Melo Empical Assestment of Eco Cerficiation Scheme in Ecuadorian Banana Production

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EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF ECO-CERTIFICATION SCHEMES IN

ECUADORIAN BANANA PRODUCTION

A Thesis

Presented to Faculty of the Graduate School

of Cornell University

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Science

by

Cristian J. Melo

August 2004



ABSTRACT

Ecolabeling has become increasingly popular as an environmental

governance tool due to recent challenges to state-based environmental

regulations (Constance and Bonnano 1999, Dryzek 1997, Kettl 2002,

Kirchhoff 2000, Mazmanian and Kraft 2001), and the increasing reliance on

market-based incentives to replace command and control regulatory efforts.

Yet, it has been reported that data on the environmental benefits of

ecolabeling programs is lacking (OECD 1997). I considered that a

comparison of the risk reduction behaviors of certified versus non-certified

operations will contribute to the knowledge of the environmental

effectiveness of third party ecolabeling schemes.

I chose to investigate banana production, due to the fact that this is

one of the most important traded commodities (only behind cereals), and

reports from scientist and activist’s organizations denouncing on the

environmental damage caused by banana farming. The research was

conducted in Ecuador, the world’s leading exporter of bananas. I compared

the environmental performance of certified farms holding either Fairtrade

(FT) or Rainforest Alliance (RA) certification with non-certified farms of

similar size. Controlling for size is essential, as size is correlated with level of

technology (and capitalization), which is the basis of risk reductionassessment in this study.



A field survey of the risk reduction practices of 47 farms (10 certified

large (RA), 13 certified small (FT), 15 non-certified large and 9 non-certified

small) was conducted. The environmental performance of each farm was

assessed against a set of best management behaviors derived from an agro-

ecological comparison of the certification standards with the Ecuadorian

environmental bylaws for banana production. Farms of the same

characteristics (size and certification) were grouped presenting opportunity to

compare large certified farms (RA) to large uncertified farms and small

certified (FT) to small uncertified farms.

The empirical findings indicate that certified farms exhibit relatively complex

environmental management systems. They implemented a comprehensive

set of risk reduction measures compatible with the requirements of the

certification standards. Conversely, non-certified farms exhibited partial,

unstructured compliance with one or other risk reduction criteria. The results

indicate that both large and small certified farms outperformed non-certified

ones. In fact, the worst performing certified farm (of any size) has an

observed higher risk reduction score than the best of the non-certified farms.

The cross-sectional analysis reported here does not allow us to address the

question of whether certification represents an incentive that enhances

investments by farms seeking to differentiate themselves or a reward to firmsthat have already made investments in environmental protection.

Regardless of this ambiguity, from a pragmatic perspective, the

environmental accomplishments of small and large certified farms speak in



favor of using ecolabels to encourage and/or acknowledge better

environmental behavior. However, it must be stated that ecocertification is a

tool for differentiating “the better farms” from others. Ecocertification can not

reach producers who lack the willingness or the resources to improve their

practices, and it should not be assumed that private efforts can assume all

the regulatory functions of the nation-state. State-regulations are needed to

set the minimum levels of environmental conservation practice that must be

obeyed by all the producers.



iii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Cristian J. Melo was born in Quito-Ecuador. He did his undergraduate

studies at the Department of Biology of the “Pontificia Universidad Catolica

del Ecuador.” After joining an Ecuadorian non-profit, he acquired some seven

years-worth experience with the successes, challenges and failures that are

part of the quest for the grail of Sustainable Development. Influenced by his

work experience, he move away from his biological sciences background and

looked forward to further education in natural resources policy. His wish was

granted by a Fulbright Grant and the support of Cornell University. His

research was conducted in ecolabeling, motivated by the lack of knowledge

in this area. After finishing his studies, his professional development plans

are contingent on living in the same city as his wife, something that he has

not done in the last two years.



iv

To Nora



v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank my advisor, Dr. Steven Wolf. Beyond support and guidance, I

must say that our intellectual relationship forced me to reevaluate and rethink

on my worldview. I acknowledge Tom Gavin, the second member of my

Committee for his comments and questions. My special thanks to Barbara

Knuth, Chair of the Department of Natural Resources. I also acknowledge

the influence of Cornell’s faculty members Marianne Krasny, Lindy Williams,

David A. Lee, Ross Lloyd and Tim Fahey in one or other stage of my

research. Also, I would like to express my thanks to my DNR colleagues and

Cornell’s administrative people for spicing my life quite a bit.

I thank the Ecuadorian Fulbright Commission, the U.S. Department of

State, and the Institute for International Education for their economic support

and several opportunities to interact with other exchange students.

I express my no-names thanks to all the producers that were willing to

spend two or three hours of their time with me. Reybancorp (Favorita Holding

Company), Conservation and Development, Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade

and the “El Guabo” Association of Small Banana Producers are also

acknowledged by their openness.

Finally I must thank my wife, Nora. Her support at the distance is

commendable, and she is the only person I know that could search

bibliography in applied phylogenetics and ecolabeling at the same time.



vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 The limits of state-based regulations 1

1.2 Ecolabeling 3

1.3 Bananas 8

1.3.1 Environmental impacts of banana plantations 10

1.3.2 Social impacts of banana production 13

1.4 Ecuador’s banana industry 16

1.4.1 Certification schemes operating with the Ecuador’s banana

industry

18

1.4.2.1 Rainforest Alliance (RA) 20

1.4.2.2 Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International (FLO) 22

1.4.2.3 The Ecuadorian Environmental Management Bylaws for the

banana sector

25

1.5 Research question 25

CHAPTER TWO: METHODS 28

2.1 Agro ecological assessment of banana production 28

2.2 Field survey of production practices and risk reduction 31

2.2.1 Important indicators 31

2.2.2 Different approaches toward risk reduction: end of pipe and

process measures

33

2.2.3 Implications of farm size for sample design 35

2.3 Field survey 36

2.3.1 Farm selection 40



vii

2.3.2 Data gathering 42

2.3.3 Notes on the field work 42

2.4 Data coding and risk reduction evaluation 44

2.4.1 Use of land 45

2.4.2 Agrochemical management 46

2.4.3 Waste management 49

2.4.4 Water quality 56

2.4.5 Total risk reduction score 63

2.4 Statistical analysis 63

CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 65

3.1 Comparison of normative schemes: Ecuadorian

Environmental Management Bylaws for Banana Production,

Rainforest Alliance and Fairtrade certification standards

65

3.1.1 Use of land 65

3.1.2 Agrochemical management 68

3.1.2.1 Agrochemicals restrictions 75

3.1.2.2 Crop management 75

3.1.2.3 Agrochemical storage facilities 77

3.1.2.4 Occupational health and training 77

3.1.3 Waste management 78

3.1.4 Water quality 81

3.1.5 Implications of the comparison of the norms 863.2 Empirical assessment of eco-certification schemes in

Ecuadorian banana production

87

3.2.1 By risk reduction criteria 87



viii

3.2.1.1 Use of land (UL) 87

3.2.1.2 Agrochemical management (AM) 91

3.2.1.3 Waste management (WM) 101

3.2.1.4 Water quality (WQ) 106

3.2.2 Total risk reduction score (TT) 111

3.2.3 Differences between certified and non-certified small farms 112

3.2.4 Differences between certified and non-certified large farms 119

3.2.5 Differences between certified and non-certified farms 121

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 126

APPENDIX 1: SURVEY “A” 130

APPENDIX 2: SURVEY “B” 135

APPENDIX 3: VARIABLES DICTIONARY 137

REFERENCES 145



ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Tethering banana plants using plastic cord 14

Figure 2: Stacking banana plants using bamboo 15

Figure 3: Study framework 27

Figure 4: Inputs and outputs of banana production (plantation level) 29

Figure 5: Inputs and outputs of banana production (processing

facility)

30

Figure 6: Farms locations 39

Figure 7: Histogram of risk reduction scores for use of land (UL) by

farm size and certification status

89

Figure 8: Fairtrade-certified organic rustic (no-technology based)

banana plantation

92

Figure 9: Rainforest Alliance-certified farm buffer zone (Reybancorp

S.A., Quevedo-Los Rios)

93

Figure 10: Histogram of risk reduction scores for agrochemical

management (AM) by farm size and certification status

98

Figure 11: Fertilizers storage at the side of the processing facility of a

non-certified farm (Naranjal-Guayas).

99

Figure 12: Pesticides mixing area of a non-certified farm (Naranjal-

Guayas)

100

Figure 13: Histogram of risk reduction scores for waste management(WM) by farm size and certification status

103

Figure 14: Rejected banana (unfit for exportation) in a no-certified

farm (Naranjal-Guayas).

104



x

Figure 15: Banana stalks open-dump in a non-certified banana farm

(Naranjal-Guayas).

105

Figure 16: Area used for burning plastic waste in a non-certified farm

(Naranjal-Guayas)

107

Figure 17: Histogram of risk reduction scores for water quality (WQ)

by size of farm and certification status

109

Figure 18: Histogram of the total risk reduction scores by size of farm

and certification status

115

Figure 19: Dot plot for the total risk reduction score by farm size and

certification status

116



xi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: List of certified and non-certified farms by location (province-

location) and type of crop management

Table 2: Variables, indicators, labels and coding for use of land (UL) 47

Table 3: Variables, indicators, labels and coding for agrochemical

management (AM)

50

Table 4: Variables, indicators, labels and coding for waste

management (WM))

57

Table 5: Variables, indicators, labels and coding for water quality

(WQ)

59

Table 6: Comparison of the RSAB, Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance

standards for use of land

66


standards for agrochemical management

69


standards for waste management

79


standards for water quality

83

Table 10: Median, mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation

for small and large non-certified and certified farms scores

for use of land

90



for agrochemical management

94



xii



for waste management

102



for water quality

108


for small and large non-certified and certified farms total risk

reduction scores

112

Table 15: Farms risk reduction scores and percentage of maximum

score for use of land (UL), agrochemical management (AM),

waste management (WM), water quality (WQ) and total risk

reduction score (TT), ordered by total risk reduction score

113

Table 16: Differences between average risk reduction score by index

(expressed as percentage of the index maximum possible

score) of certified versus non-certified small farms

117


(expressed as percentage of the index maximum possible

score) of certified versus non-certified large farms

120



xiii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APBN Association of Small Banana Producers of “Naranjal” (EC)

APPBG Association of Small Banana Producers of “El Guabo” (EC)

BNP Banana National Program (EC)

CYD Conservation and Development (EC)

EPA Environmental Protection Agency (US)

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FLO Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International

FT Fairtrade

INEN National Institute for Normalization (EC)

ISO International Standardization Organization

MAG Ecuadorian Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (EC)

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAN Pesticides Action Network

RA Rainforest Alliance (US)

RSAB Ecuador’s environmental bylaws for banana production

SAN Sustainable Agriculture Network (US)

SICA Agricultural information service of the MAG (EC)

UNEP United Nations Environmental Program

WHO World Health Organization

WTO World Trade Organization



1

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The limits of state-based regulations

In 1992, the United Nations (UN 1993) called for developing a system

of sustainable development through trade. Their assumption was that

economic development can occur in a way that can be environmentally

sustainable, without the natural resources costs that are traditionally

associated with increased economic activity – pollution, ecological

simplification, reductions in stocks of non-renewable resources. At the same

time, the traditional system of state based environmental regulation was

being challenged as too expensive or cumbersome. It was argued that the

economic cost of implementing the recommended measures, and enforcing

compliance, diminished the economic competitiveness of local firms,

industrial sectors and national economies (Dryzek 1997, Kettl 2002, Kirchhoff

2000, Mazmanian and Kraft 2001). Furthermore, supporters of state-based

environmental regulations realized that controls could not be enforced

beyond the physical and legal boundaries that define a nation. Beyond

inability to enforce regulations abroad, the local enforcement power of the

traditional state-based environmental regulation was challenged by the

emergence of the WTO-sponsored free trade. Global free trade rules mayforce a nation to change their environmental law if a regulation is found to

function as a trade barrier (Constance and Bonnano 1999).



2

In parallel to weakened faith in state-based regulation, a new set of

environmental governance tools was emerging (Kettl 2002, Goodman 2000).

These new tools seek to utilize the market to achieve better environmental

outcomes. Their designers believe that proper use of market-based

incentives could lead to sustainable development (Hempel 1996). Developed

as voluntary compliance systems, they cannot be considered as a trade

barrier because their regulatory power is based in consumer’s preferences.

While it can be argued that existence of a “green market” is a prerequisite for

incentive-based policies to work, once the market for environmental services

is established the economic actors are free to creatively find alternatives to

provide consumers with the desired product.

An additional advantage of market based policies is that the

compliance verification and enforcement can be transferred to the private

sector, opening a door for the development of two-way relationships between

environmental groups and the industry. These environmental groups

positioned themselves as third party regulators, facilitating transactions

between producers and consumers by enhancing communication and

reducing information asymmetries. Through these arrangements, private

non-profit organizations and commercial actors could develop new ways of

addressing environmental problems unresolved by state-based regulations.

Ecolabeling emerged as one of these promising market-based tools,

because it provides economic incentives to producers that invest in resource

conservation. Because ecolabeling is a relatively new phenomenon, there



3

are gaps in the knowledge about this environmental governance strategy.

The OECD (1997) recognizes that there is a lack of information of the

environmental benefits of ecolabeling, and makes a call for research in this

topic. This thesis represents a novel attempt to evaluate the significance of

leading eco-labeling initiatives for natural resource conservation through

empirical assessment of behaviors of certified producers of bananas relative

to non-certified producers. The study was conducted in Ecuador, the world’s

largest exporter of bananas. The analysis allows us to evaluate the

environmental risk reduction practices of farms operating under a certification

scheme, and compare them with the risk reduction practices deployed in

similar non-certified farms. As envisioned in this study, risk reduction results

from innovation associated with changes in management routines, training of

workers, and investments in alternative technologies. Results inform

understanding of performance of eco-labeling initiatives and the larger

question of practical significance of voluntary schemes of market-based

environmental governance.

1.2 Ecolabeling

Ecolabeling has emerged as one of the promising tools operating

under the premises of market based incentives. It has been described as an

alternative way to promote better environmental performance by helping theconsumers to identify “green” products (Dosi and Moreto 2001, Consumers

International 1999). In agriculture, it has been seen as a tool for encouraging

the incorporation of new technologies (van Ravenswaay and Blend 1997,



4

Goodman 2000). In its simplest form, an ecolabeling program is comprised of

a certification body that develops a set of guidelines, a differentiated product

(often signaled by a label or symbol), a group of consumers [market] that are

willing to acquire these differentiated products, and producers that want to

provide these products in order to have access to a new market niche or to

compete against firms pursuing similar programs (Markandya 1997). Thus,

ecolabeling offers a unique opportunity to generate an interesting feedback

mechanism between producers, certification bodies and consumers

(Markandya 1997): the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for certified goods

encourages the production of more of these differentiated products, and this

increased supply of certified goods contributes to the growth of the market.

Certification systems have become common all around the world and

across many product categories. Some of these programs are set by a

nation-state and have a country restricted market, like the Swedish

Environmental Choice, the German Blue Angel, the Nordic Swan, the

Canadian Environmental Choice Program (OECD 1997) or the U.S.

Department of Agriculture National Organic Program (USDA 2002). Others

have been set up by supra-national governments (like the European Union

Ecolabel Award Scheme) (OECD 1997) or supra-national institutions like the

International Organization for Standardization (ISO), which “networks

national standards institutes from 148 countries” (ISO 2004).

While eco-certification has and continues to grow rapidly, there are

critics. Government labeling programs based in mandatory technical



5

regulations have been identified as a form of protectionism and thus illegal

under WTO rules governing technical barriers to trade (TBT). Prominent

examples include the yellow-fin tuna/dolphin safe case and the European

requirement to label products that contain genetically-modified ingredients

(Constance and Bonnano 1999, Dankers 2003, Isaac and Kerr 2003, Jones

et al. 1999, Joshi 2004, Ward 1997). While the ISO certification system is not

a TBT due to its voluntary nature, it too has come under criticism. Its critics

claim that it could degrade the credibility of all the third party ecolabeling

systems because each firm sets its goals and timeframes without being

required to prove compliance (Cadwell 1998, Curkovic 2001, Kimerling

2001).

Beyond the controversy that surrounds national or supra national

certification systems, some of the most widely recognized certification

schemes were born as initiatives of the private, non-profit sector (thus called

third party certification systems). Some of the best know environmentally-

concerned programs are the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) (1993) and

the Marine Stewardship Council (1997). According to the FAO Ad-hoc Expert

Meeting on Socially and Environmentally Responsible Banana Production

and Trade (FAO 2000), some of the more relevant certification groups

working with agricultural products are Rainforest Alliance, several organic

certification organizations grouped on the International federation of Organic Agriculture Network (IFOAM), and the social justice movements grouped in

the Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International (FLO).



6

This type of private, non-profit certification initiatives is extremely

interesting from an environmental governance perspective. Cadwell (1998)

considered that “voluntary, private, and relatively transparent programs are at

less risk of WTO discipline than government-sponsored eco-seals.” Thus,

certification systems provide interested parties (non profit organizations,

retailers, consumer associations and individual consumers) with a way to

promote their values at the international level, avoiding the conflict that

surrounds state-based regulations.

Third party certification also has advantages for the producers, which

can get certain compensations for their “better” behavior, in the form of

premium prices, access to an exclusive market, protection against boycotts,

or public image improvement. Also, it can be that the procedures and

technology needed to achieve the “certified” status force the producer to

become more efficient, thus generating further profits by achieving a lower

production cost and higher yields than competitors. Thus, an ecolabeling

program presents a unique opportunity for a win-win situation in which

environmental and/or socially concerned actors can interact positively with

progressive producers. This interaction has the potential for improved

environmental performance at the producer level (thus achieving the social

goals of the certification systems stakeholders), while offering the producers

tangible economic benefits.

Despite the popularity of ecolabeling as an environmental governance

tool, there has been limited research on the empirical effects of these



7

initiatives. The published research focuses on analysis of various schemes

with an eye toward criticizing one or another set of standards and

assessment of the social effects of some of these initiatives (Murray and

Raynolds 2000, Raynolds 2000, Bray 2002). This literature recognizes the

ambiguity of ecolabeling programs. Simultaneously, they can be seen as a

way to promote socially conscious community-based economic development,

as part of marketing campaigns of multinational corporations, and as a

strategy of environmental management.

While this controversy remains, the present research is based on

comparisons of norms and commitments structuring the various certification

schemes and their empirical effects, due to the fact that little or no fieldwork

has been reported. The need for hands-on research is mentioned in

documents such as the OECD (1997), that mentions that it is “too early or too

difficult” to evaluate the environmental effects of ecolabeling. Even more, this

documents reports that “data relating to the environmental benefit achieved

through eco-labelling is lacking.” (OECD 1997). Some of the questions that

surround this issue were exposed in the Ecolabeling and the Greening of the

Food Market Conference (Lockeretz 2002), which raised questions about

ecolabeling and the consumers, the interaction between different seals, and

also highlighted the overwhelming need for empirical studies.

There are several reasons for the lack of empirical studies in

ecolabeling systems. In order to have validity, a study of ecolabeling must

face methodological constrains, due to the multidisciplinary and multivariate



8

nature of the task. If direct measures of “improved environmental

performance” are not practical, the research protocols must be designed to

gather information about the best management practices known for that

activity. Also, there is a need for a sizeable sample of certified and non-

certified operations whose owners have to be willing to participate in the

research. And, finally, it can be hypothesized that certification systems need

a period of time before its effects can be measured.

Given the lack of empirical data on effectiveness of eco-certification as

an environmental management strategy, there is a need to study

environmental risk reduction (understood as a set of behaviors and

investments that will reduce the negative environmental impact of an activity)

achieved by certified producers of agricultural products. To make sense of

these data, risk reduction practices on certified farms must be compared to

the practices of non-certified farms. I present the results of such a

comparative analysis through a case study of banana production in Ecuador.

While a case study cannot support global inference, bananas as the fifth

largest agricultural commodity trade in the world and Ecuador as the world’s

leading banana exporter (Chambron 1999) suggest that this case is

significant and perhaps analytically significant.

1.3 Bananas

Since bananas were introduced to the American public at the 1876

Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition, along with the Hand and Torch of



9

Barthodi's "Statue of Liberty1," American consumers have been faithful in

their increasing demand for more of these colorful fruits (Baxter 1998).

Bananas have been recognized as a good source of energy and vitamins

since the beginnings of the century (see Prescott 1918) and they can be

harvested all year round (Chambron 1999). Moreover, as far back as 1899

and the founding of the United Fruit Company, bananas can be reliably

shipped from the remote parts of the world in which they are grown to the

avid consumers in the developed word (Soluri 2000).

Bananas are the fifth most valuable agricultural trade commodity in

the world (Chambron 1999). According to the Food and Agriculture

Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the global trade of bananas in the

year 2000 was 14 million metric tons (Mt), with the U.S. consuming 4 million

Mt (28%) (FAO 2001a). Most of these bananas were of the Dwarf Cavendish

variety (Baxter 1998), and most of them were grown in one of five countries:

Ecuador, Costa Rica, Colombia, Philippines and Guatemala. These five

countries account for 71% of the world production. Ecuador is the largest

exporter in the world, producing 28% of the total (FAO 2001a).

While banana consumers and producers are counted in the millions,

five companies control 86% of the total trade (Chambron 1999). While one

of these corporations had labeled the fruit as “the perfect food for life,”(Baxter 1998) the environmental and social costs of raising bananas had

1 Free Library of Philadelphia. 2001. http://libwww.library.phila.gov/CenCol/. Accessed 11-10-2002.



10

been transferred to the workers and the environment of the countries in

which the fruit is grown. It is estimated that less that 10% of the retail price

accrues to producers, with the exporters (50%) and retailers (40%) capturing

the rest of the revenue (Banana Link 2002). According to some activist

organizations, this distribution insures that producers cannot afford to pursue

conservation. In order to maximize their profits, producers are motivated to

increase yields without regards of environmental or social conditions (Human

Rights Watch 2002, Chambron 1999). While some producers simply have no

resources to devote to natural resource conservation and community welfare,

the general institutional problem of lack of incentives and rules to motivate

firms to contribute positively to society leads to a pattern of unsustainable

economic activity.

1.3.1 Environmental impacts of banana plantations

The environmental impacts of banana plantations have received a

token share of attention by scholars. Commercial banana farming is a high

input monoculture that exerts a heavy toll on the ecosystems that support it.

A monoculture replaces highly diverse ecosystems, with large surfaces

cultivated with a few varieties of the same species or clones of the same

organism. In order to maintain a high production rate, banana plantations

require the intensive use of pesticides and fertilizers that combined with theuse of water for artificial irrigation and the lack of systems designed to stop

or delay the potential runoff, can generate on-site and off-site degradation

(UNEP 2001, Castillo et al. 1999). Also, banana production generates



11

significant amounts of organic and inorganic waste that, if inadequately

disposed, can contribute to the degradation of the already weakened local

ecosystems (Chambron 1999, Astorga 1998, Mortensen et al. 1998,

Henriques et al. 1997, Jeger et al. 1996).

There are reports that this intensive use of agrochemicals has

impacted the water quality of whole regions. It is reported the level of nitrates

in Costa Rican waters are approaching or surpassing international

permissible levels (UNEP 2001). Some other studies have linked

agrochemical use in banana production with nitrate water pollution in the

Canary Islands (Muños –Carpena et al. 2002) and agrochemical pollution in

Santa Lucia and Jamaica (Dasgupta and Perue 2003). Likewise, the banana

plantations’ fungicide run-off was blamed for the so-called Taura Syndrome,

which devastated the shrimp farming industry in Ecuador in the late 90’s

(Colburn 1997, Stern 1999).

Moreover, a study conducted in banana plantations in Costa Rica

found that avian populations were commonly exposed to agrochemical

residuals (Mortensen et al. 1998) and that plantations had a lower avian

biodiversity than forested areas (Matlock et al. 2002). While adequate

pesticide storage is a problem in most developing countries (Haines1985),

pesticide management and storage in banana plantations has been calledsloppy (Henriques et al. 1997), as there are concerns about the “less costly

alternative” mentality that drives some of the plantation owners. They are

likely to select the cheaper product without regards of its potential risk, even



12

if other less toxic alternatives are available. The same disregard for human or

environmental health has been denounced in relation with the Pesticide

Action Network’s ban on the herbicide paraquat (Mora 2003).

Some authors have expressed concerns about banana plantations

solid and liquid waste generation and disposition. Astorga (1998) mentions

that “the volume of waste produced is double the volume of bananas

produced. One fifth of this waste requires special treatment.” Plastic bags,

sometimes impregnated with pesticides, end up in the rivers adjacent to the

plantation (Henriques et al. 1997, Baxter 1998, Chambron 1999).

Likewise, plantations can have problems with adequate management

of other plastic residuals. In the words of Astorga (1998) “the polypropylene

string used for underpinning or tethering, are normally left littering the

plantation, affecting the fertility of the soil.” Due to the lack of recycling

facilities, the bags used for bunch protection are a source of pollution being

either dumped alongside roads or riverfronts, or burned. Furthermore, stalks

and non-exportable fruit are routinely dumped, producing undesirable

environmental effects (Astorga 1998, Henriques et al. 1997).

Banana production takes a toll on forest remnants, directly by the

conversion of rainforest to plantations or indirectly by requiring wood tosupport production. For example, the Ecuadorian banana industry’s demand

for bamboo stakes is partially responsible for the loss of half of Ecuador’s

wild bamboo stands in the last 20 years, according to a report of the



13

International Network for Bamboo and Rattan (INBAR 2001). These stakes

are used to tether the banana plants to ensure they remain upright (see

Figure 1 and Figure 2). It can be calculated that if half of the banana

producers use wild bamboo for staking material, approximately 60,000

hectares of wild bamboo stands are mowed down every year (following the

empirical rule of 1 hectare of bamboo for 10 hectares of banana2).

1.3.2 Social impacts of banana production

The social impacts of commercial banana farming are difficult to

quantify, but the term and connotations of the “banana republic” label, when

applied to a developing country, speaks for itself. Authors have focused on

the social problems generated by the banana trade (Soluri 2000, Striffler

2002) and some non-profit organizations have denounced the conditions

under which the workers of banana plantations live (see Human Right

Watch’s “Tainted Harvest” (2002)), Fairtrade Foundation’s “Unpeeling the

Banana Trade” (2000), Banana Link’s “Human and Environmental Cost of

Banana Trade” (2002)).

Banana plantations not only use child labor to reduce their operating

costs (Human Right Watch 2002), the workers of banana plantations are

exposed to longer than average working hours, their wages are not sufficientto cover the basic need of subsistence for their families, and they are

2 J. Meza, Reybancopr S.A., July 2003.



14

Figure 1: Tethering banana plants using plastic cord. Note the plastic bags

used for fruit protection.



15

Figure 2: Stacking banana plants using bamboo. Note the plastic bags used

for fruit protection.



16

regularly exposed to agrochemicals (Human Rights Watch 2002, Karlsson

2004). Unions are discouraged in some countries, but in Ecuador unions and

pro-union efforts are actively prosecuted (Human Right Watch 2002).

1.4 Ecuador’s banana industry

Ecuador’s banana industry accurately reflects the contradictions that

can be found in any producing nation. The banana trade accounts for 22% of

the total of exports, and it is the second leading export for the whole country

(El Universo 2003a). According to the results of the Third National Agriculture

Census (SICA 2003), 28,619 Ecuadorian producers hold 189,331 hectares

dedicated to the production of bananas. One hundred and thirty thousand

workers receive wages from this activity (El Comercio 2003), with 1.1 million

people (out of 12.5 million) benefiting directly or indirectly (FAO 2001b)

After the social struggle of the late 60’s and early 70’s, almost all the

land dedicated to this activity is in hands of Ecuadorians or companies with

Ecuadorian capital (Striffler 2002). These producers, working under contract

farming arrangements, mainly sell their bananas to one of the main

transnational banana companies (Dole, Chiquita, Del Monte, Fyffes and

Bonita) or their Ecuadorian subsidiaries. The relationships between

producers and exporters are contentious, with the producers denouncing thatthe price per unit (so called “caja”) does not cover their minimum production

cost (Macas 2003). The Ecuadorian government has been trying to regulate

this market, imposing an official price per box. However, this price (according



17

to the exporters) does not adequately reflect the market price fluctuations,

thus introducing market distortions that make Ecuadorian bananas less

competitive (El Universo 2003b).

Also, as a by product of a neoliberal-driven reform, the Banana

National Program (BNP) (in charge of regulating, controlling and monitoring

the industry) was suppressed in 1998 (D.E. 439, RO 97-S, December 29,

1998) and replaced by the policy-making Banana National Council. This

newly created institution is charged with development of the industry and

fixing the referential price (UNEP 2002), but it does not have controlling or

monitoring functions. A report by the UNEP (2002) concluded that while

some of the extension services provided by the BNP have been assumed by

exporters and producers unions, the “functions relating to the creation and

implementation of controls and monitoring are still missing,” and

acknowledges that “many producers do not comply with the existing

standards and regulations.”

Data from the last agricultural census indicates that relatively few

banana farms are large (20% of the farms are bigger than 100 hectares),

while a large number of farms are small (37% of the farms are in the 0-10

hectares range) (SICA 2003). However, the former account for 64% of the

total surface dedicated to bananas, and the latter account for only the 8% ofit (SICA 2003). In fact, several of the interviewed persons mentioned that

during the last five years the pressures generated by the complexity of

banana farming and market distortions (that favored larger holdings and



18

heavy-input management) have forced small and medium farmers to change

their management systems to more capital intensive ones, get out of banana

production, or sell their holdings to larger operations3

. These changes in

structure of banana farming will obviously enhance the concentration of

production.

Data from Ecuador’s Banana National Program shows that from 1989

to 1999 the percentage of farms that are considered technology-based (TB)

has increased from 30% to 70%; in the same period, semi-technology-based

(ST) farms have increased from 10% to 20% and rustic (no-technology-

based, NT) farms have decreased from 70% to 10% (UNEP 2002). These

designations reflect a farm’s reliance on external inputs (agrochemicals,

artificial irrigation, power in TB farms, with few or no external inputs in NT

farms) and crop management practices (TB usually being a banana

monoculture, with NT describing more diverse crop systems). These data

show that Ecuadorian producers have switched to high-impact, high yield

management systems, disregarding the environmental services provided by

less intensive producers.

1.4.2 Certification schemes operating with the Ecuador’s banana

industry

At the time of the field work reported in this thesis, three certification

systems were operating in Ecuador: Rainforest Alliance Certification System

3 V. Chacon, APPBN, July 2003; V. Mawyin, EPELDATOS, June 2003.



19

(also know as ECO-O.K. or Better Banana Program), Fairtrade (under the

umbrella of Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International, FLO), and organic

under several organizations affiliated with the International Federation or

Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), like Naturland and Skal

International.

Interestingly, Ecuador’s market share of each of these certification

programs does not exactly reflect their international popularity. In the

international arena Rainforest Alliance emerges as the largest program, with

an international participation of about 15% of the global trade of bananas

(approximately 1870000 MT) (FAO 2001c), organic is the second program

certifying 67600 MT per year and Fairtrade becomes the third with 22000 MT

per year.

In Ecuador, at the time of the study (summer of 2003), 7000 hectares

were certified by Rainforest Alliance. Fairtrade was second, with 2000

hectares. Ecuadorian Organic banana sector was at a starting point; after

consulting with producers association’s representatives, and faced with the

lack of an official body representing organic banana producers it was

possible to identify only one organic producer not affiliated with a Fairtrade

Cooperative. It is possible that more producers have moved to organic

agriculture recently, or that their farms were/are in the process of becomingcertified; nevertheless, the research protocol was designed to include only

Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance certified farms. Both organizations are



20

described briefly in the next part of this manuscript. A detailed comparison of

the norms of these programs is conducted later in the paper.

1.4.2.1 Rainforest Alliance (RA)

Rainforest Alliance, a non profit U.S. conservation organization, is well

known by it involvement in several ecocertification initiatives, which include

systems for several agricultural products (banana, cocoa, coffee, citrus and

ferns), timber products (SmartWood) and tourism (SmartVoyager). In

agriculture, Rainforest Alliance acts as the secretariat of the Sustainable

Agriculture Network (SAN), which represents conservation groups in nine

Latin and Central America countries (Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,

Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico) that share

Rainforest Alliance’s vision of sustainable development (Rainforest Alliance

2004).

Rainforest Alliance stated mission is to “protect ecosystems and the

people and wildlife that depend on them by transforming land-use practices,

business practices and consumer behavior” (Rainforest Alliance 2004).

Rainforest Alliance actively engages the industry in programs designed to

“conserve biodiversity and provide sustainable livelihoods. Ecolabeling is

their principle strategy for both recognizing and engaging different economicgroups that range from multinational banana companies (Chiquita Brand) to

cooperatives of small producers of cocoa and coffee (Rainforest Alliance

2004).



21

As seen in its rhetoric, Rainforest Alliance actively engages industry

into its programs, favoring participative approaches instead of confrontational

ones. This is evident in the case of the banana industry, in which Rainforest

Alliance has been criticized because of their engagement of Chiquita in their

Banana certification program (then known as Eco-O.K. or Better Banana

Program). In the early 90’s, this particular program was seen as a betrayal of

the traditional anti-multinational stand of social and environmentally

concerned organizations (Bendell 2003).

In the context of the Ecuadorian banana industry, Rainforest Alliance

certifies 100% of all Reybancorp S.A.4 banana operations. It is expected that

if new farms are acquired by this company, they will be included in the

certification system in due time. Thus, in the 2002 the certified surface was of

7000 hectares. In 2004 Rainforest Alliance reports a total surface of 9124

hectares (Rainforest Alliance 2004b). Rainforest Alliance’s Ecuadorian

partner in the Sustainable Agriculture Network, Conservation and

Development (CYD), conducts the scheduled and un-scheduled farm audits

that verifies that the company operations follow the certification standards.

This organization also collaborates with the development of standards for

other products (ex. cocoa) and certification initiatives (tourism).

4 Reybancorp S.A. is the banana production division of Favorita Fruit Holding Company,

which was formed by the association of the Ecuadorian Wong Group with theCommonwealth Development Corporation (UK) and International Finance Corporation (IFC).This company is one of the main Ecuadorian suppliers for Chiquita Brands (Favorita FruitCompany 2002).



22

Interestingly, the program certifies “farms” as productions units. Even

if all of the farms of a given company are certified, such as Reybancorp, the

company itself does not hold the certification. Likewise, a farm can be “de-

certified” without affecting others, as long as the problem is localized. By

localized I mean farm-specific rather than a general failure of the whole

company’s environmental management system.

The Rainforest Alliance Certification Standards used for this study are

the English version of the Complete Standards for Banana Production 9.99

(RA 1999) which were the latest available (online) when this study was

conducted. In March 2004 Rainforest Alliance released a modified version for

public consultation. Once this dialogue is complete, this new set of norms will

replace previous versions.

1.4.2.2 Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International (FLO)

According to the Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International, the

concept of Fairtrade has existed for over 40 years, beginning as a

partnership between non-profit importers and retailers in developed countries

and small-scale producers in developing countries (FLO 2004a). Fairtrade

Labeling Organizations International (FLO) is an umbrella organization that

networks 17 Fairtrade initiatives. Among other products, FLO has standardsfor traditional developing-world crops, like coffee, tea, rice, bananas,

mangoes, cocoa and sugar; FLO reports that certification protocols for other

products (cut flowers) are under consideration.



23

Recently, the FLO certification unit became a limited company, FLO-

Cert, in order “to make Fairtrade’s certification and trade auditing operations

more transparent,” (FLO 2004b), enhancing “the autonomy of its producer

certification and trader registration decisions, and facilitates compliance with

the ISO Standards for Certification Bodies (ISO 65)” (FLO 2004b); thus, the

auditing process has become independent of the certification body itself.

Fairtrade mission is to address the unfairness of international

commerce through the development of alternative commercialization chains

to bypass trading monopolies in order to transfer the benefits of this trade to

the hands of the producers thereby increasing the welfare of small farmers

and workers in developing countries (FLO 2004a).

There are two key concepts behind this rhetoric: social justice (which

includes the environment) and the unfairness of international trade. Both of

them have impacts in the way Fairtrade relates with other social and

economic actors. By creating an alternative commercialization value chain,

Fairtrade confronts the trading multinationals; likewise, Fairtrade support of

labor standards might be seen as challenge to the labor practices of these

companies. This implies that Fairtrade has a confrontational approach

towards the multinationals that monopolize the banana trade: these

companies are the cause of the problems that Fairtrade is trying to address.These two concepts also shape Fairtrade’s environmental strategy and

incentives system: Fairtrade economically encourages low-impact or

alternative (organic) management systems, and imposes restrictions on



24

some high-yield high-impact practices. Accordingly, under the Fairtrade

premium guidelines, organic small farmers are awarded the maximum

premium price (FLO 2004).5

The Fairtrade Standards analyzed in this document are the English

version Fairtrade Standards for Bananas and Small Farmers Organizations

25.05.2002 (FT 2002). Subsequent to this analysis, an updated version of

these standards was released. Under the FLO system for small holder

certification, the certificate can only be held by a small farmers’ organization.

The small farmer organization has the responsibility of accounting for its

members. FLO delegates some of the surveillance functions to the local

organizations. Additionally, there is an independent auditing system (FLO-

Cert). This reliance on the human capital available within its local partners, in

conjunction with third party verification, makes this program attractive to

proponents of community-based collective action.

In the context of Ecuadorian Banana production, FLO works with 1

plantation and 3 small holders organizations (FLO 2004c). While official

information about the certified surface was not available, published data on

one of Fairtrade certifier’s “El Guabo” Association of Small Banana Farmers

reports that it represents 340 producers and covers approximately 2000

hectares (El Comercio 2004). Without considering the other certified

5 Fairtrade awards premiums for business support, social, environmental and business

development and organic production. Thus, an organic small farmer will be granted the threepremium components.



25

associations of farmers, this data makes FLO the second largest certification

organization working in Ecuador.

1.4.2.3 The Ecuadorian Environmental Management Bylaws for the

banana sector

In order to compare the environmental management practices of

certified operations to some standard, I will elaborate the Ecuadorian

domestic regulations governing banana production. This law is known as the

“Environmental Management Bylaws for the Banana Sector (RSAB for its

acronym in Spanish: Reglamento de Saneamiento Ambiental Bananero)

(RSAB 2001)). This law rules the environmental behavior of all Ecuadorian

banana producers (Perez 2001). This decree is complemented with the D.E.

2294, RO 573 of November 22, 1994 that bans the establishment of new

plantations. A report by the UNEP considers that the RSAB was created with

the objective to “control the environmental impacts caused by the use of

agrochemicals and the expansion of the agricultural frontier” (UNEP 2002).

The Decree 2294 was created not only to regulate the expansion of the

agricultural frontier, but also with the objective of protecting zones with high

biodiversity and promote conversion to other crops (UNEP 2002).

1.5 Research question

Motivated by the lack of empirical evidence about the environmental

effects of ecolabeling, the free-trade challenges to state-based environmental



26

regulations, and the increasing reliance on market-based incentives to

achieve public policy objectives, my research question concerns the

environmental risk-reduction level of certified versus non-certified operations.

Is there any difference between the environmental-risk reduction level of

certified and non-certified Ecuadorian banana farms? Environmental risk

reduction is understood as the deployment of practices to prevent

environmental impacts (environmental degradation) before they occur.

To answer my question, I rely on an input/output agro-ecological

model to structure comparison of three normative systems that operate in the

context of Ecuadorian banana production. Comparison of Fairtrade,

Rainforest Alliance and the Ecuadorian laws for banana production lead to

identification of a set of best management practices against which the

environmental behaviors of certified and non-certified farms are empirically

evaluated. A field-based assessment of relevant farming practices of paired

samples of banana farms allow me to make an accounting of production

practices and address the significance of eco-certification through an

analysis of risk reduction (i.e., implementation of practices and strategies that

mitigate environmental risks). Chapter 2 (Methods) presents the

methodology of my study: comparison of the three sets of norms (2.1);

derivation of my definition of risk reduction (2.2); sampling procedure (2.3);

data coding and risk reduction assessment (2.4). Chapter 3 (Results)presents the results of the comparison of the norms (3.1) and the comparison

of farming practices (3.2). Chapter 4 interprets these results in a theoretical

and policy context. The global logic of the study is illustrated in the Figure 3.



27

Figure 3 Study framework

Rainforest

Alliance

Ecuadorian

LawFairtrade

Inputs-Outputs agro ecological model

Derivation of environmental risk reduction criteria

Construction of the survey

Comparison of norms

Differences between certified and no certified

farms

Certified

(1) Norms structuring

production

(2) Major categories of risk

(areas of concern)

(3) Risk reduction measures

(4) Risk reduction indicators

Large farms

(1) Sampling protocol

(3) (4) Survey design

Risk reduction evaluation-field survey(2) (3) (4) Risk reduction

scoring system

Non-certified

Small farmsSmall farms

Large farms

Risk reduction comparative analysis

Differences between

small farms

Differences between

large farms

Inferences about the empirical effects of

certification

Rainforest

Alliance

Ecuadorian

LawFairtrade

Inputs-Outputs agro ecological model

Derivation of environmental risk reduction criteria

Construction of the survey

Comparison of norms

Differences between certified and no certified

farms

Certified

(1) Norms structuring

production

(2) Major categories of risk

(areas of concern)

(3) Risk reduction measures

(4) Risk reduction indicators

Large farms

(1) Sampling protocol

(3) (4) Survey design

Risk reduction evaluation-field survey(2) (3) (4) Risk reduction

scoring system

Non-certified

Small farmsSmall farms

Large farms

Risk reduction comparative analysis

Differences between

small farms

Differences between

large farms

Inferences about the empirical effects of

certification



28

CHAPTER TWO

METHODS

2.1 Agro ecological assessment of banana production

To structure the analysis of certification norms (and the domestic law)

in such a way as to inform field-based empirical analysis of production

behaviors, a simple input/output model of banana production was developed.

The model presents the inputs and outputs of the two main phases of export

banana production at the farm level (farm-level, Figure 4 and the packaging

facility, Figure 5). It does not cover operations outside the plantation, such as

those actions that occur after the packaged bananas leave the farm. In order

to focus the analysis in the environmental implications of banana production,

labor and capital, critical social inputs, are omitted.

The inputs of a banana plantation could be categorized as

agrochemicals, energy, water, land and other materials (bamboo, plastics,

etc). In terms of outputs of the plantation we have water, soil and air

pollution, which lead to water, soil and air degradation, forest degradation

(directly, due forest conversion or indirectly, due to the over exploitation of

forest resources), and waste production. The product of the plantation phase

is raw banana (banana bunches), which are cut in the plantation andtransported to the processing facility. The processing facility is a structure for

cutting, cleaning, and packaging bananas. In order to perform the basic



29

Figure 4: Inputs and outputs of banana production (farm level)

Banana

Plantation

Insecticides

Nematocides

Fungicides

Herbicides

Fertilizers

Water

Energy

Inorganic waste

Organic waste

Water pollution

Soil pollution

Air pollution

Raw Banana

Landscape

Modification

Water depletion

Soil depletion

NRR depletion

To PackagingSheet

Original

Landscape

Biodiversity loss

DrainageChannels

ForestReplacement

OtherMaterials

Inputs Outputs



30

Figure 5: Inputs and outputs of banana production (processing facility)

Water

Energy

Packaging

materials

Post-

harvesting

treatments

Fungicides

Raw

Bananas

Packaging

Sheet

Inorganic

waste

Organic waste

Water pollution

Soil pollution

Air pollution

Water depletion

Soil depletion

NRR depletion

Infrastructure

Processed

BananaShipment

Inputs Outputs

Packaging

Shed



31

postharvest treatment of bananas, a packaging facility needs water, energy,

packaging materials, and a delivery system for the post harvest fungicide

treatment. Similarly to the plantation, the packaging facility may directly

pollute water, soil and air or by generating wastes that might lead to water,

soil and air degradation. The product of this operation is packaged bananas

(in boxes) that can be shipped to the markets.

Recognizing that all production systems generate environmental risks,

our pragmatic concern is risk reduction. Measures for environmental risk

reduction were clustered according to the perceived sources of risk, or the

potential natural resource that can be degraded or affected by the byproducts

of the activity. According to the model, the major sources of risk can be

grouped into four categories: land use management, agrochemical

management, water quality management, and waste management. These

four categories of risk structure both the comparison of the three sets of

production norms (results presented in subchapter 3.1) and the field survey

of production practices (results presented in subchapter 3.2).

2.2 Field survey of production practices and risk reduction

2.2.1 Important indicators

The focus of the empirical research was on categories of risk derived

from the agro-ecological model (use of land, water quality, agrochemical and

waste management). The comparison of norms identified a set of



32

management strategies to deal with those problems. In turn, the empirical

survey was designed to acquire information about the following management

procedures and technical practices:

1. Risk of banana plantations regarding use of land

a. Replacing forested areas with new plantations

b. Degrading forest remnants or natural bamboo stands

c. Establishing buffer zones or vegetation that could act as forest

remnants, under the assumption that these will provide

ecological services (e.g., refuges for wildlife) along with sources

of timber or bamboo, thereby relaxing pressure on existing

forest

2. Risk associated with agrochemical management

a. Pest/disease management system

b. Pest monitoring system and records (management complexity

as a proxy for environmental risk reduction)

c. Fertilizers management system and records

d. Pesticides training and records

e. Agrochemical storage facility environmental safety parameters

3. Risk associated with waste managementa. Organic waste management system

b. Inorganic waste management system



33

4. Risk of banana plantations for water quality

a. Weed and nematode management system

b. Pest control methods

c. Restrictions on agrochemical products used in the farm

d. Processing facility solid waste and latex filtering systems

e. Processing facility post harvest residuals treatment system

f. Agrochemical storage/mixing area waste water treatment

system (for pesticides and fertilizers)

g. Organic waste management system

h. Vegetative barriers or buffer zones alongside water courses

2.2.2 Different approaches towards risk reduction: end of pipe and

process measures

The comparative analysis made evident that Fairtrade, Rainforest

Alliance and the Ecuadorian Law include two types of environmental risk

reduction techniques. The first consists of a series of actions and feedback

mechanisms designed to minimize pollution before it is produced. These are

referred to as process measures. The second set of measures deal with

pollutants after they have been produced, and mainly consists on physical

systems designed to either modify outflows or delay its release to the

environment. These measures are known as end-of-pipe solutions. In orderto acquire information on each, I used two different survey forms and data

collection techniques.



34

A qualitative methodology, using in-depth semi structured interviews

was chosen for the process measures and a binary survey was used for end-

of-pipe measures.

The first form (Appendix 1: Survey “A”) collects information about farm

practices and was filled in during a semi-structured interview with either the

plantation owner or the farm manager. This technique was chosen over a

closed survey because it provided a frame for interviewing any sort of farmer

using the same set of questions (similar to a closed survey), but I considered

that the relative openness of the format was advantageous because it

permits feedback from the producer. This characteristic was especially

appealing because the survey was designed to be applied to a wide range of

people. Therefore, I considered that interaction between the researcher and

the producer was needed to compensate for the gaps that are created by

cultural or conceptual differences (i.e., literacy, use of technical jargon,

familiarity with certain concepts).

The second survey form (Appendix 2: Survey B,), which collects

information about end-of-pipe risk reduction measures, was designed to be

filled by the researcher working alone. Hence, it consists of an itemized

check list about farm infrastructure (agrochemical storage facility, products in

the agrochemical storage facility, processing facility, buffer zones) that couldbe visually compiled. Thus, only the presence or absence of infrastructure

was evaluated.



35

2.2.3 Implications of farm size for sample design

While neither Rainforest Alliance or Fairtrade program screen

applicants by farm size, in Ecuador FLO mostly certifies small banana

farmers associations (FLO 2004b), while Rainforest Alliance certifies large

operations (32 operations, 9,124 hectares, average of 285 hectares/farm

(Rainforest Alliance 2004b). Therefore, I chose to evaluate certified farms

against non-certified farms of similar size (small certified (FT) farms with

small non-certified farms, and large certified (RA) with large non-certified

farms).

This pairing was influenced by information that indicates that

Ecuadorian banana farms are differentiated by size. The agricultural census

links small holdings with low-technology-farming (the prevalence of banana

production infrastructure such as packaging facilities, irrigation systems,

funicular lines6 and agricultural equipment is lower in small holdings than in

large holdings) (SICA 2002), and Chang (1999) reported important yield

differences between technology-based (1845 boxes/ha), semi-technology

based (1294 boxes/ha), no-technology based (1094 boxes/hectare) farms.

Therefore, I assumed that large banana farms are most likely to follow the

industrial model of “chemical-intensive monoculture,” and small farmers

follow more traditional farming methods (Barret et al. 2001).

6 Funicular lines are a basic requirement for improving the “yield” of a banana plantation:

farmer whose farm is lacking funiculars can produce bananas, but some of them will berejected at the processing facility due to cosmetic damage.



36

By using paired comparison groups I argue that the results reflect the

differences attributable to certification, instead of reflecting capital and

resources availability .

2.3 Field survey

The study was conducted in the western lowlands of Ecuador from the

24th of June to the 20th of August of 2003. A total of 47 farms7 in 5 provinces

were visited, and interviews and field inspections conducted in each one (see

Figure 6, Table 5). The sample covers 9 non-certified farms of less than 50

hectares (small) deemed comparable with 13 Fairtrade certified farms, and

14 large (>50 has) farms comparable with 10 Rainforest Alliance certified

farms.

Geographically, the field work was conducted in the Ecuadorian

Provinces of Los Rios, Guayas, El Oro, Cañar y Azuay. The first three

provinces account for 77% of the total surface dedicated to banana

production in Ecuador (SICA 2003) and were included because this area is

considered the core of Ecuadorian banana production. The provinces of

Azuay and Cañar, which account for 3.85% of the total banana production

7 While a producer’s name was considered confidential since the beginning of the research,

the farm names or other specific identification criteria is withheld due requests fromproducers; thus, the name of the closest city or town or community is used for geographicalreferences.



38

Table 1 (Continued)

Non-certified farms (n=24)

Province LocationFarm

characteristicsSize(has)

BananaProduction

Surface(has)

Productionrate (boxes

hectare year)

Los Rios Quevedo T, C 233 230 1600

“ 279 225 1800

“ 45 42 1800

Guayas Naranjal T, C 220 155 1800

“ 157 81 2000

“ 196 136 1900

“ 140 115 2000

“ 150 71 1500

“ 210 120 1800

“ 166 102 1700

“ 123 123 1800

“ 64 63 1800

“ 143 130 1600

“ 105 70 1800“ 50 50 1700

Jesus T, C 300 290 1900

Maria “ 15 9 1500

“ 30 15 1500

Cañar El Triunfo T, C 120 120 1700

“ 11 11 1500

“ 45 44 1600

“ 30 30 1500

“ 28 28 1500“ 10 10 1800

T, Technology based

C, Cavendish



39

Figure 6 Farms locations



40

surface in Ecuador (SICA 2003), were included because these “highland”

provinces are home to small certified (Fairtrade) and non-certified producers.

All of the farms visited were at a maximum distance of 30 kilometers from a

main road. Thus, it can be said that all the farms were located alongside the

Quito - Quevedo - Guayaquil Highway , the Guayaquil – Naranjal-Machala

Highway or the Guayaquil-El Triunfo Road.

2.3.1 Farm selection

A snowballing sampling method was used for non-certified farms,

starting with two banana growers’ leaders8 (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998).

Once contact information was provided by these key informants, non-certified

producers were visited in person. The goals of the study, confidentiality of the

information and a detailed explanation of the measures taken for protecting

producer’s identity were discussed before asking for permission to collect

data. The owners of 47 non-certified farms agreed to participate in the study

(see Table 1).

For certified farms, contact was made by visiting the “El Guabo”

Association of Small Banana Producers (APPBG), which represents the

Fairtrade certified producers and Ecuador’s Rainforest Alliance partner,

Conservation and Development (Conservacion y Desarrollo, CYD). Once

8 V. Mawyin of EPELDATOS and V. Chacon of APPBN



43

in the interview he mentioned that “the Roundoup (gliphosate based

herbicide) was more expansive that the Herbazid (paraquat-based

herbicide).” After hearing this information, I asked him if he used “weed

killers” (matayerbas). He immediately responded that “yes, I do use those”

and show me his records of weed killers use. Thus, if I had been using a

yes/no questionnaire, I would have missed this point. When doing field

research, I argue that a researcher should acknowledge cultural differences

even if conducted in his/her native language.

A factor that was not considered when designing the field work was

the relative danger of doing research in poverty-stricken areas where rule of

law is suspect. When the research was conducted, the Ecuadorian Province

of Los Rios was going through a period of crisis: the banana prices were at

their lowest point, the economic sector was barely recovering from a strike

that involved all the banana producers, and producers were downsizing their

operations. The combination of economic constraints with the almost

stereotypical lawlessness of rural areas generated a dangerous situation, in

which the normally mild level of violence suddenly became high (for Latin

America). Thus, when an old “friend” came to my hotel at midnight and told

me to “get away fast, because some bad people are asking about you,” I had

to lose almost two week of contacting producers (and the opportunity to visit

their farms). Thus, I must say that the sample is not as large as it could havebeen, but I was not going to stay to learn if my acquaintance was right about

his worries.



44

2.4 Data coding and risk reduction evaluation

The information collected in the field using Questionnaire A was coded

using a variable dictionary (Appendix 3). Thus, the narrative collected in the

interviews was transformed into quantitative information. Each narrative was

transcribed to a survey form, with standardized responses. This process was

viewed as the best way to standardize the answers of people (producers or

farm administrators) with surprisingly different backgrounds (as an example,

the producer’s education level varied from only a few years of primary school

to graduate studies in agronomy and business management). The

information collected using the Questionnaire B was collected in binary form

(yes/no), thus there was no need for further coding or standardization. The

compiled information (Questionnaires A and B) was entered into a Microsoft

Excel for processing.

After this processing, each variable data was in either quantitative,

yes/no or categorical formats (maximum of three categories). Then, I

proceed to code the yes/no variables in binary form, assigning values of 1 for

responses that conformed to the theoretical best management practices, and

0 for negative answers. For the categorical variables, the “best” management

practice (the one that presented lower environmental risk, according to the

literature) was awarded a score of 1, with the second best being awarded ascore of 0.5 and the “worst” practice (in some cases absence of practice)

was awarded a 0.



45

Finally, there were some variables labeled “conditional,” because their

coding depends on the presence/absence of a physical entity coded

elsewhere in the survey (such as a river or water course, or a specific farm

facility). For conditional variables, if the value of the determinant variable is 0,

the value of the dependent variable is always 1. If the determinant variable

has a value of 1, then the dependent variable is scored in a way in which the

best possible practice is awarded 1 point.

Several variables were aggregated to build four indexes that reflect

the four main risk categories identified in the agro-ecological assessment of

banana production (use of land, agrochemical management, waste

management and water quality). Additionally, I create an aggregate index

(total risk reduction score) that combines the four component scores. The

construction of each of these indexes (logic, variables, coding, and scoring

system) is discussed in detail in the following sections (2.4.1 to 2.4.5).

2.4.1 Use of land

The risks that banana plantations present toward forest remnants,

national parks or other ecosystems have led the national law and both

certification systems to seek to control the expansion of the agriculture

frontier. All the systems included norms that ban replacing existing forest,regulate the indirect impacts of the industry demands over natural resources

(like bamboo stands) and force the plantation owners to establish buffer

zones and vegetative barriers.



46

Therefore, this index covers changes in land cover in the last ten

years, pressures on natural stands of bamboo, and the existence of

measures to compensate the establishment of the plantation: a plantation will

have a highest score when it was not established by clearing rainforest (10

years), uses plastic or bamboo from plantations (instead bamboo from

natural stands) for tethering the banana plants, and its owner dedicated as

much land to vegetative barriers or buffer zones as for banana production.

The Table 2 provides details about the indicators, variables and the scoring

system for this index, which has a maximum value of 4. The algorithm for the

risk reduction score of a banana plantation regarding use of land (UL) is:

UL = LAND + (TEMA +TMSO) + VEBF + RVS

RVS=VSUR/BANS

2.4.2 Agrochemical management

The comparative analyses of the norms show that the certification

standards and the law share several strategies to deal with the risks

stemming from agrochemicals. The assessment of the norms indicate that

the risk can be addressed by a) restricting the use of agrochemicals b)

improving product selection, and storage and handling practices, c) training,

d) implementing crop/pest monitoring systems, e) maintaining records as partof this monitoring system.



Table 2: Variables, indicators, labels and coding for use of land (UL)

Variable National Law1 Fair Trade2 Rainforest Alliance3 Label Land cover change Plantations can not

be established inEcosystems ofEcological Value

Plantations can notbe established incritical habitats,primary forest ofadvanced states ofsecondary forest

LAND

Tethering material TEMA

Source of tetheringmaterial

Only wood fromauthorized sources(plantations) can beused in certifiedplantations

TMSO

Reforestationareas and bufferzones

Buffer zones alongwater bodies,drainage channels,roads or shrimp poolsare required

Buffer zones alongrivers, water bodiesand secondaryforest are required

Buffer zonesaround protectedand natural areas,rivers, roads andfacilities arerequired

VEBF



Table 2 (Continued)

Variable National Law1 Fair Trade2 Rainforest Alliance3 Label

Banana plantationsurface

Slopes of more than60° must becovered withgrasses and trees

Areas not suitablefor production mustbe recuperated

BANS

Vegetative barriersor forestry areasurface

Buffer zones must beplanted with non-commercial,ornamental species

No agriculturalactivities in thebuffer zone, areallowed;reforestation with

native species isrecommended

Buffer zone must bereforested withnative specieswhen available

VSUR

Ratio of vegetativebarrier or forestryarea/bananasurface

RVS

1 Ecuadorian Environmental Bylaws for Banana Production

2 Fairtrade Standards for Bananas and Small Farmers Organizations version 25.05.2002

3 Rainforest Alliance Complete Standards for Banana Production version 9.99



49

Consequently, the agrochemical management index covers the crop

management system (agrochemicals, monitoring and records), training and

agrochemical storage. A farm will have a higher score when it does not use

agrochemicals (organic or low impact farming).

While farms that use agrochemicals will score lower than an organic

one, conventionally-managed plantations will score higher if its managers

use products not included in the PAN Persistent Organic Pollutants (Dirty

Dozen), restricts or bans the use of a whole family of chemicals, and have a

system of analysis and records that permit feedback between field reports

and agrochemicals decision making. The details about the variables and

variable coding used for this index are in Table 3. The maximum value for

this index is of 12. The formula for this index is as follows:

AM=HMET+HPRO+HERR + IMHW+ IMMR+ NMET+ NHOW+ FMET+

FREC+PTRA+PTRE+ASI

ASI = [(ADWL+AWAR+AICF+AIWL+ANWS)/5]

2.4.3 Waste management

The waste management index addresses risk reduction of organic

(banana waste and stalks) and inorganic (plastics) wastemanagement/disposal practices. A farm will score higher if it

manages/disposes its waste according to the criteria specified in the norms



Table 3: Variables, indicators, labels and coding for agrochemical managem


Weeds controlmethod

Herbicides are notallowedPlanting of covercrops is required [3months]

Mechanical control ofweeds or use ofground cover isrecommended

HMET

Products usedfor weedscontrol

Pesticides included inWHO class 1 a+b,PAN “dirty dozen”and FAO UNEP’s PICare banned.

Pesticides included inPAN “dirty dozen”and FAO UNEP’sPIC are banned

HPRO

Records forherbicides use

Record keeping isrequired, withproduct, doses,frequency and date

Record keeping isrequired, includingbrand name, genericname, concentration,time, dose, area and

justification

Farms must be ableto demonstrate a“continual reductionin toxicity andquantity ofagrochemicals used”

HERR



Table 3 (Continued)

Variable National Law1 Fair Trade2 Rainforest Alliance3 Label Pest monitoringevaluationsystem

Producer shouldimplement ICMpractices

IPM must beemployed,emphasizingphysical, cultural,mechanical andbiological practices

IMHW

Monitoring system(soil, water, insects,leaves, roots,diseases and yields)must be implemented

A monitoring andevaluation systemmust be implementedfor the use ofchemical products

Pest controlrecord keeping

Pesticides recordkeeping isrequired, withproduct, doses,frequency and date

Record keeping isrequired, includingbrand name, genericname, concentration,time, dose, area and

justification


IMMR

Nematodescontrol method

Nematocides,pesticides andfertilizers can only beused following ICMcriteria

NMET

Analysis beforenematocidesapplication

Written analysis and justification is requiredbefore usingagrochemicals

There must bewritten proceduresfor each plannedactivity

NHOW



Table 3 (Continued)

Variable National Law1 Fair Trade2 Rainforest Alliance3 Label Fungal diseasescontrol method

Triazoles,bensimidazoles orEstrobilurinas(fungicides) arebanned for groundbased applications

Less cycles of aerialfumigation thanregional average arerequired; producershould implement ICMpractices.

Use of mechanicalcontrols againstBlack Sigatoka issuggested; IPMtechniques must beimplemented

FMET[0, 1]

Fungicidesrecord keeping

Record keeping,with product,doses, frequencyand date

Record keeping,including brand name,generic name,concentration, time,dose, area and

justification


FREC[0, 0.5, 1]

Pesticidetraining forworkers

Pesticideapplicationcompanies, andagrochemicalexporters,importers andproducers mustprovide workerswith adequatetraining

After a year, anagronomist oradequately trainedtechnician must be incharge of ICM

Producers areresponsible forproviding adequatetraining for theworkers, includingpesticides,environmentaleducation, safety,emergencyprocedures.

PTRA



Table 3 (Continued)

Variable National Law1 Fair Trade2 Rainforest Alliance3 Label Pesticidetraining records

Pesticideapplicationcompanies, andbanana producersmust publishinformativematerial about thedangers ofpesticides, and firstaid measures incase of pesticidepoisoning

Before realizing anaerial application ofpesticides, theproducer mustinform workers andcommunity leadersso they can takeprotective measures

PTRE

Agrochemicalon-farm storageindicators

Storage andmanagement mustbe done accordingto according totoxicity andformulation (ruleINEN 1927:92)

Storage material mustbe kept in a “hazard-proof manner” withadequate order andcleanliness; theproducer must complywith the nationallegislation regardingpesticides

Storage andmanagement mustbe done accordingto specific rules(toxicity andformulation)

ASI

Agrochemicalson-farm storage

ASTO



Table 3 (Continued)

Variable National Law1 Fair Trade2 Rainforest Alliance3 Label Restrictedaccess toagrochemicalsstorage facility

It must have a doorthat must be keeplocked

If an individualproducer needs tostorageagrochemicals, hemust do it in aseparated, weatherprotected, locked box

Facility must be“secure against theftand vandalism.”

ADWL

Warning signalsoutside pesticidestorage facility

Warning sings inlocal language arerequired, the signalsmust be easilyreadable andcomprehensible toilliterate workers

AWAR

Non-combustiblefloor/ceiling

Concrete must beused on the floor ofthe facility; thefloor must bedesigned in a waythat permitsdealing withaccidental spills

Storage box must beprotected fromweather

Concrete must beused on the floor ofthe facility; the floormust be designed ina way that permitsdealing withaccidental spills

AICF

Non-combustibleandimpermeablewalls

Walls must bepainted to permitdetection ofpossible filtrations

Storage box must beprotected fromweather

Walls and floor mustbe “impermeable,non combustibleand non corrosive”

AIWL



Table 3 (Continued)

Variable National Law1 Fair Trade2 Rainforest Alliance3 Label Non combustibleshelves

Shelves and palletsare made of non-absorbent materials;materials are not indirect contact withthe floor

ANWS[0, 1]

1 Ecuadorian Environmental Bylaws for Banana Production





56

or if it engages in an alternate use of bananas not fit for export (sold for local

consumption, cattle feed or composted). The information about the variables

and coding used for this indicator is available in the Table 4. The WM index

has a maximum possible value of 3. The formula for this index is:

WM=ORWM1+ORWM2+INWM

2.4.4 Water quality

The risk that banana production presents for water quality is well

documented. Indeed, the assessment of the norms indicates that all the

certification systems share this concern. Strategies previously discussed as

part of other area of concern, namely vegetative barriers, buffer zones, use

of agrochemicals and organic waste disposal, have a risk reduction potential

for water quality. Nevertheless, the standards and the law also include

specific end-of-pipe measures to reduce risk to this media and require the

farms to have solid and latex retention systems, post-harvest residuals

treatments systems, and agrochemical waste water containment/treatment

system. For a complete list of this index indicators, variables and variable

coding, see Table 5. The maximum value for this index is 11. The index is

calculated as follows:

WQ= HMET+ HPRO+ NMET + FMET+ SLRS + PHTS + OWW1 + OWW2 +

(PSTO + PWTS)+ (FSTO + FWTS) + (WAOP + BSWA)



Table 4: Variables, indicators, labels and coding for waste management (

Variable National Law1 Fair Trade2 Rainforest Alliance3 Label Organic wastemanagement(waste banana)

Organic waste(banana) must bedeposited in a placeat least 10 m. fromirrigation channels,roads and houses

Composting isrecommended.Each farm musthave a “sanitarydumping place.”This facility mustbe located atleast 100 m. fromany water body

Composting of organicwaste is stronglyrecommended; ifcomposting is notfeasible, adequatedisposition (landfill) isrecommended

ORWM1

Organic wastemanagement(banana stalks)

Banana stalks shouldbe returned to theplantation

Composting isrecommended.Each farm musthave a “sanitarydumping place.”This facility mustbe located atleast 100 m. fromany water body

Composting of organicwaste is stronglyrecommended; ifcomposting is notfeasible, adequatedisposition (landfill) isrecommended

ORWM2



Table 4 (Continued)

Variable National Law1 Fair Trade2 Rainforest Alliance3 Label Inorganic wastemanagement

Open-fire plasticwaste burning isprohibited; producermust send plasticwaste to authorizeddisposal facilities(600˚C incinerators,landfills)

Recycling isrecommend ifavailable

All plastic waste mustbe collected, reusedand adequatelydisposed ; trashburning is prohibited

INWM

1 Ecuadorian Environmental Bylaws for Banana 2 Fairtrade Standards for Bananas and Sma

Organizations version 25.05.2002




Table 5: Variables, indicators, labels and coding for water quality (WQ


Weeds controlmethod

Herbicides are notallowedPlanting of cover cropsis required [3 months]

Mechanical control ofweeds or use ofground cover isrecommended

HMET

Products usedfor Weedscontrol

If not local rule isapplicable, theproducers mustfollow the FAOagrochemicalsrecommendations

Pesticides included inWHO class 1a+b,PAN “dirty dozen” andFAO UNEP’s PIC arebanned

Pesticides included inPAN “dirty dozen”and FAO UNEP’sPIC are banned

HPRO

Nematodescontrol method

Nematocides,pesticides andfertilizers can only beused following ICM

criteria∗

NMET

Artificial Nematocidescan be used only ifnon-chemical andbiological control arenot effective

Fungal diseases

control method

Triazoles,

benzimidazoles orestrobilurines(fungicides) arebanned for ground-based spraying

FMET



Table 5 (Continued)

Variable National Law1 Fair Trade2 Rainforest Alliance3 Label Solids/latexretention system

Solid waste andlatex tramps mustbe built in allpackaging facilities,to clean the wastewater fromprocessing banana

Water waste form thepackaging facility mustbe treated in a filtersystem [2 years]

Solid waste and latexfiltering systems arerequired

SLRS

Packaging facilitypost harvestresidualstreatment system

Packaging facilitiesmust have a systemto collect and treatthe residuals of thepost-harvesttreatment

Packaging facilitiesmust have a system tocollect and treat theresiduals of the post-harvest treatment [2years]

Packaging facilitiesmust have a systemto collect and treatthe residuals of thepost-harvesttreatment

PHTS

Pesticides on-farm storage

ASTO

Pesticides onfarm storagefacilitywaste/spillagetreatment system

Adequatedisposition ofagrochemicalresiduals liquidwaste is required(sedimentationtanks or similar)

All spraying equipmentmust be washed in adesigned facility, andwaste water must befiltered with carbon orcharcoal

Facilities foradequate treatmentof agrochemicalresiduals arerequired; waste watermust be treated

PWTS



Table 5 (Continued)

Variable National Law1 Fair Trade2 Rainforest Alliance3 Label Fertilizers onfarm storage

FSTO

Fertilizers onfarm storagefacility liquidwaste/spillagetreatment system

Adequatedisposition ofresiduals(sedimentationtanks or similar) arerequired

A sanitary dumpingplace must be used todispose of toxic waste;waste water must befiltered

Facilities foradequate treatmentof agrochemicalresiduals arerequired; wastewater must betreated

FWTS

Treatment forwaste banana

Organic waste(banana) must bedeposited in a placeat least 10 m. fromirrigation channels,roads, houses; thisorganic waste mustnot contain plasticwaste (19)

Use of organicwaste/manure asfertilizer isrecommended

No solid wasteshould be directeddirectly towards anysource of water

ORWM

Treatment forbanana bunchstalks

Organic waste(banana stalks)should be returnedto the plantation

Use of organicwaste/manure asfertilizer isrecommended

No solid wasteshould be directeddirectly towards anysource of water

ORWM

Water course onplantation

Buffer zones alongwater bodies,drainage channels,roads or shrimppools

Buffer zones alongrivers, water bodiesand secondary forest

Buffer zones aroundprotected andnatural areas, rivers,roads and facilities.

WAOP



Table 5 (Continued)


Buffer stripalongside waterbodies ordrainagechannels

Pesticides/fertilizerscan not be usedwithin 10 m. ofwater wells.

Pesticides/fertilizers/manure can not be appliedin a 2 m. strip boardingprimary an secondarydrainage channels

Buffer strips alongwater bodies must beof at least 10 m.

BSWA

* The “El Guabo” Association of Small Banana Producers ban the use of non-organic nema

1 Ecuadorian Environmental Bylaws for banana production

2

Fairtrade Standards for Bananas and Small Farmers Organizations version 25.05.20023 Rainforest Alliance Complete Standards for Banana Production version 9.99



63

2.4.5 Total risk reduction score

This index reflects a farm’s total risk reduction achievements, instead

of focusing on specific categories of risk as in the previous presentation of

results. To produce an aggregate score, the results of the indexes were

normalized by dividing each of the four component scores by the hypothetical

maximum possible score, then aggregating across the four risk categories

and dividing by four. This approach allows me to present the total risk

reduction score on a 0 to 1 scale, as well as on a percentage basis.

The total risk reduction scores can be used to make comparisons

across categories of farms (e.g., small certified with small non-certified), as

well as to assess risk reduction relative to hypothetical maximum. Thus, the

total risk reduction score is calculated according to the following formula:

TT= (UL/4 + AM/12 + WM/3 + WQ/11)/4

2.5 Statistical analysis

Non-parametric Mann Whitney U tests were used to establish if the

differences between the risk reduction scores of paired comparison groups

were statistically significant (α=0.05) (Ryan and Joyner 2001). This test relieson median values and was chosen due to the fact that the data form certified

farms are highly skewed (non-normal), and the samples were relatively

small.



64

Under such conditions, the median is considered as a more

appropriate representation of the population (Ott and Longnecker 2001).

Unless noted the median is the statistic reported in the results section,

because it offers a more accurate representation of the population (Ott and

Longnecker 2001).

.



65

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

3.1 Comparison of normative schemes: Ecuadorian Environmental

Management Bylaws for Banana Production, Rainforest Alliance and

Fairtrade certification standards

3.1.1 Use of land

The results of the comparison are included in the Table 6. One of the

major concerns with banana production is the pressure that it exerts on

natural ecosystems by expanding the agricultural frontier. The most effective

strategy to deal with this issue is to regulate new plantations. Indeed, both

certification systems ban the establishment of plantations replacing forested

areas or other valuable ecosystems. While the RSAB does not include any

prevision for this case, a separate regulation bans the opening of new

plantations (D.E. 2294, RO 573, November 22, 1994).

Similarly, the use of buffer zones and vegetative barriers is part of the

risk reductions strategies common to all of the systems, and is one that has

high potential for enhancing the environmental performance of a plantation. A

buffer zone, planted with appropriate species, would reduce the leaching ofagrochemicals to water courses, would provide a patch for wildlife, has the



Table 6: Comparison of the RSAB1, Fairtrade2 and Rainforest Alliance3 standards f

Natural areas

National law1 Fairtrade2 Rainfo- Plantations can not be established in

virgin forest, national parks or otherEcosystems of Ecological Value (3.2.1)

Plantations cacritical habita

advanced stat

- - Natural areaconserved an

- - Expansion establishment the certification

- - If wood is usemust come fro

- - Only wood fro(plantations)

- - Biological comigrate betwee

- - The producer strategies to

species, follow



68

potential to become a source of bamboo or other wood products, and can act

as an erosion-control barrier. In fact, all the norms require that the producers

must establish buffer zone along river sides, wells, and water courses.

Additionally, all identify this area as a no agrochemical zone. However, the

certification systems go beyond the law. Fair Trade norms mandate that

sloped areas must be revegetated while Rainforest Alliance requires the

same of “areas not suitable for production.”

Other differences are worth noting. Rainforest Alliance standards

include requirements that reflect concern with wildlife and natural habitat

protection that are missing from the RSAB and Fairtrade standards. For

example, RA norms require use of wood from plantations, no hunting or

commercial collection of plants or animals, and attention to biological

corridors. Fairtrade requires the farmer to show “agricultural diversification”

(FT 2002), thus introducing a different strategy to regulate a farmer‘s use of

land.

3.1.2 Agrochemical management

Each of the three systems attempt to regulate risk related to

agrochemical use. The measures presented in the norms can be clustered

as follows; crop management, agrochemical storage and handling, andoccupational safety and training. See Table 7 for the results of the

comparison.



Table 7 (Continued)

Agrochemical storage

National law1 Fairtrade2 RainforPesticides should be stored in

adequate facilities (specific indicatorsfor pesticide storage)(3a to 3g)

If individual farmers wish to storeagrochemicals, he must do it inseparated, weather protected,

boxes that can be locked (3.5.7)

Pesticides shouldfacil

Storage and management must bedone according to rule INEN 1927:92(classification according to toxicity and

formulation) (4a to 4h)

- Agrochemicalsaccording to their

class and formuvisib

The Storage facility must be located atleast 10 meters from housing facilities,schools, diary arms facilities and water

courses (3a)

If individual farmers wish to storeagrochemicals, he must do it inseparated, weather protected,

boxes that can be locked (3.5.7)

Recommendedagrochem storainfrastructure

infrastructure, 120200 m. from sour

(

Walls must be painted to permitdetection of possible filtrations (3d)

- Walls and floor mnon combustibl

(

- - Ceiling re

It must have a door that must be keeplocked (3f)

- Restricted access,against theft an

Good ventilation required (3c) - Good ventilatiorequ

- - Only the minimapesticides mu

- - Showers, eyewa(



Table 7 (Continued)

Agrochemical managementNational law1 Fairtrade2 Rainf

An accredited professional must bein charge of pesticide application (1,

15)

-

Record keeping, with product, doses,frequency and date is required (15)

Record keeping for any agrochemicalapplication is required (3.5.8, 3.5.9,

3.5.10)

Record keepinapplication

Written analysis and justification isrequired before using pesticides (3.1.1)

There must beeach plan

Storage and management must bedone according to rule INEN 1927:92(classification according to toxicity

and formulation) (4a to 4h)

-

- - Farms must becontinual red

quantity of agro

- Producer should implement ICMpractices (3.1.2.1)

IPM “must be ephysical, cul

biological pra

- Monitoring system (soil, water, insects,

leaves, roots, diseases and yields) mustbe implemented and application ofpesticides/fertilizers must be done

according to ICM criteria (3.1.1, 3.5.8)

For the use o

monitoring amust be implzoning and tim

be takingapplic



Table 7 (Continued)

Occupational safety and training

National law1 Fairtrade2 Rainf Adequate facilities (showers) must be

available for workers(8a, 8b)- Adequate facil

available

Adequate personal protection equipmentmust be provided (2, 5, 6 , 8a, 8d, 9)

Adequate personal protectionequipment must be provided

(4.4.2.4 GS [4.2.4.3 GS])

Adequate equipment m

After any application, the producer must“post” warnings displaying written text plus

a “hand, skull or any other symbol” thatsignal that people should no enter (18)

- After applicatimust be delimitpictograms wa

to the ar

Pregnant women, children and “sick”people should not apply pesticides (8)

Pregnant or nursing women,people under 18, persons with

reduced mental capabilities andwith chronic or respiratorydiseases should not apply

pesticides (4.4.2.5)

Pregnant or nunder 18, and

suffering chdiseases shou

The [pesticide application, exporters,importers and producers of agrochemicals]are responsible for designing contingencyplans; furthermore, they must train their

personal to be able to react adequately (7).

-

Pesticide application companies, andagrochemical exporters, importers andproducers must provide workers with

adequate training (8a and 8d)

The producer organization mustprovide their members/personalwith adequate training in

agrochemical storage, applicationand disposal of their residuals

(4.4.2.3)

Producersproviding adeworkers, in

environmenemergency



Table 7 (Continued)

Occupational safety and training

National law1 Fairtrade2 RainfPesticide application companies, and

banana producers must publishinformative material about the dangers of

pesticides, and first aid measures incase of pesticide poisoning (11)

The training must increase theworkers awareness on

agrochemical danger, health issuesand first aid (4.4.2.6)

Exporters must provide [the producers]with technical assistance in agronomic

and environmental concerns (28)

-

Exporters must provide [the producers]with training on pesticides; also they are

responsible for implementingcomprehensive environmental programs

(31 and 32)

-

- - Certified fenvironmentathe workers an




- No equivalent criteria



75

3.1.2.1 Agrochemicals restrictions

On product selection (what products can be used on the crop), both

certification standards regulate chemicals banned in international

agreements or by specialized international institutions. Rainforest Alliance

and Fairtrade ban the use of the FAO/UNEP prior consent products (PIC)

and Pesticides Action Network “dirty dozen” (Persistent Organic Pollutants,

POP). Fairtrade also bans the Word Health Organization (WHO) class 1a+b

(extremely toxic chemicals), prohibits the use of any herbicide, Tremox (post

harvest fungicide), and propose a gradual phase out of Thiabendazol (post

harvest fungicide). On the other hand , Rainforest Alliance bans the use of

highly persistent soil disinfectants, requires that all the products used in the

crop had been approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), and mandates the producers to show a “progressive reduction in

toxicity and quantity of the pesticides used” (RA1999).

3.1.2.2 Crop management

Interestingly, both certification systems use different terms to describe

their prescribed crop management. Fairtrade embraces a wider term,

integrated crop management system (ICM), while Rainforest Alliance

employs integrated pest management (IPM) to describe their recommendedpractices.



76

Nevertheless, both systems strongly encourage producers to

implement a system of best management practices when dealing with pest

control and crop management. Thus, Fairtrade or Rainforest Alliance certified

producers must implement a pest monitoring system, have written

procedures for each farm practice, keep detailed records of the use of

pesticides, encourage the use of laboratory analysis and professional

consultants to make informed decisions on crop management practices, and

require the producers to document a detailed monitoring system. These

requirements are not found in the RSAB. Requirements of the national law

related to agrochemicals are focused on basic record keeping and use of

accredited professionals in making pesticide management decisions.

3.1.2.3 Agrochemical storage facilities

Both Rainforest Alliance and the RSAB have detailed indicators about

the agrochemical storage facility itself and adequate storage and handling

practices. Rainforest Alliance and the RSAB require that the agrochemical

storage building must be roofed, that the walls and shelves must be made of

impermeable, non combustible material (RA) or that they should be painted

to identify seepage (RSAB 2001). Both require that it must have restricted-

access and have good ventilation. Also, both systems require a buffer zone

between this facility and other infrastructure. The RSAB mandates a 10meter buffer zone between the storage facility and vulnerable areas such as

other facilities (processing facilities, housing and offices), schools, and water

courses. Rainforest Alliance safety zone is wider. It requires at least 60



77

meters from other facilities or public buildings, 120 meters from water

courses and 200 meters from sources of drinkable water. Rainforest Alliance

includes norms that address signage and worker safety that are lacking in

the RSAB.

Applied to pesticide storage and handling, Rainforest Alliance

standards include detailed guidelines to transport, manage, and store

pesticides according to toxicity and formulation. The RSAB refers the

producer to a standard with similar scope and criteria published by the

Ecuadorian Normalization Institute (Rule NTE INEN 1927:9210). On the other

hand, Fairtrade’s standards encourage small producers to reduce their use of

agrochemicals and minimize the quantities kept at the farm. For

agrochemical storage, Fairtrade require that the producers keep

agrochemicals in an isolated, waterproofed, locked box.

3.1.2.4 Occupational health and training

Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade and the RSAB have similar

requirements on occupational health and training. All of them ban pregnant

women, minors and people suffering from illness from pesticide-related work.

They also state that the farm must provide personal protection equipment

adequate for each task. Nevertheless, Rainforest Alliance standard is theonly one that presents detailed instructions about what is the adequate

10 This is a standard for agrochemical management, transport and storage practices.



78

protection equipment for each labor. No detailed definitions are provided by

Fairtrade or the Ecuadorian law.

The most striking difference between the systems comes when

defining whose responsibility it is to provide workers with adequate training.

The RSAB mentions that this is a responsibility of the banana exporters,

agrochemical importers and producers. Fairtrade delegates this duty to the

producers association. Rainforest Alliance states that the producers must

provide training for the workers. The RSAB engages actors in all the industry,

under the assumption that if a producer can not provide training to their

workers, at least the agrochemical companies or the banana exporters

should provide this training. Rainforest Alliance forces the producer to

assume this duty, while Fairtrade makes the producers’ association

responsible for providing agrochemical training.

3.1.3 Waste management

There are no large differences between the waste management

requirements present in the three systems studied. All of them focus in

regulating organic and inorganic waste disposal practices, and avoiding

water pollution by agrochemical residues or waste. See Table 8 for the

results of this comparison.

On organic waste, Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade and the Ecuadorian

Law suggest that the organic waste (bananas unfit for exportation) might be



Table 8: Comparison of the RSAB1, Fairtrade2 and Rainforest Alliance3 standards for w

General practices and inorganic wasteNational law1 Fairtrade2 Rainfo

- Recycling and reusing arerecommended (3.6)

Reduction, reurecom

Waste manage

- There must be written proceduresfor each planned activity (3.6.7)

Waste managemrequired (type

- - Waste separreq

Waste burning is prohibited (20) - Burning trasOpen-fire plastic waste burning isprohibited (20)

- Burning tras

Producers must recover all the plasticwaste from the plantation, and sendthem to adequate disposal facilities

(authorized forms: 600˚C incinerators,landfills) (20)

Packaging stations and riverbanksmust be free of waste [3 months]

(3.6.1.)

All plastic wasreused and aIncinerators ccomplies with

per



Table 8 (Continued)

Organic wasteNational law1 Fairtrade2 Rainfo

- Open dumps

Organic waste (banana stalks) shouldbe returned to the plantation (19)

- Surplus bananshould be retu

(

The use of organic digesters and otheralternatives for organic waste

management is recommended (19)

Use of organic waste/manure asfertilizer is recommended (3.6.4)

Composting of orecommended

feasible, adequarecomme

Organic waste (banana) must bedeposited in a place at least 10 m.from irrigation channels, roads,

houses; this organic waste must notcontain plastic waste (19)

Each farm must have a “sanitarydumping place” covered with awaterproof membrane, drainagechannel and lixiviates treatment.

This facility must be located at least100 m. from any water body. “Toxicwaste must be dumped in this area”

(3.6.5)

Landfill musrecommendstandards and

considering imptreatment of lixivan final sealing.

used to dispdangerous mate







81

used in a composting system, and that the stalks could be returned to the

plantations. Second, all the systems regulate the use of landfills for organic

waste disposal. These norms control distances from the landfill to other

buildings, roads and water courses, and require that it fulfill certain

requirements (residuals treatment, drainage channel). Rainforest Alliance

rules that this landfill must comply with the requirements of the World Health

Organization (WHO), thus WHO toxic Materials are banned. Fairtrade

contemplates two different disposal places. One for organic matter, and one

for other kinds of material (including toxic waste).

On inorganic waste, the RSAB approves only two ways for dealing

with inorganic residues (plastics): 600ºC incinerators and authorized landfills

(maintained by local authorities). Open-fire trash burning (a common practice

to deal with plastic residues) is banned. A similar trash-burning prohibition is

found in the Rainforest Alliance norms. However, both Rainforest Alliance

mandate that the producer must keep records of the quantities of all kinds of

waste the farm produces, suggest that they should establish a “reduce, reuse

and recycle” program, and mandate that all reusable material have to be

reused or sent to the supplier, in the case of agrochemical containers.

3.1.4 Water quality

The risk for water quality presented by the banana industry is an

important concern for both the certification systems and the Ecuadorian law

for the environmental health of banana production. This shared concern



82

follows the logic which says that misguided management of agrochemicals,

fertilizers (organic or synthesized), and waste disposal practices will

negatively affect the quality of the water courses that go through the

plantation, while erosion control measures (buffer zones, reforestation of

non-productive or sloped areas) and deforestation control measures will

enhance water quality. Water is the means by which the impact of banana

plantations can reach beyond its borders, affecting other industries (like

shrimp farming) or the livelihood of adjacent communities. Therefore, all the

aforementioned risk reduction strategies can be understood as a demand for

practices that will reduce the plantation’s environmental risk to water. See

Table 9 for the comparison of standards.

Both certification systems and the RSAB require the establishment of

buffer zones along side water courses and other water sources. Likewise,

restrictions on agrochemical use and management (like the RSAB ban on

ground-based application of certain fungicides, or Fairtrade Ban on

herbicides) can be seem as measures that will reduce the potential risk of

agricultural practices. Also, Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade and the National

Banana Law require that the waste water from the Agrochemical Storage

Facilities or from cleaning pesticide application equipment and clothes be

treated and filtered (carbon or charcoal filters are suggested).

The measures identified above only deal with risk of the farming stage

of banana production. Thus, both certification systems and the RSAB have



Table 9: Comparison of the RSAB1, Fairtrade2 and Rainforest Alliance3 standards f

General practices

National law1 Fairtrade2 RainfBuffer zones along water bodies,

drainage channels, roads or shrimppools (14c)

Buffer zones along rivers, waterbodies and secondary forest (3.2.2)

Buffer zonesnatural area

facilitie

Water wells must not be sprayed(aerial fumigation) (25)

-

- Water bodies natural courses mustnot be altered (3.4.5)

Changing thealtering the

proh

- - No solid wadirectly towar

- - Residual wateranalyzed. Res

national lastandards befo

- - The plantatiorecycling a

packaging fac- - Fuel storag

requir- - No solid wadirectly towar



Table 9 (Continued)

Pesticide residuals

National law1 Fairtrade2 RainfoPesticides waste and pesticide-pollutedwaste water must be adequately treated

(sedimentation wells) (21)

Pesticides waste and pesticide-polluted waste water must betreated (carbon or charcoal

filtered) (3.4)

Pesticide-polluteadequate

Packaging facilities must have a systemto collect and filter the residuals of the

post-harvest treatment (21)

Packaging plant waste water mustbe filtered [2 years] (3.4.3)

Packaging facilitto collect and tr

post-harves

Pesticide’s application clothes must bewashed separately (8c)

All spraying equipment must bewashed in a designed facility, andwaste water must be filtered with

carbon or charcoal

Pesticide’s apequipment must

in a specially waste water m

Adequate disposition of agrochemicalresiduals (sedimentation tanks or similar)

are required (17)

A sanitary dumping place must beused to dispose of toxic waste

(3.6.5)

Facilities for aagrochemicals

- Waste water from mixing ofpesticides must be done in a place

with impermeable floor. Wastewater must be treated (3.4.3)

Any equipmeagrochemicals

specially des







85

measures to deal with the environmental risk presented by the processing

stage of banana production. Processing consists of a series of steps

beginning with the arrival of the banana bunches from the plantation and

ends with bananas cleaned, treated, packed and ready for shipment. These

steps require significant quantities of water. Both certification protocols and

the RSAB require that the water from the processing facility must be treated

adequately. However, Rainforest Alliance and the law discriminate between

the water polluted with organic matter that should be treated with a solid and

latex retention system, and the agrochemical-polluted waste water that

comes from the residuals of post-harvest treatment to be treated with a

carbon, sand and gravel sedimentation chamber (post-harvest treatment

system, PHTS). Fairtrade acknowledges only one source of waste water, and

requires the producers to treat these residuals with a PHTS.

Similarly, some of the risk for water quality arises from the organic

waste that come form this facility. Discarded banana (bananas not fit for

exportation), stalks and plastic residues from either plantation or the

processing itself, if inadequately disposed could pollute water courses. Thus,

both certification systems and the law require that packaging stations and

riverbanks must be free of these pollutants. The RSAB also requires that the

organic residues dump must be at least 10 meters away from any water

course. Both Rainforest Alliance and Fairtrade have more detailed criteria fororganic waste disposal, requiring that this place must meet international

criteria (e.g., WHO). However, Rainforest Alliance standards specify that

WHO toxic or dangerous waste can not be disposed in this organic waste



86

dump; while Fairtrade states that organic matter might be dumped in a

“special dumping area”, it also requires that “toxic waste” must be dumped in

a “sanitary dumping place.”

3.1.5 Implications of the comparison of norms

The general foci of concern and regulation within the three normative

systems are shared widely, even if there are some differences in emphases.

The comparative analysis indicates that there is a common understanding of

environmental risks among actors engaged in regulating the banana sector.

Also, similar concerns are reflected in the literature on environmental risks of

banana production (Chambron 2000, Astorga 1998, Morensen 1998,

Henriques 1997, Jeger 1996 and others)

The fact that all of the norms respect the basic agro-ecological model

and rely on similar strategies to mitigate a set of commonly regarded risks

leads me to conclude that the management practices recommended in the

standards assessment will effectively reduce the environmental risks of

banana production. Therefore, by identifying the practices recognized as best

management practices, and surveying farms’ conformity with them, I am able

to evaluate relative risk reduction. The more closely a farm approaches the

theoretical best -- implementation of 100% of the best management practices – the higher their risk reduction rating and the lower their potential

environmental impact.



87

3.2 Empirical assessment of eco-certification schemes in Ecuadorian

banana production

I urge the reader to remember that the methodology allows to

compare certified farms versus non-certified farms of similar size (small

certified (FT) versus small non-certified, and large certified (RA) versus large

non-certified). In constructing the histograms, full colors (black/white) are

used for small farms and shades of gray are used for large farms. While it is

interesting to reflect on relative scores of farms certified under FT and RA

(and to ask which of these schemes is observed to reduce risk more

effectively), I view these scores to be a reflection, in some measure, of farm

size and related factors of access to capital and level of technology.

3.2.1 By risk reduction criteria

3.2.1.1 Use of land (UL)

The summary of the results for use of land (UL) is in Table 10.

Overall, certified farms have higher scores than non-certified farms. The

median UL score for small certified farms is 4.0 versus 1.0 for non-certified

(out of 4 points), and the median UL score for large certified farms is 2.59

versus 1.0 for large non-certified farms. These differences are statisticallysignificant (Mann-Whitney Test, p<0.0002 for small farms, p<0.0000 for large

farms).



88

The data distribution (Figure 7) shows that certified farms are likely to

have higher scores than non-certified ones. The large certified farms (RA)

scores fall between 2 and 4, with 30 % of the scores in the 2 to 3 range and

70 % higher than 3. Comparable large non-certified farms scores are

between 0 and 3, with 60% of the scores being lower than 2 and 40%

between 2 and 3. A similar pattern was found in the sample of small farms.

All certified small farms (FT) scores fell between 2 and 4, with 23% in the 2-3

range and 77% scoring over 3, while non-certified small farms scores are in

the 0-3 range, with 56% of them scoring less than 2.

At the level of index individual components, there is an outstanding

difference in frequency of farms that dedicate land to vegetative barriers or

buffer zones (VEBF). All the certified farms (23 out of 23) had buffer zones or

vegetative barriers, but only 12.5% of non-certified plantations (3 of 24)

engage in this practice. The average vegetative barrier/plantation ratio (RVS)

in a non-certified farm is 0.01, or 1% of the farm surface. This information

can be compared with the average 14% RVS for large certified farms (RA),

or the average 57% RVS for Fairtrade farms (see Figure 8)11 Certified farms

are more likely to engage in this risk reduction practice and the amount of

land that they dedicate to this alternative use of land is likely to be higher

than in non-certified farms.

11 Fairtrade RVS varies from 6% (average) in technology based plantations to 100% in no

technology based organic farms (in which the surface dedicated to other plants is higherthan the surface dedicated to banana).



90

Table 10: Median, mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation for

small and large non-certified and certified farms scores for use of land

(out of 4 points)

Farm Size Small farms (<50 has) Large farms (>50 has)

Status Non-certified

(n=9)

Certified FT

(n=13)

Non-certified

(n=15)

Certified RA

(n=10)

Median 1.00 4.00 1.00 2.59

Mean 1.45 3.34 1.40 2.49

Min 1.00 2.01 1.00 2.01

Max 2.07 4.00 2.10 2.93

SD 0.54 0.83 0.34 0.32

As explained before, farms with higher scores engage in relatively

more risk reduction practices than the others. Therefore, the results

consistently show that certified farms engage in more practices to reduce the

risk stemming from land use in banana production. While the sample did not

show if certification or the law function to protect virgin forest, due to the fact

that all the farms were established in areas previously used for agriculture,

the results indicate that certified farms are more likely to have vegetative

barriers or buffer zones, and that the surface dedicated to this alternative use

of land is likely to be higher.

There is some evidence to support the hypothesis that this risk

reduction behavior might reduce the risk of banana production to forest



91

remnants and bamboo natural stands. The responses on tethering practices

(TEMA) show that 56% of the certified farms and 70% of the non-certified

farms uses bamboo for stakes. Therefore, the fact that the average RVS for

RA certified farms is 14%, and the FT average RVS is 57% (or higher for the

rustic farms) indicate that certified farms (RA) are over the empirical optimal

ratio of 1:10 bamboo/banana surface. On the other hand, only 12.5% of the

non-certified farms have buffer zones, and the average RVS is of 1%.

While no detailed information was gathered about the coverage of

bamboo in the certified farms’ buffer zones, the field inspection showed that

bamboo is one of the favored species (see Figure 9). Consequently, it is

expected that certified farms exert lower pressures on wild bamboo stands

and natural forest remnants. Thus, it is likely that certification is effectively

addressing this area of concern.

3.2.1.2 Agrochemical management (AM)

The summary of the results for the Agrochemical Management index

(AM) is in Table 11. As was the case in reviewing risk reduction related to

land use practices, certified farms consistently have higher scores than non-

certified. The median AM score for small certified small farms is 11.00 versus

4.90 for non-certified (out of 12 points), and the median AM score for largecertified farms is 9.50 versus 4.00 for non-certified farms. These differences

are statistically significant (Mann-Whitney Test, p<0.0001 for small and

p<0.0000 for large farms).



92

Figure 8: Fairtrade-certified organic rustic (no-technology based) banana

plantation. Note young cocoa plants and shade trees.



93

Figure 9: Rainforest Alliance-certified farm buffer zone (Reybancorp

S.A., Quevedo-Los Rios). Note that the buffer zone is formed with bamboo

and other species and that a nearby non-certified banana plantation (top-right corner) reaches the river banks.



94


small and large non-certified and certified farms scores for agrochemical

management (out of 12 points)



(n=9)

Certified FT

(n=13)

Non-certified

(n=15)

Certified RA

(n=10)

Median 4.90 11.00 4.00 9.50

Mean 5.49 10.85 4.06 9.70

Min 4.00 10.00 3.00 9.50

Max 7.50 12.00 5.50 10.50

SD 1.20 0.47 0.74 0.42

The data distribution (Table 11, Figure 10) shows that all certified

farms have higher scores than non-certified ones. Overall, large certified

farms scored from 9 to11 risk reduction points (RRP) while the large non-

certified farms score less than 6 RRP. Small certified farms scores vary from

a minimal of 10 RRP to a maximum score of 12 RRP, while non-certified

small farms scores are within 4 to 7 points. There is no overlap between the

two distributions. There is a gap of 4 RRP between the maximum score of

large non-certified farms and the minimum score of large certified ones. The

gap between the maximum score of small non-certified versus the minimum

score of small certified farms is 2.5 RRP. These results imply that a certified

producer engages in practices that are not common for the non-certified



96

by the certifiers audition team, while in non-certified farms product availability

and price will be the deciding factor for product selection.

Certification also influences the likelihood of a farm manager

conducting technical analyses before using agrochemicals. On nematocides,

as mentioned previously, all the non-certified large farmers used

nematocides. Nevertheless, only 66% used soil analysis results to

determinate if this application was needed. On the other hand, 80% of the

RA certified farms use nematocides, but all of them conducted soil analysis

periodically14. This finding indicate that reliance on technical tools reduce the

likeness of useless agrochemical applications. Therefore, the certified farms’

reliance on technical analysis can be seen to contribute to optimization of

agrochemical use.

We observe striking differences in two variables, IMMR (records for

insecticide use) and pesticide training (PTRA). Certified farms, regardless of

their size, consistently showed records of their use of insecticides (100%),

but non-certified farm failed to keep insecticide use records. The responses

for pesticide training indicate a worrisome difference between certified and

non-certified farms. All the certified farms provided pesticide training to their

workers and could show records of training events. Only one small non-

14

Indeed, during the interview the soil analysis result was used by the administrator of oneof the certified farm to argue that there was no need to use nematocides in his plantation



97

certified producer indicated that he provided training for his workers, but he

did not keep records of these events.15.

Due to the lack of training, it is not surprising that pesticide

management in banana farms has been described as sloppy (Jeger et al.

1996). Indeed, some of the non-certified farms have agrochemical storage

and handling practices that justify the use of this adjective. See Figure 11 for

fertilizers storage and Figure 12 for the “pesticide mixing area” of a non-

certified farm. Only 16% of non-certified farms have any sort of warning

signals outside of the agrochemical storage facility. Likewise, only 37.5% of

the agrochemical facilities had non-combustible, impermeable floors and

ceilings, and only 16% of them had impermeable shelves for storage. These

farms do not fulfill even the minimal requirements for reducing the risk of

agrochemical storage and handling.

Interviews with certified farms indicate that they have found more than

one way to provide these services. The company that owns the certified

farms (RA), Reybancorp S.A., delegates this responsibility to the farm

manager (usually an agronomist) who organizes talks on specific topics, or

major training events with the support of the company environmental

department. FT certified producers’ association provides training services for

them and their workers, therefore sharing the costs of maintaining

15 This person was retired from the Banana National Program, and had worked as an

extensionist for 20 years before becoming an entrepreneur. Interestingly, his farm scoreshigher than the others in this category.



98

Figure 10: Histogram of risk reduction scores for agrochemical management

(AM) by farm size and certification status

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12

Risk Reduction Score (AM)

P e r c e n t o f

o b s e r v a t i o n s

Non-certified large

Non-certified small

Certified large (RA)

Certified small (FT)



99

Figure 11: Fertilizers storage at the side of the processing facility of a

non-certified farm (Naranjal-Guayas). Note the roof, and fuel (diesel) tanks

close to the fertilizer.



100

Figure 12: Pesticides mixing area of a non-certified farm (Naranjal-

Guayas). Note that the surface is permeable (wood), lack of spill containment

systems and lack of mixing/measurement equipment.



101

specialized personnel. Therefore, it can be plausibly argued certification

encourages producers into finding innovative ways to utilize the resources

already available (like trained personnel), or into alternative pathways to

overcome the weakness of individual producers by encouraging collective

action.

3.2.1.3 Waste management (WM)

The summary of the results for the Waste Management index (WM) is

in the Table 12. The data show that certified farms consistently have higher

scores than non-certified. The median WM score for small certified small

farms is 3.00 risk reduction points (RRP) versus 2.00 RRP for non-certified

(out of 3 points). The median WM score for large certified farms is 3.00 RRP

versus 1.00 RRP for non-certified farms. No significance test was performed

because all certified farms reached the maximum possible score.

The data distribution (Table 12, Figure 13) is highly skewed, with all

the certified farms scoring 3 out of 3 risk reduction points (RRP). The data of

non-certified farms have a wider spread. Of the small non-certified farms,

22% scored 1 RRP, 66.7% scored 2 RRP and 11% scored 3 RRP. Of the

large non-certified farms 13% scored 0 RRP, 40% scored 1 RRP, 26.7%

scored 2 RRP and 20% scored 3 RRP.

The data from the waste management individual components indicate

that good practices for dealing with waste-bananas (ORWM1) (Figure 14) are



102

widely distributed. In fact, all the certified farms and 88% of the non-certified

farms reported having a secondary use for rejected bananas (instead of just

discarding them). However, 62.5% of the non-certified farmers engaged in

the recommended practice of returning the stalks to the plantation (ORWM2),

with the rest (37.5%) dumping the stalks elsewhere (see Figure 15). All the

certified farms reported following adequate stalks disposal practices.


small and large non-certified and certified farms scores for waste

management (out of 3 points)



(n=9)

Certified FT

(n=13)

Non-certified

(n=15)

Certified RA

(n=10)

Median 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00

Mean 1.89 3.00 1.53 3.00

Min 1.00 3.00 0.00 3.00

Max 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00

SD 0.60 0.00 0.99 0.00

The data from the waste management individual components indicate

that good practices for dealing with waste-bananas (ORWM1) (Figure 14) are

widely distributed. In fact, all the certified farms and 88% of the non-certified

farms reported having a secondary use for rejected bananas (instead of just



103

Figure 13: Histogram of risk reduction scores for waste management (WM)

by farm size and certification status

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

0 1 2 3

Risk Reduction Score (WM)

P e r c e n t o f o b s e r v a t i o n s Non-certified large

Non-certified small





104

Figure 14: Rejected banana (unfit for exportation) in a no-certified farm

(Naranjal-Guayas). Note that some of the organic waste is collected for

sending it back to the plantation.



106

Figure 15: Banana stalks open-dump in a non-certified banana farm

(Naranjal-Guayas). Note the presence of plastic residue with the stalks, and

that here was running water at the bottom of the ravine. For scale, the stalks

are approximately 1.7 meters long.



107

Figure 16: Area used for burning plastic waste in a non-certified farm

(Naranjal-Guayas). Note recently dumped residues and the residues of

previous plastic burning.



108

The data distribution shows no overlap between the scores of certified

and non-certified farms (Figure 17). There is a gap of 2 risk reduction points

between the maximum score of large non-certified farms and the minimum

score of large certified ones. The gap is 1 risk reduction point for small

farms.


small and large non-certified and certified farms scores for water quality

(out of 11 points)



(n=9)

Certified FT

(n=13)

Non-certified

(n=15)

Certified RA

(n=10)

Median 5.00 9.00 3.00 8.00

Mean 4.78 9.08 2.93 8.20

Min 2.00 8.00 0.00 8.00

Max 7.00 10.00 6.00 9.00

SD 1.75 0.62 1.48 0.40

Two variables that compile the presence absence of end-of-pipe

systems at the level of the packaging facility inform our understanding of how

certification systems work to reduce the risk of water pollution. The agro-

ecological model indicates that the general consensus is that there are two

sources of pollution at the end processing facility, organic waste from



110

preparing and cleaning bananas, and the post-harvest treatment residuals.

The assessment of the norms indicates that it is recommended that the

farmers have solid and latex filtering/retention system (SLRS) at the end of

the processing process, and a treatment system to collect the post harvest

residuals (PHTS). These investments avoid direct release of organic waste

and fungicides to water courses. However, Fairtrade norms suggest another

approach, phasing fungicides out of the post harvest mixture, hence making

it unnecessary to build and service the PHTS.

The results indicate that large certified farms employ a conventional

end-of-pipe approach, due to the fact that all of them have SLRS and PHTS

to treat the effluents of the processing facility. On the other hand, 54% small

certified farmers have already built a SLRS, and 46% are in the process of

building them. Nevertheless, none of them had plans to build PHTS. Rather,

73% of them replaced the post-harvest fungicides thiabendazole or imazalil

for an organic product (Citrex) that is likely to pose a lower environmental

risk.16 This risk reduction measure is evidently more attractive due to the fact

that it addressed the problem at its root, therefore avoiding the need of a

sand-gravel-charcoal filtering system. Due to the lack of information about

the environmental risk of this product, I treated it as if it has the same risk as

conventional fungicides. However, Fairtrade commitment to implement

process measures is worth mentioning and contrasts with the fact that all thenon-certified farms lack both SLRS and PHTS, and all of them use

thiabendazole or imazalil in their post harvest treatment.

16 Citrex® 100L is a fungicide/bactericide produced by Citrex Inc (US).



111

3.2.2 Total risk reduction score (TT)

As mentioned before, the total risk reduction score is an aggregate of

the previously named components. Due to the fact that it incorporates all the

variables included in the four previously discussed indexes, the total risk

reduction score presents a wider view of the farm, and how it affects its

surroundings. A farm score will be higher when it incorporates the best

practices identified in the assessment of the norms. Therefore, it can be

argued that farms with high risk reduction scores are likely to produces less

environmental degradation.

The summary of the results for the total risk reduction score (TT) is in

the Table 14. Certified farms consistently have higher scores than non-

certified (see Table 15). The median TT small certified farm achieved 91% of

the ideal farm score versus 46% for non-certified and the median TT score

for large certified farms is of 78% of the maximum possible score versus

34% for non-certified farms. The differences are statistically significant

(Mann-Whitey Test, p<0.0001 for small farms and p<0.0000 for large farms).

The distribution of the scores of certified and non-certified farms do

not overlap, with a gap of 19% between the maximum score of a non-

certified small farm and the minimum score of a small (FT) certified one. Thegap between large certified and non-certified farms is of 20% (See Figure 18,

Figure 19).



112

Table 14 Median, mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation for

small and large non-certified and certified farms total risk reduction scores

(out of 1 point)



(n=9)

Certified FT

(n=13)

Non-certified

(n=15)

Certified RA

(n=10)

Median 0.46 0.91 0.34 0.78

Mean 0.44 0.87 0.34 0.77

Min 0.32 0.76 0.12 0.73

Max 0.57 0.94 0.53 0.82

SD 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.03

The data shows that the risk reduction scores of certified farms are

consistently higher than the scores of non-certified farms. Thus, under the

assumption that farms of similar size have the same potential of generating

environmental degradation due to the similarities in agricultural practices, it is

highly likely that certified farms will have a lower environmental impact than

comparable non-certified ones

3.2.3 Differences between certified and non-certified small farms

When looking at the results for small farms, there is an evident

difference between certified and non-certified ones. The difference between

means is of 45% points and the difference between medians is of 43% points



113

Table 15: Farms risk reduction scores and percentage of maximum score for

use of land (UL), agrochemical management (AM), waste management

(WM), water quality (WQ) and total risk reduction score (TT), ordered by total

risk reduction score

Farms UL% ofmax.score

AM% ofmax.score

WM% ofmax.score

WQ% ofmax.score

TT% ofmax.score

NCL, T 1.0 25% 2.8 23% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 3.8 13%

NCL, T 2.0 50% 2.6 22% 0.0 0% 1.0 9% 5.6 19%

“ 1.0 25% 2.6 22% 1.0 33% 2.0 18% 6.6 22%

“ 1.0 25% 2.6 22% 1.0 33% 2.0 18% 6.6 22%

“ 1.0 25% 2.6 22% 1.0 33% 2.0 18% 6.6 22%

“ 1.0 25% 2.9 24% 1.0 33% 2.0 18% 6.9 23%

“ 1.0 25% 3.0 25% 1.0 33% 3.0 27% 8.0 27%

“ 2.0 50% 2.0 17% 1.0 33% 4.0 36% 9.0 30%

“ 1.0 25% 2.1 18% 3.0 100% 3.0 27% 9.1 30%

“ 2.0 50% 2.1 18% 2.0 67% 3.0 27% 9.1 30%

NCS, T 2.0 50% 3.9 33% 1.0 33% 2.0 18% 8.9 30%

NCL, T 1.0 25% 3.5 29% 2.0 67% 3.0 27% 9.5 32%NCS, T 1.0 25% 3.9 33% 2.0 67% 3.0 27% 9.9 33%

“ 1.0 25% 3.0 25% 1.0 33% 5.0 45% 10.0 33%

“ 2.0 50% 3.9 33% 2.0 67% 3.0 27% 10.9 36%

“ 2.1 52% 2.1 18% 3.0 100% 4.0 36% 11.2 37%

NCL, T 2.0 50% 2.0 17% 2.0 67% 5.0 45% 11.0 37%

“ 2.0 50% 2.3 19% 3.0 100% 4.0 36% 11.3 38%

“ 2.0 50% 3.3 28% 3.0 100% 4.0 36% 12.3 41%

“ 1.0 25% 3.5 29% 2.0 67% 6.0 55% 12.5 42%

NCS, T 1.0 25% 4.3 36% 2.0 67% 6.0 55% 13.3 44%

“ 1.0 25% 4.3 36% 2.0 67% 6.0 55% 13.3 44%

“ 1.0 25% 6.5 54% 2.0 67% 7.0 64% 16.5 55%

“ 2.0 50% 5.5 46% 2.0 67% 7.0 64% 16.5 55%



114

Table 15 (Continued)

Farms UL

% of

max.score

AM

% of

max.score

WM

% of

max.score

WQ

% of

max.score

TT

% of

max.score

CL, T 2.0 50% 8.5 71% 3.0 100% 8.0 73% 21.5 72%

“ 2.0 51% 8.5 71% 3.0 100% 8.0 73% 21.5 72%

“ 2.0 51% 8.5 71% 3.0 100% 8.0 73% 21.5 72%

“ 2.5 64% 8.5 71% 3.0 100% 8.0 73% 22.0 73%

“ 2.6 66% 8.5 71% 3.0 100% 8.0 73% 22.1 74%

“ 2.7 68% 8.5 71% 3.0 100% 8.0 73% 22.2 74%

“ 2.7 69% 8.5 71% 3.0 100% 8.0 73% 22.2 74%

“ 2.9 73% 8.5 71% 3.0 100% 8.0 73% 22.4 75%

“ 2.5 64% 9.5 79% 3.0 100% 9.0 82% 24.0 80%

“ 2.6 66% 9.5 79% 3.0 100% 9.0 82% 24.1 80%

CS, ST 2.0 50% 9.5 79% 3.0 100% 8.0 73% 22.5 75%

CS, T 3.1 78% 9.0 75% 3.0 100% 8.0 73% 23.1 77%

CS, ST 2.0 51% 9.5 79% 3.0 100% 9.0 82% 23.5 78%

CS, T 3.0 76% 9.5 79% 3.0 100% 9.0 82% 24.5 82%

CS, ST 3.0 76% 9.5 79% 3.0 100% 9.0 82% 24.5 82%

CS, NT 2.1 53% 11.0 92% 3.0 100% 9.0 82% 25.1 84%

“ 4.0 100% 10.0 83% 3.0 100% 9.0 82% 26.0 87%

“ 4.0 100% 10.0 83% 3.0 100% 9.0 82% 26.0 87%

“ 4.0 100% 10.0 83% 3.0 100% 9.0 82% 26.0 87%

CS, ST 4.0 100% 10.0 83% 3.0 100% 9.0 82% 26.0 87%

CS, NT 4.0 100% 10.0 83% 3.0 100% 10.0 91% 27.0 90%

“ 4.0 100% 10.0 83% 3.0 100% 10.0 91% 27.0 90%

“ 4.0 100% 10.0 83% 3.0 100% 10.0 91% 27.0 90%

NCL non-certified large farms (>50 has), NCS non-certified small (<50 has)

CL certified large farms (RA), CS certified small (FT)

T technology based crop management, ST semi-technology based, NT no

technology based



115

Figure 18: Histogram of the total risk reduction score by farm size and

certification status

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

Total Risk Reduction Score

P e r c e n t o f o b s e r v a t i o n s

Non-certified large

Non-certified small





Figure 19: Dot plot for total risk reduction score by farm size and certification



118

Agrochemical management is second area of risk reduction for which

important differences were found. At the level of index components, certified

and non-certified small farms are differentiated by agrochemical restrictions,

agrochemical storage, pesticide training and records keeping practices.

Certified small farms comply with restrictions on herbicides and nematocides,

in contrast with non-certified farms that reported a 100% of reliance on

herbicides for weeds control (9 out of 9) and 44% of reliance in nematocides

(4 out of 9).

Moreover, certified small farms used storage boxes for keeping small

quantities of agrochemicals on-farm, thereby achieving the maximum score

for the agrochemical storage facilities (ASI). On the other hand, non-certified

farms had problems meeting the requirements for agrochemical storage; the

average storage facility scored 0.71 ASI (out of 1 point), and all of them

lacked waste water treatment systems. Finally, all the certified small farmers

and their workers had access to training events (13 out of 13); only one non-

certified producer reported that he conducted training events for his workers.

However, both certified and non-certified small farmers face similar

capital and technology constrains, and are subject to the same pressures

that discriminate against small holdings. The field survey narrative indicates

that small certified farmers have access to two resources that are notavailable for non-certified producers: the “El Guabo” Association of Small

Banana Producers (APPBG) and the premium offered by the Fairtrade

commercialization system. Through the APPBG, small certified producers



119

have access to services in agrochemical procurement, agrochemical storage,

pesticide training, inorganic waste management and extension. Fairtrade

premium compensates no-technology-based farmers for the low yield of their

farms, and also offers a source of capital to do the investments required to

improve the environmental performance of small farms. Thus, certification

appears to be a worthy alternative for the problems of small farmers, as long

as they have access to their own market niche (Hellin and Higman 2002).

These benefits are not present in any form for non-certified producers.

Small non-certified banana producers must face capital constrains, the

collapse of the state-sponsored extension services, and restrictions on his

ability to ship his fruit to the market. It is not surprisingly that small farmers

reported that they are being “pushed out of business”.

3.2.4 Differences between certified and non-certified large farms

The results show that certified large farms outperform non-certified

ones. The differences between the average certified and non-certified farm is

of 0.43 (out of 1 point), the difference between medians is similar, of 0.44

(out of 1 point). There is no overlap between the risk reduction scores of

certified and non- certified farms, and the differences are spread among all

the risk reduction indexes (see Table 17, Figure 19)

Starting with use of land, one of the differentiation factors is that all the

certified farms (10 out of 10) have areas allocated to vegetative barriers and



120

buffer zones, in contrast with the non-certified producers (2 out of 15, or

13%). The average RA certified buffer zone covers 11% of the surface of the

farm, and that these areas have been forested with bamboo, several species

of native and introduced trees. It is interesting to note that it was reported

that using land for vegetative barriers and buffer zones does not imply that

that land is going to be unproductive: by producing bamboo and wood,

certified plantations are providing ecological services that are economically

sustainable.


(expressed as percentage of the index maximum possible score) of certified

versus non-certified large farms

Type of farms UL AM WM WQ

Non-certified large C 35% 22% 51% 27%

Certified large (RA) D 62% 73% 100% 75%

Difference C-D 27% 50% 49% 48%

UL use of land, AM agrochemical management, WM waste management,

WQ water quality

The agrochemical management is second area of concern for which

important differences were found. While all the large farms use the same

kind of compounds (fertilizers, herbicides, fungicides, nematocides and

insecticides), the differences in the frequencies of use of laboratory-based

diagnostics, field monitoring and record keeping practices show that certified



122

of the not-structured compliance with one or another risk reduction practice

found in non-certified farms. Therefore the answer to my initial research

question is that, indeed, certified farms have a higher risk reduction level

than non-certified farms of equal size. A summary of the findings follows:

1. Certified farms are more likely to allocate land for vegetative

barriers and buffer zones

All the certified farms implemented buffer zones but only 3 out of 24

non-certified farms engaged in this practice (12.5%), even if the

National Law (RSAB) requires that all farms must allocate land for this

use. Because research done elsewhere indicates that buffer zones

are highly efficient at removing nutrients from the flow of agricultural

fields, and can delay the release of other agrochemicals to water, the

non-certified farms failure at deploying buffer zones suggest that their

environmental impact is higher than it should be.

2. Certified farms are more likely to provide training for their

workers

The use of agrochemical is widely acknowledged as one of the major

risk generating factors associated with banana production, and

increasing the farms’ workers awareness of the risk of these

substances is one of the ways for dealing with this issue. Sadly, thistask has been overlooked by the large farms owners and

administrators, and is inaccessible for small farmers due its cost and



123

lack of state-provided extension services. The only producers that

provided training for his workers was one of a kind, because he was a

former employee of the late Banana National Program and he had the

training and the motivation to engage in this task.

3. Certified farms are more likely to restrict some agrochemicals.

Two related facts exemplify this difference: a) Fairtrade bans the use

of herbicides, and small certified farms did not report using these

products while all the rest of the farms (large certified included) used

chemicals for weeds control, b) large certified farms used allowed

herbicides, but 53% of the large non-certified and 11% of the small

non-certified farms used paraquat based herbicides, that presents a

higher environmental risk that glyphosate based ones (EXTOXNET

1996a, 1996b, Baylis 2000). Therefore, the data indicates that

certification regulates agrochemical use following two approaches,

either banning an entire family of products, or regulating which

products can be used in the crop.

4. Certified farms are more likely to use technical assessment tools

before using a product

The best example of this is found in the results for nematocides use in

large farms. In all certified large farms, it was reported that soilanalyses were performed before determining the need for a

nematocides application and nematocides were applied in only 8 out



124

of 10 farms (80%). On the other hand, while all the non-certified large

farms had used nematocides in the previous year (100%), only 66% of

them have performed laboratory analysis before the nematocides

application, with the rest determining the need of nematocides using

empirical assessment tools. The practice of trusting empirical

observations to do pest management is especially worrisome when

dealing with highly toxic products; the lack of an adequate

management system unnecessarily increases the risk of these

practices.

5. Certified farms are more likely to keep detailed records of the use

of agrochemicals.

Keeping adequate records is a mandate of practically both certification

systems (and it is included in the national law), since it is the base for

developing and implementing an integrated crop management system.

Indeed, certified large farms excelled in this aspect, having detailed

systems to records all of their agrochemical-related activities. On the

other hand, only 6% of the large non-certified farms keep records of

their use of herbicides and fungicides, and none of them keep records

of their use of insecticides. All the small certified farmers keep records

of their use of insecticides, and 92% keep records of their use of

fungicides. Contrariwise, none of the non-certified small farmers keeprecords of insecticides, and only 56% of them keep records of

fungicides use.



125

6. Certified farms are more likely to display adequate waste

management practices.

All certified farms had waste disposal practices for organic and

inorganic waste that are compatible with the local legislation. On the

other hand, while 88% of the large and 86% of the small non-certified

farms managed their “banana-waste” adequately and most of them

disposes of the stalks sending them back to the plantations (46% of

the large and 88% of the small farms), only 20% of the large and 11%

of the small non-certified farms disposed of their plastic waste in ways

approved by the law. Even more, the two methods of inorganic waste

disposal recorded (burning it or throwing it) generate an unnecessary

risk for the environment, and are banned by law.

7. Certified farms are more likely to engage in practices that should

reduce the impact of banana production in the quality of the

water.

By implementing all of the previously discussed practices, certified

farms are more likely to engage in practices that reduce their impact in

water resource quality. For example, non-certified farms fail to

implement even mandatory measures such as buffer zones and

waste-water treatment systems. On the other hand, certified farms

fulfill these requirements or go beyond them, implementing alternativerisk reduction measures which should have the same effect.



126

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Motivated by the lack of empirical evidence about the environmental

effects of ecolabeling, the free-trade challenges to state-based environmental

regulations, and the increasing reliance on market-based incentives to

achieve public policy objectives, my research question addresses

environmental risk-reduction achieved by certified farms.

To be able to answer my question, I developed an inputs outputs agro

ecological model to structure the comparison of two certification standards

(Rainforest Alliance and Fairtrade) with Environmental Bylaws for Banana

Production. Findings of this comparison indicate that the general foci of

concern and regulation are widely shared by these three normative systems.

These findings indicate that there is a common understanding of risks and

fate-transport in the environment, and similar concerns are reflected in the

literature on environmental risks of banana production (Chambron 2000,

Astorga 1998, Morensen 1998, Henriques 1997, Jeger 1996 and others).

Therefore, I identified a set of best management practices to assess the

environmental risk reduction behaviors of certified farms. I developed

matched samples of certified and un-certified farms controlling for farm size.

Certified farms exhibited relatively complex environmental

management systems; as a part of these systems, they implemented a

comprehensive set of risk reduction measures compatible with the



127

requirements of the certification standards. Conversely, non-certified farms

exhibited only a spotted, unstructured compliance with one or other risk

reduction criteria. The results indicate that both large and small certified

farms outperformed non-certified ones; in fact, the worst performing certified

farm (of any size) have a higher risk reduction score that the best of the non-

certified farms. The environmental accomplishments on small and large

certified farms speak in favor of using ecolabels to encourage/acknowledge

operations with a better environmental behavior.

The findings also inform on a breakdown in enforcement of the

existent environmental laws, and on the non-certified farmers lack of access

to extension services who might supply for that regulation failure. The

suppression of the Banana National Program generated a gap in the state

ability to regulate, control and monitor the banana industry; likewise this

neoliberal driven reform affected the state-capacity for supplying services for

resources-constrained producers (UNEP 2002).

However, the cross sectional nature of this study implies that the

causality between ecocertification and farms practices can not be

established. The results provide a snapshot of the farms, thus they do not

reflect the progress of certified farms in function of time, and how their

behavior is influence by changes in certification protocols and other externalfactors. Further research is needed for understanding the forces that drive

this process, and further clarification of the interrelationship producers,

ecolabeling systems, and the environment.



129

Consequently, the findings support the need for a state –enforced set

of rules and regulations. The Ecuadorian banana production case

exemplifies the effects of demolishing the state-enforcement abilities: the

scores of non-certified farms do not reach the minimum level set in Ecuador’s

Environmental Bylaws for Banana Production (RSAB), and certification does

not reach those farms. Therefore, state-regulations are needed to set the

minimum levels of environmental behavior that must be obeyed by all the

producers.

Finally, the findings inform on openings for improvement for non-

certified producers. The actors involved in improving the environmental

performance of Ecuadorian banana production should focus their efforts on

addressing issues associated with agrochemical management and water

quality, due to the fact that small and large non-certified producers exhibited

a marked weakness at fulfilling the requirements for these both areas for risk

reduction.



130

APPENDIX 1

SURVEY “A”

Locality: __________________ (write the name of the closest town)

Farm code: __________________ (two letters for locality + three numbers)

1. General information

a) Non-certified large Non-certified small

Certified large Certified small

b) Farm surface: _____________ hectares

c) Banana plantation surface: _______ hectares

d) Years in production: ________ years

e) Traditional agricultural land (Y/N): __

f) Banana variety: Cavendish Valery Filipino Others

g) Density: ________ plants/hectare

h) Production rate: _____ boxes/ha/year

i) Ratio: ______

2. Farm practices

2.1 Tethering

a) Bamboo Plastic Both None

b) Source: ____________________________________________________



132

2.3.2 Insecticides

a) Which method is used for pest control? _______________________

Chemical Mechanical None Other: ___________________

b) How does the farmer decide that is time for insecticide application?

_____________________________________________________________

Cyclic applications Monitoring None Other: _________________

c) Does the farmer keep records? (Y/N) ___ Type: _____________________

2.3.3 Nematocides

a) Which method is used for nematode control? ______________________

Chemical Mechanical None Other: _______________________

b) How does the farmer decide that there is a need for nematode control?

___________________________________________________________

Cyclic applications Visual None Other: _________________

Lab Analysis Before application? (Y/N) ___



133

c) Does the farmer keep records? (Y/N) ___ Type: _____________________

d) Products used last time? _______________________________________

2.3.4 Fungicides

a) Main fungal disease? _________________________________________

b) Which method is used for fungal diseases control? __________________

Chemical Mechanical None Other: _______________________

c) How does the farmer decide that there is a need for fungal diseases

control?

___________________________________________________________

Cyclic applications Visual None Other: _________________

Lab Analysis Before application? (Y/N) ___

d) Who is responsible for fungicides application?

_____________________________________________________________

e) Does the farmer keep records? (Y/N) ___ Type: ____________________



134

2.3.5 Training

a) Is pesticide training available for the farm workers? (Y/N) ______

b) If a)=yes, who is in charge? _____________________________

c) Records? ____________________________________________

d) Frequency? __________________________________________

2.4 Waste management

a) What does the farmer do with rejected banana? ___________________

Secondary use Which? ______________________________________

b) What does the farmer do with stalks? ___________________________

c) What does the farmer do with inorganic waste (plastic)?

_____________________________________________________________

2.5 Water quality

a) Water course (superficial) in the plantation? (Y/N) ____

b) Buffer strips/buffer zone along water course? (Y/N) ____



135

APPENDIX 2

SURVEY “B”

Farm code: __________________ (two letters for locality + three numbers)

1. General checklist

Item Yes No

On-farm pesticides storage facilities

On-farm fertilizers storage

On-farm processing facilities

2. Pesticides storage facility

Item Yes No

Door with lock

Warning signals

Non-combustible floor and ceiling

Non-combustible walls

Non-combustible shelves

Waste water treatment system

Banned products on storage facility (dirty dozen, FAO PIC,

WHO class 1 a+b)

Which?



137

APPENDIX 3

VARIABLES DICTIONARY

LABEL Description Values

CODE Farm identification code unique

GCOD Group code 1 non-certified large

2 non-certified small

3 certified large (RA)

4 certified small (FT)

TTAL Farm total surface continuous (hectares)

BVAR Banana variety 1 Cavendish

2 Valery

3 Filipino

4 Others

DENS Plantation density continuous (plants/hectare)

RATE Production rate continuous (boxes/hectare/year)

RTIO Ratio boxes/bunch

LAND Land cover change 0 recently cleared forest (<10

years)

1 traditional agricultural land

TEMA Tethering material 0 bamboo stakes

0 both bamboo stakes and plastic

1 plastic

1 none



138


{value depends on TEMA}

TEMA 0 1

Provider 0 0

Plantation 0 1

Provider and

plantation

0 0.5

TMSO Source of tethering material

None 0 0

VEBF Reforestation areas and

buffer zones

0 no

1 yes

BANS Banana plantation surface continuous [hectares]

VSUR Vegetative barriers or

forestry area surface

continuous [hectares]

RVS Ratio of vegetative barrier

or forestry area/banana

surface

continuous (0 to 1)

HMET Weeds control method 0 chemical

1 cultural

1 none

{value depends on HMET}

HMET 0 1

allowed 0.5 0

HPRO Products used for weeds

control

banned 0 0



139


{value depends on HMET}

HMET 0 1

accounting 0 0

accounting +

application

0.5 0

HERR Records for herbicides use

accounting, +

applications + field

reports

1 0

IMHW Pest monitoring evaluation

system

0 no

1 yes

1 not use of insecticides

IMMR Pest control record keeping 0 no

1 yes

1 not use of insecticides

NMET Nematodes control method 0 chemical

1 cultural

1 none

{value depends on NMET}

NMET 0 1

yes 1 1

NHOW Analysis before

nematocides application

no 0 1



141


PTRA Pesticide training for

workers

0 no

1 yes

PTRE Pesticide training records 0 no

1 yes

PTWH Responsible for training open field

PTFR Frequency of training

events

continuous (times per year)

ASTO On-farm agrochemical

storage facility

0 no

1 yes

HERB Banned products on ASTO

(dirty dozen, FAO PIC,

WHO class 1 a+b)

0 yes

1 no

BPAI Banned product active

ingredient

open

{value depends on ASTO}

ASTO 0 1

no 1 0

ADWL Restricted access to

agrochemicals storage

facility

Yes 1 1


ASTO 0 1

No 1 0

AWAR Warning signals outside

pesticide storage facility

Yes 1 1



142



ASTO 0 1

No 1 0

AICF Non-combustible floor and

ceiling

Yes 1 1


ASTO 0 1

No 1 0

AIWL Non-combustible,

impermeable walls

Yes 1 1


ASTO 0 1

No 1 0

ANWS Non combustible shelves

Yes 1 1


ASTO 0 1

No 1 0

PWTS Pesticides on farm storage

facility waste/spillage

treatment system

Yes 1 1

ORWM1 Organic waste

management (waste

banana)

0 open dump

1 cattle, pigs or poultry feed

1 composting

1 municipal dump

ORWM2 Organic waste

management (banana

stalks)

0 dump

1 returned to plantation

1 composting

1 municipal dump



144


FSTO Fertilizers on-farm storage 0 no

1 yes

{value depends on FSTO}

FSTO 0 1

No 1 0

FWTS Fertilizers on farm storage

facility liquid waste/spillage

treatment system

Yes 1 1

WAOP Water course on plantation 0 no

1 yes

{value depends on WAOP}

WAOP 0 1

No 1 0

BSWA Buffer strip alongside water

bodies or drainage

channels

Yes 1 1



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Melo Empical Assestment of Eco Cerficiation Scheme in Ecuadorian Banana Production

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