Melton - Is Belief Possible?

8/12/2019 Melton - Is Belief Possible?

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-143-~ s e l i e f P o s s i b l ~ ?

A note\voi thy conclusion of Needham s Belief, Languaee and E x p e r i e n ~is that: "Indifference to the constrain:t of possibil i ty is a curious propertyin a psychological verb, but i t is certainly a distinctive' mark of thenotion of belief" (Needham, 1972; 66). While this statement is not thekeystone of Needham s argument, it is sti1.l0ne of the more suggestivepoints on which his conclusion i s founded, and for that reason provides anopportunity f o r r e ~ e x a m i n i n g i t s more important implicatioIll? Needbam dconclusion that belief is indifferent to possibil i ty comes, by reflectingon Tertull ian 's paradox; an alternative approach is to corlsider the natureof possibil i ty , which i s , after a l l , a notion of some importance in thewri tings of Needhamts aclmovl1edged inspiration, Ludwig \ ~ i l l t g ~ n s t e i n . Thecomplexity 'of lrfittgenStein's writings is such that a 4eq,idated adherentcan +ind himself in the odd si tuation of disagreeing on almost ever,y matterof philosophical importance with one who is equally entit led, to wave hisbanner. This is the case concerning Needham s treatment of the possibil i tyof belief, for while onsmust admire his handling of Wittgenstein 's la terwritings, he makes not a Single reference to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Indeed, this work is not even l is ted in his bibliography.

Wi t tgenstein ' s own repudiation' of the TractatAA has contributed toi t s unpopularity, but since a reader 's opinion of a book need never be thesame as i t s author 's , t is possible to see vlittgenstein's several publishedvolUmes as parts of a whole. Naturally, some parts of the T r a c t a t ~ aremore convincing than others, but there are, to use iJit tgenstein's own metaphor,enough overlapping threilds from one book to the next to string the i,deastogether. One of the arguments begun in the Tracta;\;us that persists throughthe la ter writings i s a certain notion of possibil i ty . The argument of th isessay i s , in part , that had Needham used the word "possibi l i y" in the senseimparted to i t by Wittgenstein in the ~ r a c t a t u s his statement concerningthe possibil i ty of bel ief loJ Ould be reversed, and that this would in turn 'al ter his reflections on the universality of belief.

Wittgenstein 's idea of possibil i ty can be seen in the followingstatements both from and about, his work:, ;llhoJljht can be of. ,v hat is hot the case. (PhilosophicalInvestigations, 1195 .Thought is surrounded by a ralo. - I t s essence,logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori orderof the world: that i s , the order of possibi l i t ies ,which must be common to both world and thought.(Philosophical Investigati ons # 97)I t is essential to things that they should be possibleconstituents of states of affai rs . (Tractatus, 1/2.011

i f a thing occur in .a sta te of affa irs , thepossibili y of the sta te of affairs must be writteninto the thing i t se l f . (Tractatus, 1 2.012A thought contains the possibilit,y of the si tuationlirl which i t is the thought vlhat:L9 thinkable ispossible too. (Tractatus" I 3.02)The limits of my l anwge mean the l imits of my world. ,

~ T r a c t a t u s ? 5.6) , . . .


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-144-v e cannot think what we cannot think so That wecannot think we cannot say either. (Tractatus, # 5.61)Just as the only necessity that exists is logicalnecessity, so t.oo th,e only impossibili Y that exis tsis logicat impossibility. (Tractaty,s, 16.375 . .'Possible' is for vl t tgenstein 1'That is, expressiblein language. (Maslow, 1961;25) .An impossible thought is an impossible t h o ~ g h t (5.61) -and that is why i t is not possible to sarwhat it. is thatcannot be thought. (Anscombe, 1959; 163) .. . . . . . possibi l i tyf must here be taken as exoludingboth certainty; and impossibility. (Anscombe, 1959; 157)

These quotations need l i t t l e elaboration. Thought, possibi l i ty andlanguage are related. VJhat can be ' thought can be put into lazlt, 'Uage., ''lhe,tcan be put into language is possible. lli hin the scheme of the Tracta UB,none of these terms h s anYthing to do loTithreality, .the world, or -the \1Taythings are. "Possibility" is a logical constraint. One can say of astatement whether t is possible or impossible before one holds i t upagainst experience to see whether or not i t is part of the world. I flogical, then thinkable and hence possible. Examples are few, since i t isdiff icul t to think of things that are unthinkable. Suffice i t to say thatany abrogation of the rules of logic is an unthinka'Q e s tate of affairs ,The round square, the three-dimensional t r iangle, the bounded infini ty,are al l logioally contradictory. They defy conception; .there can be nogeneral notion of what they would be i f they were the case . Here, then,arele:gitimate uses of the words "possible", i1impossible", "possibi l i ty", ."imposSibilityll. Considering this definition, what can Needham mean bysaying that "to believe" shows an "indifference to the constraint ofpossibilityll?

Putt ing the question lIis belief possible" i r r l o ~ l i t t g e n s t e i n rs term ;inology is to say: does 'believing describe a sta te ofaffail : 's? Is there apioture of what would be so i f believing were the.case?. . , ~ . . . : - Is the English concept"believing tr thinkable? There are several approaches t9 these ~ e s t i o n sbut before elaborating them, i t is expedient to consider their generalnature, and,as a consequence, the nature of any statement that could be asat isfactory answer. The f i r s t point is quite obvious, that each of thesequestions is posed in the same language, and. herefore, that any answ-erto them will only be relevant to .that. one language, and only be valid forthat one cult-ure. These are general questions about a specif ic language,or fJTay of thinking, and any answel'S to them will not n e ~ e s s a r i l y ref lecton othe r languages. . . . ..

The next consideration i s 'even more important: that these are questionsof conceptualization, not fact . Every question here encountered is so framedthat reference to the gross facts of l&lguage would be inappropriate. . Thegenerality of the statement sought as an anS'fJTer demands the application ofdeduotive reasoning. Thus, partioular uses, or l lisuses.,of "to believe" donot signify. . c ~ c . : .'S : ; ~ .The problem is not whether every use of Uto believe". d$scribes.a state of affa i rs but whether ~ use of the verb .describes a state ofaffairs , which is to say whether or not there is .a .possible. use of "tobelieve" that describes a state of affai rs ; this af ter a l l i s the problem:is bel ief possible? Such questions express no interest in examples ofbelieving t'lhere other words can be substituted, but rather in those'1-There :.


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"believing" seems to f ind no subst i tute.Because th is essay f l i r t s with the idea of meaning, it is essentialto recognize that in order for a w ord to have meaning,' i t need not haveone meaning, or even a single clear meaning. Indeed, one can imagine fe1'lliord.s \fi h even remotely .clear meanings. Likewise, . a word n ~ e d not picturea clear sta te of affa i rs for it to describe a s t a te of affai rs . After a l l ,

t h e re1 s nothing self-contradictory, U . impossible, about vague, fuzzy,strange, pI'eposterou3, fantast ical ," or even s i l l y meanings; they aremeanings nonetheless. Furthermore, that "belief l maybe anllodd';'job" wordis not a problem. Being an odd-job word would frustrate any. attempt todefine the essence of a word. But one can hardly imagine a lexicographerdenying: a ltord dictionary space" because i t s meanings are unrelated. Wordsvdth ent i re ly different meanings are s t i l l thinkable.

Now, on to the question: I s believing a s ta te of affa i rs? The mosttempting anaweris one li'1hich begs the question yet deserves consideration."Insofar as one can only think about the ,-Torld through the media of thelanguage which one has received more or less passively, and the conceptionof bel ief is a part of the English-speaker's 1'Torld,would i t ever be possibleto think of a worldvri hout belief? . If . English laclced "bel ief ll and i t s

r e l a t e d ~ conceptions, That would the 1.,orld be l ike, and hovlwould one thinkabout i t ? Or, i f t has no meaning, vThy do people use i t ? These are questionsthat anyone whocla:i1asthat believing has no meaning must ansirler. One "lioulddo vTell to heed 'the admon t ion of J . L. Austin: our common s tock of words embodies' a l l the distinctionsmen have found worth drawing, and the connections they havefound worth markil1g, in the l i fe t imes of many generations:these surely are l ike ly to be more numerous, more sound,since they have stood up to the long tes t of the survivalof the f i t t e s t , and more subtle , a t leas t in a l l ordinaryand reasonably pract ical matters, than any that you or Iare l ikely to think up in our armchairs of an afternoon -the most favoure"d alternative method. (Austin, 1961: 182)

From thiS, one could also say that because people use and understand"believe" it obviously has a meaning; or. that people who use the word. seemto Imow what t means. Thus, the argument that IIbelief" has a meaning gainsweight from the iner t ia of c u l t ~ e . - Because it is used so . f ~ q t l e n t l y and.because t is a t the foundation of many important Tfestern ideals, becauset would be dif f icul t to think about, cer ta in thinGS a t a l l vlithout i t , it

is tempting to claim tha t i t s meaning is obvious. Thus, a Dr. Johnson, ofthe ideal is t persuasion might argue. ' ,But, of course;. th i s is no proof at.a l l . In fac t , th is argl1ll1ent is only l ikely to convince those who stand .in avTe of language. Philosophers who see the:ir task as purifying, or cleaning .up- lallt,C?Uage, as do many in the i tgenstein t radi t ion, would not sympathiseHith th is . Nevertheless, the English language 'limps along, ignorant of theprunings and amputations of philosophers. ' I f not awe, respect for langl,lagei s vi t a l . Cleaning up language can be likened to sweeping a dir t f loor; thedebris and dust are pushed away, but nothing i s rea l ly changed; sweepingforever wil l not f ind the floorboards. So, one must find. a meaning betvleenthe urge to destroy the mystifying elements of langlmrre and the p l ~ a s u r e ofbeing awed by i t s venerable majesty. '

The only Substwltial answer to the t i t l e of th is essay is that believingdoes describe a s ta te of af fa i r s . This is certainly not easy to describe,for believing i s unquestionably a difficul t conception. Nevertheless, tobegin l ITi th the obvious, "belief" is a word tbat never appears alone. Someonemust always believe something. Only people bel ieve, and they never believe


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--146 -in f . l p \ ~ : : : j - r : ' { c So, believing always -: an object; i t is a relational conception. 'I:' l.: i l16cessit ,,-.;es a distinct-,-on be CiieenthQ believing i - ~ 8 e l f beinga state of affairs and i t s object being one. Sometimes b e H e 7 ~ _ : , g l l e ~ e m snot to describe a state of affairs because i t coupled vlith an inappropriateobject. trlhenone believes in the Loch Ness Monster, the Abominable Snowman,or a f lat earth, i t i s more o ~ less c+ear what one believes, after all peoplewrite books about these things; but i t is not .91ear "1l:J.at one believes lmenone believes, n a spatial object o u t ~ i d e of ,space. Although one could saythat the, senteriQe 1Ihe believes in a round square l has no :meaning, th is snot a comment on the verb, b e c a u s ~ i t is not the believing but, the roundsquare that is absurd. 'A- purple cow is a state, of affairs, a purplegreen-spotis ,not. , ' Thus,the,question "doe:: beli?ving describe a state ofaffairs can only be answered in the context of a complete and legitimate,'use of' the word in a sentence, bearing in mind that for this, to be so' i tmust have an object i lhich is i t se l f a state of affairs. The question, then,becomes: what is the state of affairs described by the relation of a believerto any possible object of belief? This state of affai rs will define theverb.

A way into the idea of believing is through further consideration ofJehe things that form i t s possible objects. 'What sort of things can onebelieve? Do they form a class? Certainly, one would not say of everythingthat he believed or disbelieved i t , even i the 'Hord were being used veryloosely. And, evenwhen the lfOrd is used V8ry s t r ic t ly , there are not many' things which the ordinary speaker would be inclined to believe or disbelieve.Only some things then are possible beliefs,. About what sort of things canone say that one believes them? To what do belief statements apply? ~ h ekey to tIns is found in Needham's ownpages,where he l i s t s as an attr ibuteof believing i t s independence of canons of reality (Ne,edham, 1972; 71).This s supported by a quotation from vlittgenstein to the effect that i fthere liere e,Vidence bearing on matters of be,lief, th, s, would destro thewhole business (vlittgenstein, 1966; 56, quoted in Needham , 1972; 71). Here,then, is the nature of the words, which one believes. The objects of beliefstatements' have but a tangential relation to th.e l'Torld. One does not holdan object of belief up against the,world to see i f , i t exists or not; nordoes comparison with the world render a belief statement true or false.Hence, the inevitable failure of attempts to hold an idea of God up againstthe world, Or to infer a conception of God .from the world. And due to thenature of believed objects, the adherent of the ,flat earth theory rejectsa l l evidence. Also from this comes the sense of a believer saying, thoughI cannot prove God, nor can you disprove Him . ' Likewise, one wil l neverprove that the Loch Ness Monster does notex;i.st. The objects of beliefmake no claim against reali ty, ra,ther, to put i t another W'ay, they makeonly a claim against language, and, therefore, not against our l10rld, butagainst 'our conception of a l l possible worlde. In this way, belief sh.tementsand their objects are radically different from ordinary d i s c ~ r s e .In ' thinkirigabout, belief statements one cannot make a simple hop fromlanguage to verifiable real i ty . Belief statements are a projection ofthe possibili t ies of language onto a voidbeyopd what one can conceive ofas world. I f one could make correspondences between beliefs'and real i ty ,one could be related totbem in some way besides believing; i f that werethe case, beliefs could be experienced, known,proven, verified, dismissed,'or refuted. I t is because of the nature ot b ~ i i e f s t b e i m s ~ l v e s that the onlyrelation one can have to them is to believe, or, disbelieve. They are meta-physical. '

In what state of affai rs is the believer caught up? The relation ofa believer to the non-exper1ential states of affairs called beliefs is thathe is convinced of the i r t ruth,exis tence, or value. 'Because a legal proofis necessarily an after the fact interpretation ot'a.n episode, a jury' never


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knows that a man is guilty; and they n e v e r ~ e n d a man to prison beoausethey Ifth:l.nkrt he is guilty, but they would cerh.inly do so i f they "h.?lieved"in his gi,lilt. This is a cotnmon situation llh6r t wre is no alternative toconvictions strong enough to be labled b e l i e f ' ~ These convictions mayormay not be persistent, in evidenc.e, the cause of action or the' subject ofdoubt. These are quali t ies of bel ief tbatmay be i n s ~ p a r a b l e fr.9m i t , butare not a necessary part of' i t s 'conception and hence have no bearing on i t sexistence as a state of a f f a i r s ~ Althou.gh Belief, LanguagE and Efiperience(PP. 89-92) rejects conviction" as a cri terion of belief, this seems to bebased on a confusion of essence with at tr ibute. Admitting the truth of whatNeedham says, the p r o b l ~ m s he finds n the lord conviot:i.on1t make i t diff icul tto t e l l how firmly a'person may believe something, or even whether in f cthe does believe i t , but they do not make i t inconceivable th t people dbhave convictions, and thus are irrelevant to the question of whether or notbelieving i a a sta te of affairs., Throwing these objectiom aside then, thesta te of affai rs described by believing is that of a man having convictionsabout nbn-experiential s tates of affa irs . This i s a simple picture of whati t means to believe; but i t is strong enov.gh to suggest that bel ief i sindeed possible.

What follows fram the conclusion that believing i s a sta te of affairs?Considering what s tates o f a f f a i r s a r e ~ no concrete revelations could beexpected. Belief i s s t i l l an obstreperous word, both difficult to explainand diff icul t to do without. I t is hard to imagine that philosophers wil lpurge i t either f:eom the English 1anguage, or from the attempt of,socialSCience to p r o d u c ~ technical languages. But i f the argument tpat; beliefs possi ble is able to diSClose but a small, p.;trt of the substance of thatidea, i t does have the pOi"l'er to suggest the reasons for both th;epersistenceand vagueness of the word. "Believing" i s one of many non-experientialstates of affa irs . In fact , language s strewed with fOrds describing whatis beyond empirical experience, and few speakers ever.notice the peculiari tyof these conceptions. There ar.e sound reasons for this being so, and theyare suggested by reflecting on the nature of language and ' I'orld and theintuit ive semaj:ltic theory through which they are ,related. .

The difference between experiential and non-experiential states ofaffairs suggests a s:imilar dist inct ion between factual and conventional disco1.U'se.The Tractatus i s ljJittgenstein's attempt to define factual discourse.Hence, his preoccupation with truth and the resultant development of the .theory ~ O f ver i f iabi l i ty . "Facts l , as the Tractatus describes them, areproduced by confirmation of propositions about the world which are derivedfrom states of affai rs . The wor1d i s the total i ty of known facts. Onecan think about s tates of affai rs that are not facts, but , in vli t tgenstein 'sscheme, when one speaks of "knowledge", one refers to facts, sta tes ofaffa i rs that actually are the case. ' Thus, the alternat ives are to speak offacts, factual discourse, or to speak of states of affai rs that. are notfacts. The term "conventional discourse s being suggested for the la t terarrangement of speech. In the Tractatus, vlittgenstein sets out to define,the l inlits of factual discourse, t.o par t i t ion what can be said from What cannot be said. In his treatment, factual discourse e c o m e ~ c o e x t e p s i v e withthe language of science, Following from this, Vlittrrenstein argues that whatcan be known i s equivalent to the .sum of a l l pro,positions of natural science.Beyond natural science, one knows .nothing; about which one knows nothing,one may not think; where there i s no thought there can be no s.peeoh; and,finally, the concluding statement of the Tractatus.: "vlhat we cannot speakabout v e must pass over in ,silence" (Wittgenstein, 1921, 1 lJ . Thel a ~ l l a g e ' ,of science, or factual discourse, encompasses only a fract ion ofl inguistic :phenomena,and the theory of meaning ill vvi ttgenstein s Tractatusis i'nten:ded to refer exclusively to this small part of the whole. Thatv ttgens te in recognized the l imi a t ions 0 f his endeavour is. clear = Vie feel


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-148-that everivlhen. J 2 Q ~ l > ~ soientif ic questl.Jnshave been a n s T . : T e r e ~ I thproblems of l i fe rema:L1 completely u n t o u c h e d ( W i t t g e n s J G ~ i n , 1921. ;16.52).

The diffiCulty of understanding belief statements is obviously notsusceptible to allY solution that i s solely concerned withsqient i f icdiscourse. Belie'{ statements aboutnon":'experiential sta tes ,of affairs arenot verifiable in the same way as 'Vlittgensteins "facts" . "Are you atr initarian?" i s of, a d i f f , e r , ~ l 1 t o r d e ; r than nls that book red?". ,Thela t ter question is art iculated to the phYsJ.calworld and i s answered onthe ba.sis of sensory experience. ,The former is not art iculated to thephysical ,-rorld and sensory experiences a l ~ e no help in answering i t . Butthe puzzle of belief statements is tha.t questions of th is f.orm areanswered.. How is th is posSible? "

Assuming that belief statements are in the realm of 'conventional discourse, the problem is to define that realm How does i t dif fer fromfaqtual discourse: \fuat semantic principles operate in this non-sciEmtificdOmain? The statements of conventional discourse are neither true norfalse, since there is no "thing" to which i t s words can be correlated.Conventional discourse floats free of the world. Even to verify the assert ion "he is married" one must fi:rst of all know where "he" l ives and whatpeople n that oountry, think about marriage. ' Or" to put i t another way,one must know what the conventions are that deal with marriage. :Knowingthe convention, one' could compare the history of the person concerned tosee whether he had committed those actions deemed necessary for marriageto be n effect. The nature of a convent ion i s obvious from the wordi t se l f . A convention i s an agreement 0I4Y people make, a g r e e ~ i 1 e n t sAgreements are often broken; they are easily changed. Thus, convel1-tionsare human creations; words that have conventional meaning are ar t i f ic ia lboth n the Saussuriansense' and in' a more absolute, s,ense . ' "Dog" is ahuman creation insofar as the same class of objects can just as easily becalled "Hund", but only the word i s a r t i f ic ia l . Language permits' thestatement "a dog is a cat" , but the world' intervenes with thiS,staternentand contradicts i t . Inoonventional discourse the t h ing i t se l f1s ar t i f ic ia l ;i t is created and dispelled by human contract A criminal may be called bysome other' equally arbitrary name, IIVerbrecoor." for example ,bu t also. thething that is criminal today may not be criminal tomorJ,"Ow.Language permits,these statementS: .ilMurder is crimil'l.al", "Priests are criminain,,,"Property ,owners are criminal", "Students 'are criminal ; but eo,ncemUJg the validityof each, the wor;Ld is mute. r.rhil; ;Ls the oddity of conventional discourse,that the world i t se l f changes a t man's t-lhim. Or, to reverse W i ~ t g e r ~ s t e i l l s .aphorism, the' conventional 'forld does depend' on mall's will .

Statements made n the conventional domain are precisely those. f,l. boutwhich v/ittgenstein advises us to be si lent . Yet conve.ntionaldiscourse isa remarkably large part of what'lleopledo with speech, and the "efforts oflogical 'positivism have not yet prevailed against i t . What then are thesemantic principles of this segment of disc.ourf3e, . OllT do peoplethi:nl;:about conventional discourse? :Oddly enOUgh, ' l 'littgenstein himself gives theansw'er to this , albei t by implication. .This is n fact a question that answers i t se l f One does not thinlcabout conventional discourse as i f i t were different from factual discourse.Indeed, one does not 'usually think of convent'ionaldiscourse at al l ; i t . is .a term whipped up for the purposes of this essa.y, not a. standard English.

conception at, a l l . , But even when one does ponder language, one does notmake this division and erect one semantic theory for one kind of I f l . T I . g u ~ eand another theory .for the other. The truth is that people, philosophersincluded, think about conventional things as i theyw'erephysioal things.Conventional discourse operates as i f i t were factual discourse. The two


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are very different , but that people often lose sight of the art underlyingtheir words; agreements and institutions is a common errore. Even in theAge qf ReasQn, constitution builders ' did not appreciate this fact . Thetheory of natural law has gone hand in hand with the theory of socialcontract for precisely this reason (see Sir Ernest Barker, 1946). In thevery act of drawing up conventions, men could not take ful l responsibilityfor their deeds. We hold these truths to be self-evident says Jefferson,not we find these ideas expedient . Even Marx does not argue that ar t i -f icial ly conceived institutions are wrong, but that those who formed themwere out or touch with the natural course of history,and i t s claims to bescientif ic are s t i l l i t s great temptation.

That the semantic principles of factual and conventional discourseare the same i s indicated in the Tractatus. T ~ e structure of language,says Wittgenstein, reduplicates the structure of the world. Thus, theorder of the worid generates the order of language, a statement that appliesto al l language as opposed to al l speech. Factual and conventional discourseare different types of speech, but they are.epiphenomena of t h ~ same language,so that once the order of the world is duplicated by language, a l l speechwill have the same form. Hence, i t is d.nev:i. table that factual and convent ional speech are buil t on the same semantic principles. One r ea l ly needonly say that they are speech, and al l else follows from the nature' of thelanguage/speech division (see deSaussure; 7-32). Now,this essay, i s not anattempt to develop a:theory of meaning, but rather to direct any theoryof meaning to the sort of s p ~ e c h of which belili'lving is a part . And, followingfrom this , to determine the relation of believing to conventional discourseas a whole.

Why i s t sm diff icul t for speakers to admit the arbitrary nature ofthose words which i f not the most clear are certainly the most important?One approach to this is through consideration of the way in which conventional discourse is arbi trary. 1tJhile one may well argue that languageis arbi trary in deSaussure's sense, and that conventional discourse i sarbitrary in an even more absolute sense, this i s not the final word.Conventional discourse i s not only arbitrary, i t is imper&tive; one simplycannot do without i t . In fact , i t seems possible that the more obviouslyarbitrary a word i s , the more imperative t becomes. After al l , the wordsfor which wars are fought, the words for whicl).one l ives and works, arethe most resistant to definition. Likewise, the social institutionsmost closely united with human happiness are in fact the most arbitraryand v ~ r i e d The only moral vision of anthropology is this : that marriage,family, friendship and love are neither ubiquitous.nor universallydesirable; human o r g n i ~ t i o n and thought qre relative, and what pleasessome may horrify others. Thus, when men take their own fel ici ty toheart, they develop firm attachments to the most CJ;rbitrary parts of theirlanguage and their arbitrary ways become imperative. Even when one i sdistressed by the arbi trariness of a favotirite inst i tut ion, i t i s ol'l-lyreplaceable with another equally arbitrary one . Yet the chronicles of.anthropology are also f i l led with accounts of people becoming demoralisedby the revelation of their culture 's relat ivity. While doubt i s resistedby the natural mechanisms of language, once t sets in, cures are not easy\The most popular ideas of socio.logy are in fact names for this condition:Marx's alienation ; Weber's disenchantment ; Durkheim's anomie .,The qUaint customs of the exotic people who have taught us therelat ivi ty of culture are imperatively natul'al to them. Signif icantly,this discussion paral lel ' s Needham's own att i tude toward languagewhen he refers to the contingent. and arbitrary forms of order thatfor them CmenJ are real i ty i t se l f (Needham, 1972; 244). .As a supplement to this he continues:


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I am not saying that human l i f e i s senseless, butthat we cannot make sense 0;- it1, . I f only i t \iereat leas t El tale told by anidio t ) ) re might arrivea t some. o h e r e n t 1 r i e a n i n g . , b u t , ~ l f ~ ~ : t , i i e : t a p h o r presupposes cr i ter ia f " . i n t e J ; l i # . b : i i ] l ~ t y , j ; : j l l 1 d s a n i tythat we do not p o s s e s $ e * d e p t , l l Y : : : ~ . n V 6 i 1 t i o n : ~ " Onceoutside a given form of' i i f e , i r J i n . : : i ~ lost in a'wilderness' of formes' -'.' ( N e e d h ~ , ~ ' e 7 2 _ ; 244) 0. ( ~ f 1 / ~ : > -- .

In part ; i t is language tha conv inces u of tl1:e naturalnes sIt of theconvelltional meanings' of our words, by encouraging us to th:i,nk about themas i f they ~ T e r e experiential real i ty . Language is thus the f i rs t obstacle_to doubt, or, from another point of v i e ~ T , the strongest protection againsti t . 11oreover, language has an arsenal to kcepspeakers on the narrow pathimplied in i t s being learned. One .of the, n;lost effective tools in thisarsenal i s belief I f one feels Unable to " mOl-T" the real i ty of humanconventions (this i s , once' one has performed the very unnatural act ofthinking about language at al l? then one can s t i l l believe in them. Inthe realm of conventional discourse, believing i t is so makes i t so. ~ I h econscious ar t i f ice of Pirandello 's plays is their most natural quality .Belief is a way of relating conventional ideas to the realm of factualdiscourse. Considering the l imitat ion o f thought and the importance ofwhat one t r ies to think about, the perSistence of the word is not surprising.To purge English of belief l'fould' involve more than a change in the languagei t s e l f ; omission from language implies a radical change in that strange andonly par t ia l ly knowable enti ty one' thinl;::s about as ilw'orld .

There i s a f inal twist to possibi l i ty . Because bel ief is possiblein a general sense, i t may be possible in a universal sense. This argumenti s a simple one. Believil1g arises from the ~ I a y that language is art iculatedto the world . And since this isa philosophical argument, and not anexegesis o f English, this means the relat ion of a l l possible, i.e.: a l lconceivable, language to any possible l-10rld Remember what was mid aboveabout bel ief stat'ements making a claim only against a l l possible 11Orlds.The question then is : is it conceivable that any l 1 g u a g ~ could have aone to one attachment to the liorld? Is i t possible that a d ~ t e r m i n e dlanguage e?Cists, i . e . one that is not arbitr:ary in any -r;ray? l I i l l theresearch o anthropology 'unearth a language that is the salile as the llorld?I f the previous part of t h i s essay is correct, these questiOns must a l l beansw'ered no Regardless of how much comparison is done , no man I s languagewi 11 be t b - ~ 'liorId. .

Thus, not only are a l l known languages arbitrary and convent ional,but ny conceivable language is so as well Conventions, since they areneither true nor false, can be doubted; and, generallyspeakil ' lg, what canbe doubted can be believed. Thus, the possibi l i y of believing in Englishpoints to the' possibil i ty of b e l ~ e v i n g in e v ~ r , y language. Needham'spart icular question, about the universality of bel ief lilust be an,f;lwered inthe negative :Lf E v a n s ~ P r i tchard is correct God's existence i s t ~ e ' n forgranted by everybody says Evans-Pritchard :referring to the NU(;lr;(liJvansPritchard, 1956; 9) and from. that i t is clear that t h e y i h a , v : e ; 1 1 l 0 ~ e d tobelieve in God. I t is possible not to ' doubt. I t i s p O S F l , ( j ; ~ ~ r n ( ~ f i } - t o beworried by the difference between factual and conYelntiQnaldiscourse, and1;lhenever th is i s the case it isinapproprii .t te to t h i A l ~ , a ; b o u t b e 1 i e f . So,bel ief is possible but not necessar,y;and) 'it i s possible ,in t ~ l O senses.First n the sense that i t describes ,al;ltate of affai rs , and; SGtl9nd thatthe s tate of affa i rs i t describes isa cOInment on the rel-at.i9ribf languageand vlorld and hence is one in whic4,the speaker of anyoonceivable languagema.y find himself. Th1,ls , although belief .it sel f ca11no1;OO considered a humanuniversal, i t may be said that bel ief is a universal pOss'ibility.

Lavlrence C. r1el ton


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Anscombe G. E. N.

Austin, J LBarker, Sir Ernest

Evans-Pritchard, E. E.Maslow Alexander

J:iTeedham Rodney

I5IReferences'

An Introduction to v r f t t g e ~ s t e i B ' s ,$ractatus. London: Hutchinson Co., 1959.

Nuer Religion. Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1956.A stud.y j.n ~ J i t t g e n s t e i n l s Tractatus. Berlreley andLos Angeles: Uni". of Califorllia P ress, '1961.Belief. Langua.geand. Experien .g e. Oxford: Bl,aclmell.1972.

vlittgenstein, Ludwig TractatusLogico-Philosophicus. Translated by D. F.Pears and B F NcGuinness. London: Houtledge andKegan Paul/19bl Firs t German JJ]dition in Annalender N a t u r p h i l o s o ~ h ~ 1921.Philoso hical Invest i at ions; Tra.nslated by G. E. M.2nd ed. rev. 1958) Oxford: Bla.ckwell.Lectures _ ~ d Conversations on Aesthetics. J.:.svchologyand Religious Belie. . Cyril Barret t . Oxford:Blaclnrell, 1 9 ~ 6

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Melton - Is Belief Possible?

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