Mic Valhall Olf

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Valhall Corrosion Events and Management Learning Pack Eldar Larsen, Head of Operations, BP Norway.

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  • Valhall Corrosion Events and ManagementLearning Pack

    EldarLarsen,HeadofOperations,BPNorway.

  • INTERNALDISTRIBUTIONONLY 2

    ValhallCorrosion Events - Summary

    Summary

    HydrocarbonleakHIPOon6thMarch2009causedbyMicrobialInducedCorrosion(MIC)

    resultedincrudeandgasleak,FirstAidIncident,emergencyplantshutdown&muster.

    Valhalleventuallyshutdownfor10weeksforcorrosioninspectionandrepairs.

    duringwhichthreefurtherincidencesofMICand44anomaliesidentified.

    Major Lessons

    Behaviours of MIC were misunderstood

    AreasofhighflowratewerepreviouslythoughtunlikelytoexperienceMIC,thisassumptionfailedtoidentifyinternalpipeworkscalingcanprovideenvironmentforMICactivity.

    Inadequate application of hazard Recognition, risk awareness and control of work.

    TheinitialinspectionroutinewasinappropriateanddirectlyledtoexposureoftheindividualandtheresultantFAI.

    15specificimprovementopportunitiesidentifiedasaresultoftheincidentandplantinvestigations(7organisational,5workprocessand3performancemanagement).

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    Microbial Induced CorrosionWhatisMIC?

    MICisMicrobialInducedCorrosion.

    MICofcarbonsteeltypicallymanifestsitselfaslocalisedcorrosionorpittingattackfollowingthedevelopmentofasurfacebiofilm.

    Theanaerobicenvironmentsofoilandwatertransportpipeworkoftensupportthegrowthofbiofilms,whichalmostinvariablycontainsulphate-reducingbacteria(SRB),amajorcauseofMIC.

    SRBcontainingbiofilms generateH2S.

    H2SresultsinformationofIronsulphidewithinthebiofilm.

    Ironsulphidesarecathodictobaresteelandcanhavetheeffectofgreatlyincreasingcorrosionatanodicsites.

    WhydoesMICoccur?

    MICcanoccurinallsystemsthatcontainwaterwithSRBs.

    PredictionofcorrosionratesattributedtoMICisunreliable

    uncertaintyoftheonsetoflocalizedcorrosion/pitting,whether itproceedsataconstantrate.

    ParametersthatcaninfluenceMICincludepH,temperature,nutrition,velocityoffluids,presenceofdeposits.

    MICismorelikelytooccuratlocationswithlowfluidvelocity suchasindeadlegs,underdeposits,scale.

    AllmetalsaresusceptibletoMIC.Carbonsteelshavegenerallybeenfoundtobemostsusceptible.

    MICmitigationreliesoneffectivebiocidedosingregimes.

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    Reference - Valhall Timeline

    1982

    Valhallstart

    production,

    Incl.Jet

    washing

    separators

    using sea-

    water.By

    mid-90s

    using mainly

    produced

    water

    1998

    NewMetering

    Skidinstalled.

    Smallbore

    pipeworknot

    commissioned

    inWorkmate

    1999RBIAnalysisperformedMICinternalcorrosionnotsufficiently

    identifiedasathreat.

    2000

    Inspection

    scheme

    constructed

    which

    identified

    external

    inspectionof

    Liquids

    metering

    packageasa

    whole

    2004-2006

    Chemical

    cleaningof

    fastloopto

    aid

    calibration

    duetoscale

    buildup

    Ongoing

    Biocide

    treatmentof

    Sulphate

    Reducing

    Bacteria

    (SRB)on

    Produced

    Water(PW)

    system

    ongoingand

    working

    2007

    SRBs in2nd

    stageseparator

    0-460/ml

    Sept 2007

    Cor.Mngt.Health

    Check:Valhall

    Prod.Water

    SulfateReducing

    Bacteria(SRB)

    contaminationas

    ahighriskand

    recommendsa

    microbialauditby

    microbial

    specialist

    06.Mar.2009

    Leakin1

    pipefast

    loop

    HIPO

    02.Apr.2009

    Upstream

    skimmedoil

    tank

    17.Apr.2009

    Leakin6

    prod.water

    pipe

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    Reference - Valhall TimelineEvents and response:

    6thMarch2009Meteringfastloop (F&G ESD). LimitedawarenessofMIC,deemedlowprobability.LimitedspotcheckingbyX-rayoutsidethe

    fastloop.NoSDjustifiedbyresidualcorrosionrisk.Noadditionalresources.

    2ndApril2009T-337pressureincrease (NoESD).

    StartupafteracompressorincidentincreasedflarebackpressurewhichburstaMICinthe

    producedwatersystem.

    15days(6+9)shutdownlookingforMICwithEddycurrentandX-rayw.crewof3.

    17thApril20096 producedwaterpipe (NoESD).

    RestartattemptfailedwhenaMICburstintheprod.watersystem.Hadbeeninspectedinvery

    closevicinity.Increasingrealizationofthecriticalityofadequateinspectionrigour.

    10daysshutdown,100%inspectionofprod.watersystembyEddy currentandX-ray,extended

    riskbasedapproach.Increasedoffshoreresources.

    27thApril2009Condensatereturntoprod.watersystem.(F&G ESD).

    Pipeburstduringstartupattempt.Containedhighlyvolatilecondensate.

    Realizedtechnologygap.ChangedtoSLOFECscanningsuccessfully.

    30+teamoffshore.Taskforceonshore.True100%inspectionbeyondproducedwater.RIB

    revision.

    1stJune2009Successfulrestart.

    10weeksofproductionlossandseriousHSEincidents.

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    Valhall Corrosion Event (March 6th 2009)Summary of first event.

    Aseep orsweatingleakobservedcomingfromaninsulated1 carbonsteelpipewaspreparedforinspectionfollowingremovaloftheinsulation.

    Thepipewasonthecrudeexportmeteringskidandcontainedamixtureofcrudeoilandgasat25barpressure.

    Onremovalofinsulation,theleakwasobservednottooriginatefromtheflangeasoriginallyexpected.

    Aninspectorexaminingthepipeinitiallyusedabladetoscrapeoffpaintattheleaksite.

    Duringalatervisit,theinspectortouchedtheleaksitewithhisfingerandwassprayedinthefacewithoilunderpressure.

    Duringhydrocarbonrelease,theholeenlargedto10mmdiameter.

    ValhallwenttofullEmergencyShutdownandmuster.

    Hydrocarbon leak on metering skid First Aid Incident Emergency Plant Shutdown

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    Inherent Design

    Plant Layout

    Control, Alarm &

    Shutdown system

    Inspection (RBI) and Corrosion Management practices failed to identify and mitigate the internal corrosion threat/risk that led to the failureRBI assessment not updated to reflect changes to operating and/or process conditions

    Maintenance

    & Inspection

    Learning from

    the Past

    Actions from 2007/2008 Health Checks to improve Biocide treatment and to conduct Microbial survey not completed

    Force Inspection procedures inconsistent with requirements of HSE Directive for visual inspection

    Operations

    Procedures

    Inspection Engineer delegated inspection task to NDT Technician.

    Effective

    Supervision /

    Leadership

    Training &

    Competency

    Failure to follow CoWand RBI procedures

    Work Control

    Inadequate Hazard Recognition and Risk Awareness job treated as routine and Level 2 work permit.CoW - Failure to isolate energy source prior to workCoW - Failure to comply with requirements for Visual Inspection

    Support to Next

    of Kin & Injured

    Relief and

    Blowdown

    system

    Audit & Self

    Regulation

    No apparent MoC for chemical treatment of Fast Loop line.1 line not identified on risk-based inspection schedule

    Management

    of Change

    Active & Passive

    Fire Protection

    Escape /

    Access

    Rescue &

    Recovery

    HAZARDHydrocarbon Inventory at

    25bar in Fast Loop line

    Investigation &

    Lessons Learned

    HAZARDREALISATION

    Loss of containment

    First Aid injury & HiPo

    Hazard Barrier Diagram

    Heirarchy of control Bias towards hardware/inherent safety & reducing the scope for human error multi barrier defence

    Four Point Check not used.

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    Valhall Corrosion Event (April 2nd 2009)Summary of second event.

    AleakintheProducedWaterSystemfollowed

    agascompressionupset.Areaisolated&

    upstreamvesseldrained.

    25mmholefoundindrainline.

    Areasoflowflowanddead-legswereidentified

    andinspected.6furtherMICincidents

    observed.

    Investigationinitiatedtoensureappropriate

    analysisandresponsepriortorestart.

    Managementverificationofprocessmitigations

    andcorrosionmapping&repaireffort.

    Targeted inspected discovers further incidence of MIC

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    Valhall MIC Response The third event: Defining the Scope of Work

    ProducedWateridentifiedasbeingthemain

    hostofSulphate ReducingBacterias (SRBs)

    Consideredpotentialcontaminationofother

    systemsvsHCleakrisks.

    ScopeagreedbyOps,ProcessTA,Corrosion

    MgmtTA,Inspection&CMContractor.

    ProducedWaterSystemwas100%inspected.

    RiskBasedHotspot Execution Waterwetted

    surfaceseg Lowspots,Sumps,Deadlegs etc.

    Wasteinjectionondrillingplatform(DP).

    Wellsystems,confinedtoslurrylines.

    CrudeOilprocessingincludingthe

    meteringsystem.

    ClosedDrainsSystem.

    Oil Return from PW Flash Drum to Oil Return tankOrientation of defect; 9 oclock position on vertical pipe

    Unpredicted nature and location of corrosion required a new approach to

    immediate reaction inspection.

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    Leakin6producedwaterhighflowpipework

    A8mmholewasdiscoveredduringpreparationforplantrestartfollowinginspectionprogramtriggeredtwogasdetectors&ESD.

    Critical Factor1

    MicrobialinducedCorrosion(MiC)mechanismintheproducedwatersystem

    CriticalFactor2

    Inspection(RBI)andCorrosionManagementpracticesfailedtoidentifythecorrosionriskinhighlevel,highflowpipework

    Targeted inspected discovers further incidence of MIC in high flow pipework

    ValhallCorrosionEvent.Summaryofforthevent.

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    Valhall MIC project Inspection

    Extensiveinspectioneffortrequiredtoexecute

    identifiedscope 30+strongteam.

    SLOFECtechnologyused

    Priority1scopeIdentified44anomalies

    23MICRelated

    21Non-MIC-related

    19spoolsreplaced,5temporarilyrepaired&20

    scheduledforongoinginspectionfollowingstart-up

    AssuranceprocessesfollowedbyNogo/Go

    verificationreviews

    Priority2inspectionscopeidentifiedforpoststartup

    inspection.

    No.10 T-337Flangecorrosion

    Following fresh focussed risk assessment an intense and prioritised

    inspection programme was initiated.

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    Lessons Learnt

    Direct cause

    CrosscontaminationofoilproductionsystemwithSRBviatheproducedwater

    system.

    Inadequateawareness,inspectionandmitigationasanalysisdidnotidentifyoil

    systemasatriskfromSRBcorrosion.

    Insufficientchemicalinjection(suchasbiocideandcorrosioninhibitor)and

    samplingandanalysistocontrolmicrobialactivity.

    AsaresultMICoccurredwithinoilsystems.

    Underlying causes

    Improvementopportunitiesidentifiedwithin:

    Organization (7subcategorieswithrecommendations)

    Work Processes (5subcategorieswithrecommendations)

    Performance Management (3subcategorieswithrecommendations)