Memories of Dai Do
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Transcript of Memories of Dai Do
Memories of Dai Do (Apr 2004) Marine Corps Gazette
Volume88,Issue4Author:WilliamWeise
Then:
Imagineyourselfasaninfantrybattalioncommanderwithlessthan700Marinesgoingtoetotoeagainst
abattle-hardenedenemydivisionofover7,000.Fairodds-right?Butwhatifyougotnoreinforcements?
Whatthen?FastenyourseatbeltsasthebattalioncommandertakesusonawildrideneartheCuaViet
Riverinearly1968.Thenarrativepicksuponthesecondnightofaction,asexcerptedfromtheoriginal
article(MCG,Sep87).
TheNightof1-2May;PredawnAttackbyEchoCompanyonDaiDoFollowedbyHotelCompanyAttackon
DinhTo,2May
MyconcernaboutGolfCompany,increasedgreatlyasitstartedtoreceiveenemyprobes.Totakethe
pressureoffGolf,IdecidedtolaunchEchoCompanyinapredawnattackonDaiDo.IorderedHotel
CompanytobepreparedtofollowEchoCompany.Echo'sattackwouldbenorthwestfromAnLac.Wehad
tomovequicklybecauseGolfCompany'ssituationgrewworsebythehour.Twolargeenemynightattacks
andseveralsmallprobeswerebeatenback.
ThethunderofGolf'sdefensivefiresmuffledthemovementofEchoCompanyasitcrossedthelineof
departureandmovedintothericepaddiestowardassaultpositionsjustsouthofDaiDovillage.Before
EchoCompanyreacheditsassaultpositions,theenemyopenedupwithheavyvolumesofsmallarmsand
mortarfire.Thetwoforward(assault)platoonsreceivedheavycasualtiesandlostforwardmomentum.
ButCaptLivingstonimmediatelycommittedhisreserveplatoon,personallyleadingitforwardto
penetratetheforwardenemydefensesandmovedwellintoDaiDo.Thefightingwasfurious.Although
twicewoundedbygrenadefragments,Livingstoncontinuedtomovewhereverrequiredtoencouragehis
menandtomaintainthemomentumoftheassault.Eachenemypositionhadtobelocated,pinneddown
byaccuratefire,blindedwithwhitephosphorous,anddestroyedbygrenades,flamethrowers,satchel
charges,andLAAWs(lightassaultantitankweapons).
Casualtieswereheavyastheassaultcontinuedforseveralhours.GolfCompanybrokeoutofitsperimeter
toassistEchoCompanyclearDaiDo.Finally,afterseveralhoursofheavyfightingandheavycasualties,
DaiDowassecured.
ColHulltoldmeitwasveryimportanttokeepthepressureontheenemy.Itoldhimthatwehadjust
aboutrunoutofsteam.Irecommendedthatseveralbattalionsbelandedabout10kilometersnorthof
DaiDo,attacksouth,anddrivetheenemyintoourpositions.Ialsorecommendedthattheothertwo
battalionsofthe3dMarinesbemovednorthoftheriverandplacedontheleftandrightof[Battalion
LandingTeam2/4](BLT2/4).BLT2/4,1stBattalion,3dMarines,and1stAmtracBattalionwouldforman
anvilagainstwhichtheheliliftednorthernbattalionswouldhammertheenemy.Ibelievedthatwecould
annihilateorcapturemostofthe320th[NorthVietnameseArmy](NVA)Division.
ColHulldidn'thavetheassetsorauthoritytocarryoutsuchaplan.Hecouldnotevenmovehisothertwo
battalionsfromtheirpositionswithoutpermission.Onlythecommandinggeneral,3dMarineDivision
couldreactinthemannerIsuggested.
LostopportunitiesnotwithstandingIstillhadtocarryoutmyorders:keeppressureontheenemy.Icalled
uponHotelCompany,orderingLtPrescotttopassthroughDaiDoandEchoCompany,attacknorth,guide
onthestreamtotheleft,andseizeDinhTo.*HotelcrossedthelineofdepartureonthenorthwestofDai
DoandenteredDinhTo,receivinglightenemysmallarmsfireintheprocess.Astheadvancecontinued,
enemyfireincreased,reinforcedwithmortars,rockets,andartillery.Aboutone-thirdthroughDinhTo,
theenemyfirebecamesogreatthatithaltedHotel'sassault.
RealizingthatEchoandHotelcouldnotholdtheirpositioninDinhTo,Itoldbothcompanycommanders
topullbacktoDaiDo.Atthispoint,CaptLivingstonwashitinbothlegsbymachinegunfire.Unableto
move,hewouldnotpermithimselftobedraggedtotherearuntilhewascertainthatallotherwounded
wereevacuated.
EchoandHotelCompaniesbroughtalltheirwoundedandwithdrewtoDaiDowheretheyformeda
perimeterundertheleadershipofMajWarren.Warrenhadearlierbroughtthemain[commandpost]CP
GroupforwardtothesouthernedgeofDaiDo.Woundedwereevacuated.EchoandHotelCompanies
wereresuppliedandreorganized.
Byafternoonon2May,BLT2/4wasweakenedbyheavycasualties,lossofkeyleaders,andfatiguefrom
morethantwodaysofheavyfighting.Equipmentcasualtieswerealsohigh.
Ididnothavemuchchoiceinselectingthecompaniesfortheafternoonattackof2May.Echo,Hotel,and
BravoCompaniesweredecimatedandunsuitableforoffensiveaction.GolfCompany,althoughdownto
about40effectives,including4officers,wasstillaviable,spiritedfightingoutfit,despiteits2-dayordeal.
TheonlyothercompanywasFoxtrot,thestrongestwithabout80effectives,including3officers.
AsIbriefedCaptVargasandFoxtrot'scompanycommanderonthenorthernedgeofDaiDo,wesaw
anotherraresight-largenumbersofenemytroopsintheopenfieldsnorthwestofDaiDo.Wecalledinair,
artillery,andmortarfire.Pilotsintheattackingaircraftwereecstaticatbeingabletostrafeandbomb
enemytroopsintheopen.
IorderedGolfCompanytoleadtheattack,followedcloselyintracebyFoxtrot.Theprincipaldirectionof
attackwasnorthwestfromDaiDo,throughDinhToandThuongDo,guidingonthestreamtoourleftand,
hopefully,maintainingcontactwiththe[ArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam](ARVN)battalionmountedin
armoredpersonnelcarriers.Contactbetweenthetwobattalionswasfromlefttoright.Thismeantthat
theARVNbattalionwasresponsibleformaintainingcontactwithBLT2/4.FoxtrotCompany,following
closelybehindGolfCompany,wasresponsibleformaintainingcontactwithGolfandprovidingrear
securityforbothcompanies.
TheattackjumpedofffromDaiDoat1500,asplanned.GolfCompanymovedintoDinhTo.Exceptfor
occasionalsmallarmsfire,therewaslittleenemyopposition.Enemyfightingholesandbunkerswere
checkedoutastheassaultelementsmovedcautiouslyforward.CrossingtheopenareanorthwestofDinh
To,GolfCompanycameunderheavyenemyfirefromthefrontandrightflankasitenteredThuongDo.
Enemymortars,rockets,andartilleryaddedtothetempo.ItoldCaptVargastoholdupandordered
FoxtrotCompanyforward.ButFoxtrotcouldnotmove.Aftersomedelay,IlearnedthatFoxtrotCompany
waspinneddowninthericepaddieseastofDinhToandThuongDo.GolfCompany'srearwashangingin
theair,unprotected!
Aboutthesametime,approximately1700,webeganreceivingheavyautomaticweaponsfirefromthe
west(ourleftflank)wheretheARVNbattalionwassupposedtobe.Thenwesawtroopsmovingtoward
usfromacrossthestreamtoourleft.TheywereclearlyNorthVietnamesesoldiers.Wetried,
unsuccessfully,tocontacttheARVNbattalion.LaterwelearnedthattheARVNbattalionhadsimply
withdrawnwithouttellingus!Webegantoreceivelightsmallarmsfirefromourrearandrealizedthat
someenemyhadslippedinbehindus.Thingswerenotlookinggoodatall.Thenalargegroupofenemy
assaultedfromourfront.Simultaneously,heavyautomaticweaponsfirehitusfromourright(east)flank.
Thingsweregettingworse.
Desperatecircumstancesrequiredesperatemeasures.Vargascalledhistwoassaultunitsbackand
attemptedtodrawhiscompanyintoatightperimeter.Wecalledinartillerysoclosethattheshrapnel
landedamongus.Wecalledfornavalgunfiretoplasterourfrontandaskedforemergencyairsupport.
Severalhelicoptergunshipsresponded.Thefightingwascloseandviolent.EveryoneintheGolfCompany
andbattalioncommandgroupsfiredhisweapon.Therewereplentyoftargets,andwedroppedenemy
assaulttroopswithinafewyardsofourpositions.SgtMajMalnarblastedawaywithhis12-gaugeshotgun.
Eventheradiooperatorsfoughtbetweentransmissions.Theenemyfrontalattackwasfinallystopped,
butourlossesweregreat.BigJohnMalnarwaskilledbyarocketround.BothmyradiooperatorsandI
werewounded.AlloftheGolfCompanyradiooperatorswereeitherkilledorwounded.CaptVargaswas
painfullywounded(histhirdwoundinthreedaysandfifthinthreemonths)butmanagedtostayonhis
feetandcontrolthings-infact,hehelpedmovemepartofthewaytotherear.IorderedVargasto
withdraw.Hedid,bringingallthewounded.Itwasafightingwithdrawalbyfireandmaneuver,using
artilleryandhelicoptergunshipstoboxinourfrontandflanks.
IpassedcommandtoMajWarren,whostrengthenedtheperimeteratDaiDoandremainedincommand
ofBLT2/4untilrelievedbythebattalionexecutiveofficer(MajCharlesW.Knapp)thatevening.After
evacuatingthewoundedandreorganizingtheable-bodiedsurvivorsandreplacements,BLT2/4hadfour
riflecompanieswith1officerand40MarineseachattheperimeteratDaiDo.(BravoCompanyremnants
werelocatedatAnLac.)
ThereorganizedBLT2/4spentanactivenighton2-3May.Theperimeterreceivedsomelightprobesand
afewdozenenemymortarandartilleryrounds.Buttheheavyfightingwasover.
DaiDoinRetrospect
Someofficers,notawareoftheferocityofthefighting,haveaskedwhyBLT2/4sufferedsomany
casualties.Hereismyanswer:
*First,wewereattackingawell-trained,well-equipped,well-supportedenemyinexcellentfortified
positions.
*Second,BLT2/4waspiecemealedintothebattle.Whenthebattlebegan,theriflecompanieswere
spreadoutoverawidearea(one,EchoCompany,wasnotevenundermyoperationalcontrol).Ittooktoo
longtogaintherequiredauthoritytomoveeventhoseunitsundermydirectcontrol(GolfCompanyand
3dPlatoon,FoxtrotCompany).Withallfourriflecompaniesreadilyavailable,wecouldhaveseizedDaiDo
immediatelyafterHotelCompanyseizedDongHuan.ToretakeDaiDo,theenemywouldhavehadto
attacktwoorthreewell-dug-inriflecompanies.SubsequentattacksonDinhToandThuongDocouldhave
beenmadeadayearlierbystrongriflecompaniesratherthanbythepitifullyunderstrengthcompanies
wehadtouseon2May.
*Third,BLT2/4wasnotreinforcedduringthebattle,buttheenemycontinuedtoreinforcehisunitsand
toreplacehiscasualties.
*Fourth,abouthalfofourcasualtiesoccurredduringtheafternoonattackof2May.Duringthatattack,
theARVNbattaliononourleftflankwithdrewwithoutnoticeallowingtheenemytomoveinonthat
flank.
*Fifth,ifwehadmorefixed-wingairsupport,especiallyduringthefirst36hours,assaultingenemy
fortifiedpositionswouldhavebeenlesscostly.
*Sixth,weshouldhavebeenreinforcedwithatleast10tanks(wehadonly2)andanequalnumberof
ONTOS(wehadnone).Theheavyfirepower,greatermobility,andshockactionoftheseweaponssystems
wouldhavemadeourassaultsmorerapidandmuchmorepotent.
*Finally,thepossibilityexiststhatthe2dARVNRegiment,whichhadresponsibilityfortheDaiDo
complex,mighthavebeencollaboratingwiththeenemy.
Butdespitenumerousproblemsandpossibletreason,BLT2/4accomplisheditsmission.Asuperior
enemyforcewasdrivenfromtheriverbanks,andthevitalCuaVietandBoDieuRiverswereopenedto
traffic.
Howbadlywasthe320thNVADivisionhurtatDaiDo?I'mnotsure,butmuchofitsfightingeffectiveness
wasdestroyed.MajGenRaymondDavis,whobecamecommandinggeneral,3dMarineDivisionafterthe
battleofDaiDo,statedthatthedefeatofthe320thDivisionduringAugustthroughSeptember1968was
hastenedbythepunishmentittookduringAprilandMay.
IhaverefoughttheBatleofDaiDomanytimesinmymindandalwaysreturntothesameconclusion:We
accomplishedourmissionagainstgreatodds.Whatevertheenemyintendedtodo,hedidn't.Whatever
successwehadisatributetotheindividualMarine.Onceagain,IquoteLtVieTaylor,whosaysitwellfor
allofus:
IwaitedandwatchedthoseMarinesabouttogointobattle.Somewerestandingwatch,somereadied
equipment,somesleptorrested,butallwerequiet.Nonervousjabbering,nofalsebravado,nowhining,
nomelodramatics...theywereprofessionals.Mostwereteenagers;manyfarlessthanayearawayfrom
home;buttheywereseasonedbymonthsoffightingwithadeterminedenemy.Despitetheiryouthand
theirrelativelyshorttimeintheCorps,theywereaswillingandprofessionalasanyonewhoeverworea
uniform.Iwasproudtobeamongthem.
Now:
Inrecentcorrespondenceconcerningthebattle,BGenWeisestated,"Theoutstandingartilleryandnaval
gunfire(NGF)supportreallymadeabigdifference.Firefromour105mmand155mmhowitzerswas
continuousthroughoutthebattle.Iwastoldthatthe105satDongHafiredmorethan6,000rounds.Also,
inaninterviewin1999,LtGenTranVanQuan,thecommanderofallenemyforcesinthenortherntwo
provincesofSouthVietnamfrom1965-74,toldmethatMarineCorpsartillerycausedmoreNVA
casualtiesthanNGForair.In1987,then-MajGenDennisMurphy,whohadbeenS-3forColHull's3d
Marines,toldmethattheengineersburied1,568enemybodies3daysafterthebattle."
Intoday'sMarineCorpsespousingexpeditionarymaneuverwarfare,onewouldassumethecommand
andcontrolrestrictionsexperiencedby2/4simplywouldnotoccur.
SemperFidelis
*ForacloselookattheDinhTobattle,seeLtColVicTaylor's"StingofBattle"account,p.71.
William Weise July 2004 Marine Corps Gazette -Seemoreat:https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/04/memories-dai-do#sthash.IxDe6kBE.dpuf DaiDoRemembered
*ThisletterreferstoLtCoIVieTaylor's"HotelCompany-DayThree,"(MCG,Apr04).Notmanypeopleknowthisaboutthen-2dLtVieTaylor,andhecertainlywouldnevertell,buthewasn'tsupposedtobepresentatthebattleofDaiDo.Whenthebattlestartedon30April1968,hewasaboardtheUSSIwojima(LPH2)recoveringfromwoundssufferedduringapreviousbattle(TaskForceKilo).Vieheardthemedevacchopperslandingontheflightdeckandhurriedtolearnwhatwasgoingon.alloftheinitialMarinecasualtieswerefromHotelCompany,sufferedduringtheafternoonassaultonDongHuan.Vieneverhesitated.Hescroungedarifle,flakjacket,helmet,andammoandjumpedaboardoneofthe"UglyAngels"H-34helicoptersreturningtopickupmorecasualties.Vie,ofcourse,neveraskedpermissionasheknewitwouldbedenied.HearrivedatDongHuanintimetohelpmoppingupandreconsolidation.
CaptJimWilliams,anoutstandingcompanycommanderandcombatleader,hadbeenseriouslywoundedandmedevacedduringtheDongHuanassault.
IstLtScottyPrescottassumedcommandofthebatteredbutstillfeistyHotelCompany.TwodayslaterScottywouldalsobewoundedandmedevaced,passingcommandto2dLtVieTaylorinthemidstofahorrendousfirelight.YoungVicTaylorwasmorethanequaltotask,andanumberofMarinesarealivetodaybecauseofhisbraveryandsuperbleadership.
ViedidallofthiswhilehewasAWOLfromsickbay!
God,wheredoestheCorpsgetmenlikehim?
BGenWilliamWeise,
USMC(Ret)-Seemoreat:https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/07/letters#sthash.LRx6IsBq.dpuf