Mexico's Central American Policy.pdf

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1/22

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Mexico's Central American Policy: Apologies, Motivations, and PrinciplesAuthor(s): Edward J. WilliamsSource: Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Oct., 1982), pp. 21-41Published by: Wileyon behalf of Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)

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2/22

Mexico's

Central

American

Policy:

Apologies,

Motivations,

and

Principles

EDWARD J. WILLIAMS*

Professor

of

Political Science

University

of

Arizona

INTRODUCTION

Mexico

has

emerged

as an

important political

factor in the Central

American

region.

On the

diplomatic

level,

President Jose

Lopez

Portillo

and

Foreign

Minister

Jorge

Castafieda

have

worked

to

diminish internationaltensions

by

pushing

for

negotiations

between

the

United States

and

Nicaragua

nd

between

the United States and Cuba.

The Mexican

government

has

also

joined

with

France in

calling

for

recognition

of

the Salvadorean

opposition

as a

'representa-

tive

political

force',

and

the

Mexicans

have

urged

negotiations

between the

two

sides

in

the

Salvadorean

struggle.

Nicaragua's

revolutionary

government

has

benefited

from

diplomatic, political

and economic

support

from

Mexico

almost

from the very beginning when Mexico joined Costa Rica in early 1979 in

recognizing

the

belligerency

of

the

Sandinista

insurgents.

In

addition to sub-

stantial economic

support

for

Nicaragua,

Mexico has extended

economic

aid

to

the

entire

region

by

cooperating

with Venezuela n an

arrangement

upplying

cheap petroleum

to the

area'snations

through

a

system

of

cut-rate

oans.

All

of

that reflects Mexico's

increasingly

active

foreign

policy.

The new

posture

emanates

from a number of

developments including

a

longer

range

evolution

to

a more active

stance,

initiated

during

the Adolfo

L6pez

Mateos

regime (1958-64),

new-found

petroleum

muscle,

and

the relative

decline

of

US

influence

in the area. As a Mexican

commentator has

it,

'the

hour

of the

true

CentralAmerican iberation coincides with

the

hour in which it is

possible

for

Mexico to

operate

nternationally

as

an active medium

power'.1

As

Mexico's

role in

Central America

grows,

official

and

unofficial

sources

have

put

together

a series

of

apologies

and

policy

positions designed

to

explain

Mexico's intrusion into the area. Some

of

these

explanationspossess

a

certain

validity,

but others are far less

convincing.

In still

other

cases, indeed,

no

men-

tion has

appeared

of

principles

that

logically

inform

the

nation's

concern with

the Central

American

region.

This

paper,

however,

will consider

n

detail several

*Most of the researchand all of the writingfor this articlewereaccomplishedduring

1981-82 when

I

was

Visiting

ResearchProfessor

with the

Strategic

StudiesInstituteof

the

US

Army

War

College.

I

gratefully acknowledge

the

support

of the

Strategic

Studies

Institute and the US

Army

during

that

period,

but

the

views,

opinions,

and/or

findings

contained in this

article are mine and

should

not be construed

as official

Department

of

the

Army

position, policy

or

decision.

I also

gratefully

acknowledge

a

critique

offered on

an earlier ersionof

this

paper

by my

colleague

at the

Institute,

Col.

William

.

Staudenmaier.

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3/22

BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH

explanations

that have been

put

forward for

Mexican

foreign

policy

in the

region;

each

of these will be

put

forward,

examined

and,

where

necessary,

criticized.

SOCIO-CULTURAL

TTACHMENTS

At

the

highest

level

of

abstraction,

Mexican

apologists

are wont to

wax enthus-

iastic about the

socio-cultural ies

that bind them

to

their

CentralAmerican

neighbours.

Those

'well known

. .

.

cultural affinities which exist between

Mexico

and the

Central

American

and

Caribbean

nations

are

derived from

geographic

determinantsand similar

origins'

and

presumablycompel

Mexican

decision-makerso a fraternal

oncern

or their

CentralAmericanbrethren.2

Although

the

argument

s

diffuse,

it flows

from a

premise

hat

carries

a

degree

of

validity.

Both

Mexico and the

Central

American

nations featuresocio-cultural

value

systems

informed

by

the

Hispanic-Catholic

radition.

n

a variation

of

that

unifying

bond,

mestizo socio-racial

configurationspredominate

n

Mexico

and

significantly

nfluence

the

make-up

of most of the

Central

American

nations,

particularly

El

Salvador,Honduras,

and

Nicaragua.

n

still

another

gradation

of

cultural

bonds,

the

indigenous

peoples

of southernMexico and northernGuate-

mala derive rom the same

ethnic

and

socio-linguistic

raditions.

Some elements

of

socio-cultural

nterchange,

moreover,

may

be

seen as con-

tributing

to

those

fundamental bonds of

language,

religion,

and

tradition.

Reciprocal

tourism is rather

well

developed

between Central America

and

Mexico, although the flow northward s relativelyhigher than from Mexico

to

Central America. Mexican

revolutionary

art

is well

known

in Central

America,

Mexican

popular

music has

effectively

penetrated

he

nations

to the

south,

and

the

Mexican cinema

is

popular

in

the

area.

Although

exact

figures

are

difficult

to

come

by,

finally,

'important

numbers' of

Central

American

students have been trained n Mexico over

the

years.3

Combined

with

similarity

in

basic

cultural

traditions,

that social intercoursehas

probably

nurtured

a

modicum

of

community

between the

peoples

of

Mexico and the severalCentral

Americannations

and

may

have

some influence

in

how

the

Mexican

decision-

makers

have

conceptualized

he

contemporaryagony

of the

CentralAmerican

maelstrom.

Conversely,

several

factors

cloud and

diminish

the effect of

socio-cultural

bonds and similar tradition as an

explanatory

device in

fathoming

Mexico's

ambitions

in

Central

America.

The

concept

is

too

diffuse

to offer

precision

n

understanding

urrent

Mexican

policy.

Even if an ill-defined and

amorphous

sense of

fraternity

could

be

regarded

as

playing

a role in the

way

that

Mexican

decision-makers

hink

about Central

America,

ts

weight

in the overallcalcula-

tion

of

foreign

policymaking

s

impossible

o

discern.

Moreover,

some

nuances

of

the role

of

socio-cultural

nfluences

may

well

imply disadvantages

or Mexico's ambition

to

strengthen

ts hand in the

region.

If

the

Hispanic

cultural

raditiontends

to

connote

some

contribution

o

unity,

for

example,

the

equally

salient

cultural strains

of

contemporary

nationalism

work the other

way.

The

passage

of

time,

indeed,

tends

to

accentuate

the

peculiar

characteristics

f

national culture and

social

patterns,

thereby

high-

lighting

eatures hat

separate

nation states

rather

han

uniting

them.

To

push

the

argument

one

step

further,

cultural similarities

may

be a

22



4/22

MEXICO'SCENTRAL

AMERICAN

OLICY

double-edged

sword,

as

exemplified

by

the

indigenous

populations

of

southern

Mexico and northern

Guatemala.

In

both

nations,

the

peoples

inhabiting

the

border

regions

have

suffered from a long history of neglect by the central

governments

and

exploitation

by

the

local elites.

In both

nations the

native

populations

are

beginning

to stir

and the

respective

national

governments

have

been

compelled

to

respond

to their

disquietude.

It is

certainly

an

exaggeration

to

suggest

strong

separatist

movements

in those

areas,

but

a

history

of

such

initiatives exists

and their

resurrection

s not

beyond

the

pale

of

possibility.

Writing

n

1926,

Carleton

Beals

described

he

scenario.

The

similarity

of

Mexican

Maya

and

Guatemalan

Quich6

cultures

has

led,

during

the

100

years

of

Mexican

independence,

to

various

plots

looking

towards

the

formation

of

a

Maya-Quiche

republic.

On

various

occasions

MayaMexico has threatenedto withdraw romthe Mexican

Federation;

t

has,

in

the

past,

applied

for

annexation,

both to

the

United

States and

to

Guatemala.

As

late as

1920,

Felipe

Carillo

was

actively

plotting

to

foment

a

race-secession

movement

affecting

all the

territory

from

the

Isthmus

of

Tehuantepec

to

Central

America.

Five

States and

Territories,

Tabasco,

Chiapas,

Campeche,

Yucatan

and

Quintana

Roo,

covering

about

90

thousand

square

miles

of

mountain,

plain,

and

marsh

were to be

wrenched

away

and

ultimately

united

with

Guatemala.4

The

maturation of

that

scenario

is,

of

course,

quite

beyond

the

realm of

possibility for the immediatefuture, but it does suggesta flaw in the argument

for

socio-cultural

unity

as

Mexico

formulates

and

implements

its

Central

American

policy.

In

tandem

with

increasing

nationalism

within the

Central

American

states and

in the

context of

the

fundamental

imprecision

of

the

argument

at the

outset,

it

implies

the

insufficiency

and

inadequacy

of the

apology

from

socio-cultural

similarities

as

a

serious

explanation

for

Mexico's

contemporary

Central

American

nitiatives.

HISTORICAL

ONDS

The

argument

rom

historical

bonds carriesabout the samemixture of validity

and

myth.

Shared

historical

experiences

are

part

of

the

picture,

but

they

offer

little

by way

of

understanding

current

relations,

their

depth

is

often

exagger-

ated,

and

they

also

carry

the

seeds of

conflict as

well

as

harmony.

Carlos

Fuentes,

a

well-known

Mexican

iterary

figure,

sets

out the

argument.

In

lecturing

US

policymakers

about

Central

America,

he

admits

that

'Mexico

recognizes

many

legitimate

US

interests

n the

area'.

But the

United

States

must

recognize

that

Mexico

also

has

legitimate

interests

there.

First,

there

is

historical

precedent.

From

Guatemala

to

Panama,

Central

America

was

part

of

the

viceroyalty

of

New

Spaingoverned romMexicoCity

during

hreecenturiesandfor a few

years

after

independence

n

1821,

the

provinces

of

the

isthmus

continued

to

be a

part

of

Mexico.5

Beyond

the

Colonial and

early

Independence

periods,

the

historical

record

offers

additional

evidence

of

some

degree

of

shared

experience

and

historical

contact

during

the

19th and

20th

centuries. A

Mexican

commentary

captures

23



5/22

BULLETINOF LATINAMERICAN

RESEARCH

one element

of 'the

historical

parallels

hat

have arrived

t

a

point

of confluence'

in

noting

that both

Mexico

and the CentralAmerican nations

were the

first to

suffer

the

military,economic,

and

political

actions

of

US

expansionism'.6

More

directly,

independence brought

a

long

series

of

negotiations

over boundaries

between

Mexico

and Guatemala hat were

peacefully

resolvedand

finally

con-

firmed in 1899.

During

the third

quarter

of the

19th

century,

Mexico's

iberal

reformer,

Benito

Juarez,

played

politics

in

Guatemala

and later

Porfirio

Diaz

was a

'sporadic

meddler

n CentralAmerican

affairs'.7

Twentieth-century history

also

offers occasional

examples

of Mexico's

involvement n

CentralAmerica.

Shortly

after

the turn of the

century,

Mexico

joined

the United

States

to

encourage

he

peaceful

resolution

of international

disputes

amongst

the

chaotic Central

Americannations.

The

enterprise

rought

about the foundationof the CentralAmericanCourtof Justice. Buttressedby

US

and

diplomatic

pressures,

he

Court

worked

relatively

well

for

several

years,

but

eventually

fell into disuse. Mexico's

contribution o

the

effort

ended

with

the

outbreak

of

the Revolution

n

1910.8

As

the Mexican

Revolution

wound down after

1920,

there

was

another

short

period

of

Mexican nterest

in

Central

America.

The

revolutionary

eal

of

Mexico's

leadership

sparked

t to

carry

the

revolutionary

message

southward.

According

to

a

contemporary,

he

imperialistic ampaign

had Mexico

'creating

a

conflicting

sphere

of

influence

[which]

may

have

profound

significance

or

the future

history

of

this continent'.

The

Mexicans

were

particularly

ctive

in

Nicaraguaduringthat period, earningthe condemnationof the United States

for

harbouring

bolshevik'

agents

who

were active

in

Nicaragua.

Among

several

others,

Augusto

Sandino

evolved

close

relations

with

the

Mexican

government.9

While this

chronology

only

mentions

the

major

examples

of

Mexican-

Central

American

ontact,

t does

go

some

way

towards

explaining

he

apologist's

claim

for bonds

of shared

experience.

On

the other

hand,

this

sharing

s

only

limited.

Furthermore,

several

other considerations

end

to

diminish whatever

sentiments

of

amity may

evolve from it.

At the

outset,

it is

obvious that sharedhistorical

experience

does

not

neces-

sarily

lead

to

feelings

of

fraternal oncern.

To

the

contrary

t

frequently

has

the

opposite

effect,

catalysing

mutual

hostility.

In

that

sense,

the record

of

Mexican-

CentralAmerican

relations s

not

without

ambiguity.

In

point

of

fact,

much

of

the

history

is

conflicting

and not harmonious.

Looking

to the

Colonial

period,

a

standard

istory

of Central

Americadescribes he

reality.

Yet

there

were

enough

nstances

n

which the

viceregal

uthority

attempted

to

intervene

n CentralAmerica

over the

course

of the

Colonial

period

that Central

Americans

developed

some

feelings

of

antagonism

oward

Mexico.

The

superior

trade

privileges

and

opportunities

of Mexicansand

the Central

Americans'

resentment

of the

viceregal

status

held

by

the

inhabitants f Mexicocompounded his animosity.10

Although

some

Central

Americans

reacting against

the

autocratic

rule

of

Guatemala

later

welcomed

the

Confederation

with

Mexico,

others

opposed

Mexican

claims.

Salvadorians,

or

example, ought

the move and

only

succumbed

to

a

Mexican

army.

Still later

during

he

19th

century,

the

meddling

of Juarez

and

Diaz

catalysed opposition

in Central America

as

did the

imperialistic

24



6/22

MEXICO'SCENTRAL

AMERICAN OLICY

campaign

of

the

Mexican

revolutionary

zealots

during

the1920s.

In

sum,

the

historical record

gives

pause

in

accepting

the

argument

for

bonds of

friend-

ship.11

Evolving

nationalism

in the

Central American

region,

moreover,

works

in

the

other

direction. Nationalistic

sensitivities

thrive

on the

mythology

of

real

and

imagined

transgressions

by neighbouring

nations. As

the

Central

American

nations fashion

their various

nationalistic

ideologies,

the fear of

renewed

Mexican

ambitions

in

the

area

may

well

become salient

parts

of

the

nations'

ideological

formulations.

In

any

case,

the

incidents

mentioned

above are

exceptional.

In

fact,

Mexico

ignored

its

neighbours

o the south

until

very recently.

Writing

n

1981,

a

com-

mentator had it that

'until two

years

ago,

Mexico

paid

scant attention

to the

tiny republicssouth of its border'.Another student of the regiondatesMexico's

interest rather

earlier,

but

still

supports

the

point

in

claiming

that

'prior

to

the

1970s,

its

[Mexico'sl

regional

posture

n

CentralAmericanand

Caribbean

ffairs

was

low'.

Reviewing

Mexican

foreign

policy

in

1963,

Castafieda,

he

present

foreign

minister,

probably

comes closest to the

mark n

dating

ncipient

Mexican

interest

as

crystallizing

n

the

1960s.

Castafieda

decried the

'defensive' tone

of

Mexico's

eadership

at

the

time:

The

postwar

attitude

of

Mexico

towardthe

outside

world is

still,

however,

one of

mistrust and

partial

disinterest,

and its

foreign

policy

is

mostly

defensive

and

anti-interventionist.Until the

inception of the present

administration,

when

the

international outlook of

the

country

began

gradually

to

change,

Mexico's

participation

in

the

discussion

of

world

political

and

economic

problems

has

been,

generally,

reserved,cautious,

and

mainly

defensive.

Drawing

special

attention

to

the Central

American

region,

Castafieda

ontinued

that 'the

successive

administrationsmade no

great

effort to

asserta true

political

and

cultural

Mexican

presence

n Latin

America

or even

Central

America.'12

IDEOLOGICAL

YMPATHY

The

ideological

sympathy

motivation as an

explanation

of

Mexico's

newly

found

interest

in

Central

America

differs

a

trifle from

the

others

previously

discussed.

Apparently,

it

is

not

applicable

to the

entire

region,

but

rather

imited to

the

governmentsand/or

peoples

in

Central

America 'in

search of

a

higher

level of

social

justice'.

In

her

conclusion to

an

examination

of

'new

preoccupations

and

traditional

notions'

in

Mexican

national

security,

a

leading

Mexican

scholar

argues:

Concerning

the

situation

in

Central

America,

this

brief

re-examination

of

Mexico's

traditional

position

in

the

Inter-American

ystem

puts

in

relief

the gradein which sympathyfor social

change

n that

region

s embedded

in

the

profound

traditionsof

Mexican

diplomacy.

President

L6pez

Portillo

(1976-82)

captured

another

nuance of the

argument

in

proclaiming

he

'close ties

uniting'

the

Mexican

and

Nicaraguan

overnments

as

deriving

from

their

'common

popular

origins

and

their

coinciding

objectives

of

social

transformation.

Dialogue

is

easy',

he

concluded,

'between

States

which

25



7/22

BULLETINOF

LATIN

AMERICAN

RESEARCH

understand the

nature

of

revolutionary

processes'.

The

argument,

n

short,

proposes

that

Mexico's traditional

nterest

n

social

justice

and

its

own revolu-

tionary

experience

compel

it

to

a

special

sensitivity

to

and

sympathy

with the

forces of changenow doingbattlein the CentralAmerican egion.13

While not

without

qualification,

the

argument

claims some

validity.

Even

before

the

promulgation

of

the

Estada Doctrine

in

1930,

Mexico evolved a

recognition

policy

acknowledging

he

legality

of

regimes

covering

the ideo-

logical

spectrum.

Later,

of

course,

it maintained

diplomatic

relations

with

Castro's

Cuba. In his

first

address

to

the

nation in

1971,

President Luis

Echeverria

1970-76)

reiterated

the

posture

in

emphasizing

he

principle

of

'political

pluralism'

as

guiding

Mexico's

diplomatic

relations.14

Although

less

dramatically

han

his

predecessor,

President

L6pez

Portillo

pursued

he

essence

of the policy. A diplomatic tour in 1980, for example, touched a series of

nations

representing

he entire

political

spectrum.

n

manifesting

Mexico's

new

presence

in

Latin American

affairs,

Lopez

Portillo

visited

Brazil,

Costa

Rica,

Cuba,

Nicaragua,

anama,

and Venezuela.

The

historical record also counts other

examples

of

Mexico's

sympathy

for

'revolutionary'

egimes

and

its

opposition

to the

ambitionsof the United States

to

control

'subversion' n Latin America.

In

1948,

Mexico

opposed

the forma-

tion of the

Inter-AmericanDefense Council.

Later,

Mexico

supported

the

Jacobo

Arbenz

Guzman

government

n

Guatemala;

t

voted

against

he

organiza-

tion of the

Inter-American

eace

Keeping

Force in

the

Dominican

Republic

n

1965 and, still later, offered a strongdefence of the SalvadorAllenderegime

in Chile.

Supporting

that

stance,

Mexico

welcomed

significant

numbers

of

political

exiles

fleeing

Franco's

Spain

and

right-wing egimes

n

Latin-America

-among

them

large

contingents

of

Argentines,

Chileans,

Guatemalans,

Salvadorians,

nd

Uruguayans.

n

sum,

Mexico's

diplomatic

tradition

reflects

a

special

sympathy

or

'revolutionary'

overnments

nd,

in that

sense,

ts

present

posture

n

CentralAmerica

lows from established

practice.

Conversely,

everal

actors

fly

in

the

face

of

Mexico's

heralding

ts

ideological

sympathy

for

the Central

AmericanLeft.

The

diplomatic

record

of

support

or

revolutionary egimes,

for

example,

is

not so

clean

as

it

appears

at

first

sight.

The Mexican-Cuban quationis a salient case in point. Even though Mexico

continued to

carry

on

diplomatic

relations

with

Cuba,

the

larger

ontext

of the

relationship

was far from

effusively

friendly.

One

commentary

written in

the

early

1970s

described

elations

as

being

'cool

and formal'

and

specified

a

number

of

decidedlyunfriendly

activities.

Travellers

sing

airlines

o Cuba are

carefully

dentified,

and the

informa-

tion is turned

over to the United

States

and Latin American

ntelligence

services.Mexico

has

also

made t difficult

for

Cubanbooks

and

propaganda

to enter

the

country,

and

so

restricted

the

Cuban news

service,

Prensa

Latina, hat it finallyclosedits doors.'5

A

careful

scrutiny

of Mexico's

contemporary

relations with

the

Central

Americannations reflects

a

similar

combination

of

revolutionary

nd

pragmatic

postures.

The

revolutionary

dimension

s

exemplified

by

political

and economic

assistance

o the

Nicaraguan

evolutionaries,

measurable

oliticalsupport

or

the

Salvadorian

Left,

and a cool

stance

vis-d-vis

he

right-wing egime

n

Guatemala.

26



8/22

MEXICO'S

CENTRALAMERICAN OLICY

Conversely,

a

solid dose

of

calculating

pragmatism

winds

its

way through

Mexico's

policy

and calls

into

question

official

revolutionary

rhetoric.

Mexico

continues

to

maintain

diplomatic

relations

with El Salvador

and both

President

L6pez Portillo and Foreign MinisterCastaiiedahave assumed measuredtones

in

policy

declarations

on

El Salvador

calculated

to maintain

options

as the

un-

certain

struggle

evolves.

Through

a

petroleum supply arrangement

n

partner-

ship

with

Venezuela,

moreover,

Mexico offers substantial

amounts

of

financial

assistanceto the

established

governments

n the area.El

Salvador,

or

example,

receivedsome

$30

million

during

1981.16

Without

offering

a

comprehensive

critique

of

the

Mexican

revolutionary

experience,

it

is

certainly logical

to

suggest

that the

Mexican elites'

commit-

ment

to

revolutionary

change

must

be

imperfect,

at best.

If

not

quite

dead,

the

Mexican

Revolution is

certainly

far from the

robust

vehicle

for

socio-

economic

change

that it was

during

the late 1930s. Products of that

system,

in

turn,

are bound to

be

governed

by

relatively

conservative

norms

designed

to

maintain

stability

rather han nurture

revolutionary

hange.

None of

those

reservations,

however,

should be

interpreted

to

deny

ideo-

logical

considerations

a

role in

explaining

Mexico's

contemporary

policy

in

Central

America.

To

be

sure,

the

ideological

sympathy

is not

so

pure

as the

rhetoric

proclaims,

but the

facts

suggest

that it

contributes

to

the

dimensions

of

Mexico's

current

policy

in favour

of

rapid

socio-economic and

political

change.

The

diplomatic chronology

demonstrates a

solid

strain of

support

for

revolutionaryregimes over the years and Mexico's present policy in Central

America

is

consistent with that

record.

Although

it

has

faded

with time and

been

corrupted by

economic

affluence,

moreover,

the

revolutionary

deal has

not

disappeared

rom the

Mexican

political

culture.

A

strain of

revolutionary

fervour

continues

to

inform

the

Mexican

world

view.

The

Revolution,

to

be

sure,

is

still

not

much

removed in

time and vivid

memories

and

personal

attach-

ments to its

ideological

deals continue to

influence

Mexican

policy.

ECONOMIC DVANTAGE

In

recent

history,

economic

advantage

goes

a

long way

towards

explaining

Mexico's rapprochement with Central America initiated during the 1960s.

As

Mexico's trade

balance

began

to

grow

to

serious

negative

proportions

in

mid-decade

and

as

the

Central

American Common

Market

(CACM)

began

to

take on

increasing

coherence,

Mexican

decision-makers et

out a new

policy

to

strengthen

relations. On

different

occasions,

Mexico

broached

proposals

to

affiliate with

(and

dominate?)

the

CACM

and/or

to

fuse the

CACM

with the

Latin

American Free

Trade

Association

(LAFTA),

to

which

Mexico

adhered.

Mexico failed

in

both

attempts,

but in

1964

a

Mexican

trade

commission

initiated

a

successful

campaign

o

increase

commercial

contacts

without

formal

economic

integration.

In

its

footsteps,

President

Gustavo

Diaz

Ordaz

(1964-

70) launched in early 1966 the first

goodwill

tour of the CentralAmerican

nations ever

undertaken

by

a

Mexicanchief of

state.17

From

that

beginning,

the

die

was

cast.

In

early

1971,

President

Echeverria

encountered 'an

unprecedented

crisis in

the

Mexican

balance

of

payments'

and

respondedby

meeting

with the

chief

executives

of

Costa

Rica,

Guatemala,

and

Nicaragua

to

'explore

the

possibilities

of

increasing

the

exportation

of

27



9/22

BULLETINOF LATIN

AMERICAN

RESEARCH

manufactured

products

to

Central America'.18

Shortly

after his accession

to

power,

President

L6pez

Portillo followed the lead

of

his

predecessors

n con-

ducting

a series

of

bilateral

meetings

with his CentralAmerican

counterparts

looking

to

ongoinggrowth

n Mexican

exports.

As

Mexico's economic

recovery

advanced

during

the late

1970s

and as the

instability

of

Central America

gave

way

to

growing

turmoil,

economic con-

siderations

n

Mexico's

policy

have been

superseded

by

other motivations.As

captured

by

a

Mexican

analyst,

however,

at

least some

in

Mexico continue

to

see

potential

economic

advantage

as a

part

of the

largerunfolding

scenario.

After

discussing

socio-cultural and historical

influences,

his

discussion

goes

on to 'more

subtle' considerations.

The

development

of

national

markets,

heretofore

strangled

by

small

oligarchiesand feudallords,would be able to extend the establishment f

forms

of

economic

cooperation [between

Mexico and the Central

American

nations] mutually

beneficial

or the

countries

of the

region.19

More

specifically,

the

potential

for

economic

advantage

ncludesboth

general

trade and investment and

special

considerations

deriving

from

petroleum

exports.

More than a

decade

ago,

Mexican decision-makers ecame aware

of

those

possibilities

and

they

continue to exist.

According

to

1979

figures,

the

CentralAmericannations

(including

Panama)

ounted a

Gross

Regional

Product

of

almost

$20

billion.

Assuming

a

free

trade

area

encompassing

Mexico and

its southeastern neighbours,Central America would increase the Mexican

market

by

almost

20

per

cent.

Including

the

Caribbeannations

would add

another

54

per

cent increase.2

In

passing,

t should

be

noted,

the

collapse

of the

CACM offers Mexico

more

opportunity

to make

inroads into the

Central

Americanmarket than

during

he

mid-1960s,

when Mexico first

began

an

eco-

nomic

courtship

of the

region's

nations.

Petroleum

exports

and the concomitant activities

of

Petroleos Mexicanos

(PEMEX)

play

a

special

role in the

projection

of

economic

advantage.

Speak-

ing

in

1978,

the oil

monopoly's

director-general

declared

Central

America

as

a natural

market

for

Mexican

hydrocarbonsexports.

Thereafter,

Mexico

began

to

supply petroleum

to severalnations n the CaribbeanBasinand

capped

those ad hoc initiatives

with

the

comprehensive

Mexican-Venezuelan

rrange-

ment

negotiated

n

1980.

Now the

keystone

of

Mexico'seconomic

policy

in the

Caribbean

Basin,

the

arrangement

onnotes

a

generous

programme

f

assistance,

but

it also

implies

the

capture

of

additional

markets

for

Mexican crude.

The

point

is made

n an

analysis

of Mexico'sCaribbean

olicy.

It is clear that

Mexican/Venezuelan

ooperation

s

necessary

n

order

for

Mexico to

gain

a Caribbeanmarket

for its crude.Mexicowants

an

assured

regional

market

for

heavy

crude which

it

may

have

difficulty selling

else-

where. The San Jose Agreementstipulatesthat recipientcountriesmust

take

50

per

cent each

of

Venezuelan

and

Mexican

crude,

thus

providing

an entree

for

the latter.21

In addition to

petroleum

exports,

Petroleos

Mexicanos

has launched

other

programmes

n the

Caribbean

Basin

designed

to

increase

Mexico's economic

influence and

advantage.

In

Costa

Rica,

PEMEX

has

been

engaged

n

several

28



10/22

MEXICO'S

CENTRALAMERICAN

OLICY

programmes ncluding

technical advice and

exploration.

PEMEX

has

donated

oil

drilling

equipment

to

Nicaragua

nd has been

training

Nicaraguan

echnicians.

Other

cooperative

ventures have been

negotiated

with

Cuba

and Panama.

In

each instance, those initiatives increase Mexico's economic impact in the area

and,

to the

point,

hold

out the

possibility

of future

economic

advantage.

Potential

gains

for

Mexico

in

trade and investment

with

Central

America

and the

Caribbean ake

on

added

perspective

within

the

context of

Mexico's

ongoing

economic

problems,

dramatized

by

the

devaluationof

February

1982.

The

devaluation sent

shock waves

through

the

nation

and

precipitated

a crisis

of

confidence.22Most

seriously,

an

'emotional

trauma' truckthe

nation in

mid-

1981

catalysed

by

a

'virtual

overnight

downturn n

prospects

or

crudeoil

exports'.

As the

year

passed,

the

immediate

crisis

was

overcome,

but the

international

petroleum

market

continued

to

be

depressed

and

Mexico's

hydrocarbons xport

earnings

for 1981

were less than

$14

billion some

$6

to

$7

billion

below

expectations.

To make matters

worse,

predictions

or 1982

foresaw he

possibility

of an

actual

drop

in

earings

to

$12

billion,

the

first

decline

in

earnings

incethe

discoveries

of

the

mid-1970s.23

In

tandem with other

nagging

economic

problems

in

Mexico,

in

short,

the

petroleum

exporting

crisis dramatized the

vulnerability

of

the Mexican

eco-

nomy.

Within the

context of this

analysis,

urthermore,

t

implies

some evidence

in

support

of

economic

advantage

as

a factor in the

overall

calculation

of the

nation's

newly

found

interest

in

nurturing

ts Central

Americanand

Caribbean

neighbours.

Against

this,

however,

those several

considerations nvolve

a

relatively

minor

economic

stake in

Central

America and

suggest

that

economic

advantage

is

probably

not

an

important

part

of the

several

motivations

informing

Mexico's

current

Central

American

policy.

In

the

first

place,

the

Central

American

market

is

comparatively

mall and

poor.

To

make

matters

worse,

the

CentralAmerican

economies

have

been buffeted

by

rising energy

costs,

reduced

prices

for

their

commodity

exports,

and economic

dislocation and

flight

of

capital

result-

ing

from

political instability.

At least for the

short

term,

Central

America

offers little

hope

for

significant

increases in trade

and/or

investment

oppor-

tunities.

Moreover,

as of

now

Central

America s

only

marginally

mportant

o

Mexico

as

a

trading

partner.

In

1978,

Central

America

accounted for

only

2.6

per

cent

of

Mexico's total

exports

and a

miniscule

0.43

per

cent of

the

nation's

imports.

While

some

increases in

relative

exports

were

registered

from

1970

when

the

figure

stood

at

2.16

per

cent,

they

were

hardly

enough

to

invite

the

concerted

attention of

Mexico's

policymakers.

Imports

from

Central

America

decreased

from

0.62

per

cent

during

the

same

period.24

In

sum,

therefore,

economic

advantage

s

no

longer (as

it

was in the

1960s)

a

major

factor

behind

Mexican

policy

towards

Central

America.

POLITICAL

NFLUENCE

The

political

principles

informing

Mexico's

contemporary

Central

American

posture

feature

both

foreign

policy

considerations

and

domestic

political

implications.

The

foreign

policy part

of

the

equation

combines an

extrapolation

of

the

trends

toward

a more

active

foreign policy

stance

initiated

in the

1960s

29



11/22

BULLETINOF LATIN

AMERICAN ESEARCH

and a

response

to

the

present

turmoil

of

the CentralAmerican

region.

The

motivations

flowing

from

domestic

politics

focus

upon

the

governing

elite's

need to

respond

to

domestic

pressures

n favour

of

supporting

the

Central

AmericanLeft and

opposing

US

diplomacy

n the area.

Official statements

rarely

highlight

Mexico's

political

ambitions

n Central

America,

but their

implications

along

with unofficial

commentary

provide

sufficient

evidence

to

make the

case

for

the

argument.

The

official line

sings

the

praises

of

noninterventionand

dwells

much

on

the

dangers

of the 'inter-

nationalization'

of

the

domestic

struggles

n

the

region.25

This

policy position

portrays

Mexico as

providing

protection

from

outside

intervention.

As

with the

oil

supply

arrangement

nd

initiatives

o

protect

coffee

prices

and tuna

fishing

grounds,

t

projects

Mexico

into

a role of

leadership

n the

region.

Furthermore,

a

stance

against

the

internationalization

of

the Central

American conflicts

maximizes

Mexican nfluence.

Another

variationon

Mexico's

diplomacy

buttressing

ts influence

n

Central

America

evolves from

its role as an

intermediary

etween the United

States

and

the

nations

of

the

region.

Taking

off from

the Mexican-United

States

'special

relationship'

principle,

the

image

holds that

Mexican

policymakers

possess

a more

acute

appreciation

f

the United States than others.

They

are,

therefore,

able

to

bridge

gaps

of

understanding

hat

sabotage

discussionswhen the

parties

are not

so

intimately

connected.

President

Lopez

Portillo

gave testimony

to

the

principle

early

in

his

term when he

offered

to

serve as a

'bridge

builder'

in

inter-American elations.Later,he appliedthe principle n the context of the

negotiations

over the

Panama

Canal,

differencesbetween

Cuba and the

United

States,

and

in

his

attempt

to

mediatebetween

Nicaragua

nd the

United States.26

The

point

is

capturedby

a Mexican

cholar

n

an

analysis

of

Mexico'sCentral

American

policy.

After

stating

hat 'Mexicohas

neither

an

imperialistic

ocation

nor

ambition

in

Central

America',

he

allows

that the

present

situation does

'permit

[Mexico]

to

play

the role

of

confidential

nterlocutor,

as

much on

behalf

of the

Central

American

peoples

who

struggle

or

their liberation

as

for

interests

in the United

States

who

fight

to

impede [the peoples

of

Central

America]'.

The

analysis

proceeds

that 'in this context Mexico is able

to

introduce

vigorously

its own nationalinterests,

taking advantage

of the contradictionswhich over-

whelm

the

United

States'.

Later,

the

point

is made that CentralAmerica is

a zone

which

relates

'to

the

national

security

and international

oliticalprestige

of

Mexico'.

Foreign

MinisterCastanedaused more measured

ones

in

an

inter-

view

discussing

petroleum

in

Mexico's

foreign

policy,

but

the

essential

point

is

similar.

The

Foreign

Ministercautioned that

'energy

sales cannot

be

reduced

to the level of

mere

commercial ransactions'

and that Mexico

'should

obtain

something

more

than their

monetary

value in

return'.

He

then

listed

several

considerations

concluding

with the criterion of

'soberly-evaluated

olitical

benefits'.

Focusing

on

Central

America,

the

Foreign

Ministerstressed hat his

interpretation

of those

considerations

n

foreign

policy

had

guided

Mexico's

relationswith the

Sandinista

overnment

n

Nicaragua.Reflecting

hose

analyses

on the

contemporary

Mexican

scene,

a

foreign

commentator

reported

that

Mexico now describes he CaribbeanBasinas its 'natural reaof influence'.27

Several contextual considerations end further credence to the

argument

from

political

influence.

They

include historical trends

in

Mexican

foreign

30



12/22

MEXICO'SCENTRALAMERICAN OLICY

policy,

the

relative decline

of US

power,

and,

more

speculatively,

he

messianic

qualities

of the

Mexican

revolutionary

deology.

Seen

in

historical

perspective,

in the

first

place,

Mexico's

increasing

influence

in

Central

America

and

the

Caribbean s a

perfectly

logical

extrapolation

of almost two decadesof evolu-

tionary

change

leading

the

nation

to assumean

increasingly ignificant

role

in

contemporary

internationalaffairs.

The

first

steps

toward

a

more

open

and

dynamic

foreign

policy

were taken

by

President

L6pez

Mateos. The

evolving

policy

was marked

by

several

significant

commitments,

including

a

specific

decision

to

affiliate with the

Latin

American

Free Trade

Association

LAFTA),

a more

implicit

bid for

expanded

nfluence in Latin

American

affairs,

he

hosting

of the

1968

Olympic

Games,

and a move

toward an

increased role in

Third

World

politics through

sponsorship

of

the

Charter of

the

Economic

Rights

and

Duties

of

Nations. In

even

more

definite and

theatricalform, the die was

cast

by

Echeverria who

initiated a

campaign

for

Mexican world

leadership

involving

a

series of

measures

including

his

appearance

at

numerous

con-

ferences,

his

visits

to

even more

numerousThird

World,Socialist,

and

European

nations,

and

his

regime's

establishment of

diplomatic

relations

with 65

new

governments.28

WhilePresident

Lopez

Portillobacked

away

from

his

predecessor's

lamboyant

theatrics,

he

continued

to

pursue

an

active

foreign policy

after

a

short

respite

when he

was

concentrating

on

Mexico's

domestic

economy.

Making

use

of

Mexico's

newly

found

petroleum power,

Lopez

Portillo

negotiated

with

leading

world powers and definitely establishedMexico as a voice to be reckoned with

in

the

larger

global

arena.

Mexico's

acceptance

of a

seat on the

United

Nations

Security

Council in

1980 and

its

hosting

of a

North-South

summit

meeting

in

1981

symbolized

the

success of

the

policy.

Coupled

with

a series

of

economic

initiatives centred more

specifically

in

the

Central

American

region,

that

evolu-

tion of

Mexico's

global

political

policy

led

quite

naturally

to

increased

concern

with the

problems

of

Central

America

and to

a

conscious

policy

to further

Mexican

interests

in

the

region.

In

short,

the

motivation

of

political

influence

contributed to

several

other

factors that

had

traditionally

guided

Mexican

policy

in the

area.29

Developments

in the United States and US

foreign

policy

also contributed

their

part. During

the

period

that

Mexico's

policy

was

evolving

positively,

the

relative

influence

of

the

United

States

was

diminishing, hereby

creating

novel

opportunities

for

other

nations to fill

the

gap.

Believing

that the

United

States

could

not

restore the

old

order in

Central

America,

Mexican

policymakers

moved

to

formulate an

alternative,

thereby

protecting

their

national

interests.

A

recent

analysis

posits

the

point.

Mexico has

changed

internally

over

the

last

decade,

and so has

the

inter-

national

environment. Most

fundamental,

the

decline

of

United

States

economic,

political-ideological,

and

military

hegemony

throughout

Latin

America

and

the

Caribbean

ver the

1970s in

comparison

with

the

decades

of

the

1950s

and

1960s has

enabled

Mexico to

assume

an

independent

role

in

hemispheric

affairs.

...

Today

Mexico

faces

an

increasingly

Gaullist'

or

'balkanized'

nternational

system

in

which

it

is not

only

possible

but

imperative

for

Mexico to

assume a

more

assertive

role to

protect

and

31



13/22

BULLETINOF LATIN

AMERICANRESEARCH

foster its national interests.

The

dissolution

of the Pax

Americana

s

nowhere more in

evidence

nor

more

threatening

o Mexico

than

in

Central

Americaand the Caribbean.30

In a more

speculative

vein,

the

argument

from

political

ambition is

sup-

ported

by

a

messianicstrain

that winds

its

way

through

Mexican

revolutionary

history.

On the

domestic

scene,

the

message

has

been

manifested

by

the

educa-

tional reforms

of the

1920s,

the

taming

of the

military

during

he

1920s

and

1930s,

and he

resurrection f the

communal

jido

land

holdings

and

the

agrarian

reform

of

the 1930s.

Most

dramatically,

he

messianic

quality

is

reflected

in

Mexico's successful

drive for

industrialization,

parked

by

President

Lazaro

Cardenas

(1934-40),

consolidated

by

President

Miguel

Alemain

(1946-52),

andpursued o the present.

In

decrying

the excesses

of

the commitment

to

industrialization,

rofessor

FrankTannenbaum ad it

that 'the

idea

of

bigness

s

upon

them'.

The

Mexican

elites

were

captured

with the

grandeur

of

'big

plans'

and

'great

industries'.

As that

fascinationmanifested

tself,

Mexico

pushed

the

construction

of

sprawl-

ing

steel

mills,

rationalized

assembly

ines,

enormous

dams,

and

sophisticated

petro-chemicalplants.

As

a

Mexican

commentator

proposed,

'the Revolution

produced

a

new

breed

of

public

figure,

almost

fanatically

proud

to

be

Mexican,

and determined

o drive hat nation into the modernworld'.31

As

a more

positive

foreign

policy

hasevolved n

Mexico,

to

pursue

he

point,

the nation's elites have

increasinglyextrapolated

he 'idea of

bigness'

to the

global

arena.

A new

sense

of

aggressivepride

has

captured

the Mexicansand

suffused Mexico's

conceptualization

of its role in the

contemporary

world.

President

Lopez

Portillo

is

anxious

for

his

country

to

exercise

influence

in

international

politics

proportionate

o

its

size, wealth,

level of

industrialization,

petroleum holdings,

and

political sophistication.

The

point

of

departure

s

a

sphere

of

influence

in the

CaribbeanBasin combined

with a

voice

in Third

World

politics.

It should be

emphasized,

furthermore,

hat

Central Americanshave

long

feared Mexico as its own 'Colossusof the North' and Mexico'spolicies have

intensified

those

concerns

throughout

the CaribbeanBasin. As

early

as

the

1960s,

when Diaz Ordaz laid

the

groundwork

or

Mexico's

present policy,

'contact

with Central

American

ulers

grewrapidlyenough

to

engender

uspicion

on the

part

of some

political

elements

in

the

region

that

Mexico was

becoming

a

subimperial

power'.

During

the

1970s,

the Prime Minister

of

Trinidad

and

Tobago

criticized

Venezuela's ambition

in

the

Caribbean.

A

leading

scholarof

the area

suggests

that

'his

verbal

attacks

implied

that

he

was

concerned

that

perhaps

both Venezuela and Mexico

were

attempting

to

play

pivotal

roles in

the

Commonwealth

Caribbean

egion'.

On the

contemporary

cene,

the

govern-

ments of Guatemalaand El Salvadorhave both complainedat Mexico's nter-

ventionistic

and

mperialistic

nitiatives

n the

region

and a

particularly

ombastic

critique

emanated

from

a

Colombian

minister.

He

charged

Mexico

and

Vene-

zuela with

'exercising

a

new

type

of

dark

eyed

imperialism

n

the Caribbean

zone'

and,

in

referring

o

traditional

US activities

in the

area,

explained

that

'imperialism

comes

not

only

from those with

gringo

eyes ,

but also

from

those

with dark

eyes'.

What

is

happening',

he

concludes,

'is that

Mexicowants

32



14/22

MEXICO'SCENTRAL

AMERICAN

OLICY

to continue

commanding

with its

imperialistic

course

in

the

seas to

the

North

[of

Colombia]'.32

It

is

also

worth

discussing

the

imperatives

of

Mexican

domestic

politics

as making a contribution to Mexico's support of revolutionarycauses in the

CaribbeanBasin. The

argument

tates

that

foreign

policy

measures n favour

of

the Left divert

attention from

conservative

and

authoritarian

policies

at

home

and,

in the

process,

co-opt

the

Mexican Left

and

legitimize

the

regime

in

the

eyes

of

the

Mexican

people,

who have

been

indoctrinated

with

the rhetoric

of

Mexican

revolutionary

deology.

The

analysis

s

shared

by

both

the

Left and

the

Right,

at home

and abroad. In

analysing

Mexico's

courting

of Fidel

Castro,

one

Mexican

commentator

interprets

the

policy

as

flowing

from

international

economic

and

political

ambition,

but

also

'as

a

question

of

the internal

health

of the

system.

That

is to

say',

she

continues,

'that it

makes

foreign policya

legitimizing

element of internal

politics'.

A

conservative North

American

agrees

n

positing

that

'undoubtedly

he

reasonfor

the

L6pez

Portillo

favourable

approach

to

the forces of

revolution

in

neighbouring

ountries'

emanates from

'the

ability

of

the

Mexican

governingsystem

and

the PRI

to

substitute

revolu-

tionary symbolism

for

revolutionary

ction

in

the

domestic

political

context and

thereby

absorb

and

neutralize

most

of

the

more

radical

eft

forces'.33

While it

is

true,

in

the

words of a

Western

diplomat,

that

'Mexican

presidents

always

like

to

wave

their left

hand abroad

and use

their

right

hand

at

home',

the

argument

should not

be

overemphasized.

As noted in

the

discussionof

the

ideo-

logical contributionsto Mexico'spolicy, some degreeof revolutionarycommit-

ment

continues

to

influence

the

world

view

of

Mexico's

elites.

The

waning

of

that

zeal

does

not

necessarily

mply

its total

disappearance.

Even

more

cogently,

the

objective

realities

of

Mexico's

potential

power

have

changed.

While it

may

be true

that a

revolutionary

posture

helps

the

maintenance

of

the

Mexican

system,

it

is

equally

true that

Mexican

foreign

policy

is at a

crossroads.

The

movesto

increased

nfluence

n

the

Caribbean

Basin are

much more

than

cynically

manipulative.

Rather,

they

represent

an

incipient

and

potentially

profound

new

departure

n

Mexico's role

in

regional

global

politics.34

Even

so,

the

argu-

ment

from

political

influence

must

weigh heavily

as an

explanation

for

Mexico's

contemporaryCentralAmericanpolicy.

STRATEGIC

CONCERNS

AND

NATIONAL

SECURITY

NTERESTS

The

official

line

denies that

national

security

concerns

influence

Mexico's

contemporary

Central

American

policy,

but

unofficial

analysis

combined with

logical

inference

are

clearly

to

the

contrary.

They

demonstrate

that

security

motivations

contribute their

part

to

Mexico's overall

posture.

The

argument

is

catalysed by

several

security

imperatives

and

supported

by

Mexican nitiatives

to

bolster its

military

capabilities.

Continuing

problems

in

Mexico's southern

states and

the

security

of the

nation's

southernoil

fields are the

most

important

strategic

considerations.The modernizationof the nation's

military

is the most

cogent

point

as

evidence for

the

influence

of

national

security's

contribution

o

Mexico's

policy.

Mexico's new

oil

implies

several

strategic

considerations

and

national

security

concerns. The

petroleum

bonanza

has

catalysed

further

economic

growth

and

created

novel

strategic

imperatives.

Mexico's

Defence

Minister,

General Felix

33



15/22

BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH

Galvan

L6pez,

made the

point

of

explaining

he

military's

modernization

pro-

gramme.

He

emphasized

hat

Mexico's

ncreasing

wealth and

industrial

growth

had created

new

'necessities

for

protection

and

vigilance',

making particular

referenceto the 'vital installations'of PetroleosMexicanosand the Compafia

Federal

de

Electricidad.

We

have

to

give

them

security',

he

noted,

and

'for

that reason

we need more

equipment,

more

means,

and more soldiers'.35

The location

of

the

new

petroleum

reserves

s

especially

important

here.

Two

key

fields

are located

in the

southeastern tates

of

Chiapas

and Tabasco.

Both

states

border

on

Guatemalaand some

of the reservoirs re less

than 100

miles from the frontier.

The

protection

of these oil fields is

clearly

part

of

Mexico's

larger

Central American

policy

and contributes

to the

military's

increasing

concern with the nation's

southern

states.

As a

reflection

of that

fact,

the most

important

manoeuvresconducted

by

the nation's

military

in

the

last

50

years

were held in the southern

oil fields in

1980.

Though

ess

fre-

quently

mentioned,

an

additional

strategic

consideration n the

south is

the

security

of the

transisthmian ail

ine,

recently

upgraded

nd

destined

o

become

a lucrative conomic asset

for

Mexico as

the

1980s

unfold.36

The oil fields and

the

rail

line, however,

are

only

part

of the

scenario

n

Mexico's south

that relates

strategically

o the nation's

CentralAmerican

policy.

A

bombastic

ournalistic

metaphor

may

exaggerate

he

point,

but

it

captures

an

essential

concern

among

some

sectors

in

Mexico

in

declaring

that 'Central

America is

reaching

northward oward Mexico

like a knife

pointing

at

the

pro-

verbialsoft underbelly'.37n truth, the area has alwaysbeen unsettled and old

problems

havecombined

with new ones to exacerbate

he situation.

Traditionally,

the

nation's southern states have

been Mexico's

poorest

and least

developed

region.

The area

also counts

the nation's

largest

concentration

of

indigenous

peoples,

many

of

the same ethnic tradition

as

their brethren

iving

in northern

Guatemala.

The

developmental

backwardness

of

the

region

implies

the con-

tinuing

existence

of

large

haciendas,

socio-economic

exploitation,

and

political

authoritarianism. ver

he

years,

t has

triggered

ccasional

peasantchallenges

o

governmental

uthority

and,

in

response,

repression

f

the local

peasantry.

As the oil boom

matured n

the

area

during

he

1970s,

it

sparked

additional

complexitiesas hundredsof thousands looded the area n searchof jobs.Those

interlopers

imposed

stresses

and strains

on the

socio-political

fabric

of

the

region.

To

makematters

worse,

the

exploitation

of the

area's

petroleum

riches

also

brought

and

condemnations,

oaring

nflation,

increases n

crime,

environ-

mental

damage,

water

pollution,

and

unmanageable

demands

upon

the local

infrastructure.All

of

that,

in

turn,

catalysed

an

angry

response

on the

part

of

the

southerners,

including petitions,

protest

marches,

road

blocks,

and

the

occupation

of

drillingrigs

and

construction

sites.

It is a familiar

tory:

an eco-

nomic boom

sparking

ocial

dislocation

eading

o

political

protest.

But the

story

does not end

there.

Migrants

rom the

Central

Americannations

have addedtheir

destabilizing

nfluences.As the Salvadorian ivilwar

rages

and

as the Guatemalan

guerrilla

activities

heat

up,

thousandshave

fled

across

the

Mexican

border

to seek

refuge

and/or

to

find better

economic

opportunity.

The entire

southern

region,

n

short,

is

experiencing nparalleled

hange

and,

in

the

process, creating

novel

challenges

and

implyingpotential

security

problems

for Mexico

City.

34



16/22

MEXICO'S

CENTRAL

AMERICANPOLICY

In

response,

he Mexican

decision-makers

ave

launched

programmes

ombin-

ing

carrots and sticks. The

carrots

encompassdevelopmental

programmes

nclud-

ing

road

construction,

medical

clinics,

new

governmental tores,

and

agriculturalextension

programmes

nvolving

the distribution

of new

seeds and

the

provision

of

tractors

at token

fees.

The

stick

is

more

germane

to

the

subject

at

hand.

While

the

government's

agricultural

experts

and

social

workers

ply

their

trade,

the

military

presence

has

also

grown.

The

Mexican

Army

has

assigned

one

of

its

most

senior

generals

to the

Chiapas

zone and

reinforced

ts

garrison

n

the

state.

A

Washington

ost

report

quotes

a

'well-placed

official'

as

estimating

that the

military

post

at

Comitan

grew

from

3,000

to

8,000

men

in

early

1981.

Remembering

hat

the

entire

military

establishment

n

Mexico

numbers

only

a trifle

more

than

100,000,

an increaseof 5,000 men in one provincialpost is obviouslysignificant.38

Beyond

the

strategic

mplications

of

the

southern oil

fields

and

the

security

considerations

of

the

rapid

socio-economic and

political change

in the

southern

states,

Mexico's

newly

launched

programme

to

modernize its

military

forms

part

of

the context

connecting

to

the

nation's

Central

American

policy.

The

point

of

departure

s to

understand

hat the

Mexican

military

s

assuming

a more

vigorous posture

than

it

has for

more

than a

generation.

In the

now

famous

interview

granted

to

Proceso

in

late

1980,

General

Galvian

waxed

enthusiastic

about the

military's

modernization. In

responding

to

a

question

reflecting

disquiet,

General Galvan

brushed aside the

apprehensions

in

praising

the

initiative on the groundsthat it 'will guaranteethe sovereigntyand integrity

of our

territory

and

of

all

interior

missions

which we

[the military]

have

to

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