Metaphysics of Aristotle

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Metaphysics of Aristotle (A

Textual Study) Jaimon Thadathil

A science beyond the human knowledge and grasping which is the science of allsciences.


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METAPHYSICS OFARISTOTLE

(A Textual Study)

By

Jaimon Thadathil

Under the Guidance of Rev.Dr. Henry Kodukuthiyil

Dissertation Submitted in Partial FulfillmentFor the requirement for the Degree

Of the Bachelor of Philosophy

November 2009

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Suvidya College

Frasalian Instituteof

Philosophy and Social Sciences

Electronic City

TABLE OF CONTENTS

METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE ................................................................................... 2 November 2009 ................................................................................................................. 2

Suvidya College ...................................................................................................... .......... 3

Frasalian Institute of Philosophy and Social Sciences ...................................................... 3

Electronic City .................................................................................................................. 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................... ........... 3ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................. .... 5GENERAL INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... ..... 7

CHAPTER-1 ...................................................................................................................... 8WHAT IS METAPHYSICS? .............................................................................. ............. . 8Introduction ..................................................................................................................... .. 8

1.1. The life and works of Aristotle ................................................................. ..... ............ 9

1.2. The origin of the term Metaphysics ......................................................... ............. 11

1.3. Nature and Scope of Metaphysics ............................................................................ 11

1.4. Dignity and Object of Metaphysics .............................................................. ........... 13

1.4.1. The Basis of Difference in Animals ...................................................................... 13

1.4.2. The Basis of Difference in Human .......................................................... ............. 14

1.4.3. Science and Art .................................................................................................... 15

1.5. Metaphysics: the science of first causes and first principles .......................... ......... 16

1.6. Nature and Goal of Metaphysics .............................................................................. 17

1.6.1. Speculative science .............................................................................................. . 17

1.6.2. Metaphysics; a free science ...................................................................... ........... 18

1.6.3. Metaphysics is not a human possession ................................................................ 18

1.6.4. Metaphysics: the Most Honorable Science .......................................................... 19

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Conclusion ............ 19

CHAPTER-2 ...... .. 20METAPHYSICS OFCAUSALITY ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE ............................................................. 202.0. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 20

2.1. Material Cause ...................................................................................................... ... 21

2.2. Different views on material cause ............................................................................ 21

2.2.1. Thales: the originator ......................................................................................... ... 22

2.2.2. Empedocles ........................................................................................................... 22

2.2.3. Anaxagoras ................................................................................................ ........... 23

2.3. Efficient Cause and Final Cause .............................................................................. 23

2.3.1. Efficient Cause as a Principle of Good and Evil ................................................... 24

2.3.2. Efficient Cause as a Principle of Intellect ............................................................. 25

2.3.3. Efficient Cause as Love ...................................................................... ..... ............. 25

2.3.4. Love and Hate as Efficient Causes of Good and Evil ........................................... 26

2.4. Truth and Causes ...................................................................................................... 26

2.4.1. Acquisition of Truth .............................................................................................. 27

2.4.2. Metaphysics: science of truth and knowledge of ultimate causes ............ ........... . 27

2.4.3. The existence of first efficient cause ........................................................... ......... 282.4.4. The existence of first material cause ..................................................................... 29

2.4.5. The existence of a first in final and formal cause .............................................. ... 29

Conclusion ........................................................................................................ ............. 30

CHAPTER-3 .................................................................................................................... 30METAPHYSICAL PROBLEMS ................................................................ ..... ............. .. 303.0. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 31

3.1. The Need for Questioning in search for Universal Truth ........................................ 31

3.2. Question Concerning the Method of Metaphysics ................................................... 32

3.3. The Problem of One and Many ................................................................................ 32

3.4. Unity and Being. ...................................................................................................... 33

3.4. Being and Entity ......................................................................................... ............. 34

3.5. Being and Essence ........................................................................................ ........... 34

3.6. Being and Analogy ................................................................................... ............. .. 35

3.7. Being and transcendentals ........................................................................................ 36

3.7.1. Being is One .......................................................................................................... 36

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3.7.2. Being is True

.............................. 36

3.7.3. Being is Good

......................................................................................................................................... 37

3.7.4. Being is Beautiful .................................................................................. ............. .. 37

Conclusion ............................................................................................................. ......... 38

CHAPTER-4 .................................................................................................................... 38FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS AND PRICIPLES OF METAPHYSICS ................... .... 384.0. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 38

4.1. Subject Matter of Metaphysics ......................................................................... ....... 39

4.1.1. Metaphysics: the study of Being as being ............................................................. 40

4.1.2. Being Specifically in Aristotle ............................................................................. 41

4.2. Being and Unity ....................................................................................................... 42

4.3. Unity and Plurality ................................................................................................... 43

4.4. What is Substance? ........................................................................................... ....... 43

4.5.The Role of Substance in the Study of Being as Being ...................................... ..... 44

3.6.Substance, Matter, and Subject ................................................................................. 46

4.7. Substance and Essence ............................................................................................. 48

4.8. The Doctrine of Categories ..................................................................................... 50

4.9. The Being of beings in Aristotle (The Concept of God) ................................ ......... 51

4.9.1. Being as Being ..................................................................................................... 52

4.9.2. The analysis of the Infinite ........................................................................ ........... 53

4.9.3. The Cause .............................................................................................................. 53

4.9.4. The Actuality ........................................................................................... ............. 54

4.9.5. The Unmoved Mover ............................................................................................ 55

Conclusion ........................................................................................................ ............. 55

GENERAL CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 56BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................ ............. .. 58

1. PRIMARY SOURCES ........................................................................................... 582. SECONDARY SOURCES ...................................................................................... 58

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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My heart

fills with joy at

this time of the accomplishment of this thesis, owing to

myriads of persons. First of all with immense gratitude and

contentment of heart I raise my heart and mind to the

Being of beings (as Aristotle would call it) for His inspiration

and enlightenment in this accomplishment of this thesis.

I express my indebted gratitude to Rev. Fr. Henry

Kodukuthiyil my moderator of this thesis for accepting the

task of being my moderator and correcting the thesis in

spite of his busy schedules and heavy responsibilities. I also

extend my sincere thanks to all the staffs of Suvidya, viz.,

Dr. Emmanuel Uppamthadathil, Dr.Jolly Chakkalakkal, Dr.Joy

Mampally,Dr. Thomas Kalariparambil, Dr. George

Panthanmackal ,Dr. Santosh Kumar, Dr. Antony

Mookenthottam, Fr. Jose, and Fr. Michle Selvan for bringing

me up in wisdom and knowledge. Finally I extend a Big

thanks to all my friends and well wishers for their support

and encouragement in making me what I am.

Suvidya College

Electronic city

November 2009

Jaimon Thadathil

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GENERAL

INTRODUCTION

All men by nature desire to know. So does Aristotle optimistically begin the

Metaphysics , a book, or rather a collection of lectures. It is so difficult to read so much

so the Arabian philosopher Avicenna said that he had read the Metaphysics of Aristotle

forty times without understanding it. The above-mentioned statement manifests the

desire, which is the origin of all knowledge. However it is this desire for knowledge that

captivated the philosophers and thinkers of all times to think deeper and deeper and toexplore higher and higher.

Down through the centuries of western philosophy Aristotle remains as a star

icon with his vast knowledge on myriads of disciplinary, which remains as a great

influence on the thinkers of the western philosophy. His metaphysics, which is known,

as Physics rather what he calls wisdom is no exception to this. It had a tremendous

influence not only the philosophers of that time but also the religions of the medieval

period evidently in Christianity.

The metaphysics of Aristotle is a long as well as hard treaty, which treats

being particularly. This being, which is gradually identified with God, becomes highly

relevant for as Christians, as our Christian theology and doctrines are based upon it to a

certain extent. It was Thomas Aquinas who had stridden to bring in the Aristotelian

philosophy into the Christian thinking. What inspired me to choose this topic for my

thesis is one of these reasons. And we will be seeing further metaphysics as the study of being ultimately in detail.

This thesis is a textual study of the metaphysics of Aristotle. The first chapter of

the paper would give an account of what metaphysics is exactly and the special features

of this science. The second chapter brings out the theory of causality according to

Aristotle and further discusses the different theories of causality. The third chapter deals

with the problems of the metaphysics, which opens up the possibility of understanding

the problem of one and many at large. The fourth chapter would give an account of the

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different principles

and notions of

metaphysics, which

ends up in the notion of God as the unmoved mover and primary cause of the universe.

So the entire paper is a birds eye view on the metaphysics of Aristotle.

This dissertation is a humble attempt to study the text of the metaphysics of

Aristotle which covers probably the entire aspects of it, inclusive of being, Being of

beings, ultimate causes, fundamental notion s and metaphysical problems etc. and every

nuance of its principles and notions.

CHAPTER-1

WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?

Introduction

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Aristotle

considers

metaphysics as the

study of being. It is metaphysics because it deals with realities that are transcendental.

Metaphysics can be probably described as the core of human knowledge or the ground

or foundation of philosophy is the science of being as being. It is the core of human

knowledge as it underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unifies all other departments of

human knowledge. It underlies all other departments since its principles are the

detached and disinterested drive of the pure desire to know the unfolding of the pure

desire to know takes place in the empirical, intellectual and rational consciousness of

the self affirming subject. All questions, all insights, all formulations, all reflections and

all judgments proceed from the unfolding of that drive. Hence metaphysics underlies

logic, mathematics, and all other sciences. Metaphysics underlies all other departments

of knowledge .the most important principles of metaphysics is that there is always

something? If at all one makes a statement that there is nothing at all, it would be self

contradictory because there exists at least the statements that one would make. And this

experience of something is the beginning of metaphysics. In this chapter we will

analyze the nature, the scope, the origin and the object of metaphysics.

1.1. The life and works of Aristotle

Aristotle was born in 384 B.C at Stageira in Thrace, and was the son of

Nicomachus, a physician of the Macedonian king, Annyntas II. When he was about

seventeen year old Aristotle went to Athens for purpose of study and became a member of the academy in 368B.C., where for over twenty years he was in constant intercourse

with Plato until the latters death in 348B.C. he thus entered the academy at the time

when Platos later dialectic was being ground in the great philosophers mind. Aristotle

found in Plato a guide and friend for whom he had the greatest admiration and though in

later years his own scientific interests tended to come much more to the fore, the

metaphysical and religious teaching of Plato had a lasting influence on him.

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After

Platos death

Aristotle left Athens

with Xenocrates and founded a branch of the academy at Assos in the Troad. Here he

influenced Hernias, ruler of Atarneaus, and married his niece and adopted daughter,

Pythias. While working at Assos, Aristotle no doubt began to develop his own

independent views. Three years later he went to Mitylene in Lesbos, and it was there

that he was probably in contact with Theophrastus, a native of Erseus on the same

island, who was later the most celebrated disciple of Aristotle. In a343 Aristotle was

invited to Palla by Philip of Macedon to undertake the education of his son Alexander,

then thirteen years old. This period at the court of Macedon and the endeavor to

exercise a real moral influence on the young prince, who was later to play so prominent

a part on the political stage and to go down to posterity as Alexander the great, should

have done much to widen Aristotles horizon and to free him form the narrow

conception of the ordinary Greek, though the effect does not seem to have been so great

as might have been expected. In336, Alexander ascended the throne. In 335 Aristotle

had returned to Athens, where he founded his own school. The new school was in the

northeast of the city, at the Hyceum, the precincts of Apollo Hyceus. The school wasdedicated to muses.

In 323B.C.Alexander the great died and the reaction in Greece against

Macedonian suzerainty led to charge against Aristotle. Aristotle withdraws from Athens

and went to Chalices in Euboea, where he lived in an estate of his dead mother. Shortly

after he died of an illness. To the credit of Aristotle there are number of works on

philosophy, literature, history, esthetics, politics, biology etc. some of his major works

are Categories, de Interpretatione, Metaphysics, Physics, Meteorology, histories of

animals, De anima, Nicomachean Ethics, Politics, rhetoric, poetics etc .1

1

.Frederich Copleston, s.j. History of Philosophy vol..I Greece and Rome, Westminster,Maryland: the New Man press, 1953.pp.266-275.

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1.4. Dignity and

Object of

Metaphysics

Aristotle first sets down an introduction to this science, in which he treats of two

things. First he points out with what this science is concerned. Second he explains that

metaphysics is not a practical science. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he

shows that the office of this science, which is called wisdom, is to consider the causes

of things. Secondly he explains with what causes metaphysics is concerned. In regard to

the first he prefaces certain preliminary considerations from which he argues in support

of h is thesis does two things:

Firstly he makes clear the dignity of scientific knowledge in general.Secondly he explains the hierarchy in knowing. 6

Now Aristotle establishes the dignity of scientific knowledge from the fact that

all men naturally desire it as an end. Hence, in regard to this he does two things. First,he states what he intents to prove. Second proves a sign of this. Accordingly she says,

first all men naturally desire to know. 7 Three reasons can be given for this: The first is

that each thing naturally desires its own perfection. The second reason is that each thing

has a natural inclination to perform its proper operation. The third reason is that it is

desirable for each thing to be united to its source; since it is in this that the perfection of

each thing consists. It is in this reason the ultimate happiness of man naturally desires to

know.

1.4.1. The Basis of Difference in Animals

Aristotle considers the hierarchy in knowledge. He does this first with respect to

brute animals he mentions first what all animals have in common and second, that by

which they differ and surpass one another. He states, Now in some animals memory

6

. Ibid., p.7 . 7. Aristotle , 350 BC Metaphysics, trans . W.D Ross . New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002.p.5.

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Knowledge that is

derived from the

sensory perception is

for every one and it not wisdom as such.

Again, a person who is more certain in wisdom can be considered a wise person

and this certainty arises from fundamental causes and principles. A person who is able

to teach about the causes and of things is considered a wise man in every branch of

science. Metaphysics is the science, which exists for itself and for the sake of

knowledge than the sciences, which exists for itself and for ht e sake of knowledge than

the sciences, which exists for the contingent effects. Metaphysics is superior to all other

sciences. For, a wise man must not be directed but must direct, and he must not obey

another but must be obeyed by one who is less wise. 16

1.6. Nature and Goal of Metaphysics

Metaphysics is not a practical science because its wonder, the starting point of

philosophy. Wonder began gradually from less important things to more important

things. A philosopher is a lover of myths, because myths are made of wonders. They

philosophized only for the sake of knowledge and not for any utility. 17 Aristotle speaks

of metaphysics in four terms. First he shows that this is not a practical science but a

speculative one. Second it is free in the highest degree. Thirdly, it is not a human

enterprise. Fourthly it is the most honorable science.

1.6.1. Speculative science

No science in which knowledge itself is sought for its own sake is a practical

science, but a speculative one. Metaphysics exists for the sake of knowledge itself;

therefore it is a speculative science. He proves the minor premise in this way. Whoever 16

. Ibid. , p.19.17. Ibid.p.24.

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seeks as an end to

escape from

ignorance tends

toward knowledge for itself. But those who philosophize seek as an end to escape from

ignorance. Therefore they tend toward knowledge f or itself. It was wonder, which was

the guiding factor of philosophy, which had led philosophers to philosophize. The

statement wisdom or philosophy is not sought for any utility but for knowledge of itself

is proved by what has happened i.e., what has occurred in the case of those who have

pursued philosophy. And from this, it is clear that wisdom is not sought because of any

necessity other than itself but for itself alone. 18

1.6.2. Metaphysics; a free science

Here Aristotle proves the second attribute namely that, wisdom is free; and he

uses the following argument: that a man is properly said to be free who does not exists

for some one else but for himself; for slaves exists for their masters, works for them,

and acquire for them whatever they acquire. But free man exits for themselves and work

for them. But only this science exists for itself and therefore among all the sciences only

metaphysics is free. 19

1.6.3. Metaphysics is not a human possession

Aristotle proves his thesis by the following argument. A science, which is free inthe highest degree, cannot be a possession of that nature which is servile in many ways.

Therefore this science is not a human possession. Human nature is said to be servile

insofar as it stand in need of many things. Metaphysics which is sought, for itself alone,

man cannot use freely, since he is often kept from it because if the necessities of life.

18. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle .trans. John P.Lowan,vol.II ,

Chicago : Henry Regnery Company, 1961,p.24.19. Ibid.

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Nor again is it

subject to mans

command, because

man cannot acquire it perfectly. 20

1.6.4. Metaphysics: the Most Honorable Science

Metaphysics, which is most divine, is most honorable, just as god himself is also

the most honorable of all things. For he says, what is most divine is most honorable. 21

This science is most divine and is therefore the most honorable science. Metaphysics is

said to be divine in both ways; first, the science, which God has, is said to be divine;

and second, the science, which is about divine matters is said to be divine. Since

metaphysics is about first causes and principles, it must be about God. Again such a

science, which is about God and first causes, either God alone has or, if not He alone, at

least He has it in the highest degree. Indeed, He alone has it in a perfectly

comprehensive way.

Conclusion

From all these considerations Aristotle draws the further conclusion that all

other sciences are more necessary than this science for use in practical life, for these

sciences are sought least of all for themselves. But none of the other sciences can be

more excellent than this one. In this chapter we analyzed what exactly is metaphysics.

We have also analyzed the importance of metaphysics in the midst of all the other

sciences. We should also understand the fact that this is the most honorable of all

science because this is a divine one. So the study of metaphysics becomes highly

relevant since it sits at the top of the hierarchy of all the other sciences, which is so

divine.

20

. Ibid.,p.2521. Aristotle , 350 BC Metaphysics, trans . W.D Ross . New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002.p.32.

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CHAPTER-2

METAPHYSICS OF CAUSALITY ACCORDING TOARISTOTLE

2.0. Introduction

To know a thing is to know the nature of the thing. But in what does the nature

of a thing consist? Aristotle points out that philosopher in the past have by no means

been as to what constitutes the nature of a thing. He says some hold that nature and

substantive existence of natural products reside in their materials, the analogy of the

wood of a bed steel or the bronze of a statue. And in like manner it is thought of the

material themselves bear to them yet other substances the same relation which the

manufactured articles bear to them. If for instance water is the material of bronze or

gold or earth or bone or timber and so forth- then it is the water or earth in that we must

look for the nature and essential being of the gold and so forth. And this is why some

have said that it was the earth that constituted the nature of the thing, some fire, some

air, some water, and some several and some all of these elements. For whichever

substance or substances each thinker assume to be primary he regarded as constituting

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the substantive

existence of all

things in general, all

else being modification, states, and disposition of them.

2.1. Material Cause

Accordingly Aristotle says most of those who first philosophized thought that

only the things which belong to the class of matter are the principle of all things. 22 In

regard to this it must be said that they took the four conditions of matter which seem to

belong to the notion of a principle. Because first thing, that of which a thing is

composed seems to be a principle of that thing. But matter is such a thing; for we say

that a thing that has matter is of its matter, as a knife is of iron. Secondly, that from

which a thing comes to be, being also a principle of the process of generation of that

thing seems to be one of its causes, because a thing causes into being by way of

generation. But a thing first comes to be from the matter, because the matter of things

precedes their production. Now the matter which is the substance of a thing remains

through out every transmutation, although its attributes, such as its form and everything

that assumes to its own an above its material substance, are changed. From all these

considerations they concluded that matter is the element and principle of all begins.

2.2. Different views on material cause

When some change occurs with regard to a things attributes, and its substanceremains unchanged, we don not say that it is generated or corrupted in an absolute

sense, but only in a qualified one. But matter which is the substance of things according

to them always remains; and every change affects some of a things accidents, such as

its attributes. From this they concluded that there is nothing generated or concluded in

an absolute sense, but only in a qualified one. Even though they agreed in this point, in

posting a material cause, nevertheless they differed in their position in two respects:

22. Aristotle , 350 BC Metaphysics, trans. W.D Ross . New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002.p.36.

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first with the respect

to the number of

material causes,

because some held that there is one, and others many; and second, with respect to its

nature, because some held that it is fire, others water and so on. 23

2.2.1. Thales: the originator

Firstly, Aristotle gives the opinion of Thales who said that water is the principleof things. Aristotle says then that Thales, the originator of this kind of philosophy, i.e.

speculative philosophy, said that water is the first principle of all things. Thales is said

to have been the originator of speculative philosophy because he was the only one of the

seven wise men, who came after the theological poets, to make an investigation into the

causes of things, the other sages being concerned with moral matters.

The first reason to show that water is the principle of being of things is that thenutriment of living things must be moist. The second reason is that its proper and

natural heat conserves being of any physical thing. But heat seems to be generated from

moisture. The third reason is that universal life depends on moisture. And for this

reason he adopted this opinion that moisture is the principle of all things.

2.2.2. Empedocles

Here Aristotle gives the opinion of Empedocles, who held that there are a

limited number of such principles. According to Empedocles there are four elements,

which are the principles of things; i.e. water, air, fire, and earth. Empedocles held that

these elements always remain and are neither generated nor corrupted. 24

23. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle .trans. John P.Lowan, vol.II ,

Chicago : Henry Regnery Company, 1961,p.32.24. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, p.35

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Aristotle

says then, that some

philosophers have proceeded in this way in positing a material cause, but that the very

nature of reality clearly provided them with a cause for understanding or discovering the

truth, and compelled them to investigate a problem, which led them to efficient cause.

This problem is as follows: no thing or subject changes itself, for example wood doesnt

change itself so that a led comes from it, nor does bronze cause itself to be changed in

such a way that a statue comes from it; but there must be some other principles which

causes the change they undergo an this is the artist. But those who posited a material

cause, whether one or more than one, said that the generations and corruption of things

come from this cause as subject. Therefore there must be some other cause of change,

and to seek this is to seek another class of principle and cause, which is called the

source of motion. 26

2.3.1. Efficient Cause as a Principle of Good and Evil

Aristotle says that after the forgoing philosophers who held that there is only one

material cause, or many bodies, one of which was active and the others passive, and

after the other first principles given by them, men were again compelled by the truth

itself i.e. the one which naturally follows the forgoing one, namely, the cause of good,

which is really the final cause. Although they held it only incidentally, it will be seen

below. They held that there is a cause of goodness in thing only after the manner of an

efficient cause. But neither fire nor earth nor any such bodies were held to be adequate

causes of this kind of good disposition or statue of being which some things already

have but others acquire by some kind of production. However, this is also seen to be

false by reason of the fact that good dispositions of this kind are found either always or

for the most part, whereas things that come about by chance or fortune do not occur

always or of the most part but seldom. 27

26

. Aristotle , 350 BC Metaphysics, p.45. 27. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, p.40.

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2.3.2. Efficient Cause as a Principle of Intellect

Aristotle gives the views of those who held that the efficient cause is intellect.

Aristotle says that after the forgoing doctrine someone appeared who said that there is

an intellect present in nature at large, just as there is in animals, and that this is the cause

of the world and the order of the whole i.e. of the universe, in which order, the good of

the entire universe and that of every single part consists. Hence it is evident that those

who held this opinion claimed at the same time that the principle by which things are

well disposed and the one, which is the source of motion in things, are one and the

same. 28

2.3.3. Efficient Cause as Love

Here Aristotle gives the opinion of those who claimed that love is the first

principle, although they did not hold this very explicitly or clearly. So Aristotle says

that Hesiod had sought for such a principle to count for the good disposition of things or

anyone else who posited love or desire in nature. And he also held that love, which

instructs all the immortals, is a principle of things. He did this because the

communication of goodness seems to spring form love, for a good deed is a sign and

effect of love .29 Because love moves us to act, because it is the source of all emotions,

since fear, sadness and hope proceed only from love. Thus Hesiod posited chaos andlove as though there had to be in existing things not only a material cause of their

motions, but also an efficient cause, which moves and unites them.

28

. Aristotle , 350 BC Metaphysics, p.48.29. Ibid ., p.11.

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2.3.4. Love and

Hate as

Efficient

Causes of Good and Evil

If the cause of all good things is good and that of all evil things is evil. 30 This

was said by Empedocles, which Aristotle refers to what is evil? The definition of evil

according to Thomas Aquinas goes, as privation of what is good. Love, which is

considered to be absolute, the cause of all good things cannot become the principal

cause of all evil things. Then how do we explain the evil things that are happening in

the world? Is God accountable for it? If God who is absolute good is accountable for

evil things would bring upon itself contradiction. Aristotle solves this problem by

explaining and referring to Empedocles that strife or conflict is the cause of all evils. If

we really understand this expression rather than taking as a faltering expression, we will

discover that love is the ultimate cause of all things in totality and conflict is the cause

of evil things. If we understand the context in which he spoke, we must first say that

good and evil are principles. There is a tendency in beings to separate from Being, and

then there is strife. But this strife is not absolute but only relative. There fore it is wise

to say that causes of all good things are good and causes of evil things are evil.

2.4. Truth and Causes

It is right to call philosophy the science of truth. For the end of theoretical

knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action. 31 What is therelationship between truth and cause? Truth and cause are related in a way that w know

truth only by knowing its cause. For example, fire is hot and the cause of heat is actually

other things. Therefore that is also true in the highest degree, which is the cause of all

subsequent things being true. But there exists a truth in the highest degree which is the

principle of things and which is always true too. Therefore Aristotle concludes in so far

30

. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, p.42.31. Aristotle , 350 BC Metaphysics, p.35.

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as each thing has

being to that extent

it is true. 32

Philosophers are in search of truth and in the process of the discovery of the truth. Truth

can be known only in terms of its causes. Therefore there is an intrinsic relationship

between truth and causes.

2.4.1. Acquisition of Truth

According to Aristotle the theoretical or speculative knowledge of truth is

difficult in one sense and in another sense easy. It is manifested in the fact that no one

can attain an adequate knowledge, at the same time every one do not fail in this attempt

but each one is able to say something true about nature. Personal effort of an individual

can add nothing to the truth, all the same. A combined effort of all serves the truth to be

known. And the difficulty involved in the cognitive process is that we cannot

understand whole and parts simultaneously. However the cause of it is not in things but

perhaps it is in us. Aristotle says that we must be grateful not only to those views that

we agree with but those views that are superficial in the unfolding of the truth. Aristotle

uses the example that; if there had been no Timotheus, we would not have been great

part of our music; and if there had been no Phrynis, there would have been no

Timotheus. In the same way we accept the opinion of some of them who have made

statements about truth and others have been the cause in attaining their knowledge. 33

2.4.2. Metaphysics: science of truth and knowledge of ultimate

causes

It is only right to call metaphysics the science of truth because the end of

metaphysics is the truth, whereas the end of practical knowledge is action. We know the

32

. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, p.120.33. Aristotle , 350 BC Metaphysics, pp.34-35.

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truth of something

only by finding out

the cause of it. In so

far as each thing has being and to that extent it is true. Further, it is evident that there is

a principle and that the causes of existing things are not infinite either in series or in

species. For it is impossible that one thing should come from something else as from

matter in an infinite regress, for example, flesh from earth, earth from air, air from fire

and so on to infinity. In the case of reason, there cannot be infinite regress when

something is done, or though walking was for the sake of health, health for the sake of

happiness and happiness for the sake of something else. There fore we can say one thing

is always done for the sake for something else. It is impossible to proceed to infinity in

the case of quiddity i.e. formal cause too.

2.4.3. The existence of first efficient cause

We already know that causes of beings are not infinite in number. Aristotle first

provides that there are no finite numbers of causes in a series; and second he proves thatthe classes of causes are not infinite in number. If we had to say which of three i.e., the

first, the intermediate, or the last, is the cause of others, we would have to say first is the

cause. What is last cannot become the cause because effect follows a cause. Nor

intermediate can be said as the cause of all others. Because intermediate is followed by

only one thing i.e., what is last? There must be a first cause of motion, which is prior to

every intermediate cause. If we say that there is an infinite series of moving causes, then

all causes would be intermediate ones. Consequently if the causes of motion proceed in

this way there will be no first cause. But first cause is the cause of all things. 34

34. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, vol.I, pp.124-126.

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2.4.4. The

existence of first material cause

Aristotle says it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the cause of material

causes. Now just as action is attributed to the cause of motion, so in undergoing action

attributed to matter. Aristotle illustrates this by way of the process of natural direction, s

if we were to say that water comes from fire, earth from water, and so on to infinity.

With regard to the class of material causes, Aristotle assumes foundation and basis of

the others. Matter is held to exist and Aristotle asks whether the things that are

generated from matter proceed to infinity.

Aristotle uses two common suppositions accepted by all of the ancient

philosophers:

First, that there is a primary principle and therefore that there is a primary principle and therefore that is the process of generation there isno infinite regress on the past of the generated; second that matter is

eternal. Therefore, from this second supposition he immediatelyconcludes that nothing comes from first matter in the second way, i.e. inthe way in which water comes from air as a result of the latterscorruption, becomes what is eternal cannot be corrupted. 35

Now it is evident that a thing comes from this first material principle as

something imperfect and potential which is midway between pure and non-being and

actual being, but not as water comes from air by reason of the latters corruption.

2.4.5. The existence of a first in final and formal cause

Again, that for the sake of which something comes to be is an end. 36 But an

end does not exist for the sake of other things, but others exist for its sake. If there is an

ultimate end, there will not be an infinite regress. But if there is an infinite regress, there

will be no reason for which things come to be. Aristotle concludes that all those who

35

. Ibid ., p.128.36. Aristotle , 350 BC Metaphysics, p.37.

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posit an infinite

regress in final

causes do away with

the final causes. When the final cause is removed, the good also is removed because the

meaning of good also is removed because the meaning of good and are same. Every

intelligent agent acts for the sake of some end. Therefore an intelligent agent cannot do

away with the final cause. If we believe in infinite regress of the final causes, scientific

knowledge would become impossible because when there is infinite number of causes,

we cannot know anything. But unless we know the causes of things the scientific

knowledge is impossible. If it does not exist (i.e., if the infinite does not exist) the

essence of the infinite is not infinite. 37

Conclusion

There seems to be a contradiction in the nature itself. There are things, which are

good as well as evil, order and disorder etc; more evil things than good things and more

base things than noble things. And because of this Empedocles brought out the term

love and strife are the causes of all effects. If we really understand this expression, wewill discover that love is the ultimate causes of all things in totality and conflict is the

cause of all evil things. If we understand the context in which he spoke, we must first

say that good and evil are principles. Like wise it is better to say that causes of all good

things are good and causes of all evil things are evil. St.John says, God is love because

love comes from God. St. Paul would say, love never ends, as for knowledge and

prophecies; it will come to an end. Therefore Love is the ultimate principle of all

causes.

CHAPTER-3

METAPHYSICAL PROBLEMS

37. Ibid.

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3.0. Introduction

In the book III, Aristotle proceeds with the study of truth. First he proceeds

disruptively indicating those pints, which are open to question so far as the truth of

things is concerned. Second he begins to establish what is true. In the first, he states

what he intends to do. In the second, he proceeds to do. The basis of the problem one

and many can be located in the question of the numerical nature of being which is

implied in the basic metaphysical question of being as such which is the starting point

of metaphysics. Metaphysics begins with the question of being.

3.1. The Need for Questioning in search for Universal Truth

Aristotle says first, then, that with a view to this science which we are seeking

about first principles and what is universally true of things; we must attack, first of all,

these subjects about which it is necessary to raise questions before truth is established.

Now these are disputed pints of this kind for two reasons, either because, the ancient

philosophers entertained a different opinion about these then is really true, or because

they completely neglected to consider them. 38 Aristotle says that those who wish to

investigate the truth are worthwhile to examine carefully those matters, which are open

to question. In so far as the mind is puzzled about some subject, it experiences some

similar to those who highly bound. For just like a person whose feet are tied cannot

move forward on an earthly road, is a similar way, a person whose mind is puzzled

cannot move forward on the road of speculative knowledge. Further Aristotle says that

those who investigate without recognizing the problem are like those who do not know

where they are going. One, who knows the problem before hand, will know the goal

when he reaches it but no the one who does not know. Further he says one who has

made all the arguments of the litigants, as it were, and of those who argue the question,

is necessarily in a better position to pass judgment. 39

38. Thomas Aquinas, commentary on the metaphysics of Aristotle. Trans. John P.Lowan, vol.I ,

Chicago : Henry Regnery Company, 1961,p.142.39. Aristotle , 350 BC Metaphysics, trans. W.D Ross . New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002.p.40.

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3.2. Question

Concerning the Method of Metaphysics

The first problem concerns the things about the question, whether it belongs one

science or to many to speculate about the causes. Here Aristotle raises problems about

the things which metaphysics considers. First he enquires about the things which

metaphysics considers about substances; and second about substances themselves. If

metaphysics deals with substance, there is the question whether one science deals with

all substances or many sciences. It is also necessary to inquire whether sensible

substances alone exist or whether there are many substances in addition to these. There

is also a problem whether this speculation has to do with substances alone or also with

proper accidents of substances. And Aristotle says that we must inquire about sameness

and difference, likeness and unlikeness, centrality, priority and posteriori, and all other

such things, which the dialecticians attempt to treat basing their investigation only on

probabilities. Further more, we must investigate all these essential accidents of these

same things.

3.3. The Problem of One and Many

Being is that which is in some way or something. In so far as it is in some way,

it is one. However each being is in its own way. In so far as each being is in its own

way, all beings are in their own ways, which are many. In other words, Being which is

in someway is also in its own way. In so far as beings are their own ways there will be a

plurality of beings that is many beings.

Aristotle asks whether it is the office of one science or many to study all the

calluses of causes. In the case of many existing things not all the principles are present

how can the principle of motion be present in all the invisible things or how can the

nature of good be formed there? Because everything which is a good in itself and by

reason of its own nature is an end and thus a cause, because it is for its sake the other

beings come and exist. All actions involve motion; therefore it would be impossible for

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this principle to be

present in immobile

things. In so far as

metaphysics has been defined as the science of first causes and of what is most

knowable, such a science will be about substance. For a while subject may be known in

many ways, Aristotle says he who knows what a thing is in its being knows it better

than he who knows it in its non-being. 40

3.4. Unity and Being.

The most difficult problem which has to be considered and the one which is

most necessary for a knowledge of the truth, is whether unity and being are substance of

existing things, and whether each of them is nothing else than unity and being. Or

whether it is necessary to investigate what a being and unity themselves are, as though

there were some other nature, which underlies them. Empedocles would say that unity is

being; and further, he says that being is love, since this is the cause why unity belongs

to all things. Others would say that this unity and being is made up of fire and some

others would say it is air. Unity and being are principles for those who say that there are

many elements, which constitute being and unity. Being and unity are substances and

they are the most universal of all. If there is no being-in itself, there will be hardly

anything existing apart from what are called singular things. If unity is not a substance,

number cannot exist as another reality. But if there is being-in itself, substance of these

must be unity itself and being itself. Unity and being are predicted universally of all

things. All beings are either one or many, each of which is a one. Further, if unity is

indivisible, according to Zenos axiom it will be nothing. Aristotle speculates that it is

possible for a thing to be indivisible in such a way that some answers may be made

against him, because when something is added it will not make a thing greater but

more. 41

40

. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. p.151.41. Aristotle , 350 BC Metaphysics , pp. 55-61.

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3.4. Being andEntity

Thomas Aquinas has hired most of his metaphysical notions from Aristotle. For him metaphysics is the science on ens qua ens. The whole attention of Thomas appears

to be on entity. Being is the actual intrinsic principle, which explains entity. However in

actuality Being for Thomas is more than a mere intrinsic principle. Because entity

always finds itself in Being which is the act of existing of entity. It is the Being of

entity. Hence the traditional Aristotelian definition of metaphysics as a science of ens

qua ens , for Thomas, in the science of entity in terms of Being. In God, entity is still

clearer from his theory of participation. Just as that which has fire but is not itself fire, ison fire by participation, so that which has existence, but is not existence, is an entity by

participation. But God is his own essence. But he is not his own act of being; he will be

an entity by participation and not by essence. In that case he will not be the first entity,

which is absurd to say. Therefore, God is his own act of Being, and not only his own

essence. God is related to creatures as pure perfection is related to its imperfect

similitude. God is not related to its imperfect similitude. God is not heat or light as any

other form, but Being itself. There is only one Being, the subsistent entity of God

himself, which is communicated to the created entities. 42

3.5. Being and Essence

All creatures are composed of Being and essence. They are two actually and

objectively distinct, but inseparably related principles. The real distinction between

Being and essence is evident right from the beginning of his writings. The main

arguments given by Aquinas to prove the real distinction are three:

According to first argument, being is not included in the definition of any

creature. Anything that is in a gender has a quiddity that differs from its being. The

second argument is based on the uniqueness of God in whom is the identification of

being and essence. In God being and essence are same and they are not distinct

principles. His essence is his own very Being. Third argument is based on the finitude

42

. George Panthanmackal, One and Many , Indian Institute of Spirituality, Bangalore:1993,pp.38-39

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of the creatures. The

creatures are finite

because they do not

have the fullness of the perfection of Being. 43

Every creature has finite Being, but whim being is not received in something

else, it si not finite but absolute. Therfgore evry finite creatures hs being and essence

wchich are distinct from each other. Aristotle also interprets bieng and esence in terms

of act and potency. The funciton of th act belongs to beign asnd the funciton of the

potency belongs to essence. 44

3.6. Being and Analogy

Aristotle classifies anlaogy into three;

That which is is analogous according to intention, and not according to

existence. That which is analogus according to existence only, and not according to

intention.

That which si analogous according to intention and according to existence.

The first is the anolgy of proportion or attribution in which intrinsic form, or formal

perfection, is found only in the primary analogate and is predicted of all other

analogates throughextrinsic denomination.

The second is the anlogy of inequality. In metaphysics and in antural secneces the

term is not used in the same respect when it is applied to curruptible and incurruptible

bodies. The third type of anolgy is th eanlogy of proper-proportionality since nothing is

considered equal either according to a common inteniton or according to the act of

existing. This si truly the metaphysicsl analogy of Being. 45

43. Ibid., pp.39-40.44

. Ibid., pp.38-41.45. Ibid., pp.42-43.

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3.7. Being and

transcendentals

Transcedentals are those properites and modes of Being which are present in all

entiteis is so far as they are Being. The main ones are one, true, good, and beautiful.

Transcedental means inadequate and intrinsic supreme modes or attributes nesecesarily

present on everything and every experience. Bieng means all the attributes of bieng are

also tranascedentally present in evrything, such as oneness, truth, goodness and beauty.

3.7.1. Being is One

Everything is one in so far as it is in someway or something. Besides, every

being is one. Every unity is a bieng, every being is a unity. Being is one which means

undivided in itself and divided from all other beigns. There are two kinds of one:

Perfectly one

Imperfectly one

Perfectly one is one of simplicity without any composition. Ex: God.

Imperfectly one is one of compostion with distict part or elements within it. For Ex: all

materail biengs. one does not add any reality to Being, but is only the negation of

division; for one simply means unidived Being. 46

3.7.2. Being is True

Every being is true in so far as it is. Being is perfection. Perfection implies act.

Hence actual beign is perfect. Being implies truth an dtruth implies being. They are both

46. Ibid., p.43.

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convertible and thus

transcendental.

There aer three

logicla truth. Logicla truth is the conformity or correspondence of the intellect to a

thing. Moral truth is the duo conformity of correspondence of expression and thought.

Ontologicla truth is the conformity or compatiblity of the thing to the intellect. There

are two kinds of ontological truth: in the conformity of correspoedece of an idea which

is taken as the norm, the standard, or the pattern of a bieng. Indentical ontological truth

is the original identity of being and knowing. Metaphysically speaking evry being is

true in so far as it is.

3.7.3. Being is Good

Aristotle says good is that which all desire. Desiralbilty is the result of

perfection. Perfection depends on actualtiy. The actuality of a thing depends upon

actuality. The actualtiy of a thing depends upon the act of exsiting. To be good is really

the same thing as existing. Goodness of a thing consits in its being desirable ; hence

aristotles dictum good is what all things desire. The perfection of athing dependsupon how far it h as achieved actuality. It is clear that a thing is good in as much as it

exists. But the question arises is every thing that exists good?. In as much as they

exist all things are good. Goood is absolute where as evil realative. 47

3.7.4. Being is Beautiful

Beauty is the splendor of order by which a being can delight a cognitive

faculty. According to Thomas, beauty is that which pleases the mind when seen or

apprehended. Whatever is good is also beautiful at the same time. Beauty deals with

experiential knowledge that delights the agent of experience. As good thing is also in

fact a beautiful thing; for both epithets have the same basis in reality, namely, the

possession of the form; and this is why the good is esteemed beautiful. Good deals47. Ibid., pp.45-46.

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The notion of

Being.

The notion of

Action.

The notion of Self.

These three notions are implicitly present in all our experiecnes. Bieng is not

only a notion but also ultimate priciple. In this chapter, we will analyse the pricples and

notion of being.

4.1. Subject Matter of Metaphysics

The subject matter of metaphysics is nothing but being. And metaphysics is a

certain science which studies Being as being and the attributes which necessarily beong

to being. Metaphsycis is not a sciecne which can be identified with other disciplines of

sciences because none of the other sciences attempt to sudy being as being in general.

Whaterver other sciences study only some parts and accidents of being. Here Aristotle

shows that sceince that sceicne with which we are dealing has being as its subject, andhe uses the following arguments: Every priciple is of itslef th epriciple and csue of

some nature. 48 But we are seeking the first priciples and ultimate cuases of things and

therefore these are of themsleves the cause of some nature. But this nature can only be

the nature of bieng. Therefore we can sya metaphysics is a sceince whch deal which

seeks priciples of being as being. H ence being is the subject of this sceince, for any

sceince seeks the proper cuaes of its subject but also the proper accidents of its subject,

Aristotle therfore says there is a sceince which invetigates bieng as being and the

attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. 49

48. Thomas Aquinas, commentary on the metaphysics of Aristotle. Trans. John P.Lowan, vol.I ,Chicago : Henry Regnery Company, 1961,p.127.

49

. Aristotle , 350 BC Metaphysics, trans. W.D Ross . New Delhi: Cosmo Publications,2002.p.62.

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4.1.1.

Metaphysics: the study of Being as being

The term being is used in amny senses, but with reference to one thing an to

some to one nature and not equivocally. Therefore the term being is used not univocally

and equivocally but anlougously. Aristotle would argue in this way that those things

which have one term predicted of them is common ,not univocally but analogously,

belong to the consideration of one sceince. But the term being is predicated to all

beings. Therefore all beings i.e., substance an accidents belong to the consideration of

metaphysics which considers being as being. Accordingly Aristotle says that term bieng

has sevral meanings. It is predicated of different things in various senses. Sometimes it

is predicted according to a meaning wchih is the same and then it can be predicted of

them univocally, as animal is predictated according to meaning which is entirely

different.

Therefore we say, the term being has many senses. Yet every being is caled

such in realtin to one first thing, and this first thing is not an end or an efficient cause, as

is the case in the forgoing examples, but subject. Because some things are called beings

in the primary and proper sense. Others are called beings because theyh are affections or

properties of substances. And otheres are called beings because they are processes

toward substance, as generation and motion. And others are called beings because they

are curruptions of substances; because curruption is the process toward non-being.

Certain quantities and accidents ar ecalled beings because theya re generative priciples

of substance. When a negation of posessses a being, it is called a non-being. Hence non- being is non-being. Then Aristotle shows that this sceince, even though it considers

biengs, is chiefly concerned with substances. 50 We have learned that metaphysics is the

sudy of being in general. An every being is analogous which includes two things:

Being is anlogous wchih means Being is analogously present in evrything.

50 . Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. pp.216-220.

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Every Being

is analogous

that means it

is realated analogously to Being as such. It also means that every being is

analogously related to other fellow beings.

4.1.2. Being Specifically in Aristotle

When the word being turns up in texts of Aristotle, it is this hidden history of its

use, and not its etymology, which is determining its meaning. First of all, the word fills

a gap in the language of being, since Greek has no word for thing . The two closest

equivalents are to on and to chrema . To on simply means whatever is, and includes the

color blue, the length two feet, the action walking, and anything at all that can be said to

be. To chrema means a thing used, used up, spent, or consumed; any kind of possession,

namely, that is not being . Being holds together, remains, and makes its possessor

emphatically somebody. In the vocabulary of money, being is to to chremata as

whatever remains constant in a thing is to all the onta that comes and goes. Being also

carries with it the sense of something that belongs somehow to all but directly and fully

only to a few. The word is ready-made to be the theme of Aristotle's investigation of

being, because both the word and the investigation were designed by Plato. For

Aristotle, the inquiry into the nature of being begins with the observation that being is

meant in many ways.

To Aristotle, this means that being is not a universal or a genus. If being is the

comprehensive class to which everything belongs, how does it come to have sub-classes? It would have to be divided with respect to something outside itself. Beings

would have to be distinguished by possessing or failing to possess some characteristic,

but that characteristic would have to be either a class within being, already separated off

from the rest by reference to something prior, or a non-being. Since both are impossible,

being must come already divided: the highest genera or ultimate classes of things must

be irreducibly many. This is Aristotle's doctrine of the categories, and according to him

being means at least eight different things.

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4.2. Being andUnity

With regard to being and unity Aristotle proceeds to show that the study of

common attributes such as one and many, and, same and different belongs to the

consideration of one and the same science. Even though being and unity same and are a

single nature in the sense that they are expresssed by a single concept. An even if we

consider them as same, it makes no difference. Aristotle therefore says being and unity

are the same and are single nature. 51 He says this because some things are numerically

the same which are not a single nature but different natures. The term one and being do

not signify different natures but a single nature. One and bieng signify one nature

according to different concepts, so they are like terms principle and cause. Aristotle

uses these particualr arguments in explicating this;

For one man and human being and man are the same thibng; and nothingdifferent is expressed by repeating the terms we say, this is a human being, aman, and one man. And it is evident that they are not separated either ingeneration or in corruption. The same holds true of what is one. Hence it isevident that any addition to these expresses the same thing, and that unity isnothing else than being. 52

Hence Aristotle concludes that it is the business of the metaphysics to consider

the parts of unity, just as it is to consider the parts of unity, just as it is to consider the

parts of being. Since being and unity signify the same thing, species of being and

species of unity also must be same and correspond to each other. Parts of being are

substance, quantity, quality, and so on and parts of unity are same when they are one in

substance, one in quantity, one in quality etc. hence all parts of metaphysics are united

in the study of being and unity , although they are about different parts of substance.

51

. Ibid., p. 222.52 . Aristotle , 350 BC Metaphysics, p. 64.

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4.3. Unity andPlurality

Here Aristotle shows that it is the duty of metaphysics to study opposites and

plurality in opposite of unity. It is also the duty of metaphysics to study negation and

privation, because in both cases we are studying the unity of which there is negation or

privation. There are two kinds of negation:

Simple negation- by which one thing is said absolutely not present in something

else. Negation in a genus- by which something is denied of something else, not

absolutely, but within the limits of some determinate genus.

Therefore this difference is present in unity over and above what is implied in

negation; because negation is the absence of the thing in question. But in the case of

privation there is an underlying subject of which the privation is predicated. 53

But plurality is the opposite of unity. Therefore the opposite concepts like

otherness, unlikeness, and inequality, and any others which are referred to plurality or

unity must come within the scope of metaphysics. Hence the term one is used in many

senses and this term designate the opposite which are motioned above. Therefore it is

the business of metaphysics to know them all. Aristotle draws the conclusion from what

has been said, namely, it belongs to metaphysics to reason about these common

predicated and about substance, and consideration on unity and being. 54

4.4. What is Substance?

In his Metaphysics , Aristotle takes up the promised study of substance. He begins

by reiterating and refining some of what he said of that being which is said in many

53

.Ibid.,p.65.54. Thomas Aquinas, commentary on the metaphysics of Aristotle. pp.226-229.

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ways, and that the

primary sense of

being is the sense

in which substances are beings. Here, however, he explicitly links the secondary senses

of being to the non-substance categories. The primacy of substance leads Aristotle to

say that the age-old question What is being? Is just the question What is substance? 55

Before answering this question about examples, however, he says that we

must first answer the question about criteria: what is it to be a substance?The negative

criterion (neither in a subject nor said of a subject) of the Categories tells us only

which things are substances. But even if we know that something is a substance, wemust still say what makes it a substance what the cause is of its being a substance.

This is the question to which Aristotle next turns. To answer it is to identify, as Aristotle

puts it, the substance of that thing. 56

4.5.The Role of Substance in the Study of Being as Being

The Categories leads us to expect that the study of being in general (being as

being) will crucially involve the study of substance, and when we turn to the

Metaphysics we are not disappointed. First, Aristotle argues in a new way for the

ontological priority of substance; and then,he wrestles with the problem of what it is to

be a substance. We will begin with the account of the central place of substance in the

study of being qua being.

As we noted above, metaphysics is the science which studies being qua being. In

this respect it is unlike the specialized or departmental sciences, which study only part

of being (only some of the things that exist) or study beings only in a specialized way

(e.g., only in so far as they are changeable, rather than in so far as they are beings). 57

55 Frank A Lewis. Substance and Predication in Aristotle . Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.1991,pp.78-85

56. J Michael Loux, Aristotle on Matter, Form, and Ontological Strategy. Ancient PhilosophyCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.81-123.

57

. David Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence . Oxford: Clarendon Press.2002, pp.125-130.

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an account of the

central case of

beings

substances. 59

3.6.Substance, Matter, and Subject

Aristotle begins with a list of four possible candidates for being the substance of

something: essence, universal, genus, and subject. Presumably, this means that if x is a

substance, then the substance of x might be either (i) the essence of x, or (ii) someuniversal predicated of x, or (iii) a genus that x belongs to, or (iv) a subject of which x is

predicated.The idea that the substance of something is a subject of which it is

predicated.

A subject, Aristotle tells us, is that of which everything else is predicated,

while it is itself not predicated of anything else. This characterization of a subject is

reminiscent of the language of the Categories , which tells us that a primary substance is

not predicated of anything else, whereas other things are predicated of it. Candidate (iv)

thus seems to reiterate the Categories criterion for being a substance. But there are two

reasons to be wary of drawing this conclusion. First, whereas the subject criterion of the

Categories told us that substances were the ultimate subjects of predication, the subject

criterion envisaged here is supposed to tell us what the substance of something is. So

what it would tell us is that if x is a substance, then the substance of x that which

makes x a substance is a subject that x is predicated of. Second, as his next comment

makes clear, Aristotle has in mind something other than this Categories idea. For the

subject that he here envisages, he says, is either matter or form or the compound of

matter and form. These are concepts from Aristotle's Physics , and none of them figured

in the ontology of the Categories . To appreciate the issues Aristotle is raising here, we

59 . Alan Code. Aristotle: Essence and Accident. In R. Grandy and R. Warner (eds.),

Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends . Oxford: Clarendon Press.1986, pp.411-439.

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must briefly

compare his

treatment of the

notion of a subject in the Physics with that in the Categories .60

In the Categories , individual substances (a man, a horse) were treated as

fundamental subjects of predication. They were also understood, indirectly, as subjects

of change. (A substance, one and the same in number, can receive contraries. An

individual man, for example, being one and the same, becomes now pale and now dark,

now hot and now cold, now bad and now good.These are changes in which substances

move, or alter, or grow. What the Categories did not explore, however, are changes inwhich substances are generated or destroyed. But the theory of change Aristotle

develops in the Physics requires some other subject for changes such as these a

subject of which substance is predicated and it identifies matter as the fundamental

subject of change . Change is seen in the Physics as a process in which matter either

takes on or loses form. 61

But from the point of view of the Physics , substantial individuals are seen as

predicative complexes; they are hylomorphic compounds compounds of matter and

form and the subject criterion looks rather different from the hylomorphic

perspective.

Matter, form, and the compound of matter and form may all be considered

subjects, Aristotle tells us, but which of them is substance? The subject criterion by

itself leads to the answer that the substance of x is an entirely indeterminate matter of

which x is composed. For form is predicated of matter as subject, and one can alwaysanalyze a hylomorphic compound into its predicates and the subject of which they are

predicated. And when all predicates have been removed (in thought), the subject that

remains is nothing at all in its own right an entity all of whose properties are

accidental to it. The resulting subject is matter from which all form has been expunged.

(Traditional scholarship calls this prime matter, but Aristotle does not here indicate

whether he thinks there actually is such a thing.) So the subject criterion leads to the

60

. B Jones . Individuals in Aristotle's Categories, Phronesis 1972, pp.107-123.61 . Ibid., pp.167-176.

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answer that the

substance of x is the

formless matter of

which it is ultimately composed. 62

Being separate has to do with being able to exist independently ( x is separate

from y if x is capable of existing independently of y), and being some this means being a

determinate individual. So a substance must be a determinate individual that is capable

of existing on its own. One might even hold, although this is controversial, that on

Aristotle's account not every this is also separate. A particular color or shape might

be considered a determinate individual that is not capable of existing on its own it isalways the color of shape of some substance or other.But matter fails to be

simultaneously both eparateand some this. The matter of which a substance is

composed may exist independently of that substance (think of the wood of which a desk

is composed, which existed before the desk was made and may survive the disassembly

of the desk), but it is not as such any definite individual it is just a quantity of a

certain kind of matter. Of course, the matter may be construed as constituting a definite

individual substance (the wood just is, one might say, the particular desk it composes),

but it is in that sense not separate from the form or shape that makes it that substance

(the wood cannot be that particular desk unless it is a desk). So although matter is in a

sense separate and in a sense some this, it cannot be both separate and some this. It thus

does not qualify as the substance of the thing whose matter it is. 63

4.7. Substance and Essence

Aristotle turns to a consideration of the next candidate for substance: essence.

Essence is the standard English translation of Aristotle's curious phrase to ti n einai ,

literally the what it was to be for a thing. This phrase so boggled his Roman

translators that they coined the word essentia to render the entire phrase, and it is from62 . T Scaltsas, Substances and Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics . Ithaca: Cornell University

Press.1994, pp.107-128.63

. Charlotte Witt, Substance and Essence in Aristotle: an Interpretation of Metaphysics VII-IX .Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1989, pp. 215-228.

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this Latin word that

ours derives.

Aristotle also

sometimes uses the shorter phrase to ti esti , literally the what it is, for approximately

the same idea. In his logical work, Aristotle links the notion of essence to that of

definition ( horismos ) a definition is an account ( logos ) that signifies an essence

and he links both of these notions to a certain kind of per se predication ( kath hauto ,

literally, in respect of itself) what belongs to a thing in respect of itself belongs to

it in its essence for we refer to it in the account that states the essence.He reiterates

these ideas by saying; there is an essence of just those things whose logos is a

definition, the essence of a thing is what it is said to be in respect of itself. It is

important to remember that for Aristotle, one defines things, not words. The definition

of tiger does not tell us the meaning of the word tiger; it tells us what it is to be a tiger,

what a tiger is said to be in respect of itself. Thus, the definition of tiger states the

essence the what it is to be of a tiger, what is predicated of the tiger per se . 64

Aristotle's preliminary answer to the question What is substance? is that

substance is essence, but there are important qualifications. For, as he points out,

definition ( horismos ), like what it is ( ti esti ), is said in many ways . That is, items in

all the categories are definable, so items in all the categories have essences just as

there is an essence of man, there is also an essence of white and an essence of musical.

But, because of the pros hen equivocity of is, such essences are secondary

definition and essence are primarily and without qualification of substances . Thus,

he tells us, it is only these primary essences that are substances. Aristotle does not here

work out the details of this hierarchy of essences, but it is possible to reconstruct a

theory of such a hierarchy on the basis of subsequent developments. 65

Aristotle goes on to argue that if something is primary and spoken of in respect

of itself ( kath hauto legomenon ) it is one and the same as its essence. The precise

meaning of this claim, as well as the nature and validity of the arguments offered in

support of it, are matters of scholarly controversy. As Aistotle has already told us, only

64 . Charlotte Witt, Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Ithaca,

NY: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp.148-152.65 . Ibid., pp.182-184.

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species of a genus

have an essence in

the primary sense.

Man is a species, and so there is an essence of man; but pale man is not a species and

so, even if there is such a thing as the essence of pale man, it is not, at any rate, a

primary essence. 66

At this point there appears to be a close connection between the essence of a

substance and its species, and this might tempt one to suppose that Aristotle is

identifying the substance of a thing (since the substance of a thing is its essence) with its

species. But such an identification would be a mistake, for two reasons. First, Aristotle's point is not that a species is an essence, but that an essence of the primary kind

corresponds to a species (e.g., man ) and not to some more narrowly delineated kind

(e.g., pale man ). Second, the word eidos , which meant species in the logical works,

has acquired a new meaning in a hylomorphic context, where it means form

(contrasted with matter) rather than species (contrasted with genus). In the

conceptual framework of Metaphysics, a universal such as man or horse which was

called a species and a secondary substance in the Categories is construed as not a

substance, but a compound of a certain formula and a certain matter, taken universally.

The eidos that is primary substance is not the species that an individual substance

belongs to but the form that is predicated of the matter of which it is composed. 67

4.8. The Doctrine of Categories

The categories have familiar names: quality, quantity, relation, time, place, andaction, being-acted upon. The question Socrates asked about things, what is it? Is too

broad, since it can be answered truly with respect to any of the categories that apply,

and many times in some of them? For example, I'll describe something to you: it is

backstage now; it is red; it is three feet high; it is lying down and breathing. I could

continue telling you what it is in this fashion for as long as I pleased and you would not

66 . Ibid., pp.184-186.67

. Michael Woods, Problems in Metaphysics , Chapter 13. In J. Moravcsik (ed.), Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essay s. New York: Anchor. 1967, pp.215-238.

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know what it is. It is

an Irish setter. What

is different about

that last answer? To be an Irish setter is not to be a quality or quantity or time or action

but to be a whole, which comprises many ways of being in those categories, and much

change and indeterminacy in them. The redness, three-foot-high-ness, respiration and

much else cohere in a thing, which I have named in its thinghood by calling it an Irish

setter. Aristotle calls this way of being ousia . Aristotle's logical works reflect upon the

claims our speech makes about the world. The principal result of Aristotle's inquiry into

the logical categories of being is, I think, the claim that the thinghood of things in the

world is never reducible in our speech to any combination of qualities, quantities,

relations, actions, and so on: that ousia or thinghood must be a separate category. What

happens when I try to articulate the being of a thing such as an Irish setter? I define it as

a dog with certain properties. But what then is a dog? It is an animal with certain

properties, and an animal is an organism with certain properties, and an organism is a

thing with the property life. At each level I meet, as dog, animal, organism, what

Aristotle calls secondary ousia or secondary thinghood.

I set out to give an account of what makes a certain collection of properties

cohere as a certain thing, and I keep separating off some of them and telling you that the

rest cohere as a whole. At my last step, when I say that an organism is a living thing , the

problem of secondary thinghood is present in its nakedness. Our speech, no matter ho

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