Mia Mikic TID, ESCAP
Transcript of Mia Mikic TID, ESCAP
APTIAD
‘‘Regionalism and Regionalism and multilateralismmultilateralism’’ clash clash ‐‐ Asian Asian
stylestyle
Mia MikicMia MikicTID, ESCAPTID, ESCAP
APTIAD
Outline
• Setting the scene• Using APTIAD to learn more on Asian regionalism in trade
•Stylized facts•Level of trade liberalization and sectoral coverage•Performance
• Looking into the future
APTIAD
Source: Fink 2006
APTIAD
APTA
SAFTAAFTA
Bhutan
Sri Lanka
Maldives Bangladesh
IndiaPakistan China
Rep. of Korea
New ZealandBrunei
Darussalam CambodiaIndonesia
Lao PDR
MalaysiaMyanmar Philippines
Thailand
Viet Nam
Nepal
SPARTECA
Marshall Is. Micronesia
Palau Tuvalu
Cook Is. Fiji Kiribati Nauru Niue Samoa
Tonga VanuatuSolomon Is.
MSG
Australia
Singapore
Papua New Guinea
USA
Chile
Japan
Hong Kong, China
Macao, China
Jordan
Bahrain
BIMSTEC
PICTA
EFTAEU
Turkey
Russian Fed.
Georgia
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia
Kazakhstan
Ukraine
Azerbaijan
Turkmenistan
Afghanistan
APTIAD, Sep 2006, some PTA s not shown
Moldova
Niger
CISFTA
GULF
APTIAD
APTA
SAFTAAFTA
Bhutan
Sri Lanka
Maldives Bangladesh
IndiaPakistan China
Rep. of Korea
New ZealandBrunei
Darussalam CambodiaIndonesia
Lao PDR
MalaysiaMyanmar Philippines
Thailand
Viet Nam
Nepal
SPARTECA
Marshall Is. Micronesia
Palau Tuvalu
Cook Is. Fiji Kiribati Nauru Niue Samoa
Tonga VanuatuSolomon Is.
MSG
Australia
Singapore
Papua New Guinea
USA
Chile
Japan
Hong Kong, China
Macao, China
Jordan
Bahrain
BIMSTEC
PICTA
EFTAEU
Turkey
Russian Fed.
Georgia
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia
Kazakhstan
Ukraine
Azerbaijan
Turkmenistan
Afghanistan
APTIAD, Sep 2006, some PTA s not shown
Moldova
Niger
CISFTA
GULF
Mexico
PanamaPeru
Qatar
Canada
SACU MERCOSUR
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Definitional matters
• Regionalism and multilateralism: – policies– processes
• Trade plus
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APTIAD as a data source• Qualitative and historical trade flow data
– identify stylized facts– underlying architecture of the regional integration in Asia and the Pacific
– identify degree of overlapping membership– content / substance of liberalization
• Trade performance indicators – assess the implicit (ex‐ante)– or actual (ex‐post) effect of a proposed or implemented track of liberalization
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Qualitative data and historical trade flows
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Stylized facts1. Process of regional integration started in earnest in the
1990s.2. Strong preference for BTAs.3. Strong preference for FTAs (in name) rather than customs
union.4. Multiple memberships are a norm. Average number of
agreements per country is 3.9.5. BTAs in force focus on industrial goods, while RTAs might
have slightly broader but equally shallow approach to trade liberalization. Extent of tariff liberalization is variable and rules of origin are protectionist.
6. BTAs tend to be core of much wider economic partnerships.7. IP especially in FTAs with the US gets most coverage and
mobility of labour the least.
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47-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 95-00 01-present
Asia-Pacific Worldwide
Many agreements, but ….
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Architecture
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How much trade covered?
B TAR TA
To t al ESC A Pt rade
In ESCAP trade
In world trade
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In ESCAP tr ade In wor ld tr ade
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Overlapping membership
ESCAP economies and multiple PTAs membership in 2004
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Number of agreements per economy
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f eco
nom
ies
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From a few layers:
and apparently trade not adversely affected
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……to to more more layerslayers……
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and the frontrunner is:
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Features of the ‘model’ FTAGOODS SERVICES OTHERS
trade in goods, including trade remedies (safeguards, anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties)customs proceduresrules of origintechnical barriers to tradesanitary and phytosanitary measures
trade in services, and in particular:
o trade in financial services
o trade in telecommunications servicescommercial presencemovement of natural persons
intellectual propertycompetition policygovernment procurementtrade facilitation investment
electronic commerce
transparent administration of laws and regulationsconsultations and dispute settlement and legal and institutional issues
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Tariff reductionPTAs Positive list Negative list Full elimination
Total 24 24 26
BTA 19 17 22BTA (CB) 2 2 2RTA 3 5 2
FTA 18 20 22Other 6 3 3CU 0 1 1
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Rules of origin
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“Beyond the goods” sectoral coverage
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M o b ili t y o flab o ur
Services C o mp et it io n Pub licp ro curement
T rad ef acil i t at ion
Invest ment Int el lect ualp ro p ert y
BTAs RTAs
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Example of ‘beyond the goods’ ‐ IP
Type of Agreement Coverage
FTA CU Other Broad Very broad
BTA 19* (7) 12 (7) - 7 10 (5) 7 (1)
BTA(country-
bloc)
5** (2) 3 (1) 1 (1) 1 4 (2) 1
RTA 3 - - 3 2 1
Total 27 15 1 11 16 9 TotalExcludingTurkey
18 7 - 11 9 8
Total number
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In summary, Asian BTAs compared to RTAs deliver
• ‘Deeper’ cuts in trade barriers, but selective– and thus more protectionism through exemptions
• More trade restrictive rules of origin, thus potentially neutralizing liberalization efforts
• Cooperation in more policy areas covering many directions spanning economic, social, political, security policy making
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Trade performance indicators
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•Has intra‐regional trade intensified after the formation of a preferential agreement?
• Index: Trade Intensity
• Definition:
• Interpretation: Trade share relative to world average trade share (if greater than 1, then the regional trade is ʹintenseʹ).
• Usefulness: Ex‐ante potential for trade diversion/preference dilution (if intense trade with non‐members), success in promoting regional trade, ex‐post occurrence of trade diversion.
INDICATORS used to answer various questionsINDICATORS used to answer various questions
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Intra Extra
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• Are the trade profiles of current or prospective members of a preferential trade agreement compatible?
• Index: Complementarity
• Definition:
• Interpretation: The degree to which the export profile of country A matches the import profile of Country B (%).
• Usefulness: Indicator of potential for trade creation, degree of adjustment costs, changes in economic integration.
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2002Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam
Indonesia - 43.6 54.3 48.5 46.6 46.0Malaysia 38.7 - 61.1 71.7 54.9 34.4Philippines 33.9 69.0 - 65.1 50.3 32.2Singapore 51.8 81.1 71.2 - 67.1 49.4Thailand 55.0 72.7 76.2 70.6 - 53.7Vietnam 34.2 23.7 33.2 28.5 27.0 -
1992Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam
Indonesia - 30.0 44.4 42.8 36.1 33.9Malaysia 37.5 - 54.2 68.0 49.0 36.9Philippines 35.7 57.5 - 59.2 45.3 36.9Singapore 44.7 66.5 56.1 - 54.4 55.4Thailand 36.5 50.4 50.2 54.4 - 40.6Vietnam 18.8 15.4 26.9 26.3 21.2 -
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• Can we identify those sectors in which members have comparative advantage?
• Index: Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA)
• Definition:
• Interpretation: Greater than unity if the country exports more of the commodity than the world on average.
• Usefulness: Can highly protected sectors be matched to strong comparative advantage in at least one member economy ex‐ante? If so, there is potential for trade creation.
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• Can we identify those sectors that might be significant sources of trade diversion?
• Index: Regional Orientation (with RCA)
• Definition:
• Interpretation: The relative degree to which exports of a commodity intra‐region compare to those extra‐region.
• Usefulness: Indicator for trade diversion (when used in combination with RCA).
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Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam
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And more…• To what extent are individual economies dependent on regional markets and how has this changed post PTA?
• To what extent are individual economies or regions dependent on particular products?
• Are some economies regionally dominant, and what might this mean for negotiations?
• What is the structure of competitiveness?• Has intra‐industry trade expanded or contracted? What are the implications for adjustment costs?
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Bottom line?
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• Non‐discrimination, promotes economic efficiency
• Minimizes complexity for traders and investors (and trade negotiators)
• Can negotiate reduction of agricultural subsidies
• For small countries:– Benefit from MFN liberalization of big players
– Can negotiate in alliances (G‐20, G‐33, G‐90)
• Access to DSU
• Can yield welfare gains relative to the status quo (trade creation versus trade diversion)
• Under certain circumstances, can be more beneficial than multilateral integration– Obtaining preferential
access to a highly protected market
– Terms of trade gains vis‐à‐vis the rest of the world
– Learning‐by‐doing effects• Greater bargaining
effectiveness (less scope for free‐riding on MFN)
• Greater scope for regulatory cooperation
Multilateralism:Multilateralism: Regionalism:Regionalism:
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Building blocks?• RTAs reduce trade protection, which can
eventually be multilateralized• Spur competitive liberalization• RTAs can innovate: offer models for rule‐
making at the multilateral level• RTAs force governments to do their
preparatory ‘homework’ which benefits WTO negotiations as well
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Stumbling blocks?• Diversion of
– Negotiating resources– Private sector engagement– Political capital
• Trade preferences can create constituents that may lose out from and therefore resist further multilateral liberalization
• Undermine bargaining at the WTO (e.g., diminished quid‐pro‐quos for the reduction of agricultural subsidies)
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Looking into the future –centrality of regionalism in emerging global trade architecture?
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I. Laissez‐faire: wait and see at what configuration proliferation of PTAs will come to rest?
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II. Policy‐induced consolidation and rationalization
‐ geographic consolidation‐functional consolidation‐ integration through supranational institutitons
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Your feedback would be welcome and much appreciated ‐ thank you!