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Assembled agency: media and hegemony in theChilean transition to civilian rule

Stephen B. Crofts WileyNORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, USA

[T]he supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’. A social group dominates antagon-istic groups, which it tends to ‘liquidate’, or to subjugate perhaps even by armedforce; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must,already exercise ‘leadership’ before winning governmental power (this is indeedone of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequentlybecomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in itsgrasp, it must continue to ‘lead’ as well. (Gramsci, 1971: 57–8)

The challenge was not only to reflect the national aspiration [for change], but,through the campaign, to fill that affirmation with daily content. . .. That contentwent from being a sentence to being a song, to a video clip, to an overall toneof the campaign, to the subject of political speeches and a popular expression inthe streets, in the marches, and on the day of the plebiscite itself and in thecelebration afterwards. (Portales, 1989: 90)

From 1973 to 1988, the authoritarian government of General AugustoPinochet controlled Chilean television with military severity. The dictator-ship maintained a tight grip on programming through censorship and theproduction of vast amounts of pro-Pinochet propaganda, all the whileimposing a thorough commercialization of broadcasting and permitting theunregulated private development of cable television. For 15 years, Chileantelevision was open to the growing transnational flows of advertising,entertainment programming and technology transfer, but closed to thevoices of dissent and the faces of opposition. Television, during this period,reinforced the authoritarian project of controlling national public space andreorganizing ‘Chile’ as a territory of uncontested, transnationally dependentcapitalist development. The regime’s extensive efforts to exert authoritariancontrol over the mass media failed to produce substantial popular support

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for General Pinochet, but for 15 years the military government’s occupa-tion of national cultural space did successfully prevent the development ofa viable opposition.1

An important change was about to take place, however. In 1988, hopingto legitimate its revision of the Chilean Constitution and to prolong GeneralPinochet’s hold on power, the military government held a nationalplebiscite. After many years of deep internal division and distrust, theChilean opposition united against Pinochet, forming the Concertacion dePartidos por el No,2 a broad coalition to campaign for the ‘No’ vote.Eventually encompassing 16 parties from the moderate Right to themoderate Left, the Concertacion became a strong, unified and disciplinedopposition capable of tremendous technical, organizational and discursivework during the months preceding the vote and in the transition to civilianrule that followed. On 5 October 1988, the ‘No’ won with 54.7 percent ofthe vote (International Commission, 1989), paving the way for electionsand the transition to civilian rule.

Central to the opposition’s victory in the plebiscite and pivotal in thebroader context of the Chilean transition to civilian rule was the militarygovernment’s authorization of a limited opening in national televisionbroadcasting prior to the October 1988 vote. As a gesture toward equalmedia access, and in an effort to demonstrate the legitimacy of the newConstitution it had written, the military government granted 15 minutes ofnational television broadcast time to the ‘No’ campaign each night duringthe month preceding the plebiscite. The opposition’s nightly 15 minuteswas to run back-to-back with 15 minutes for the ‘Yes’ campaign. Thisunusual head-to-head propaganda battle – the ‘Franja Electoral’ – wascarried simultaneously on all the television stations in the country duringthe month of September.3

Pinochet and his advisers clearly underestimated the eventual effects ofthis concession. Drawing on the expertise of Chilean social scientists andmedia professionals, assistance from American political marketing experts,and funds from the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy and otherinternational sources, the Concertacion developed a highly effective cam-paign centered on its nightly national TV spot, the Franja del No. Theopposition campaign, and the Franja del No in particular, broke throughthe military monologue that had dominated the national media for 15 yearsand quickly drew Chileans into a new, participatory logic. At this criticaljuncture, the Concertacion established a set of political strategies and anew vision of Chilean society that effectively catalyzed the longer-termreorganization of Chilean political culture that would follow.

These striking changes in Chilean authoritarian television broadcastingwere paralleled by equally dramatic changes in popular practices of mediause. Popular interest in the nightly Franja Electoral was evident from itshigh ratings (by far the highest of any Chilean television program shown

672 Media, Culture & Society 28(5)



since the military coup), and from its continuous recirculation as thepremiere item of news and discussion on the radio, in the printed press andin everyday conversation during the month prior to the plebiscite (Sunkel,1989). These changes were indicators of a broader transformation ofChileans’ relationship to the media: for the first time since the 1973 coup, amajority of viewers was finding its beliefs and desires expressed onnational television.4

Together, these changes in national broadcasting and in the place oftelevision in Chilean political culture constituted a marked shift: from thelogics of authoritarian culture toward a new, hegemonic dynamic ofconsensus and participation, albeit within certain ideological limits imposedby the authoritarian regime. In the pre-plebiscite juncture, the oppositionsuccessfully used its access to television as a catalyst in the process ofarticulating a new kind of political space and a new vision of nationalidentity. A new hegemonic bloc came together under the banner of theConcertacion and established, largely via the milieu of television broad-casting, its national image and cultural leadership. We can thereforeexamine, through an analysis of the shift in logics governing televisionbroadcasting infrastructure, the terms according to which that hegemonywas defined. These changes, in turn, defined the broad ideological andpolitical framework that would become the basis of the radical transforma-tion of Chilean media and culture during the post-Pinochet years.5

The Concertacion’s success in constituting a political and culturalalternative to military rule illustrates the process by which hegemony isconstructed, but at the same time it allows us to reconsider this classicsociological concept in several important ways.6 First, hegemony isnormally thought of as a way of maintaining the status quo – as themaintenance of unequal, and often oppressive, social relations. Yetthe Chilean transition illustrates hegemony being constructed from scratch,as it were, as a force for change. The Chilean case demonstrates theconstitution of what is arguably a progressive form of hegemony –the construction of a more inclusive cultural space and a more participatorypolitical movement in favor of democratic change. Second, hegemony hasbeen understood primarily in terms of signification – that is, as a form ofideological domination based on influencing the perceptions, thoughts andbeliefs of the common people. The present analysis, by contrast, demon-strates the importance of going beyond the definition of culture as meaningto take into account the material, technological and affective dimensions.Third, hegemony has almost always been conceptualized, and studied, as anational phenomenon. The Chilean example shows that, while hegemony isconstructed at the national ‘level’, it is constructed out of transnationalflows. In short, the Chilean case allows us to rethink hegemony as a multi-dimensional, transnational assemblage of agency.7

673Crofts Wiley, Assembled Agency



The article chronicles the construction of that assemblage. In the firstsection, I describe the structure of the Franja Electoral and the formationof the Concertacion. In the second section, I discuss the political strategiesof the Concertacion – the key elements of their effort to construct ahegemonic alternative to the Pinochet government. In the third section, Ianalyze the discursive strategies of the No campaign itself – the alternativevision of Chile constructed by the Concertacion through language, imagesand music. In the final section, I discuss Chileans’ response to theConcertacion strategies and the resulting emergence of a new hegemonicbloc in Chile. I conclude by considering the implications of the Chileancase for theories of hegemony.

The Franja Electoral and the formation of the Concertacion

The way in which the Chilean opposition gained access to nationaltelevision broadcasting in 1988 was rather unusual and, despite thegovernment’s efforts to minimize opposition media use, it ultimatelybenefited the No campaign. Nearly a year prior to the plebiscite, foreigndiplomats (and the US ambassador to Chile in particular) had joined theChilean opposition in pressing the Pinochet government to give free andequal access to the media, especially television. International representa-tives informed the Chilean government that the plebiscite would not beconsidered legitimate unless the No campaign had a reasonable opportunityto promote its option. The government, in turn, wanted to satisfy thisexpectation in order to legitimize the plebiscite and, by extension, the newConstitution that it had imposed in 1980. At the same time, GeneralPinochet wanted to relinquish as little control as possible and to maximizehis own chances in the plebiscite, so he sought to cede as little media spaceas possible to the opposition.

In order to meet these two contradictory goals, the military governmentgranted the opposition 15 minutes of national broadcasting per day for27 days, during the four-week period preceding the plebiscite vote(5 September–1 October). Each night, a 15-minute segment of program-ming by the No campaign would be paired with a segment of equalduration for the Sı campaign. The Franja Electoral would be broadcastsimultaneously on all the television networks, which would be obligated totransmit the program. The Franja, and all other electoral propaganda, wasto cease four days prior to the vote itself.

The format of the Franja – back-to-back programs of equal duration –gave a semblance of equality, even as the government continued to saturatethe rest of national broadcasting with various forms of pro-Pinochetprogramming. The government thus broke its own Voting Law (Ley deVotos y Escrutinios) by continuing to run paid political advertising and




unpaid propaganda, thinly disguised as news stories and ‘special reports’,during the final weeks before the plebiscite (ILET, 1988). The governmentalso attempted to minimize the potential audience of the Franja by placingit in a late-night time slot, from 10:45 to 11:15 p.m. on weekdays and from11:30 to midnight on weekends. By specifying an equal time period foreach option (Sı or No), the government could point to ‘equal access’; bylimiting access to 15 minutes of late-night programming, it minimized theopposition’s incursion onto the terrain of national broadcasting.

The limited time available to the No campaign was actually anadvantage, however. First, the actual Franja del Sı appeared as little morethan a continuation of the official propaganda already omnipresent onChilean television, while the Franja del No stood out in stark relief againstthat background. Second, the limits placed on the opposition’s accessrequired the No strategists to focus their energies on a smaller program-ming segment; this led to greater compactness of programming and higherproduction quality, and so to greater audience impact (Fernandez, 1989).Finally, because this was the first and only television broadcasting spaceproduced by the opposition itself, more or less on its own terms, it drew agreat deal of attention from viewers, who had grown weary of authoritariantelevision. Despite the late-night time slot, the Franja received the highestaudience ratings of any show broadcast during 15 years of military rule(ILET, 1988: 2).

Who produced the No campaign? The Franja del No was the product ofa complex assemblage of national and transnational forces coordinated bythe opposition leadership under the banner of the Concertacion. Unlikeprevious Chilean broadcasting, which came either from the militarygovernment itself and its allies (in the case of political propaganda,national news and current events) or from national and transnational mediaand advertising corporations (in the case of entertainment programmingand advertising), the Franja del No was the product of a new transnationalpolitical and ideological bloc seeking to isolate General Pinochet and toinstall a civilian government in his place. The new transnational bloc thatproduced the No campaign was composed of several elements, each ofwhich was, itself, fundamentally transnational.

Formally, the opposition campaign was the work of the Concertacion dePartidos por el No, a coalition of 16 political parties officially registered bytime of plebiscite. This group was a subset of the traditional Chileanideological and political spectrum, and it excluded several parties of theleft. Those authorized to represent the opposition in the polls and onnational television were already predetermined by Article 8 of the militaryConstitution of 1980, which outlawed political organizations of Marxistinspiration.8 The Concertacion itself was the outcome of several distincttransnational intellectual and political trajectories. Much of the leadershipof the center-left parties participating in the Concertacion had been exiled




for many years and had participated in the ideological reform of socialistthought through political party activities in Europe and Latin America inthe 1980s. The rightward shift of the Chilean left had made it ideologicallycompatible with the centrist Christian Democratic Party and the moderate,anti-Pinochet parties of the right. Drawing on these social and intellectualexperiences of exile and ideological reform, the Concertacion leadershipbrought to the No campaign a new, pragmatic ‘social liberalism’ that re-articulated the Chilean socialist and Christian Democratic traditions toliberal, transnationally open capitalism.9

The political parties participating in the Concertacion formed a smaller,non-partisan team, the Comando por el No, to conduct the strategicplanning of the overall campaign. This group was charged with settingaside ideological differences and rising above party politics to focus on thepragmatic goal of winning the plebiscite. The Comando, in turn, created aComite Tecnico (Technical Committee) to conduct sociological and psy-chological research and analysis prior to the campaign, to produce thenightly television programs of the Franja del No, and to conduct ongoingaudience studies during the month prior to the vote. The Comite Tecnico –a team of social scientists, advertising experts and television productioncrews – recruited television production talent from the large community ofChilean writers, television and film directors, editors, camera people andperformers whose work had been censored or prohibited under militaryrule. Many of these media professionals had been forced to work inadvertising instead, in Chile and abroad, and had developed valuableexperience that contributed to the quality of the No campaign (de Aguirre,1989). In addition to preparing the campaign spots, these production crews(including two camera crews, two editors, and light and sound crews)created short news reports on approximately 200 events during the Franjaitself, 54 of which were used in the news segment of the nightly Noprogram (Gongora, 1989). The Comite Tecnico also drew on the assistanceof American political marketing consultants, who advised the Chileansociologists and psychologists on the use of focus groups to monitor thecampaign’s effects.10

Direct foreign support for the No campaign was extensive. The opposi-tion parties received about $15 million in 1988, including $6 million fromUS-based organizations such as the US National Endowment for Democ-racy, the Agency for International Development, the World Council ofChurches, the Ford Foundation, the AFL-CIO, and the US CatholicConference of Bishops (Whelan, 1989: 1002–3). International participationalso took the form of international observers, who began to arrive in Chilein the weeks prior to the plebiscite to monitor and report on campaign andvoting conditions. Official representatives from 37 different countries werepresent. NGOs represented included the International Human Rights LawGroup, Freedom House, the Socialist International, the Centro Latino-




americano de Trabajadores (Latin American Workers’ Center), the ConsejoLatinoamericano de Iglesias (Latin American Council of Churches), theLatin American Studies Association, the Secretariado Internacional de laEnsenanza (International Secretariat of Teaching), and the Instituto Ameri-cano para el Desarrollo del Sindicalismo Libre (American Institute forthe Development of Free Syndicalism) (Zavala, 1989: 73). Earlier, in1987, a delegation of Republican representatives from the US Congress hadvisited Chile and urged government officials to guarantee ‘free and equalaccess to television by all political parties’ prior to the plebiscite(Lagomarsino et al., 1988).

Transnational financial and political support, including the presence inChile of a wide range of diplomatic delegations, foreign media crews andrepresentatives of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs),made the No campaign a fundamentally transnational project to isolateGeneral Pinochet politically and ideologically and to reintigrate Chileanpolitics into the regional community of pluralist, civilian-led, capitaliststates. During the plebiscite juncture, national broadcasting, and specifi-cally the Franja del No, was the milieu through which this transnationallyarticulated bloc secured national-popular participation and legitimacy.

Political strategies of the Concertacion

The Concertacion’s use of national television broadcasting in the plebiscitejuncture constituted a radical departure from the logics that had dominatedprevious discursive production of both the government and the opposition.Unlike those earlier communication strategies, the new logics establishedby the Concertacion in the pre-plebiscite period were pragmatic, dialogicaland professional. Furthermore, they approached politics as an affective,rather than an ideological, process, and they conceptualized television asthe focal point of a broader social strategy – not as a vehicle of ideologicalmanipulation sufficient on its own. I discuss each of these five logicsin turn.

A key shift from earlier strategies was the Concertacion’s decision to beutterly pragmatic. Opposition to authoritarian rule had, for many years,privileged absolutist ideological and moral arguments in a ‘logic ofresistance’: the Pinochet government was clearly illegitimate and immoral,so any cooperation with it or acceptance of its institutions and laws wasunthinkable. Many had argued against participation in the plebiscite forthese reasons. They saw the role of the opposition as denouncing theregime’s political atrocities and economic injustices, and to do so her-oically, despite the costs of resistance. Faced with the possibility of eightmore years of Pinochet, however, and faced with the recognition thatideological puritanism had been an unsuccessful strategy for overthrowing




the military regime, the opposition leadership chose a new tactic: to acceptthe government’s terms and to participate in the plebiscite as if it were alegitimate electoral contest. The Concertacion decided to place the victoryof the No above all other political goals, and to do whatever they could(within the parameters established by the Pinochet government) to achievethat victory.

The decision to be pragmatic and flexible had several consequences.First, the political parties, which had been divided by ideological differ-ence, were able to unite around the pragmatic objective of winningthe plebiscite (Walker, 1989). Despite deep historical divisions over themeaning of the Allende years, the military coup and the economic changesthat followed, most Chileans, and all of the opposition leadership, couldagree on saying ‘No’ to Pinochet. Second, pragmatism forced politicalleaders to align their message and their tactics with the disposition of themajority; it meant favoring the logic of massification over the logic ofradicalization (Correa, 1989). A resounding denunciation of human rightsviolations and a bold call for punishment of military leaders might projecta clear message of radical commitment, for example, but if such aprovocative position made potential voters fearful of military retribution, itwould not be a pragmatic strategy and therefore would have no place inthe campaign.

The pragmatic goal of winning the plebiscite led to a second key changein the logics of discursive production: a shift to what analysts (andopposition campaign strategists) called a ‘professionalization’ or ‘moderni-zation’ of Chilean politics.11 Professionalization meant ‘defining objectivesand then utilizing specialized mechanisms to obtain results efficiently andeffectively’ (Fernandez, 1989: 5) instead of repeating traditional politicalparty stances and strategies. Professionalization implied handing oversignificant decision-making power to the tecnicos (technicians) – sociolo-gists, psychologists, political marketing consultants, campaign designers,audience analysts and television production teams.

Within the ideological limits established by the authoritarian regime, andby the Concertacion’s articulation (within those limits) of an alternative toPinochet, the tecnicos would determine what themes, images, songs,program formats and campaign activities best served the goal of winning amajority vote for the No. Sociologists and political analysts would segmentthe ‘electoral market’ and develop a campaign focused on the keysegments: the ‘undecideds’ and the ‘soft’ No voters (Vergara, 1989: 15).

This stance represented a radical departure from traditional Chileanpolitics, in which ideologues and party leaders staked out a predefineddiscursive terrain and then rallied party members and voters to support thatposition. Whereas the traditional approach started with an ideologicalposition and worked to project it outward to the people, the new, ‘modern’form of politics searched for a set of messages and communications




techniques that adequately captured or expressed voters’ sentiments andbeliefs. It focused on ‘adjusting’ the No campaign messages ‘to the hopes,fears, aspirations, and needs of the undecided’ voters (Martınez, 1989: 30).

The adoption of a professional, marketing-style approach to the Nocampaign led, in turn, to a third key transformation in the logics ofdiscursive production. In place of the customary unilateral logic of bothauthoritarian cultural production and many traditional political partystrategies, the No campaign was based on a dialogical communicationframework. Instead of simply projecting its messages outward or ‘down-ward,’ from the political cupulas (high-ranking leadership) to the votersand viewers, the Concertacion established mechanisms that articulated andrearticulated the campaign to the reactions and comments of the targetaudiences. By monitoring and measuring viewers’ responses to the Franja,and then reshaping the campaign with those responses in mind, the Nostrategists were able to construct a television program that effectivelyexpressed the desires of the voters (see note 4).

Initially, opinion surveys were used to identify the major concerns ofdifferent segments of the electorate. The Concertacion production teamthen designed strategies that responded, cognitively and aesthetically, tothose concerns. In addition to the initial use of opinion surveys and othersociological analyses, the No campaign set up and employed variousfeedback loops to monitor the effects of the campaign and to makeadjustments based on those effects. The Concertacion strategists madeextensive use of focus groups to test viewers’ emotional responses to theNo campaign spots, the credibility of the images and messages, andthe retention of content and themes (Campero, 1989: 126). The focus groupsessions were conducted by Chilean sociologists and psychologists, whoconsulted with US experts (Campero, 1989: 126). Person-on-the-streetinterviews were also used, and some of these interviews were filmed andincorporated into the No television program. In this way, the No campaignincorporated images of dialogue and participation in addition to usingactual feedback loops.

A fourth important change in the logics of discursive production was theshift from a cognitive, ideological strategy to an affective one. Publicopinion research, and especially the focus group studies conducted by theConcertacion strategists, showed that people’s hesitance to vote ‘No’ wasdue to affective obstacles, not cognitive ones: most Chileans agreed thatGeneral Pinochet should go, but many were afraid to express that wish orafraid of the political, economic and social disorder that might result if theNo won. The opposition campaign therefore sought to organize actualsocial spaces – parties, carnivals, festive marches, car caravans, neighbor-hood concerts – in which people could express and exorcise those desiresand fears – and to produce televised images of such spaces that legitimizedthat expression and articulated it to a constellation of visual and verbal




messages. The general goal was ‘the formulation of messages and theorganization of events that, instead of reinforcing the conflictive anddisintegrative tendencies that had dominated Chilean society for years,responded to the people’s desire for reconciliation and social cohesion’(Tironi, 1989: 13). As a result of this change in the logics of discursiveproduction, the campaign itself became a place in which new social andcultural bonds, and a new common discourse, could take shape. As oneChilean analyst put it:

. . . those who made the success of the Franja del No possible were thecommon people – that is, the majority of Chileans. What the production teamdid, and therein lies its contribution, was to channel and express thatmajoritarian desire in an attractive and appropriate manner. (Gongora, 1989,emphasis added)

The televised Franja del No, as a visual concretization – an expression, inthe Deleuzean sense – of that affective investment, became the nationalfocal point linking and coordinating the various local and regional publicactivities of the No campaign.

Finally, the Concertacion’s bid for power was successful because it usedtelevision effectively as part of a broader political and cultural strategy.The No campaign represented a shift in the place television occupiedwithin Chilean political culture more generally. Unlike the Sı campaign,which relied almost exclusively on a strategy of televised propaganda (onbombarding the audience with manipulative and repetitive messages), theNo campaign used television as the focal point for a multi-dimensionalmovement comprised of a wide range of pubic spaces and processes.Television alone did not produce affective investment in the No vote, but itserved as a public, national locus, discursively and spatially, for thecoordination and integration of the broader network of practices organizingthat investment.12 The music of the No campaign; its youthful, carniva-lesque visual aesthetic; the media personalities who associated themselveswith it; and the issues it placed on the agenda of other media and ofeveryday conversation served as threads of commonality uniting thedispersed pockets of opposition sentiment. The replication and amplifica-tion of these discursive lines, and their coordination via the space ofnational broadcast television, created a ‘home’, as Meaghan Morris (1992)calls it, for the latent oppositional majority – an affective and visualspace in which anti-authoritarian sentiments could be placed, shared andmade explicit.13

One important strategy of the No campaign focused not on Chileanviewers and voters, but on the international audience of diplomats,representatives of pro-democracy NGOs and foreign journalists – and, byextension, the readers and viewers of news about Chile in other countries.




The Concertacion set up a press office that monitored foreign coverage ofChile in 15 major world newspapers, provided foreign correspondents withinformation and press releases that interpreted key events, facilitatedcontact between the international press and key figures of the opposition,and in general sought to build and maintain the opposition’s credibility inthe eyes of the international media (Reyes Matta, 1989). The opposition’spress office also offered technical support to foreign correspondents: telex,fax machines and networked computers to help them provide news aboutthe campaign to their home constituencies.

Furthermore, the Concertacion created an electronic conference called‘ChileNet’ via PeaceNet, and supplied it with articles and news announce-ments emphasizing the unity of the opposition over the image of divisionand discord that the Pinochet government sought to promote internation-ally. Concertacion press releases also highlighted the divisions within themilitary regime (as opposed to the international image of Pinochet’sstrength) and focused on the ongoing poverty in Chile (in contrast to thegeneral international image of Chile as an economic success story) (ReyesMatta, 1989: 80–81). In short, the discursive production of the Concerta-cion was conceptualized transnationally, as a project of re-articulating both‘domestic’ and international discourses on and images of Chile. While theFranja incorporated testimonies of internationally known celebrities andprovided Chileans with previously inaccessible news about foreign criti-cism of General Pinochet, the opposition’s press office worked to projectthe Concertacion’s discourse to the global media beyond Chile’s borders.

Discursive strategies of the No campaign

The logic of discursive production that guided the No campaign – thepragmatic, professional strategy of monitoring and responding to the needsof the target audience – resulted in a specific constellation of discourses,verbal and visual, that effectively expressed those needs – selected andorganized them into a coherent apparatus – and linked them to a newnational political culture. In other words, the Concertacion’s strategy ofdiscursive production effectively articulated a new hegemonic discourse.The discourse of the No campaign was guided by three fundamental logics.

First, the No campaign produced a discourse structured by a future-oriented temporal logic. While the government’s discourse emphasized the‘threat of the past’ – communism, food shortages, social disorder – andsought to associate these negative images with the opposition, the Nocampaign largely ignored ‘the past’ as a discursive element and spoke,instead, of a new and better future ‘without the dictatorship’. The




campaign’s theme song, ‘Chile, la alegrıa ya viene’ (‘Chile, joy is on theway’) thematized this temporal structure explicitly:

By focusing on the future, the opposition campaign created a discursivespace of imagined (and eventually, real) reconciliation, community andwell-being, effectively side-stepping most of the political, economic andideological issues that had divided the opposition during military rule.More importantly, the future-oriented discourse invited Chileans to leavebehind the divisiveness and conflict that had characterized Chilean culturesince the early 1970s and to forge a new political culture based on aconsensus about basic (liberal capitalist) rules of the game. The discoursewas not explicit about what the future would hold, other than ‘democracy’and the departure of Pinochet as president. Instead, it constructed a highlysymbolic constellation of images and broad themes, and allowed viewers toproject a wide range of desires onto a common vision.

A second basic discursive strategy of the No campaign was to emphasizepositive themes of joy, reconciliation, national unity and participation. TheSı propaganda pursued a negative strategy of threats, fear and violence(which was undoubtedly effective at influencing some viewers), but theConcertacion’s analysis of the undecided voters and the ‘soft’ No votershad determined that Chileans were weary of such images. Focus groupstudies conducted during the Franja found, furthermore, that the govern-ment’s strategy was backfiring; instead of associating the Pinochet cam-paign’s images of terrorism and violence with the opposition, viewersidentified that bellicose rhetoric with Pinochet himself. The No campaign

TABLE 1

Porque nace el arcoiris,después de la tempestad;Porque quiero que florezcami manera de pensar;Porque sin la dictadura,la alegría va a llegar;Porque pienso en el futuro,voy a decir que ‘No.’Coro:Vamos a decir que no,Oh con la fuerza de mi vozVamos a decir que no,Yo lo canto sin temor,Vamos a decir que no,Vamos juntos a triunfar,Por la vida y por la paz.

Because after the storm,a rainbow is born;Because I want my way ofthinking to blossom;Because, without the dictatorship,joy will soon be here;Because I’m thinking about thefuture, I’m going to say ‘No.’Chorus:We’re going to say no,Oh with the power of my voice,We’re going to say no,I sing it without fear,We’re going to say no,Together we will win,For life and for peace.

De Aguirre and Bravo (1988)




offered a future of joy and national reconciliation that effectively expressedthe desire of a majority for an end to strident conflict. The focus on thesepositive themes was evident in several dimensions of the No campaigndiscourse: in its youthful, celebratory aesthetic (the use of rock music andyouthful actors); in its symbolic representation of joy and peace (therainbow, images of groups working together, people embracing, etc.); andin its explicit articulation of these positive themes (through celebrityinterviews, through the comments of the on-camera host and in thestatements of opposition political leaders).

The third basic discursive strategy of the No campaign was a calculatedrealism. Although the celebratory, future-oriented discourse discussedabove dominated the Franja del No (especially in the initial weeks), thecampaign also incorporated news reports on current events, interviews andcommentaries that aimed at discrediting the government’s rosy picture ofprogress. The No campaign focused on the widely shared perception that,despite the country’s macroeconomic ‘success’, few Chileans had benefitedfrom that economic growth. Similarly, the opposition discourse incorpo-rated exposes of unresolved social problems, such as unemployment, thelack of adequate housing, and the inaccessibility of higher education andgood health care for most Chileans. In general, the Concertacion policyplatform emphasized continuity with the military government’s overalleconomic strategy (export-oriented development, fiscal conservatism and atransnationally open capitalist economy) but suggested that ‘all Chileans’should be incorporated into the processes of ‘modernization’. The Nocampaign’s recognition of the social problems affecting the majority ofvoters and its use of realist televisual discourses to express those dis-satisfactions was an effective discursive strategy and contrasted sharplywith the triumphalist rhetoric of the Sı.

In sum, in September 1988, after 15 years of strict authoritarian controlof national television, the opposition was able to define itself and its projectin front of a national audience for the first time. While the pro-Pinochetcampaign relied on discursive strategies that had been used by thegovernment for years, the opposition coalition assembled a pragmatic,professional, transnationally linked campaign for a No vote againstPinochet in the October plebiscite. The opposition employed a dialogicalstrategy of discursive production to effectively analyze Chilean voters’desires and perceptions, then organize them into a network of socialand televisual spaces where they could be expressed, made coherent andarticulated on a national scale. The Concertacion campaign as a wholeconstructed a series of events and practices that invited Chileans to makean affective investment in the No. Meanwhile, the opposition’s televisualdiscourse articulated that investment to a forward-looking, carnivalesquenarrative of joy, reconciliation and national community.




Conclusion: hegemony and assembled agency

How did Chileans respond to these strategies? The nightly propagandabattle between government and opposition achieved an average rating ofover 60 points – more than 10 points higher than Chile’s most-watchedprogram, Sabado Gigante (ILET, 1988: 2). By the time the plebiscite votewas held on 5 October, over 90 percent of Chilean voters had watched theFranja Electoral at least once (Silva, 1989: 103). The themes of the Franjadel No, as well as the program itself, became key elements on the agendasof everyday conversation, while the songs and slogans of the campaignwere repeated in neighborhood gatherings and widely recirculated inthe microchannels of interpersonal communication (Sunkel, 1989). At theoutset of this article I quoted Diego Portales’ description of the propagationof the No affect through broader and broader networks. It is worthrepeating here:

The challenge was not only to reflect the national aspiration [for change], but,through the campaign, to fill that affirmation with quotidian content. . .. Thatcontent went from being a sentence to being a song, to a video clip, to anoverall tone of the campaign, to the subject of political speeches and a popularexpression in the streets, in the marches, and on the day of the plebiscite itselfand in the celebration afterwards. (Portales, 1989: 90)

In short, the themes, images, melodies, sentiments and stances of theopposition campaign were picked up by a wide range of people andreplicated through a growing variety of channels.

The wide propagation of the No discourse throughout Chilean societywas certainly a sign of successful planning on the part of the Concertacionleadership and its technical team, but it also indicated the active role of‘ordinary’ Chileans in producing the No victory. A large number of Chi-leans sought out the Franja del No, staying up late and forgoing othertelevision programs to see it; they evaluated the program and identifiedwith it; and they reiterated its messages and its music in other circles. (Andhundreds of thousands of Chileans contributed to the campaign in otherways, as neighborhood organizers, poll watchers, etc.) The oppositioncampaign organized a network of spaces – televisual and social – in whichChileans could invest; but ultimately, it was the individual and small-groupacts of investment that produced the political majority that defeatedPinochet. This point is clear if we consider that, despite its vast resources,its relentless use of national broadcasting for propaganda, and its control ofevery aspect of television outside the Franja del No, the pro-Pinochetcampaign was unable to mobilize majority support for the Sı vote. In short,when we speak of a hegemonic movement, it is important to recognize theactive role of popular support. The Chilean military regime set the terms inwhich the plebiscite would take place, and the Pinochet government and




the Concertacion leadership shaped the two choices voters were given, butthe voters themselves, and more broadly, a majority of Chileans, chose tosay ‘No’ to Pinochet.

The story of Chileans’ collective No to General Pinochet illustrates theprocess by which hegemony is constructed, but at the same time it suggeststhat this classic sociological concept needs to be rethought in severalimportant ways. I would like to conclude this article by considering someof the implications of the Chilean case for theories of hegemony.

Although the term ‘hegemony’ was originally used by Lenin (Hall,1996: 424–5), it was of course the work of Antonio Gramsci (1971) thatmost fully elaborated the concept. Writing against the economic reduction-ism of some forms of orthodox Marxism, Gramsci argued for a morecomplex, and more historically concrete, analysis of political struggle – ananalysis that would take seriously the cultural and political aspects ofpower. For Gramsci, hegemony is a particular – and perhaps exceptional –historical organization of forces in which a dominant bloc moves beyondits immediate class interests to assume leadership of a multi-class, multi-sectoral alliance. It is the moment:

. . . in which one becomes aware that one’s corporate interests, in their presentand future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economicclass, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too.This is the most purely political phase, and marks the decisive passage from thestructure to the sphere of the complex superstructures; it is the phase in whichpreviously germinated ideologies become ‘party’, come into confrontation andconflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tendsto prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society –bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but alsointellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the strugglerages not on a corporate but on a ‘universal’ plane, and thus creating thehegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups.(Gramsci, 1971: 181–2)

Hegemony entails the production of a ‘ “national popular” unity’ (Hall,1996: 423) in which the leading bloc articulates its interests and those ofthe subordinate classes and groups as elements of a common political andcultural project.

Historically (and despite the counter-examples in Gramsci’s own analy-ses), neo-Marxist theorists have thought of hegemony as a conservativeforce – as a way of preserving the status quo. And, typically, hegemonyhas also been understood as maintaining unequal, and often oppressive,social relations. The Chilean case, by contrast, illustrates the compositionof what is arguably a ‘progressive’ form of hegemony – the construction ofa more inclusive cultural space and a more participatory political move-ment in favor of democratic change. The Concertacion organized publicspaces for the expression of hopes and fears that had been suppressed bythe Pinochet regime, and it articulated these to a nationally televised




discourse of pluralism, diversity and democratic participation. To put itbluntly, this was one hegemonic project that most progressive theoristswould want to support.

This is not to say that the cultural and political project of theConcertacion was free of exclusionary rules; it wasn’t. As noted above,the Concertacion operated within the ideological and political parametersthat had already been set by the Pinochet government, and those para-meters excluded the radical left explicitly. At the same time, the Concerta-cion made a strategic decision to limit its discussion of human rightsviolations and to exclude altogether the issue of punishment for militarycrimes. Political strategists for the No believed that these issues would stirup fears and divisiveness, particularly among undecided voters, who werethe primary target of the campaign. And finally, instead of questioning theneoliberal model of economic development itself, the Concertacion limitedits social criticism to the unequal participation of Chileans in what itjudged as an overall economic success. When analyzing and judging thespecific ideological and political commitments of the new hegemonic bloc,it is important to take these issues into account. However, while one mightargue that the Concertacion could have done more, or that it represented acontinuation of the policies of the authoritarian regime, it seems clear thatthe hegemonic project it organized offered a majority of Chileans sig-nificant change: the cultural space for previously repressed expression, thepolitical will to defeat the Pinochet government in two elections, andthe organizational capacity to lead a transition to civilian rule. It seemsunlikely that even the harshest critics of the Concertacion’s ‘negotiatedtransition’ (e.g. Jocelyn-Holt, 1998; Moulian, 1997; Petras and Leiva,1994) would argue that these limited changes were unimportant, or thatChileans would be better off had the Concertacion not been successful.

A second lesson from the Chilean case concerns the definition of culturethat undergirds theories of hegemony. Hegemony has been understoodprimarily as a form of ideological domination; that is, as a matter ofshaping perceptions, interpretations, world-views or beliefs. As Stuart Hallnotes, Gramsci sees the ideological or cultural component of hegemony astwo-tiered, involving both philosophy and common sense. Common senseis ‘the terrain of conceptions and categories on which the practicalconsciousness of the masses of the people are formed’ (Hall, 1996: 431).Such a perspective sees culture as a production of shared meanings. Myanalysis, by contrast, demonstrates the importance of going beyond thecognitive definition of culture to take into account the material, techno-logical and affective dimensions. As Grossberg notes, ‘the failure ofcultural studies is not that it continues to hold to the importanceof signifying and ideological practices but rather, that it always limits itssense of discursive effectivity to this plane’ (1996: 167). He argues, bycontrast, that ‘discursive fields are organized affectively (“mattering maps”)




as well as ideologically’. That is, ‘particular sites are differentially investedwith energies and intensities that define the resources which can bemobilized into forms of popular struggle’ (Grossberg, 1996: 167). Cultureis more than meaning; it is – perhaps even primarily – an organization ofpractices, emotions and commitments. The success of the Concertacionclearly depended on an effective diagnosis of Chileans’ affective state inthe wake of authoritarianism, and on the development of successfulstrategies for the expression, mobilization and articulation of new affectsand practices.

Third, and finally, hegemony has almost always been conceptualized,and studied, as a national phenomenon. As Stuart Hall points out in hisdiscussion of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, ‘it is only in such momentsof “national popular” unity that the formation of what [Gramsci] calls“collective will” becomes possible’ (1996: 423). Theorists of neo-imperialism, postcolonialism and globalization have called the nation-stateinto question as an analytical unit and as a site for progressive politics(Wiley, 2004), while others have argued that the nation-state remains animportant site for policy and politics (Waisbord and Morris, 2001).14

It seems to me that these debates have been organized around a falsedichotomy: globalization or the nation-state. Instead, we might think of thenation as an assemblage of transnational flows (Wiley, 2004, 2005). TheChilean example shows that, while hegemony is indeed constructed at thenational ‘level’ – that is, in terms of national politics, culture and history –it is constructed out of transnational flows. This was evident in the fundingthat made the No campaign possible, in the presence of foreign marketingprofessionals, in the education of Concertacion intellectuals at Europeanand US universities (often during exile) and even explicitly, in the presenceof international election observers and in the use of international celebritieswithin the Franja del No. Indeed, we could not understand the success ofthe Concertacion’s hegemonic project without taking into account thesetransnational articulations.

In light of these observations, it may be helpful to rethink hegemony asa multi-dimensional, transnational assemblage of agency. An assemblageis a ‘constellation of singularities and traits deducted from the flow –selected, organized, stratified – in such a way as to converge . . . artificiallyand naturally’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 406). It is a collection ofmatter-flows that is structured by multiple, contracdictory logics – simulta-neously a multiplicity and a concrete unity (Wiley, 2005: 71). The conceptof an assemblage allows us to think about hegemony as the production of acertain degree of organization and consistency in a particular historicaljuncture and over a particular terrain without assuming that the processesof production (the agency shaping the assemblage) are coterminous withthe territory over which the hegemony extends. In other words, it allows usto analyze the production of a hegemonic movement or situation as taking




place (literally) at the national level, but as an assemblage of ideas,resources, forms of expertise, images, etc., that come from a range ofplaces, including many that are beyond the national borders.

Applying the concept to the Chilean case, we can understand theConcertacion as a transnationally articulated political and cultural projectfocused on the transformation of a national political regime. This per-spective allows us to redefine the concept of hegemony – one of the richestconcepts in the history of critical theory – on a new ontological terrain,beyond the dichotomous framework of the globalization/nation debates.

Notes

1. For an analysis of Chilean media during the authoritarian regime, seeBresnahan (2002), Wiley-Crofts (1991).

2. The Concertacion de Partidos por el No could be translated as the ‘Coalitionof Parties for the No’, Concertacion (pronounced cohn-sair-tah-SYOHN) impliesmore than a coalition, however. It suggests a harmonization of goals and strategies,like instruments that are brought together in a concert. Due to the lack of a goodtranslation for this term, I will use the Spanish. The name was later changed toConcertacion de Partidos por la Democracia (‘Coalition of Parties for Democ-racy’).

3. I will refer to the television propaganda battle using the Spanish term FranjaElectoral in order to preserve the unique set of meanings attached to it in theChilean plebiscite context. A ‘franja’ (pronounced FRAHN-ha) is a strip or asegment (such as a programming segment), but the term has political, as well asbroadcasting, connotations: it can refer to a specific segment of the population thatidentifies with particular political, cultural or ideological positions. In any case, theterm is essentially a spatial one, suggesting that the Franja Electoral wasconceptualized explicitly as a political and media space whose content and logicswould be defined by the opposing plebiscite contestants, the ‘Si’ (in favor ofPinochet’s continued rule) and the ‘No’ (rejecting Pinochet in favor of openelections and a return to democracy).

4. I do not mean that television simply reflected or translated Chileans’ wishes. Iam using the term ‘express’ in a specific, Deleuzean sense here (Deleuze andGuattari, 1987). ‘Expression’ in this sense should not be understood as ‘representa-tion’ or ‘translation’, as if the affective and cognitive disposition of an audiencecould be accurately or authentically reflected in discourse. Expression, in thetradition of Spinoza, Nietzsche and Deleuze, implies, instead, a relation of powerand transformation. A discourse ‘expresses’ certain desires or beliefs by gatheringtogether elements of those desires and beliefs and shaping them into a coherent,compelling, communal apparatus. The discourse of the No selected and organizedparticular desires (the widespread need for public security and an end to fear anddistrust, for example) and particular beliefs (that Pinochet was an illegitimatepresident, for example, or that Chile should be oriented toward the future, ratherthan the past) and wove them into a meaningful and attractive whole – the Nocampaign as a social and discursive apparatus, with the nightly television programas a central axis. On the implications of Deleuzean philosophy for cultural studies,see Wiley (2005).




5. Those changes included the unregulated development of cable television;privatization of broadcasting networks that had previously relied on mixed funding;transnational investment; and the overall expansion of Chilean television infra-structure. For a discussion of these changes, see Wiley (2003, in press).

6. For Antonio Gramsci’s original formulation of the concept of hegemony, seeGramsci (1971: esp. 12–13, 55–8, 161, 210–11). Recent discussions of the conceptin relation to cultural studies include Hall (1996) and Grossberg (1996). Also seeLaclau and Mouffe (1985).

7. The concepts of ‘assemblage’ and ‘assembled agency’ draw on the work ofGilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987). For a theoretical discussion of theseconcepts, see Wiley (2005). For their usefulness in conceptualizing globalizationand nationality, see Wiley (2004). For an application to the role of media inChilean national politics, see Wiley (2003) and Wiley (in press).

8. Under this law, the Chilean Constitutional Tribune had declared severalexisting parties unconstitutional: the Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodrıguez (ManuelRodriguez Patriotic Front, FPMR), the Partido Comunista (Communist Party, PC),the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left Movement,MIR), and the Partido Socialista-Almeyda (Socialist Party-Almeyda wing, PS-Almeyda). Most of these parties, and in particular the Chilean Communist Party,had been important pre-coup political and ideological forces; their exclusion fromlegal politics in the new regime effectively curtailed the traditional Chileanpolitical spectrum, shifting the range of legitimate political discourse to the rightand making the fundamental tenets of neoliberal capitalism an ideological pre-condition of inclusion.

9. On the ‘renovation’ of the Chilean left, see Jeffrey Puryear’s (1994) ThinkingPolitics. For a critical account, in which the socialist leadership is portrayed as‘selling out’ to neoliberal capitalism, see James Petras and Fernando IgnacioLeiva’s (1994) Democracy and Poverty in Chile: The Limits to Electoral Politics.

10. Gerald Sussman and Galizio Lawrence (2003) provide an insightful critiqueof the globalization of US-style ‘professional’ political marketing. They note that:

A flexible electoral system commonly uses specialists who cross over fromother industries (and often whole continents) and who need not have any partyloyalties themselves. Globetrotting political consultants help establish or re-inforce enclaves of collaboration between different state elites and bring about afuller integration of politics and market economics, a standardization of politicsand political discourses that emphasize market choices and technocracy as themeasure of rational decision making and freedom and the ‘inefficiencies’ ofpublic spending. (Sussman and Lawrence, 2003: 314)

11. Sussman and Lawrence (2003) criticize theories of ‘political profession-alization’ for depoliticizing the processes by which corporate power is extendedinto the political process:

[T]he professionalization thesis shifts the public gaze away from the question ofhow organized transnational interests, including media corporations, employelection events, symbolism, and public engagement to sustain their ownlegitimacy and reproduction. (Sussman and Lawrence, 2003: 323)

12. In other words, this is not a ‘McLuhanesque’ view, as Davies (1999: 159)has suggested. The point is not that television (or other media) produce hegemonyor create cultural identities. Rather, they constitute discursive networks andsymbolic rallying points around which previously disparate segments of thepopulation can connect and organize. A widespread culture of opposition pre-datedthe plebiscite, but it circulated in the micro-channels of daily conversation, semi-




clandestine political party meetings, NGOs, cafes, small concerts, church meetingsand a few print publications of limited circulation (on oppositional culture underthe Chilean military regime, see Bresnahan, 2002; Hirmas, 1993; LaMay, 2004;Sunkel, 1989; Wiley, 2003; Wiley-Crofts, 1991). Without access to national mediachannels, however, these multiple sites of resistance remained atomized. The 1988plebiscite, and specifically the Franja Electoral, created a nationally coordinated,nationally distributed discourse that served as a focal point for those multipleopposition identities. This is not a matter of ideological representation orinculcation, but of symbolic and affective resonance (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987;Wiley, 2003; Wise, 1997).

13. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) discuss the role of music and repetition in theconstitution of self, giving the example of a young child who sings to himself.Starting from chaos, the song draws a circle of safety within the psyche of thechild and thereby creates a starting point for other processes of organization. Thatis, music literally forms the boundaries of a psychic place to which other affectsand thoughts can be articulated, and from which a self can be constructed:

A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under hisbreath. He walks and halts to his song. Lost, he takes shelter, or orients himselfwith his little song as best he can. The song is like a rough sketch of a calmingand stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos. (Deleuze andGuattari, 1987: 311)

For a Deleuzean analysis of the role of resonance and repetition in theconstruction of ‘home’, see Wise (2003).

14. Or as Silvio Waisbord notes, in another context:

. . . the national does not disappear in global times. It is necessary to rethink thestate in conjunction with a revisited conception of culture that recognizesthe plural and syncretic character of Latin American societies. Even in times ofcultural fragmentation and postnationalities, the nation-state continues to be afundamental locus of power and cultural referent for rooted and uprootedcitizens, for those who live at the centre and for the millions who live at themargins. (1998: n.p.)

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Steve Wiley is Associate Professor of Communication at North Carolina StateUniversity. His research examines the changing role played by communica-tion and information technologies in the social construction of space, placeand human agency, with a particular focus on globalization and the re-articulation of national spaces in Latin America. His recent publications




include ‘Spatial Materialism: Grossberg’s Deleuzean Cultural Studies’ (Cul-tural Studies, 2005) and ‘Rethinking Nationality in the Context of Global-ization’ (Communication Theory, 2004). Address: Department ofCommunication, Box 8104, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NorthCarolina, 27695–8104, USA. [email: [email protected]]




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