Menlo Park Fire Protection District2250 East Bidwell St., Ste #100 Folsom, CA 95630 (916) 458-5100...

Standards of Cover

Assessment

for the

June 16, 2015

2250 East Bidwell St., Ste #100 Folsom, CA 95630

(916) 458-5100 Fax: (916) 983-2090

Menlo Park Fire

Protection District

Management Consultants Folsom (Sacramento), CA

Volume 2 of 3 –

Technical Report

This page was intentionally left blank

Menlo Park Fire Protection District—Standards of Cover Assessment

Volume 2—Technical Report

Table of Contents page i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

VOLUME 1 of 3 – Executive Summary (separately bound)

VOLUME 2 of 3 – Standards of Cover Assessment

Technical Report (this volume)

Section 1—Introduction and Background ...................................................................................1

1.1 Report Organization .........................................................................................1

1.2 Project Scope of Work .....................................................................................2

1.3 District Overview .............................................................................................2

1.4 Previous Studies of the District ........................................................................4

Section 2—Standards of Coverage Introduction ........................................................................5

2.1 Standards of Coverage Study Processes ...........................................................5

Section 3—District Deployment Goals/Measures and Risk Assessment ..................................9

3.1 Why Does the District Exist and How Does it Deliver the Existing

Fire Crew Deployment Services? .....................................................................9

3.2 Community Risk Assessment Introduction ....................................................12

3.3 Risk Factors ....................................................................................................16

3.4 Community Growth and Development ..........................................................19

3.5 Prior Risk Studies ...........................................................................................23

3.6 Community Expectations ...............................................................................25

3.7 Risk Assessment Methodology ......................................................................26

3.8 District Hazards Assessment ..........................................................................27

3.9 Risk Assessment Result ..................................................................................41

3.10 Existing District Deployment .........................................................................42

Section 4—Staffing and Geo-Mapping Analysis .......................................................................45

4.1 Critical Time Task Measures—What Must be Done Over What Time

Frame to Achieve the Stated Outcome Expectation? .....................................45

4.2 Distribution and Concentration Studies—How the Location of First-

Due and First Alarm Resources Affects the Outcome ...................................52

Section 5—Statistical Analysis ....................................................................................................63



Table of Contents page ii

5.1 Historical Effectiveness and Reliability of Response—What Statistics

Say About Existing System Performance ......................................................63

5.2 Service Demand .............................................................................................63

5.3 Response Time Analysis ................................................................................68

5.4 Simultaneous Incident Activity ......................................................................73

5.5 Station Demand Percentage and Unit Hour Utilization .................................74

5.6 The District’s Unique Deployment Issues ......................................................76

Section 6—SOC Evaluation and Recommendation ..................................................................87

6.1 Overall Evaluation ..........................................................................................87

Section 7—Next Steps ..................................................................................................................91

7.1 Next Steps .......................................................................................................91

Appendices

Appendix A—Risk Assessment Exhibits

Table of Tables

Table 1—Standards of Response Coverage Process Elements ....................................................... 6

Table 2—Fire Department Deployment Simplified ....................................................................... 7

Table 3—Probability and Consequence Matrix ............................................................................ 14

Table 4—Town of Atherton Demographics ................................................................................. 17

Table 5—City of East Palo Alto Demographics ........................................................................... 18

Table 6—City of Menlo Park Demographics ............................................................................... 18

Table 7—San Mateo County Demographics ................................................................................ 19

Table 8—District Population ........................................................................................................ 21

Table 9—District Employment ..................................................................................................... 21

Table 10—District Residential Development ............................................................................... 22

Table 11—Non-Residential Development – District Cities ......................................................... 22

Table 12—Urban Land Hazard Exposure Area – San Mateo County .......................................... 24

Table 13—2010 ABAG Hazards .................................................................................................. 28

Table 14—2010 ABAG Hazards Potentially Impacting the District ............................................ 29

Table 15—2015 District Hazards ................................................................................................. 30



Table of Contents page iii

Table 16—District Incident Response Capabilities Correlating to Hazard Impact Severity

Mitigation ...................................................................................................................................... 31

Table 17—District Risk Assessment Zones ................................................................................. 31

Table 18—Probability of Future Major Incident Occurrence Criteria ......................................... 32

Table 19—Probability of Future Occurrence by Incident Category ............................................. 32

Table 20—Impact Severity Factors .............................................................................................. 33

Table 21—Impact Severity Factor Analysis – BUILDING FIRE ................................................ 34

Table 22—Impact Severity Factor Analysis – WILDLAND FIRE.............................................. 34

Table 23—Impact Severity Factor Analysis – MEDICAL EMERGENCY ................................. 35

Table 24—Impact Severity Factor Analysis – RESCUE ............................................................. 35

Table 25—Impact Severity Factor Analysis – HAZARDOUS MATERIAL RELEASE ............ 35

Table 26—Overall Risk Rating Scores by Incident Type ............................................................ 36

Table 27—Overall Risk Rating Categories .................................................................................. 36

Table 28—District Overall Risk Ratings by Incident Category and Risk Zone ........................... 37

Table 29—Daily Minimum Staffing per Unit for the District – 2015 .......................................... 42

Table 30—Resources Sent to Common Risk Types ..................................................................... 43

Table 31—First Alarm Structure Fire – 16-21 Firefighters .......................................................... 46

Table 32—Multi-Casualty Traffic Collision – 3 Firefighters plus 2 Ambulances ....................... 48

Table 33—Cardiac Arrest – 3 Firefighters plus an Ambulance ................................................... 49

Table 34—Road Mile Coverage for First-Due and First Alarm Units ......................................... 53

Table 35—Incident Demand by Incident Type by Year ............................................................... 67

Table 36—Incident Demand by Property Use by Year ................................................................ 68

Table 37—Call to Arrival Response Time (Minutes/Seconds) .................................................... 69

Table 38—Turnout Time Performance ......................................................................................... 70

Table 39—Travel Time Performance ........................................................................................... 71

Table 40—Incidents: Count – Year by Station ............................................................................. 72

Table 41—Call to Arrival Time for ERF Incidents by Year ........................................................ 72

Table 42—Travel Time for ERF Incidents by Year ..................................................................... 73

Table 43—Simultaneous Incident Activity – 2014 ...................................................................... 73

Table 44—Unit-Hour Utilization for Apparatus........................................................................... 75



Table of Contents page iv

Table 45—Apparatus: Count – Arrival Sequence by Station ....................................................... 77

Table 46—District Resources Used By Arrival............................................................................ 77

Table 47—Apparatus: 90% Performance Minutes – Arrival Sequence and Count per Station ... 78

Table 48—Apparatus: 90% Travel Minutes – Vehicle ID and Count per Hour of Day (City Side

Resources into Bay Side Area) ..................................................................................................... 80

Table 49—City Side Combined Apparatus Travel Time and Counts by Hour ............................ 81

Table 50—Apparatus: 90% Travel Minutes – Vehicle ID and Count per Hour of Day (Bay Side

Resources into City Side Area) ..................................................................................................... 83

Table 51—City Side Combined Apparatus Travel Time and Counts by Hour ............................ 84

Table 52—Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria – BUILDING FIRE ............................... 95

Table 53—Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria – WILDLAND FIRE ............................. 96

Table 54—Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria – MEDICAL EMERGENCY ................ 97

Table 55—Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria – RESCUE ............................................. 98

Table 56—Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria – HAZARDOUS MATERIAL

RELEASE ..................................................................................................................................... 99

Table of Figures

Figure 1—Risk Types ................................................................................................................... 13

Figure 2—Fire Progression Timeline ........................................................................................... 16

Figure 3—Risk Zone Rating Calculations Flowchart ................................................................... 27

Figure 4—Survival Rate vs. Time of Defibrillation ..................................................................... 39

Figure 5—Number of Incidents by Year ...................................................................................... 64

Figure 6—Number of Incidents by Year by Incident Type .......................................................... 64

Figure 7—Number of Incidents by Month by Year ...................................................................... 65

Figure 8—Number of Incidents by Day of Week by Year ........................................................... 65

Figure 9—Number of Incidents by Hour of Day by Year ............................................................ 66

Figure 10—Number of Incidents by Station by Year ................................................................... 66

Figure 11—Number of Station Simultaneous Incidents ............................................................... 74

Figure 12—Bay Side Incidents ..................................................................................................... 79

Figure 13—City Side Incidents .................................................................................................... 82

VOLUME 3 of 3 – Map Atlas (separately bound)



Section 1—Introduction and Background page 1

SECTION 1—INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Citygate Associates, LLC’s detailed work product for a Standards of Response Cover (SOC)

review for field deployment functions for the Menlo Park Fire Protection District (the District) is

presented in this volume. Citygate’s scope of work and corresponding Work Plan was developed

consistent with Citygate’s Project Team members’ experience in fire administration. Citygate

utilizes various National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) publications as best practice

guidelines, along with the self-assessment criteria of the Commission on Fire Accreditation

International (CFAI).

1.1 REPORT ORGANIZATION

This report volume is structured into the following sections. Volumes 1 (Executive Summary)

and 3 (Map Atlas) are separately bound.

Section 1 Introduction and Background: An introduction to the study and background facts

about the District.

Section 2 Standards of Response Coverage Introduction: An introduction to the Standards of

Coverage (SOC) process and methodology used by Citygate in this review.

Section 3 Deployment Goals/Measures and Risk Assessment: An in-depth examination of the

District’s deployment ability to meet the community’s risks, expectations, and

emergency needs.

Section 4 Staffing and Geo-Mapping Analysis: A review of (1) the critical tasks that must be

performed to achieve the District’s desired outcome; and (2) the District’s existing

fire station locations and future locations.

Section 5 Response Statistical Analysis: A statistical data analysis of the District’s incident

responses and an overall deployment evaluation.

Section 6 SOC Evaluation and Deployment Recommendation: A summary of deployment

priorities and an overall deployment recommendation.

Section 7 Next Steps: A summary of deployment short- and long-term next steps.

1.1.1 Goals of Report

As each of the sections mentioned above imparts information, this report will cite findings and

make recommendations, if appropriate, that relate to each finding. There is a sequential

numbering of all of the findings and recommendations throughout Sections 3 through 6 of this

report. To provide a comprehensive summary, a complete listing of all these same findings and

recommendations, in order, is found in the Executive Summary. Section 7 of this report brings

attention to the highest priority needs and possible next steps.




This document provides technical information about how fire services are provided, legally

regulated, and how the District currently operates. This information is presented in the form of

recommendations and policy choices for the District leadership to discuss.

1.2 PROJECT SCOPE OF WORK

1.2.1 Standards of Response Coverage Review

The scope of the Standards of Response Coverage review included the following elements:

Modeling the need and effects of the current fire station locations. Although this

is not a study of fire departments adjacent to the District, the study considered the

impacts of the District’s existing or potential automatic and mutual aid

agreements on the District’s needs.

Establishing performance goals consistent with best practices and national

guidelines from the NFPA and CFAI.

Using an incident response time analysis program called StatsFD™ to review the

statistics of prior historical performance.

Using a geographic mapping response time measurement tool called FireView™

to measure fire and ambulance driving coverages.

SOC Study Questions

To prepare and develop a Standards of Coverage document for the District, Citygate reviewed

computer data, response time analysis, and past performance. As a result, this study addresses the

following questions:

1. Is the type and quantity of apparatus and personnel adequate for the District’s

deployment to emergencies?

2. What is the recommended deployment to maintain adequate emergency response

times as growth continues to occur?

1.3 DISTRICT OVERVIEW

Located between Highway 280 and the San Francisco Bay in the southern most portion of San

Mateo County, the Menlo Park Fire Protection District provides public safety services consisting

of fire protection and prevention, emergency medical, technical rescue, hazardous materials,

disaster preparedness, and public education, as well as related services to the Town of Atherton,

Cities of East Palo Alto and Menlo Park, portions of unincorporated San Mateo County, and

contract emergency services for the Stanford Linear Accelerator (SLAC).




Bordered generally by Redwood City on the north, San Francisco Bay on the east, Santa Clara

County (Palo Alto) on the south, and Woodside on the west, the District encompasses

approximately 30 square miles with an estimated population of 90,000 residents. Situated just

north of Silicon Valley in Santa Clara County and South of San Francisco, the area developed

initially as a popular country estate community for San Francisco businessmen. In addition to

being home to Stanford University, Stanford Hospital, and Facebook, the region is also known as

a venture capital center and research and development hub for the Valley with one of the ten

Department of Energy National Labs at SLAC and other National Testing Centers such as

Stanford Research Institute (or SRI International).

As part of the greater urban San Francisco Bay Area, the majority of the District is residential

with related commercial and light industrial uses. The economy centers around high density

venture capital, private equity, financial services, law firms, and other professional services

companies focusing on technology and health science. The economic activity is concentrated in

the western area of the District near Stanford University and Hospital, and high density business

and industrial uses on the east side adjacent to San Francisco Bay near the Dumbarton Bridge.

With elevation ranging from sea level to approximately 300 feet, the District enjoys a

Mediterranean climate characterized by mild winters and dry summers. Rainfall averages

approximately 16 inches per year, generally occurring between mid-October and mid-April.

Average temperatures range from a low of 36o

F – 40o

F in the winter to a high of 75o

F – 80o F in

the summer. The area enjoys an average of 255 sunny days per year with 56 days of precipitation

and mild winds.

The District receives fire dispatch from San Mateo County Communications serving all of the

cities, districts, and unincorporated areas of the County.

1.3.1 Legal Basis for Agency1

On September 16, 1915, a group of 62 residents petitioned the San Mateo County Board of

Supervisors and the Menlo Park Fire Protection District was formed. The boundaries of the Fire

District eventually followed lines similar to those drawn for the original incorporation of Menlo

Park. On March 23, 1874, Menlo Park became the second incorporated city in San Mateo

County, although only for a short time. The purpose was to provide a quick way to raise money

for road repairs. This incorporation, which included Fair Oaks (later Atherton) and Ravenswood

(later East Palo Alto) lasted only until 1876. Menlo Park attempted to reincorporate in 1923, and

the boundaries would have included what is now Atherton. Citizens in Atherton had other ideas

and beat Menlo Park to the County Courthouse by only minutes and submitted their own

incorporation documents. Menlo Park delayed their submission and the city was not incorporated

1 District web site history.




until 1927. East Palo Alto remained as an unincorporated county area until 1983 when the City

of East Palo Alto was formed. The Menlo Park Fire Protection District is older, therefore, than

the three cities that it protects.

1.3.2 Funding Sources and Restrictions

In Fiscal Year 15/16, the Board-approved Final Operating Expenditures were $37,521,000.

Revenues inclusive of property taxes and fees were projected to be $37,347,000 for all funds.

The Board of Directors places a high priority on closely monitoring the impact of local economic

conditions on the District’s finances and on the District’s ability to maintain current service

levels, meet infrastructure needs, and build and maintain healthy reserve balances. The budget

preparation and adoption process is guided by several basic fiscal tenets:

Ongoing operating expenditures are to be paid with ongoing operating revenues.

Some services provided by District staff have a cost recovery element that is close

to 100% cost recovery.

Alternate revenue sources such as grants are encouraged with the caveat that the

associated expenditures have a limited life equal to that of the revenue source.

Paid time off balances, such as annual leave, will be funded at 100% pay out

values per Memorandum(s) of Understanding and compensation and benefit plans

effective at the end of each fiscal year.

The District has incorporated these tenets into its fiscal strategies and uses them to set fiscally

responsible short- and long-term goals. The District also continues to provide a high level of

reliable service to the public. Despite the recent difficult economic conditions, the District’s

reserves are healthy and its long-term financial outlook is strong. Fire stations have not been

closed and no fire engines were taken out of service. Employees have not been laid off or

furloughed and service levels have been maintained. Effective leadership and prudent fiscal

practices continue to ensure that the community the District serves will receive the service level

that it has come to expect.

1.4 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE DISTRICT

The District Directors last commissioned a full Standards of Cover study in June 2004. Since that

time the District has conducted user and impact fee studies and successfully managed its

operations as the communities it serves continued to evolve.



Section 2—Standards of Coverage Introduction page 5

SECTION 2—STANDARDS OF COVERAGE INTRODUCTION

2.1 STANDARDS OF COVERAGE STUDY PROCESSES

The core methodology used by Citygate in the scope of its deployment analysis work is the

“Standards of Response Coverage” 5th

Edition, which is a systems-based approach to fire

department deployment, as published by the CFAI. This approach uses local risk and

demographics to determine the level of protection best fitting the District’s needs.

The Standards of Response Coverage method evaluates deployment as part of the self-

assessment process of a fire agency. This approach uses risk and community expectations on

outcomes to help elected officials make informed decisions on fire and emergency medical

services deployment levels. Citygate has adopted this methodology as a comprehensive tool to

evaluate fire station locations. Depending on the needs of the study, the depth of the components

may vary.

Such a systems approach to deployment, rather than a one-size-fits-all prescriptive formula,

allows for local determination. In this comprehensive approach, each agency can match local

needs (risks and expectations) with the costs of various levels of service. In an informed public

policy debate, a governing board “purchases” the fire and emergency medical service levels the

community needs and can afford.

While working with multiple components to conduct a deployment analysis is admittedly more

work, it yields a much better result than using only a singular component. For instance, if only

travel time is considered, and frequency of multiple calls is not considered, the analysis could

miss over-worked companies. If a risk assessment for deployment is not considered, and

deployment is based only on travel time, a community could under-deploy to incidents.




The Standards of Response Coverage process consists of the following eight parts:

Table 1—Standards of Response Coverage Process Elements

Element Meaning

1. Existing Deployment Policies Reviewing the deployment goals the agency has in place today.

2. Community Outcome Expectations Reviewing the expectations of the community for response to emergencies.

3. Community Risk Assessment Reviewing the assets at risk in the community. (In this Citygate study, see Section 3.2 Community Risk Assessment.)

4. Critical Task Study

Reviewing the tasks that must be performed and the personnel required to deliver the stated outcome expectation for the Effective Response Force.

5. Distribution Study Reviewing the spacing of first-due resources (typically engines) to control routine emergencies.

6. Concentration Study

Reviewing the spacing of fire stations so that building fires can receive sufficient resources in a timely manner (First Alarm assignment or the Effective Response Force).

7. Reliability and Historical Response Effectiveness Studies

Using prior response statistics to determine the percent of compliance the existing system delivers.

8. Overall Evaluation Proposing Standard of Cover statements by risk type as necessary.

Fire department deployment, simply stated, is about the speed and weight of the attack. Speed

calls for first-due, all-risk intervention units (engines, trucks, and/or rescue ambulances)

strategically located across a department responding in an effective travel time. These units are

tasked with controlling moderate emergencies without the incident escalating to second alarm or

greater size, which unnecessarily depletes department resources as multiple requests for service

occur. Weight is about multiple-unit response for serious emergencies such as a room-and-

contents structure fire, a multiple-patient incident, a vehicle accident with extrication required, or

a heavy rescue incident. In these situations, enough firefighters must be assembled within a

reasonable time frame to safely control the emergency, thereby keeping it from escalating to

greater alarms.




This deployment design paradigm is reiterated in the table below:

Table 2—Fire Department Deployment Simplified

Meaning Purpose

Speed of Attack Travel time of first-due, all-risk intervention units strategically located across a department.

Controlling moderate emergencies without the incident escalating to second alarm or greater size.

Weight of Attack Number of firefighters in a multiple-unit response for serious emergencies.

Assembling enough firefighters within a reasonable time frame to safely control the emergency.

Thus, small fires and medical emergencies require a single- or two-unit response (engine and

specialty unit) with a quick response time. Larger incidents require more crews. In either case, if

the crews arrive too late or the total personnel sent to the emergency are too few for the

emergency type, they are drawn into a losing and more dangerous battle. The science of fire crew

deployment is to spread crews out across a community for quick response to keep emergencies

small with positive outcomes, without spreading the crews so far apart that they cannot amass

together quickly enough to be effective in major emergencies.



Section 3—District Deployment Goals/Measures and Risk Assessment page 9

SECTION 3—DISTRICT DEPLOYMENT GOALS/MEASURES AND RISK

ASSESSMENT

3.1 WHY DOES THE DISTRICT EXIST AND HOW DOES IT DELIVER THE EXISTING FIRE CREW

DEPLOYMENT SERVICES?

3.1.1 Existing Response Time Policies or Goals—Why Does the Agency Exist

The District Board of Directors over the decades has not

adopted formal response time policies by type of risks.

However, the District has a long history of striving to

provide a high level of service that can be documented in

response times, number of fire companies, and minimum

staffing. Thus, although no formal policy has been

adopted by the Board or the citizens of the District, the

District has been budgeting for and providing a level of services that can be well documented.

For emergency medical services, the current countywide first responder fire department system

uses fire engines with paramedics and expects a response time of 6:59 minutes/seconds from the

time the 9-1-1 call is received in the County Communications Center. Emergency ambulances

are staffed by a paramedic contractor and have a response time standard of 13 minutes from

dispatch.

Another source to look for community response time policies are the Safety Elements of the

cities’ and the County’s adopted General Plans. However, given there is a fire district, none of

the other governmental agencies have adopted fire service response time goals or explicit desired

outcomes. The General Plan Safety Elements do have broad goals for overall community safety.

Thus, today it is impossible to measure current performance to national best practices that define

a start and end time by type of risk to be protected for non-EMS incidents.

The lack of response goals by the District is not congruent with best practices for emergency

response time tracking. Nationally recognized standards and best practices call for a time line

with several important time measurements that include a definition of response time.

The District also has not identified response goals for technical rescue and hazardous material

responses; in addition to firefighting and EMS, these incident types response time goals also are

required to meet the Standards of Coverage model for the Commission on Fire Accreditation

International (CFAI). In this Standards of Coverage study, Citygate will recommend revised

response time goals to include all risks including fire, EMS, hazardous materials, and technical

rescue responses. The goals will be consistent with the CFAI systems approach to response.

3.1.2 Existing Outcome Expectations

SOC ELEMENT 1 OF 8*

EXISTING DEPLOYMENT

POLICIES *Note: This is an overview of Element 1.

The detail is provided on page 42.




The Standards of Response Cover Process begins by

reviewing existing emergency services outcome

expectations. This can be restated as follows: for what

purpose does the response system exist? Has the

governing body adopted any response performance

measures? If so, the time measures used need to be understood and good data collected.

Current best practice nationally is to measure percent completion of a goal (e.g., 90% of

responses) instead of an average measure. Mathematically this is called a “fractile” measure.2

This is because the measure of average only identifies the central or middle point of response

time performance for all calls for service in the data set. Using an average makes it impossible to

know how many incidents had response times that were way over the average or just over. For

example, if a department had an average response time of 5 minutes for 5,000 calls for service, it

cannot be determined how many calls past the average point of 5 minutes were answered in the

6th minute or way out at 10 minutes. This is a significant issue if hundreds or thousands of calls

are answered far beyond the average point. Fractile measures will identify per minute the number

of incidents that are reached up to 100%.

The District has data from the regional computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system and its Records

Management System (RMS) indicating its actual performance.

Upon completion of this study, the District should consider adopting the performance goals

recommended for its emergency response systems consistent with the recommendation of the

NFPA and CFAI. There are other organizations that suggest different criterion; however, CFAI

is the most detailed and system-wide analysis available.

More importantly within the Standards of Response Coverage Process, positive outcomes are the

goal, and from that crew size and response time can be calculated to allow efficient fire station

spacing (distribution and concentrations). Emergency medical incidents have situations with the

most severe time constraints. In a heart attack that stops the heart, a trauma that causes severe

blood loss, or in a respiratory emergency, the brain can only live 8-10 minutes without oxygen.

Not only heart attacks, but also other events can cause oxygen deprivation to the brain. Heart

attacks make up a small percentage; drowning, choking, trauma constrictions, or other similar

events have the same effect. In a building fire, a small incipient fire can grow to involve the

entire room in an 8- to 10-minute timeframe. If fire service response is to achieve positive

outcomes in severe emergency medical situations and incipient fire situations, all responding

2 A fractile is that point below which a stated fraction of the values lie. The fraction is often given in percent; the

term percentile may then be used.

SOC ELEMENT 2 OF 8

COMMUNITY OUTCOME

EXPECTATIONS




crews must arrive, size-up the situation, and deploy effective measures before brain death occurs

or the fire leaves the room of origin.

Thus, from the time of 9-1-1 receiving the call, an effective deployment system is beginning to

manage the problem within a 7- to 8-minute total response time. This is right at the point that

brain death is becoming irreversible and the fire has grown to the point to leave the room of

origin and become very serious. Thus, the District needs a first-due response goal that is within

the range to give the situation hope for a positive outcome. It is important to note the fire or

medical emergency continues to deteriorate from the time of inception, not the time the fire

engine actually starts to drive the response route. Ideally, the emergency is noticed immediately

and the 9-1-1 system is activated promptly. This step of awareness—calling 9-1-1 and giving the

dispatcher accurate information—takes, in the best of circumstances, one minute. Then crew

notification and travel time take additional minutes. Once arrived, the crew must walk to the

patient or emergency, size-up the situation, and deploy its skills and tools. Even in easy-to-access

situations, this step can take two or more minutes. This time frame may be increased

considerably due to long driveways, apartment buildings with limited access, multi-storied

apartments or office complexes, or shopping center buildings such as those found in parts of the

District.

Unfortunately, there are times that the emergency has become too severe, even before the 9-1-1

notification and/or fire department response, for the responding crew to reverse; however, when

an appropriate response time policy is combined with a well-designed system, then only issues

like bad weather, poor traffic conditions, or multiple emergencies will slow the response system

down. Consequently, a properly designed system will give citizens the hope of a positive

outcome for their tax dollar expenditure.

For this report, “total” response time is the sum of the fire dispatch, crew turnout, and road travel

time steps. This is consistent with the recommendations of the CFAI.

Finding #1: The District Directors have not adopted a complete and best

practices-based deployment measure or set of specialty response

measures for all-risk emergency responses that includes the

beginning time measure from the point of fire dispatch receiving

the 9-1-1 phone call, nor a goal statement tied to risks and outcome

expectations. The deployment measure should have a second

measurement statement to define multiple-unit response coverage

for serious emergencies. Making these deployment goal changes

will meet the best practice recommendations of the Commission on

Fire Accreditation International.




3.2 COMMUNITY RISK ASSESSMENT INTRODUCTION

The third element of the SOC process is the development

of a community risk assessment or analysis. The objective

of a community risk assessment is to:

1. Identify specific hazards with potential to

adversely impact the community or

jurisdiction

2. Quantify the probability of occurrence of each identified hazard

3. Quantify the probable severity of resultant impacts from a hazard occurrence.

Hazard is broadly defined as a situation or condition that can cause or contribute to harm.

Hazard examples include fire, medical emergency, vehicle collision, earthquake, flood, etc. Risk

is broadly defined as the probability of hazard occurrence in combination with the likely severity

of resultant impacts.

For an SOC study, the Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI) identifies two

risk categories: fire risk and non-fire risk3. Identification and quantification of the various fire

and non-fire risks are important factors in evaluating how fire resources are or can be deployed

to mitigate those risks.

Figure 1 identifies the fire and non-fire risks evaluated for this SOC study. As the District is an

“all risk” response agency, all of the incidents categories were evaluated.

3 Commission on Fire Accreditation International, Standards of Cover (5

th Edition)

SOC ELEMENT 3 OF 8

COMMUNITY RISK

ASSESSMENT




Figure 1—Risk Types




3.2.1 Building Fire Risk

Table 3 illustrates four building occupancy risk categories based on probability of occurrence

and likely severity of consequences.

Table 3—Probability and Consequence Matrix

Low Consequence High Consequence

Hig

h P

rob

ab

ilit

y

Moderate Risk

(High Probability)

(Low Consequence)

Maximum Risk

(High Probability)

(High Consequence)

Lo

w P

rob

ab

ilit

y

Low Isolated Risk

(Low Probability)

(Low Consequence)

High/Special Risk

(Low Probability)

(High Consequence)

Probability is defined as the likelihood of fire occurring in a particular occupancy type, and

consequences are defined as the effects that the fire will have on the building, occupants,

property, and community. The building occupancy risk categories are described below:

Low/Isolated risk building occupancies include detached unoccupied garages and

outbuildings.

Moderate risk building occupancies include mobile homes, detached single-

family and two-family residences easily reached with pre-connected attack lines,

commercial/industrial buildings less than 10,000 square feet without a high fire

load, and other buildings where loss of life or property value is limited to a single

occupancy.

Maximum risk occupancies include concentrations of older multi-family

dwellings, multi-family dwellings over two stories high, occupancies with high or

hazardous fuel loading, aircraft or airport property, large commercial occupancies,

and built-up areas with high concentrations of property with substantial risk of

loss of life, severe financial impact, or the potential for unusual damage to

property or the environment.

High/Special risk occupancies include apartment complexes greater than 25,000

square feet, key government/infrastructure occupancies, hospitals, nursing homes,




industrial complexes with needed fire flow exceeding 3,500 gpm, refineries and

warehouses, vacant/abandoned buildings, and any building where available water

supply is less than needed fire flow.

Another measure of building fire risk is required fire flow, or the quantity of water in gallons per

minute (gpm) that would be needed if a building were seriously involved in fire. The Insurance

Services Office (ISO) calculates Needed Fire Flow4 (NFF) for buildings it evaluates for

insurance underwriting purposes. For the Menlo Park Fire Protection District, the ISO database

identifies 931 buildings evaluated, 293 of which have required fire flows of 2,000 gpm or higher.

There are also 38 buildings with fire flows in excess of 4,000 gpm, and 21 buildings at 5,000-

7,000 gpm or greater.

This is a significant amount of firefighting water to deploy, and a major fire at any one of these

buildings would require the entire on-duty District firefighting force. Using a generally accepted

figure of 50 gallons per minute per firefighter on large building fires, a fire in a building

requiring 2,000 gallons per minute would require 40 firefighters, which is more than the

minimum number of 24 on-duty fire engine-based firefighters in the District. For fires exceeding

the on-duty District forces, then the regional automatic and mutual aid system is required.

Resource deployment and response time are two critical components necessary to achieve a good

outcome for building fire risk. Figure 2 shows that response times of 7 minutes or less are

necessary to stop a building fire before it reaches the flashover point. Flashover is the point at

which the entire room erupts into fire after all of the combustible objects in that room have

reached their ignition temperature. Survivability of a person in a room after flashover is unlikely.

4 Needed Fire Flow (NFF) is the same as Required Fire Flow




Figure 2—Fire Progression Timeline

Source: http://www.firesprinklerassoc.org

Building fire risk is mitigated by both resource distribution and concentration: distribution to

ensure rapid intervention to control small fires, and concentration to prevent moderate fires from

escalating into larger, more damaging events.

3.3 RISK FACTORS

Elements to be considered in a community risk assessment include factors that influence service

demand; response capability; probability of risk occurrence; and severity of impacts on life,




property, and community resilience. The factors include community demographics and projected

future population growth and development.

3.3.1 Community Demographics

Key demographic information relevant to this study for the communities served by the District is

summarized in Table 4-Table 7 below:

Table 4—Town of Atherton Demographics

Demographic 2000 2010

Percentage / Percent Change

Population 7,194 6,914 -3.90%

Under 5 years 371 282 -23.99%

5 – 17 years 1,332 1,261 -5.33%

18 – 64 years 4,040 3,809 -5.72%

Over 65 years 1,451 1,562 7.65%

Median age 45.3 48.2 6.40%

Housing Units 2,505 2,530 1.00%

Owner-Occupied 2,288 2,116 -7.52%

Renter-Occupied 125 214 71.2%

Median Value $1,000,000+ n/a n/a

Birthplace

U.S. 6,178 n/a 85.7%

Foreign Born 1,032 n/a 14.3%

Education

High School Graduate 267 n/a 5.4%

Bachelor’s Degree 1,785 n/a 36.0%

Graduate Degree 1,995 n/a 40.2%

Employment

Professional 2,220 70.1%

Sales/office 599 18.9%

Service 194 6.1%

Other 153 4.8%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Fact Finder




Table 5—City of East Palo Alto Demographics



Population 29,506 28,155 -4.58%

Under 5 years 2,943 2,616 -11.11%

5 – 17 years 7,376 6,360 -13.77%

18 – 64 years 17,668 17,504 -0.93%

Over 65 years 1,519 1,675 10.27%

Median age 25.8 28.1 8.91%

Housing Units 7,091 7,819 10.27%

Owner-Occupied 3,033 2,971 -2.04%

Renter-Occupied 3,943 3,969 0.67%

Median Value $302,000 n/a n/a

Birthplace

U.S. 16,546 n/a 56.2%


Education

High School Graduate 2,733 n/a 18.0%


Graduate Degree 545 n/a 3.6%

Employment 3,043 2,723 -10.5% Source:

U.S. Census Bureau, American Fact Finder

Table 6—City of Menlo Park Demographics



Population 30,785 32,026 4.03%

Under 5 years 2,030 2,458 21.08%

5 – 17 years 4,707 5,347 13.60%

18 – 64 years 19,159 19,643 2.53%

Over 65 years 4,889 4,578 -6.36%

Median age 37.4 38.7 3.48%

Housing Units 12,714 13,085 2.92%

Owner-Occupied 7,055 6,927 -1.80%

Renter-Occupied 5,332 5,420 1.65%


Birthplace

U.S. 23,780 77.25%

Foreign Born 7,006 22.75%

Education




Employment


Sales/office 2,927 19.00%

Service 1,415 9.20%

Other 1,392 9.00% Source:





Table 7—San Mateo County Demographics



Population 707,161 718,451 1.60%

Under 5 years 45,374 46,360 2.17%

5 – 17 years 116,726 113,412 -3.05%

18 – 64 years 456,976 462,417 1.19%

Over 65 years 88,085 96,262 9.28%

Median age 36.8 39.3 6.79%

Housing Units 260,576 271,031 4.01%

Owner-Occupied 156,133 153,110 -1.94%

Renter-Occupied 97,970 104,727 6.90%


Birthplace

U.S. 479,043 n/a 67.7%


Education




Employment


Sales/office 98,865 27.3%

Service 48,869 13.5%

Other 59,487 16.5% Source:


3.4 COMMUNITY GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

3.4.1 Overview

Future population growth and development within the Menlo Park Fire Protection District will

center primarily on the cities of East Palo Alto and Menlo Park. No projected growth or

development data was available for the Town of Atherton; however, there is little if any open

space remaining, and zoning restrictions preclude any commercial or industrial uses. Citygate

was also unable to isolate projected population and development projections for the

unincorporated areas of the District; however, despite the majority of the area being older

residential and commercial occupancies, some open space exists in the North Fair Oaks area and

a few newer office/commercial buildings exist.

The City of East Palo Alto plans for an approximate 25% growth in population, and nearly 28%

growth in employment, over the next 20 years. The City expects this population growth to drive

a 30% growth in residential housing units, and nearly 1,000% growth in non-residential

development over the same period.




The City of Menlo Park also envisions significant growth over the next 20 years, anticipating a

17% growth in both population and employment. The City also anticipates a 10.5% growth in

housing units, and slightly more than 22% growth in non-residential development.

3.4.2 Land Use

Atherton5

Land use in Atherton is also predominantly (approximately 90%) low- and medium-density

single-family residential with approximately 5% public facilities and 5% parks / open space.

East Palo Alto6

Land use in East Palo Alto consists of approximately 40% single-family residential, 10% multi-

family residential, 10% general office/commercial, 10% light industrial, and 30% open space /

undeveloped. Industrial use is limited to the northeastern area of the City on the north and south

sides of Bay Road.

Menlo Park7

Land use in Menlo Park is predominantly (approximately 70%) low- and medium-density single-

and multi-family residential with approximately 10% apartment/office, 10% commercial, and

10% general industrial uses. Office and commercial uses are located generally on the southwest

end of the City in the Sand Hill Road corridor and the core downtown area. Commercial uses are

limited to the very northeastern area of the City adjacent to San Francisco Bay.

San Mateo County8

Land use in the San Mateo County areas of the District outside of the three incorporated cities is

a combination of open space, low- and medium-density residential, and commercial.

5 Atherton General Plan (2002)

6 East Palo Alto Vista 2035 General Plan Update, Existing Conditions Report – Figure 4-1: Existing Land Use

(2014) 7 Menlo Park General Plan Land Use and Zoning Maps (2013)

8 San Mateo County Zoning Map (no date)




3.4.3 Population

Table 8 summarizes estimated District population growth between 2012 and 2040.

Table 8—District Population

Service Area 2012

Population

Projected 2040

Population

Projected Population

Growth Percent Growth

Atherton 6,888 7,903 1,015 14.7%

East Palo Alto 28,467 35,526 7,059 24.8%

Menlo Park 32,513 38,060 5,547 17.1%

Unincorporated Areas 18,038 24,158 6,120 33.9%

Total 85,906 105,646 19,740 23.0%

Source: Draft Menlo Park Fire Protection District Facilities Impact Fee Study (2015)

Table 8 shows that the population within the District is projected to grow by nearly 20,000

residents over the 25-year planning horizon. The City of East Palo Alto is projected to

experience the greatest population growth, followed by the unincorporated areas of San Mateo

County and the City of Menlo Park.

3.4.4 Employment

Table 9 summarizes estimated District employment growth between 2012 and 2040.

Table 9—District Employment

Service Area 2012

Employment1

Projected 2040

Employment Employment

Growth Percent Growth

Atherton 2,666 3,1731 508 19.0%

East Palo Alto 2,824 3,6043 780 27.6%

Menlo Park 29,784 34,9802 5,196 17.45%

Unincorporated Areas 4,158 5,6301 1,472 35.4%

Total 39,431 47,677 8,246 20.9% 1 Draft Menlo Park Fire Protection District Facilities Impact Fee Nexus Study (2015)

2 Menlo Park General Plan Update, Draft Existing Conditions Report (January, 2015)

3 2035 projected employment – East Palo Alto General Plan Update, Existing Conditions Report (February, 2014)

Table 9 indicates that the City of Menlo Park is expected to experience the greatest employment

growth, accounting for nearly 65% of anticipated new jobs within the District, primarily due to

the Facebook and Menlo Gateway projects.




3.4.5 Community Development

Residential Development

Table 10 summarizes projected residential development growth within the Menlo Park Fire

Protection District from 2013 to 2035.

Table 10—District Residential Development

Service Area

Housing

Units 2013

1

Projected Housing Units

2

2035

Projected Additional Housing

Units

Projected Growth Percent

Atherton 2,440 N/A N/A N/A

East Palo Alto 7,754 10,0692 2,315 29.8%

Menlo Park 12,803 14,1503 1,347 10.52%

Unincorporated Areas N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 U.S. Census Bureau

2 East Palo Alto General Plan Update, Existing Conditions Report (February, 2014)

3 Menlo Park General Plan Update, Draft Existing Conditions Report (January, 2015)

Table 10 indicates that Menlo Park expects moderate housing growth at 10.52%, and East Palo

Alto expects extensive housing growth at 29.8%, over the next 20 years. No residential

development projection data was available for the Town of Atherton and the unincorporated

areas of the District.

Non-Residential Development

Table 11 summarizes projected non-residential development growth within the District from

2013 to 2035.

Table 11—Non-Residential Development – District Cities

Service Area

2013 Non-Residential

Development

Units1

Estimated 2035 Non-Residential

Development Units

1

Projected Additional Non-

Residential Development

Units1

Projected Growth Percent

Atherton N/A N/A N/A N/A

East Palo Alto2 1,225

2 1,664

2 439 35.8%

Menlo Park3 8,850

3 10,829

3 1,979

3 22.36%

Unincorporated Areas N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 1,000 square feet

2 East Palo Alto Vision 2035 General Plan Update, Existing Conditions Report (2014) and Ravenswood/Corners TOD

Specific Plan (2013) 3 Menlo Park General Plan Update, Draft Existing Conditions Report (January, 2015)




Table 11 indicates that Menlo Park anticipates over 22% growth, mostly in the M-2 area,

including several potential mid-rise to high-rise buildings. East Palo Alto also envisions

significant growth in non-residential development, primarily targeted for the University Avenue /

Highway 101 interchange and the Ravenswood / 4 Corners area.

3.5 PRIOR RISK STUDIES

The federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA2000), which amended the Robert T. Stafford

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), emphasizes the need for state and

local entities to closely coordinate disaster planning and mitigation efforts to reduce the severity

of disaster impacts. In addition to continuing the requirement for a state mitigation plan as a

condition of federal disaster assistance, DMA2000 creates a similar requirement for local entities

and creates incentives for increased coordination and integration of mitigation activities among

local jurisdictions.

In 2005, the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG)9 published its initial Multi-

Jurisdictional Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (MJLHMP) for the San Francisco Bay Area –

Taming Natural Disasters. The Plan, updated in 2010, identifies the following hazards with

potential to impact the Bay Area:

Earthquake-Related Hazards

1. Surface faulting

2. Ground shaking

3. Liquefaction

4. Landslide

5. Tsunami

Weather-Related Hazards

6. Flooding

7. Wildfire

8. Drought

9. Climate change

9 Association of Bay Area Governments includes participating jurisdictions from Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin,

San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma counties.




Human Condition Hazards

10. Hazardous material release

11. Dam failure

12. Energy shortage

13. Weapon of mass destruction

The ABAG Plan focuses on natural hazards related to earthquakes and weather, and only

addresses the human condition hazards as they relate to earthquake and weather-related hazards.

Jurisdictions participating in the ABAG Multi-Jurisdictional Local Hazard Mitigation Plan for

the San Francisco Bay Area, including the County of San Mateo, the Town of Atherton, and

cities of Menlo Park and West Palo Alto, have developed and adopted annexes to the Plan for

their specific jurisdictions.

The San Mateo County Annex addresses all of the hazards identified in the 2010 ABAG Plan

with the exception of tsunami, climate change, hazardous material release, energy shortage, and

weapon of mass destruction. Table 12 summarizes the urban county areas exposed to each

identified hazard in acres.

Table 12—Urban Land Hazard Exposure Area – San Mateo County

Hazard

Acres Exposed

2005

Acres Exposed

2010 Percent Change

Total Acres of Urban Land 31,277 31,215 -0.20%1

Earthquake Faulting (within CGS zone) 1,380 1,404 10.14%

Earthquake Shaking (within 2 highest shaking categories)2 25,959 26,099 0.54%

Earthquake-Induced Landslides (within CGS study zone) Not Available3

Liquefaction (within moderate, high, or very high susceptibility) 6,089 6,197 1.78%

Flooding (within 100-year floodplain) 1,084 1,108 2.21%

Flooding (within 500-year floodplain) 238 243 2.10%

Landslides (within areas of existing landslides) 5,932 5,999 1.13%

Wildfire (subject to high, very high, or extreme wildfire threat) 13,078 13,989 6.96%

Wildland-Urban Interface Fire Threat 10,838 11,242 3.73%

Dam Inundation (within inundation zone) 811 832 2.59%

Drought4 31,277 31,215 -1.78%

Source: San Mateo County Annex to 2010 ABAG Local Hazard Mitigation Plan

1 Attributable to ABAG mapping revisions intended to improve accuracy

2 In large part to presence of San Andreas Fault within County

3 No maps prepared yet for San Mateo County

4 All urban areas within County subject to drought




The Town of Atherton Annex, adopted in May 2011, validates four earthquake-related hazards

including ground shaking, liquefaction, landslide, and tsunami, and three weather-related hazards

including flooding, wildfire, and drought as having potential to impact Atherton.

The City of East Palo Alto Annex, adopted in November 2011, validates the five earthquake-

related hazards and the four weather-related hazards as having potential to impact the City. It

further concludes that the City of East Palo Alto does not face any other natural disasters, and

cites earthquake shaking and flooding as posing the greatest risk.

The City of Menlo Park Annex, completed in October 2011, also validates all of the earthquake-

related and weather-related natural hazards as potentially impacting the City with the exception

of surface faulting. Surface faulting is not considered a hazard because no active seismic faults

are located within the City. The Annex further suggests that the Fire Threatened Communities

map depicting the area of the City west of El Camino Real as at risk for wildfire not be used for

planning purposes until further mapping or revisions of the map are completed by the California

Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE). This map was created in 2003 by CAL

FIRE’s Fire and Resource Assessment Program (FRAP). A more appropriate reference for

wildfire risk exposure is CAL FIRE’s Fire Hazard Severity Zone (FHSZ) maps. The FHSZ

project utilizes a variety of wildland fire hazard attributes, including wildland fire history,

vegetative fuels, topography, weather, fire occurrence probability, and predictive fire behavior

modeling, to identify Moderate, High, and Very High Wildland Fire Hazard Severity Zones. For

local jurisdictions, such as cities outside of CAL FIRE’s statutory responsibility, the program

only identifies areas meeting Very High Hazard criteria. The map for San Mateo County, last

updated in November 2008, identifies all areas of the City of Menlo Park as outside of a Very

High Hazard Severity Zone. This does not preclude a local jurisdiction from adopting its own

risk criteria, including lower threshold criteria for wildland fire hazard risk.

3.6 COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS

As indicated, the cities within the District, as well as San Mateo County, have not formally

adopted a specific fire department response performance standard either by policy or within the

Safety Element of their respective General Plans. However, it is reasonable to assume that

residents, employees, and visitors of the District expect a level of fire service response that

effectively keeps time-sensitive events such as serious medical emergencies, fires and hazardous

material releases, from becoming more serious, or worse, catastrophic. To achieve this, best

practices for the first-due fire department response in an urban risk area is within 7:00 minutes

from time of 9-1-1 notification, with a crew of 3 to 4 firefighters. Serious emergencies requiring

multiple units and a minimum of 14-15 firefighters, including a Chief Officer, should arrive

within 11:00 minutes of 9-1-1 notification.




3.7 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

A risk assessment is a fact-based objective evaluation of local hazards and their associated risk to

the community or jurisdiction, and involves the following basic elements:

1. Hazard identification

2. Determination of hazard occurrence probability

3. Identification of impact severity factors by hazard

4. Quantification of overall impact severity by hazard

5. Determination of overall risk rating by hazard.

It is important to understand that, regardless of the methodology employed, every risk

assessment involves some element of subjectivity, and risk perception will likely vary from one

individual to the next. The important concept to remember is that every risk assessment is a

chosen or perceived rating.

The methodology utilized by Citygate to assess community risk as an integral element of an SOC

study involves the following specific steps:

1. Identify natural and human-caused hazards with potential to adversely impact the

community/jurisdiction

2. Identify primary agency response capabilities as incident response categories that

correlate directly to mitigation of impacts of the identified natural and human-

caused hazards

3. Identify specific geographic risk assessment sub-zones (risk zones) as appropriate

for each incident category

4. Identify probability of future incident occurrence criteria

5. Determine the probability of future occurrence score of major incidents by risk

zone for each incident category using the probability of future incident occurrence

criteria and agency/jurisdiction-specific historical data

6. Identify appropriate factors influencing impact severity (impact severity factors)

by incident category

7. Determine appropriate impact severity factor evaluation and scoring criteria

8. Evaluate and determine the impact severity factor score for each impact severity

factor in each risk zone of each incident category using the corresponding impact




severity factor scoring criteria and agency/jurisdiction-specific data and

information

9. Add the impact severity factor scores to determine the total impact severity

factors score for each risk zone of each incident category

10. Multiply the probability of future occurrence score by the total impact severity

factors score to determine the overall risk rating score by risk zone for each

incident category

11. Determine overall risk rating scoring criteria

12. Identify the overall risk rating for each risk zone of each incident category using

the overall risk rating score and risk rating scoring criteria

13. Summarize community/jurisdiction risk assessment findings.

Figure 3 further illustrates the calculations made to determine the overall risk rating for each

incident category by risk zone.

Figure 3—Risk Zone Rating Calculations Flowchart

3.8 DISTRICT HAZARDS ASSESSMENT

3.8.1 Hazard Identification

As discussed earlier in Section 3.5 of this report, the 2010 ABAG Multi-Jurisdictional Local

Hazard Mitigation Plan (MJLHMP) for the San Francisco Bay Area identifies 13 hazards with

potential to impact the Bay Area as shown in Table 13.




Table 13—2010 ABAG Hazards

Hazard Category Hazard

Earthquake-Related Hazards

1 Surface Faulting

2 Ground Shaking

3 Liquefaction

4 Landslide

5 Tsunami

Weather-Related Hazards

6 Flooding

7 Wildfire

8 Drought

9 Climate Change

Human Condition Hazards

10 Hazardous Material Release

11 Dam Failure

12 Energy Shortage

13 Weapon of Mass Destruction

Also as discussed earlier in Section 3.5, annexes to this plan adopted by the Town of Atherton,

cities of East Palo Alto and Menlo Park, and the County of San Mateo, validated these hazards

for their specific jurisdictions with the following exceptions:

Atherton

Earthquake faulting

Climate change

Hazardous material release

Dam failure

Energy shortage

Weapon of mass destruction

East Palo Alto


Dam failure

Energy shortage





Menlo Park

Surface faulting


Dam failure

Energy shortage


San Mateo County

Tsunami

Climate change


Energy shortage


Citygate’s analysis of District demography, infrastructure, and hazard history concludes that the

hazards listed in Table 14 from the 2010 ABAG Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan and

adopted local agency annexes, have potential to adversely impact the District.

Table 14—2010 ABAG Hazards Potentially Impacting the District

Hazard

1 Ground Shaking

2 Liquefaction

3 Landslide

4 Tsunami

5 Flooding

6 Wildfire






Citygate’s analysis further identified building fire as an additional significant hazard with

potential to adversely impact the District. Table 15 summarizes all of the natural and human-

caused hazards with potential to impact the Menlo Park Fire Protection District.

Table 15—2015 District Hazards

Hazard

1 Building Fire

2 Ground Shaking

3 Flooding


5 Landslide

6 Liquefaction

7 Tsunami


9 Wildfire

3.8.2 Incident Categories

In the context of a Standards of Response Coverage (SOC) study, the natural and human-caused

hazards with potential to impact the District in Table 15 correlate directly to a fire agency’s

response capabilities. For example, ground shaking, flooding, landslide, liquefaction, and

tsunami hazards correlate directly to fire, rescue, and medical emergency capabilities. Similarly,

hazardous materials release and weapon of mass destruction hazards correlate directly to

hazardous materials response, rescue, fire, and/or medical emergency capabilities. Thus, another

way to look at hazards for risk assessment, particularly relative to an SOC study, is in terms of

the specific operational capabilities needed to effectively mitigate the potential impacts resulting

from natural and human-caused hazards, or similarly, in terms of the incident response categories

related to occurrences of natural and human-caused hazards. Table 16 identifies the specific

District response capabilities required to mitigate impact severity of the natural and human-

caused hazards listed in Table 15.




Table 16—District Incident Response Capabilities Correlating to Hazard Impact Severity

Mitigation

Incident Category

1 Building Fire

2 Wildland Fire

3 Medical

4 Rescue

5 Hazardous Material

3.8.3 Risk Assessment Zones

Citygate next analyzed District demography and historical response data to determine

appropriate geographic risk assessment sub-zones for the District specific to each incident

category. Table 17 identifies the risk zones identified for each incident category.

Table 17—District Risk Assessment Zones

Incident Category Risk Zone

Building Fire

Low/Medium Density Residential

High Density Residential

Commercial / Industrial

Wildland Fire Southwest of Alameda de las Pulgas

Northwest of Alameda de las Pulgas

Medical Emergency

Atherton

East Palo Alto

Menlo Park

San Mateo County Areas

Rescue District-Wide

Hazardous Material Release District-Wide

3.8.4 Future Incident Occurrence Probability

A commonly accepted principle of risk management is that, absent implementation of mitigation

measures that effectively reduce or eliminate occurrence, prior hazard occurrence is an effective

predictive indicator of future hazard occurrence. As such, Citygate evaluated prior incident

occurrence in terms of historical response to various incident types to determine the probability

of occurrence of future major incidents using the criteria in Table 18.




Table 18—Probability of Future Major Incident Occurrence Criteria1

Score Description

1 Never Less than 1% probability of occurrence within study timeframe

2 Unlikely 1% - 5% probability of occurrence within study timeframe

3 Possible 6% - 49% probability of occurrence within study timeframe

4 Probable 50% - 99% probability of occurrence within study timeframe

5 Certain Greater than 99% probability of occurrence within study timeframe

1 Major incidents only requiring multiple-alarm resources and impacting multiple assets at risk

Citygate’s determination of future probability of major incident occurrence by incident category

over the next ten years (2015-2025) is shown in Table 19.

Table 19—Probability of Future1 Occurrence by Incident Category

Incident Category Risk Zone Probability

Score Probability Description

Building Fire2

Low/Medium Density Residential 3 Possible

High Density Residential 4 Probable

Commercial / Industrial 4 Probable

Wildland Fire3

Southwest of Alameda de las Pulgas4 3 Possible

Northwest of Alameda de las Pulgas 2 Unlikely

Medical Emergency5

Atherton 2 Unlikely

East Palo Alto 4 Probable

Menlo Park 4 Probable

San Mateo County Areas 3 Possible

Rescue6 District-Wide 3 Possible

Hazardous Material Release7 District-Wide 3 Possible

1 2015 – 2025

2 Significant building fire incident requiring multiple-alarm resources and involving multiple occupancies or a large single high-risk/value occupancy

3 Wildland fire incident requiring multiple-alarm resources and impacting multiple values at risk

4 Mutual Threat Zone (MTZ)

5 Mass-casualty incident requiring multiple-alarm resources and impacting multiple hospitals

6 Multiple-victim incident requiring multiple resources (e.g., earthquake, explosion, flooding, etc.)

7 Incident requiring multiple resources and impacting multiple values at risk (e.g., freight/tank truck collision, freight train derailment, earthquake, explosion, weapon of mass destruction, etc.)

The Probability of Future Occurrence scores in Table 19 reflect Citygate’s analysis of historical

major incident responses from January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2014 as discussed in detail

in Section 5 of this study. It is important to note that this analysis focuses on future major

incidents impacting multiple values at risk and requiring a significant number of response

resources, and does not include less serious and more routine incident responses.




It is also important to note that mitigation and fire prevention programs are needed to minimize

the probability of incidents occurring. Therefore, the District’s existing fire prevention programs

have to keep up with the new and existing building fire code inspection needs. This could impact

the District’s fire prevention staffing, office spaces, and inspector vehicles.

3.8.5 Impact Severity Factors

Impacts resulting from a hazard occurrence are generally described in terms of adverse impacts

to assets or values at risk. For urban/suburban communities, assets or values at risk typically

include people, critical infrastructure and key resources (e.g., government services facilities;

schools; hospitals; lifeline utilities including water, electricity, gas, sewer, and communications

facilities; key access/egress and through transportation routes; railways; airports; etc.), and key

economic drivers, such as large employers and/or large revenue-producing businesses.

The factors evaluated in this study as influencing impact severity for each incident category are

shown in Table 20.

Table 20—Impact Severity Factors

Incident Category Impact Severity Factors

Building Fire

1 Building Construction

2 Occupancy Loading

3 Built-In Fire Protection Systems

4 Water Supply

5 Response Capability

Wildland Fire

1 Vegetation

2 Weather

3 Topography

4 Water Supply


Medical

1 Population Density

2 Population Demography

3 Traffic

4 Pre-Hospital Emergency Care

5 Hospital Emergency Care

Rescue

1 Earthquake

2 Flood

3 Explosion / Act of Terrorism

4 Traffic


Hazardous Materials

1 Vulnerable Populations

2 Hazardous Materials Use/Storage

3 Hazardous Materials Transportation


5 Evacuation Capability




3.8.6 Impact Severity Factor Analysis

To determine the potential impact severity for each incident category, Citygate evaluated the

impact severity factors using the criteria for each incident category in Appendix A. Using data,

information, and observations of the Menlo Park Fire Protection District for each risk zone, each

impact severity factor was assigned a score of 0 - 5 representing its relative impact severity for

the overall incident category for the specific risk zone. A score of zero represents that the factor

does not add to overall impact severity for the incident category, or contributes to limiting impact

severity. A score of five represents that the factor adds significantly to overall impact severity for

the incident category. The Impact Severity Scores were then totaled to determine the Total

Impact Severity Score for each risk zone for each incident category. Table 21 through Table 25

show the impact severity factor scores by risk zone for each incident category.

Table 21—Impact Severity Factor Analysis – BUILDING FIRE

Building Fire1

Impact Severity Factors

Construction Type

Occupancy Loading

Fire Protection Systems

Water Supply

Response Capability

Total Impact Severity Score

Low / Medium Density Residential

5 0 3 1 1 10

High Density Residential 5 3 5 2 2 17

Commercial / Industrial 2 2 3 1 2 10


Table 22—Impact Severity Factor Analysis – WILDLAND FIRE

Wildland Fire1


Vegetation Weather Topography Water

Supply Response Capability

Total Impact Severity Score

Southwest of Alameda de las Pulgas

4 3 1 1 3 12


3 3 0 0 1 7

1 Significant wildland fire incident requiring multiple-alarm resources and impacting multiple values at risk




Table 23—Impact Severity Factor Analysis – MEDICAL EMERGENCY

Medical Emergency1


Population Density

Population Demography Traffic

Pre-Hospital Emergency

Care

Hospital Emergency

Care Capacity

Total Impact

Severity Score

Atherton 2 3 2 0 0 7

East Palo Alto 5 2 4 0 0 11

Menlo Park 3 3 5 0 0 11

San Mateo County Areas 5 2 3 0 0 10


Table 24—Impact Severity Factor Analysis – RESCUE

Rescue1


Earthquake Flood Explosion / Terrorism Traffic

Response Capability

Total Impact

Severity Score

District-Wide 5 3 2 5 1 16

1 Multiple-victim incident requiring multiple resources (e.g., earthquake, explosion, flooding, etc.)

Table 25—Impact Severity Factor Analysis – HAZARDOUS MATERIAL RELEASE

Hazardous Material Release

1


Vulnerable Populations

Hazardous Material

Use/Storage

Hazardous Material Trans.

Response Capability

Evacuation Capability

Total Impact

Severity Score

District-Wide 2 4 5 1 3 15

1 Incident requiring multiple resources and impacting multiple values at risk (e.g., freight/tank truck collision, freight train derailment, earthquake, explosion, weapon of mass destruction, etc.)

3.8.7 Risk Rating Determination

Subsequent to the impact severity factor analysis conducted in the prior subsection, Citygate then

calculated the overall Risk Rating Score for each incident category (hazard) by multiplying the

Probability of Future Occurrence scores from Table 19 by the Total Impact Severity Score from




Table 21 through Table 25 for each incident category and risk zone. The resultant Overall Risk

Rating Score for each incident category and risk zone are shown in Table 26.

Table 26—Overall Risk Rating Scores by Incident Type

Incident Category Risk Zone

Probability of

Occurrence Score

Total Impact

Severity Score

Overall Risk

Rating Score

Building Fire

Low / Medium Density Residential

3 10 30

High Density Residential 4 17 68

Commercial / Industrial 4 10 40

Wildland Fire


3 12 36


2 7 14

Medical Emergency

Atherton 2 7 14

East Palo Alto 4 11 44

Menlo Park 4 11 44

San Mateo County Areas 3 10 30

Rescue District-Wide 3 16 48

Hazardous Material Release

District-Wide 3 15 45

The Probability of Future Occurrence Score range of 1 – 5 from Table 18, combined with the

Total Impact Severity Score range of 0 – 25 from Table 21 through Table 25, yields a potential

Overall Risk Rating Score of 0 – 125 (probability of future occurrence score x total impact

severity factors score). An Overall Risk Rating was then determined for each risk zone for each

incident category using the scoring criteria in Table 27.

Table 27—Overall Risk Rating Categories

Overall Risk Rating Score

Overall Risk Rating

0 – 31 Low

32 – 62 Moderate

63 – 94 High

95 – 125 Very High




The Overall Risk Ratings for Menlo Park Fire Protection District by incident category and risk

zone are summarized in Table 28.

Table 28—District Overall Risk Ratings by Incident Category and Risk Zone

Incident Category Risk Zone Overall Risk Rating Score

Overall Risk Rating

Building Fire

Low / Medium Density Residential 30 Low

High Density Residential 68 High

Commercial / Industrial 40 Moderate

Wildland Fire


36 Moderate


14 Low

Medical Emergency

Atherton 14 Low

East Palo Alto 44 Moderate

Menlo Park 44 Moderate

San Mateo County Areas 30 Low

Rescue District-Wide 48 Moderate

Hazardous Material Release District-Wide 45 Moderate

3.8.8 Risk Assessment Summary

Overall risk in the Menlo Park Fire Protection District is typical of other medium-sized urban

communities within the greater San Francisco Bay Area region with technology/investment-

focused economies. Measured in terms of probability of future natural and human-caused hazard

occurrence and response capabilities necessary to effectively mitigate the potential impacts of

prospective hazard occurrences, overall risk within the District ranges from low for medical and

wildland fire incidents within specific risk assessment zones to high for high-density residential

building fire incidents. These risk ratings reflect a generally low to moderate probability of

future major incident occurrence combined with low to moderate impact severity scores.

The impact severity scores reflect the generally low to moderate impacts expected from a hazard

occurrence due to the excellent response capabilities of the District and its adjacent partner

agencies, good water supply, high quality pre-hospital care capability, multiple emergency care

facilities within close proximity, and a population with a relatively low percentage of at-risk

persons.




Other impact-reducing factors include a generally low building occupancy rate within residential

and commercial occupancies, mild weather and topography, and low probability of an act of

terrorism. Factors increasing impact severity include population density in some areas, traffic,

earthquake probability, flooding potential in some areas, and quantity of hazardous materials

used, stored, and transported through the District.

The District also offers strong programs for community self-help preparedness such as the

Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) training, “Get Ready” (an individual or family

preparedness program), and other classes and outreach programs that focus on being prepared for

emergencies. While these are essential to train residents and business employees how to be

initially self-reliant, the District’s personnel also have to be trained, equipped, and able to

respond to any of the hazards identified in this review.

3.8.9 Emergency Medical Services System Risk Assessment

The emergency medical services (EMS) system provided by the District consists of the fire

engines staffed with at least one Advanced Life Support Paramedic (EMT-P). These units are

equipped to meet the standards set forth by the San Mateo County Emergency Medical Services

Agency requirements. The County emergency medical services system provides a 24-hour

emergency paramedic ambulance response, treatment and transportation of ill and injured

patients in the District, plus the planning and staffing of medical coverage for special events and

related activities.

Within the District, a 9-1-1 call for medical assistance receives an ambulance and a fire engine or

ladder truck, whichever is closest. This level of response provides a minimum of two paramedics

and three firefighters to every call for service.

The most serious medical emergency would likely be a heart attack or some other emergency

where there was an interruption or blockage of oxygen to the body. The figure below indicates

survivability rate of a heart attack victim. There are other factors that can influence survivability

as well such as early CPR, early defibrillation, and early ALS intervention. The District has a

very robust emergency medical services delivery system.




Figure 4—Survival Rate vs. Time of Defibrillation

Source: www.suddencardiacarrest.org

3.8.10 Hazardous Materials Risk Assessment

Hazardous materials risk assessment is for fixed facilities that store, use, and produce hazardous

chemicals. Additionally, with the road and railroad transportation infrastructure within the

District, the risk assessment also includes transit risk.

California Health and Safety Code Chapter 6.95 and the California Environmental Protection

Agency (CalEPA) regulate hazardous materials use in businesses. In addition to certain sections

of the District’s adopted state fire code, the County Department of Environmental Health

manages the CalEPA regulations for all areas of San Mateo County.

For the state environmental regulations, the County has to inspect each business once every three

years to assure compliance with the business’s environmental disclosure, use of chemicals, and

emergency plans. Additionally, each facility receives fire and life safety inspections from the

District’s Fire Prevention bureau annually for hazardous materials and occupancy permits. Fees

are collected and permits are issued along with inspections for compliance. Hazardous materials




are present throughout the District and the District needs to deliver services to mitigate these

incidents. Before service levels can be defined, the amount and type of chemicals needs to be

assessed. This assessment is based on the level of risk; not all chemicals present a high level of

risk or concern.

The District then responds to chemical release emergencies in a tiered approach. Each fire

department in the County operates at the “First Responder Operational” (FRO) level that is

trained to determine the severity of the problem, isolate bystanders from the area, perhaps begin

chemical containment/runoff, and then, as needed, call for the regional Hazardous Materials

Team, staffed by other agencies.

3.8.11 Technical Rescue Risk Assessment

It is difficult to predict and locate where technical rescue requests for service will occur in an

urban area. The potential types of technical rescues that might occur in the District range from

trench collapses from water pipe installations, high angle rescue of window washers, structural

collapse after an earthquake, confined space rescues from tanks and underground vaults, and

swift water rescues from flooded urban streams and Bay rescue responses. Technical rescues can

also come from industry. Personnel trapped in machinery, transportation accidents, aircraft

crashes, rail incidents and daily motor vehicle accidents account for many technical rescues.

The District has prepared and trained for these events and has established a response matrix with

the regional fire dispatch center to send the appropriate number of personnel and equipment to

mitigate those situations.

The Menlo Park Fire Protection District sponsors a Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) national Urban Search and Rescue Task Force (CA-TF3) CA-TF3 is a specially trained

and equipped 80-person Urban Search and Rescue Task Force consisting of 18 participating

agencies and 60 civilians. There are a total of 220 members in all that are available to respond.

Task Force 3 includes firefighter and paramedic rescue specialists, emergency room physicians,

structural engineers, heavy equipment specialists, canine search dogs and handlers, hazardous

materials technicians, communications specialists, and logistics specialists. This unique technical

rescue team responds with 70,000 pounds of prepackaged search and rescue tools and medical

equipment to conduct around the clock search and rescue operations at domestic and

international disasters, both natural and man-made. As the sponsoring agency, the Fire District

has the responsibility of managing the team to ensure it is able to respond to any incident it is

requested to do so.

The District is a registered training center with the state of California for the following

disciplines: Rescue Systems I, Rescue Systems II, and Confined Space Rescue Operations. The

District’s training center has a full additional heavy rescue tool cache at the training center. The




District also has a very strong water rescue capability with trained personnel and watercraft well

suited to the low-water-level bayside areas and mudflats.

Given this level of technical rescue preparedness, the District’s personnel are well trained and

equipped for technical rescue; however, these types of incidents can require large numbers of

personnel. Therefore, when these incidents occur, the limited number of District personnel can

call upon the Countywide mutual aid system.

3.9 RISK ASSESSMENT RESULT

Upon Citygate’s review of the risk assessment data, the District has:

Urban population densities in many areas.

Significant building stock ranging from single-family detached homes to

multiple-story residential and business properties. In the ISO database, there are

no buildings taller than three useable floors in the District.

Unique commercial and institutional uses such as schools and health care

facilities.

Many residential areas that are bordered by open space areas containing quantities

of wildland fire fuel types mixed in with the housing.

Three major highway corridors, major surface street prime arterials, and a rail

line.

Strong automatic aid agreements and resources on three sides of the District.

Based on the these factors, the District has staffed and designed its response system to field an

“Effective Response Force” of multiple units to reported serious fires in buildings and wildland

areas, and operates paramedics for emergency medical responses.

The District’s multi-unit force (First Alarm) is designed to stop the escalation of the emergency

and keep it from spreading to greater alarms. This “informal” goal will be the foundation of

updated deployment measures as part of this Standard of Response Cover Process.




3.10 EXISTING DISTRICT DEPLOYMENT

3.10.1 Existing Deployment Situation—What the District Has in Place Currently

As the District Directors have not adopted a best

practices-based response time policy, this study will

benchmark the District against the response time

recommendations of NFPA 1710 for career fire service

deployment. These are:

Four (4) minutes travel time for the first-due unit to all types of emergencies

Eight (8) minutes travel time for multiple units needed at serious emergencies

(First Alarm).

The District’s current daily staffing plan is:

Table 29—Daily Minimum Staffing per Unit for the District – 2015

Per Unit Minimum Staff Extended Minimum

7 Engines @ 3 Firefighters/day 21

1 Truck Company @ 4* Firefighters/day 4

Subtotal firefighters: 25

Battalion Chief 1 Per day for command 1

Total: 26

*The ladder truck will soon be staffed with a minimum of four personnel instead of three.

This daily staffing is adequate for the immediate response fire risk needs presented in the most of

the built-up urban areas of the District. However, for this staffing statement to be accurate for a

building fire, the assumption is that the closest crews are available and not already operating on

another emergency medical call or fire, which can and does happen. For example, if one engine

and one rescue-medic unit are committed to an emergency medical services call, then an adjacent

engine company or truck company must respond. This situation will be evaluated separately in

Section 4 of this volume where simultaneous incident workload is analyzed.

The District has solid automatic and mutual aid partnerships with the surrounding fire

departments that, via regional dispatch, will send their closest units into the District if the

District’s units are committed to other emergencies.

SOC ELEMENT 1 OF 8*

EXISTING DEPLOYMENT

POLICIES *Note: Continued from page 9.




Services Provided

The District is an “all-risk” fire department providing the people it protects with services that

include structure fire, technical rescue, and first-responder hazardous materials response as well

as other services.

Given these risks, the District uses a tiered approach of dispatching different types of apparatus

to each incident category. The County Fire/EMS Communications Center’s system selects the

closest and most appropriate resource types and handles this function. As an example, here are

the resources dispatched to common risk types:

Table 30—Resources Sent to Common Risk Types

Risk Type Minimum Type of Resources Sent Total Firefighters

Sent

1-Patient EMS 1 Engine or Truck and 1 Ambulance 3-4 FF+

Ambulance

Auto Fire 1 Engine 3 FF

Building Fire 5 Engines, 1 Ladder Truck, 2 Battalion Chiefs (BCs) 21 FF1

Wildland Fire 3 Engines, 1 BC 10 FF

Technical Rescue 1 Engine, 2 Tech Rescues2, 1 Truck, 1 Ambulance, 1 BC 16 FF + Ambulance

1 In some instances the 4

th and 5

th engines comes from automatic aid; the 2

nd and 3

rd trucks always come from automatic aid;

and the 2nd

and 3rd Battalion Chiefs come from automatic aid.

2 The second technical rescue unit comes from automatic aid.

Fire

The District provides typical structural fire protection services utilizing seven engine companies

and one truck company from seven stations. The District has two technical rescue units, reserve

engines, and water rescue craft along with other specialty and command apparatus.

The District is equipped for the common, everyday risks present in the District, if all of the fire

stations are staffed.

Rescue

The District operates a heavy Type 1 technical rescue unit and a rescue engine, both of which are

cross-staffed by the Station #1 personnel.




Finding #2: The District has a standard response dispatching plan that

considers the risk of different types of emergencies and pre-plans

the response. Each type of call for service receives the combination

of engine companies, truck companies, ambulances, specialty

units, and command officers customarily needed to handle that

type of incident based on fire department experience.

3.10.2 Emergency Unit Staffing

The seven engine companies are staffed on a daily basis with a minimum staffing of three

firefighters. The ladder truck will be staffed with a minimum of four personnel instead of three.

More personnel are on duty some of the time when there are not absences for vacation, sick and

injury leave and other types of leaves. The daily minimum shift staffing count is 25 firefighters

on firefighting units plus one Battalion Chief. Per NFPA 1710, 14-15 firefighters plus a

command chief are required for a typical room and contents fire in a home in a suburban area.

For a single-patient emergency medical services event, one fire company plus an ambulance is

needed.

Thus, the daily staffing depth of the District is adequate to handle several medical emergencies

and one serious building fire before relying on automatic aid. However, the District does not

need to use all of its resources at once. In the regional automatic aid closest-unit agreement a mix

of different agencies is sent based on shortest response times. Doing so leaves other District units

available for simultaneous calls for service.

Finding #3: Minimum apparatus staffing per unit on engine companies at three

is appropriate for the size and risks present in the District. The

District will soon fund four personnel per day on the aerial ladder

truck.



Section 4—Staffing and Geo-Mapping Analysis page 45

SECTION 4—STAFFING AND GEO-MAPPING ANALYSIS

4.1 CRITICAL TIME TASK MEASURES—WHAT MUST BE DONE OVER WHAT TIME FRAME TO

ACHIEVE THE STATED OUTCOME EXPECTATION?

Standards of Coverage (SOC) studies use time-task

information to determine the firefighters needed within a

timeframe to accomplish the desired fire control objective

on moderate residential fires and modest emergency

medical rescues. The time it takes to complete one specific

task is called an “evolution.” These time-task evolutions are shown one the following page to

demonstrate how much time the operations take. The following tables start with the time of fire

dispatch notification, and finish with the outcome achieved. These tables are composite tables

from Citygate clients in communities very similar to the Menlo Park Fire Protection District, and

with unit staffing similar to the District’s (three personnel per engine or ladder). These tasks and

times also are consistent with national published studies. There are several important themes

contained in these tables:

1. The evolution test results were obtained at training centers under best conditions;

the day was sunny and moderate in temperature. The structure fire response times

are from actual events, showing how units arrive at staggered intervals.

2. It is noticeable how much time it takes after arrival, or after a task is ordered by

command, to actually accomplish the tasks and arrive at the desired outcome. This

is because it requires firefighters to carry out the ordered tasks. The fewer the

firefighters, the longer some task completion times will be. Critical steps are

highlighted in grey in the table.

3. Task completion time is usually a function of how many personnel are

simultaneously available. This is desirable so that firefighters can complete some

tasks simultaneously.

4. Some tasks must be assigned to a minimum of two firefighters to comply with

safety regulations. For example, two firefighters are required for searching a

smoke-filled room for a victim.

The following tables of unit and individual duties are required at a First Alarm fire scene for a

typical single-family dwelling fire. This set of duties is taken from typical suburban fire

department’s operational procedures, which are entirely consistent with the customary findings

of other agencies using the Standards of Response Cover process. No conditions existed to

override the OSHA 2-in/2-out safety policy which requires that firefighters enter serious building

fires in teams of two, while two more firefighters are outside and immediately ready to rescue

them should trouble arise.

SOC ELEMENT 4 OF 8

CRITICAL TASK TIME

STUDY




Shown below are the critical tasks for a department’s response to structure fires in built-up

suburban areas with three engines, one ladder truck, one ambulance, and one Battalion Chief for

a minimum force total of 16 personnel.

As stated in Section 3.10.1 above Table 30, due to automatic aid in San Mateo County, the

regional system sends 21 firefighters to a structure fire. So the times in the table below show

what a minimum force can accomplish. The larger the force (weight of attack), the faster the

tasks are completed.

Scenario: This was a simulated one-story residential structure fire with no rescue situation.

Responding companies received dispatch information as typical for a witnessed fire. Upon

arrival they were told approximately 1,000 square feet of the home was involved in fire.

Table 31—First Alarm Structure Fire – 16-21 Firefighters

Task Description Task Clock

Time Elapsed Time

from 9-1-1

Time of call 00:00 00:00

Dispatch 01:20

Crew turnout 02:00

Travel to scene 05:13 08:33

First-due engine on scene, size up, pull fire attack line Begin Scene Time

08:33

Ladder truck on scene / ventilation 00:40 09:13

First ladder to roof 02:54

Forcible entry 04:05

Attack team entry pre-connect 04:05 12:38

2nd

engine on scene 04:20

Provide water supply line 05:22

Rescue-ambulance on scene 05:00

Battalion Chief on scene, transfer command 05:40

3rd

engine on scene 07:27

Primary search completed 08:03 16:36

Roof ventilation completed 08:06

Rapid Intervention Crew established 08:21

Water on fire 09:05

Fire knocked down 09:10 17:43

Secondary search completed 09:20

Fire under control 09:30 18:03

Total Time to Control: 09:30 18:03

Total Personnel: 16




The above duties, grouped together, to form an Effective Response Force or First Alarm

assignment. Remember that the above distinct tasks must be performed simultaneously and

effectively to achieve the desired outcome; arriving on-scene does not stop the escalation of the

emergency. While firefighters accomplish the above tasks, the clock keeps running, and has been

since the emergency first started.

Fire spread in a structure can double in size during its free burn period. Many studies have shown

that a small fire can spread to engulf the entire room in less than four to five minutes after free

burning has started. Once the room is completely superheated and involved in fire (known as

flashover), the fire will spread quickly throughout the structure and into the attic and walls. For

this reason, it is imperative that fire attack and search commence before the flashover point

occurs if the outcome goal is to keep the fire damage in or near the room of origin. In addition,

flashover presents a serious danger to both firefighters and any occupants of the building.

For comparison purposes, the critical task table on the following page reviews the tasks needed

on a typical automobile accident rescue.

Scenario: This was a simulated two-vehicle accident with three patients, two of whom were

trapped. Extrication required total removal of the driver’s door. A standard response of one

engine and two ambulances responded with a total of 7 personnel.




Table 32—Multi-Casualty Traffic Collision – 3 Firefighters plus 2 Ambulances


Time Elapsed Time

from 9-1-1

Time of call 00:00

Dispatch 01:20

Crew turnout 02:00


First-due engine on scene Begin Scene Time

08:33

Size-up by 1st engine fire captain & ambulance paramedic 02:00

Foam line flowing onto fuel spill 03:30 12:03

Car #2 cribbed to support it on its side 04:30

1 FF into upright car (#1) for patient assessment 04:30 13:03

2nd

ambulance on-scene, patient #2 assessed in car #1 05:11

Car #1 driver door removed 05:30

FF into car #2 for patient care 08:00 16:33

Patient #1, car #1 removed by backboard 09:40

Windshield removed from car #2 10:50

Patient #1 packaged, ready for transport 11:15 19:48

Patient #2, car #1 removed by backboard 11:30

Patient #2 packaged, ready for transport 12:20 20:53

Roof cut and removed from car #2 15:40

Patient #3,car #2 removed from car 16:15

Patient #3 packaged, ready for transport 16:30

Total Time to Begin Transport: 16:30 25:03

Total Personnel: 7




As another comparison, below are the critical tasks needed on a typical cardiac patient full arrest:

Scenario: This was a simulated one-patient full arrest indoors. A standard response of one

engine and one ambulance responded with a total of 5 personnel.

Table 33—Cardiac Arrest – 3 Firefighters plus an Ambulance


Time Elapsed Time

from 9-1-1

Time of call 00:00

Dispatch 01:20

Crew turnout 02:00


First-due engine on scene Begin Scene Time

08:33

Engine crew determine full arrest and start CPR 00:55

Rescue ambulance on-scene 01:35

Cardiac monitor attached to patient 02:10

Auto pulse CPR unit attached 03:18

Intravenous line placed 03:24 11:57

Bag valve mask ventilation started 03:42

Epinephrine administered 05:32 14:05

Intubation completed 06:10 14:43

Defibrillate, positive change in patient rhythm 06:53 15:26

Patient on gurney 07:28

Patient in ambulance 10:15 18:48

Total Time to Begin Transport: 10:15 18:48

Total Personnel: 5

4.1.1 Critical Task Analysis and Effective Response Force Size

What does a deployment study derive from a response time and company task time analysis? The

total task completion times (as displayed in the tables) to stop the escalation of the emergency

must be compared to outcomes. We know from nationally-published fire service “time vs.

temperature” tables that after about four to five minutes of free burning, a room fire will grow to

the point of flashover. At this point, the entire room is engulfed, the structure becomes

threatened, and human survival near or in the fire room becomes impossible. Additionally, we

know that brain death begins to occur within four to six minutes of the heart having stopped.




Thus, the Effective Response Force must arrive in time to stop these catastrophic events from

worsening.

The response and task completion times discussed previously show that the residents of the

District are able to expect positive outcomes, and have a good chance of survival, in a serious

fire or medical emergency. This is because the District’s first responding units are typically

available in 6:34 minutes/seconds or less total response time and the follow-on units for serious

emergencies (the Effective Response Force or First Alarm) typically arrive on-scene within 9:31

minutes/seconds minutes total response time. As has been discussed, the District is staffed per

day with enough firefighters to deliver one such force at a large building fire.

Mitigating an emergency event is a team effort once the units have arrived. This refers back to

the “weight” of response analogy. If too few personnel arrive too slowly, then the emergency

will worsen instead of improve. Control of the structure fire incident in the simulation still took

09:30 minutes/seconds after the time of the first unit’s arrival, or 18:03 minutes/seconds from

fire dispatch notification. The outcome times, of course, will be longer, with less desirable

results, if the arriving force is later or smaller.

In the District, the quantity of staffing and the arrival time frame can be critical in a serious fire.

Fires in older and/or multi-story buildings could well require the initial firefighters needing to

rescue trapped or immobile occupants. If a lightly-staffed force arrives, it cannot simultaneously

conduct rescue and firefighting operations.

Fires and complex medical incidents require that the other needed units arrive in time to

complete an effective intervention. Time is one factor that comes from proper station placement.

Good performance also comes from adequate staffing and training. In the critical task measures

above, the departments that staff units similar the Menlo Park Fire Protection District can

perform well in terms of time. However, major fires and medical emergencies in which the

closest unit is not available to respond still challenge the District’s response system to deliver

good outcomes. This factor must be taken into account when fire station locations are

considered. If fire stations are spaced too far apart, then when one unit has to cover another

unit’s area, or multiple units are needed, these units can be too far away and the emergency will

worsen.

Previous critical task studies conducted by Citygate, the Standard of Response Cover documents

reviewed from accredited fire departments, and NFPA 1710 recommendations all arrive at the

need for 15+ firefighters arriving within 11 minutes (from the time of call) at a room and

contents structure fire to be able to simultaneously and effectively perform the tasks of rescue,

fire attack, and ventilation. Given that the District sends at least 14 of its own personnel (3

engines, 1 ladder truck, 1 Battalion Chief) to an incident involving a working First Alarm

building fire, it is clear that the District and its leaders understand that firefighting crews arriving




closely together are needed to deliver a positive outcome that protects lives and property by

stopping the escalation of the emergency as found by the arriving force.

A question one might ask is, “If fewer firefighters arrive, what from the list of tasks mentioned

would not be done?” Most likely, the search team would be delayed, as would ventilation. The

attack lines would only consist of two firefighters, which does not allow for rapid movement

above the first-floor deployment. Rescue is conducted with only two-person teams; thus, when

rescue is essential, other tasks are not completed in a simultaneous, timely manner. It must

always be remembered: effective deployment is about the speed (travel time) and the weight

(firefighters) of the attack.

Nineteen initial District firefighters could handle a moderate-risk house fire; however, even a

department-based Effective Response Force of 16 will be seriously slowed if the fire is above the

first floor, in a low-rise apartment building, or commercial/industrial building. This is where the

capability to add alarms to the standard response becomes important.

However, due to the County Automatic Aid response agreement using a single dispatch center,

the fact that the actual District First Alarm (Effective Response Force) uses automatic aid to

deliver 21 personnel to a moderate risk building fire reflects the District’s goal to confine serious

building fires to or near the room of origin, and to prevent the spread of fire to adjoining

buildings. This is a typical desired outcome in built-out areas and requires more firefighters more

quickly than the typical rural outcome of keeping the fire contained to the building, not room, of

origin.

It should be noted that the dissolution of the Belmont / San Carlos Fire Authority resulted in the

net loss of one Battalion Chief and Aerial Ladder Truck in the South San Mateo County zone.

Essentially, those units between Redwood City and Foster City / San Mateo no longer exist.

Given no adopted Board of Directors response time policy, the District’s current physical

response to building fires, is in effect the District’s de-facto deployment measure to built-up

urban/suburban areas. Thus, this becomes the baseline policy for the deployment of firefighters.




4.2 DISTRIBUTION AND CONCENTRATION STUDIES—HOW THE LOCATION OF FIRST-DUE

AND FIRST ALARM RESOURCES AFFECTS THE OUTCOME

The District is served today by seven fire stations. It is

appropriate to understand what the existing stations do

and do not cover, if there are any coverage gaps needing

one or more stations, and what, if anything, to do about

them.

In brief, there are two geographic perspectives to fire

station deployment:

Distribution – the spreading out or spacing of first-due fire units to stop routine

emergencies.

Concentration – the clustering of fire stations close enough together so that

building fires can receive sufficient resources from multiple fire stations quickly.

As indicated, this is known as the Effective Response Force, or, more

commonly, the “First Alarm Assignment”—the collection of a sufficient number

of firefighters on scene, delivered within the concentration time goal to stop the

escalation of the problem.

To analyze first-due fire unit travel time coverage for this study, Citygate used a geographic

mapping tool called FireViewTM

that can measure theoretical travel time over the street network.

For this time calculation, Citygate staff uses the base map and street travel speeds calibrated to

actual fire company travel times from previous responses to simulate real-world coverage. Using

these tools, Citygate ran several deployment tests and measured their impact on various parts of

the District. The travel time measure used was 4 minutes over the road network, which is

consistent with the “benchmark” recommendation in NFPA 1710 and desirable outcomes in

critical emergencies. When a minute is added for dispatch time and 2 minutes for crew turnout

times, then the maps effectively show the area covered within 7 minutes for first-due, and 11

minutes for a First Alarm assignment.

4.2.1 Traffic Congestion Impacts

Once Citygate team members observed in person the current rush-hour traffic congestion in the

eastern District, and obtained from the City of Menlo Park its Environmental Impact Report

(EIR) traffic study data which has values for volume of trips and the negative impacts of that

volume to crossing an intersection on one or more green light cycles (intersection grading A-F),

we realized that our legacy approach to predict fire apparatus travel times over a street network

did not have enough actual fire unit travel time occurrences at peak rush hours to be statistically

significant enough to slow down the GIS travel time model during rush hours.

SOC ELEMENT 5 OF 8

DISTRIBUTION STUDY

SOC ELEMENT 6 OF 8

CONCENTRATION STUDY




We thus researched and found traffic throughput travel speed data from the company that

provides real-time traffic data to Google and Apple maps. That company is a multi-national firm

called HERE and is a subsidiary of Nokia. This is the same data that drives the Apple/Google

map view of traffic congestion with red, yellow, and green segments to indicate flow impedance

and thus sluggish travel times at peak congestion hours. HERE obtains traffic speed samples

from a variety of public and private sources and measures traffic speeds in 15-minute time

blocks, between intersections (segments), on a 24/7/365 for a rolling 36-month period.

For the time-over-distance maps to follow, the model first uses actual fire apparatus travel times

averaged over a 24-hour time period for two years. Then the HERE data is used to build a

congested traffic model. The baseline non-rush hour coverage is shown as green street segments,

the congested as red. Overall, the congestion impacts can be measured in the quantity of streets

in the District covered at peak and off-peak hours:

Table 34—Road Mile Coverage for First-Due and First Alarm Units

Measure

Non-Congested Miles

Reached

Congested Coverage

Miles Reached Difference (Miles)

First-Due unit, 4-minute

travel, only Menlo Park

FPD stations

280.95 212.18 68.77

First Alarm, 5 engines,

1 truck, 1 Chief 476.82 74.75 402.07

As can be seen the first-due unit coverage is negatively impacted at rush hour. More importantly,

the multi-unit coverage is severely impacted, as units have to travel across large sections of the

District. The maps to follow will show where this reduced coverage occurs.

4.2.2 Community Deployment Baselines

Map #1 – General Geography and Station Locations

This view shows the existing District fire station locations with the District boundaries. This is a

reference map view for the other map displays that follow.

Map #2a – Risk Assessment – ISO Surveyed Buildings, Hazardous Materials Permitted

Businesses, and District High Hazard Sites

Risk assessment is an effort by the District to classify properties by potential impact on service

demand levels. Building fire risk, separate from the housing areas, was examined by

understanding the locations of the higher fire flow buildings as calculated by the Insurance

Service Office (ISO) as a measure of how zoning locates the educational, commercial, and

industrial uses in the District. These higher fire flow sites (shown in blue) are the buildings that




must receive a timely and effective First Alarm force to serious fires, thus requiring more

firefighters in fewer minutes should a serious fire emerge. Most of these higher fire flow

buildings are along the major road corridors.

Businesses that use hazardous materials as permitted by the County Department of

Environmental Health are shown as small red dots (large red dots are station locations).

The District has also used the Risk Hazard and Value Evaluation process (RHAVE) to determine

properties that would present significant challenges to firefighting efforts and/or the rescue of

trapped persons. These sites are shown in green.

Of significance is the quantity of buildings in the City of Menlo Park’s M2 development zone

currently consisting of mostly smaller building businesses. There are a total of 154 sites

comprised of 125 hazardous materials locations, 27 high fire flow ISO sites, and 2 District-

identified RHAVE sites. This cluster represents a significant risk of commercial buildings to be

protected, even if the area is substantially redeveloped as proposed.

Map #2b – Risk Assessment – Wildland Fire Threat Zones

As another measure of risk, this map displays the areas in the western district where there is

significant exposure to buildings from wildland fires. The mutual threat zone is an area identified

by CAL FIRE where, if a fire starts in this area, the state will start suppression efforts as this area

abuts state responsibility areas.

Map #2c – Risk Assessment – Primary Response Routes

This map identifies the feeder roads that fire engines use from their stations out into

neighborhoods. If these roads are impacted with traffic congestion or traffic calming structures,

response times can be significantly delayed.

Map #3a – First-Due Unit Distribution 4-Minute Engine Travel – District Stations ONLY

This map shows, using green street segments (for off-peak uncongested traffic) and red street

segments (for peak congested traffic), the distribution of District stations per a best-practice-

recommended response goal of 4 minutes travel time. Therefore, the limit of green color per

station area is the time an engine could reach within this time, assuming it is in-station and

encounters no unusual traffic delays. In addition, the computer mapping tool uses actual fire

company speed limits per roadway type. Thus, the green projection is realistic for fire trucks

with normal traffic present.

Real dispatch data shows response times to be a little slower in some edge areas. Most likely, this

is due to the effects of the non-grid street design layout and open space areas and freeways that

bisect parts of the District. The purpose of computer response mapping is to determine and

balance station locations. This geo-mapping design is then checked in the study against actual




dispatch time data, which reflects the real world. There also should be some overlap between

station areas so that a second-due unit can have a chance of an adequate response time when it

covers a call in another fire company’s first-due area.

This map also shows in red the streets ONLY covered in 4 minutes during morning and evening

traffic congestion. As can be seen, units west of Highway 101 cannot reach east of the highway,

if the two closest units are already assigned on incidents. Also, Stations #2 and #77 cannot even

reach the edges of their assigned areas.

It is not possible to serve every road segment out to the edge of the District’s urban areas in 4

travel minutes; however, traffic congestion makes even getting somewhat close to the edges of

the District problematic in several station areas.

Finding #4: Using the current seven fire station locations, not including

automatic aid stations, the highest developed population density

areas are within 4 minutes travel time of a fire station. However,

traffic congestion has a marked negative impact on unit travel

times.

Map #3b – First-Due Unit Distribution 4-Minute Engine Travel with Automatic Aid Stations

This map also shows the distribution per a best-practice-recommended response goal of 4

minutes travel time, with automatic aid stations also shown for the uncongested and congested

travel coverage models. Even with automatic aid stations, the units cannot overcome traffic

congestion in multiple areas.

Map #4a – ISO Coverage Areas

This map exhibit displays the ISO requirement that stations cover a 1.5-mile distance response

area. Depending on the road network in a department, the 1.5-mile measure usually equates to a

3.5- to 4.5-minute travel time. However, a 1.5-mile measure is a reasonable indicator of station

spacing and overlap. As can be seen, the ISO coverage is similar, but less forgiving on a few

edges of the District, than the 4-minute travel time measure. This is due to the fact that a

“distance-based” measure cannot account for higher speeds on freeways and primary arterial

streets that feed out into the neighborhoods.

This map shows a first-due fire company is located properly to provide most areas a distribution

of neighborhood-based fire units to deliver rapid response.

Map #4b – ISO Ladder Truck Coverage Area

This map exhibit displays the ISO requirement that ladder trucks cover a 2.5-mile distance

response area. Depending on the road network in a department, the 2.5-mile measure usually




equates to an 8-minute travel time. As can be seen using this measure, a single ladder truck from

Station #1 cannot cover the entire District, and in particular it cannot cover the built-up areas of

eastern East Palo Alto and much of the M2 development area.

Map #5 – Concentration (First Alarm)

This map exhibit shows the concentration or massing of fire crews for serious fire or rescue

calls. Building fires, in particular, require 15+ firefighters (per NFPA 1710) arriving within a

reasonable time frame to work together and effectively to stop the escalation of the emergency.

Otherwise, if too few firefighters arrive, or arrive too late in the fire’s progress, the result is a

greater alarm fire, which is more dangerous to the public and the firefighters.

The concentration map exhibits look at the District’s ability to deploy its units based on the

entire County’s regional closest-unit response plan to send five engine companies (at least two

from automatic aid), the District’s one truck company, and two chief officers to serious, working

building fires within 8 minutes travel time (11 minutes total District response time). This

measure ensures that a minimum of 21 firefighters (three firefighters per engine and four on the

truck) can arrive on-scene to work simultaneously and effectively to stop the spread of a serious

building fire.

This map shows in green where the District’s current fire station system should deliver the initial

Effective Response Force during off-peak traffic hours.

As can be seen, given the regional fire department’s policy to require five engines to respond to

report building fires, some edges of the District are just beyond this coverage at off-peak traffic

hours. During peak traffic congestion, so many units are slowed that an effective First Alarm can

only reach the red area in the center of the District, where the stations “come into the center” of

the station siting plan.

Map #6 – 5 Engines Only at 8-Minute Travel

This map shows a different view of concentration by only showing the 8-minute coverage of

engine companies. Here, the green color shows the areas receiving five engines in 8 minutes

travel time during off-peak travel hours, which is most of the District. In the congested traffic

model (shown in red), the 5-engine area is again much smaller, showing that the slow coverage is

due not only to the District having one ladder truck, but also traffic congestion.

Map #6b – 5 Engines Overlap at 8 Minutes Travel – Traffic Congested Model

It is also important to understand the number of engines from the District and automatic aid

sources that are available together (overlapped) at 8 minutes travel or less in the most built-up

areas of the District. This map measure shows that for the congested traffic model, the five-

engine coverage area is mostly District units and is only in the center of the District.




Map #7 – One Battalion Chief and One Ladder Truck at 8-Minute Travel

This map displays the coverage for one Battalion Chief at 8 minutes travel time, and the

District’s one ladder truck, both of which respond from Station #1. While, for safety reasons, the

regional automatic aid agreement sends three chief officers and three ladder trucks to serious

emergencies, there is only one District Battalion Chief and ladder truck within the District.

Therefore, this map shows the minimum District provided chief officer and ladder truck

coverage. The coverage from Station #1 is good to all of the developed areas in the District only

in the non-congested traffic model. During periods of traffic congestion, the Station #1 units

cannot reach large sections of Station #2 and #77 areas.

Map #8 – Ladder Truck Overlap Coverage at 8-Minute Travel

Map 8 displays the 8-minute ladder truck overlap travel time coverage using the District Station

#1 and the automatic aid ladder truck locations. As can be seen, the core of the District can be

reached by at least two ladder trucks, during off-peak traffic hours, assuming the automatic aid

units are not already on other incidents and that there is not a traffic congestion problem. During

traffic congestion, again a ladder truck in 8 minutes travel cannot reach large areas of Station #2

and #77 areas.

Map #9 – All Incident Locations

These next maps are an overlay of the exact location for all incident types. It is apparent that

there is a need for fire services on almost every street segment of the District. The greatest

concentration of calls is also where the greatest concentration of District resources are available.

Given the District’s boundary drop and closest-unit automatic aid partnerships, also shown are

the locations outside the District where its units responded.

Also of note on this map is the quantity of incidents in the M2 Development area and in eastern,

East Palo Alto. Even the areas zoned for businesses generate demand for fire department

services.

Map #10 – Emergency Medical Services and Rescue Incident Locations

This map further breaks out only the emergency medical and rescue call locations. With the

majority of the calls for service being emergency medical, virtually all areas of the District need

emergency medical services.

Map #11 – All Fire Type Locations

This map identifies the location of all fires in the District since January 2013. All fires include

any type of fire call, from auto to dumpster to building. There are obviously fewer fires than

medical or rescue calls. Even given this, it is evident that all first-due engine districts experience

fires; the fires are more concentrated where the population is higher and the District resources




are more concentrated. This also happens to be the area where the building stock is older and less

likely to be in compliance with current codes.

Map #12 – Structure Fire Locations

Displayed in this map are the structure fire locations. While the structure fire count is a smaller

subset of the total fire count, there are two meaningful findings from this map. First, there are

still structure fires in every first-due fire company district. The location of many of the building

fires parallels the older and higher risk building types in the District where more significant risk,

and the ISO-evaluated buildings, are more common. These areas and buildings are of significant

fire and life loss risk to the District. Second, fires in the more complicated building types must be

controlled quickly or the losses will be very large. Fortunately, in the commercial and industrial

zones where commercial buildings tend to have automatic fire sprinklers and good management

practices, there are fewer to no building fires in the 2-year period.

Map #13 – Emergency Medical Services and Rescue Incident Location Densities

This map view examines, by mathematical density, where clusters of emergency medical

services incident activity occurred. In this set, the darker density color plots the highest

concentration of all incidents. This type of map makes the location of frequent workload more

meaningful than just mapping the dots of all locations, as done in Map #10.

This perspective is important because the deployment system needs an overlap of units to ensure

the delivery of multiple units when needed for serious incidents or to handle simultaneous calls

for service. When this type of map is compared with the concentration of engines in Map #6, the

best concentration should be where the greatest density of calls for service occurs. For the

District, this occurs primarily in East Palo Alto, where the incident demand has been the highest

in the District. Once the single station is committed to an incident, simultaneous incidents in East

Palo must wait for units that can only come from one direction—the west, which at rush hour,

are the most traffic-congested roads in the District.

Map #14 – All Fire Location Densities

This map is similar to Map #12, showing the hot spots of activity for all types of fires. Again,

much of this incident activity occurs in East Palo Alto, where over the decades the incidence of

fires and fire deaths has been the highest in the District.

Map #15 – Structure Fire Densities

This map shows only the building fire workload by density. The density is more focused in the

older areas of the District, including East Palo Alto, and follows the higher population densities

per square mile.




Finding #5: A neighborhood-based fire unit within a best practice

recommendation of 4 minutes travel time covers all of the

District’s neighborhoods, except for small outer-edge areas.

Finding #6: The District’s most built-up areas are within 8 minutes travel time

of an Effective Response Force assignment of 5 engines, 1 District

ladder truck, and 1 District Battalion Chief.

4.2.3 Second Ladder Truck Need and Location Test

The GIS analysis indicated that while there is overlapping ladder truck coverage in the District

due to regional automatic aid, the District’s single ladder truck not only cannot cover the entire

District, it cannot reach the eastern edges of East Palo Alto and the City of Menlo Park M2

development zone within the ISO 2.5-mile distance measure. Additionally, at rush hour, traffic

congestion slows the ladder truck and other units from their normal travel times to the areas east

of Highway 101. The travel time and workload statistics for this will be covered in the next

section of this report.

In the District there are 88 buildings that are three stories and 11 that are four or more stories.

These are not spread equally throughout all seven fire station areas in the District. These taller

buildings present the most challenges for fire departments. While ladders cannot reach the roofs

of mid-rise and high-rise buildings, they can reach multiple lower floors and are very effective in

rescue operations by delivering firefighters to upper floors, and in limiting the spread of fire from

the building to adjoining buildings at the lower stories. Ladder trucks also are an effective rescue

tool in construction accidents, when window washer equipment malfunctions on high-rise

buildings, and when earthquakes damage buildings making normal entry impossible.

As early as 2004, the District identified (by way of a Standards of Response Cover report) that

the western portion of the District is underserved with a single ladder truck located at Station #1.

That study’s second finding as received by the District’s Board of Directors, stated, “The truck

company cannot cover the west side of station areas 3 and 4.”10

Currently the City of Menlo Park is master planning the development of the area known as M2

on this study’s maps. While final building heights and densities are not fully set, all of the plans

to date call for a significant increase in the usage of the land and multiple story buildings in an

area today dominated by single story, widely spaced buildings.

10 Standards of Response Cover Deployment Analysis for the Menlo Park Fire Protection District, Citygate

Associates, June 2004.




While in and of itself the M2 area might not add enough multi-story buildings in a single

neighborhood to trigger the ISO requirement (that when 50% or more of another 2.5-mile driving

distance “standard response district” for a ladder truck is obtained, an agency add another ladder

truck), the M2 area and eastern, East Palo Alto clearly places the District in the position of

needing a second ladder truck. If the M2 area is redeveloped, the District will have areas on both

its west and east sides with multiple buildings that, in the aggregate, exceed the ISO criterion.

Further, the cumulative fire suppression needs of the District cannot be adequately served by one

ladder truck at one location. It is not feasible to expect the District to move the single ladder

truck to the east side of the District to serve this new project and exacerbate the existing ladder

truck coverage issues in the western areas of the District as reported in Citygate’s 2004 study.

Good fire deployment practices would direct a specialty unit to cover a 360-degree response area

and cover the most road miles, in the least travel minutes. Given the street network in the District

and this intense, new development on the eastern edge, the District cannot cover all of its tall

building needs with a single truck at any one location.

As for the ISO rating in the future, a local agency cannot predict what the next ISO rating will

be. The District, in the last rating in 2013, was graded at Class 2 on a scale of one to ten, with

one being the best. In the next rating, even if all the other ISO measures stayed the same, given

that new taller buildings are located more than 2.5-mile driving distance from the District’s only

ladder truck, and they are at the easternmost edge of the District’s service area, it is reasonable to

expect that the District’s ISO rating may be negatively impacted by the increased M2

Development. This would also be the case even if improvements in other non-ladder truck ISO

Classification areas were to be made by the District.

If the District slips from an ISO Class 2 to an ISO Class 3, it could negatively impact properties

including the newly constructed M2 area buildings. Ladder truck coverage is required by the ISO

even when buildings have fire sprinklers.

The M2 development area is located at, and just beyond, the 8-minute response time

recommended by NFPA Standard 1710. NFPA Standard 1710 is a nationally-recognized

recommended best practice routinely relied on and used by fire service professionals. Given

street network designs and traffic congestion, the 8-minute travel time recommendation

translates to an approximate 2.25- to 2.75-mile driving distance. The M2 area is located

approximately 3.0- to 3.3-mile driving distance from the nearest ladder truck. Moving the ladder

truck to a closer station would compromise the safety of residents in other areas of the District.

In a recent realistic time trial, with no traffic congestion, at night, it took a ladder company from

Station #1 8-9 minutes to respond to the M2 area site.

Finally, the ladder truck coverage to the M2 area would be inconsistent with the District’s risk

assessment under the Commission on Fire Accreditation International’s Standards of Response




Cover methodology. The District’s response plan is to send an effective response force of

multiple units quickly enough to keep fires in or near the room of origin. Given the rate at which

structure fires spread, this usually equates to the NFPA 1710 8-minute travel time. As noted

above, the M2 development area would not comply with the NFPA 1710’s recommended 8-

minute travel time.

Given that the ladder truck’s response to an incident at either the M2 area and eastern, East Palo

Alto will exceed a best practices response time of 8 minutes, there is a serious concern that the

District would be unable to confine a fire in these areas to the room of origin. Thus, the District

would be severely challenged to prevent the spread of fire to other areas or other structures and

becoming a potentially serious fire emergency. There are many variables in fire spread, and there

are threats by fire to occupants even in a building protected by fire sprinklers. In some scenarios,

a slow to non-existent ladder truck response could negatively affect outcomes.

Based on only two units east of Highway 101, significant call for services, simultaneous calls,

and the limited ladder truck reach east of Highway 101 discussed above, this study modeled the

impact of adding a second ladder truck, as a third company, east of Highway 101 at Station #2 in

East Palo Alto.

Map #16 – Added Ladder Truck Coverage from Station #2

This map shows the 8-minute travel time for a proposed second ladder truck. The location at

Station #2 completely covers the eastern District areas as well as overlaps the ladder truck at

Station #1 up to downtown Menlo Park. Thus, a serious fire in downtown Menlo Park would

receive two ladder trucks within 8 minutes without waiting for an out-of-District ladder truck

from the automatic aid system.

Finding #7: The District’s single ladder truck is insufficient to cover the

eastern, more developed areas of the District.

Recommendation #1: To deliver best practices-based ladder truck coverage to

the eastern District areas, as well as to add a third

company to the east of Highway 101 area to provide an

improved multiple-unit response force to this more

remote area of the District, the District should add a

second ladder truck or a quint and rescue squad unit at

Fire Station #2. Additionally, to ensure the District can

also add other units as needed east of Highway 101,

Station #77 should be rebuilt to accommodate at least two

fire crews of 3 to 4 personnel each.



Section 5—Statistical Analysis page 63

SECTION 5—STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

5.1 HISTORICAL EFFECTIVENESS AND RELIABILITY OF RESPONSE—WHAT STATISTICS SAY

ABOUT EXISTING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

The map sets described in Section 4 show the ideal

situation for response times and the responses

effectiveness given perfect conditions with no competing

calls, light traffic conditions, units all in place, and no

simultaneous calls for service. Examination of the actual

response time data provides a picture of how response

times are in the “real” world of simultaneous calls, rush hour traffic conditions, units out of

position, and delayed travel time for events such as periods of severe weather.

5.1.1 Data Set Identification

Menlo Park Fire Protection District provided National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS

v5) incident data for three years. Dispatch CAD data, however, was only available for two years.

A good merge of the 2-year CAD and NFIRS data sets was obtained for the period of 1/1/2013 –

12/31/2014. This data set contains 16,344 incidents and 26,151 apparatus response records, and

is considered to be a statistically significant data set.

5.2 SERVICE DEMAND

In 2014 the Menlo Park Fire Protection District responded to 8,152 incidents, or about 22.33

incidents per day. Of those incidents, 1.13% were fires, 64.60% were EMS, and 34.27% were

other types of incidents.

SOC ELEMENT 7 OF 8

RELIABILITY & HISTORICAL

RESPONSE EFFECTIVENESS

STUDIES




The number of incidents declined only slightly from 2013 to 2014:

Figure 5—Number of Incidents by Year

The following graph illustrates the number of incidents by incident type. The number of fires and

emergency medical incidents decreased slightly, while the number of “Other” incident types

grew between 2013 and 2014.

Figure 6—Number of Incidents by Year by Incident Type




5.2.1 Breakdown of Incident Demand Over Time

Incident counts are generally lower in late winter, rising through June. There is a slight decline

through summer, and a large increase in December.

Figure 7—Number of Incidents by Month by Year

When broken down by day of week, incident activity is fairly flat during the workweek. Activity

declines on Saturday. There is a further decline in incident activity on Sunday.

Figure 8—Number of Incidents by Day of Week by Year




This following graph compares incident activity by hour of day. The graph follows traditional

fire department activity hours. The annual increase in incident activity appears to be roughly

during business hours.

Figure 9—Number of Incidents by Hour of Day by Year

5.2.2 Breakdown of Incident Demand by Station Area

The following is a breakdown of the number of incidents by station area. Incident activity is

increasing in Station #3 and Station #77’s area.

Figure 10—Number of Incidents by Station by Year




Finding #8: The District’s time-of-day, day-of-week, and month-of-year calls

for service demands are very consistent. This means the District

needs to operate a fairly consistent 24/7/365 response system, and

is not in near term need of a peak-hour-of-the-day part-time unit.

5.2.3 Breakdown of Incident Demand by Property Type

Another way to understand the location of fire department responses is to review the types of

properties at which incidents occur. The next chart illustrates the count for property types

receiving services from the District. Family residences, medical facilities, and roads make up the

top property types. Only the incident types with greater than 100 occurrences are listed first:

Table 35—Incident Demand by Incident Type by Year

NFIRS Code # and Description 2013 2014 Totals

321 EMS call, excluding vehicle accident with injury 4,716 4,503 9,219

611 Dispatched & canceled en route 604 584 1,188

700 False alarm or false call, other 353 281 634

322 Vehicle accident with injuries 282 285 567

531 Smoke or odor removal 244 226 470

324 Motor vehicle accident no injuries 176 152 328

550 Public service assistance, other 152 153 305

600 Good intent call, other 164 138 302

554 Assist invalid 126 108 234

320 Emergency Medical Service, other 217 217

745 Alarm system sounded, no fire - unintentional 84 119 203

743 Smoke detector activation, no fire - unintended 107 94 201

Other Key Incident Types

323 Motor vehicle/pedestrian accident (MV Ped) 53 48 101

131 Passenger vehicle fire 28 36 64

111 Building fire 29 32 61

143 Grass fire 11 7 18

Of the 8,152 incidents, 1,076 (or 13%), were accidental/false/canceled responses. Of the

remaining 7,076 incidents, 4,809 (or 68%), were for emergency medical activities.




The following chart illustrates the ranking of incidents by property types. In a broad sense, all

residential property types are in the 400 series. The most activity in residential property types

occurs in “419 1 or 2 family dwelling”, “429 Multi-family dwellings”, “400 Residential, Other”

and “449 Hotel/motel, commercial”. If all 400 series property type areas are added together they

account for 8,442 incidents in 2013 and 2014. That means 51.65% of all incidents occur in a

residential property type. Only the property types with greater than 100 occurrences are listed

below:

Table 36—Incident Demand by Property Use by Year

NFIRS Code # and Description 2013 2014 Totals

419 1 or 2 family dwelling 3,108 3,264 6,372

429 Multi-family dwellings 818 782 1,600

962 Residential street, road or residential driveway 719 715 1,434

311 24-hour care Nursing homes, 4 or more persons 267 248 515

963 Street or road in commercial area 239 257 496

961 Highway or divided highway 236 246 482

960 Street, other 264 209 473

965 Vehicle parking area 169 160 329

340 Clinics, Doctor’s offices, hemodialysis centers 135 148 283

599 Business office 121 118 239

213 Elementary school, including kindergarten 116 104 220

331 Hospital - medical or psychiatric 74 89 163

500 Mercantile, business, other 52 79 131

400 Residential, other 92 33 125

215 High school/junior high school/middle school 44 70 114

519 Food and beverage sales, grocery store 49 64 113

161 Restaurant or cafeteria 62 47 109

5.3 RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS

Once the types of incidents are quantified, incident analysis shifts to the time required to respond

to those incidents. Fractile breakdowns track the percentage (and count the number) of incidents

meeting defined criteria, such as the first apparatus to reach the scene within progressive time

segments.




5.3.1 District-Wide Response Time Performance

A citizen measures the speed of fire department response from the time assistance is requested

until the assistance arrives. This measurement is called “Call to 1st Apparatus Arrival” (or “Call

to Arrival”). Police and sheriff’s departments, under state law, act as a Public Safety Answering

Point (PSAP) for 9-1-1 calls. All 9-1-1 calls for fire service in the District are routed to the San

Mateo County Regional Communications Center.

Based on national recommendations, Citygate’s response time test goal is for the 90% Call to

Arrival to be 7 minutes (or 420 seconds). This is made up of three component parts:

Call Processing Time: 1 minute (receive, determine need, alert crew)

Turnout Time: 2 minutes (notify, don required protective gear, get moving)

Travel Time: 4 minutes (travel time)

The following is the breakdown for Call to First Apparatus Arrival for the overall District and by

station area by year for fire and emergency medical incidents:

Table 37—Call to Arrival Response Time (Minutes/Seconds)

Station 2013 2014

District-wide 06:32 06:34

1 06:41 07:03

2 05:40 06:09

3 06:09 06:29

4 07:08 07:08

5 06:32 06:14

6 05:55 05:26

77 07:36 07:11

Finding #9: The overall District’s total response times are better than

Citygate’s recommendation of 7:00 minutes/seconds from call

receipt at fire dispatch.

5.3.2 Call Processing Time – Call to Dispatch

In 2014 we found that 90% of the calls were received and dispatched to the crews within 24

seconds.




Finding #10: The San Mateo County Regional Communications Center’s

dispatch processing times are very good and are better than

national recommendations.

5.3.3 Turnout Time

Turnout time – This measure is for all crews to hear the dispatch message, don safety clothing,

and begin moving the assigned apparatus.

Table 38—Turnout Time Performance

Station 2013 2014


1 01:51 01:51

2 01:36 01:55

3 01:48 01:46

4 01:51 01:49

5 01:45 01:50

6 01:43 01:40

7 01:55 01:46

While the NFPA recommends 60-80 seconds for turnout time, it has long been recognized as a

standard rarely met in practical experience. Crews must not just hear the dispatch message, they

must also don the OSHA-mandated personal protective clothing for the type of emergency.

Citygate has long recommended that, due to this and the floor plan design of some stations,

agencies can reasonably make a 2-minute crew turnout time to 90% of the emergency incidents.

Finding #11: The District’s turnout times are consistently under 2 minutes from

station to station, which is very good.




5.3.4 Travel Time

Travel time – The District-wide travel time measures for 2013 and 2014 to all emergency

incidents are shown hereafter. Travel time is defined as the time element between when the

dispatch center is notified either verbally or electronically that the unit is enroute to the call, and

when it arrived at the address or location street front, not the patient side.

Table 39—Travel Time Performance

Station 2013 2014


1 04:51 05:06

2 04:20 04:31

3 04:39 04:49

4 05:27 05:35

5 04:59 04:39

6 04:19 04:04

7 05:41 05:36

NFPA Standard #1710 recommends a 4-minute travel time goal in urban and suburban areas.

Given the travel times above, the District is challenged to meet this goal. There are several

reasons for this: some emergency medical incidents occur outside of the District boundaries;

traffic congestion varies; a non-grid road network design exists in many areas; open spaces,

waterways, and highways that limit through streets; and, in some places, the station districts are

too large to cover in a short travel time. Having said this, all but three of the District’s stations

have times less than 5 minutes, and the balance in less than 6 minutes. A 5-minute travel time is

hard even for metro fire departments on a grid street network with adequately spaced stations to

achieve.

Finding #12: The travel times in the District are longer than a best practice goal

of 4 minutes, which is reflective of the size of some station areas

and serious traffic congestion at morning and evening rush hours.

Short of adding more fire stations, fire station-based crews, or

peak-hour activity units for simultaneous incidents, there is no way

to appreciably lower the travel times. This is particularly true for

the third- through sixth-due units to the areas east of Highway 101.




Finding #13: The District’s total response times are very good, and given the

travel times being slightly longer than 4 minutes, the good

performance at 7 minutes is due to excellent dispatch and turnout

times.

5.3.5 First Alarm (Effective Response Force) Performance to Building Fires

First Alarm or Effective Response Force Performance to Building Fires – In the District, the

regional closest-unit system response plan is for 5 engines, 3 ladder trucks, and 3 Battalion

Chiefs (two ladders and chiefs arrive from automatic aid).

However, this response force is large in order to provide enough units due to traffic congestion

when some fires are very serious at the time of the 9-1-1 call. However, in a year there are few

building fires where the entire force of 11 units all are needed and arrive at the incident location.

Therefore the response time sample size is very small:

There were 10 Effective Response Force (ERF or First Alarm) incidents requiring all units to the

scene during the 2-year study period. Only incidents where arriving ERF resources were

dispatched within 60 seconds of each other were counted as ERF-dispatched incidents. This filter

was used to eliminate escalated responses:

Table 40—Incidents: Count – Year by Station

Station 2013 2014 Totals

2 3 1 4

3 1 3 4

5

2 2

Totals 4 6 10

The following chart illustrates the Call to Arrival for each of the 10 ERF incidents. Citygate’s

recommendation, based on national best practices, is for the entire force to arrive within 11

minutes of the 9-1-1 call being received in fire dispatch:

Table 41—Call to Arrival Time for ERF Incidents by Year

Station 2013 Time 2014 Time

2 15:27 09:31

3 08:22 10:06

5

08:53




The following chart illustrates the ERF Travel Time for each of the 10 ERF incidents. Citygate’s

recommendation based on national best practices is for the entire force to arrive within 8 minutes

travel time of the 9-1-1 call being received in fire dispatch:

Table 42—Travel Time for ERF Incidents by Year

Station 2013 Time 2014 Time

2 14:17 08:27

3 07:19 09:21

5

07:47

Finding #14: The District’s total response time for all units to serious fires,

known as the Effective Response Force (ERF or First Alarm),

ranging from 08:53 to 10:06, are better than Citygate’s

recommendation of 11 minutes.

5.4 SIMULTANEOUS INCIDENT ACTIVITY

Simultaneous incidents occur when other incidents are already underway at the time a new

incident occurs. In the District in 2014, 33.59% of incidents occurred while one or more other

incidents were underway. Here is the percentage of simultaneous incidents broken down by

number of simultaneous incidents:

Table 43—Simultaneous Incident Activity – 2014

# of Simultaneous Incidents Percentage

1 or more 33.59%

2 or more 6.62%

3 or more 1.00%

4 or more .15%

In a large city or county area, simultaneous incidents in different station areas have very little

operational consequence. However, when simultaneous incidents occur within a single station

area, there can be significant delays in response times.

The following graph illustrates the number of single-station simultaneous incidents by station

area in 2013 and 2014. Station #2 has the greatest number of in-station area simultaneous

incidents, followed by Station #1.




Figure 11—Number of Station Simultaneous Incidents

5.5 STATION DEMAND PERCENTAGE AND UNIT HOUR UTILIZATION

Due to the simultaneous incident rates measured in the section above, this next section of

incident measures presents the location the demand occurs, the hour of day it occurs, and

determines if the peak hour demand is so high that response times suffer since units must cross

the District to cover for overly busy units.

In the tables to follow, the different colors illustrate the variation in demand; the lowest rates of

activity are green, progressing up to yellow, and finally red, which indicates the greatest quantity

of incidents or rate of activity. The utilization percentage for apparatus is calculated by the same

primary factors; number of responses and duration of responses. The following chart illustrates a

Unit-Hour Utilization Summary for District apparatus. The busiest apparatus are listed first:




Table 44—Unit-Hour Utilization for Apparatus

Vehicle E2 E4 E6 E1 E77 E5 E3 T1

00:00 6.95% 3.50% 2.54% 3.00% 2.46% 2.02% 1.70% 0.77%

01:00 6.95% 2.84% 1.52% 2.76% 2.69% 3.84% 2.16% 0.97%

02:00 8.90% 2.47% 1.49% 4.18% 3.37% 3.40% 1.71% 2.31%

03:00 6.07% 1.83% 2.42% 2.29% 1.78% 1.47% 1.74% 0.80%

04:00 5.20% 2.39% 1.78% 1.53% 0.92% 1.40% 0.82% 0.53%

05:00 5.52% 3.42% 2.46% 1.95% 3.04% 4.21% 1.80% 1.72%

06:00 6.80% 3.20% 2.61% 3.43% 2.37% 1.62% 1.47% 0.82%

07:00 8.33% 5.80% 3.86% 3.21% 3.37% 2.88% 2.64% 1.99%

08:00 9.58% 5.76% 5.45% 5.09% 4.61% 4.91% 3.40% 2.62%

09:00 9.08% 7.28% 7.68% 5.91% 6.29% 3.28% 4.20% 2.77%

10:00 8.18% 6.87% 8.02% 7.71% 7.67% 4.15% 4.25% 3.08%

11:00 9.19% 6.33% 7.84% 6.88% 7.34% 4.34% 3.96% 2.85%

12:00 10.76% 7.18% 6.84% 6.75% 5.13% 3.68% 4.77% 3.50%

13:00 13.51% 7.07% 6.05% 6.76% 6.29% 6.00% 6.19% 3.45%

14:00 14.07% 9.78% 6.34% 6.70% 6.08% 4.51% 5.01% 3.31%

15:00 12.00% 7.96% 8.39% 7.10% 5.42% 5.71% 7.47% 4.80%

16:00 11.63% 7.27% 6.67% 6.07% 6.52% 5.18% 4.58% 3.62%

17:00 14.32% 7.32% 6.26% 4.60% 5.43% 4.36% 4.94% 3.64%

18:00 15.55% 6.26% 6.48% 6.12% 7.69% 5.13% 3.76% 3.93%

19:00 12.22% 7.12% 4.67% 5.62% 4.59% 3.40% 4.71% 3.10%

20:00 12.07% 5.10% 4.65% 3.32% 4.01% 2.96% 3.49% 1.79%

21:00 11.30% 6.22% 5.46% 5.23% 4.14% 3.29% 3.07% 2.39%

22:00 10.51% 5.22% 3.48% 3.55% 4.11% 2.44% 3.09% 1.79%

23:00 7.11% 3.32% 3.24% 2.96% 2.99% 2.61% 2.00% 1.36%

Overall 9.83% 5.48% 4.84% 4.70% 4.51% 3.62% 3.46% 2.41%

Responses 4,874 2,518 2,593 2,727 2,499 1,837 1,743 1,986

While Station #2 is the busiest unit during daylight hours, the utilization percentage does not

reach Citygate’s problematic threshold of 30%, above which crew training and other fire

department duties suffer during daylight hours.




5.6 THE DISTRICT’S UNIQUE DEPLOYMENT ISSUES

There are two categories of fire department performance measurements—distribution and

concentration. Distribution measures the performance of the first fire department apparatus to

reach the scene. Concentration measures the performance of second due and later apparatus—the

apparatus necessary to assemble teams on apparatus on an emergency scene.

The District does not have a significant distribution problem. First unit arrival performance is

within predictable expectations. The District does have a concentration problem. When more

than one fire apparatus is required on the scene of complex emergencies, there can be significant

delays.

To understand the concentration problem, it is necessary to visualize the District as having two

distinct operational areas separated by Highway 101. For purposes of clarity, station areas 2 and

77 on the bay side of Highway 101 will be referred to as the Bay Side operational area. Although

there are only two fire stations in the Bay Side operational area, this area accounts for 44.42% of

all fire and emergency medical incidents.

The other 5 District fire stations (1, 3, 4, 5, and 6) are located on the city side of Highway 101.

This area will be referred to as the City Side operational area. This 5-fire-station area experiences

55.58% of the District’s fire and emergency medical incidents.

Traffic patterns allow Bay Side apparatus to move within the Bay Side area with only the usual

traffic and road network issues. The same is true for apparatus movements within the City Side

area. Again, apparatus are able to respond with expected traffic and road network issues.

The problem occurs when Bay Side apparatus are required to respond through Highway 101

traffic choke points into the City Side area, or when City Side apparatus are required to respond

through the same traffic choke points into the Bay Side operational area.

For the 2-year study period there were 16,344 incidents. If this total is reduced to “No Aid

Given” incidents the number drops to 15,629 incidents. If that number is reduced to fire and

emergency medical incidents only, the number of incidents drops again to 10,645. Of the 26,151

apparatus responses that occurred during the 2-year analysis period, 16,582 were directly related

to the 10,645 fire and emergency medical incidents. If we filter-out automatic aid apparatus and

command vehicles, and focus on just the following primary vehicles: E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6,

E77, and T1, we see the number of apparatus responses drop further from 16,582 to 13,416. If

those responses are reduced to only those arriving at the incident, the number of apparatus

responses reduces again to 12,283. Of this number of apparatus responses, 5,786, or 47.11%, of

responses occurred in Bay Side while 6,497, or 52.89%, occurred in City Side. Here again we

see that the Bay Side contains more complex incidents requiring more apparatus resources than

the City Side.




The following is a breakdown of these apparatus responses by arrival. Note, this is the arrival

sequence for these apparatus only and does not include outside companies or command vehicles:

There are 12,283 Apparatus records being analyzed.

Table 45—Apparatus: Count – Arrival Sequence by Station

Station

1st Arrival

2nd Arrival

3rd Arrival

4th Arrival

5th Arrival

6th Arrival

7th Arrival Totals

1 1,506 164 109 30 3

1,812

2 3,378 304 223 45 14 8 2 3,974

3 728 67 40 13 7 4 1 860

4 1,283 66 32 9 2 1

1,393

5 927 109 52 20 5 1

1,114

6 1,409 81 64 8 3 2

1,567

77 1,331 125 86 20 1

1,563

Totals 10,562 916 606 145 35 16 3 12,283

Notice Station #2 is the heaviest consumer of concentration resources. The following is the

breakdown of District resources used by arrival:

Table 46—District Resources Used By Arrival

Arrival Number and Percentage of District Resources

Station #2’s 1st Arrival 3,378 of 10,562 or 31.98% of District resources

Station #2’s 2nd Arrival 304 of 916 or 33.19% of District resources

Station #2’s 3rd Arrival 223 of 606 or 36.80% of District resources

Station #2’s 4th Arrival 45 of 145 or 31.03% of District resources

Station #2’s 5th Arrival 14 of 35 or 40% of District resources

Station #2’s 6th Arrival 8 of 16 or 50% of District resources

Station #2’s 7th Arrival 2 of 3 or 66.67% of District resources




In the following table, the previous Table 45 illustrating counts (above) is converted to show the

travel time of apparatus by arrival. The longest travel times are highlighted:

There are 12,283 Apparatus records being analyzed.

Table 47—Apparatus: 90% Performance Minutes – Arrival Sequence and Count per

Station

Station 1st Arrival 2nd Arrival 3rd Arrival 4th Arrival 5th Arrival 6th Arrival 7th Arrival

1 05:01 (1,506) 05:39 (164) 06:51 (109) 08:24 (30) 05:33 (3)

2 04:24 (3,378) 07:38 (304) 09:23 (223) 10:20 (45) 14:22 (14) 46:48 (8) 10:34 (2)

3 04:44 (728) 07:28 (67) 11:57 (40) 08:16 (13) 12:07 (7) 20:16 (4) 07:17 (1)

4 05:29 (1,283) 07:56 (66) 08:08 (32) 14:17 (9) 09:36 (2) 09:27 (1)

5 04:46 (927) 07:37 (109) 08:36 (52) 11:10 (20) 12:42 (5) 04:17 (1)

6 04:10 (1,409) 05:23 (81) 08:16 (64) 19:29 (8) 18:54 (3) 19:48 (2)

77 05:36 (1,331) 06:35 (125) 07:49 (86) 09:06 (20) 12:19 (1)

First Arrival Summary

Station #2 does not have a distribution (first apparatus arrival) problem. In fact, it has the second

shortest first arrival travel time.

Second Arrival Summary

Station #2 does have a concentration problem. Station #2 requires nearly one-third of all second-

due arrivals, yet it has the second longest second-due travel time. The station with the longest

travel time has the least number of second apparatus arrivals at 66.

Third Arrival Summary

Station #2 requires more than 36% of third-due arrivals, yet it has the second longest third-due

travel time.

Fourth Arrival Summary

Station #2 requires nearly a third of all fourth-due arrivals, yet it has the fourth longest fourth-

due travel time.

Note: Due to lower volumes the 5th

, 6th

, and 7th

arrivals will tend to be very volatile.




5.6.1 Geographic Illustration: Bay Side Incidents

Below is a snapshot of City Side resources responding into Bay Side incidents through traffic

choke points. Only incidents occurring between 7:00am – 11:00am (peak City Side to Bay Side

travel congestion) are shown. Notice Station #1 delivers most of the City Side resources into the

Bay Side operational area during these times:

Figure 12—Bay Side Incidents




The following chart illustrates the response of City Side resources into the Bay Side area by

Vehicle ID and 90% travel time. These responses are to fire and emergency medical incidents

during the 2-year study period:

There are 357 Apparatus records being analyzed.

Table 48—Apparatus: 90% Travel Minutes – Vehicle ID and Count per Hour of Day

(City Side Resources into Bay Side Area)

Hour of Day E1 E3 E4 E5 E6 T1

00 04:32 (1)

01:26 (1)

05:46 (3)

01 06:38 (6)

14:48 (2)

08:17 (11)

02 15:09 (5) 06:59 (1)

08:27 (3) 09:17 (1) 13:19 (6)

03 05:58 (4)

03:08 (1) 07:11 (1) 06:10 (3)

04 09:26 (2)

10:47 (5)

05

06:39 (3)

06 07:33 (2)

06:17 (1) 08:39 (1)

07 04:53 (2)

13:33 (3)

07:37 (10)

08 08:32 (4)

07:30 (10)

09 04:52 (3)

06:00 (1) 11:55 (2)

08:49 (6)

10 11:35 (3)

02:35 (1) 06:57 (3) 07:41 (3) 09:30 (12)

11 04:39 (3) 00:30 (1)

03:38 (1)

07:31 (5)

12 07:34 (3)

04:41 (3)

13 14:23 (4)

06:28 (4) 06:51 (1) 08:57 (8)

14 12:12 (10) 07:27 (1)

12:25 (6) 05:14 (1) 08:28 (16)

15 14:22 (6)

07:30 (1) 10:43 (2) 12:58 (7)

16 10:21 (4)

06:45 (2) 03:24 (1) 06:43 (10)

17 12:52 (11)

02:25 (1) 05:50 (3)

13:38 (9)

18 08:44 (12)

08:41 (6) 10:19 (1) 08:59 (19)

19 07:10 (3)

03:21 (2)

10:18 (8)

20 10:42 (7)

12:16 (4)

21 05:26 (5)

09:58 (2) 10:17 (2) 07:06 (7)

22 05:52 (5)

05:02 (1)

09:32 (9)

23 07:10 (4)

07:19 (1) 12:19 (2) 07:21 (7)




The following is the same 24-hour travel time breakdown, but this time all City Side apparatus

are combined into one count and travel time:

Table 49—City Side Combined Apparatus Travel Time and Counts by Hour

Hour of Day Travel Time (Count)

00 05:46 (5)

01 08:17 (19)

02 09:17 (16)

03 07:11 (9)

04 10:47 (7)

05 06:39 (3)

06 08:39 (4)

07 08:17 (15)

08 08:32 (14)

09 08:49 (12)

10 09:30 (22)

11 05:49 (10)

12 07:34 (6)

13 08:27 (17)

14 11:22 (34)

15 10:43 (16)

16 07:49 (17)

17 12:52 (24)

18 08:59 (38)

19 08:11 (13)

20 10:42 (11)

21 07:39 (16)

22 06:41 (15)

23 07:21 (14)




5.6.2 Geographic Illustration: City Side Incidents

Below is a snapshot of Bay Side resources responding into City Side incidents through traffic

choke points. Only incidents occurring between 3:00pm – 8:00pm (peak Bay Side to City Side

travel congestion) are shown.

Notice very few Bay Side resources travel deep into the City Side operational areas during this

peak congestion time.

Figure 13—City Side Incidents




The following chart illustrates the response of Bay Side resources into the City Side area by

Vehicle ID and 90% travel time. These responses are to fire and emergency medical incidents

during the 2-year study period. Notice far fewer resources cross Highway 101 from Bay Side to

City Side:

Table 50—Apparatus: 90% Travel Minutes – Vehicle ID and Count per Hour of Day

(Bay Side Resources into City Side Area)

Hour of Day E2 E77

00 02:51 (1) 05:59 (3)

01

04:07 (1)

02

04:18 (1)

05

07:17 (1)

06 08:24 (1) 07:59 (2)

07 02:51 (1) 11:10 (2)

08 04:41 (2) 05:52 (5)

09

06:21 (2)

10 02:30 (2) 06:17 (2)

11 03:02 (3) 05:50 (5)

12 05:48 (5) 03:56 (3)

13 03:48 (1) 07:28 (4)

14 04:18 (5)

15 07:27 (4) 12:42 (3)

16 05:49 (3) 07:38 (2)

17 05:34 (7)

18 09:31 (5) 09:06 (7)

19 05:10 (3) 06:25 (6)

20 05:03 (3) 06:08 (4)

22

02:58 (1)

23 04:10 (4)




The following is the same 24-hour travel time breakdown, but this time all Bay Side apparatus

are combined:

Table 51—City Side Combined Apparatus Travel Time and Counts by Hour

Hour of Day Travel Time (Count)

00 05:59 (4)

01 04:07 (1)

02 04:18 (1)

05 07:17 (1)

06 08:24 (3)

07 11:10 (3)

08 05:52 (7)

09 06:21 (2)

10 06:17 (4)

11 05:50 (8)

12 05:48 (8)

13 07:28 (5)

14 04:18 (5)

15 12:42 (7)

16 07:38 (5)

17 05:34 (7)

18 09:06 (12)

19 06:25 (9)

20 06:08 (7)

22 02:58 (1)

23 04:10 (4)

5.6.3 Deployment Discussion and Summary

The experience of a responder stuck in grid-locked traffic is memorable and compelling. The

District’s growing employment base and regional post-recession economic jobs recovery is

yielding intense traffic congestion at rush hours. The GIS travel time analysis in this study and

the prior travel time data for District responses clearly show the substantial hindrance this causes

to emergency response travel in the District.

The only way going forward to maintain reasonable travel times, will be for the District to add

more crews, positioned initially east of Highway 101. Other crews may be needed later in the




central and western District on a full- or part-time basis. One way to visualize this would be the

tight fire station spacing needed in downtown urban areas like San Francisco, Manhattan, and

Chicago where traffic congestion impairs typical fire station spacing.

Highway 101 isolates Bay Side Stations #2 and #77 from District concentration resources

required for complex incidents. However, GPS closest unit dispatching has most likely

moderated the Bay Side resource imbalance keeping performance stats from being severely

degraded by traffic.

Finding #15: The most compelling justification for additional resources in the

Bay Side area is simply call volume, as well as the slightly greater

likelihood of complex incidents on the Bay Side of Highway 101.



Section 6—SOC Evaluation and Recommendation page 87

SECTION 6—SOC EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION

6.1 OVERALL EVALUATION

The District serves a very diverse land use pattern with a

geographically challenging and limited road network in

some areas. Population drives service demand and

development brings population. The western, more

upslope areas of the District have slightly slower response times typical of outer edge, hilly

suburban areas of California. While the District and now the state-mandated Fire Code has

required fire sprinklers even in dwellings, it will be many more decades before enough buildings

are replaced or remodeled using automatic fire sprinklers. For the foreseeable future, the District

will need both a first-due firefighting unit and Effective Response Force (First Alarm) coverage

in all parts of the District, consistent with current best practices, if the risk of the fire is to be

limited to only part of the inside of the affected building.

If the District wants to provide the three outcomes below, the District will have to increase its

deployment of crews, to include at least a second ladder truck or quint / rescue squad and more

personnel east of Highway 101 as development occurs:

Provide equitable response times to all similar risk neighborhoods

Provide for depth of response when multiple incidents occur

Provide for a concentration of response forces in the core for high-risk venues.

For its current risks and desired outcomes, the District has the correct quantity of fire engines

(pumpers). The District’s single ladder truck does not cover the entire District. While the

regional response system provides ladder trucks, there is no guarantee they will be available in a

timely manner. Additionally, due to traffic congestion and incidents east of Highway 101

occurring at the peak hours of the day, the District needs a third company and more personnel in

that area.

To increase ladder truck coverage and total staffing east of Highway 101, the District has two

immediate options:

1. Field a second ladder truck east of Highway 101 at Station #2 staffed with 4

personnel.

2. Field two quints (combination engine/ladder apparatus) staffed with four

personnel that would replace Engines 2 and 4. Additionally, add a two-person

rescue squad at Station #2, increasing the personnel east of Highway 101 by a

total of three and by one at Station #4.

SOC ELEMENT 8 OF 8

OVERALL EVALUATION




Additionally, in the future when Station #77 is rebuilt, the District should make it large enough

for two crews in case this station needs two crews as calls for service grow past what three

companies east of Highway 101 can handle in the near term.

Recommended deployment next steps are summarized below, and further specified in Section 7:

The first deployment step for the District in the near term is to adopt performance measures from

which to set forth service expectations and, on an annual basis, monitor Fire Department

performance as part of its annual budgeting process.

The second and on-going step is for the District Board to provide the policy direction for the

appropriate capital impact development fees to allow the District to require growth to pay its way

for the needed capital expansion needs.

Third, the District should strive to fund the addition of a second ladder truck crew or a quint /

rescue squad with personnel east of Highway 101.

Fourth, over time, the District should provide for the needed replacement or repair of fire stations

as they continue to age.

6.1.1 Deployment Recommendation

Based on the technical analysis and findings contained in this Standards of Coverage study,

Citygate offers the following overall deployment recommendation:

Recommendation #2: Adopt District Board of Directors Deployment

Measures Policy: The District elected officials should

adopt updated, complete performance measures to direct

fire crew planning and to monitor the operation of the

District. The measures of time should be designed to

deliver outcomes that will save patients medically

salvageable upon arrival; and to keep small, but serious

fires from becoming greater alarm fires. With this is

mind, Citygate recommends the following measures:

2.1 Distribution of Fire Stations: To treat medical patients

and control small fires, the first-due unit should arrive

within 7 minutes, 90% of the time from the receipt of the

9-1-1 call in the regional fire dispatch center. This

equates to a 1-minute dispatch time, a 2-minute

company turnout time, and a 4-minute drive time in the

most populated areas.




2.2 Multiple-Unit Effective Response Force for Serious

Emergencies: To confine fires near the room of origin,

to stop wildland fires to under three acres when noticed

promptly, and to treat up to five medical patients at

once, a multiple-unit response from the regional

response system of a minimum of 5 engines, 1 ladder

truck, and 2 Battalion Chiefs totaling 21 personnel

should arrive within 11:00 minutes from the time of 9-1-

1 call receipt in fire dispatch, 90% of the time. This

equates to 1 minute dispatch time, 2 minutes company

turnout time, and 8 minutes drive time spacing for

multiple units in the most populated areas.

2.3 Hazardous Materials Response: Provide hazardous

materials response designed to protect the community

from the hazards associated with uncontrolled release of

hazardous and toxic materials. The fundamental mission

of the District response is to minimize or halt the release

of a hazardous substance so it has minimal impact on the

community. It can achieve this with a travel time in

urban to suburban areas for the first company capable of

investigating a HazMat release at the operations level

within 4 minutes travel time or less than 90% of the

time. After size-up and scene evaluation is completed, a

determination will be made whether to request additional

resources from the District’s multi-agency hazardous

materials response partnership.

2.4 Technical Rescue: Respond to technical rescue

emergencies as efficiently and effectively as possible

with enough trained personnel to facilitate a successful

rescue. Achieve a travel time for the first company in

urban to suburban areas for size-up of the rescue within

4 minutes travel time or less 90% of the time. Assemble

additional resources for technical rescue capable of

initiating a rescue within a total response time of 11

minutes, 90% of the time. Safely complete

rescue/extrication to ensure delivery of patient to a

definitive care facility.




2.5 Emergency Medical Services: The District has to

continue to provide first responder paramedic services to

all neighborhoods to 90% of the medical incidents

within 6:59 minutes/seconds from crew notification, per

the current agreement with the County EMS agency.



Section 7—Next Steps page 91

SECTION 7—NEXT STEPS

7.1 NEXT STEPS

The purpose of a Standards of Cover Services Assessment study is to compare the District’s

current performance against the local risks to be protected as well as to compare against

nationally recognized best practices. This analysis of performance forms the base from which to

make recommendations for changes, if any, in fire station locations, equipment types, staffing,

and headquarters programs.

As one step, the District Board of Directors should adopt updated and best practices based

response time goals for the District and provide accountability for the District personnel to meet

those standards. The goals identified in Recommendation #2 meet national best practices.

Measurement and planning as the District continues to evolve over time will be necessary for the

District to meet these goals. Citygate recommends that the District’s next steps be to work

through the issues identified in this study over the following time lines:

7.1.1 Short-Term Steps

Absorb the policy recommendations of this fire services study and adopt updated

District performance measures to drive the deployment of firefighting and

emergency medical resources.

Monitor the final approved developments for the City of Menlo Park M2 area.

Continue to measure the effects of traffic congestion on response times and

communicate the effects to partner agencies having the authority for traffic

circulation design and the possible use of traffic-calming measures.

Immediately develop the costs and a timeline for the addition of a second ladder

truck or quint / rescue squad staffed by additional personnel at Fire Station #2.

The timeline needs to include the pace of development in eastern Menlo Park and

East Palo Alto, along with the District’s ability to open the new and rebuilt Fire

Station #2 and fund not just the ladder truck or quint / rescue squad via impact

fees, but also the staffing for the additional personnel at Fire Station #2. The

District should explore the option of remodeling or rebuilding Station #77 to

accommodate more than a single fire crew of 3 to 4 personnel.

7.1.2 Long-Term Steps

Monitor the effect of growth in the eastern District areas on incident demand

volume at peak hours of the day.



Section 7—Next Steps page 92

If adding a third company east of Highway 101 (the second ladder truck or quint /

rescue squad located at Station #2) and rebuilding Station #77 to handle two

crews is not enough to maintain response times to District-adopted goals, the

District should begin the long-range planning for the addition of a reliever unit to

operate at peak hours of the day, possibly a 2-firefighter Fast Response Rescue

Squad, to assist with peak-hour incidents inside traffic-congested areas.



Appendix A page 93

APPENDIX A

RISK ASSESSMENT EXHIBITS



Appendix A—Risk Assessment Exhibits page 95

Table 52—Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria – BUILDING FIRE1

Impact Severity Factor Score Scoring Guidelines

Building Construction

0 ≥90% of buildings are protected non-combustible construction (Type II-A) or better

1 ≥90% of buildings are unprotected non-combustible construction (Type II-B) or better

2 ≥90% of buildings are protected combustible construction (Type III-A) or better

3 ≥75% of buildings are unprotected combustible construction (Type III-B) or better

4 ≥75% of buildings are protected wood-frame (Type V-A) or better

5 <75% of buildings are protected wood-frame construction (Type V-B) or better

Occupancy Loading

0 ≥90% of buildings have less than 10 persons average daily occupancy




4 ≥25% of buildings have more than 250 persons average daily occupancy

5 ≥25% of buildings have more than 500 persons average daily occupancy

Built-In Fire Protection Systems

0 ≥95% of buildings have monitored fire sprinkler system and monitored fire detection/alarm system

1 ≥75% of buildings have monitored fire sprinkler system and monitored fire detection/alarm system

2 ≥75% of buildings have automatic fire sprinkler system and local fire detection/alarm system

3 ≥50% of buildings have automatic fire sprinkler system and local fire detection/alarm system

4 ≥25% of buildings have automatic fire sprinkler system

5 <25% of buildings have automatic fire sprinkler system

Water Supply

0 ≥90% of buildings have Needed Fire Flow2 (NFF) available within 300 ft.





5 <50% of buildings have Needed Fire Flow2 (NFF) available within 1000 ft.

Response Capability

0 ERF3 for all building fire risk, meeting minimum recommended annual training, available with response time ≤15:00 min. @ 90%

1 ERF

3 for ≥90% of building fire risk, meeting minimum recommended annual training, available with response time ≤15:00 min. @

90%

2 ERF

3 for ≥90% building fire risk, meeting minimum recommended annual training, available with response time ≤30:00 min. @

90%

3 ERF

3 for ≥75% building fire risk, meeting minimum recommended annual training, available with response time ≤30:00 min. @

90%

4 ERF3 for ≥50% building fire risk available with response time ≤30:00 min. @ 90%

5 ERF3 for ≥50% of building fire risk not available, or response time >30:00 min. @ 90%


2 Needed Fire Flow as determined by the Insurance Services Office (ISO) criteria

3 Effective Response Force (ERF) – number of personnel required to apply Needed Fire Flow and perform other critical tasks necessary to prevent fire from impacting other values at risk




Table 53—Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria – WILDLAND FIRE1


Vegetation

0 No flammable vegetation2 within 1000 ft. of ≥90% of exposed values at risk

3


3


3


3


3

5 Flammable vegetation2 within 100 ft. of ≥25% of exposed values at risk

3

Weather

0 High fire weather factors4 occur together ≤ average of 15 days per year



3 Very high fire weather factors5 occur together ≤ average of 30 days per year

4 Very high fire weather factors5 occur together ≤ average of 45 days per year

5 Very high fire weather factors5 occur together > average of 45 days per year

Topography

0 Average slope ≤5%; no topographic features6 present within 1/4 mile of ≥90% of exposed values at risk

3


3


3


3


3

5 Average slope >10% and/or topographic features6 present within 1/4 mile of >25% of exposed values at risk

3

Water Supply

0 Public water supply ≥1,000 GPM within 500 ft. of ≥90% of exposed values at risk3

1 Public water supply ≥750 GPM within 500 ft. of ≥90% of exposed values at risk3



4 Public or private water supply ≥500 GPM within 1000 ft. of ≥75% of exposed values at risk3

5 Public or private water supply <500 GPM; or >1000 ft. of >25% of exposed values at risk3

Response Capability

0 ERF6 for all wildland fire risk, meeting minimum recommended annual training, available with response time ≤15:00 min. @ 90%

1 ERF

6 for ≥90% of wildland fire risk, meeting minimum recommended annual training, available with response time ≤15:00 min. @

90%

2 ERF


90%

3 ERF


90%

4 ERF6 for ≥50% of wildland fire risk available with response time ≤40:00 min. @ 90%

5 ERF6 for ≥50% of wildland fire risk not available, or available with response time >40:00 min. @ 90%

1 Significant wildland fire incident requiring multiple-alarm resources and impacting multiple values at risk

2 Includes more than 5 grouped (less than mature species height spacing) specimens of highly combustible tree and/or brush species, or more than 5,000 ft

2 of dried annual weeds/grasses

more than 6” high 3 Includes occupied buildings; Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR); vulnerable populations

4 High Fire Weather Factors: Temperature >90

o F.; relative humidity <25%, wind >5 mph

5 Very High Fire Weather Factors: Temperature >95

o F.; relative humidity <15%, wind >10 mph

6 Includes box canyon, chimney, ridge, saddle

7 Effective Response Force (ERF) – number of personnel required to apply appropriate fire flow and perform other critical tasks necessary to prevent fire from impacting other values at risk




Table 54—Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria – MEDICAL EMERGENCY1


Population Density

0 Average population density ≤500/sq. mile

1 Average population density ≤1,000/sq. mile




5 Average population density >10,000/sq. mile

Population Demographics

0 ≤5% of population: under age 10 and/or over age 65 and/or average annual household income ≤ $25,000





5 >40% of population: under age 10 and/or over age 65 and/or average annual household income ≤ $25,000

Traffic

0 No highway traffic; no seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog; controlled intersection service level2 A ≥ 90% of the time

1 Single rural two-lane highway; no seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog; controlled intersection service level2 B or better ≥ 90% of the time

2 Multiple two-lane rural highways; no seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog; controlled intersection service level2 C or better ≥ 90% of the time

3 Single multiple-lane highway; seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog; controlled intersection service level2 D or better ≥ 90% of the time

4 Single multiple-lane freeway; seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog; controlled intersection service level2 E or better ≥ 80% of the time

5 Multiple 4+ lane freeways; seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog; controlled intersection service level2 F or better ≥ 15% of the time

Pre-Hospital Emergency Care

0 ALS3 services available ≤ 6:00 min. response time5 @ 90%



3 ALS3 or BLS4 services available ≤ 10:00 min. response time @ 90%

4 ALS3 or BLS4 services available ≤ 15:00 min. response time @ 90%

5 ALS3 or BLS4 services not available, or available > 15:00 min. response time @ 90%

Hospital Emergency Care

0 Primary emergency room ≤10 min. travel time @ 90%; secondary emergency room ≤20 min. travel time @ 90%; trauma center ≤30 min. travel time @ 90%





5 Primary emergency room >25 min. travel time @ 90%; secondary emergency room >45 min. travel time @ 90%; trauma center >60 min. travel time @ 90%


2 Controlled intersection Level of Service (LOS) – Levels A-F describe delay/queue times for traffic through controlled intersections (US Dept. of Transportation)

3 Advanced Life Support (ALS)

4 Basic Life Support (BLS)

5 Response Time – time from receipt of 9-1-1 call to arrival of initial response resource




Table 55—Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria – RESCUE1


Earthquake

0 No known active fault/historical earthquake activity within 100 miles

1 No historical earthquake activity ≥3.0 magnitude within 100 miles in past 20 years




5 Historical earthquake activity >6.0 magnitude within 100 miles in past 20 years

Flood

0 None of risk zone within 500-year floodplain or tsunami inundation zone

1 ≤1% of risk zone within 500-year floodplain or tsunami inundation zone




5 >25% of risk zone within 100-year floodplain or tsunami inundation zone

Explosion / Act of Terrorism

0 No presence of hazardous processes; no likely probability of act of terrorism

1 ≤1% of occupancies use hazardous processes; ≤1% probability of act of terrorism




5 >25% of occupancies use hazardous processes; >25% probability of act of terrorism

Traffic

0 No highway traffic; no seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog

1 Single rural two-lane highway; no seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog

2 Multiple two-lane rural highways; no seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog

3 Single multiple-lane highway; seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog possible

4 Single multiple-lane freeway; seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog possible

5 Multiple 4+ lane freeways; seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog possible

Response Capability

0 Type-I USAR Company or better / Type-1 Swiftwater/Flood S&R Team available ≤30:00 min. @ 90%

1 Type-I USAR Company or better / Type-2 Swiftwater/Flood S&R Team or better available ≤45:00 min. @ 90%

2 Type-2 USAR Company or better / Type-2 Swiftwater/Flood S&R Team or better available ≤60:00 min. @ 90%



5 No Technical Rescue capability / no Swiftwater/Flood S&R capability available or available > 120:00 min. @ 90% 1 Multiple-victim incident requiring multiple resources (e.g. earthquake, explosion, flooding, etc.)




Table 56—Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria – HAZARDOUS MATERIAL RELEASE1


Vulnerable Populations

0 ≤5% of population under age 10 and/or over age 65





5 >40% of population under age 10 and/or over age 65

Hazardous Material Use/Storage

0 ≤1% of occupancies use/store ≤100 lbs./gals. of hazardous materials

1 ≤5% of occupancies use/store ≤500 lbs./gals. of hazardous materials

2 ≤5% of occupancies use/store ≤1,000 lbs./gals. of hazardous materials



5 >10% of occupancies use/store >5,000 lbs./gals. of hazardous materials

Hazardous Material Transportation

0 ≤500 lbs./gals. of hazardous material transported into/through risk zone ≤weekly

1 ≤5,000 lbs./gals. of hazardous material transported into/through risk zone ≤weekly

2 ≤10,000 lbs./gals. of hazardous material transported into/through risk zone daily



5 >250,000 lbs./gals. of hazardous material transported into/through risk zone daily

Response Capability

0 Type-I HazMat Team available ≤ 15:00 min. @ 90%; all response personnel trained to HazMat FRO2 level

1 Type-I HazMat Team available ≤ 30:00 min. @ 90%; all response personnel trained to HazMat FRO2 level

2 Type-II HazMat Team or better available ≤ 30:00 min. @ 90%; all response personnel trained to HazMat FRO2 level

3 Type-II HazMat Team or better available ≤ 45:00 min. @ 90%; ≥75% of response personnel trained to HazMat FRO2 level

4 Type-III HazMat Team or better available ≤ 60:00 min. @ 80%; ≥50% of response personnel trained to HazMat FRO2 level

5 Type-III HazMat Team or better not available, or available > 60:00 min. @ 80%; <50% of response personnel trained to HazMat FRO

2 level

Evacuation Capability

0 Evacuation plan adopted and functionally exercised ≤ every 12 months; multiple EMNS

3 able to effectively notify ≥90% of

residents/businesses ≤15:00 mins.; EMNS tested ≤ every 12 months

1 Evacuation plan adopted and functionally exercised ≤ every 18 months; EMNS

3 able to effectively notify ≥75% of

residents/businesses ≤15:00 mins.; EMNS tested ≤ every 18 months

2 Evacuation plan adopted and evaluated ≤ every 18 months; EMNS

3 able to effectively notify ≥75% of residents/businesses

≤30:00 mins.; EMNS tested ≤ every 24 months

3 Evacuation plan evaluated ≤ every 24 months; EMNS

3 able to effectively notify ≥50% of residents/businesses ≤30:00 mins.;

EMNS tested ≤ every 24 months

4 Evacuation plan not evaluated; EMNS3 unable to effectively notify ≥50% of residents/businesses ≤30:00 mins. and/or not tested

5 No evacuation plan and/or no EMNS available 1 Incident requiring multiple resources and impacting multiple values at risk (e.g. freight/tank truck collision, freight train derailment, earthquake, explosion, weapon of mass destruction, etc.)

2 First Responder Operational (FRO)

3 Emergency Mass Notification System (EMNS)

Menlo Park Fire Protection District2250 East Bidwell St., Ste #100 Folsom, CA 95630 (916) 458-5100...

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Transcript of Menlo Park Fire Protection District2250 East Bidwell St., Ste #100 Folsom, CA 95630 (916) 458-5100...