 1988:875 emphasis in original).

Beckers open functional logic corresponds to security materialisms functionality.

The objective mechanism is pragmatic human agency, and thepoint of reference is the

existential need for security-from-violence which invokes the objective processes of

constructing security practices and institutional arrangements. Moreover, the fulfilment of theneed for security-from-violence cannot be inferred from the need itself, since it is the

properties of a specific material context that determine if human-devised security practices

and institutional arrangements are functional within it.

Gregor (1968) also accepts that functional accounts are explanatory when they

contain

generalizations covering initial state descriptions and compensatory

intrasystemic variations which maintain a specific goal or preferred state in

the system; that is, functional explanation implies the possibility of

formulating lawlike statements which relate variables, state coordinates,

and their interrelationships in some determinable fashion (Gregor

1968:433).

Again, security materialism meets these requirements since the initial state of the material

context can in principle be closely specified, and the variations in security practices and

structures that occur to maintain the goal of security-from violence can in principle be

observed. Thus security materialisms reliance on a functional model of causation appears to

be sound.

Levels of analysis

According to (Buzan 1995:198) The level of analysis problem is about how to

identify and treat different types of location in which sources of explanation for observed

phenomena can be found. There is no agreement on the number of levels of analysis

International Relations should contain, how they are defined, which are most important and

how analysis based on them ought to be integrated (Buzan 1995-11). Disputes over the


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number and nature of the levels of analysis required emerge according to whether scholars

regard levels as ontological - concerning different units of analysis - or epistemological

pertaining to the types of variables that explain a particular units behaviour (Moul 1973

cited in Buzan 1995:203).

Singer (1961) argued for recognition of the level of analysis as an important

conceptual issue to address before undertaking research, and for its consistent application

throughout a study. Singer also proposed two levels, the international system and the nation

state and while he did not define the former, taking it as a given, he also stressed that these

were only two of many possible levels. Singer also considered that theoretical integration of

two (and presumably more) levels was not possible.

One result of Singers argument and the influence of Waltzs Theory of InternationalPolitics was that the debate over levels was constricted to only two unit and structure

(Buzan 1995:207-8). However, there is no philosophical basis to this limitation, and The

important issue in international relations theory is which units of analysis and which sources

of explanation tell us most about any given event or phenomenon (Buzan 1995:212-13).

Buzan (1995) proposes five levels of analysis (system, subsystem, unit, bureaucracy and

individual) and three sources of explanation (interaction capacity, structure and process).

These can be represented in a matrix (Figure 5). For security materialism, the source of

explanation lies in the violence interdependence (violence interaction capacity) of the materialcontext. This is analyzed within and across the units, typically states, but historically applies

to any scale of human collectivity.

Figure 5 - Levels of analysis in international relations theory

Sources of Explanation

Levels of analysisInteractioncapacity

Structure Process

System

Sub-system

Unit

Bureaucracy

Individual

Source: adapted from Buzan (1995:212)

Security materialism does not restrict analysis to a single level. According to

Deudney (2007:17) Arguments about material contexts and their relationship to political


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structure and security-from-violence are not confined to either the system level or the unit

level, but rather address both. These possibilities are expressed in Figure 6.

Figure 6 - Material context shapes Unit-Level and System-Level

Source: Deudney (2007:17).

Violence interdependence

Violence interdependence is a refined application of the interaction capacity

proposed by Buzan, Jones and Little (1993:66-80) in their analysis, critique and extension of

neorealism to structural realism. It is refined in that Deudney is only considering the

technologies that are directly related to, or supportive of, the capability to deliver violence.

The latter being the technologies of transport and communication. For example, Roman roads,

railways, oceanic navigation and flight, all underpin both peaceful and violent interaction.

Even if devised and used for purely peaceful purposes, these technologies can always be used

for violent ends. Buzan (1995:210-11) argues for interaction capacity as a distinct source of

explanation since the absolute quality of interaction capacity is fundamental to the existence

of a system. Where there is no or minimal interaction capacity between units, due to

geographical barriers and the lack of technologies to overcome them, no international system

(political structure) exists. History shows that interaction capacity has varied over time and

over space, and it is a variable of interaction [which] crucially affects the meaning and

construction of the system (Buzan 1995:211).

Explaining and understanding

Using Holliss and Smiths (2003) conceptions of explanation and understanding

in international relations, Deudneys theory is a positive social science model and therefore

explanatory. But as Deudney admits, no security theory ... could be complete without more

Materialcontexts

Unit-Level

System-Level


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extensive treatment of ideational factors as well as political economy (Deudney 2007:xiv).

Considering Allisons and Zelikovs (1999) study of the Cuban missile crisis, in the light of

security materialism we might explain the ad hoc changes in security politics as being caused

by the increase in violence interdependence from the Russian missiles installation in Cuba.

That the security order did not crash was because the ad hoc adjustments made were

functional in that context. But to understandprecisely how such adjustments were made may

require multiple approaches, such as organisational theory and government politics in

Allisons and Zelikovs study. However, synthesising several approaches is problematical.

According to (Buzan 1995:213)

The important theoretical question is: if two or more [levels] and sources

of explanation are operating together, how are their different analyses to be

assembled into a whole understanding? To this there is yet no clear answer.

This also suggests that security materialisms explanatory power is, while perhaps

quite valid, of little practical use. However, its value does not lie as much in its richness of

explanation as in the specification of the (hypothesised) security order that is functional in a

particular material context. Further value comes from the theorys ancillary propositions

which offer the prospect of obtaining insight into the stability of an extant security order.

While approaches that lead to a detailed understanding of how an effect arose inevitably

require extensive and inevitably after-the event-analysis, Deudneys parsimonious and

materialist theory offers the prospect of real time analysis, providing the required details of

the material context can be monitored.

Nonlinear effects of violence interaction capacity

InBounding PowerDeudney contends that in the current planetary-nuclear era,

violence interaction capacity is so extreme that only a republican form of world government

would provide a functional security order. That such an arrangement has not developed is

explained through the tendency of security practices to persist and for adjustments to lag

material contextual changes. For Deudney, the failure of the early 20th century European

states to adapt security structures to the vastly increased violence interdependence produced

through the technologies developed in the industrial revolution, and the resulting two world

wars, exemplifies such lagging adjustment. The current almost federal and republican states-

union of the European Union is seen as the delayed adjustment to the capabilities of

advanced industrial weaponry. Deudney interprets nuclear arms control agreements as early

signs of movement towards a global federalism.


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However, Deudney does not consider that the effects of increasing violence

interaction capacity may be non-linear. As Waltz (2000) argues, nuclear weapons have at

least checked the likelihood of nuclear weapon states engaging in war against each other.

Allisons and Zelikovs (1999) study of the Cuban missile crisis shows that awareness of the

high stakes of nuclear conflict were an inhibiting factor shaping the outcome, although it did

not necessarily determine the outcome. Certainly, nuclear weapons have not prevented

nuclear-armed states waging conventional war against other non-nuclear states. However, it

appears that a material context characterised by this form of extreme violence

interdependence is paradoxically also violence-inhibiting. Deudneys argument inBounding

Powerfor the inevitability of a federal world government on the American federal-republican

model may therefore be flawed. 7

This does not discount the theory so much as to highlight the challenge of

hypothesising which security practices will be functional in a specific material context. For

while the material context conditions the viable security practices and structures, there need

be no assumption that the solution for a particular context be singular and thus confined to a

specific type of political order. After all, what matters for security-from-violence is only for

security practices and structures to be functional.

Modification and application to oil supply security

While security materialisms focus is on the varying violence potential of changing

material contexts, the theorys explicit inclusion of technology (as technics) and geography

strongly suggests the possibility of its application to energy supply security. Materially, the

security of energy supplies is bound to the natural world through its energy resources and

their extent and distribution, and to the human world via technics consuming those resources.

More specifically, this binding arises through energy conversion technologies, such as the

internal combustion engine, which critically depend upon these resources, transforming them

into the useful forms of energy underpinning a plethora of economic and military

capabilities.8

A key assumption of security materialism is that human corporeal vulnerability sets

the goal for security-from-violence since without life itself no other human goals are

7 Deudney admits to his inherent bias towards the American federal-republican political form in the introduction toBounding Power.8 Internal combustion engines are the dominant providers of motive power for vehicles of all kinds (petrol, diesel,

hybrid), ships and submarines (marine diesel), aircraft (piston engines, gas turbines in turbo-props and jets), anddiesel-electric railway locomotives (Smil 2006).


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possible.9 But humans are corporeally vulnerable to more than violence. Prior to the

possibility of humans meeting a violent end from conflict, flows of energy minimally in the

form of food supplies, or maximally in the form of the fossil fuels (and renewable energies)

required to sustain contemporary industrial societies are an existential requirement. Of

course, these underlying material factors are masked when energy (and food) supplies are

abundant. Thus security from energy supply disruption or degradation meets the requirements

for the central open functional logical underpinning the theorys functional mode of

causation. If security-from-violence is primary because without it no other goals are

achievable, so then is the security of energy supplies, and in particular oil supplies, equally

fundamental.

Fundamental importance of energy

Energy is a foundational material factor in sustaining all life forms, and determining

the extent and scope of all human activity from the level of the individual upwards to states

and civilisations. For individuals, social indicators of infant mortality, female life expectancy

and the human development index are closely correlated with annual per capita energy

consumption 10 (Smil 2008:348). For states, industrial capacity and military capability is

directly linked to energy. The development of the United States within a century from a

wood-fuelled rural country of marginal significance in international affairs to an economic

and military superpower was accompanied by the tripling of its energy consumption per

capita and its becoming the worlds largest producer and consumer of fossil fuels (Andrews

2005:18, Smil 1994 cited in Homer-Dixon 2006:390).

Economic growth and output is very closely correlated with energy consumption

(Ayres and Warr 2005). Smil (2003:65) observes that when gross world economic product is

expressed in purchasing power parities, the growth rates of global commercial total primary

energy supply coincide almost perfectly with those of the [Gross World Product]. Garrett

(2009) calculates that from a global (or civilisational) perspective the human system

grows through a self-perpetuating feedback loop in which the

consumption rate of primary energy resources stays tied to the historical

9 Note that the scope of security-from-violence is not restricted to violence between states. It applies also toviolence within states and includes the possibility of a governments violent predation of its own people. InBounding PowerDeudney states: In thinking about types of government and security, republican security theory[or security materialism] maintains that the extremes of anarchy and hierarchy are fundamentally alike becauseneither provides adequate restraints upon the application of violence to human bodies ... security requiresavoiding the extremes of both anarchy and hierarchy, and that republics entail [their] simultaneous negation ...(2007:30-31 emphasis in original).10 For the early 2000s Smil (2008a:348) notes that the best observed rates of infant mortality (less than 20 per

1,000 births), female life expectancy greater than 80 years and a Human Development Index greater than 0.9 areassociated with an annual per capita energy consumption of at least 100GJ, equivalent to 2.39 tonnes of oil.


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accumulation of global economic production through a time-

independent factor of 9.7 0.3 mW per inflation-adjusted 1990 US

dollar.11

Civilisational development can be characterized as a quest for ever higher energy flows

transformed into larger human populations and greater organizational complexity (Smil

2008:365). Thus energy supplies are of foundational importance

Security materialism injects technology into security politics through a nuanced

conception of technology and the notion oftechnics. The social factors that might explain the

development of any particular technic may of interest, but what matters for security politics is

that technics of destruction exist. However, no technic exists in a vacuum. It possesses

inherent physical dependencies, in three critical ways. Firstly, technics are material objects,

and their construction depends on an existing technological landscape (Geels 2002)

populated by the other technics and materials required to fabricate various components, and

containing a specific set of scientific knowledge and engineering know how. Secondly, this

landscape is only maintained by flows of energy, mainly from stocks of finite energy

resources but in much smaller proportion, renewable flows (wind, light, water) that derive

from the solar flux or gravitational effects (tides) (Smil 2008). Thirdly, a particular technic

such as any internal combustion engine may possess critical dependency on an energy flow,

such as petroleum.

In the context of industrial states numerous obvious examples abound, not least the

modes of transportation that underpin economic activity through trade and distribution and

are also the basis of military power projection. At their most elemental, forces of destruction

derive from military technics which are a product of industrial capability, and both of which

depend critically on energy supplies, often on specific types of energy resources and their

derived fuels. While a state lacking the industrial capacity to manufacture its own military

capability can purchase the required technics, it cannot avoid their dependencies on energy

supplies. Thus, adopting Marxist terminology, beneath the infrastructure lays an empowering

energy substructure of conversion technologies and the resources that empower them (see

Figure 7).

11 1,000 mW = 1 W (one Watt).


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Figure 7 - Substructure of forces of destruction

In the industrial era, violence interdependence is fundamentally dependent on oil

supplies. Either directly, through the delivery (transportation) of the means of violence

(personnel or munitions), or indirectly, through the industrial processes (transporting and

transforming materials) required to build weapons. Both are inconceivable without adequate

and reliable and appropriate oil supplies. States must therefore secure appropriate and

adequate oil supplies if they are to maintain their internal governance and military and

economic capabilities.

In Deudneys theoretical framework, changingforces of destruction determine the

viability of different modes of protection (clusters of security practices) and their attendant

superstructures of political authority structures (Deudney 2000:80). In the case of oil supplies,

theforces of destruction are those that either directly or indirectly delimit, disrupt or degrade

the flow of oil supplies from producer to consumer states. The modes of protection are the

political arrangements between and within states, and between states and other actors such as

the oil industry and international organisations, intended to secure the reliable flow of oil

supplies from producers to consumers. Alternatively or concurrently such modes may seek to

increase security by reducing dependence on imports or dependence on oil itself by modifying

patterns of consumption.

The corresponding independent variable, energy interdependence, would be

multidimensional and register technological change, and include such factors as the

Energy resources

Energy conversiontechnologies(power generation;

engines)

Production(transportation andtransformation of

materials)

Military capabilityEconomic capability

Power(forces of destruction)

Energy substructure


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geographical distribution of oil resources and oil consumption, the fraction of oil consumption

imported, and drivers of oil consumption (developmental trajectories, internal combustion

engine population) and factors of resource availability (geological, economic and

technological factors).

The material context of oil supplies

The important insight that security materialism offers for the security of states oil

supplies is that the relevant security practices and structures can be expected to change in

response to material contextual changes. The material context pertinent to oil consists of three

distinct material components. First, the geographic (or geological) factors of the distribution

and extent of petroleum resources and their associated physical (geological) properties (for

example those determining rates of extraction). Second, energy conversion technics

(generators, engines) which transform petroleum-derived fuels into useful energies

(electricity, mechanical energy). Third, the varieties of technics, military and otherwise, that

critically depends on the energy flows from petroleum production. A further material factor is

the existence of disruptive technologies such as petrol-electric hybrid vehicles (Sankey,

Micheloto and Clark 2009) which can potentially moderate oil demand.

Periodisation of history and oil supplies

The claim that history is divisible into stages on the basis of distinct material contexts

is a central feature of all historical materialist arguments, whether Marxian or geopolitical

(Deudney 2000:89). History could be divided into four broad periods demarked by the

changes in exploited energy resources which are associated with substantive technological

changes: solar | coal | oil | post-oil. Taking a much longer view, these may possibly be

conflated to: solar | fossil-nuclear | solar, or even further: renewable | non-renewable |

renewable. The application of security materialism to the material context relevant to oil

supplies clearly requires a finer subdivision of what a historical materialist approach might

regard as whole and single period.

From a highly abstract and large-scale historical viewpoint, periodisation of history

may provide some analytical leverage. However, if changes in security praxis can be

explained by material contextual variations, then the search for grand historical periods for

the sake of categorisation is simply unnecessary. Assuming a material (or virtual material)

contextual fluctuation reaches some threshold value or rate of change, and the theory is valid,

shifts in security practices should be observable. Dropping the requirement for large-scale

periodisation of historical change does not affect the theory in any fundamental way.


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Applying security materialism to the security of energy supplies tests the applicability of the

theory at finer gradations of material-contextual change.

Preliminary findings

The research has taken the form of a plausibility probe case study. 12 It uses selected

case studies of historical instances of change in states oil supply security practices to pursue

a key aspect of the research agenda proposed by Deudney: developing more nuanced versions

of his hypothesis by specifying variations in material contexts in greater detail,and to

reconsider, sharpen and employ the numerous other material variables in early geopolitical

theory (Deudney 2000:98). Using an essentially heuristic approach the historical record of oil

supply security was examined to identify instances (cases) of change in state oil supply

security practices, and for each such case observe the changes, if any, in the material context

prior to that change. The independent variable of the material context consists of a cluster of

empirical variables materially relevant to both the demand and supply of oil as discussed

above. A typology for the dependent variable of oil supply security practice is in

development.

Preliminary findings from a series of case studies of oil supply security practice

changes during the 20th century, focussing particularly the US but also the UK, Germany and

Japan, strongly suggest that praxis change does follow rapidly from a significant and rapid

material contextual change. However, a significant initial finding is that to adequately

explain changes in oil supply security praxis, security materialism requires a modification to

take account of ideational factors.

Virtual material factors

According to Deudney, no security theory ... could be complete without more

extensive treatment of ideational factors as well as political economy (Deudney 2007:xiv). In

security materialism, ideational and indeed all social factors (such as norms) are corralled

within human agency and are not treated as variables. It is proposed that the insertion of a

particular class of ideational factors, termed virtual material factors, into an otherwise

materialist theory is necessary for its application to energy security. Their purpose is to

account for the existence of strictly non-material factors that in practice either cause a change

to be experienced in a material context, or cause actors (states) to behave as though such a

change has occurred or will occur with some certainty in the future. Preliminary research

12 In Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, George and Bennett (2005:75) define a

plausibility probe as preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine whether moreintensive and laborious testing is warranted.


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suggests virtual material factors are a necessary extension if security materialism is to be

successfully applied to oil supply security.

A virtual material factor may be a perceived or projected change in a material factor,

such as a forecasted decline in oil production. It may also derive from a socio-political cause

that amounts in effectto a material change, such as an embargo reducing oil supplies, or a

treaty prohibiting a particular form of weaponry. The defining characteristic of virtual

material factors is their tight binding to the material context.

While specific socio-political factors might be identified as the cause of a particular

virtual material factor, only their consequence is here taken into account, as if it were another

factor in the otherwise strictly material context. Its causation arises within human agency

which is not a variable in security materialism. The justification for this approach stems fromthe observation that in the matter of oil supplies virtual material factors clearly deriving from

political factors, such as the closure of the Suez Canal or restrictions placed on the oil

industrys operations within Israel by Arab oil producing states have the salience of material

factors.13 They tend to persist for significant periods of time, and they also have the

hardness quality of physical objects or geographical features: the Suez Canal may just as

well have been closed by an earthquake; Israels border rendered impregnable by a wall.

Even a casual observer of the history of the world oil supply system could not but

conclude that aside from any material factors, a host of political, commercial, economic,

strategic and military factors, have shaped its course of development. Perhaps personal

ambition ought to be considered, since that too results in a material change the formation of

an oil exploration company for example, increasing the supply of oil. However, what

distinguishes the proposed virtual material factors from other such factors (which may also

have material consequences) is the scale and immediacy of their effective materiality. Indeed

it is the speed of change associated with virtual material factors that appears to make them

decisive compared with typically slow changing material factors.

Virtual material context of oil supplies

The virtual material context includes those ideational factors that interpret the

material context. These include forecasts of constrained or excess energy supply; expectations

of disruptive technologies impacting the structure of energy demand; as well as socio-political

factors biasing decisions on energy conversion technologies, such as Germanys recent retreat

13 For a discussion of the impacts of political factors on oil production and supply in the Middle East see (Odell

1986:190-198). Odell does not use the terminology of material and virtual material factors, but his discussionmakes the materiality of virtual material factors plain.


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from nuclear electricity generation (Bowen 2011). 14 It also includes socio-political factors

that effectively impact the material context, such as embargoes, and economic and political

factors influencing the rate of energy resource production, as well as expectations of the

impact disruptive technologies.

The material context of oil resources is characterised by highly uneven geographical

distribution of both production and consumption. However, the virtual material context of the

global oil market (effectively setting a global oil price) means that distribution effectively

drops out since oil supplies are equally available to all states (providing they are willing to

pay the market price). A key question for energy security analysts is whether or not the global

oil market will hold as a mode of protection should the oil price, usually considered as a

shock absorber (through demand destruction) in the market-analysis approach, become a

shock inducer when and if oil broaches $150 a barrel.

Oil price

Another important virtual material factor is the price of oil, the consequences of

which reach materiality under specific conditions. Since World War II, all but one recession

in the United States has been preceded by a spike in the price of oil (Hamilton 1983) and

more recent data appears to confirm this (Stevens 2005). Spruyt and Ruseckas (1999:95)

consider that oil is one of the few commodities that are highly [price] inelastic. In the

absence of substitutes, one has no option but to buy that good at the price offered. However,

in practice there is an upper bound to this elasticity.

According to Bashmakov (2007) economic instability is observed when the ratio of

energy costs to GDP exceeds about 10 percent. Two such periods have been experienced in

the last 50 years: the stagflation and recession of the 1970s and early 1980s following the

1973 Arab oil embargo, and the recent period culminating in the global financial crisis which

saw the price of oil spike at $US147.25 per barrel. Bashmakov concludes that sustainable

variations of energy costs to GDP ratios are limited to below 810 percent for the United

States and 911 percent for OECD countries (Bashmakov 2007:3585). Once these limits are

exceeded, it appears that financial and economic instability result. Others calculate an even

lower threshold of 5.5% as indicative of recession (Hall, Balogh and Murphy 2009). Sankey,

Micheloto and Clark (2009:4) observe that in the United States, Oil demand only breaks at

around $4/gallon at the US pump, or $150/bbl. Additionally, the precise economic effect of

any oil price increase will be modified by monetary policy responses (Bernanke, Gertler and

14 One social explanation for this retreat lays wholly in domestic politics: the need for Chancellor Angela Merkelto attract votes that would otherwise go to the Greens, and in the future, the policy change may be reversed.


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Watson 1997). Indeed there are many factors influencing the price of oil products delivered to

the final consumer. These include government taxation polices, perceptions of the potential

for supply disruptions from political events in producing states, and in Todays context of

extensive paper markets and real time screen trading, the heights to which prices might be

pushed could be unimaginable (Stevens 2005:21-22).

One explanation for Bashmakovs observation is that the nature of energy

dependence in developed economies lies in the strong technological ties between energy and

production capital (Vavilov 2008). Capital is only made productive through energy. For

example, the capital invested in an airliner clearly has no return whatsoever without energy.

Return on such capital is tightly dependent on the cost of that energy. Furthermore, energy

underpins global-scope economic infrastructures for example the entirety of the tourism

industry the return on the capital invested in which also depends on cheap oil making mass

air travel possible and profitable.

During the ramp up of oil prices in 2008, airlines, for whom fuel represents a large

share of operating costs, were very hard hit, and some multinational businesses with

production extensively outsourced to developing countries contemplated bringing their

manufacturing back onshore (Rohter 2008). A report by investment bank CIBC World

Markets concluded that the increased cost of shipping goods internationally was equivalent to

a 9 percent tariff, effectively offsetting the gains from three decades of trade liberalisation(Rohter 2008). Through its linkage with the prime movers of globalisation, oil and its price is

thus an under-appreciated factor shaping the pattern of world trade. As Stevens (2005:19)

concludes, the oil price remains a key economic variable to determine the health of

economies.

Thus while on one hand the price of oil lacks materiality since a change in price,

however sudden or extreme, does notphysically affect the quantity of available oil nor

interdict its flow between and within states, on the other hand once the oil price broaches athreshold value, material effects do occur: significantly less oil is used; consumers seek more

oil-efficient technology or use current technology less; certain business models (airlines)

become stressed or collapse, and economic activity materially changes. Thus under specified

conditions the price of oil is a virtual material factor.

Conclusion

In utilising security materialism for the study of the security practices related to oil

supplies, three steps are required. The first is to apply a theory explaining change in securitypractices as a response to large scale changes in the material context of military technology,


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to changes in the material context relevant to oil supplies. This move rests on the assumption

that the security of energy supplies can be treated as a distinct field of security studies despite

its connection to military and economic security. The second move is the application of the

theory to where changes in the material context are not as dramatic, disruptive or seemingly

of as larger scale as those associated with substantive historical shifts in military technology,

and further, where base technologies for example, the internal combustion engine do not

significantly change.15 Both these moves are simple logical steps, but represent a new test of

Deudneys theory in contexts significantly different from those contemplated in its genesis.

The third innovative move is to include a set of new factors virtual material factors to

take account of variables which measurably affect the material context, but which in

themselves strictly lack materiality.

Further research tasks include refining a typology of oil supply security practices, and

developing hypotheses about which oil supply security orders are likely to be functional in

specific material contexts. Additionally, to confirm the validity of the ancillary propositions

of security materialism, which serve as empirical indicators of the functional/dysfunctional

status of a security order, they will be applied to historical cases. Their applicability to the

contemporary material context of oil supplies will then be evaluated.

15 The inventors of the first internal combustion engines (Otto, Benz, Diesel) in the mid-late nineteenth centurywould instantly recognise its contemporary form since its principle features have not changed, and improvementshave largely been in the form of materials engineering and electronic engine control mechanisms. The steam

turbine, invented by Parsons in the 1880s, generates the vast bulk of world electricity (some 90%), and the sameholds for the gas turbine (jet engine) developed towards the close of World War II.


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