MFR NARA- T7- Logan Airport- Luongo Stephen- 2-11-04- 00696

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    COMMISSION SENSITIVE { fEvent: Interview of Stephen Luongo, General Security Manager at Logan on 9-11Type: Interview (conference call)Date: February 11, 2004Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Lisa SullivanTeam: 7Participants (non-Commission): Steve Luongo and Christine Beyer, TSA GeneralCounsel'Participants (Commission): John Raidt, Lisa Sullivan, and Bill JohnstoneLocation: Conference call held from GSA conference room.Background[U] FAA hired Luongo in 1985 as a FAM after the TWA hijacking. In 1989, he becamethe lead agent for security at Logan. He applied for and got the Federal SecurityManager (FSM) position at Logan in 1991, and served in that position through September2001. After 9-11, he was called up to active duty as a Lt Col in the AF Reserve. He wasactivated through August of 2002 in the reserves. When he came back, many changes hadoccurred at Logan and within the system. TSA gave him ajob as Assistant FederalSecurity Director for Regulatory in Sarasota, FL.Aviation Security Program at Logan prior to 9-11[U] Luongo knew the Logan Aviation Director, Tom Kinton, well. He had a goodrelationship with both him and the Massport Security Director, Joe Lawless. Leading upto September 11th, the FAA was conducting Special Emphasis Assessments (SEAs) at theairports to address priority security issues.[U] Logan airport was focused on assessment and remedial action with respect to accesscontrol. Guards were assigned to doors that stayed open. This happened prior to 9-11.[U] The SEA program also gave them good baseline data to look to in order to constantlyupdate the plan for Logan. The federal regulation for the airport security program (FAR- 107) was in re-write for a long time. Logan officials were waiting on the FAA tocomplete the re-write, but finally decided to move forward with updating security atLogan on their own initiative. This began at least a year before 9-11.

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    Luongo pointed out that Electronic Finger Printing at Logan was in place beforemandated by the FAA; that was up and running before 9-11.[U] The construction pace at the airport was "feverish" at that time. Everything was influx - the perimeter of the airport and the gates were changing - it became a full time jobfor someone at to keep up with it. "MASSPORT went above and beyond in a lot ofplaces" when it came to security.[U] Luongo approved all amendments to the security plan for Logan. The pace of theamendments was constant mostly because of the ongoing construction. He urged them tobeef it up. Joe did nothave control over everybody at the airport. They should haveinvested a little more inside the badge office.[U] Luongo did not feel as though the amendments he got from security were attemptingto "water down" the standards at the airport.[U]Counter Technology, Inc. (CTI) had a role in assessing the airport. Kinton relied onthem to do a lot of different assessments. He was aware they were there but he had norole in negotiating their contracts or reviewing their product.[U] As FSM, he reported to Washington. Pete Falcone was his immediate boss at theFAA. He thinks he was a branch manager. He did not report to the CASFO. He had nostaff and no resources. He said he was "reliant on the CASFOs and regional folks for theequipment and office space."

    [U] For the most part, FSM and CASFO relations were good. There was a little tensionat first because Turano was new and Luongo had been there a while; and because he hadalso applied for her job. was ironed out. They worked well together. There wasconstant communication between them because they were co-located in the same office.The co-location was good for information flow. In comparison, he was in less constantcommunication with Tom Kinton and Joe Lawless.[U] Somewhere along the line the CASFO got bigger and more supervisors were put intoplace. The roles and division of management were clearly defined between the CASFOand the FSM to avoid friction.[U] Luongo said that he assumed all the duties set forth in the Act that created the FSMpost. He was supposed to know about anything security-related in the airport it. "Myphilosophy was to solve things at the lowest possible level." Duties of the FSM werestated in the Act; and he also referred to his FSM handbook, which was also in re-write.

    laid out his duties. He didn't limit himself to the official job description.

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    Consortia - the Boston model; ..the LEO[U ] "Logan was one of the firstairports in th e co un try to estab lish a Con so rtium th ataddressed screening an d law enforcement th at people volu nteered to jo in ." T he groupdeterm in ed how to han dle presiden tial visits (U .S . S ecret Service, etc) and helped clueth e airlines in on new technology. H e said that, after a few years, the C onsortia lostmomen tum ( i.e . " ta pe re d/~u t" ).[U ] T here w as also a q uarterly law enforcem ent m eeting w ith officials fro m the airport.T hese m eetin gs w ere p ro du cti v e fo r in fo rm atio n-sh arin g p urp oses. T he co nso rtiam eetings w ere replaced by LAMCO (L ogan A irport M anagem ent C omm ittee) m eetin gs.A t a LAMCO meeting p rio r to 9 -1 1, an FB I agent talked about B in L aden. H e delivereda report to Loganofficials on groups that w ere active in the area; not just raising m oney.L ogan reJied o n .such inform ation as this from the FB I. N o inform ation, how ever, w asI2rovided on specific threats to the airport. He thought the FBI liaison to the airport was

    (U] L uo ngo m entio ned the Jo int V ulnerabi1ity A ssessm en t co ndu cted by the FAA an dFB I on Logan that concluded there w ere no specific threats to the airport.

    [U] H e rem em bers the Pat M cD onnell presentation o n threats assessed by FAA CivilA viatio n In telligence. L uong o w as at th e presen tation. H e do esn't recall th e sp ecifics bu trem em bers it tak in g p lace.

    S pecific intellig ence w as req uired for th e airpo rt to take sp ecific actio ns. From theinformation p rovided in M cD onnell's presentation, th e airport could o nly con tinu e tom ake sure it m et the standards outlined by the FA A. D eciding w hether or not thestan dard s set fo rth ap pro priate ly resp on ded to th e th re at lev el as d efin ed b y in tel1 ig en cew as th e jo b o f H ead qu arters.

    S Ds (S ecurity D irectives) hand ed do wn to the 'airpo rts w ere based on th e in telligencereceiv ed b y the It w as L uong o's job to im plem ent secu rity m easures as directed.Breaches of security at Logan prior to 9-11[U] L uongo w as aw are of the pre-9ft I Fox N ew s expose on security breaches at thecheckpoint; the guy w ho clim bed onto the fuel farm; an d th e B osto n ca b d riv er asso cia tedw ith th e C ole bom bin g that frequented L og an airport.[U ] Luongo said they took the Fox N ew s incident very seriously . T he airport w anted toconduct its own tests to m ake sure didn't happen again by im proving checkpointscreening. A C onso rtia m eeting w as held o n the top ic. T he airlines w ere inform ed . WillyG ripper w ent to that meeting held to discuss the Fox N ews story.

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    [U] was Luongo's expectation that an y time an event happened that involved lawenforcement and aviation security Lawless would tell him about it. He was supposed tobe inform ed of all things security related.[U ] Luongo didn't believe he received enough threat information from intelligence andlaw enforcement sources. Before 9-11; he told the FBI he trusted that law enforcementwas protecting them if there was a "bad guy" trying to infiltrate Logan.[U] Since 9-11, he has learned that intelligence will never be 100 percent. Securitymeasures need to be taken pro-actively that much better address deficiencies ofintelligence gathering. !

    Luongo does not recall a stOry about five Middle Easterners trying to get a tour of theControl Tower on 9/8/01.1 twas the tower manager at the time,Logan's Customer Service Program[U] Luongo noted that the Logan Customer Service Program which in part tried toenforce timely processing through security (with the threat of taking a carrier's gate awayfor poor throughput for passengers) "was all costumer service related stuff." He was notconsulted on the program and agreed that the act of timing people through the checkpointcould diminish effectiveness of security procedures if that occurred. He did not hearconcerns that air carriers were leaning on security screeners to hurry people throughsecurity to keep the schedule, or receive complaints from screening companies.[U] Luongo noted that Bob Johnson Station Manager at American was a "fine guy." Hewas instrumental getting the EDS machines implemented at Logan. The United guy wasalso a great guy. He doesn't recal1 them griping about long security lines or poor service.Check-point screening[U] The Checkpoint, equipment, and screeners had to meet standards set out by FARs107 or 108. Enforcing this aspect of security was primarily a CASFO function. MaryCarol Turano, the former CASFO, would know better about the checkpoint performanceat Logan pre-9-11. Contract screening wasn't the best system because of the highturnover rate, for one thing. TSA is a lot better. FAA had a program of testing - missesat one checkpoint or another happened - there were three or four companies at Loganhandling screening pre 9-11.

    Joint Testing Initiative[U J Prior to the FOX News Show revealing security problems at Massport, the SEAprogram was finding a lot of violations. They were working to address these problems .

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    [U J After the Fox News expose, there was a lot of heat on MASSPORT. There waspressure on Logan to do some kind of testing with the state police.[U J Lawless wanted a group associated with the Mass. State Police (MSP) to conducttesting of the checkpoints at the airport. FAA wanted to know if the air carriers weregoing to be involved, and if they were going to share the results with the carriers.Logan's answer to both questions was no. Luongo said that there were two mainquestions from the FAA perspective. One, did the airport have the legal authority to testthe system. Two, why conduct the tests if you weren't going to share the results? Theidea eventually got derailed.[U] As a member of the integrated product team with the FAA officials, Joe Lawlesswent to a meeting with Lee Longmire where he raised the issue of the airport conductingits own testing with the help of Troop F of the MSP. Eventually The FAA wrote up adraft agreement on a joint initiative that had enforcement language based on theoutcomes of the testing. Logan did not want to deal with enforcement issues should theirtests reveal poor results. He thought that the idea for the "cooperative agreement" was totest both checkpoint and access controls, but he's not certain.Strengths

    Luongo believes that the leadership at Logan, with Kinton and Lawless, was strong.They were committed to security. MASSPORT put their money where their mouth was.They had cops on site such as K-9 and bomb units, Dive Teams, Swat Teams etc, as wellas hostage negotiators. They had a good LEO presence overall. Joe stayed on top ofprob1ems. As a member of the Integrated Product Team, Joe Lawless was able to getthem the newest technology very quickly.

    Weaknesses

    That probably added to the reason w y

    [U] The older design of the airport made controlling access tough and breaches occurredas a result. Also, the ongoing construction presented challenges for this reason.9-11

    [UJ He was in the car in traffic whelhhe:o~he call frorryl the doesn't rememberth e time) that AAL 11 was hijacked as in the region at the time; not the fieldoffice. He probably first learned of t e ijacking fromthe ATC presence. A net wasopened up there - a primary net possibly. He could-hear the conversation in thebackground. He called Lawless and informed hi~':

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    [U] It's a tough job for the screeners - "looking for a needle in a haystack but t he y don 'teven know what haystack to look In.''

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