June f~ý- AUGf7p-p

R-2460-NA

0 June1979

Men and Arms in the Middle East:The Human Factor in Military Modernization

Anthony Pascal, Michael Kennedy and Steven Rosen

with Paul Jabber, Margaret Krahenbuhl, Joseph Large, David Ronfeldt

Ifor ptibhi rel. awoi ; W~.ILA

A Report prep)ared for

DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT,_j OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Rand

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R-2460-NA D D -

June 1979

C

Men and Arms in the Middle East:The Human Factor in Military Modernization

Anthony Pascal, Michael Kennedy and Steven Rosen

with Paul Jabber, Margaret Krahenbuhl, Joseph Large, David Ronfeldt

A Report prepared for

DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT,

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Rand

{i D)I O)R [-ITIII It R• It L ASL; M)I X1 110 I [ON LIN•I I KII Iti)

PREFACE

This report addresses the contributions of'manpower qJuality and managerialcompetence to the effiectiveniess ofrmilitary forces in the Middle East. InI this regionthe human factor plays at critical role in explaining variations in military' effective.ness. The report use, at conceptual framework for analyzing human contributionsaInd firesents factual informtationt organizedf to illuminate trends, -atid improve as-sessilertent of the toilital.y% balance. The rettort, which wits written before the recentuptheavals int I ratt, relies in part on official docutmentation not readily available.

Research focused ott tfte Arab states in thteir confrontattiont with Israel. Thestud i % includled exp~lorations of' militarY modernization in I rant and Turkeyv bothbecause these States-appeared to be potential militar ' %.exemplars for their Arab

a ~neighbors atnd because they figure in other important regiottal balantces. Under the

g ~terots of thle agreetment with tfte sponsor, no explicit investigatiotn of' Israeli otili-L~~ tary developtments wats undertaken. This mesearch wats spottsored by the Director

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w III SUBBABMENyTANT aORyy

Middle East Egypt Iran

Military Assistance Syria TurkeyDeveloping Countries Jordan Culture (Social Sciences)

Military Personnel Saudi Arabia Sociology*Armed Forces (Foreign) Iraq

See Reverse Side

DO 1473 DITIoN OP 1RON II i N F 1NO . oeLDr

T~ BICftITY UNCLASSIFIED14 ..... U_ C-OTS S -F _E ....

1= ASSIFTRI)SECURITY CL$ASFICL ITION OF THIS PAGt(W. Data 9e-

Assesses the contributions of improvement in man-

power and organization quality to military effec-

tiveness of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and

Iraq, plus Iran and Turkey. The Israeli advantage

in past wars stemmed from manpower and management

superiority. The Arab states are changing their

outlooks and are receiving substantial military

training and advice along with imported weapons.

But efforts so far have not overcome the cultural

factors that inhibit modernization. Authoritarian

behavior patterns, rote education methods, and con-

cern for "face" inhibit delegation of authority and

innovative problem-solving. Some countries have

shortages of skilled and trainable workers. Although

there is evidence of a slow closing of the Arab-

Israeli gap in individual level competence, prolif-

eration of untried weapons and molecularization of

the battlefield will probably escalate requirements

in the organizational and managerial qualities af-

fecting fighting units. No gap-closing between Arabs

and Israel is perceptible at that level. Differences

in comparative modernization rates may be more sig-

nificant for other middle Eastern balances. (0T)

CifUNCAIf SS IFIED

SUMMARY

*1 This study assesses the contributions of improvements in the quality of manl--1 power and organization to the minlitary effectiveness otcertainl Arab states-Egypt.

Syria. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and iraq-plus Iran and Tuckey. Military develop-ment in the first group directly affects the future of the Arab-Israeli balance, andthle last two tire interesting both because they may be modernization exemplars fortheit Arab neighbors aml because they figure in other critical Middle East balances.llistoricaltv. thle Israeli advantage has stemmned from its superiority in manpower

and management. It has proven itself more advanced than its adversaries in both

micro-comipetence-thle operation and support of modern weapons-and macro-competence-the organization ofimen and weapions inl the pursuit of military objec-tives. The project reported onl here wats motivated by several factors:

*The apparent impirovement of Arab finrres relative to Israeli forces in 1973may fiave signaled a gradual convergence in competence between the twosides.

*The new wcealsins being introdfuceid into thle region have implications forthe importance of' miicro-conmpetelcev and maicro-rontipetencve thatt differfront tile past.

* atsto mnilitarc' modernization adopted in tton.Arah neighbor statos in)thet Middle East inor hare influenced Arab military policies. ý

This stud til ade not attenlipt to directly assess; progress in) thc Israeli tmilitarye'stablishmntvll

D)ATA SOURCUS

F'or each sta te we exsa IiIItninel crretit and futture su ppllies ofCttI-i Ita availalet t Io thI emiitiary anid sociall and( cultural trendls that influence thle sutpply. Theset ultimnatelydeternutiti the vafstbifit) of military thcsto exploit advanced weapons. Datasources otIt general nusklt-lizat ion trends included published statistical cuntpemldiaonI economoic itid social conditions, theV growvth fotrecasts developed inl a compattionst oily. and interviews with people inl governmentt andl private firms fam11iliar. withhelt Middle Euast scene. We also queried stall at American universities about Arab

studmnts studyIng Ili the United States.We- Investigated Arab ptlortrimance in the 19f73 War tot gain understanding of

lionbunon apial nd a-gmniatio fictns wrk lteoseveeout ontt te fsttlefield.O1pen andt classified literalkltur Was Consulted.

For countries that operate weaplon syaf lvi-, originatling in tile United States, a-vesamuined tite current aftsorption piricess Iin sonite detail. concentrating oni skill tilt(organlizationall factors tlint nay impede watrtimne pertlrniance now attl in tltefutture. Dleriving Coticlivsions its to rates ofi progfress ineceissitiatedilizvosItigittiott off'orci.t-winasbly. training, practice. anld Ininagnetnett. lasts cotnsistedl of interviewswithI kniowledlgeabmle miifitnitr iatii conmtract or officiitla. intelligenice repomrts filedl byobservers. Andi firilmitf Studies licipilceu itt Iol) atti elsewhere.

v

vi

CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

After reviewing various arguments about the relation between broader socio-economic modernization and modernization in the military, we concluded that aneffective fighting fairce, capable of engaging a aophiaticat-ed adversary, ia moatlikely to emerge out of a developing aociety. Only then will the akilla and outlookanecessary to successfully prosecute a modern war be available. We considered, butultimately rejected, the alternative model, which posits the building of a aophis.ticaited military capability in isolation from, or even as a precursor to, generaldevelopment.

To better understand how modernization in the civil and military sectora in-

terrelate we developed it conceptual scheme. Figure S.1 presents a flow chart thatdepics thiapprac. It imoft thnesien teons Utgilizatio th f~e btom. T mis dter

ifft-vtii-eness (Mt ofanov military branch is determined by three faictors: the miiilitaiysituationi (K) faicing the country, the particular wieapions QA, it posseassea, and the

niedb teconhv l nitiirv huincptlrsucs() hc iebroken intothle humanin cmpiitil S~kills (1-I) antIoid igra-iroizt a foirims (1121 tbiitaireavailable. The level of human capital skills anai the efflectiveness of oiganizationiilbrats wcill hi detertoitted hmy o-tihc-Joh traininttg tand soin practice rlmoratmteristies

7 ~~~~ihh. iroiiiiion jirtgruinos !(;, iand the rtoe tmaterial IFt aviailaible to thle imilitaiiysector. The rule of firi-igi assistance INt auoos large here,, iii assisting traintting tindexercise pirograimis. its Well as, dlirectly augmtenting operaitional idomestic personnel.

hue iotima raw tmaterial, or manpower qtuality Mi, available tot thle mtilitary tde-htelids oili three ilictors: the altrartivns ititt'a ofill, nulory (includling powers; toconlscripit 11)), (Ilt-rimtici-iv ompaortlo tiitie ili the civilian scritir lEt, mind the notionalItitii muit resoti ri-i hose (Ci. TheI last is Itiore. fIllIittliutetell ttI shaped fty t- Iin ii Itm ItootItcuii tiul profirotis t li tnd tie litttrsti,, of the utIdVelyimIg l

Iiplilaltioti bust, IAl.

GjENERtAL MIOD)ERNIZATION TRENDS

Saudiii Ariabiia loatds in the region itt econlonttic growth, followied Ity' l1-11(l. TheLothers. particutlarly Egypt. will expterientce muttch less griowthi. For getnerail intielctitoirs of ttttterttizatiiti(e t

i. literacy, t-turbnizatitin. fIttiteI4 lItlttr for-ce ptarticipattion)the ranikinigs tire reversiedl with Egyptt in tilt leiai anti Saudi Arabiia itnly tit thettike-off' point,. Turkey showstiwa) well, sail Iriin wits luit ctlchting upt htefirev therectaltit pheav-al. Eihmcittioittl attainttmient is, htighiest iii Egypt, Jordamn. atmilTurkey,the stiates with the( motst expoisure toi thet Wost: hut the oil expttrtersi ate bieginntingto dev-ote Conidaterable resouri-es toticientific educatitntandtm study aibroatd. The Artibsatesa are intri-steiy lintked li flows tifrapittil 1)-nt tile til-richm to thle oil-pour. andm11 flow iot exahmtriatie liatir ini timt- opposaite tdirectioni. Miiddlle ElAtitermn students enl-.ulheth m itt titmUitedl States tir inicreasinigly shilling tio tchiticuil sutbjects. tutuinmcreatsingly large f~ricitmimn itf' thoul om-igimuitte mml ie mmil couttntries. Undtteveloipedmtechantmicatl aiptitudes tutu] miotivattion pirobhleims tillen immipt-le their pttogress. Stu-int'ms ti-tint E~gyjt. Jordatnt. smit Scrii titre higher cauliber. limt train.\y (thiniot return itothtoir-tittie cotuntries. Egyptt hits tlielutimst impressive itaistiig scismice mird techmnol-ogy hose, ulhiought Iraq timd Saudi Arabhiam htave ambhitious plants. Shortage of pltyti.

vii

A BPopulationn CivilianHuma

B .1 Coi~ase Capdut:Uv ol r o it~ lLl itaili P 'rorams vI i.l

I'tna

Huma Reore

viii

cal facilities and the paucity of middle level technicians constitute thle most seriousproblems throughout the region.

Deovelopment changes outlooks and attitudes, but not fast enough to Preventcultural factors fand political insecuritY) firom exerting a drag onl modernization.Authoritarian behavior piatterns, traditional education methods, and thle concernfor laice" and "clean" occupations all inhibit delegation of 'autho-ity and innova-tive. problem-solving styles.

THE DgETRmINAN'rS OF MILITARY EFFEcriVENE.S.S

We concIlude !fhat tile lnutan faictor dlot's indeed plaY at rritical IOle in thedevelopiment of, militarY efllbetiveness. We examined the current situation WithIrespect to the mlental anil phvsiral VlicarcteriStiC.s ONItropS. thle (Iualities of*leader-Stoil in officers and [Iitital.\. management Structures, and prospects far change.

T'he oil-rich and coni-ContatI ioll States devote thet largest Share of' national re-Asourcesotto li ttary ends. (lifher t in rgs Vitlal1. tIMIMIUls st ates ta te anl advanita1hge inalssemb") ling t a rainale forces. alt Itbough c-iv ilIa ton1 ianlt1 capIi itaI prigratIn., help. Itiodus.t ritilieat ion, tirbleizatin loll, en xposure tot the West sweem ito cordler definite advan.,tagvsý bmi rapid rate-s ot ecolnomic growth severely. constrain miilitary recruitmentandlrtnin Re-gimet instabilitY geneitrates Significant rusts: It inhibits delegatlionil'autilhotit% increase's tile propiensity to assign toil prototew the loyal rallther than

the( VOni~epetn. imld discourages realistic practice. and e-Xercise. Mdeislwcintionweaik-ins i-itt-it cultural pireilispositiitins-- the disdainl fit manual tlabor, litie prefer

car hrrigtf iiearciv.tie fear of itinovationi. tile tenlencv to punish risktiks

-- that ativvrselt atfect Iniilitarc tefitiac vut menvi chiange mire, rapidly hllost it IItI ots: the dev elopiitent of urglitionatuil strutortres ti-aturitig ileltgatiol lt'fauthlsric. smitnlteidtit"Iiorntatioit flows. itdol inetives flilt- lirolier 1wriortinatice

sees o ittlitcriotiistit Standairds intl retention silicie'sobviously affect thequility ii'ltatlie.

force htwl lilt-% art. cotitruttued lv tuiul-lizatiuin tieeis toil brisutfr s-octal etnds.Atilrilitiate assugnonunt ofuritotto function IS only bieginning tot re-ceive attvn*tion TIt. tenletu1cy to issigr tht, lues.t pueople toi tine netwest tnditluoist prestigiousItnnts. tlilt is itc i natI loll tot detnuute tilie ittcoultnitelit. adtoilte rtltuctance, tot tiltticiviliat expert-ise, cediiur. capiaftlitles. tlass barriers to, paurticipatiion ari getuerally

lulling. -1- li si 1 haresrttai tong iti Itiist sltates

Tralincing recelives seriuts attentiottIl ilt tilthe states bitl is luanultiered fuShr sitt.atges of skilled Itnstructors andl niuttuvatuout hiritlent.s aoitttgt ruitteies. For nuttnyfunuctionts it takies (\iv n ires long toi troiti a1 Middlle Ezututecuwi as wvotuld lie itecosary

frnit .\tt-ietati thenruilliy. ist atrt tuttioeraktots flttittiitttiite ttrtlisis Theiiits- itt i-xpait-illt teisonntitI its itnsttrtctttrs expiedites t rainintg. hut theiriitililmittivtt lit kim Supporiit tiles ilt-tirts f~roittiflit- Iitetitiut aituttottiy of the thitr-elitii otIttit For mtaintatinitng Skill leviels uttld Ileiuble responitis clapabilities. reatlisticitracltue ind exeirise, sessionsial.riteirtitd itt seeit dlifficuilt ito ltst ituttittlaliee illthu- Mdltiful Ealst The ittitutlti to %ubfstitutte catpitail fot tlabotr thttouigh "black hits

t-itiive~iith~rtiappihiiitroahes tiuuy sitittlY esrtlute skill ibt-itittis toi htighti- levels.supjl s sv sittIns proiutsit lhiistrtaiiits iititrgoititioitiits itt which tradliitional iiithrtts

of, otiorite auth reuuplotsibihitt citittriutti elliciutut IM--foiirttutct'. Ill thle states liii

ix

which authentic wartime tests of general command and Control Capabilities "reavailable, weaknesses have repeatedly been noted, although there have been sontesigns of progress.

NhT ASSESSMENT

-' As, to the Arab-Israeli balance, we argue that although individual competence�skills, stamina, motival iou-is, rapidlc% improving onl the Aratit side. and may evenho improving relat ive to thlat of the Israelis, the advcancing technology of warfarehas ambiguous impltication., tot the importunier of' Comtpetence to military ouit-Colles, particularly ifire assume that surprise tin initiation of hostilities; is no longer

I'he proltte:-ation of untried weapons, moleculacization of tlic battlefield, andother developmnents, will ticitimbly escalate compe-tence requirements ait the nmacrole'vel-in tile argalnicationlal and managerial itualities aff-cting performlance of'lighting units. Anid it is preriseic ait tien macro level wh-Iere. no significanit closing of'the Arab-Israie gapt is liercepttible. 'liii Arabs. however, ma , conclude that theutidoublted imptlrovements thel, have mnade dto lead to a1 reductionl in tnel disparities.Th Iis Cot Itli l ushI t ItenlIt to f Ivor the Iit wart o pt tilt ll)ýTIie-refi ir' . i t i s unitI k ely) thaInIt therewill be. a recuultittitn in net efitctesagainst Israel oiver the( next ittl years.

With rugord if, otit.1 to alatice. in tihe region. differencese. ill rttipfatrtice tatesof itiitlentooiti nay Ilie lu11cc signifitiant. Irat." fill vxaltlipli. apiwateuireil lere the

recenti tifilteacal to Ilie gainling ini iliiliull ffctvees re-lative it) its Arab nieigh.hior ts dOit irsult of the pirodigious effirts that were underway there.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thle authors owe at debt of* gratitude to the many peoplIe who made importantcontributions to this report. Hand colleagues Marga ret Krahienbuhl. Paul Jabber,anl D~avid Ronfeldt prepared specifir materi that have been adapted and incor-porated. Abrahiam Becker, Cheryl Cook. anl,. Charles Wolf read early drafts aadolflred valuable suggest ions obr improvement. James Hlayes. Mlilton Katnins,Robert haiiser. and Christopher Roach contributed ideas. laid MIichael Rabin atndKatie It, dell assistedl withI research ot, prelimninary study.

Attdrew Marshall, Peter Sletrtbeit. and Jatoes Rochte of'OSI)!NA pirovidedwise c , unst-l and helpful accesks to pli sons and Publicatiotts.

Man.% observers of the Middle Etait scene outside of'Rand and OSI) NA gener-ously agreed to h..- interviewed. P'rotmises of' conlidentialit)y prerlude ar. metntion-Ing niamles tanl tlliliat ion.4 hilt ther inclttde personnel it) the, Departments of' D~etease, State. and thle Treasury asv aeli as in the Central Intelligence Agency attd theNat iona~l Science Fotundait ion. The authors also bettehited greatl lv frnat discussionswith official., in Anlierivan tita~s. utniversities. attd organizations that have ilntper.tantt tIles to thle Middle Vtst

Toill o( these lieople go oar thanks and out apologies lbr all% etrrots attdnitittterpretat ionls thte retport mlay sttll Conttain.

'it

CONTENTS

iiPR EFA C E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. iii

SUM M ARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................... xi

TABLES ................................. xv

1. IINTR DUCTIO .......E ......I.....N......S.... 10

The AelloationshiMnpwe Between Moderniza anonM dMilitary % S fectrs es .. ............... 12

Trinngs od 'arc e th d lg .. . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13

Ormani R sucszf h ationl ........ . ........... 10(Thein All saionst 'ance e Bewe 1iiia6n

MIilita ry Seti ctoirn s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 18

Training andt G atowtl .................. ............... ....... 213Organizat ion att Forms .. . ..or . .. . . .. . . .. ..e. . . 21I'ogrei ss istt tlivettt .... a ... tt......................... .... :16Arb tadttsitar 1e ti hen UtielSae........................ 23.........1

Ecnoitc at rowectht g in.. the.. Ara.. ............................ 27Popultiot n andrtt Labott Ao r b .. ttt............................ 21

Pr ogress tiatnigenIoustEdcatio ............................ 233

Arhsutdttetntts Vail th Ui tdsaes..... ... ......................... 17(jienj atnd Pt vlc log 'athill t............d.... ................. 27NI miiaco Shtring VAmonti Arab........ ........................... ,31

M'o dernui zatt ion........ ......................... ......... 33

IV.NI3 SESETO'Tl MILITARY BODRNZANCEN . 'IN T.......3Autonomou VaibEAST .................................. ... Z1

Military Bamict ....................................... 1

xiv

Time Trends in Modernization ....................... .......... 49Other Factors in the Military Balance ........................... 52C onclusions .................................................... 54

TABLES

1. Comparative Economic Positions of the Arab States, 1975 and1985 ... ........ ........................ ................ 21

12. General Indicators of Population and Labor Force Status in

Selected Middle Eastern Countries. Various Years............... 223. Genera' Indicators of Educational Progress in Selected Middle

Eastern Countries, Various Years .......... .................. 244. Arab Students Attending Selected American Universities and

Technical Schools, l167519177................................. 265. Research and D~evelopment Expentditure itt Selected Countries,

Vasious Years............................ ... .......... 296t. Military Expenditure., in Relation to GNP and Population.

Selected Middle Eastern Countries. 19N78...................... 387. Comparison of Population and MIi litatry Forces for Selected Middle

Eastern Countries, 1978 ................... .......... ...... 39

xv

1. INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVES

The outcome of an ' particular war depends on a host of factors including thedegree of surprise attained by the initiator, the availability of troops and weapons,the skill of leaders. and fortuitous events onl the battlefield and in, world chanceries.In the Arab-Israeli coafrontation especially, the qualities of officers and men weighheavily in the balance. Wars there erupt suddenly end terminate quickly becausestrategic objectives are limited. Both sides own weapons of extreme sophistication.In these circumstances high levels of technical and military competence, adaptabili-ty in thle face of uncertainty, and ability to exploit unforeseen opportunities countfor miuch.

IIli storicalIly, thle Israel is hatve displayed a decidted ad va ntage i n just su ch fielIds.Israel has fielded at citizen army composed of solidly educated, technologicallyadvanced, and highl,% motivated soldiers who fight in) well-integrated military cor-ponents. Their Arab adversaries, however, have assembled forces composed ofinodesily trained conscripts, rigidly organized into tether isolated units. Yet theArabs, particulairly in the latest confrontation, show signs of learning from theirow past mnistakes and from thle successes of'their opponents. Many of the Arabsocieties have enjoyed considlerable economic growth and have experienced thlesort of social change that adds to military potential. With anl overwhelming advan-tage inl numbers and with at clear advantage inl Weapon inventories. a significanitimprovement fur the Arabs in human capital would suggest the eventual dlisappeer-I ance of thle Israeli military edge.

This stude concentrates onl the contr-ibution of advancos in humnan capital andK organlization to thle military effectiveness of Mitddle East forces. flow reel has been

thle improvement iii Inullan and nutanagerial elemlents-what we -all for vonlven-leave, cmilitary miodernization-un thle Ar-all side? thisa it been rapid enough imirelative terl-me tto por-tendi the erosiont or 81.1101s mnilitary super-iority? Whicht of theArabl moilitariesmiltas register-ed the most itopressaive paice? Whatt backgrounmd factorsexplaitnt trendslm it) military mioderniizaitioni? Whait lelsosom haive thle Arabse lea~rnetd orm)ighlt they asorbt in thle future fr-nm tile course of' mnilitary developmetnt inl tilenteighiborinmg Muslimntmations, hIran and Turkey? Flimally, givent Ibrecasts derivablefrom observable events. wnat result lmighit we expect frommi1 future watis ill thleregioti? Such questionls haive miotivatedltihe ploeseit Study.

This report alttelmpts to tratce the recenit history of itilititly mlodhernizatiotn. illits hiutman 11111 manaitgerial dlimensionls, in thile chief Arabtit) tates anld in Turkey iitdItiii 11111 to dra1w couluch is iibout future prospects. The retttaindnr uifthtissectiolldisicusses Ltme relationsiptit betweent gelmeril andl Imilitairy mlodlern~izationt 111) our-resntearc mlethiodology. Sectiotn II 0ffers it conceptuni framilework dlesignedl to ilIus-tiiito morec systonitmiitially thte linteractions of gemneritl denvelopmllent trends inid ape-

riflk mnilitai-y policy decisions ats destermtinmants of' thle ritte of' chainmge itt mtilitam-ycomptletenlce. Int See. Ill we. presentt diitii 01 tie course ofdolveloptment iii thin eco-mmommmic. techniologicial, itid enocia Spheres in time Muslitmi Saltes of' thile Mid~dle Eiast.particularly for Egypt. Syriai, Saudi Ar-abiai, Jordan,. and Iraq. SetLoitn IV sumnmmlia-

2

rizes our attempt to validate our hypotheses as to the correlates ofmilitary modern-ization; and Sec. V provides a preliminary assessment of the military future of theregion and points out important remaining research questions.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MODERNIZATION ANDMILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

Although there are various doctrines concerning the relationship between anation's stage ofdevelopment and its military effectiveness, a search of the litera-ture reveals a plethora of speculation and a paucity of theory. The state of knowl-edge is still so primitive that empirically testable hypotheses are nonexistent.Nevertheless, the arguments can he classified into two basic types: One holds thatdevelopment generally precedes the attainment of an effective fighting force, andthe contrasting view holds that military effectiveness not only leads but that, infact, the stability it provides is a prerequisite to development.

In the first view, change in a society is seen to proceed simultaneously onseveral fronts. The attainment of internal political stability is often the prerequisitebecause leaders can then concentrate attention on issues other than their ownsurvival. Furthermore, without some measure of stability, other elements of soci-ety find it difficult to engage in planning that requires a degree of predictability asto the course of future events. Given control over expansion of consumption, eco-nomic growth may provide the surplus of resources that may be devoted to invest-ments in physical and human capital and in more effective organizational forms.

Modernization brings about the changes in attitudes toward work, innovation,science, the future. personal initiative, and other matters that reinforce furtherdevelopment. A belief in this series of linked and mutually reinforcing streams ofprogress constitutes o0ne explanation of how a country develops itself sufficiently sothat it canm if it chooses, become an effective military power.

As societies develop and change they become more adept at absrbhing, adapt-ing, and exploiting the advanced technologies embedded in contemporary weapons.When one's adversarv is a modern industrial state with a highly skilled ami moti-vated army. the fiailure to field a fotrce of well-led, technically able men oflen hasmeant failure on the battlefielt. Economic and social development, considered inthe broad. generates many of the qualities necessary fol- such a force. Social andcultural attitudes alter with development and become more compatible with themanagement practices modern warfare demands. Mechanical aptitudes evolveamong the populace so that troops cart be trained to operate and support advancedmilitary hardware. Tihus, modernization. it general, seems to underlie the enter-gence of modern military forces, This line of thought fortns our basic approach,

But a converse relationship merits consideration. The military, after ill., cot.pteso with the private sector and with tile civilian bureaueracy 1om- technical exper.tise and mttigerial competence, Rapid rates of growth in civilian sector opportu.nitics may drain away tile talent upon which am modern lbree must depend, And.clearly, tie military also competes for physical resources, domestic and imported,as well as Ibr thie sustained attention of the nation's leauders, Political energy tnd

(o -,c i Ch,, , 2ilxpi, a tdtis p.2l srfo, , Mdiey Pof , r ids I'st,-iiaret, tt t. u tne h, ontL Stiins , Msos., t970ttospoxeisity eli., 2tiand pp. 112-97) fec reviews sf -rietma atlitenmusus sad symilthssis of scurest kmswalsdge.

j .I

commitment are always in short supply. Particularly in countries with a heritageof Levantine bureaucracy, the priorities pursued by the governing regime willaffect the rates of dcvelopment among the various sectors.

Advocates of the second type of doctrine argue that military power, in all butthe most primitive states, may emerge not out of general socioeconomic and cul-tural change but out of a deliberate decision by a committed leadership to developthis sort of prowess as a basis for national development or as a way of maintainingits own power. A further distinctinn is necessary. The leadership may recognizethat a modern military will stimulate general modernization and thus attempt todesign a force that will enhance such side benefits. Alternatively, leaders mayactually prefer a modern army in an otherwise traditional society and thus workto improve but also to isolate the military. Ataturk's efforts in Turkey and KingAbdullah's with the Arab Legion tend to illustrate the two approaches, Althoughit can be granted that a modern military force requires healthy, literate, motivated,and technologically competent personnel with organizational ability and a problem-solving orientation, and that economic development produces such qualities in thepopulace, it nonetheless may prove more efficacious for a country to give secondpriority to general development in its quest for military effectiveness and insteadisolate the military from tile rest of society and simply direct to it the requiredresources.

When highly developed weapons systems and the training necessary for theiroperation can be imported, the link between the indigenous society and its militarysector is further weakened, In fact, general development may even inhibit theinitial attainable rate of growth in military capability by diverting resources, de-stabilizing politics, and channeling energies into private rather than public endeav-ors. ifa tmlodern military force can import weapons and training and can secure themost talented members of'society, and if it is accorded and enjoys high prestige. itmay exist in an otherwise quite backward society.

The military may then become a source of nmodernizing preasure on tile rest ofsociety through the provision ofeducated, trained, and motivated people who havecompleted their military service or through direct civic action (eg., teaching, publichealth, infrastructure projectsi. In olvly case, this second argument holds that themilitary leads atid precedes and is nut primarily the beneficiary of general develop.ment elsewhere in society. These considerations led us to a general concern over

the degree to which the military is isolated 'rom or integrated into time society. Tilelinkage varies over tinte and geography.

Ol1the countries we have studied, soule conlorm more closely to tile first modelIIEgypt is prob-ably the best example) and others adhere more nearly to the second(Saudi Arahbla now, and Turkey in time past). But in no case is tile fit pertect; in theArt-iab.reli dispute tilt tIme participants have accorded high priority to the develop.menl of military power and each liits also enjoyed it general upward movement intechoiical and economic capacity that has bunufited its military force. Generallythen,

Modern military potential is it ftnction of' economic and technologicaldevelopment; both economic and technological development and militaryperlfornmaace are depiendent oil thil existence of appropriato values, atti-tudes, and ways of behavior.

4

" Although the modernization process in each of the countries under studysupports their abilities to wield military power effectively, their large-scale reliance on importation of military technologies, expertise, and train-ing has created a situation of asymmetric development, and there may bea wide gap in the pace and status of modernization between the high-technology military sectors and the rest of society. Therefore, (1) society-wide development indexes do not provide reliable indicators of futuremedium-term military proficiency; (2) to provide this we need not only acomparative analysis of Arab military performance since 1967 but a moreadequate theory of the long run determinants of military power as theyemerge from social and economic change.

" In assessing the quality of manpower in the more advanced sectors, weneed to develop a means of evaluating the extent to which relevant pro-technological values, once downgi-aded in traditional Arab culture, arenow being absorbed.

We have genet-ally tended to adopt the perspective implying that developmentprecedes and is the basis for military competence. We have indeed focused on thepositive aspects of this relationship and have tended to ignore a conceivable nega-tive repercussion--that development and modernization can lead to political insta-bility and thereby reduce ultimate security even though military effectiveness mayhave improved (namely, the current turmoil in hIan). Thus, by and lhage, we haveassumed that stability is a prerequisite to the attainment of military competenceand that development enhances stability.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Selection of Countries

The current international situation, as well as recent history, niade a convinc-ing ease For including certain states. Egypt and Syria have borne the brunt of thefighting against Isriael and their inclusion was automatic. Jordon, as it neighbor ofIsrael. as1a sometime participant in the series of wars, and as ia contenidr for controlofethe West Bank, also merits detailed attention. Although it has played ita modestrole froin a military standpoint, Saudi Arabia's position its yhief financier of theArab ctuse, particularly since 1974, makes its inclusion necessary. It nay alsoparticipate mmch more significantly in Ifture military engaigemlients. l'i-q's growthin oil revenues, its current radical government, and the strong Soviet influeniceargued for inclusion. It has heen less active against Israel than Egypt and Syria intile past but more involved thin Saudi Arabia. For convenience, we call these the"primary" states. Several, suchi as Saudi Arabii amnd Iramq, have demonstratedsignificant rates of ecomnomuic and social development. Others (Egypt. Syria) haveshown appreciable progress in military competence, By means of cross.-countrycomi) parisons we ait tempt to derive implications about the interrelationships ofthesetrends. Beyond the primaries, we had to make hard decisiotns on inclusion ofcountriOiS, partly its it result ofh rsetirech time mnd rs8ource constraints,

Lebanioni's geographic position and the availability ofinlormatioa predisposed

us toward its inclusion. But its history of relative neutrality in time confiontationIJ/

5

and its modest military capabilities led toward exclusion. We therefore did notcollect data directly on Lebanon.

Although oil revenues continue to accumulate in the smaller Persian Gulfstates, given their scant indigenous real resources and remoteness, they are prob-ably more interesting as financiers of military capability in the primary states thanas powers in their own right.

Some of the same arguments made with respect to the Gulf States applied toLibya, although recent history suggests an even more active role as a financier ofconfrontation and as a provocateur ofconflict. Our treatment of Libya and the Gulfstates is restricted to observations on students enrolled in U.S. universities.

The Mahgreb, Saharan, and Sahel nations seem either too remote from theMiddle East conflict or too weak to warrant consideration at this stage. Even thosewith substantial financial resources, such as Algeria, have internal developmentneeds that make a much more active role in the confrontation unlikely in the nearfuture.

Strong reasons argued for- both the inclusion and the exclusion of Iran' andTurkey. They are not Arab states and until recently at least did not maintain ahostile posture toward Israel. Iran's presence in the Persian Gulf does affect themilitary postures of its neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Even more interestingabout Iran and Turkey, however, are the lessons they promise to teach us aboutauspicious and inauspicious paths to military development in their Arab neighbors.The efflorts Iran had until recently undertaken to attain power status in both themilitary and economic spheres actually predate the recent massive escalation in itsoil revenues. And the course Iran followed-buildup of indigenous education andtraining facilities, importation of foreign advisors and teachers, investment in hightechnology industries, procurement of advanced weapon systems with theiraccompanying technicians--may well be emulated in the primary states, whichhave, after all, societies not too dissimilar from the Iranian. Recent events in Iranhowever raise serious questions about the future of the modernization programthere and about the extent to which neighboring states will want to emulate itsexample.

Turkey has a reputation for military prowess demonstrated in actions in Koreaand against the Greeks in Cyprus, and its membership in NATO works to raisestandards of militay perhformance. Turkey also interests us in its potential role asan exemplar fhr the Arabs.

In fact, supporting research revealed that Turkey iand Iran have nol played therole ofexemplars for the Arabs it tny specific fashion, Still, study ofthese neighborstates, particularly li-an proved valuable because they had been in some respectsfurther along time oad it ofmiitaiy modernization the Arabs tire also traveling. Thusthey have not been conscious mentors but may highlight futuie problems andopportunities.

Basle Approach

Our objective has been to assess the future ability of the Arab states to managecomplex mi itary functions (l.g., combat, logistics, training, couminunications) andto exploit tie modehrn teclhnmologies necessary to effective military operations. The

ITisia rutio • its writtin bmofar the rovvolution in lIran that led to this downilml ofthie Shali's regime*.

6

requisite managerial and technological skills emerge from several sources in civil-ian society.

To understand this process, we developed a conceptual model designed to illus-trate how supplies of talent interact with military sector policies and equipment toproduce various degrees of martial prowess, recognizing that the process requiresthe evolution of appropriate administrative structures. The model helped us iden-tify the key points at which the current state ofand future prospects for militaryeffectiveness may be assessed. We used several devices to evaluate the validity ofhypotheses derived from the conceptual model.

We gathered extensive data on modernization trends in the selected states. Ourintention was to assemble information to assess:

. The current supply of talent. The first step involved organizing data onthe level and quality of trained manpower for both leadership and techni-cal positions. Quantitative information was garnered, where possible,froom published statistics, and on quality from area experts. In many cases,we were unable to arrive at numerical estimates of the sources of supply.

. Likely future talent supplies. In the near future, over say the next tenyears, the sources of technicians and managers who could be available tothe society and its military sector constitute the existing "pipeline." Weused information on planned investments in education, in training, and inthe national scientific infrastructure to assess the size and quality dimen-sions of near-future talent pools.

* Sociocultural trends that influence theasupply of talent. Certain socialand cultural aspects ofa particular national society influence the effective.ness of manpower and organization available and underlie prospects intoa future more distant even than the ten years referred to above. Althoughdemographic trends, for instance, would indicate how many people ofappropriate ages will be available froi training, we must also gain insightinto some of the cultural attitudes that govern a society's ability to devoteits human resources to particular uses, In many spheres, traditionalpredispositions may stand in the way of progress, and it is thereforeimportant to gauge the pace of change in certain relevant attitudes.

Tite IblIlowing hypotheses guided us in making this assessment:

A At approach to problem-solving emphasizing rationalism and the scion-tific mtthod rather than fittalism and convention is likely to result inpressures for more rapid change,

* When prestige attaches to technical occupations rather than to the tradi.tionel prolfessions (lty. huttianities, religion), change is likely to occurfttster.

* The propensity to welcome ideas fItom abroad, to overcotne xenophobicrigidity, will fitcilitate developmtent.

S ithe mnintonance of barriers to upward oecupatiotat mobility againstlower status people, women, and fbroigners dittinishes tile talont pool out"of which tratited persontel ta y be recruited.

* Rehlctanco to dlettt t tauttot-ity tad responsibility ty superiors and t btr.-.iulness about displaying initiative atnong subordinutts tire likely to inhib.

it organizational offlectivotttss,

.7

In producing our assessment ofgeneral development, we were concerned with bothindigenous change and foreign contributions, whether the latter were carried onin the primary state le~g.. training of mi litary technicians and of industrial manage-ment counterparts) or abroad le~g., training in military sutaff olleges oc universityschools ofengineeringl. Our primary focus for foreign contributions was the UnitedStates, but we recognize the potential importance of training offered by otherWestern nations, by states in the region itself, and in the Soviet Bloc.

The sources of talent we surveyed include Formal schools (secondary schools.universities, and technical institutes, both civil and military); training programswithin organizations (for example, courses given by military unita, industrial firma,and government agencies); on-the-job training (as in the case of counterpart pro-grams); and thle direct importation of both military and civilian labor.

Tframned labor and skilled management emerging from these sources can beapplied in either msilitary or- civilian sectors at different levels or- for various func-tions within each sector. We were interested in mechanisms used to allocate thetalent. For thle military sector, tdevices include conscription, volunteer systems,mobilization, military academies, and the hiring of civilians for- military tasks. Onlthle civilian side, labor univ be "recycled' hack into uni versi ties laid other foirmal

schoolsand research faicilities to produce succeeding generations of managers andtechnical wcorkers.

Besides the numbers. types, ;and prolicienry of' skilled peOople raicrr-compe.tenrel, a crucial aggregation problecm eludes separate numerical tabulation; the

c~mptene ad elbciveessand initegr-ite rof ogan iaationls or inuiro-coinpetence.Organizational performiance clearly rests on the quality and types 51 stall. But inaddition, thle performance of an organization depends onl how it is structured.F internal incentives, informational access, laid thle like. E~valuating the status andprogress in organizational behavior in the selected Middle E~astern societies lasab)eei t ma ijor task of our itilbrination gaithering sod interviews. Our, research lilsastres~sed the -ecr-uitmtent antI pet-forstanre of lendei-s atal skilled psersonntel on thleune hland, wit It instituttions latid or-ganiza~tiottal infr-astructure onl tile otlier.

'fli ident lict-atla ionif' key psoints in the( conicepittual motdel aio guiidedl our' re-Search oili weaponts systems absort-ilon inl 1 numbeltr of' stites in thle region. Webielie'ved thlit it prolititlil miethod lot iassesitg imillitar potbrl licthttitie lily itn extamti-nationi u sltecific wetipois systettis itttorited by. vatriotus Middle Eastertn coutrtties.We wislal ieic-tls hiwsilitdogitlitoa lictors haveaillbeted weaponsausie. Forit examptlle, ice intquire'd itnto thte cutrrent anod proaspective perfor'miance o1'combaet air latid ait- defenset gystemns in (lie recipient couitrites iand tile degi-ec towhich perfoirtmiance lilts beetn affekcted by- proble'ms its aotert-tor tini taittntentatnceskill livel, uir sitlily ot-gaivutisaiit. We sitlisequetitly dhevelopeid prognioses Ott ellbe'tivettem of lti'se over time its skill levels oi- orgatnitationtal schemies imiptiove.

ForIt tlie- selectedl attiIititriest ann alyte, we stt-essei. isa extittraliles. tile absoirptiotiiil' the F-fi lighter itircritfl atid Ott' Halwk atir defettac systeti. Aitotng the weaponsin tlie( At-it)i inv'eintories, thIese systeita dlemaind high levels ol'itidividittl atr i nira-

compelateince'. 'They ialsti tetnd to rcetvel high priority in manitpower tallocatuiosla id.il

~~~ ~in flett. ace irpicitlly ttsitnttei by volutitevis ranther thatn isonscrilits.t Thus, we felt

8

that the l"-5 and Hawk experience constituted good tests of absorption potential.The ability to effectively operate modern fighters and SAMs would imply a generalability to exploit contemporary weaponry. Aa an added inducement, air supremacyhas proven a critical determinant of the outcomes of wars in the region.

Ground sy' stems such as armor and artillery, which generally impose less rigor-ous demands on micro-competence, also rank lower in terms of manpower supply.A full scale analysis, as opposed to the exemplary analysis pursued in this report,would require the simultaneous examination of 11) the quality distribution in themilitary nmapower penl, (21 the skill demands generated by the entire weaponsinventories, and 131 the mechanism used to a-sign and train people for. variousiFinctions Because study, resources wtere limited, wve concentrated on the air sys-tems.

But relevant military effectiveness requires more than improvements in micro-competence. Orlganizational factors and higher level management quality influencehowv well sy, stems are exploited in fighting war,,. The ability to success fully position,support, and integrate individual units we call mm-ru-comnpetence. And competeniceis ultimiatel 'y meaningful only is relations it) tile compt~encel of the adv'rsarvy. We didattempt In make summatyr judgments, as to progress in Arab macro-comlpetence,(anl similarly fot- Iranll)ml 'ITurkev), but we can uniy speculate onl the(- tate ofadvance in both types of competence for, thle Israelis.

Thus our- studiy is concerned Ibot wimith thw' current inventory of skills aoldorganization capabilities pre'sent in mini soc-iety :loid thle skills and orgoailiationalgtr-uclure" needed fer eiffective utilization of modern weapons systemns. But "need"is, of COar-se, too alrong1 at Word. because (It systemls Call be effertively operated andsupported in maIIIny circumlInstalnces, including those relating to skill aivailability; and(21 deficiencies in somie tc-itical skill Or oi-tanicatiiOial capa~bilitieS may degrade tilt,.weaspon SvStlen pe1-lriforoMae but not necessairily render it ''ineffective'' We thusexia Iine. degr-ees of' performance as they are related to adeqitacy otaskili and orgalti-satio'liii base.

tin addiition. skill level is not a static phe-nomenon but is constantly changing itiasa 'mclilto oft raittimg anid 'pe-lm.*iiiteflet-tive weapons obsorpt ionl has a littlepoileoh Iinvltals thlit we tail to contsider illterternomlral traileolik itt tile ability toellectivily litilize eq.uipinelmt for examplte. limeavy elianice titi foreign conttraict pet'-somitel mIII,% enhantci' pterformianmce tiow tit tile, cost of a trainted. inidigenmous worikfilt-i-v ini the Futuire.,

For each weapons system of' in!tei-est, we askeid flair kint&sti oltteittlols:

1. What skills aitd or-gaizmationial forums tire (or woulid bet used itt the UntitedStates toi oplerate Ile( systelil?

2. Whotitirse tlie iintenttions for operatitng time 8 systeiti ini time, specific coiuntry?Thatt is, if those in conititniud ofeucal-lying out1 the slystoto jilom it ditfferentiinix ait skilledi aid unsakilled labor antid capitail litii perlbrti-miig tilt tasksimecessitrl tom operate indmai nmntalin tilt! systelmi, Whamt is it? Whamt lilt' tile'

iimplicationis 'or thlils pitmim d iiil loi li tilte oci-tiil lixlm-essel tutu proicediuresuiseid iii sutpporin-ig mitd operiatintg thle itystotit giveni Limi resources aivail-

alitle?

tepl'it-'mai ill ilutignlk- i n'ms llll' 11ir matfilary i~ntioirls titvititisly ahirtK the. rimilsiwa natiisi'A

9

3. Hoe has the weapons system operations and support scheme worked outin practice?

4. What are the implications of 3. for the effectiveness of the System as testedin exercises and maneuvers?

In addition, evidence fromt the October War of 1973 provided information onthe efflbcts of various retorms instituted in the Arab forces between that time and1967. Studying the successes and failures in Arab performance during the YomKippur Warl allowed us to derive conclusions about which policy revisions seemedto work and1 which did not.

Data

Thle data used in the course of this study cotnsist of documents an6 reporttspublished by the U.S. government, by Middle East governments, and hy, interna-tonal acgencies and tlte general literature onl the Middle East. Equally' imiportantt

were anl extensive series ot interviews with U.S. governmtent officials (civil andmilitary , v scholars. bUSitiessinen, and educators, till in tltis country.

We combined] itforimation from interviews and writtetn sources to derive jiidg-ments on the current satuis of and fluture hirosptects tot getnertal developmnent in thlestates of~the Middle East, For our ttalahsis of'the 1973 Witr and the pieriod leadingtip to it, we reliedl primarttily ott the open literatttre-.books and articles-written oilthe subject.

We use-d three basic tdata sources for weaptons absorption: interviewsi withpeople directly kitowleduteaitbl atbout the Situaution itt the Country. reptort$ filedl byobservers onl the scetne, attd fortttal reports out the particulaur counttry issued byvauriotus agencies ohf the U.S governmenet, particttlarly the IDefense D)epartmuent.

iBerause wre ptotmistcd coniufdetttiuiit 'v to ti outr initerviewees, mtatny of' the observat.tiotns tire tot dloctumnetted 4cud( thits canntot he doiuble-checked. We lielieve thatt theremliftiing caindor of iur sources wtore thatin comptlensates fin (lhe tuck afdtiruuieutuu.

lion.

11. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZINGTHE DETERMINANTS OF PROGRESS

IN MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

This section olutlines a conceptual framework for analyzing the effectiveness ofweapo~ns system utilization. The framework is based largely on our, studies ofMiddle Eastern countries and imported fighter aircraft and surfnce-to-air-missilesand may suffer fromt some narrowness of experience in that regard.

Figure 1 is at flowc chart that illustrates our, proposed fr-amework. It is mostconvenient to begin at the bottom. The effectiveness (M) of any' particular (groupnfl military unlitisi is determined by three factors: the miilitary situation (K) facingthe country. lthe particular iveapons WL it possesses, and the effectiveness in uitilizo-tinn (J) of these weapons. Utilization effectivenless; is determined by thle mnilitaryItunion capital resources (11 of the countr 'N, which ar!e hroken into the hunioncapital skills (1-11 and managerial (sld organ izational farmns 11-2) that are available,

N The level of humian capital skills antI the effiectiveness of organizational forms willhe dleterminied by on~the~jb training (oTi and ii nit pract ice churtiioteristics (H)i,frait inig prograins (GA till( the rote intteriol (F) available to tlte initary sector,Tile role of' Iirelgnitasaistoiici (N) loots large here itt helping wiht training itudexercise programts ats Wrell ats directly autgmtenting operattional domestic tierstittnel.The liutiait raw material, or manitpower quality I F). available to thle military tie.pends onl three fleitors: thle statuis of flip mnilary, (1)), vivilion sector (1l. attd thelnotional hl non resource' base (C). 'fhel latter isl mtore fuitindaetntally shaped byciti lion litilianl capital programs 013 and the characteristics of' the( utnderlying

We wcill iiow proceed fromi the top of Fig. I dowii. examiniing ittn it Iore dettailedlwray: till hiii we conceptiually detitte lthe ittiportatit vritlvilesi associated with eachbox atid (bi how we tmight etmplirically titnvsire tilie.%, variables andi the nature anidtoignitiude oftlIe cautuIl reOlatioitS dutinog 0l101t1.

HUMAN RUSOU1CLS OF THlE NATION

Boxes A andu 13 relireseilt the twoi factors that determitne thie atitoutit oh itoittatresources iavailabile to thle naitioni. *lThe essetitial ilihlterntic between these two far.toirs is (lie siusceptibility to planntted, ptolicy-indiuced chantge. Bhy Ppuilatitont basle we-itteat exogetnous chatracteristics that cannot bel atflected tWt :Oatit itt the sliiirt tertmtby govertnmeit authorities. These include tile size, alge. oid utrbatn distributtioni ittthe populationi. anid thle sociocultural clinracteristicA of that poipulatitotn that haveat bearitng (li military pterfoirmanutce. Imiiportanit anitotg these are inerluattirtl atndmiathiemiaticail aptitudes; attitudles toward authoiirity, ittualtutl labor. bong hours of'work. atnd the givinig anttd acceptltiice ofcriticisatl of~ol pvir lwttlortiice: orienttationttoward itndividual versua group accomnlishmluent; tout tcceptantce of tiew. terbium)ca.ly advancred ideals.

statue social relationsq tire Ittrticularly importiant: (I1I the ability of Iieohile whoace skilled but inot uvell-coattwrted tgonatelogically or politicallyt to r-ise to Positions

10

,A BPopultionCivilian Human

Base Capital Programns

I CNational

Human Resources

0Attract iveness Civilian Sectorof Military Opportunitins

F2

5-a

or11-

Matrtlufrtilian

Itiurmaii

T1ajnin I C ooii'lua flSeitt I iu tIttti ulu lto itycfuLvt'

IIN

12

of power and effertirel 'v exercise it; (21 attitudes toward participation by women inlthe military' labor force; and (31 attitudes toward less favored ethnic groups orforeigners. To call any of these factors "exogenous" is not to imply that they cannotbe changed to some extent by ronscious government action. However, they arephenomena that we e,'tect to change rather slowly with respert to our time frame

of interest. One mutst certainly be onl the lookout for changes in these factors.Clearly, government programs to Foster economic development will tend, directlyoi- indirertiY. to alter manny attitudes with pre-industrial roots. But sociocuiltural

The ecod deermnan ofte knds flimanresour ces available to a countryis the level antIfetvneso t ivla ua capital programis-basicallyhealth, nutrition. and education. These are discussed in Sec. Ill. The kind ofeduca-tion receiveid dominates iiveriage years of attainment in its importance for produc.ing manipowver valuable to the military. Mathematical, scientific, mechtanical. andforeigii lantiguge training will help in molding individuals whlo canl contribute toat mailers mtilitary force; test memorization and religious training are much lessatppropriiate. lIn our- lhutiuani-rsour~ce-dIeter-minationi dichotonir. these htealt~h andkeducation comnpontents ace the e~ndogenous branch. We mttst evaluate ant only' the

h t ~current health and edtucaitiont levels of the populatioini but also plits for- changingtiet ian evels- thlroughi tmore extensive otr effiective education progritmns, new healthtatni ntitritiiitt nitiatives. etc. Thete will then be tt cottaidem ,ahle tisle ltag btetweetnittprovedhm ttiatn capital efforts and the availability of a store productive labiorforce.

THE AILLOCATIION OF MANPOWER BI~TWEEN CIVILIANAND MILITARY SECTORS

Thei poptlatiitott baseaitd tuitin t'tpitatl progratmts determtine the sizeanduii quttl-ity ofth lit'itoinal laboir force. We titust Pest conseider tow atucfh oft his labor loircethe linii Iat'. is atble to uobtiain. In states lthat ifs tnot utiilize consci'iptiont, ft;ti is

(ilteriniittod by thei relatuve attractiventess of' the civiliani aiti militairy sectolrs intermt; tiflilly. prestige', pre'requiisites; anil opporitunity for tidviicunionet . E'veii coun-tries thfat (tonotit idepenoitlsi volunteers fo)r their mtilitary manitpower sup~ply will fintdthat itoraile, antI pierhaps retenttion, will be ittorer the lower do- liatt ractivetles ofthe itililiiii' Secitor relative to) the ,'i'ilitmt.1 ]Insissy countries roh'the worlid. f(tssharp1 ifistinctioniit between v'iliinteer aid constript 'siteos bireaiks (totin as storeadonlvaageif segmeitns of lie populatiotn exploit viarietati ''iefer'i'ent'' options. lItiiditioni, smilie tusks; in an.% military organizatiton atre. in ileth. restricteif toi ttluit.teecs. [in all% i'ase, contscriptioni policy is it key vai'iable.

(One hias difficutlty disentaingling boxes E totlf I), fitwever', fb'cause of' at leiastthreltsi' nit oii iteract'itlt among theit). First, tile militatry may he vieweil itsiasittrct, of' t 'timing oltecftttticol . fagnigua'. etchl forl liter list- in th fic ivilian sectorc.This eases thilt recrittitinett bttt mttkes mtove soveni the 'etentitont probllemt, Secotnd.

Ani itisla'rutoii uniiiirtoigi-,t .,'S. o i ttl'.ato thiat wn 4, 5 ollst n a Iias','ll it, "'inld is it,,' 11Y1s,,sis.n,or r'' I, t-myte atit' c is,, ,'ol,,il5its cuirrent and, lpni'ct,' i- l'tilirniatl' iswitt obitousilyt oitor

mimlill' ruatditslii the l'tt~ll l o~liti odr s aý,; intheir c~tivj ,,ha'!iltikry clean'. 1'This 011541 mit thun'ralililii,'a wne tsr, mdiasnig is itilcase-h at tin'sl. IMt

13

some military personnel may hold part-time civilian positions. This may detractfromt militaryv performance, but it may be a superior solution for the military thanlosing skilled people altogether. Finally, civilians canl be hired for, many militarytasks.

We were able to unrover very little information on how the Middle Easternmilitaries assign manpower to various military functions. Diagniosis of basic skillsand aptitudes, evaluation of the effects of training, periodic performance review,and management incentives toward appropriate slotting are obviously importantaspects of personnel assignment systems. We attempted to assess the probable

-aqualit 'y of assignment procedures by examining other related military organiza-tional forms, as in training, maintenance, and supply.

TRAINING AND PRACTICE

Once the size and qualit 'y of tie- pool ofinilitary law miaterial has been deter,mined, its usetaitess in militaryN work will be shaped by the nastute of itts trainingprograrms, on-the-job training (OJT). latnd unit pttactice. A critical cottaidoration istite iltarit cation oif' units itt assignment of' high qttality moanpower. rereitt of'traitning, ;and allocation of tttaterial fon- practice antI exercises. It is inao llicient toexattintl t raining pntgralitts otr pract ice schedu les tar it single unit. In factC.c-rtainbraneites of thet armted forces leat-Iicularly, those that Ilse sophisticated. lttestigiots,impotlrted weitpottst ttrolxbyi' get lte he'lst ;s-rsonwe~l ats inputs ittto tr-aining. Olte lestlantd titusI tttastl expettsive) trtinit lg iirlgrutlts. anttd tite mttst ttoraatih tantd thutsIttast expetittei a ,t t pratl-im-- I-lgiials. Ina otr satuiltatr ' attettpts to tevalttate armledtitrce&t etiti-fcttvecss ats a whtole. we btelieve tha~t Itriotitislitiott lts itmportattt itt.llit-at ions fot- thte getter-al ttilitttt- situatitotn.

Whenl~l examtinting individual tri-nting pr-mgt-tllitt, we sotight atnswers ttt fite, fl-iow~ttg questiotts:

1.Whten etu t-r-its pitttred. itow gtood were lhey compasre-d a-it h U.S. recruits?2. Ilid tter htave gottt itotivato untt att ttitude- toward workV3. Did tha-syllabusquu sm-e t ued it) ti larcmrsi ot- tld it ntied toiittl-

catiott?4. Wt-rm criterttt ltot passitg accepmtable It) U.S. sittndards?

.Whtat wet-e tirotlgllltlt watltlat, Hand t'm-ycI lle s Willtm htd ow dlid] thesecotatptitc with plahtttl

6i. Whlent rcr--sits gradutedlt l htow ttIAtihtley be cotniatrv-d wiht . grudu-

(tt t.- Of V.S. t rainlees attd grttduates its tt Suntdt(t tI atatiltimt teals fl-otttthte V.S. torigin at the welltilt~t 511t-Etem we were qtud ittg, asi well tat its rtttteenimmceitt gtvitng ait adttit tetlly tultjictive tnotdssttewhttt ni-buittus ytrirdsicls to tmse atrulsevatrioust soutrces ttf e'oi-ttltiotmt We paitd part-icul-sr tittieltiolt to tlrtrc Nnh~er (is-peT-ts otlIrainnitg lit- tirtst wats thle etfct-e of foreign i-sthlt thanttitdatytiv locatiitonm'ialsliittg, aet well its itttttliratiots of usittg for-eigtt intsti-tlcttrs dires-ily rmmlthýv- thtanmisitg foreigtters Rtra inl toltiest4c cttdr&-s. lIt thIt c'.ilntectiont, proimlects !fortrabinilt

sclaulcen-wre evaltiitued. Secottd, we looketd esperitilly hard tit Lite Utitet trendof' petl-fontmaitcm ill ttraiting grgrti t ks4ing mivideto of'thw 'bot-totn of the 1,411

14

rel' phenomenon, in which the magnitude of the force modernization programexhausts the supply of capable personnel, forcing the use of lees suitable inductees.This kind of evidence conveys an important message for the future, of course.Finally, we took account of intertemporal substitution possibilities to achieve miii-tary readiness, It is possible to move the heat personnel from operational assign-ments to advanced training programs. This has a detrimental effect on currentreadiness, as less; qualified personnel fill in; but it has a salutary effect in futureyears. as the now improved top people regain their positions. Information aboutthese kinds of developments would also aid prognostications.

After formal training, military personnel join their operational units, and a keydeterminant of the readiness of these units is the level and kind of exercises andOJT in which they engage. With respect to OJT. we asked:

I1. What is the quality of entrants into OJT fromt the training programs,evaluated on a U.S. standard"~ (This repeats the last question posed abouttraining programs.)

2. What is the motivation and attitude of OJT participants'?3. :s OJT actuall 'y pursued at scheduled rates?

4 As it is purs ued, is it effective in terms of rs ealisin, discipline, propersupervision. vigorous criticism, and correction of faults?

5. Ifit is ttot effiective, is thtis because of perverse incentive schemes?6. N\s persotnnel protgress thtrough skill levels, what is their actual capability

ranked oil a U.S. secttle'?

F'me a~g,1on. ve- triedl to extttnite differettces itt OJT1 practice and results as experi.

el;,vi umd~'.1 hoth foreign and domestic supervision.('Orrvsponding to OJT' ait tlte individttal level is mtilitary exercise ait tilte ttnit

leipl. 'Iwo kintds of exercises aire itmportant itt ttaitttaittittg reatditness. The fitst isroutitte. day.t-o.dlIv prlctice. whticht keeps skills shtatp. ettstttes thtat equiptment is inlworkiaig urder, and is closely littketd to routtitte taintetatnre. A secrotnl is surge orPerioditc extercise, itwlttcWtichapabilities mtre strained tand actutal cottbat situationstire qulkislattlid,

We exanutited tilte extettt of botlt routitte and surge practice. pitying specialtOtattion to theste lPictors:

it Are ti xrie ~aitcwttrespect to tilte (ttntuil l . electronic) ett viron*-

I). Are the reieit, ncrurtmtely ttotnitoretd, attt vacrevtly reported to appropri.ste aupý vsioes?

v. Are tbwme atdequttte iticentises for thtose responttiblo for- exercises to carryal-en outtm'

d. Ame thlive tlilfwernces in fttreign antt tdottestic 5ttltervisiott schltettte?u. Art esvreisett realistic witht respect to tite tmilitary otwironmntetm-e.g.,

altti -.,Iats?

We aattplt. hilorltattton tit-, tite relatiott etlwoe'n exercise untt true cotmbat perfot'.ieance. ilfre'ýtaim (lXnekiss ttre igntoretd or ittadequattely ltLrfitrtted, itow much dttes,OIN degr. 10 manuhaIt perf'ormaurce? Ot', put tantthler way, Canl tlte tttilitary forces. inti'mt ofyvrisi.,,suddenly adopt tttodes ofotperatiott thtat htave never-, or otnly poorly,hec(I rollteam-0 It' tot, htow Close Ctan thoy get?

15

Operator and Maintenance Skills

We analyzed in particular operators (pilot, fire control officer) and hands-onmaintenance personnel (fault isolation, item cepair-, routine calibration). Our mea-sure of individual skill level is based on comparisons with U.S. personnel in me-chanical aptitude, discipline, initiative, performance under stress, and manualabilities. This measure is necessarily subjective and imprecise, but it is at leastcomparable across different data sources and, because skill is itself imp-ecise andsubjective, avoids the misleading appearance of numerical accuracy.

In evaluating the production of individual skills, we studied four points in thetraining process: entry into the military, end of formal training, progressionthrough OJT. and average skill levels post training. In try' ing to explain the im-provement rates as personnel pass through these points, we concentrated ourinvestigation onl the followving postulated key determinants of the effectiveness ofskill enhancement programs:

1. Student motivation and attitude toward wvo-k.2. Appropriateness of syllabus, especially' with respect to cultural orienta-

tion and initial skill level of stttdents.1. Instructor inrentives for pupil advancement,

4. Domestic vs. foreign location of training.5. tObjectivitc of evaluation.6. Access of' ultimate superiors to accurate inflormation about student

progr-ess.

itt addition to measuring local personnel against U.S. standards, we examinedseveral otiher mevasures that stay shed light onl the situation: (1) compar-ison ofpersonnel with lit os.e ofothier couint riosein the region, 21comltarison ofcuret-ictwithpast personnel, and (3) deptendence onl lot-sign personnel. Our- basic interest is afterall in Ibrecasting fuitutre levels in military efihectiveness and autonomy.

Finall ,y, wve investigated the role of teclmictil change in making certain skillseit her inure or- less impor-tant . As new sNstont;t tire intrtoducetd, these developmentsWill strongly influence what kindis of'manpower constrainits will be most imtportantiii the fuitutre. Ani examnple of' a change dlesigned to ailleviate skill shot-tapes ismodultlar design of' sYstells lettditng tto direct exchainge ("blatck box'' aplprotach) vs.idirect re-patir mnethotds of manttttenatnce. But we recognized thtat bltack box tip-pititchlss titti csail ini esctalating Ih lielentitid for- diagnmostic skills tutu sophtisticatedsupptly systettis thiatt positiotn the black box~es where nteeded.

-' I ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS

This adtequatcy itfirgitnixatlotnil forms for aiccomtplishting niecessiary tasks is Ilieother maijor aspiect of' hutmnan Catpital thttt is relevitnt to military efflectiveness. Thehuitttiit capitatl idevoted to mattnagemtent conmbined with administrattive strtucturesdleterminites or-gtanizatitonal eflectiveness. We loouked sptecifically tit two kitnds ofortgantiztationts: tmatintenantce arra-tngetments tutu suppuly schemes.

By tmtiintenatnce tritine 9st, we mettn the abhility of the system to atdequatelycarr-y ottt routine tmintinteance (schtedtule eqtuipmtent tint aissigii petsonenel correct-ly). ditigiutas itift-etusitlY uittiing pr-oblemns, titd aissign propel- personnel and equip-

16

ment (from stores or cannibalization) to solve them. We sought to investigate threecrucial aspects of maintenance organizations in trying to explain the success orfailure of various units in carrying out their tasks:

1. Location of responsibility, location ofasuthority, and motivation schemesfacing personnel, with special attention to the existence of rewards andsanctions for performance.

2. Relations of superiors to workeis: interpersonal attitudes toward author-ity, discipline, personal criticism, and correction of faults.

3. The actual management skill level of the supervisors themselves, in bothfault diagnosis and personnel administrstion.

Finally, we examined with particular interest the i-ole of foreigners in sustain-ing maintenance effectiveness at current levels. Two metrics of self-sufficiencyseemed important: the year when manning requirements could probably be met outof domestic pei-sonnel (excepit those personnel who by definition are foreign-e.g.,manufacturer's technical representatives) and the length of time operations couldproceed land their time profile of degradation) if foreign personnel were suddenlyto leave the country.

We did a simuilar anal 'ysis ofcertain supply systems. We viewed a supply systemas containing two crucial components: an effective infocmaionos flow system (ft-nmbase to depot and from depot to supplier) indicating what spat-es or expetidables ateneeded: and a iottmogetitet I iticenti Ii i scheme, which enroou-ages htolders of suppliesto release them in it timelyN fashion and demnanders to fot-wtttd tequests so as tomaintain ontlY atppropriate Unit itivetitoties.

Determtinants of the effectiveriess of the information (low system include

at, Its phlysicatl nmaifestation-e.g., hard copy ot- electronic.1). The level of stockpiles tund their dispemsal (overstockitng din compensate

fotr other otrganizational defects tind enhancttes effectiveness).'c. 'l'le htuman capitatl skills atit experietnce. of the indivitduals in chat-ge le~g.,

whethiet those itt charge of nt-deting spatres cotnsider aivetilge lifetimes ofeqtuipmtentt, thereby antticipating fatilure rather- thtan iawaiting it).

In otiti analysis of supple, it, well tts othert aspects of lutniat caitital, we concen-trate oil clittoge nvest titlie, bioth htistotic and prospective, and the curietnt otidfuture role of foreigners in the sy-stemn.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

We tave, totted at severiml Pointts thme role ml foreigners itt stichi activities atsorgatiizinig anl rtunnimng ti-aitnitng and pritctice priogtramis aitt iii directly augieneitingdlotiestic per-sotnnel, Any evaluittt Ool the, cutrient tiid prospective mnilitarmy offer-tiveness of' a tountry intist, of' cout-st, ctonsider Ittw much sutchi effectiveness ismainiltained throughi for-eignt tipport. The flow chart iii Fig. I indicates three iminpol

Thi -fttit relereed is as the "hlmatiing 1imalem tin- lises hse itso steacitind that oIlijily1111i1111JIV sri' iMIdstc'd to heejini~tvtriat rather than release it wtini otilirtmiriate. ptijierting atimit lilac

ptirtle a turoeineoiath tinifotiimry tutmasgoniteot iits~tiouat, tool rewardtkyoslott.

""( I .... *,n,,-, l urodi," " ,"" "n tI o

A$1

17

tant ways in which foreign assistance may be instrumental in determining how wellmilitaries perform. First is use of foreign personnel in organizing and staffingformal training programs. Next is their use in designing, supervising, and enforcingexercise and practice schedules. Finally, foreigners (civilian or military) maydirectly perform military tasks, simply supplementing domestic personnel. Bothinsufficient numbers and inadequate quality of indigenous people can lead to de-pendence on foreigners, assuming the host country can afford to hire the services.

The implications of the presence of foreigners for military effectiveness may bequite complex and was the subject of considerable research. Aside ft-om their obvi-ous beneficial effect in adding human capital skills to the domestic military force,foreign nationals may have detrimental effects. For example, foreign supervisor-teachers may have little incentive to ensure that their trainees-subordinates ad-vance in skill level, because sufficient advancement would imply that the foreignersare not longer needed. Further, host military officers may use the presence offoreigners to avoid making decisions and taking responsibility for mistakes butthereby lose useful command experience.

Critical, too, is the implication for the military autonomy of the country inquestion. Presumably, dependence on a large foreign supervisory and operationalpresence limits the military options the country can realistically exercise, in viewof the consequences of a foreign military pullout. It is for this reason that, asmentioned above, we posed some of our questions about current and prospectivehuman resource levels in terms of how soon reasonable self-sufficiency might bereached, or in terms of how long, and at what level, operations could be maintainedin the face of a foreign pullout. But these are very complex questions, and at leastthree have to be kept in mind:

1. Foreign personnel may participate in front line or support activities.2. Foreigners may originate froom many different countries (heterogeneity

may itself pose problems).3. Many of the foreigners in the region ire manufacturers' technical repre-

sentatives, whose required participation may extend for a very long timeindeed.

The importance ofthe final point merits its further development. Even a coun-try that has reached "self-sufficiency" would still presumably employ technicalrepresentatives, and given the U.S. origin of many of the weapons, most wouldprobably ibut not necessarilyl be U.S. citizens. Thus, a foreign pullout even after"self-sufficiency" could seriously harm military potential for a time. These consider-ations lead naturally to another flaw in the definition of"self-sufficiency." Presuim-ably, at least, some depot repair and much spare part supply will come f!rom theUnited States regardless of the level of self-sufficiency in other spheres. Thus, thethreat ofa service oit resupply embargo will always have some effect and make anysimple notion of self-sufficiency untenable.,'

The size of the foreign presence and the specific role of foreigners are veryimportant in determining ultimate military effectiveness, present and prospective.One must consider the implications of changing, especially reduced, levels of for-

Even here subtstitutes are savilatbl if the main s upplier ci ell ottsupport: lbr exaimiplo, surreptitiousthird party transctions tost use of alternative pritmitry parts atd repair suppliers intuely, Westorn"support ofi Fgyptiii Mi(ts.

......................-----........

18

eign support in evaluating how well weapons might be used in specific futurescenarios; but the issues are sufficiently complex that definitive answers certainlycannot be expected.

MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

The schematic "bottom line" in Fig. 1 argues that ultimate military effective-ness is a function of three things: the military situation facing the country, the sizeand kind of its weapons stock, and the military human capital resources it hasavailable. The human capital resources determine how effectively the weaponsthemselves will be used. Given the military situation, men and arms determine theoutcome.

We did not aspire to build a model of military outcomes. However, we werecontinually aware that the significance of the ability to use weapons effectively isstrongly contingent on the military situation the country expects to face. Here wesimply list those military contingencies that seem most important.

Offensive vs. defensive posture,Surprise vs. pre-planned combat.Limited war of attrition vs. all-out war for territory.Prospect for immediate foreign resupply of expendables.

An example may be useful to explain why it was crucial for us to consider themilitary context in making judgments about weapon effectiveness. Measures ofeffectiveness must include aircraft dispersal, site hardening, and ability to scrambleif surprise attack is expected, but these measures may not be necessary if surpriseattack is not expected. Judgments about effectiveness thus must accommodate thegoals and expectations of the military decisionmakers.

Two kinds of measures of utilization effectiveness are possible--numerical andjudgmental. (For convenience, we will now specialize our discussion to aircraft,Similar considerations, but different acronyms, apply to other kinds of equipment.)

The main numerical measure is the mission capable (MC) rate, formerly calledthe operational ready (OR) rate, The MC rate is the percentage of aircraft that, atany given time, are capable of carrying out their specified mission. Not-mission-capable aircraft are broken down into not-mission-capable-maintenance, NMCM(those needing maintenance work) and not.mission-capable-spares, NMCS (thoseneeding some part).

4

We have been continually warned of the inappropriateness of MC rates asmeasures of effectiveness in weapon use, for two reasons: (1) MC rates are staticand do not express the potential to generate effective sorties in a combat situation;and (2) MC rates may be sustained by refraining from flying aircraft, with obviousimplications for training schedules and experience of both pilots and ground crews.Nonetheless, MC rates (or their equivalent) are currently the common measure ofreadiness, and we have collected what data we could on them. We have attemptedto be sensitive to their limitations and have gathered what other numerical mea.sures we could find as well. These include sortie rates, planned and actual practice

4NMC aircraft are also divided iste these flyable sad these grosnded.

19

use of equipment, and test scores of trainees. Although the information tends to bespotty, it is often enlightening.

By far our most important source of information is informed judgment. Wegenerally asked personnel experienced in the countries in question themselves toevaluate the effectiveness of weapon use. We immediately noted two problems withthis procedure:

1. Answers were seldom precise.2. Answers were colored by the peculiar experiences of the interviewee and

thus necessarily subjective.

We tried to overcome the second problem by interviewing many people, bothcivilian and military, both high and low ranking, and both with in-country experi-ence primarily and mainly observing from the United States. Comparing anwersacross these categories was often in itself illuminating.

The first problem is, of course, more difficult. We sought to sharpen answers byasking for hypothetical intercountry combat comparisons or "if Country X andCountir Y fought a certain kind of battle with certain specific, identical equipment,who would win? By how much?") or for simple rankings of countries ("Rank thesecountries according to their ability to utilize a specific weapons system," recogniz-ing that "utilize" implies a specific kind of mission.) We also asked for judgmentsabout combat outcomes. Another technique was to ask for evaluation against abackground oea specific military scenario l"IfCountry X attacked Country Y, eachwith its own peculiar equipment, what would the outcome be? flow will this changein future years?"). We found those kinds of questions fruitful in eliciting commentsabout skill levels and organizational adequacy. Interviewees rarely otherwisevolunteered comprehensive evaluations.

The reader should recognize judgmental evidence about military effectivenessfor what it is: opinions of informed people about future events. We feel, however,that such information has increased our ability to understand and project the roleof human capital in the military situation in the Middle East.

The reader must use his own judgment on the usefuilnes of this approach, ofcourse. But given the inherently nebulous and non-quantifiable nature of suchnotions as skill, organization, and effectiveness, this judgitmental evidence may inthe end te the most appropriate of all.

1

III. INDICATORS OF SOCIOECONOMICMODERNIZATION

Our definition of general modernization hews fairly closely to the standardones. We examine growth in physical output, changes in population and labor force,investment in human capital, and the attitudinal changes these various phenomenaimply-' The objective of these efforts has been to gain a better understanding of thenature of change in the three key societal characteristics: (1) the pool of technicaltalent available in the society, (2) the supply of skilled managerial personnel, and13) the ability of the society to develop and sustain the institutional infrastructurenecessary to solve problems in administration, production, and, finally, security.Without technical capacities, skilled management, and effective organizations thedevelopment process will not proceed rapidly. But it is also true that as develop-ment proceeds, technology, management, and administration improve together.

There are more pragmatic reasons for concentrating on these particular con-comitants of development. Most observers agree that in past confrontations withIsraeli forces, the Arab deficiencies have been precisely in the realms of manage-ment and organizational effectiveness and in technical capabilities, although lessin 1973 than in earlier wars.' Substantial disparities between the two sides havebeen apparent in their abilities to marshal military resources, execute actions-particularly in fluid battlefield situations--and exploit and maintain complex mod-oern equipment.

In some cases we have been able to develop quantitative measures of develop-ment-e.g., educational trends, production of engineers and scientists, industrialperformance. For many other variables of interest we have been obliged to blendopinion, judgment, and indirect evidence into more subjective evalmations of therate of progress.

The themes treated in this section appeared to us to be the critical elementsnecessary to ain assessment of general mobilization trends and prospects. That is,economic growth and transfers front other states provide the wherewithal tofinance military undertakings, and the size and quality of the manpower poollargely determiine how well physical resources will be exploited. Quality dependson investments in domestic and foreign education and oit immaigration and emigra-tion. Scientific endeavors reflect how much a country hlte developed a "pro-technol-ogy" outlook. Finally, time cultural milieu, as tmirrored in endemic attitudes, influ-ences how well various factors amny be conibined to produce desired outcomes. Thespace devoted to each theme does not reflect our conviction as to its relativeimportance hut rather tIhe degree to which the findings are based on our ownresearch compared with generally available information.

iWe alsoii, i lori' the hiiring at Ai'sarri, 11115mg sito' aroti .ifiltlis.Anaily•is ol'l ist waie litie, also identii ieill inlirtiimlt dillere 'lcs ill thii, will toi tight bleiweeii the' two

aijis. trlis dil~i llte hllilat il i le hi iirm'wit•sii ovrt lhit, and is eiven nil 'vi I l hsiad e lai n t il Otherqultllitivi, we have livenq digrsria•tig. Motivationali probleiml1 areo tiol| o*up|hilgiTzei[ Ill this re~port.

20

" I

21

ECONOMIC GROWTH

Table 1 indicates projections of rates of growth in the principal Arab states asderived by Smithies in a companion study.' The figures portray the dominance ofthe Saudi economy in both current and prospective wealth. In per capita terms itexceeds its nearest rival, Iraq, by more than 4 to 1 and Egypt, easily the mostpopulous, by about 20 to 1. Iraqi wealth and growth prospects also appear impres-sive. Syrian development looks rapid but the base is low. The very small relativesize of Jordan's economy comes through clearly.

Table 1a COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC POSITIONS OF THE ARAB STATES, 1975 AND 1985

(Constant 1975 dollars)

GDPGOp' Non-sit GDP Per Capita Accumulations Population

(billions) (billions) (thousands) (billions) (millios)a

Country 1975 1985 1975 sass sa75 sa8s 1975 1985 1975 1985

Saudi Arabia 38.0 61.1 5.6 15.2 6.1 7.3 56 79.121 6.2 8.4

Egypt 12.4 21.4 .3 .4 37.1 47,6Syria 4.7 9.0 .6 _q5 7.4 9,9Jodents *9 1.7 .5 .56 2.0 2.7Iraq 13~ 22.5 5.3 10.8 1.2 1.6 4 26-42 11.1 14.9

SOURtCE: IMF lulerst joust Statistics; IBRD Worltd Taibles..a1985 GOP figures for the oiltrich sassurer export income increaaing at 3.5 percent annasaty.bopul~atiei, figures sassume 1975 populationa incrarses at 3,0 percent annustly with the exception

- . of Egypt, which is sasaumed to increase at 2.6 percest. Population figures are unreliable because of the-! I difficulty at deatintg with mrigrants is both years.

POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE

Ttable 2 pt-esents, detmogtraphic inldicators developed to portray thle natture anddynamnics of population antd labor forces for the Middle East states alnd permitscomparisotns ttmong them. Egypt, the mnset populous, nnd Jot-dan, the least popo.lous of tlte At-sb sttates, demonstrate certain Sitnilarities: for example, itn urbanize-lion pt-sport-ions anti hettltht indicators. They both rank fair-ly high its adult litertacyatid femrale la~bor fot-ce pttrticipation. Althtough among the msost Westernized of thestates. they bothltatck sufficientt inter-nal resources fot- rapid growth. Staudi Arabiaand Ir-aq begtan from a lower base; tlte flood of oil revenues occurred too latte foi-results to appetar in available published statistics. Syria occupies at middle grouttdin boiji Westerntiztations and export wealtht, but we believe thstt tlte available sitatis-tics for- Sytia are the least reliable of atty of tlte states, given what we htave beenablel to leartt atbout thsat country from othter evidence.

'Arthur Sisithies, IThe Rmnour,ui Potential of the Arah (asutries.,rh RlIanda C'orporatisn, Rt.2250.NA October 1578. Na sapacate rueoatrch wita commttissiuoned at growth tretulo far Iran attd Tarhey.

22

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23

Turkey and Iran shared many characteristics, although Turkey scores higherin literacY and female labor forre participation and lower in urbanization; thestatistics indicate a coming convergence.' Generally', they appear, to rank with theleading Arab states on most indicators.

PROGRESS IN INDIGENOUS EDUCATION

Syria. according to published figures at least, enrolls thle largest fraction of theage-eligible population at the first twvo educational levels laceeTable 3). Statistics forJordan and Turkey are also impressive. Egypt seems, to do at middling job at theprimiarY level and relatively much better at thle secondary. ats does Iran. Thle Saudifigues ae thle least impressive. hut significant changes may well fhave occurredthere since 197:3. At the university and institute level, the Egyptian.s stand out. TheJordanian andi, to at lesser extent. Iranian third level figures ate low because somany of their a ifdents studY abroad.

Irtaql and 'lurkey tppear to make thme greatest efflbrt in education, devoting sonmc211 percetnt orthft governmietnt budget. 'lhe Egyptian, Iraniati, ,nt Syrtiatm ftrictionsrankonext , and the Jlordanians and Smudis aplteatr to mnake thle samallest effort.

In priorities, tlii iitdicatoms show that Iran especlimllY and then Stria, Iraq. amidSaudfi Arabia pilace tile greatest sttess ott scietnce ;aid etngineeritng. Egypt ttmtt-Jordan lag ratther markedly.%

The figures oilt fr-actions of st udetmt astudintvmg abroadm atie mflerted appreciabilylby tie availability'% of uttlquame facilities at homae. TImel tcontrast bet weten S tb amidIraq itt this regard, becatuse they mave similar inmdigetnous etducatiotnal imifraslruc.totes,. is thits illumminmating.

Itt nonte oft he Arab States lilts putblic editcatiott broken fret' oft line cottventiottalIslatmtic miode of, list 'oct totn. Th~e apptroachl to edutrat iotn itt thme Middtle East st ressesboth t radit ionalt mmhjemt mnttater-m'eligiom. Imiqmoryv, Korantic limw.-.mmd Itte-tttotel-tttetdtgogy. itt wlmichtatthmoritam'iatm teachers ttse milmmemmor'izationm, unith sticit tlmemi'

etice to cottvey at fited crrtmmulmmmmm. ChIaniges ate mtmtterwa.v, Itit refiormit i's slow.Ilttts,bald stilt stirs lilt educat ionatl attaitimient ptt'ttlYlll Coct eatil atppteciable quality (till'ereimits lietweeni N Im It'l Easterim ImithIIl Westerut atudem Its it sit 1vI I subjiects its sciettce.mitt hmemitinmis, attu forteignm litiguages.

ARAB STUDENTS IN THEI UNITIED ST'ATE.S

'lhe nmbmitler of' Arab stutdents 9tudimmvng abrmotud lis shot kill thttmmtiatically isinice1901)I. Untit Wil nuf int' that)tt 40I prcen(tt ol'Ihteti wet'totI Egyptmitnd eAtuitti lv~eslem'imllY 'rolt sYtilla ttd lordati tim tA-bittott with Itabout Ill petrcenth tot tsr Artih stattes.0f' thosie stutdyinig outisidec time MIiddle Etast, thie shill hits bteet i 'ort Ettiope Kat tIanid West towardtitlme Utnitedl Slates atra taway f'tottt ails. utruttilutthic-. ittd socmiamlciecutem towatrtd etnginteeritng. ltatnt tcictices. attd educattttiti

We stttveved U'.S. lustittutiucut t httt etnrolledu ututiver~itiy stuttenuts tattd techtnicalspecithisits trintinttg loir various 11umpects 01' auitlitte opertuitons. Wt, chose intstitutionts

24

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that enrolled substantial numbers of Amons but varied significantly in selectivity.The national origin of the students. instruction level (graduate and undergraduate),and field of study are cross-tabulated in Table 4. The dominunce of the Saudis andof engineering and education as fields are striking ebatures. So is the unexpectedly

low numlber of Iraqi students, given that country's wealth, although there may belarge numbers of Iraqtis studying in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Conmparing our- data with figures fromt 1973-1974 supplied hy the Institute forInternational Education, we find evidence of a substantial shift in the origins andfields of studY For Atrab students attending American educational institutions since1973. The great increnact in oil revenues has petrmitted exporter states to send manymote. and it has incresed the demand for trained manpower inl development effor-tsin these same states.

Certain Chiaracteristics and( tactors, were foundl to influence the performnanceantd behavior of Arab students onl American campuses. The Arab student generallycompletes his degree programn although the process may be time-consuming le~g.,changing majors. changing schtools. repeating subjectsl. evidencing at strong com-mnitossot to the credential. A degree f*root an American institution. alnmost regard.less of the field, is regarded as it ticket to high status ait homne.

IDiflfenrt-es occur hYrcountrY in 11w proportion of Arab students who eventuallyreturn homek ailer completion oftlivir degree: Ettyptians. Jordanian-. Scriatta. andl'velaneseV have tended to stay in the Coaited Slates after rompleting their vd,:valion.latt increaingiijly t(he boomoing crunollnlies ill the Persian Gunf attrart' snly. More.over. student.fonItm these. countries have (ended ito he sell'support ing and thuswithout Contractual obligation., to return home. BY contrast, students root SaudiArabia. Kuwait. the tGulf states, L~ibya, and Iraq increasinlgly route undler govern-onent1 sponIsorship anti HOW nearly always return to their honte countries whereconl attic: Condit ions assure high pay utold high statust.

Certainl tttctos seem ito itttluentet the chances that the Anti)student will ticevetdin hm ois acadic endeavors: aigt, marital Antko,. opplortunity ito visit homte. andschool 0vot-ed, ( unerollY speaking, older. otttrrie-d men. accomipantied bty sltttttm5.whot)thie opportunities ito visit homeit anottailly; teal tol make beitter sttitents.espe-CmallY iftl theV have alreVadc. bad work rxpt'rienct, and have at litirly ri crate ide-a oflthet skills t lwc wish ito gain front thteir ' 1;. atcademlic experience. Selective instatl-tiats tlitt have not attra~tu-d sit tnany Arab studenits its to provide insulated envicontocots vomti to otftr thle btest ttiliett for gtood Iterlrtlttotre.

iTte youngzer stidntttt. single. with voigue rarver gtoals andl no tvotlittg esperi-*ttct,. otld 'Vltt is itlten itntttutt re ttt thte Contest of itt owtt culttire onym illesuir itoutt

ttte-ltctat Atitriat irituitttiota. liIt, tendls to ltick cittotitowtet attd perss'ver-

eltce. Ison-ritit invotlved itt legal anid otlier difficulties. iatd courts iluito strotngly toArteric~at cutltture. sotit-titties it the farmi ofsprAttrciia io t ileis, himl-gmnigo. antd bethavior.

The, tctttltpitur tillicttltits ettctuitineretl by Aritl sttttentst etmerge tiuostiy uth tof

alt crit taIntin Ito knotwletdge andt k-artitiutg thati hats vt-cc- difteretit cools fromn theAttericanm aptprtotch. Itt 191l11i. llioltl0W~gt. isl givent ty Allah, ,ttd tile letchiing mytth-ttl tiskl int relitgiouts schooils litvi' beeni aptiioid by sectuttir schtoitls Its inell. Knowl-

4 ~~~~edge-I to tii Rentertdt regardedl as ti itrtttltt oh Ititotit reason attd thus stubjec-t toexpatsintait d itill itttrhtrottiottt rithier it is gilt i otte vapiti. -Aa iiti witht which oneis -ailortlw& , Couit& ..- Ii effect relatiinaltipt; are nolt stressed. Mentairization intdintitittioti arte prlimatry letirning nitetodmi

26 ,

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Moreover, because memorization is a literal technique, knowledge acquired inthis way is difficult to transfer to new, unfamiliar situations. In this approach tolearning, powers of analysis and generalization go undeveloped. The technique ofmemorization limits flexibility and adaptability of learning. Individual creativityis downplayed. In teats of vocabulary, Arabs do well; in tests based on analogies,they score low. The strong Arab sense of shamne may also make them somewhattimid and unadventurous as students. Fear of being wrong, of losing face, willinhibit the Arab from going beyond the conventional bounds of the subject understudy. Originality and initiative are not highly regarded.

Arab students' academic behavior also reflects an emphasis on group or collec.-tive accomnplishment, as opposed to the American norm, individual achievement.tOne of the consequence, af this value system is the high teported incidence ofcheating among Arabs at American institutions. To refuse to help a compatriot is

thought dishonorable.Arabs also tentd to be goal-oriented rather than lprocess-oriented. Thle attain-

ment ol an Amnerican university degree is considered at desirable objective, leadingto improved social status aad financial condition. However. tile process of educationthat must he tptrsued to earn the degree is underemphasized. Thus, many Arabstudents arrive. piroud aad confident, extpecting to advance quickly to their goalonce selected for foreign study, Thley% often face a severe shock onl discovering that

ofth dereeand110 tie mthos ued ll btanin itthat seemts most impiortanot.Undvelpedmecanial ptiude% serntocharacterize Al-al)students gener-

allY alhouh tis hare wi; iademos frquetlyabout students front the

the typical Amierican, Eturopean. or Japanlea high school. I owever., mnost observersregard this, il liculty as largely remediable with adequtiat traintitg and espoattre toequtipmetut. Instilling teail excellencte in thet researcht laboratory, Itowe-ver, nay htaveto await at highe'r qutality itdigenotus ecient.c educatiott systeml antd more fr-equentteXposure to HItterlIittical aIp~arai us While tile students tire growintg tilt.

Atab stuileats htave bpent characterized tse shitewd, politicttlly aetuto to thettuatt1Ves Of htumtan behavior hut nonrICIatiV and attlaOtttttalytirttl ill thoughti Ililt)Ces.ses. Face-to-lace asstociationst are highly valued; oltltrttttilities for Verbtal cotn.fi-otttat ott, especialliy otl t a gcottp basis, are etgerly wolcotttetl H owever-. writtentwork that requires aolitttde atnd individttal eflirit tends to be shttttted. All itt till, theArtil sttudetnts studlyittg iii tilt- United Statet r-eflect thle cttlttute and esperitince oft11e suCiltett frtottt whitch tho Itcctme. We httve chtosen to sitremet aretis ol weaktteasrat itec thbant etretgth hecittise thle lbi-mer latter reveal Lthe ttoblulettsitl ftlte Variotussociet-ieS ilt detalitng Wiht tilt' Itiodrn WotrId tantd with t avery Ittodurit adeertiory.

SCIENCE AND) TECHINOL.OGY IN THE ARAB WORLDWe otffer til abbtreviateid dictwiss-itta oftscietuce tttd techtttlogicatl tdevelopments

itt the Mithdle Eaýst ittt bectui usew believe thatt till Mattleit however u~tl mlustt

-~ .'~ .~.'~J ... .'e .

28

engage in basic research but because we believe that serious attention to thesematters reflects a commitment to modernization and the aggressive absorption ofadvanced technology.

Aside from Egypt, whose situation differs by orders of magnitude, the Arabstates evidence only the very early stages in development ofa scientific and techno-logical infrastructure. In some countries, an awareness of the importance of scienceand technology is only now dawning. Although bodies to plan and coordinate scien-tific efforts may have existed on paper for over a decade, in most cases these didnot really become active until the 1970s-and after 1973 as a rule. In the absenceof any planning or goal-setting, universities have conducted most of the research,which has often been poorly financed, with inadequate equipment, poor library orother documentstional support, and murky priorities.

Applied research has been too expensive even for governments to support inmany of the countries (e.g., Jordan, Syria). Government-sponsored efforts havemostly dealt with practical matters-water resources, agriculture, climate. Basicresearch has been mostly abjured as an activity whose ultimate product can bepurchased more cheaply through imports of industrial technology.

Frequently, sreports note that even more than qualified scientific and engineer-ing personnel, the Arab states lack trained technicians to support research appli-cation efforts. Causes lie in the poor pay and low status accorded these jobs and inthe absence of scientific elements in the conditioning culture such as popularscience magazines scientific toys and games, and opportunities for youngsters tobe exposed to mechanical apparatus. Av'esion to manual work may also inhibit thedevelopment of technician training institutions, of which only Egypt has significantnuntbers.

The scientific and technological enterprise in these states is affected by lowfinancial rewards, poou chances for advatcement, low social status, heavy adminis-trative burdens, and isolation from tlte world of science. Language barriers play arole uts do the paucity of publications in Arabic. For these reasons, a large fi-action,perhaps 10-20 percent, of Arabs who go abroad for technical and scientific trainingfail to return home, either remaining in the host countiy or relocating in oil-richArab states where pay and lacilities tre better.

Blecause of their determination to replace expatriate technicians with nativesat the earliest possible time. the oil exporter states have now begun to stress scienceand technical education in universities. However, the availability of technicallytraittblt manpower, given the still primitive quality vof primary and secondaryeducation. severely limits the speed at which this goal can be accomplished. SaudiArabia and Iraq in particular, where preuniversity education is rather rudimien.tary. tire stressing basic edtucttiotltl progralns that will support science expattsionOnly ill the long trtui.

industry outside ofpetroleutitl hls pliyed it tiitintuil role ill sponsoring R&l) ilthe Atil state-., except in Egypt. A surprisingly sinall percentage of the avaihlbleintitve scientists titnd etngineers actually eotduct research or work oti developmentprobletts. It go-ernment, industry, and thie military, technically trained peoplequickly btecome tianagers and mouse htbre long to le techiticall.

Table 5 provides it Comparative pictute ott the basits ofavailthle data. Egypt'sisizthle cotittitttient to R&D is reveoled by thie high fraittion of' the labor force

involved nul by tile 0li pIercent of GNP it devotes. The long history of traditecotntectionts with thil, West astd tarly ttotr-gent'co of tittilnufhcturitg (leg.. ini cotton

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textiles) probably explain the Egyptian lead. Although Iraq demonstrated only amiddling level of commitment by 1974, it has announced a new dedication toscientific development and has the resources to support its goal, including a fairly

Slarge population to draw from. Jordan is also making a determined effort in scienceand technology but is severely limited by a small economy and meager population.Figures on R&D expenditures are not available for Saudi Arabia or Syria. Saudispending for R&D will probably approach the Iraqi pattern, given the expressedconcern by Saudi officials and the large numbers of Saudi engineering studentsbeing sent abroad for training.

As to the future, Saudi Arabia and Iraq will probably begin to move upward,given their resources and stated commitments, although they have a long way togo in building infrastructure and achieving the cultural attitudes favorable toscientific endeavors. Egypt possesses the basis for a science-oriented society butlacks the physical resources for much future progress. Syria and Jordan appear toosmall and too poor for any appreciable improvement in the foreseeable future.

The countries of the Middle East, particularly those belonging to the "ArabNation," pursue development according to individual conditions and priorities butalso interact significantly with one another. Not only is there a degree of coordina-tion-varying over time--in the foreign policies of the individual states, but theyare linked by complex flows of resources across national boundaries. We exploresome of these transactions below.

RESOURCE SHARING AMONG ARAB STATES

The capital to finance the social and economic modernization we have hypothe-sized to be a precursor to military effectiveness comes in the Arab world froom onesource, oil. Countries lacking their own export supplies depend on brother nationsfor assistance. Another sort of interstate dependency grows out of labor shortagesand is remedied in part by labor exchanges among the Arab countries. The adequa-cy of the capital and labor flows is, in part, a function of the nature of inter-Arabpolitics.

"Capital moves from the petroleum exporter states, Saudi Arabia, the Gulfstates, Iraq, and Libya, to those with lesser natural endowments. Labor of all skilllevels moves froom "surplus" areas such as Egypt, the West Bank, and North Arabiato places where oil is fueling an indigenous economic boom. The state of tension,the prospects for true development, and the compatibility of leaders in tile recipientstates will all influence the future generosity of Arab donors and their hospitalityto expatriate workers.

Capital

Of critical significance to the fl-ont.line economies will be the willingness of theoil-rich states to furnish large-scale assistance. The heavy spending of the 1973-1976period-including the waging of the 1973 War-would have been infeasible withoutSaudi and Kuwaiti financial aid. Future aid levels will depend to some extent onthe availability of surplus ftinds but even more on the interests, intentions, andfears of the surplus states.

31

The record since 1973, when oil prices started their steep ascent and largemoney reserves began accumulating in oil-producers' state coffers, exhibits severalcharacteristics worthy of note. Reliable statistics on aid flows have been extremelydifficult to assemble except in the most tentative fashion:

* Egypt has received the lion's share of Arab aid since 1973, some 80 per-cent, with Syria getting some 15 percent and Jordan 5 percent. Aid seemsto be about evenly divided between direct military purposes and generalbudgetary and economic developmental assistance.

SAlthough aid pledges have been substantial, actual disbursements havelagged far behind. Transfers show no dramatic increases commensuratewith increases in the monetary reserves ofthe oil-rich countries (with theprobable exception of Kuwait). In fact, the percentage of Saudi GNP dis-bursed as aid to Arab states went down from 4.3 percent during 1968-1972to 3.4 percent in 1974. (After the oil price increase of 1974, of course,higher absoiute levels of Saudi aid will require smaller fractions of GNP.Global figures for Saudi aid since 1974 have not been available.)

. Much of the aid actually disbursed has been in the form of loans, notgrants, and on terms that are not very liberal (e.g., they often bear a 5percent interest rate and are repayable in seven to ten years).

. Aid suppliers have tied most of their assistance to specific projects andrequire rather strict fiscal accounting of how their money is being spent.Saudis, in particular, are concerned about the honesty and efficiency ofthebureaucracies in the recipient states. Only in 1977 did they allow theirloans to Egypt to go to direct budget support, and that as a result of the,January 1977 riots and concern over the survival of Sadat's regime.

, The Saudis have been the main providers of outright grants for weaponsprocurement, with Egypt as the principal beneficiary. Here again, therecipient has little control over the funds themselves and little flexibilityin their allocation, as the equipment is largely being purchased directly bythe Saudis. However, there is soine indication that the donors have ahigher regard for the competence and integrity of military recipients.

* The two big spurts in aid since the O)ctober 1973 war-grrnts for recovery-from war damages and restocking of military equipment in Egypt and

I Syria in the immediate aftermath of the war, and the $2 billion in loansto Egypt in February through May 1977-were direct responses to excep-tional political circumstances. The first was a contribution to the wiar effortagainst Israel, The large 1977 commitments by the oil exporters helpedsalvage the domestic position ofa regime more tolerable to the conserva-tive states than the likely alternatives,

What emerges is a picture of careful, tightly controlled, parsimonious aid by thenil-rich states primarily aimed at stabilization of politically congenial regimes anddutiful participation in the anti-Israel struggle, and up to now only incidentallyrelated to or occasioned by econontic distress in the firont-line states. If a compre-hensive Arab-Israeli settletnent materializes, aid fer military purposes may declinevery quickly. However, given the long-ter- economic pr-oblemls afftecting Egypt andthe benefits to be derived from having a friendly, moderate government at tile helmin politically radical Syria, aid levels ire not likely to be reduced much over the

-------------------------

32

next decade. Less congenial regimes in Syria and Egypt would almost certainly findthe Saudis more grudging.

Should the Middle East conflict continue unresolved, aid levels from all sourcesshould be expected to rise somewhat as the confrontation heated up again, with thebulk of the increase coming from Saudi Arabia for military purposes. It should notbe surprising to see Saudi aid figures double to over $4 billion per year if a slidetoward a potential fifth war were to begin.

To sum up, the poor, front-line states can expect aid levels firom the Arab oilproducers to be affected by the future course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A settle-ment will be reflected in a shift of assistance to the development sector. IncreasedArab-Israeli tensions may produce an increase in aid but a shift of the bulk of ittoward the military sector.

Traditionally, the flows of private capital ran from Kuwait to Iraq and fromSaudi Arabia to Syria, but the takeovers of those countries by socialist govern-ments have inhibited new investments. At the same time, private Gulf investmentsin Lebanon and Jordan have dropped off as a result of recent civil wars in thosetwo states. As for Egypt, Gulf investors tend to feel that the "French" bureaucraticstyle in that country is an obstacle to business. They also complain that "one cannottelephone Cairo" because of the deterioration of the telecommunications systemthere.

To the extent capital availability influences military power, the prospects arethat increased wealth will build up in the exporter states but that the front-linecountries will receive appreciably more only if tensions escalate dramatically. Ac-cording to this argument, Iraq and Saudi Arabia will flourish, but Egypt, Syria, andJordan will do no more than hold their own.

Migrant Labor and Brain Drain

Labor exchanges among the Arab nations constitute the other side of the coin.Perhaps 2.5 million Arabs worked in countries other than their own even as earlyas 1970. As many as 1.5 million Egyptians-technicians, artisans, truck drivers,physicians, nurses, school teachers-work in Libya and to a lesser extent in SaudiArabia and the Gulf states. Up to 250,000 Palestinians ale employed throughoutthe Peninsula, as are Lebanese. The oil exporting economies are increasingly de-pendent on imported labor, although such a situation is a cause for some anxiety.There have been reports of labor unrest at Jubail in Saudi Arabia and at the Qatarsteel works. Many of the smaller Gulf states now have a majority of expatriatteworker,. The continuation of high wages in oil producing states and the need forremittances (Egypt currently derives about $400 million pe' year finoa this sourcelin the laboi exporting countries suggest a continuing flow, or at least make repa-triation unilikely. But the problem of"brain drain" in Syria, Egypt find Jordan, andthe labor importers' fears of being overwhelmed (responsible in plart for the increas.ing encouragemenit to temporary East Asian workers), ma' yet result in inter-Arab

agreements to control and regulate the labor flows.The existing arrangements covering migrant workers tire mostly bilateral and

primar'ih deal with skilled and proles'ional workers. Thus, teachers, trainers',doctors, nurses, etc, are provided from those Arab counitries that can supply them.Other less formal systems of iainpowor transfers, bttsed iiiostly on personial recruit-

I-El'

33

ment and application, go on between Arab states as well. This is particularly trueof construction workers and laborers.

In addition, of course, many Arab emigrants leave the Middle East for WesternEurope and North America. Engineers, physicians, and businessmen-particularlyfrom Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon-flocked to the United States during the 1960sand early 1970s. The brain drain out ofthe Arab world seems to have moderatedsomewhat as opportunities have opened in the oil producing states and as govern-ments have become more concerned to ensure that students sent abroad for studywill return.

Supplies of skilled labor constitute critical inputs in the development process.All of the countries we have studied, except for Egypt, exhibit serious shortages inkey skills. In Syria and Jordan the problem grows worse as labor continues toemigrate. In Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, the increasing proportion of expatriatelabor causes the rulers to feel insecure and to consider limiting the numbers,thereby inhibiting their growth potential. Iraq, which seems to have decided to livelargely within its own domestic labor means, finds itself unable to progress in manyareas. Only Egypt has adequate supplies, at least on paper. But the quality ofEgypt's labor, its allocation among sectors (especially industry vs. bureaucracy),and the increasing tendency for the best to leave imply manpower problems evenin this "population surplus" economy. The shortages will more and more requiregovernment to choose between releasing skill supplies to the hungry civilian econ-omy and continuing to hoard them in the military.

ATTITUDINAL AND CULTURAL TRAITS THAT IMPINGE ONMODERNIZATION PROSPECTS

Although the Middle East states under study vary substantially in the degreeof modernization they have already attained, certain cultural attributes have im-portant implications for current and future military competence. Any attempt atpolicy manipulation must contend with longstan ling attitudinal predispositions.Religion, education, social organization, the state of economic development, andhistory combine to produce a set ofattitudes that inhibit the emergence of technicalsophistication in troops and modern management practices in military leadership.Rather than attempt to characterize the cultural position of each country on theSbasis of the traditional-lslamic versus the Western-industrial, we will discuss a setof amdal attributes of tile Middle East outlook, identifying the traits and attitudes

/ relevant to military competence.

'The description of culture and attitudes presented here emerged out of myriadconversations with American civilian and military people who have had sustainedfamiliarity with the Middle East. We noted a remarkable consistency in opinion onthe vestiges of cultural barriers to modernization. Impressions of our respondentscame from field experience and not fiom exposure to the standard academic analy.tses of the regional personality such as tlatai's Arab Mind' or Berque's The Arabs.,Each respondent cited numerous anecdotes to support the contentions made, Still,

S Scribow's. Nt York, 197i ."Ell Praeger. New York. 1964.

34

cultural generalizations are fraught with subjectivism and, particularly becauseour informants were Westerners, may include significant traces of ethnocentrismas well. We present this material because it seems to represent a fair consensusamong knowledgeable and experienced observers, but we recognize regretfullythat it may strike some readers as verging on stereotype.

Muslim religion stresses the unquestionable authority of scripture as revealedin the Koran, the unadulterated expression of God's word, transmitted through hisprophet Mohammad. The teachings apply to political, social, and economic rela-tions as well as to metaphysical matters. The resulting conformity, fatalism, andauthoritarianism contrast with the emphasis accorded individualism and self-determination in, say, American or Australian society. Acceptance, obedience, andloyalty figure prominently. Although such traits are valuable in instilling disci-pline, they may work against the flexible and adaptive behavior required to suc-cessfully prosecute the sorts of military engagements likely in the region, especiallyin opposition to Israel.

The education system, still incompletely secularized at the preuniversity level,reinforces these culturally instilled habits and perspectives. Rote memorizationcontinues to dominate learning; problem-solving through generalization, trial-and-error techniques, and reasoning by analogy are exceptions to the rule. Religion,language, and culture (rather than mathematics, science, and social studies) remainthe emphasis in primary schools and, in many states, even in secondary schools.

Low per capita incomes and lags in economic development mean that childrengrow up with little exposure to the mechanical artifacts of society. In well-to-dofamilies where these appurtenances of industrial society may be common, theingrained disdain for manual labor may militate against the development of ine-chanical aptitudes.

Prejudice against hands-on activities has other negative consequences. Because

clerical, mercantile, and administrative functions command higher prestige in Mus-lim societies, even those who have received technical training-engineers, chem-ists, journeymen mechanics-seek departure from the field, the lab, or the shop tobecome managers. The shortage of middle-level managers in developing economiesaccelerates the drain. The result is often a waste of much of the investment inherentin the training.

The inertia that emerges out of these underlying religious and educationaltraditions finds reinforcement in another aspect of Middle East culture. The impor-tance of "face" and the associated use of shame as a negative sanction worksagainst the adoption of unconventional methods. Outcomes that aime unfortunateare regarded as personal failures, whereas in other cultural contexts they wouldbe regarded as risks worth taking in the deliberate search for novel solutions. Insocieties that use guilt, it demonstration of worthy motivation may excusu lack ofsuccess; in those that use shaiiie, often associated with a favoring of ends overmeans, almost nothing can justify ii mistake.

The authoritamrian element in Muslim society further predisposes caution.Lenders' decisions go unchallenged simply because they occupy elevated positionsin the hierarchy. The social distance between superiors and subordinates makes the

for-mr distrusttlil and contemptuous toward initiative in the lower ranks. Al-though i sHome Middle East states, women, minorities, and even fbreigners have

begun to enjoy greater access to positions of respoisibility, chauvinism also contiii-use to exact its toll by wasting talent.

iI

35

Finally, the political instability of governing regimes inhibits sharing of author-ity. Power independently exercised may be regarded as an invigorating influencein many nations, but in many others it is threatening to existing regimes. The Arabcountries being among the latter, the leadership tends to hoard power: Aristocraticvestiges may have waned, but political loyalty often replaces birth as a criterionfor assignment and promotion. The ascriptive system is thus replaced by one basedon fidelity rather than merit. A leader appoints the most faithfil candidate whofrequently has ties to the same family, town, or sect as the governing group.

In short, fear of failure, authoritarian attitudes, and political instability allcontribute to organizational systems in which vast numbers of decisions are rou-tinely bucked up to scant numbers of top leaders. As a result, decisionmakers lackthe information required to identify and select what, by Western standards, wouldbe the logically sensible options; and so matly decisions are imposed on so fewdecisionmakers that responses are delayed. To economize energy and expediteaction, elaborate but brittle plans define "solutions" to problems. These plans arefunctional only so long as the external world behaves according to a fixed script;against a resourceful adversary or even recalcitrant nature, strict adherence to theblueprint may lead to failure and defeat. Resourcefulness in military behavior isstressed in precisely those units-the Palestinian terrorist-commando outfits-thatare not tied to established and therefore centralized governmental authority.

Most observers remark a withering away of the attitudes and outlooks thatimpede modernization as a result of the very process of modernization itself. Asurbanization and industrialization take hold, fear of experiment, xenophobia, fatal-ism, social rigidity, and disdain for the manual appear more and more dysfunction-al. Violations of tradition-in expression or behavior-provoke weaker social sanec-tions and finally become the new norm.

Individual attitudes alter more rapidly than do a culture's characteristic orga-nizational forms. A society will begin to produce individuals who can solve technicalproblems, for example, before it evolves the organizations necessary to accommo-date and reward such talents. The evolution of the organizations requires thepurposive coalescing of like-minded people, socially a much more difficult task thanproviding education or even inculcating new attitudes. Thus, the appearance ofadlministrative structures that automatically and impersonally define problems, laynut alternative solutions, test options for feasibility, schedule the put-suit of theadopted strategy, and reward participants on the basis of results may substantiallylag the availtbility of cottpetencies in the populace.

The attempt to duplicate organizational forms that appeatt successful itt ad-mired fotreign contexts nmy [it times actually constitute an impediment to truemanagerial eftlbctivenes. Thie Arab penchant for elaborate and intricately pre-lspecified Iplas of action may lead to sactifice of flexibility tt( sponttineity. The key,

it appears, lies int sullicient ctnfidettce by the leadership in both the loytlty andiCapability of subordinates tIat the atppropriate delegation of authratity tty takeplace. Given thit trust at the top, plant mnnagers, ollice chlielo, and field command-

ers will grtow acctstnted to making the responsible but imaaginative decisions•! required ill fluid ,itulationls.Oil net, we gee ill the Middle East at group of societiest undergoing change.

4 Outlooks and tltitudes characteristic of the preindustrial sttge linger otn and coil.tittuo to ttffect It h pace offtodetttitton Itut itre itndeed fadinglottg with develop-

36

ment. Change at the individual level outstrips reform at the organizational level.But the recognition of weaknesses and the experience of 30 years of intermittentwarfare will inevitably speed the process ofadaptation in the military forces. It isto specifically military developments that we turn next.

iI

IV. MILITARY MODERNIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

As we have seen above, a host of factors come together with the human vari-ables to influence the effectiveness with which a given society will exploit itsmilitary forces. The nature of the threat, the strategic objectives, the weaponsavailable, terrain, and climate of course form the background against which thehuman factor is played out. And, for purposes of analysis, the human factor re-quires subdivision into the mental and physical characteristics of troops, qualitiesof leadership in officers, and organizational structures appropriate to the accom-plishment of military missions. Some of the human factors are amenable to changethrough policy decisions, others are largely autonomous in their gradual evolution.We aim to provide an abbreviated summary of findings as to tihe directions ofchange in a list of what we have come to see as the critical variables. This synopsisconstitutes our attempt at assessment of the various hypotheses introduced earlierin the report.

AUTONOMOUS VARIABLES

Population size confers obvious advantages. The determinants of the size of therequired military force are largely exogenous and stem from the strategic situationfacing the country. Other things equal, populous countries can more easily find thetrainable manpower required in their military forces, assuming a fairly equaldistribution of native abilities in each country. Civilian human capital programs-nutrition, health, education, training-will naturally enhance the effective supply.

In this connection, we explore here some national indicators of military effortin relation to each economy and labor force, The states of the region vary apprecia-bly in commitment of national resources toward security ends. As shown in Table6 it is generally the oil-rich states-Saudi Arabia and lran-and the confrontationstates-Egypt. Jordan, and Syria-that devote large fractions of their nationalproducts; none, however, comes close to Israel's commitment. Iraq, so far, lagsconsiderably in the fraction of GNP absorbed by the military, asdoes Turkey, whichhas neither the excess budgetary resources nor tie immediate security problem.

A somewhat different picture emerges from tile per capita statistics. WealthySaudi Arabia, to ia lesser extent Iran, and beleagured Israel stand out. Populousstates such as Egypt and particularly Turkey score low, The requirements ofcon.frontation for Syria laid Jordan and a favorable ratio betwoen foreign exchangeand population for Iraq tend to push them to the intermediate rank.

Table 6 indicates relationships between national populations and the size of thevarious military forces. By and large, the bigger the fraction absorbed by tilemilitary. the more intense will be the competition between tihe sectors. Clearly,however, low levels of demand for raw unskilled labor it) the domestic econlomy (itsin Turkey) will reduce the social cost of mass conscription. Moreover, the averagelevel of skill il the population afilbets tile results of the competition, In it sense then,Israel, where skills are highest, may be more capable of bearing tile enormousburden of her military than Saudi Arabia, whose burden is small but whose skill

37

38

Table 6MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN RELATION TO GNP AND POPULATION

IN SELECTED MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES, 1978

Military Expenditures Military Expenditures Military ExpendituresCountry (milliona/dollurn) as a Percent of GNP Per Capita (dollarsaa

Egypt 2.8 21 70Iran 9.9 14 280Iraq 1.7 11 136Jordan 0.3 23 100Saudi Arabia 9.6 17 1215Syria 1.1 17 151Turkey 1.7 4 39Israel 3.3 30 892

SOURCE: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Baulance, 1978-1979. These figures appeared to us mrore reliable than those presented by tbe U.S. Arms Controland Disarmament Agency in Wlorld Military E.vpendilarea and Aerna Transfers 1967-1976.They are, for exarmple. much closer so figures reported in classifiedl intelligence sources.

a Bused on CIA population estimates, Nulionul Basaic Intelligence Factbools. 1978.

level in tslso low. Egypt, It-tn,atnd Turkey employ consitderably smialler fractionts oftheir labor forces to meet military needs.

The sadvantages of a large population base in relaition to the size of'tle armtedforces are illustrated by Table 7. For till of the populous States-Egypt, Iran, andTurkey-the military tbsborbs about 6 percent of Ile relevant population and about10) percent of the poptulation "fit" for- service. These are also the states, tasidle fromtIsrael, where the lurnled forces glrcoulster thle least relative tlificulty in Ilmeetin~g

skill needs. Sauldi Arabia a~ttempts 11o more than the ''Big ThreeC" tin percenltagetermss. but the backwatrdness of her popu~lation makes it stubstantially more, difficultto secure anl efl'ertie mlilitlary. Jordlan an~d Iraq alppear' 10t too dissimilar ill lspira-tien and Syria seem11 to try the hardest of 1111 exclusive oflsrilel. By dedulction. whlatwe havec discoveretd abotut skill shlortages in Jordlan-that, for- examll~pe. Sulpplies ofreadilv trtiinabhle trie1 are s00o1 exhaustetl-may aplply as well 10 Iraq allt evenlmlore pronountcetdly to Syria. Israel plays ill all enltirely lifllbrellt league, ill torrus

* I ~ofpoptllatioll skill levels s0o11ha1 even if it dlevotes the highlest fractiton 01falan1poscelto its mnilitalry forces, it is able to tit~tlill thle mlost iln ll6Celllt' mlilita~ry collipetellce.Nonethleless. tile cost of'thle Stanting arml~y ill econlomic product florgolla is boundi

to be hoasiy thlere, tit Suggested il 'T'able 6.

widen Lthe opitionl fo' bild~intig mitlitalry potwor. Not on~ly dlo phyicaitll resources fonrmlilitarly alggranizlitemenlt bacomle m110W avaIihlablei but tile enltry~ into technologicalCulture Usually propulrieB tile citizenlry for palrtic'ipaltionI ill cotllective undtertaikings

ill whlichlitI mtodernl outlook conlfens great adveanltages. Although it is undioubftedllytrue thatt tile senlse of collective purpoise (notably Lthe Israeli concernl withl natlionllisurvivall ellhanrert ffl'ectiveness, it is also thle caise thalt wsri are hais chlanged SUdratlnatifally thatt thle goerllri conlcomlitants ofurball indlustrial ellistente-thle abili-ty to work ill organizetd tenims with1 adtvancedl etquip~llt'nt--outiseigl tile marl-ttialfyuseful tqualities gener-ated ill nomadlic 0o'i-orral soy~ieties.-lierce loysiltilss. IWIsoiialbraver-y.

39

0

4 0

40t

0 u at

40

In out review of comparative rates of national military modernization, therelative positions of Egypt and Iran on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia arid Syriaon the other, seem quite informative. Noting that each pair contains both rich andpoor states, the former have demonstrated a superior capacity to translate ele-ments of msodernity front the economic sphere into the military. The choice madeby Saudi Arabia and Syria, modernization of societies through the military vehicle,may have costs in strictly militai-'v terms. Turkey represents an interesting case in)point. The Turkishs attempt to modernize its social structure through militaryservice appears to have degraded military effectiveness. To buildsa modern militaryin at traditional society may be a good development strategy; it is unlikely to winwars against at thoroughly modern opponent.

Gliven contenmporary sources for technology and advanced economic organiza-tion, modernization will probably be accompanied by increased exposure to the

is ~West, Whens the Western influence extends into the military, to the supply of armsand the training ofnmen, it seems to confet- an additional advantage. The case ofJordan is illustrative. Jordan's small size and vulnerable strategic situation haveaffected its abilitY to aswing substantial weight in past Arab-Israeli engagements.But Israelis, almost unanimiously' , rank Jordanians as man-for-man their moatdangerous opponents lin the air and onl the ground. Most attribute the Jor-danianedge to their long association with the British as military advisoirs and trainers. Thecontrast between thle results of the Britilsh influence' in Jordan and thle Sovietinfluence in Egypt tpre- 19731 pirovides, further confirmation of thet thesis.

Urlsan industrial societies genevrally have highser levels of per capita income fin-the nsass of the population. For armies, gen-ral affluence conthra its adeartagesthrough thle Ishysical stamnina anif mental competence of the troops. Amonig thecountries we hsave examined, diflet-entials itsstaisdards of living tire tsoft fit-pesentver-y gi-eat. Impr-essive statistics onl per capita lnouet in tfte sil-richtstates ruisk tinextremne inaliistribution oflen chiaracterist ic of the earle atioes of econlomic dlevil-opulent wfhen affluence hilts iot yet trickled (town tot the masses.

But tates of econoamic growth do differ utfifrevi-ibifsl across ftie selected courtt-tries. lhose withs expanding ecumnoilies find it increasingly dlifficult to attract ittitretain neededf talents in the militate sectior attainst tfhe enticement of high wagesand tipport-tuilities flit adlvanscemnent in civilian life. !m-ot smit Saudimi Arabia tireexampifles. But ev-en in tlte slmiw-growthf ati nos-gi-wtwhi evoi-mmotiies, cmismpetitiott hrpesocninel enters thbroughm tile lute tif ettlfit-itiot. IHundrledsa of, ithousandis ti ymtiiigEgyfptianis, Jordianiamns.intl Syrian,; %mirk it thme (billslates atim Lifbya where oilexport pi-oceedsfa iel at cotinttinitgr Ociaonttic hotlttst.i

Stabitl regimises Call Wield miilitiary powier timice effctively, tnot biecause they

necessaily ha-ftve supem-ior suppshie tif ituitats Capitiltl btut hiertitse they Callm miffocu toorganizse pseople mor ofiinl \tr eue enlough to attempt lit) delegate jiautfhority- to its ti't afmppropriahte les-el, haitslg less 6-111. that indepenentt~iit nutclei of'puower a-ill i hieutten tilie exist iigm tructure. D~elegatlimit apeticar mo hit! it prt'reifuigitt

to time etitthlishilietst of' flexibile mmi ihadapt ive Commmmandmitrfeuctuires.Over mind its-et s-e were struck bthis le criticial cimitribuimtiontitihmctt ihc

hecisiisonmiikitig to tme succesahif im posecutofnit of war ini mttll regiomn. Thie 19173 Wamr,onl limthi thme Sinai amit Goilan fro-ts.i illustrae ittflowiss hmcpei-memttrtiized imilitary Colo.imisimms mmil thme Arahtsithe fotundit difihficutlt fit) respimmnm fto inantificipiaied uppod itillit tealtimd thireiitms: I'fie Syr-iasti ignoured ii possible otfpportunmify to madvanmce hmeyond Othi

41

Golan Heights and into the Galilee Valley in the first few days of the campaign; theEgyptian canal crossing achieved such surprise as to make possible the occupationof the Mitla Pass and Abu Rudeis but the opportunity was not pursued; it tookinordiniate time for- the Egyptian high command to react to the Israeli counterat-

tack onl the west bank of the Suez. Anecdotal evidence as to the superiority ofEgyptian field commanders relative to the Syrians leads us to surmise that aportion of the edge in organizational adaptability displayed by the Egyptian mill-Wary (compared with the Sy' rian) may be attributable to the regime stability factor.

Somec have argued that the fear of insurrection directly affects training prac-tires as wcell. Without live ammunition and combined force operations, the realismof exercises is much reduced and the preparation of the forres thereby diminished.But fearful leaderships seem reluctant to disperse the resources and to permit thelateral cooperation necessary' to organize these sorts of exercises. The superiorinternal security situation in Egypt, compared, say, with that in Syria and Iraq,should in (lays to come begin to translate into better training and then greaterpotential battlefield responsiveness.

Regime insecurit ' has additional implications. Where loyaltyi to the existinggovernment is an issue, the leadership will naturally stress faithfulness rather thancompetence in making assignment and promotion decisions. The Jordanians regu-larly favor Bedouins over Palestinians. the most educated and progressive compo-sient of' thle population, in sensitive military appoinntments, Evidence of thle loyaltycriterion is talso seen in the doaminance of Alawites in key' Syrian command positionsan tI a scoring of leaders, orginating in the town ofTikrit in the Iraqi forces. As anexample of' the consiequences, many Observers allege at sharply negative relationbetween tank and capabilit 'y in the SYrian officer corps. although they perceive nosucht pat tern amttotg tin Egyptians. Whethter thle hight quatlity junior officers Oh-servedt in tile Syrian forces in !9t73 wcill bi, ertmt'tittedl to advatnce up) tlte ranks ttnd,it' so., whtether they will then be coopted tadteiml ligttedt by thle reigiling establisht.tinent relittintin tot be seenl.

Must votttttetttators agree that atsitde frotm tilt- loyalty test," barriers to ad,vaettttetnett btased ott et htmicity orl social statuts htave recemksd itt till of' tlte Atabsotcieties tsA dettifncratie attd plurttlist ic ideais gttitt ttcceptatmce. Perhtapstailt' Cletiresttitd ttlot costIcy-ial etliciency terttlsi-n t ite rettaining barriers affeact wotmtetn.lttttt iritltrly in thet mstot ttttditional societies sutcht its Statti Artbiatt. Ecent with tilesevere ltabor shortages illtit.th Kingdtatt, aottwn httrdly participalte inl tilt' civilitttevtmttltt. let tIone. illtit, mteilittaty bices. Jttrdttn, trio, atnd Egyptt hatve ntutcl ttorereatdily accettted wtittett ill clerical tatnd teviltuiciil ptositiotts. evett itt thte toilitaty,amlthoghitail strotng rettetienl by tradtitiontal olementis is ttlready apptatretnt.

Tlhe tttilitalrY, tincnursle, ttust rotnpetei witht thte civiltitt ecnitttmty lot' tile soicie.tv'sY" avtailable tttlentt. Ciceltitlte le-Vt.l of electivnetts itt Contscriptiott policy. tltehtigther thet pre'stige tttd tilie tmore attractive tilt cotnditiotts tin' the tmilitatry calling,tile etisier teit- ttaintmtetnt ot iattnltowet' gottls. 1\trkey. where tilt- watrrior trtidictionreigttstitd tilt, mnilititec (itreer Coilfers 11igh jttesige, meets its ttttitthtuweroubjectivestmotst stticessli11 illvaong the countlries sutrvyoed. ('otmecript qutotas tire etasily nettoo because tilt livittg standitrhi andtile t~etmbmrtiomt mind truimmitmg oppotmrtuntitiesComttpttme favottably wiht clyiliati liII''. MIilitatry ctivm-r htave' lower rlt"itive piettigelitt Saudi Artlibit titd macrt, lower still iii irnt.with obtvious tnegaitive itmplicationts forreicruitntlimmt ini those coutntries.

42

In the course of our study, we found that commentators consistently reflectedon the cultural characteristics that affiect the trainability and performance of Mid-dle Easterners. These cultural characteristics appear to suffuse the entire weaponssbsorptien and military modernization process, and we summarize comments onsome of these traits here.

These characteristics plus an accompanying disregard for tools and measuresdiscussed in previous sections mainly affiect maintenance operations, as in Iran,where maintenance is regarded assa dirty word. Iraniasn tend to perform quite wellat "clean" electronics work.

In Saudi Arabia a reinforcing belief holds that contractors have been hired todo the dirty work, but Jordan and Egypt, owing to their different cultural back-grounds and more vocationally oriented educational systems, do not hold that beliefto nearly the same extent. In the Middle East las in much of the rest of the world)piloting airplanes is regarded as respectable, but driving tanks is dirty. Therefore.higher status people are attracted to the air forces.

Progress towarJ a more Functional work ethic comes in fits and starts when theproper incentives are instituted. After exposure to U.S. military training, Iranianand Saudi students generally show that they call develop mechanical aptitudes andperform adequately, but they sometimies irelapse upon return to operational assign-

ments. The Turkish experience suggests migrant workers who return fromt West-ern Eui-ope may olten absoib and subsequently use more efficient business prac-tices. They mnay also create new demands for- better public education and vocational

training in thle home countr-y. Turkish invo~vement in NATO may have had similareffects in the specifically military sphere, as a result of sonic standardization intraining practices, the participation iii joint exercises. exposure to high standardsof perlbri-ance, etc.

Knowledge acquisition comes through drill, not analysis. Rote learniing leads tomnastery ot'routine tasks but does not develop thle ability to see causte-elfect andendill-niiiens relationshipli. This outlook suffices for systems in which operation andmaintenance is bused cii repetitive steps, uts in the TOW aunti'tank system. Butinein1ori-Aing set proiceduires (lees iiot iiistill flexibility iuni ingenuity or- the aibilityto ad~just to unuluueseell conutinugencies. Onie wonilers whether the Airais, 1oi exauni-lple, have iibsor'bed the imnplicautiioni of inistaukes miade in thle tOctobei' War to tli.extent thiit Isruielit; have leia'ned 1)-cm their owui weaknes~ses,

Iii Miiddle Dutterum cultures, responsiility teiids toi be treated us a shaured sociiilphienoiieiioni riathier thiin ins; saomthing pertainiiiig strictly to the individuial. Coii-cepts olriglit iind wrong dopeiiu lessoii iiidiviiduiil dIeterminiiation aiii muire on whatis devinled might Oi- wi-ang by the woild surr-oundiing thlt individual-produchiugpeople wmo tire sensiltive stud subiject to public shanime but lbel it lesser seimue oifplirsomiiul guilt.

Ammawering to im-citity fau iill deeds create's presisurest firi officens and iieui touppieii bliumume~les by keeping andmi saving "faee', tii escupe censure. Fauct) thusbecornmesiiil extr emely hi aniomtaclt ehummiir-nt ol persoiial nI oti vat iinan iil sociall intel-ac-tions biecause it r ellec ts the inidividmuals w omrthi anid dignity. Keepinig lu-v ofteniresults in [t iurmal show imaniship, lidii savinhg lace requires excasevs fll- falurhmes andimshortcomlingsiald leads toishifting blamue. Thlecomirern I'm- hee ilbetth ri -sitiomi to both o'ler and accept criuticism.

The abilhity' to hut on) it good show-the affixinug ofdlecils to tile flmselagie-umiiyaphpear Inure. iimpomrtanit as ii mieasur-e ol suctess than) a high operautional mai-nuhess

0.,~

43

rate, the practical importance of which may even be downplayed. The imperativesof aerving the group and keeping face also have pronounced effects on the class-room performance of military trainees. Students avoid showing ignorance by notasking questions. Instructors avoid provoking shame by not posing questions.Cheating carries little stigma and may, in fact, be seen as a way for students to helpeach other and to serve group goals. Refusing to help a colleague is thought dishon.orable. U.S. instructors have had to take considerable care to design programs thatwill accommodate cu'ltural differences. Otherwise, there would be little give andtake in the classroom and poorer students weould not receive remedial training.

The pervasiveness of what are often called "punishment" cultures in the Mid-dle East also has military implications. For example, in Iran, ifs civilian or militarytechnician made ant error, he could lose pay and risk incarceration or corporalpunishrment. This incentive sy'%stem motivates some typical behavior patterns rang-inig front general inertia to thre falsification of reports. In tactical flying, for example,concern for tire safetY of the aircraft often leads to very conservative training. Inmaintenance, fear of losing or damaging equipment means conservative testing andpracticing. Ini Iran, at least, the harshnress of the punishment culture had recentlydimninishred. Some Western management techniques-discussion meetings thathelp idlentify prroblems without try ing to rover up failurres, devices to retrain me-chranics wire err-were being adopted lin the nrilitarY. Lesser adaptation is seen inlSaudi Arabria.

Rigid hirirarrlrY. rent ralization of' cornurrrnd, and prescribed responsibilitiestlrak Middle E~asternr authrority pratterns. Threse trarnslate irnto 1r pencharnt for stay-irrg irt corrvenrtirrral chranrnels ilt rri litary oper'rtiorrrs At wor'kirrg levels, skills rindrtut ios iecorre hrigi!\y rrrrriartrrrertalizeri arrnl isolatedl. Orre's, prowner brase often(rietrrnrs tupornr and is reflecrerd ry. irrarrdirrg of' rmrterials, prarts, rrrd personnel.Disgrrrgirng at broardl tray require rrultiple sigrratur'es rrrni f'orrrs sor ite to dispelRsererrjrrrsilrihiry.

'i'irr irlr1Al rrl'entrt alicat irr c'aurse rridrile-level personrnrel tot rejectI rleisitrrrrrrk.ing resptrrrrility irrtr to pass es'err srrrrl rmrrtlet's trll trr highere corstrrrrrrnet's whothnItclrrr rrnr' urrr r'llrt'r witir rieisisrrs rrrr istres arbout whricir they larck rrecerrsrrr'vIrnfor'tatiror. ii igi'lec'l arrthorr'itie's rare expecteri tobieirue' in it fin'rrly rigird rrrarrrrer.Apitrirrerrt rrlrdetiierts tn ordier's is. aurtrrrmatic even'r whren tire, t'orrrrrrrrr is tot fuifrila'tbIrk' 'i'ir 'result of therse C'rrndit irons is tin riminirishr tire irrcentives rrrtr onpporrtunritiesforr'-.wir irnrrovatiror rarnd lexibii ty, I tn pilrot trairninrg, Middle Easrrernr sit udnrts

t o plav .r ltin'orrinaciterrn relianrrce ort ire, Itnstructorr Pilotr,so tirat threy l''eitrerrtly tutilitr learnr lhInn systt'rrs arrni prorrcedrires thorro'nughly. lThis inhnibitsi lire dievelopmernrt orfflexibnility irl rierlirrg wit irunrexprectedi evntvs'r.

Culfturrrlr crornstrarinrts relatriing tin local ideterr inn' thriorily atnd resrponnsiblrity are,reflectedr thrrrutghrrutr Ire prrutnAsns rof' tecirrnrlrogy abisorpr'tiror. Vor- exarrmple, tireIrmrrrrIrrlio nnib prlansnred tor prchtiase tire rrost sorphristictiredi C, technlorurgy inr tireworrli. irnit Were irtrllirr~hg intinlr'v tire ver'tticral linrkages upiwardin tr tire Shah.rnir rrrrnottilt' lrsrixsrrttsl fieldi lirrkrgelt. 'T'ie Ar'rs--livr.-esit f'oir' tire *irrsrrriarrs-harve hadst

4 evir~~~Pt-1 Mrrres nroticearhle ni litalt'vsti in radirptirrg rrrerni(rr" techrnorlrogy. agrini parsitly forcultuinraln rr'asrrrrr: tire reluctanrrce to shniare resorirtsceit. tlre cn'rern'er to psrortet onrieself0-orrin resiinrsr'ini lit ', fillr Iitursinthen fisai'ck ofi' titlr iy surperionrrs inn tire corpl~nirtee rrfsuordinrraitnter Th Ires' ul'tiniltrg rrinlexsibility diegrds nci trairnirng enxorrci~ses asnd, ultirrmnrtc'

fy. adopinitablit ilrt tm ile battleimeld._ _ _ __ _ _ _

44

CIVILIAN POLICY VARIABLES

Human capital building programs-basic and university education, technicaland vocational training, public health, medical care, and nutritional improvements--obviously enhance the quality of the population base from which the militaryrecruits its force. Some Ir.raeli commentators perceived significant improvement inhealth and literary among Egyptian prisoners captured in 1973 over 1967. How-ever, spending on such programs comes out oif the some national budget thatfinances direct military expenditures, and the civilian program inevitably benefitspeople who do not enter the military. A dedicated warrior state could conceivablyconcentrate its human capital improvement efforts exclusively on its soldiers, atleast in the short tun. All of the states we studied have adopted a more generousapproach and have generally had comprehensive social programs. Those with theheaviest defense burden, such as Syria, have obviously had to make the mostsacrifices onl the social front.

Table 7 shows the 1978 total population estimates for the states surveyedtogether writh the size of the relevant population, the "fit" population, and themilitary. forces. Ani indication of the general extent and success of human capitalprograms can be surmised fromt the column indlicating the fract ion of the popula-tion aged 15-49 deemned fit for military service. Although Israel leads the others at86 percent. Jordan stands out amiong the predomninantl ,y Muslim states at 71 per-

<I cent, and Egypt Ihollows atl 65 percent. All ofthew others cluster between 55 and 60percent.

MILI'IARY POLICY VARIABLES

As We have discussed earlier, and as 'fablest 6illnd 7 bear out, countries that fieldlarge armned abcres out of slitall or- pooly prepatred populaition lases encounter the"ltost difficult ies inl meeting military mtanpower requtirettents, e'xplaitning thle Colt*pacatirt' diflfivlt h's noted in Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

IRecruittment methods racy,. widely amtong thte states. Sontesuch ats Egypt andSyria. Conscript: othet's. such its Saudi Arabia, rely onl voluntteers. The choice d~e.tends onl traditionl, politics. and mtilitary needs. In sooty staltes-Agypt, for. example-Conscriptiont Culall su carce skill supplies. In ttahers, selectivity through 'hiring"

tosy be advisablelit vleast given the sotnievhat negative experienve Wilit rottsrnp.tiott intt Itrltt'. Retettiott ptlit'ies also vary.''The hitch asta fromi 2t0 toottths to thr'eerears fll- ettlistedl nun in enarlt coutttry.'lthe period adoptedl c ire t aCthoice oilthe ntrdvoll, f'tnctiont betwretn currentt capability. whtich is; best Ittlaitted thtroughltastanditng proll'esgitttl f'orce Witlti yeairs of' experietce, attt tmtbilizatttttt potential,which is heightetted by t Ih' jtrtresittg of' ltt'ger tttthet-s of' Yotttg ttl ettrtttvttgitecessarily Shotocer Ititrltes.T'he latter otptiont will tlst appeal to''ttrker, whicht seesits4 ttitty tts it motternitzing mnid stcitlizing veltiele tlt- thte latrger sttritty.

(settsrtlliv, espuctise itt tssigttttettt -It t lt-atchting td' tptittttes ttttt skills Witlltpttsititmls-. is tquite tttntertdevelopled itt MIiddle 1-asntertt tttilititri's,. Ditgtttsis ttttreoltetilitttt receivte shttrt shtrill . Pttlitit'ttl loytalties ctttttitnte to Weight Iteavily illpromttotitotden ota Atssigtttttetl protbletts etneorge [lot ontly tttt tf' intexpe'riettceWithi till' lrina'ltle 0tl' er-ttttttel tttttttgetnettt bttt tts at testtlt tilttrell tf' tilte aflett

obsecrv'd intclittatiotn tot'itt t lt., best htutant t Lttotrcett frott thle getterality of units

45

so as to man the elite forces or the most recently acquired weapon system. FavoringSAM anid anti-tank units in 1973 seems to have led to certain advantages for theArabs, however. Iran seemed to have made the most progress in planning for forcebalance, hut even there the priority unit syndrome produces adverse spillovers onpersonnel capabilities in the general run of units.

We have pointed out the inefficiences inherent in the maintenance of ethnic,sex, and class harriers to participation. The military forces of the states studiedvary substantially in their openness to pluralism because the political price neces-sary to gain the advantages of wider access differs among them. The Iraqis distrustthe Kurds, Jordanians restrict the Palestinians, Syrians discriminate againstShiites, each operating out of motives of regime security and political patronage.Integration of womien violates deep-seated values in Muslim society of which theSaudi ru~lers seem moat observant. Even in neighboring Iran, the Shah's attemptto break with traditional sexual segregation evoked strong reactions.

Aitriough our- evidence ise sketchy, class barriers have apparently been theearliest to fall, particularly in the ostensibly socialist, states of Iraq, Syriz. andEgyp. But in Egypt, particularly, we have noted a tendency--reflecting broadersocial values-to permit paper credentials to signify as weightily as demonstratedcompetence. The importance ofimelit rather than background or, loyalty may differby seet-vice within a given country. In Jordan, for example, the air force appearssuperior to the gr-ound for-ces in its readiness to assign and pr-omote officers on theb'asis of competence alone.

The Middle Eastern concern for, face, also, discussed eal-lier, adids complicationsin the development of rationalized per-sonnel systems. Criticism evokes shiame andbecomes mnuted out of a reluctance to embarrass follow soldiers. Add this to notionsof shared rather than individual r-esponsibility. and the result often is a failure todemiote or dischtarge the inept. 'These pI-oblemissalow uip moat proalilently at mliddlemnanagemlent levels. The Iranlians a~ppearled to haveC diagnosed their- dilhiculties 511(wel-e mllking somle pr-ogr-ess in dealing witih themn by lltlltl5 of trllinillg rehlcltl and(

* ~debriefing 5e$5iontlCAll olltile stlotje have e'xperimen~ttedi withl tiltt, lust' olfotsillels for the tartbr-

111111 fl't'0 certain spec'ializedl tasks. lile Sauldi mnilitary~ ullltlo ' ed vlast numbersll of'5aiorcignt'rl frotll Southt Atqill, East Asill 1111 tilt Wtelt. 'lle Irlallilons t(lippud foreign~

sour-ces it) trivet' skilled laibor- shortllgeq nd all lso de'veloped the1 hinlllfilr systelit inwhici tulilcy higih walges were pa~id to indligentotus civilian~s withl scllrckŽ skills oillong-tel-It contract'to tile Inilitlry. Tihe hoioiihtr t'olcelt ofifers attralctive lldvilltl'tages to) tilosIS, otborl forces ill tile Itogion ill whlicht'i lttt c'iviiianl skill tlhortllges do

Itot Illecludet itsu. (os lg., Egyapt. perhap~ls Syrinanltd Iralqt. Thle iden, Iowevor, 5011111

'The emp~loy ment oi' Itstilie persontllel c'ertalinly addlts to illllledillte capabilitya111 mostlt likely exploliltt' tile ellllncenienllt ofii itigettous mtilitary skills thrloughI

OJT.' Butt schci doi ndllit alsotI115 ca~rries colt-I 115ide fr-ont tile obvious 1)115 itlilerontill highler colllletlsilttotl111 ll tn.ile theC cis f ept)SlltilttiC, til e lpletionl oi' foreignexch'ilge reser-ves. Ctviltan wvorkers tire gollelally less subljec't to nliilitliry conltrol

are1 al~so e'xpaltrliates ho owe1110 primary'. allegia~nce tol A01110 thirid p(Ww~r, the albilityto mlake war o111ti1y esustainled basis will be ulilectod by tite acquiesceince if tiot

approval of that third powol.

t ______0,

46

Substitution of capital appears as one solution for labor shortages. Black boxreplacement in place of periodic maintenance is a concrete manifestation. As wehave argued, however, the substitution may simply escalate skill requirements toa higher level. The instruments that diagnose the black boxes require maintenance.There is increased dependence on a sophisticated system to supply the black boxeswhere and when needed. Because skill shortages are even more severe at theselevels, the alleged "capital substitution" solution may prove ephemeral.

Although necessary to prepare the forces for action, training is, as we havediscussed in earlier sections, expensive in several senses: It uses resources and itdegrades immediate response capabilities. The poverty of many ofthe countries inthe region constrains training by limiting supplies of parts and expendables. Egyptand Jordan come prominently to mind.

The goal of catching up with the Israelis in proficiency drives the Arab forcesto train more intensively. The improved Arab performance, particularly in anti-aircraft and anti-tank units, demonstrated in 1973, testifies to the payoff fromtraining. A side cost often intrudes, however. The better the training in technicalsubjects, the harder it is to retain the resulting electronics specialist or enginemechanic in the military force, given his alternative pay in the civilian economy.This problem has been most severe in Iran. Saudi Arabia, and Jordan where thelure is emigration, but it is felt even in Turkey. The United States and Israel arenot immune to this problem either.

Training often works best when the trainee is removed from the inhibitions ofhis accustomed sociocultural milieu. Acceptance of individual responsibility andcriticism, innovative behavior, esteem for manual endeavom, and willingness towork long hours may be more easily inculcated in settings where these traits areapproved and rewarded. Middle Eastern students often return frolnm training stintsin the United States fired with new attitudes and work styles. The use ofibiculturalliaison officers. assigned responsibility for discipline and behavior, who accompanytheir training contingents, had come to be seen by Iran as an ellective device fbrrvinltrcing the Ipsitive ellects., The Saudis have recently installed similar proce.dures. Always present, however, is the danger of'reversion to traditional behaviorfollowing the1 return to the home country.

In none of the countries studied did we encounter any obsolete barriers totruining operators and logistics support peorsonel for sophisticated weapons. Evenin haudi Arabia, where inanpower shortages and cultural inhibitions svaenl tost"severe. training takes. But we also found that it Iiiy require twice i., lng to

Iproduce a Saudi pilot, mechanic, or supply clerk with U.S. lproliciency standards.In the other countries whore the U . trains iilitaty persoue!-Iran. Jordan."Turkey-the training poerid exceeds U.S. specifications blt by lesver announts.

Deriving tilt most beatelits front practice requires that exercises be carried outwith ia huge elemut ofreailisin. The Egyptian predispotsition fir thorough plattitig

and intensive training appuears to have yielded impressive returns during tile canalcrossing that openied the 1973 War. lI fe of live anuatunitioll, aurraingeauents fbr jointoperatioits--or example, airaom-infitry--and the incorporation ol'uncerthintyand fluidity to the mock baittle situation hest lureplirus troops iuld colnnanders forthle test of war. But certain background factors in thie Middle Etslt mnilitaite agaiustsuelc devices. Anmnunition is eoxpenlive. llttor-unit iorizoantal links are unidevelopedits a conse(qielice botli of traldition aind reginle insecurity. Tlue preparation of ia

floxeiblu respons cznu bility goes against thle Arab preebrence for well-specified anid

47

well-rehearsed plans. The yield derived from force exercises is thus diminishedeven when they occur. Without prasctice, skills scquired in training may atrophyto the point where the system simply loses its effectiveness.

Supply systems provide ample illustration of organizations where traditionalpatterns of authority and responsibility have constrained efficient performance.The reluctance to release accumulated hoards, the insistence on face-to-face trans-actions, the fascination with forms and stamps. and the disposition to seek higherlevel approval for trivial decisions means, for example, that a parts inventory mayremain in excess in one location while equipment is grounded for want of the sameitem at a nearhy base- These difficulties appeared even in Iran where progress inlogistics rationalization had moved faster. Malperformance is even more wide-spread in Saudi Arahia (but individual parts inventories there are larger).

Basic reforms in managerial style must precede significant progress in what wehave labheled macro-level competence. For the Arah states that have fought Israel,failures in responsiveness and adaptability have been noted repeatedly. Even in1973 the Egyptian and Syrian forces display' ed rigid adherence to prespecified plansand overcentralized command structures. Armored attacks, for example, were or-ganizedl in textbook fashion with little attention to terrain or enemy responses.Lateral coordination wats weak, and rent cal IIQ quicklY- became over-loaded withinformtation and slow to respond. Although some attemipts at reformn are underway. vprogress in this area is difficult and time-consuming. Other heretofore secontl-linestates, such ats Saudi Arabia and Iraq have neither Syria's experience of past conflictto (Iriv-e the les~sons home nor* thte state of social developmtent chariacte-istic ofEgypt and -Jordan.

Iranil had gis-ettsotne indict.tion or rapid devctiopntent itt military mniiatgemntetCapability accordinig to U.S. observers. Problems itt evalutiting Iranian progt-ess;stemi froml thle paucity ,1 Votests for Ithat systetm. H aying fought to serious engtage-tleitts agaitist worthy adversaries, Iran's true' abilities in this regard retmainedmtostl atmse -y.Th Trs. ith a long histois- of' mtilitary' relatiotis weith tilteWest, gave at good avirrottt of themtselves agaiitst the Gteeksm itt Cyprus; but eveitthey expetiencred diffictulties itt organizing tile Clutlitign.

CONCL.USIONS4

Inlilt, tIl' tbidiu ter he Conitiinuation ofecottonir antid ocitil developtment andprogramls that incromiec the mlttmlit ,' of' aritttutryVs hliuntan Capital w-ill, itt turn,enhtance its mtilitary ptotenttiall Few states, pterhapls. will opt delibterately to slowdown t he r-ate noveoitoittir growth expressly ito ease recrutitinig problemts. But giventhe supply tif'ovailable nianptnet' and att esigetoutmily determinited force size gtoal.pambcy Choices ropreiwiti alternittive routes nit the wa it itoimproved military ofer'ctivvntess. 'there- is it pl'oiltit-ttti Ibltirtnt 'or titilitary v'trt'rtvenelss. and Its argo-ilot'teults itude hnittitio reimmiurres. timie. atid lierseseretice. ilie primititie stole of'eXist itig i IeOi-y atntil tt .411trititlestts rdat have preveitled otur research fniitt us-tilutitttng thle size otf tht' tayotfsi to lie expected tfront personnel piolicies versustai IsWittInIg V-ermits u exrci s.'s VeQniml orgai i i t in atIitl relortois at tIlinct ion I a id cotn %t it i tdlev els1. We Ihave, we bewlie ve, i (01t liettlle t Iet c r itict I pol icy chtoices (bor th1e it todernitizi t gntilit'll -v. We reiteralto the implortance of the obdurate atlititditnal variables thant willilifltties the course ol'ittiproewniteut associated with titty chanige ii strategy.

V. NET ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY BALANCE INTHE MIDDLE EAST

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MODERNIZATION AND THEMILITARY BALANCE

The unequal level of military modernization in different states affects theirrelative abilities to organize, maintain, operate, and obtain the greatest combatusefulness from given sets of equipment. Differences in organizational andmanagerial effectiveness, social and cultural milieu, manpower competence, com-bat experience, and military leadership greatly influence how effectively varioussystems are adapted to the particular requirements of different states. Indeed, itcan be argued that although differences in the "human factor" are inherently moredifficult to measure and quantify than differences in equipment, competence factorshave historically had a greater effect on combat outcomes than have differences inweapons hardware.

Nowhere has this been more evident than in the Arab-Israeii wars. !n 1967, theIsraelis were outnumbered by more than 2:1 in combat aircraft and almost 3:1 intanks, yt according to public reports they achieved an air combat kill ratio of 20:1and a tank kill ratio of better than 7:1. In 1973. outnumbered again by 2,5:1 in bothcombat aircraft and tanks, the Israelis achieved favorable kill ratios of 40:1 indogfights and 2:1 in tank kills. Some of these disparities are explained by differ-ences in the perlormance characteristics o1 the equipment and some oay be ex-plainable by differences in casualty rates traditionally experienced between attack.ing and delitnding forces (particularly the tank-kill ratiot, but these factors alonecannot explain the greater part of the outcomes. Indeed. oil somne characteristics,such as unilateral advantages in night fighting equipment in 1973, the qualitativeedge in hardware favored the Arabs. Observers agree that only by bringing in thehuman competence dillbrential can the Israeli margin oftsuperiority be explainedand that individual and collective excellence hisa been the kevsttone ofthe favorablemilitary bulance tnabling Israel to tolerate greatly Unequal forte ratios.

It ol1lows thai imiprovemelnts in the ability of the Arais to use different equip.ment eflectively could, in principle, more greatly allbct the inilitary balatnce thanmere imnprovemnits in tihe quantities or qualities ol'equipelont inventories their.tselves. lit theory, if the Arabs could close the mlunpover lantI nrganizational Coritlio.tence giali or introduce itew systems whose simplicity of operations reduced theimportance of' tile giill. they might decisively improve the imilitary balance. Themodernization it.atue is thinrelro at the very Center of ellbrts to assessm the 1itureArab-N-reli military balance,

I)illereaces in the levels of' modernization nlullug the stttes we have examninedin the iliddle I-Eust are probably riot as wide as in the cases of the other miilitarybalaunces of, the region. but there tre iWrmue disparities. I'•g.ypt hi1s a significiuitadvantage over ILibya. and Iraq hats considerabily great, r combat experience thanKuu\.,it and Saudi Arabia. Although fruitii lcks tile combat experience offIrilq. italupealsA to le at ai higher level of mulderitization, auil tile gap alppears to be widlen.ing. Iran had seiiied much Iurther down the road of modernization than Kuwait

48

49

or Saudi Arabia.' Finally, the Syrian-Iraqi balance is probably one of fairly equallevels of military effectivenesa, although the advantages conferred on Syria as aresult of more intensive war experienre could tip the balance. Detailed comparisonsin these cases are more difficult, as most of the recent combat experience of theregion has involved opposed forces of Israel and the Arabs, and therefore most ofthe data points apply to this particular balance. Indeed, differences among theArabs must be inferred from their unequal performance against Israel.

TIME TRENDS IN MODERNIZATION

When trends in modernization are related to the future military balance, it isimportant to recognize that not every increment of modernization by one aidenecessarily leads to a narrowing of the manpower and organizational competencedifferential and an improvement of the military balance in its favor. Conceivablywe could see the Ar-sb-Israeli gap wvidening rather than narrowing, in spite of Arabsuccesses in modernization, when we examine the elements of the modernity gapmore closely.%

First, the level of modernization, as it relates to military competence, is arelative measure, and improvements on one side must be r-elated to improvementson the other. It is sometimes asserted that the Israelis are already close to 100

percent of the theoretically attainable "perfect" operation of military systems,whereas the Arabs have been operating at only' 25 or 50 percent effectiveniess, andthat therefore improvements onl the Arab side st-c bound to nar-row the gap. Butindividual antI organicational competence are not "perfectible". As in competitivesport, there is always the possibility of improvemnent, and Israeli impr-ovenmentsalso must be taken into account.

Yet this objection is not ats basic ats some others. Although both the beginninganld advanced athlete Call jinprove his perfboroMane thle rates of impr0ovemet thaltare, possible for the beginnter clear-ly excee't those possible for the front runner, andin this sense the gap will tetnd to narrow even if it nevel, closes. Moreover, inl theprocess o1' military modernizatiotn, there may be at point wher's a decisive qualita.tive transformnation itakes place, after- which sellsustaitming growth in omilitaryeffectiveness becomes thet norm. At thle eartly stages; of' modernization thmere isprimary reliatice on loreign advisor-s, the, social andl ciltum-al mtilieu r"it ipoenmetits, attd modern military siystems remitial foreign imports that cannot he fullytibsorheil by local lientoniel. But at litter stalge oftmodernizatiotil can) builtd on thlelocal accumttlation ohinilitary capital, expertisea, anti experience; cotnstant improve-mnett is built into tles systeml. anid foreign technoitlogies can be absorbed marelrapidly. If' the Arabis can achieve such at qualitative tt'atsforination, untilatieralituprovententola fuay litme an absolute effert onl thle military balance oven if theIsraelis also imtpro ve.

A second antd store important objection is raised Wheln levels oftinodurnicatiolmat-s related to time operator and support personntel Compemtence and organiztationalrequirements impoised he time weapons being itntroduced. lit practice. wemipotis difl'srin tilt, level o1'skills (they r-equire o1'their Oitsratl-s. anid them port~ion of' coimbat

Asais s' rentuist mlt eder Oitw iths rv-irt was wratvs atr wi-tlis reost. uptiesavl in Iran.

50

outcomes explained by individual and organizational competence (as opposed to theinherent capabilities of the weapons themselves) is much greater for some systemsthan for others. For example, the effectiveness of long range, terminally guided,surface-to-surface missiles carrying large nuclear warheads against area targets islargely a function of the devices themselves and is quite insensitive to the skill ofthe operators. (But difficulties in programming the guidance systems may indeedvary with the skill of operators.)

In contrast, the effectiveness of an F-4 against a MiG-2! has been shown to bemore related to pilot skill than to the inherent characteristics of the platforms andtheir weapon fits. (This was illustrated by the experience of U.S. Navy pilots inIndochina, who improved their dogfight kill ratios from 2.3:1 in the period 1965-68to 12.5:1 in the period 1970-73 by going through the Dissimilar Air Combat pilotretraining program-a 400 percent improvement with the same equipment.) Also,the effectiveness of forces in the field is a function of the support systems backingthem up, including all the elements in the maintenance, supply, and logistic train.Although for some systems the performance of the weapons themselves is the key,for many others what is done with the hardware is more important than its me-chanical attributes.

To relate changes in the competence gap to changes in the military balance, weintroduce an intervening variable: changes in the share of combat outcomes ex-plained by human competence, itself a function of technology. Suppose, for exam-ple, the Arabs marginally improved their competence "rating" compared with thatof the Israelis. At the same time new systems le.g., advanced tactical fighters) wereintroduced whose operation and support required much greater competence. Thenet military balance might improve in favor of Israel even though the weaponswere introduced on both sides and the rates of improvement in the human factorwere greater on the Arab side. The key to this intervening variable between mod.erni-ation rates and the military balance is the changing portion of the combatoutcomes explained by diffbrences in individual and collective competence.

This study has been concerned primarily with modernization itself: and wehave seen that, with varying degrees ol success, fairly rapid improvements arebeing undertaken in a number ofccuntries. Although no effort has been made hereto examine the Israeli case, it is probaily fair to conclude that, for the reasons givenabove, on at least somie characteristics the competence gap is gradually closing, ifonly because the Arabs started a considerable distance behind. The Aruba are alsoclosing the qualitative gap in equipment by obtaining advanced European, Soviet,and Americani systems. Theose hfctors, combined with their quiititative superiori-tyin weiipons inventories and maln power, maly lead observers to conclude that the imetmilitary balance is improving in tile Arabs' favor and even that they are boundeventually to achieve strategic superiority.

But such an assessniont may be altered whei we counaider tile mission require.taunts oh the various parties in greater detail, ospeciaily when ollbnmsive and debin.sre iissiomn requirements are related to changes in prevailing military technology,

as addrssed below. The nit inasessenenit mast also take account or the interveimingvariable between modernization and tihe military balance-the share of combatoutcoimesa explainied by humnan colmpetence. To determine that share requires de-tailed study' of future weapons inventories. It nmay be that time role of individual andcollective eonipetonce is gaining imiltortanco more rapidly than tile competence gapis narrowing.

Ii

51

It is important to distinguish two classes of competence questions: those per.taining to individual skills in the operation, repair, and provisioning of equipmentsets micro-competence and those pertaining to collective capabilities to organizeand operate forces effectively to fulfill military objectives mocro-competence.)

At the micro level, there are countervailing trends. For some systems, theintroduction of highly sophisticated but simple to operate weapons will reduce theinfluence of humian skill in military operations. The closer we come to thle mythicalautonmated battlefield, with p~ush-button "fire and forget" weapons, the less individ-ual competence and initiative will count. New systems vary greatly in the expertisedemanded of their operators, but some simplify the skills required of the actualuser on the front line. For example, the second generation anti-tank missiles (TOW,Dragon. Milan) come closer to truly automatic guidance, once properly pin-grammned. than the first-generation missiles thle)- replace; and the eventual intro-duction of' third generation systems will continue this evolution. Such develop-ments reduce the advantage of technical sophistication and "brainpower" in theoperation of weaponis onl the battlefield and act as til equalizer between armies ofunequal skill (though even in these cases the supply and maintenance demandsmay be increasing).

For- other systems, the importance of operator competence is growing. The F-ISis saidl to apiproach the limit of humain mental endurance and capacity, because ofthe wide variet y of platformn and weapon cotntrol options that must be consideredsimiultaneously. Even when one subsystemi is impr-oved for fairly automatic opec-aitiolt. ats in the case at'reliable all-aspect. tice-and-fot-get infrared-hioming dogfightmissilies, the optimial deployment 01'the platf'orm and tmissile combination to obtainthe greatest net uttility ft-oat this advantage imposes, greatertitanl ever dletmttds on)the tactical ingenuity andl inventiveness of' thle pilot, who imust simultaneouslyconsider all til' othter elements (1', tilte combat environment. Stict developmnentsinc-rease the advantage otterlinical sophistication find widetn the nmargin ofinequal-itv betwieen tiirces itt'uteqtiil skill.

Althbough it is difitictult to derive sumtrtttnty cotnclusions ait the mticro heve%, tit tLifetitacte level ot cottipetetuce tite trettds ttppleat' strotigly' to enhlantce thle Vttltue ofhumitan etl'ectivtiless; as af tbice mtultiplier. Tih' eflibr oftite techitological revolutiotis to inicrease thle demntiids ottl tighir tranuted personniel ftind to heighitentilte advalt'tIngo ol'an otlit-er corps, t hat calt aidapt, imtprovist'. ftind tmatutfiae etficiently. One fitctoris t he IniilecilaIrisat iont of, thte batitlefieltd. Blecautse eftclbi is firepower is becotmingincreasinigly light antd compact. itt the ftitutre nloiolt. inead titit-ly indtependtettt sitttllunitis will ofleti he' tused to thrieatent atmi dltstro ,v larger' untits itt thte Msiddle East fitdothitt plates where the ptrotbletts of' tartget alcqulisition fitre redutcedl find thters is api-etijititi ott ittobility. cotncealmient., iiitd disiperwil. Mitre autthoirity wsill have tom hodelegatedit) lowser Commndtati levels, afind thei quatlity of' jitllitir otlicers afind tileitteritietiate rantks fromt catitlttt to colontel will mtore heavils' ittfluenice tilt' etfee-tiveia'ssq of th ft' ightin fogtrces. Imtpt-ovisattiontal tactics fitd Operattiotnal flexibillitywsill fintdt their Wcidest scope. findttile tiet effe~ct at'11 fleitos technologies Wviil enhatnce

5 iuii raih'r thian reduce tlit' ittiportant'c iifthe qkitialttiiVV Intlaittni 1`11cto.At thle samte ltie. tttixittttiat stress isill be iplatced of)tiltt ability offthe high

Cotimanatd. cnroii -l. anti coimnntticiation systent iWhere there is ii pruolil'eratitin oh'1. I -t ~~~~sittitl titits iiuld ii mtolec-ular piatter-n of ileplayitetit. Th'lis siill multiply time iiivaii-

tage oft he 'orces operiating nfit ittetioir -itther than exterior lites. whlo are, morereadily able toi concentrtate tgignist otte ivulneriable or high Value pouint andi theli

52

another. This advantage will be further enhanced when combined with "mechani-cal" force multipliers such as the Hawkeye R-2C downward looking airborne radarsand the integrated tactical ground environment computers.

Another factor at the higher levels of strategy and war planning is the veryspeed of technological change and innovation. An unprecedented number of sys-tems incorporating new concepts are being introduced into this region simultane-ously, and if there are future wars the participants will have to rely heavily onweapons never before operated under combat conditions. The performance of indi-vidual systems is bound to differ from simulations and results obtained on thetesting ground. It will be necessary to modify organization, deployment, and tacticsunder the pressure ofbattle, and there will be substantial rewards to the side thatis able to adapt more rapidly and absorb and integrate new equipment and ideason shoi ter lead times.

In the coming years. a technological breakthrough or surprise is less likely totake the form of an unforeseen new weapon system per se than an innovativeapplication of the known technology resulting froom a superior understanding of itsultimate significanre on the battlefield. Rapid adaptation of systems to meet newthreats during the war, such as the devising ofECM responses to new radar threats,may be as important as the possession of the systems themselves. In these and otherways, tile relationship between human capability and the rapidly changing equip-ment technologies may enhance the advantage of states favored by greater skillsat the higher levels.

But these counterargunients and objections on the relatiombhip between mod-ernization and the military baltnce are complex and i1o nat yield easily to quantifi-cation If there is a narrowing ofthe competence gap combined with ii narrowingof the qualitative gap in equipment. most observers will he attracted to the viewthat the military bilance itself'is improving flir the Arahs correspondingly. There-fore, although the i"objective- olfect oftnodernization mtiy not necessarily favor tileArabs, the suljective eflect is quite likely to lie a iperception that the Arab militaryposition has improved. It hollows that whether cr not ittodernization iltnproves tilemilitary haliice i) faivor of the Arabs, it will le perceived to do so. itl to thatdegree military imodernization will make the war option miore attractive.

OTHER I'AMrOUS IN TIlE MI'IT'ARY BALANCE

It is not ppoiisible to derive a net assessittent ofii' th, regional itiilitary hatlancesolely front the modernization fhctors examined in this report. A full study Wouldhave to esuitaie in detiail other olenlents such as:

O hfl'insive iud delellsive inissiol requietitents;* The military geography oh' iissutned conflict theaters;* Forces pIrepositioued in combat iureas:

F oirces that could he mobilized or redeployed within relevait time Imitaltes:"E xterail supplies or sqpport units that mighti lie ifted tn thie Conflicttheaters:

* Comparisons of orlers oii ibaitt both quantitative laild qalitative; andI intolligence capabilities.

i ]P

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In addition, scenario-specific assumptions must be made as to a number ofcontingencies, such as:

*The main military moves;*Whether tactical and strategic surprises are achieved;*Levels of mobilization over time;*Whether pre-emptive options are exercised;*The contributions of expeditionary forces by third and nth states;*The participation or nonparticipation of superpowers; and*The specific locations of military actions.

F~inally, assessments must be made of the relative effectiveness of opposedsystems (some never- tested in battle) in given scenarios, such as:

. The state of the tank-antitank competitions;

. The fluidity of battle lines;

. The effectiveness of SAMs and SAM suppression weapons;

. The freedom of ground attack aircraft to operate effectively in variouszones of the combat theater;

. Electronic systems vs. ECM vs. ECCM;- I Target acquisiton and terminal guidance systems V'ý. Stealth technologies.

decoys,. and other aniti-systems; and* Moilit~enanceentand mobility-denial systems.

Moat of' these issues- Clearly Pill outside the narrow question oftmodernizatiotiof' human capitil. I Yt, modernization lecels (10atlfct net asse'ssmlents,. and It wouldbe desiraible to conduct lCtllow-on research. Thle following examples illustrate but dtonot exhautst the r-esearchahlc' qust ions.

First, mnoderniz.ation quoest ions qlwciltic to particular trellnologivs elffrt micro-comtpetenice in the absorption and eflert ice operattioni of individuaol systemsi. Forexample, what is the potential of a giveti state to absorb oltll uitilize numbeibrs of agivenl airrrafll. na1val platfhnnl. land combat vehicle, weapont, 'Ir intelligence aid?

e. I ~~low will the skill of operatio ntal pes-ronnel iii this state compare wvithi that 01 theadversary. uniti whalt will be tie net efl,'ct onl the titlitary vbalatice?

Secotnd. does it given qtate leicie the organiizatiotnal capability ito structure givenlevels of1 ciiitbai ttiiiipowei- tand equlipmenet ehlectivelY inito fighitinig uttits able tot

- liperftatiltt specihivd ittilitar ' taliks? Tbis includes iittiiierepiair, and logit-tic- I utuhipori:-t theblty todl -e combat tutits to critical points withini re.stricted tinie

ffrattue: thle coordinationi oif comtmiandl. conitrol. cuiiintilttictitioti. tind intelligenceutnder organicational stress; centralization and dlelegation of authority: unitd othereleentsit of wartime ititmnagemnent iif ighttig untits-

Third. iat the strategic level, is the tnational comandtati authotrity i-ble to propor-tioti ends to ateatis; ta set milssion reiluircointits thait are attainabtlle liy availableforces and miltik;, optimtal use of resources:; to adiapt war ptlatns to take amounuit ofchiangitng crcn-umstances; to dlevise eflfctive courses of action; and to intetgrateztailitary iiid political objectives?

Thesge is.,ues of ilidividuaol, organtizationail, anid strategic cottipetetice have beenadthresseilat itt genteral level int this study, but a weaponl-specific aid msinseiianalysuis is at task for the flature,

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CONCLUSIONS

With regard to states active in the Arab-Israeli balance, we have identifiedsome significant trends of improvement in micro-competence, the factors affectingthe performance of individuals. But the findings also suggest that no significantbreakthrough is likely in macro-competence, the organizational and managerialfactors affecting the performance of fighting units. Therefore, it is unlikely thatthere will be a revolution in the net effectiveness of the Arabs over the next tenyears, particularly if, as we have argued, competence itself has a growing influenceon military outcomes.

With regard to the other military balances of the region, differences in com-parative rates of modernization may be more significant. Iran before the recentupheaval seemed capable of a decisive improvement by achieving a qualitativetransformation to ultimate modernity. If so, the military balance between Iran andthe other states of the Gulf might have been fundamentally altered.

These conclusions suggest that the Arab states will not be able to close the gapwith Israel over the next decade, and that they would have lost ground in relationto I-an had trends there continued, in spite of the great effort being undertaken andthe progress being made. The widespread belief that time is on the side of theArabs, and that the wind of history is behind the Arab sail, is not fully supportedby a detailed examination of trends in modernization and projections over the nextdecade within the confines of this analysis. However, the improvements that arebeing achieved are likely to affect perceptions of Arab military effectiveness, andto that degree the)y may affect the strategic choices that are made.

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