Merchants and Colonialism: The Case of Chovvakkaran Moosa and the English East India Company

Merchants and

Colonialism: The Case

of Chovvakkaran Moosa

and the English East

India Company

M.P.Mujeebu Rehiman

Number 1

August 2006

history farook series

P.G.Department of History Farook College Kozhikode-673632, Kerala

Email: [email protected]

W O R K I N G P A P E R

mailto:[email protected]

Merchants and

Colonialism: The Case

of Chovvakkaran Moosa

and the English East

India Company

M.P.Mujeebu Rehiman

Number 1

August 2006

1

history farook working paper series Number 1 August 2006

M.P.Mujeebu Rehman, Lecturer in History, Farook College [email protected]

India‟s trade with other countries underwent several important changes in the course of the

18th

century1.

The crucial role played by indigenous merchants and business communities in the

process of consolidation of British empire in India has become an important area of research at

least for the last three decades2 .The period under review is remarkable for its unanticipated trends

manifested in the form of fluctuations in prices, extinction of some age old trading groups as well

as emergence of some new coupled with the dislocation of trading centers and formation of the

new ones3. Instead of regretfully deserting the trading arena, some of the indigenous merchant

groups endeavoured to make use of the changing scenario by acting as financiers of the English

trade and war in India, as well as the assistance they rendered to the company in several other

ways4

.In this process, the indigenous merchant class which had developed at the traditional

centres of trade, suffered considerable losses, with the elements of it being virtually wiped out.

Some managed to survive by migrating to the new towns, where a trading structure had developed

through collaboration between the English and the Indians5. Prof. Bagchi postulates that the

banias, sarkars or dewans acted in the British trade as the servants of the East India Company,

which needed them fronts for their illegal trading operations as well. They also played variegated

roles as bankers and revenue farmers. Customs duties and other transit duties in ports were often

collected by the rulers with the co-operation of the leading merchants6.

While examining the role of merchants in the rise of colonialism, Prasannan Parthasarathi

locates the late eighteenth century as a very turbulent time in South India. Social conflict and

warfare widened and escalated. There was intensified competition between and among states,

merchants, producers for resources and shares of the social product. Merchants often found

themselves at the centre of the conflicts of the period. Their position as intermediaries between the

state and producers made them vulnerable to the claims of both and, as a group, merchants found

it difficult to compete against the claims of either. It is well known that the English East India

Company (EEIC) played a major role in these conflicts. Its attempt to command a larger share of

South India‟s wealth brought the Company in to conflict with indigenous states and many groups

in South India 7.

The share of Malabar coast in India‟s maritime trade in the eighteenth century has been

assiduously attested.8 But scholars have paid very little attention to unveil the intricacies of the

2



nature of trade and its very nuances which caused to emerge new merchant households like keyis9

and the role played by them in both hinterland and maritime trade. An enquiry on emerging

indigenous trading family of Malabar, the keyis, against the backdrop of stupendous trade in

Thalasseri [Tellicherry], becomes relevant. The present paper attempts to unravel the socio-

economic conditions necessitated the origin of keyis in general and the political clout they

established under the stewardship of Chovvakaran Moosa, in particular.

Any attempt to reconstruct the history of indigenous merchants, as rightly observed by

Ashin Das Gupta, is found hampered by the problem of scarcity of ample source materials10

.The

major source of an enquiry of this kind, the customs records of the Indian administrators, he

laments, has totally disappeared. The second possible source - the papers of the Indian merchants -

are, again, almost totally lost. The major reliable source materials for us, therefore, are the papers

of the various European companies and some private papers of their officials in India11

. The case

of keyis is not an exception to this. The scanty references in Tellicherry Consultations, Diaries,

Thalasseri Rekhakal, Collection of Treaties and travelogue of Buchanan are insufficient to portray

the history of such a mercantile household which had been engaged in the trade for at least a

hundred years. Fortunately we have a 20 page monograph on the Keyis, a hagiographic work of an

amateur writer, A.P. Ummer Kutty, compiled in the early decade of the 20th

century, the veracity

of many details seems to be dubious12

. Keyi Charitram, as it is titled, is the only available source

material regarding the early history of Keyi family and its founder, Chovvakaran Moosa. The

pedigree of the family can be traced back to Aluppi, the maternal uncle of Moosa, belonged to

Chovva in erstwhile Chirakkal Taluk, (Kannur) who started his career as a retail hill produce

merchant13

. Realizing the scope for direct trade with the Europeans, Aluppi moved towards

Thalasseri along with his family consists of two nephews Bappan and Moosa. He purchased some

lands on the coast of Thalasseri from the Kottayam Raja, who was the then lord, and gradually the

trade prospects marked splendours. Thalasseri trade, however made Aluppi so influential and a

flourishing merchant who was honorably called as kaka and his warehouse as kakante

Pandikasala (kaka‟s warehouse). Aluppikaka then encouraged Moosa, who had been assisting

him for several years, to usher in a business enterprise of his own and extended him financial

support14

.

3



However, the first attempt itself was an unlucky game. As he lost his business, a

humiliated Moosa rushed to Tiruvitamkur and started a small-scale business there. In the

meanwhile he met the ruler of Tiruvitamkur and requested for financial assistance. Impressed by

Moosa‟s dynamism and confidence, the king ordered to pay sufficient amount to „Vadakkan

Moosa‟ ( as the king addressed him; we have to identify the ruler). Actually it was the initial

working capital of his future fortunes. Apart from money, the magnanimous ruler endowed Moosa

with sufficient teak wood, a site in Alappuzha etc. for buttressing his venture. The compound and

contiguous areas including the backwaters, where Moosa embarked on his business came to be

known in the beginning of 20th

Century as Moosakkeyi Valappu and Moosakkeyi Kayal

respectively15

. This can be seen as Moosa‟s astuteness to make use of political power, especially

from the said ruler and later from the British. The tradition says that as he grown as a successful

merchant, Moosa returned and shifted back his business to Thalasseri .

After his uncle Aluppi‟s demise, Moosa introduced some innovations in his business in

tune with the emerging British trade. He appointed agents in the business centers like Bombay,

Madras, Pondichery, and made some arrangement for appointment of associates in cities like

London, Paris and Amsterdam to acknowledge the commodities sent to Europe and vice versa16

.

Moosa had gradually become owner of several country boats, pattemaris, kottiyas and urus. His

reputation as an honest merchant enabled Moosa to get a contract of supplying rice and many

other commodities to the Company.

The Chovvakkaran family of Moosa was prominent among the Mappila merchants who

could successfully take advantage of the prospects of nascent European trade in the 18th

century

Malabar. Thalasseri then had been transformed to be a prosperous trade center even with a branch

of the Madras Bank and branches of three great European firms17

. Moosa‟s name was firstly

mentioned by the Tellicherry Board in 1779, about eight years after the death of Ezekiel Rahabi,

the Jew merchant of Kozhikode. For that year he agreed to supply 20 kanties [ one kanti = 290 kg]

of cardamom to the Tellicherry factory and fell down on it18

. The Company declared both Chattoo

Chetty and Moosa as the faithful merchants19

. As Tellicherry Consultations and some other

Company accounts reveal, Chattoo Chetty was associated with the Company in the first half of the

18th

century, while Moosa in the latter half20

. Buchanan‟s reference to Moosa as the great

4



monopolist of Thalasseri proves that during the days of his journeys (1800) Moosa was at the

crescendo of his glory.

Buchanan‟s remarks on the trade at Thalasseri and the role played by Moosa are palpable.

He writes, “the Company has always made its purchases by contract entered in to with a few

merchants, or in fact for many years almost with a few only; that is with Chovvakkara Mousa [sic]

of Tellicherry. Seven others have also dealings with the company; but one of them is Mousa‟s

brother and others are in a great measure his dependants. In December and January, when the

crops are so far advanced that a judgement can be formed of the quantity of pepper likely to be

obtainable, the commercial resident assembles the contractors, and a written agreement is entered

into with them, setting the price, and the quantity that each is to deliver. At this time, some times

the whole, and in general at least one half of money is advanced to the contractors” 21

. He adds

that the native merchants, by means of their agents, procure the pepper partly from small traders

and partly from cultivators. Buchanan recognizes Moosa as the most honest merchant by stating

that, there is no danger of an ultimate loss of the money advanced to Moosa22

.

It was the British experiment of monopolizing pepper, coupled with stringent measures

against smuggling and establishment of military outposts, helped the rise of Chovvakaran

Moosa23

. Due to a spate of cases of disappearance of hinter-land merchants after imbursement of

advance, the company found solution by restricting the contracts to the Thalasseri resident

merchants only24

. The accounts from the year 1783 to 1793 produced by Moosa speak itself of the

quantity, value and price of the pepper supplied by Moosa to the Company25.

By 1790‟s Moosa

had grown to send ships to Mocha and to challenge the king of Kochi to let these vessels

unharmed. His trump card in all difficulties was the EEIC, which he would amiably describe as

„our own Company‟26

.

Moosa had become a highly influential trader with the support and patronage of the

British. The prime minister of Samutiri, Shamhanth Patter, once ruefully informed the English

Resident at Kozhikode that Moosa had threatened to bring an English army if he ventured to

interfere in Moosa‟s timber trade27

. One of the representations submitted by the merchants

including Moosa and his brother Bappan before the Company reflects the relationship between

5



Moosa and the British. It reads, “though we are suffering from recurring losses, we have been

pursuing our business only because the Company has been preserving and protecting us as the

mother looks after her children from the period of our forefathers it self” 28

. The Company had

also deemed Moosa to be the close ally with great respect. One of the letters from the

Superintendent of the Company directed the Neeleswaram Raja to protect the belongings and

commodities of Moosa, who is a protégée of the Company and make sure that Moosa‟s trade and

his commodities must be spared intact in an area from Kavvayi to Goa29

. Moosa also reciprocated

the Company by lending money in its hard times. It is said that Moosa had lent the Company some

20 lakh sicca rupees at the time of Mysore war but the Company failed to pay back and they

could only give him the bond as guarantee as the company was unable to pay the whole amount at

one stretch30

.

The long and fruitful partnership of Chovvakaran (bazaar merchants) family with the

British in the 18th

century proved to be mutually beneficial and of course more so for the Mappila

merchants, which was a great threat to the „mercantile-rulers‟, the Ali Rajas of Kannur. With the

unwavering support of the Factory officials, the Chovakkarans created an expanding sphere of

influence that steadily swallowed up large chunk of the Arakkal domain. By the 1770‟s

Chovakkarans had become the richest and the most powerful lessees of Randattara district31

. The

English factory considered Ali Rajas as the sole sponsors of Hyder Ali on the coast of Malabar.

Firstly, it systematically and successfully eroded their economic base in the hinterland. Secondly,

it patronized the Mappilas who defected from their camp, in the wake of their declining influence

in Dharmapattanam as a deliberate strategy to undermine the community support for the Arakkal

house32

.

The elevation in the position of Ali Rajas in the context of Hyder‟s campaign, however,

was not beneficial to Kunhi Amsi, the then Raja in the long term. Ali Raja had been serving the

Mysorean sarkar as their tax collector. He had introduced taxation in the form of ad hoc

contribution after 1766 and on the basis of a proper computation of the produce after 1774. In a

sense he had theoretically authorized the Mappila merchants to bypass the multi-layered chain of

command of the Nairs and to procure the taxable commodities directly from the fields in

6



Malabar33

. Though initially it was tremendously advantageous for the merchants who sold to the

European ships, the government had to face stiff resistance of dispossessed rulers and land lords.

Kunhi Amsi fell from Haider Ali‟s grace in 1774. Owing to the huge arrears in tribute,

mainly due to the defaults by the coalition partners, Hyder dismissed him from the office of

revenue collection in the Kolattiri realm34

. Just a year before the beginning of second Anglo-

Mysore war (1780-84) Ali Raja Kunhi Amsi died and bequeathed a troubled legacy to his niece

and successor Junnumma Bi valiya Tangal35

. In 1783 the English army had also rampaged

through Kannur, looted its treasure and taken the important members of the family as hostages. A

war-weary and bankrupt Bibi had been forced to sue for peace and raise money for their ransom

through her „banker‟ Chovvakkaran Moosa. She had mortgaged the coir of her Lakshadweep

islands for the same to Moosa36

. This anecdote may be seen as an ample evidence to show how an

age - old aristocracy was shrinking in the context of marked change of new political economy, the

core of which was alliance between foreign merchant capital and rising indigenous merchant class.

Gleanings from Thalasseri Rekhakal and some other records tempt us to pose some

questions regarding the identity of Moosa vis a vis his relation with the local rules. For Example,

in a letter to the Thalasseri superintendent Christopher Pilie, the Kadathanad Raja informs that as

the total collection of the revenue for the year 970 ME (AD 1795) seems to be insufficient, the

amount was sending in full (Rs.70000/-) by borrowing money from Chovvakaran Moosa37

. We

get another letter of similar kind sent by Chirakkal Raja to Christopher Pilie, which states that

since waiting for the revenue collection will naturally lead to further delay, the payable amount of

the Malayalam month of Metam (probably March-April) Rs 38,333, Rae33,Qtrs3 will be

submitted by Moosa in time38

. Again, Chirakkal Raja assures Pilie of remittance of third

installment of revenue Rs.29,613 Rae 33 and Qtrs 3 by Chovvakaran Moosa 39

. Arakkal Bibi also

had made such an arrangement with Moosa to settle her revenue dues 40

. ( In some occasions

Moosa was paying the revenue amount in advance). The similar instance of the ruler of Kutaku

(Coorg) also endorsing Moosa to pay his annual revenue dues Rs 24,000, is noticeable41

. Though

some cases of default by Moosa have been reported42

, he was continued to be their reliable banker

or representative. In yet another incident, a bond was submitted before the company by Moosa to

pay the Bibi‟s arrears of revenue43

. Christopher Pilie once had admonished Moosa for the delay in

7



remitting the revenue collected by him44.

As Malabar came under the British occupation according

to the peace treaty of Srirangapatanam, Lakshadweep islands were handed over to Moosa on a rent

basis45

. Apart from these varied roles, many a time Moosa had financially assisted even the

Company during the days of its distress.

One of the ways in which the merchants were gaining access to the state was by entering

into the state revenue collection machinery. Merchants are thought to have increasingly gained

leverage over states by extending loans to states and rulers. And by becoming revenue farmers,

merchants are thought to have achieved direct access to state power46

. C. A. Bayly goes on to

argue that their entry into revenue collection system, as tax farmers, gave merchants greater

political power and, at times, leverage over state.47

Instances of financial support, advancing of

cash in lieu of revenue and issuing of loans to the rulers, as well as the Company etc. tempt us to

pose some questions regarding Moosa‟s multi-faceted role. Some of the features of revenue

farmers and money lending class in many other parts of the country can be attributed to Moosa,48

though we are in want of references of a system of revenue farming or usury in Malabar. Apart

from this, at least three of the qualities of a „portfolio capitalist‟ can be attributed to Moosa,49

though it is meaningless to compare him with the portfolio capitalists, as the case of the Akrur

Dutta of Bengal.50

However, Moosa and his family were independent and efficient merchants, who

could equally manipulate both the colonial and pre colonial dispensations.

In one of their comments on the pepper production in the country of Malabar, the Joint

Commissioners underscored that the production of pepper had steadily declined ever since the

Mysorean invasions. They state with regard to “Malabar money” (as they called pepper), that they

have been assured by respectable native merchants of the ceded districts from Cavvayi to Chetwa,

nearly 20,000 candies per annum, and the ordinary price did not then exceed from 70 to 80

rupees51

. As per an estimate presented by Chovakkaran Moosa, the pepper production in 1784 was

between 11,000 and 12,000 kantis of which he himself purchased 9,000 at (as he says) 130 rupees

per kanti52

; and to Moosa, in a favourable year (A.D 1792) he would expect 7,000 - 8,000 kantis

of pepper for the area under the control of the Company. For him, the total estimated produce of

the year from the whole coast of Malabar, including Kochi and Tiruvitamkur, was 18,000 Kantis

of pepper at the rate of 200/- per kanti53

.

8



In spite of this dwindling trend in pepper production, pepper still constituted the chief

export product of Malabar even in 1804 at 45% of exports54

. The failure of the British policy on

pepper can be attributed to three factors: the strong influence of the Rajas on the pepper producers

and their opposition to British monopolization of pepper, the activities of private trader Murdoch

Brown, and also the private trading affairs of the EEIC officials. As a result, the EEIC didn‟t

achieve the economic advantages that they hoped would come from the conquest of Malabar.

Murdoch Brown, the British private merchant, posed a challenge against Moosa, at a time

when he had attained a position of unrivalled merchant of Malabar. Both of them competed each

other for reaping the profits by selling spices to the Company. Between 1790 and 1793 a case was

heard in the court in which Moosa prosecuted Brown for a debt of Rs 30,750/-, the price of 500

kantis of pepper. Brown maintained that he had not received the pepper from Moosa, where upon

Moosa called on James Rivet as a witness and produced a letter which Brown had written to Rivet

in 1790. In this letter Brown said that James Rivet had undertaken to make up any deficiency in

the payment for the pepper. Robert Taylor supported Moosa‟s case and the court found in his

favour55

. Thus the crookedness of Brown was eminently beaten up by Moosa. But Brown no

longer dropped his ambitious career, rather he decided to co-operate with the Joint Commissioners

and eventually he bought a piece of land in 1797 near Mahe which he later nurtured the cinnamon

plantation56

. However, the Company was so cautious of the growing influence of both Moosa and

M. Brown. Though it was necessary for the customs department to prevent smuggling, the Ewer‟s

plan to forbid private merchants was much against the interests of the pepper merchants. He

believed that only such a measure could curtail the activities of M. Brown and Moosa 57

. Though

these kind of observations were made, no such stringent measures found implemented with

immediate effect.

Tipu Sultan‟s invasion of Malabar was a period of commotion for the indigenous

merchants in general and Moosa in particular. Like his father, Tipu saw the merchants as a

lucrative source of revenue. The steps to retain the merchants in the khudadad sarkar were, there

fore, considered imperative. He thought that the best way to end the Company‟s spice trade

absolutely from Malabar was to ensure that the Mappila merchants of Malabar were forced to

9



withdraw from Thalasseri. This was the plan, there fore, Tipu envisaged for the devastation of the

factory of Thalasseri58

.

As the resilient ally of Mysoreans, Bibi of Arakkal was assigned with the great task of

obliterating the Mappila merchants. But Bibi secretly send a massage to Moosa of the plan of Tipu

in the year 1786. The massage was to “Moosa and few other principal merchants desiring they

should leave the place directly and offering them asylum , either in her own on district or in those

of the Nabob, which offer if they rejected and was ensured, they would share the fate of the

rest”59

. Tipu‟s intention was to utilize the influence of Bibi over Mappilas of North Malabar.

Surprisingly, the Mappila merchants of Thalasseri didn‟t respond propitiously to the call

by the Bibi of Kannur to move from Thalasseri to the Khudadad sarkar for fear of the fact that

they would be dispossessed of their wealth. For them, Thalasseri was the only place of peace,

security and good governance in Malabar. The British were deprived of the chance to secure even

the small quantity of pepper they had obtained in 1785 for the Company‟s official trade. By the

time the livelihood of Moosa and his fellow country merchants was entirely dependant on British

commerce on the Malabar Coast60

.

The merchants stayed at Thalasseri until the end of the third Anglo- Mysorean war of

1790-92 when Malabar was annexed by the British. Moosa found it as a better chance for

revamping hinter land trade which was devastated by Tipu. The then governor of Bombay

Abercromby as well as Mappila merchants saw it as a chance to further their commercial interests.

Abercromby felt that it was necessary “to protect the Moplahs who were a very useful merchant

class” for their own benefits and that of the British company61

. In the coming days Moosa

continued to be the principal commercial ally of the British. Moosa had shown on various

occasions that he was a “special kind of ally” to the EEIC62

. Moosa sincerely relied on the

company who considered it as “our own company”. The alliance of these forces however was

reciprocal.

Christopher Bayly puts forth a reason for the British to establish direct rule in Malabar at

the end of the 18th

century. To him, the British felt that the Mappila traders were treated unfairly

10



by Hindu rulers, and this explains why they didn‟t wish Hindu rajas to rule. More importantly, the

British would have feared an endangerment of the pepper trade and the political stability of the

country if Hindu rajas had experienced an indirect rule63

. This kind of an argument is partially true

in the sense that the local rajas and landlords had unleashed protests in the initial phase of the

British take over, but at the same time the merchants at this time aligned along with the British.

Contrary to his perennial collaboration with the British, we get some references to Moosa‟s

association with Pazhassi Raja in the early period of the 18th

century. It is highly significant in the

context of latter‟s opposition to the British64

. It is reported that Moosa and Mucky had delivered

rice, some other goods and gun powder to rebels for pepper in exchange65

. Northern Sub Collector

of Malabar, Thomas Harve Baber had reported to the principal collector Thomas Warden that

Moosa and Mucky, the Company contractors, had involved in illegal transactions. Though it was a

crime of high treason, in reply to Baber, Warden held that as Moosa and other merchants had

signed an accord with the Company, their business cannot be considered as treason66

. In another

letter Baber made it clear that out of 400 kanti pepper procured by Mucky and Moosa from

Chirakkal, at least 200 kantis were from rebels. He emphasized that as per the present custom,

death sentence be awarded to them and they must be taken away from their seat of influence.

Baber‟s concern over the clandestine relations with the rebels and Moosa‟s inclination to keep

alive the spirit of rebellion were shared with Warden67

. Governor General Wellesley, who was

also aware of the deviation of Moosa‟s engagements, directed Col. Sartorius to inform Moosa that

his style was to hang such mischievous fellows68

. It is interesting to note that though Mucky and

Moosa had been engrossed in these illegal activities, the Collector didn‟t take any punitive

measures against them as they were the sole contractors of the Company69

. The Company was

well informed that any action against Moosa would endanger the procurement of pepper from the

high ranges, primarily because he was the only link between the company and pepper producers in

those hill tracts. More importantly, the company had to prevent smuggling of pepper to the

French Mahe through Moosa and his agents, which offered comparatively a higher price. In the

case of Moosa‟s engagement with the rebels, the paucity of evidences constrains us to make a

conclusion over the possibility of any other ulterior motives in their relation other than business

deal. We don‟t know whether Moosa or his family, the once strong allies of the British had

diverged from the control of the British as the case of the Duttas, the sloop merchants of Bengal 70

.

11



The legendary trader Moosa‟s career came to an end by his death in the year

1807(M.E.982) 71

. His successors could not transgress his achievements but carried on the

commercial enterprises more or less the same. His family came to be known later by four lines viz,

Keloth, Valiyapura, Puthiyapura and Orkatteri72

. We do have few references regarding the later

phase of the keyis of Thalasseri. As one researcher observes, the penetration of European merchant

capital in Malabar under the colonial state also minimized the commercial opportunities of the

Mappila merchants of Thalasseri. Many gave up commerce in exchange for investment in land.

Their counterparts in Bengal didn‟t fare any better under the British73

.

Conclusion

Instead of repeating the question whether the emerging merchant class like Keyis were the

collaborators of the British commercial capital it is better to make a discussion on the atmosphere

in which such a business group emerged. The political economy of the early 18th

century Kerala is

significant with the upsurge in pepper trade. It was a time of efflorescence for kingdoms like

Tiruvitamkur, whose ruler himself was an industrious entrepreneur, where as a bad time for

Kozhikode due to the decline of trade in Surat. Kochi, at the same time, followed more or less a

stabilized status as she had been engaged in trade with the East. It was in such a context Moosa

found asylum in Tiruvitamkur. The question why did he opt for Tiruvitamkur can be simply

answered, that as he found no other rulers as enterprising as that of Tiruvitamkur as no other local

rulers gave as much patronage to trade as Tiruvitamkur. It was the same logic behind his later

„collaboration‟ with the British Company. This sort of acts of collaboration can be viewed as

utilization of congenial atmosphere by a group of intermediary merchants / brokers, whose aim

was to grab maximum profit . Most of the successful merchants in most of the regions

collaborated with the British, both commercially and politically74

. This is not fully true in the case

of Moosa and his family. The example of the spice trade in Malabar has shown that the agents of

EEIC at Tellicherry exploited many of the contradictions found in Kolathunad to monopolise the

spice trade on the coast75

. The collaboration theory may be found as an academic exercise as there

were several occasions of both collaboration and conflict76.

However it is obvious that Malabar

witnessed the formation of an indigenous merchant capital in association with the colonial capital,

which could not blossom into political spaces as occurred elsewhere in India. It is a problem,

which demands intensive research.

12



Notes and References

1. Ashin Das Gupta, (2001),The World of Indian Ocean Merchants 1500-1800,Collected

Essays of Ashin Das Gupta, Delhi,140. He portrays significant changes in various aspects

of maritime trade during the said period extensively.

2. For a detailed bibliographical note see, Shubhra Chakrabarti, (2004) ,„The English East

India Company and the indigenous sloop merchants of Bengal: Akrur Dutta and his

family,1775-1857‟, Studies in History, 20,1n.s; C.A. Bayly,( 1982), Rulers, Townsmen

and Bazars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, Cambridge.

3. Ashin Das Gupta, (2001), 102-121.

4. Lakshmi Subrahmanian, „Banias and the British: The role of indigenous credit in the

process of imperial expansion in the western India in the second half of the eighteenth

century, Modern Asian Studies,vol.21:3,1987.

5. Ashin Das Gupta, (2001) , 102-121.

6. A.K.Bagchi, (2002), „Merchants and Colonialism‟, in his Capital & Labour Redefined:

India and the third world , Delhi, 36.

7. Prasannan Parthasarathi, (2002), „Merchants and the Rise of Colonialism‟ in Seema Alavi,

ed., The Eighteenth Century India,Delhi, 201.

8. See for example, K.N. Choudhuri, (1978),The Trading World of Asia and The English East

India Company.1660-1760,Camridge University Press; Ashin Das Gupta,( 1967), Malabar

in Asian Trade, 1740-1800, Cambridge; Sinnappah Arasaratnam, (1994), Maritime India:

Seventeenth Century, New Delhi; Pamela Nightingale, (1970), Trade and Empire in

Western India, 1784-1806, Cambridge, etc.

9. ‘Keyi’ is a Persian term, which means „preserver‟ or „protector‟, the labourers of ships used

to address their owners as ‘Keyis’ which seems to be originated from the port of

Bombay,which later became a unique title to identify the descendents of the Chovakkaran

family of Thalasseri. The term „kaka‟ also has a Gujarati origin at the same time denotes

the midland Mappila merchants of Malabar. Aluppi and Moosa were addressed with the

suffix of kaka, as Aluppikaka, Moosakaka and Valiya Makki kaka respectively. The title

‘keyi’ actually originated in association with the fourth member, Valiya Kunhippakki. If

„kaka’ was to denote rural mappilas the titles such as Koya, Keyi,Naha etc are mostly

associated with the coastal merchants who are considered to be elites among the Muslims

of Malabar. The transformation from „kaka‟ to ‘keyi’ sheds light on the upward social

mobility of this family as well; See Vanidas Elayavoor,ed. (2002), Vadakkan Aitihyamala

(Northern Legends), Kottayam,159- 166. the term kaka is also found mentioned in one of

the 17th

century grandhavaris. See, M.G.S. Narayanan ed,( 1987),Vanjeri Grandhavari,

Calicut, , Doc.71A(A.D.1642), 105A (A.D.1696).

10. Ashin Das Gupta , (2001), 142.

11. ibid,142

12. A.P.Ummer Kutty, (1916), Keyi Charitram,(The History of Keyis), Tellichery, reproduced

in C.P.Cheriya Mammu Keyi Souvenir, (1995),Thalasseri, ,185-208.

13. Tellicherry Consultations mentions the name of a local trader called Comben Aluppi,

which we can‟t say the same person.

14. A.P. Ummer Kutty, (1916).

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15. ibid

16. ibid

17. C.A.Innes, (1997),Malabar Gazatteer, Trivandrum, 2nreprint ,455.

18. Ashin Das Gupta , (1967),Malabar in Asian Trade, Cambridge,128.

19. Bonaventure Swai, (1979),‟ Trade and Politics in the 18th

Century Malabar‟ ,University

of Sussex, ,15

20. ibid, 12; and Buchanan, (1807) Journey From Madras through the countries of Malabar

and Canara, , Vol.2,Madras,126.

21. Buchanan, (1807), 531-32

22. ibid., 532.

23. Ashin Das Gupta, (1967),128.

24. B.Swai,( 1979),15.

25. Report of a Joint Commission 1792-93, [ RJC], 241-242

26. Ashin Das Gupta,(1967),129.

27. ibid

28. Letter dtd: 20th

Jan 1798, Scaria Zacharia,ed.,( 1996),Thalasseri

Rekhakal,[mal],Kottayam, ,327.

29. Letter from Tellicherry Supdt. Jemissa Stevens to the Raja of Nileswaram, dtd.7th

April

1799, in Scaria Zacharia ,ed, ( 1996), 529-30.

30. A.P.Ummer Kutty, (1916),192.

31. Ruchira Banerjee, „A Wedding Feast or Political Arena?:Commercial Rivalry between the

Ali Raja and the Englsih factory in the Northerm Malabar in the 18th

Century‟, in

Rudrangshu Mukherjee & Lakshmi Subramanian ed, (2003) Politics and Trade in the

Indian Ocean World, Essays in Honour of Ashin Das Gupta, Delhi,99.

32. ibid

33. ibid ,105

34. ibid,106

35. ibid

36. ibid,107; A.P.Ummer Kutty,(1916),194; RJC,(1792-93) Para 137;

37. From Kadathanad Porlathiri Kothavarma Raja to Superintendant Christopher Plie, 17th

May 1796, in Thalasseri Rekhakal, 3.

38. From Chirakkal Raja Ravivarma to Christopher Plie, 27th

April 1797, in Thalasseri

Rekhakal,146.

39. From Chirakkal Raja to Christopher Plie, 13th

Sept.1797, Thalasseri Rekhakal, 213-14.

40. From Bibi to Christopher Pilie,28th

April, 1798,Thalasseri Rekhakal,399.

41. From Vira Rajendra Vatera to Stevens, 20th

Apr.1799-Thalasseri Rekhakal, 540.

42. Thalasseri Rekhakal, 153, 213,etc.

43. Logan, (1795), A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and other Papers of Importance

Relating to British affairs in Malabar, pt. ii. CIII, 4th

Dec., 248.

44. Thalasseri Rekhakal, 97-98.

45. Logan,(1951), Malabar, I, 526.

46. Prasannan Parthasarathi,op.cit, p.205.

47. C.A.Bayly, (1983), Delhi, 165,170-174.

48. For a discussion of role of Banias in British expansion, see, Lakshmi Subramanian,

,(1996), Indigenous Capital and Imperial Expansion: Bombay, Surat and West coast,

Delhi.

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49. Sanjay Subrahmanyam and C.A. Bayly, „Portfolio Capitalists and Political Economy of

early Modern India‟,in Sanjay Subrahmanyam ed,(1990),Merchants, Markets and the state

in Early Modern India, Delhi , 259.

50. Shubhra Chakrabarthi, (2004),133.

51. RJC, para 410., 420

52. ibid

53. ibid

54. M.Frenz,( 2003), From Contact to Conquest, Transition to British Rule in Malabar 1790-

1805, Delhi, 109-10

55. P. Nightingale, op.cit, 114-115. The alleged role of Murdoch Brown in shaping of the

Company‟s policies and his own strategies of trade demand serious enquiry but the lack of

sources constrains such an endeavour.

56. ibid,118

57. ibid,122-123

58. Bonaventure Swai, op.cit, 133.

59. Boddam to Governor General 13 Feb. 1786, Secret and Political Department Diaries,

No.33, cited in, B.Swai op.cit ,134.

60. B.Swai, op.cit .,135

61. ibid

62. ibid, 136

63. Christopher Bayly,( 1996 ), Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire,

Cambridge, 63.

64. M.Frenz, op.cit.p. 156;

65. A.P. Abdurahiman, „Palassi Rebellion: Role of Coastal Merchants‟, Journal of Kerala

Studies, vol.1,No.2 & 3,Jan.1974,p.295.

66. Baber‟s Letter dtd.14th

Mar1804, Collector‟s Records ( pol) vol.2275,F.49,cited in ibid.

67. Baber to Warden, dtd.16th

Mar 1804, Principal Collector‟s Diary, vol.2382,F.284-285.

68. Duke of Wellington Despatches, Sept.10, 1800; K.K.N. Kurup,( 1988), Pazhassi

Samarangal, Thiruvananthapuram, 124

69. K.K.N. Kurup, (2004), Pazhassi Samara Rekhakal, Calicut, 108.

70. Shubhra Chakrabarti,opct.

71. A.P. Ummer Kutty,(1916),195.

72. ibid.

73. B.Swai, op.cit,137.

74. Amiya Kumar Bagchi, „Merchants and Colonialism‟, op.cit, 65.

75. Bonaventure Swai, (1985), „From Kolathunad to Chirakkal, British Merchant Capital and

the Hinterland of Tellicherry, 1694- 1766, Studies in History,1,1,n.s, 110

76. ibid, 18; B.Swai calls Moosa as „collaborator par excellence‟, op.cit., 137.

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Merchants and Colonialism: The Case of Chovvakkaran Moosa and the English East India Company

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Transcript of Merchants and Colonialism: The Case of Chovvakkaran Moosa and the English East India Company