James Deane

Director, Policy

BBC Media

Action

Media and Fragile States: the challenges of transition Oxford Media Policy Summer Institute, 2013

Media and Fragile States: the challenges of transition

• When and how media has been incorporated in development policy

• Some media and communication trends shaping political outcomes in fragile states

• Policy, practitioner and academic debates and how they don’t meet

• Three case studies: Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq • Some conclusions on how to improve policy in this

area

“A fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters. More resilient states exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and its territory. They can manage and adapt to changing social needs and expectations, shifts in elite and other political agreements, and growing institutional complexity. Fragility and resilience should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum”

OECD 2012

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Fragile States: the development perspective

• The share of people living in extreme poverty in fragile states has doubled from 20 – 40% since 2005.

• No low income fragile state yet to achieve any of the Millennium Development Goals.

• Fragile states tend to be conflict affected states and about 70% of them have been in conflict since 1989.

• Considered drivers of international insecurity

Fragile States: why they matter

• States with deep fractures along ethnic, religious, political or other factional lines

• Patronage and identity based politics common.

• Low Income: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Malawi, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe.

• Middle Income: Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, Iraq, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kiribati, Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Federal States of Micronesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor-Leste, West Bank and Gaza and Republic of Yemen.

Fragile States as Fractured States

• Growth in number of media actors • Experiencing some of the fastest growth

in new technologies, but uneven

• Mobile phone increased almost six-fold in five years, from 7% of the population in 2005 to 40% in 2010

• In some countries, mobile phone access remains low or negligible.

• Myanmar at 1.24%, Eritrea at 3.53%, Somalia at 6.95% and Ethiopia at 8.26%.

• Expectation of high future growth rates.

• Increasingly fragmented media – traditional and social - in already fractured states

Principal Media Trends in Fragile States

• Historically normative - belief that media freedom is a good in and of itself regardless of political context;

• Not obvious distinction between approach to media in fragile states and other states;

• Variety of interventions and approaches: • Media liberalisation and regulatory

reform • Training • Voice and accountability • Dialogue and debate • Capacity building • Nation building • Peace journalism

• No obviously coherent approach between actors

The Existing Practitioner Discourse on Media in Fragile States

The Existing Policy Discourse on Media in Fragile States

• Fourth High Level Conference on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan, South Korea in 2011 outlined a new consensus

• 5 peacebuilding and statebuilding goals

– Legitimate Politics - Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution

– Security - Establish and strengthen people’s security – Justice - Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice – Economic Foundations - Generate employment and improve

livelihoods – Revenues & Services - Manage revenue and build capacity for

accountable and fair service delivery

• Approach to media in policy support to fragile states very limited: • Invisible in in New Deal on Fragile States; • Low policy priority (apparently) placed

on issue even where substantial funds spent: • Iraq and Afghanistan

• No clear mandate for any international organisation to lead on the issue internationally and only rarely in country

• Largely invisible in e.g. electoral cycle approach

• Does this matter?

The Existing Policy Discourse on Media in Fragile States

• Substantial history of challenge to normative approaches to media support in fragile states • “Establishing a political framework is vital to peace building, and the crucial

underlying aspect of this is the issue of security. Peace requires the acceptance of certain hierarchies and the prevention of violence, based on some semblance of the rule of law. In such circumstances, a degree of censorship may be essential. “

• Media Policy and State Reconstruction, Allen and Stremlau, LSE 2005

• Major research focus on social and digital media as a democratic driver, especially in context of Arab Spring – but less in context of debate on media in fragile states

• Substantial – but inconclusive – debate on relationship between media fragmentation and political polarisation, especially in the US.

The Academic Discourse on Media in

Fragile States

Liberalisation and statebuilding traditions

Two Traditions

• Liberalisation Tradition: encourage a diverse, free

and plural media

• State Building Tradition: support media that

provides state/government with

legitimacy

“The conventional wisdom among human rights activists holds that a great deal of the ethnic conflict in

the world today is caused by propagandistic manipulations of public opinion. As antidotes, such

groups prescribe democratization, wide-open debate in civil society, and greater freedom of the press. ...”

“We argue that promoting unconditional freedom of public debate in newly democratizing societies is, in

many circumstances, likely to make the problem worse. Historically and today, from the French Revolution to

Rwanda, sudden liberalizations of press freedom have been associated with bloody outbursts of popular

nationalism. The most dangerous situation is precisely when the government's press monopoly begins to

break down.” Snyder and Ballantyne, International Security, 1996

Somalia: from “bloody outbursts”.........

A History of Media

Cooption?

From Barre to the warlords

“Everyone was trying to have their own radio station in Somalia. The people used to create radio stations based

[especially] on their tribe”

“Radio stations belonged to clans and warlords and reported what was good for the clan or the subclan. It has been very unprofessional at the beginning and they fomented social

hatred”

“Back in Somali history culturally speaking, you will find that every clan had a poet who would speak on the bravery of

the clan. After Barre fell, stations started mushrooming and it seemed like they were trying the replace the poets of the

clans.”

“It is this sensationalism that has somehow [infected] the Somali media, glorifying war or talking about fighting the whole time. Or warlords being interviewed threatening each other, which was very popular and people enjoyed

getting a daily dose of this sensation”

Somalia: from “bloody outbursts”.........

A History of Media

Cooption?

From the warlords to Al

Shabab

““Al-Shabaab brutally has struck fear in the heart of journalists,

forcing them to employ self censorship,”

“Al-Shabaab killed many [journalists] just as a lesson to the rest”

“The media [have been] destroyed by Al-Shabaab, The warlords

tried to threaten the shape of the media but it did not fundamentally change that. When it came to Al-Shabaab more than 500 journalists fled the country, especially in Mogadishu. They will kill you for the slightest reason....I have never seen

another group in the world that is that ruthless.“

[“The different interests] who are fighting each other in the capital, they call and tell managers or news editors to do what they want. They say, ‘this is the news I want you to broadcast,

do as I want or you will be killed”

......to force for moderation?

Journalistic Courage and

independence

A tradition of successful moderate, popular private

media – Horn Afrik, Shabelle and co.

Supply without demand:

the economics of extremist media in Somalia

An increasingly media

literate society demanding multiple perspectives

“I don’t think you’ll find a media anywhere that is more

brave and resilient than the Somali media. Many people fled but we still have a large number and some even say that

they would rather die defending the freedom of Somali media.....I have great respect for Somali media”.

“I think radio tends to play a moderating role in Somalia

because it has so often been sophisticated. Radio stations have tended to mimic the BBC in putting two conflicting

voices on the radio, and that has a moderating influence”

“People have been switching off from radios controlled by Al-Shabaab. Mainly they carry sermons from the chief of Al-

Shabaab every Friday, they run Quranic content and translation....but when you ask people for example in

Kismayo do they listen, they say no”.

I think the Somalis are becoming much more sophisticated people”

• Success story with well developed commercial sector

• Substantial investment from both private and donor funding

• Tensions between tradition and modernity and no trusted national source of information – but a force for moderation

• Limited advertising base • Growth of warlord media • Donor withdrawal with two

consequences: • Consolidation of media • Cooption of media

Afghanistan: from force for moderation to “bloody outbursts”?

• Externally generated and arranged media reform;

• “the US-led coalition was unable to

read Iraq. Wishful thinking and

ideology blinded them to the reality of

power in a society that had been

shaped by violence and patronage for

decades”. Charles Tripp, Nov 2012

• State broadcaster co-opted by

international coalition; entrenched

systems of state patronage endured;

private media rapidly deregulated; • Ethno-sectarian media empires:

• fuelling violence and division?; • Advancing religious/political

agendas?: • Legitimately afffirming long

suppressed identities?

Iraq: Ethno-sectarian empires – from bloody outbursts to affirmation of identity?

• Fragmented media and communication environments increasingly characteristic of fragile and often fractured states;

• Implications of that fragmentation different in different states at different times;

• Both positively and negatively becoming more influential in shaping political settlements in transitional societies;

• The post Rwanda debate has not prompted sensible policy discourse in this area; causes, consequences of hate media have very different dimensions now;

• Arab Spring research often normative, digitally focused and not obviously guiding policy making

• New technologies make censorship and control of media less viable policy options.

Some Conclusions

• Little evidence that media and communication has become a stronger or more coherent arena of policy making in either development or diplomatic communities – despite new focus on political economy;

• Complex, often contradictory set of research and practitioner debates provide limited guidance or coherent signposts to policy makers. We need a better debate.

• The role of media and communication – traditional and digital – makes this an arena where there is much to get right and little evidence of progress.

Some Conclusions