Metadata Security: MetaShield Protector

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Tactical Fingerprinting using metadata, hidden info and lost data using FOCA Chema Alonso, José Palazón “Palako”

description

Sesión impartida por Chema Alonso, de Informática64, durante el SIMO Network 2009.

Transcript of Metadata Security: MetaShield Protector

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Tactical Fingerprinting using metadata, hidden info and lost data using FOCA

Chema Alonso, José Palazón “Palako”

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2003 – a piece of history

Irak war was about to start US wanted the UK to be an ally. US sent a document “proving” the

existence of massive destruction weapons

Tony Blair presented the document to the UK parliament.

Parliament asked Tony Blair “Has someone modified the document?”

He answered: No

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2003 – MS Word bytes Tony Blair

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What kind of data can be found? Metadata:

Information stored to give information about the document.

▪ For example: Creator, Organization, etc.. Hidden information:

Information internally stored by programs and not editable.

▪ For example: Template paths, Printers, db structure, etc… Lost data:

Information which is in documents due to human mistakes or negligence, because it was not intended to be there.

▪ For example: Links to internal servers, data hidden by format, etc…

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Metadata

Metadata Lifecycle

Lost Data

Hidden info

Wrong managementBad format conversionUnsecure options

New appsor program versions

Embeddedfiles

Search enginesSpidersDatabases

Embeddedfiles

Wrong managementBad format conversionUnsecure options

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Metadata created by Google

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Lost Data

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Lost data everywhere

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Public server

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So… are people aware of this?

The answer is NO. Almost nobody is cleaning

documents. Companies publish thousands of

documents without cleaning them before with: Metadata. Hidden Info. Lost data.

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Sample: FBI.gov

Total: 4841 files

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Are they clean?

Total: 1075 files

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How many files is my company publishing?

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Sample: Printer info found in odf files returned by Google

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Google Sets prediction

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Sample: Info found in a PDF file

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What files store Metadata, hidden info or lost data?

Office documents: Open Office documents. MS Office documents. PDF Documents.▪ XMP.

EPS Documents. Graphic documents.▪ EXIFF.▪ XMP.

And almost everything….

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Pictures with GPS info..

EXIFREADER

http://www.takenet.or.jp/~ryuuji/

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Demo: Looking for EXIF information in ODF file

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Even Videos with users…

http://video.techrepublic.com.com/2422-14075_11-207247.html

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And of course, printed txt

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What can be found? Users:

Creators. Modifiers . Users in paths.

▪ C:\Documents and settings\jfoo\myfile

▪ /home/johnnyf Operating systems. Printers.

Local and remote. Paths.

Local and remote. Network info.

Shared Printers. Shared Folders. ACLS.

Internal Servers. NetBIOS Name. Domain Name. IP Address.

Database structures. Table names. Colum names.

Devices info. Mobiles. Photo cameras.

Private Info. Personal data.

History of use. Software versions.

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How can metadata be extracted?

Info is in the file in raw format: Binary. ASCII .

Therefore Hex or ASCII editors can be used: HexEdit. Notepad++. Bintext

Special tools can be used: Exif redaer ExifTool Libextractor. Metagoofil. …

…or just open the file!

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Tools: Libextractor

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Tools: MetaGoofil

http://www.edge-security.com/metagoofil.php

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Yes, also Google….

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Your FBI user

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Your UN user

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Your Scotland Yard user

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Your Carabinieri user

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Your WhiteHouse user

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Yes, we can!

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Drawbacks

These tools only extract metadata. Not looking for Hidden Info. Not looking for lost data. Not post-analysis.

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Only Metadata

http://gnunet.org/libextractor/demo.php3

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Not very good with XML files (SWX, ODF, OOXML)

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Google is [almost] GOD

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Filetype or Extension?

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Foca

Fingerprinting Organizations with Collected Archives. Search for documents in Google and Bing Automatic file downloading Capable of extracting Metadata, hidden

info and lost data Cluster information Analyzes the info to fingerprint the

network.

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Demo: FOCA

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FOCA Onlinehttp://www.informatica64.com/FOCA

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Solutions?

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First: Clean all public documents

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Clean your documents:MSOffice 2k7

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Clean your documents: MSOffice 2k3 & XP

http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=144e54ed-d43e-42ca-bc7b-5446d34e5360

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OLE Streams

In MS Office binary format files Store information about the OS Are not cleaned with these Tools FOCA finds this info

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Demo: Looking for info in cleaned document

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OpenOffice cleaning options

Only metadata Not cleaning hidden info Not cleaning lost data

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Cleaning documents OOMetaExtractor

http://www.codeplex.org/oometaextractor

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Demo: OpenOffice “Security” Options…

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Are you safe relying on your users?

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IIS MetaShield Protector

http://www.metashieldprotector.com

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Second: Beg Google to delete all the cached files

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Don´t trust your users!!!

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Don´t complain about your job!!

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PS: This file also has metadata