Meta-Ethics

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Meta-Ethics Meta-Ethics Slaver y is evil Honesty is a virtue Abortio n is wrong Meta’ from Greek meaning ‘above’ or ‘after’

description

Meta-Ethics. Abortion is wrong. Slavery is evil. Honesty is a virtue. ‘ Meta’ from Greek meaning ‘above’ or ‘after’. What is meta-ethics?. Asks whether there are moral facts or not. Discusses what someone is doing when they make a moral claim / judgement. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of Meta-Ethics

Page 1: Meta-Ethics

Meta-EthicsMeta-EthicsSlavery is evilHonesty is

a virtue

Abortion is wrong

‘Meta’ from Greek meaning ‘above’ or ‘after’

Page 2: Meta-Ethics

What is meta-ethics?What is meta-ethics?• Asks whether there are moral facts or not.

• Discusses what someone is doing when they make a moral claim / judgement.

• Considers the significance of calling something right or wrong, good or bad…..

What meta-ethics is NOTWhat meta-ethics is NOTIt does NOT recommend ways to act and feel as do Normative theories such as Utilitarianism, Kantianism and Virtue Theory.

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Two branches of Meta-ethicsTwo branches of Meta-ethicsCOGNITIVISM

(REALISM)• There are moral

facts• When we make a

moral claim / judgement we are expressing a belief that can be verified (shown to be true or false)

NON-COGNITIVISM (IRREALISM)

• There are no moral facts

• When we make a moral claim / judgement we are expressing something else i.e., our approval.

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The Verification PrincipleThe Verification Principle• The principle arose from a group of Logical

Positivist Philosophers (using science and observation in philosophy) called ‘The Vienna Circle’, in the early 20th Century.

• The principle;

A proposition only has meaning if it is, in principle, verifiable (if it can be shown true or false through observation - Empiricism). So, excluding possibility of moral facts

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Fact–Value distinction [claim about Fact–Value distinction [claim about the world]the world]

• FACTS = Details of situation, revealed through observation e.g, abortion & euthanasia methods, effects on people….

• VALUES = Not found in the facts e.g., abortion is wrong, euthanasia is compassionate, honesty is a virtue….

World of facts is free from values & values are just our attitudes to the facts. So, no evaluative conclusions can be drawn fromfactual premises (reasons). We are free to hold any moral view.

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Is-Ought Gap Is-Ought Gap [claim about logic][claim about logic]

• No ‘ought’ – MORAL - statement can be deduced from ‘is’ – FACTUAL - statements.

‘you ought not kill’, ‘you ought to tell the truth’

• Cannot draw a moral evaluative conclusion from factual statements.

Irrealism / Non-Cognitivism accepts both the Fact-Value distinction and the

Is-Ought gap.

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M ETA-ETHICAL THEORIES

Em otivism- A.J.Ayer

- C .L .S tevenson

Prescrip tiv ism- R .M .H are

N O N -C O G N ITIVE (Irrealism )

Intu itionism- G .E .M oore

- H .A.Pritchard- W .D .R oss

N aturalism- F .H .B radley

C O G N ITIVE (R ealism )

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David HumeDavid Hume• Influenced the Logical Positivists.

• Sentiment is the source of right and wrong.

• If you decide to help someone you do so because you have certain feelings i.e., compassion, it is nothing to do with reason.

• ‘..when you pronounce any action…to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that..you have a feeling or sentiment of blame…’

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Ayer – Meaningful statements must be verified

synthetically or analytically. Religious beliefs &

moral claims cannot be verified in these ways, so are

not meaningful (not facts or knowledge.)• When making a moral judgement you are

expressing your emotions.• You are also trying to get others to feel and act the

same way.

e.g., ‘It is wrong to steal’ = I feel it is wrong to steal, you should feel the same way and not steal.

Non-cognitivism:Non-cognitivism: Emotivism – Emotivism – ‘Boo-Hurrah theory’‘Boo-Hurrah theory’

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Ayer –

• Moral arguments are simply people

expressing their emotions.

• Some moral statements are like commands [Prescriptivism takes this further]

Stevenson – more than expression of emotion

• Moral arguments are where there is a disagreement in attitude or underlying belief.

• Moral claims have two parts;

- expression of an attitude based on a belief

- persuasive element to influence others

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Difficulties with EmotivismDifficulties with EmotivismAyer’s version;• Moral disagreement is impossible,e.g., ‘Diane

Pretty was refused euthanasia’, I say ‘boo!’, you say

‘hurrah!’ Just disagree about the emotion expressed.

No more than different preferences.

Both versions;• Rely on fact-value distinction. If this is shown to be

untrue the theory collapses.• Are we always trying to influence everyone to share

our point of view? What about diversity and debate?

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Non-cognitivism:Non-cognitivism: PRESCRIPtivismPRESCRIPtivismR.M.Hare;• Moral statements are prescriptive, theycommand behaviour and guide action. ‘You ought to keep promises’ = a command to act. [‘Ought’ corresponds to ‘right’] • Moral statements as objective. Act on maxims youare prepared to Universalise – would you want everyone to do the same in similar circumstances? [=reason has a role in Prescriptivism, unlike Emotivism]• To say something is ‘good’ is to commend it, I am then committed to following this judgement.

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Difficulties with PrescriptivismDifficulties with Prescriptivism• Universalisability. Can any two situations be

similar enough to universalise judgements?

• Commend without commanding. We can think something is good without being compelled to follow it e.g. examples of courage.

• Hare believes moral principles override all others. In some situations this may be false.

• Relies on the fact-value distinction.

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SUMMARYSUMMARYMORAL CLAIMS…• Express emotion• Influence others

• Indicate an underlying belief

• Prescribe, command action

• Are objective because they are universalised

Emotivism – Ayer

Emotivism – Stevenson

Prescriptivism - Hare