Measuring the Effect of Radical Right Parliamentary Presence ......the mechanisms behind them. For...

Berlin/Frankfurt (Oder), 04.05.2013

Bartek Pytlas/Oliver Kossack

Measuring the Impact of Radical Right Parties on Spatial and Ideological

Shifts within Central and East European Party Systems

European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder)

Faculty of Social and Cultural Studies

Chair of Political Science I: Comparative analysis of political systems, movements and cultures

[email protected]

[email protected]

To be presented at:

7th ECPR General Conference, 4-7 September 2013, Sciences Po Bordeaux

The following text is a draft! Please do not circulate, cite or quote without the authors’ permission!

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Bartek Pytlas/Oliver Kossack

Measuring the Impact of Radical Right Parties on Spatial and Ideological

Shifts within Central and East European Party Systems

Introduction

Democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) continuously struggle against the upsurge

of radical right political parties (RRPs). Research on these parties in post-communist Europe,

however, has mostly focused on the description of party development or agenda (Szayna

1997; Ramet 1999; Hainsworth 2000; Bayer 2002; Mudde 2005b; Segert 2006; Mesežnikov

2008; Frusetta/Glont 2009), as well as providing explanatory mechanisms or variables for

RRP success (Beichelt/Minkenberg 2002; Minkenberg 2002a; Mudde 2007;

Bustikova/Kitschelt 2009; de Lange/Guerra 2009; Biró Nagy/Róna 2013).

Existing research mostly omitted the question of effects of radical right parties. While the

primary interest in electoral results seems natural given their straightforward visibility, the

continuing lack of analytical focus on the impact of radical right parties is puzzling. This is

particularly true for the – still understudied – CEE countries where RRPs‟ electoral fortune

has been much more in flux compared to Western Europe whereas radical right impact on

mainstream public and party discourses as well as on parliamentary policy making has been

much more profound (Mudde 2005a: 281; Segert 2006: 70; Pytlas 2009; Pytlas 2013). What

follows is that besides these empirical observations, no attempt has been made to develop an

analytical framework including operationalised indicators that would measure the impact of

radical right parties on CEE party systems.

Even regarding Western Europe, the impact of radical right parties has only rarely and rather

recently attracted scientific attention, though often with a narrow focus on a specific

dimension of impact and/or on a specific country (Heinisch 2003; de Lange 2012; Akkerman

2012; Akkerman/de Lange 2012; for more comprehensive studies see; Minkenberg 2002b;

Schain 2006; Williams 2006). Regarding the impact on party systems, the majority of

research points at a general shift to the right as a consequence of emerging radical right

parties (Mudde 2007). Looking at Germany and France in the 1980s and 1990s, Minkenberg

further finds increased polarisation between a left and a right camp, particularly in the French

case (Minkenberg 2002b). Nevertheless, the aforementioned studies are still some of only

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very few comparative, analytical investigations of the impact of radical right parties on the

party system.

This paper aims to tackle some of these shortcomings and provide impulses for future studies

on political impact of the radical right, particularly in CEE. Departing from empirical

observations of party competition between RRPs and their mainstream competitors, this

contribution asks about the effects of RRPs on positional shifts within party systems in

Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

In order to analyse this aspect of radical right impact, a two-step model shall be applied. First,

quantitative evaluation of expert surveys will be carried out to identify spatial shifts within the

party system. To meet the requirements of the dynamic nature of party competition and to

account for spatial shifts, the paper will look at party positions at three different points of

time, using data from the 2002, 2006 and 2010 waves of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey

(CHES) (Hooghe et al. 2010; Bakker et al. 2012). Given the varying salience of different

issues of identity politics in the countries under examination, the first step of the analysis thus

draws on a broad indicator covering the parties‟ general stance on identity-related politics on

the socio-cultural GAL/TAN cleavage axis (cf. Hooghe et al. 2002).

Second, qualitative observations of political competition will be used to shed further light on

the mechanisms behind them. For this purpose, original data on the proliferation of radical

right narratives in the discourse of nearby competitors as well as RRPs shall be extracted from

media reports on identity-based politics in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. The data shall be

coded and evaluated by the application of Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis

(CAQDA) in order to depict ideological shifts among nearby mainstream competitors of

RRPs in regard to radical right narratives.

Based on this data, it shall be argued that active political participation of RRPs in the sphere

of issue competition causes spatial as well as ideological shifts to the right (i.e. moving to the

traditionalist end of the GAL/TAN division) among their mainstream competitors and the

CEE party systems in general. Second, it shall be argued that RRPs influence the salience of

conflicts along the GAL/TAN axis, as visible by the variation of party convergence of the

party system in this dimension.

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Defining the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe

The phenomenon of right-wing radicalism in Central and Eastern Europe needs to be

approached carefully. On the one hand, similarly to its counterpart in the West, it must be

perceived as a modern and modernization-related phenomenon and not a mere revival of

inter-war fascist currents (Mudde 2000: 44; Minkenberg 2002c: 335). On the other hand, the

emergence of radical right parties needs to be considered a phenomenon embedded in a

specific socio-historical context and thus of a different character compared to similar

occurrences in the West (Minkenberg 2002: 356). This understanding therefore perceives

radical right parties in Central Eastern Europe as a specific subtype of the new radical right

party family. They are not detached from their West European pendants with regards to their

modernisation-related emergence and ideological focus. Yet, considering their articulated

issues and frames, they still operate in a specific cultural, historical and sociological

contextual framework of political and discursive opportunity structures (cf. Mudde 2007: 5).

In established Western democracies, the emergence of the new radical right in the 1970s has

been explained in relation to post-industrial transformation (Ignazi 1992, Ignazi 2003; Betz

1994; Kitschelt/McGann 1995; Minkenberg 1998, 2000; Rydgren 2004; Mudde 2007;

Bornschier 2010), visible mostly in the dimensions of economy, culture and politics

(Minkenberg 1998: 69). Next to the reshaping of occupational market structures and post-

material value shift, processes of dealignment/realignment as well as the articulation of new

issues transformed the political sphere. The emergent electoral niches were soon occupied by

parties aiming to counteract the changes, a stance referred to as „silent counter-revolution‟

(Ignazi 2003; cf. Minkenberg 1998). In CEE, processes of modernization resulting from the

democratization wave that had swept across the region in the course of the „Autumn of

Nations‟ were „more far-reaching, deeper and complex than the current modernization process

in the West‟ (Beichelt/Minkenberg 2002: 5f). Nonetheless, transformation took place along

the same dimensions as in Western Europe and caused similar effects of atomization,

disenchantment with politics and – most importantly – pluralization and liberalization of

cultural value systems.

The latter point of cultural transformation needs to be underlined here, especially if one

recalls that the radical right operates mostly along the conservative-liberal cleavage

(Minkenberg 2003). The last twenty years of post-communist state- and nation-building

processes have been marked by constant phenomena of discursive competition over symbolic

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concepts of state and national identity (cf. Blokker 2005: 382; Zubrzycki 2001: 631f.). Attila

Ágh referred to this conflict between „traditionalizers‟ and „modernizers‟ as “value wars”

(Ágh 2001: 41). Intensive axiological debates on the form and development of national

identity polarised the political scene around questions related to notions of geopolitical

strategies, national self-understanding, collective belongingness, social norms and value

priorities (Pytlas 2013: 164). The reinterpretation of symbolic identity markers in CEE has

had a profound effect as a provider of discursive opportunities raising the salience of these

issues as a part of the conservative-particularist vs. liberal-pluralist cleavage.

To further elaborate on this argument, it is important to note that unlike their Western

counterparts (cf. Rydgren 2004), radical right parties in CEE have not emerged out of a

gradual upsurge of new niches and issues after the party systems had remained „frozen‟ for

several legislative periods. Instead, the division lines have been visible in CEE societies from

the beginning of the post-communist modernization process and have constituted an

established sphere of political conflict. The collective identity patterns, such as the beliefs

regarding the interweavement between the nation, the state and the individual, collective

myths, historical narratives as well as religious and secular value constructs, have been put on

political display for the purpose of politicization by political actors and formed a set of

discursive opportunities (Koopmans et al. 2005, Giugni et al. 2005). These have determined

public resonance and legitimacy of questions concerning the nature and direction of post-

communist state and nation building.

The phenomenon of the radical right, therefore, cannot be solely understood as a protest of

socio-economic „losers of modernization‟ or a sheer inexperience with democracy but to a

much bigger extent as a programmatic, ideological construction of reality adhered to by those

who perceive the post-communist state and nation building path as a threat to the integrity,

character, principles, values and/or interests of “the nation”. Considering these contextual

factors, right-wing radicalism, following Minkenberg (1998: 33ff., 2008: 12f.), needs to be

conceptualised as an ideology based on a core of a populist myth of romanticised

ultranationalism that, in an attempt to cope with the processes of societal modernization,

questions the principles of a liberal and pluralistic democracy and formulates radicalised

criteria of societal exclusion. The radical right cannot be described as strictly „anti-modern‟

but rather as a dialectic countermovement aimed against the direction and character of the

current modernization process (Minkenberg 2003) willing to reframe it according to its

exclusionary, ultranationalist ideology.

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The salience of the socio-cultural cleavage and the visibility of discursive opportunities

related to nation-building could explain why, on the one hand, radical right parties managed

to introduce their own resonant narratives fields relevant to identity issues, such as morality or

minority politics (cf. Pytlas 2013). This, on the other hand, might further illustrate why

mainstream parties tend to demonstrate less hesitation to engage in competition over identity

issues and their radical right interpretations (cf. Segert 2006: 70). In effect, this perspective

highlights the role of radical right impact on the areas of public discourse and party

competition in regard to identity-related policies of Central-Eastern European party systems.

Radical right effects in Central and Eastern Europe: Impact on party systems and issue

competition

In spite of the crucial importance of radical right parties as agents of identity-based party

competition in post-communist Europe, only few authors attempted to model their impact in a

more comprehensive fashion (Schain 2006; Minkenberg 2002b; Williams 2006). The impact

of radical right parties has to be understood as a dynamic process including several levels of

society: street visibility including radical right as well as counter-mobilisation, public opinion,

policy-making and spatial shifts of the party system (Minkenberg 2002b). Despite the

promising character of this approach, Minkenberg tends to build his analysis rather on

singular events and misses to develop more universal indicators for the impact on each

dimension. Despite some other suggestions for measuring the impact of radical right parties in

a fashion more suitable for comparative studies (Williams 2006), there is a continuing need

for consistent and systematic theoretical and methodological work on the measurement of

party impact.

Regarding the impact on the party system – the dimension of particular interest for this study

– several (comparative) case studies conclude that radical right parties were able to influence

issue positions of their competitors and, therefore, the party system in general (Minkenberg

2002b; Heinisch 2003; Schain 2006; Williams 2006). However, despite “a widely held belief

that populist radical right parties have had a significant impact on the policy positions of other

parties” (Mudde 2007: 284), the only statistical analysis of the impact of West European

radical right parties on the positioning of other parties regarding immigration concludes that

the impact is “both weak and complex” (Williams 2006: 69). Nonetheless, confronting this

result with the findings of the majority of case studies the impact might actually be not weak

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but only complex and thus hard to tackle in a comparative statistical analysis. Therefore, the

task is to develop a more accurate and suitable model for measuring the – indeed, mostly

indirect (Mudde 2007) – effects of radical right parties on the systemic level.

The influence or impact of radical right parties on the change of issue positions of their

mainstream competitors already points to the crucial importance of party competition.

Consequently, a model of radical right impact on shifting positions of mainstream parties

needs to follow the underlying logic and mechanisms of party competition.

Party competition is intrinsic to party systems (Dahl 1966; Sartori 1976; Mair 1996). It is hard

to imagine any phenomenon of electoral dynamics of parliamentary political agency without

the concept of party competition (Benoit/Laver 2009: 1). At the same time, several authors

pointed out that the dynamic and extent of spatial competition among mainstream and radical

right political actors is one of the crucial factors influencing radical right electoral fortune

(Kitschelt/McGann 1995; Bale 2003; Ivarsflaten 2003; Eatwell et al. 2004; Carter 2005;

Meguid 2005, 2008; Schain 2006; Art 2007; Kitschelt 2007).

At least since the seminal book of Anthony Downs (1957), talking about party competition in

terms of spatial ideas has become “a universal phenomenon of modern politics” (Stokes 1963:

368). As Benoit and Laver state at the very beginning of their elaboration:

“Most people who talk about politics are likely to talk sooner or later about the „positions‟ of political

actors. It is difficult if not impossible to have a serious discussion about the substance of real politics

without referring to „where‟ key actors stand on substantive matters at issue” (Benoit/Laver 2009: 11).

Benoit and Laver further present basic concepts of the spatial or dimensional understanding of

political competition. Since „position‟ or „space‟ implies „distance‟ this notion allows us for

an imagination of the grade of difference between particular parties (Benoit/Laver 2009: 11).

Distance further implies „movement‟ and „direction‟ (moving towards or apart of each other),

only possible to be measured based on a particular „benchmark‟ such as a uni-dimensional

left-right axis or multi-dimensional policy spaces (Benoit/Laver 2009: 11ff.). Therefore, the

spatial metaphor provides not only the possibility to pinpoint political interests. The

observation of spatial shifts within the party system also helps to draw a map of relationship

and interactions within the party system under question.

Political actors thus consistently need to confront each other in regard to the positions they

aim to occupy on the electoral scene (Koopmans et al. 2005: 21). The goal of this contention

is issue ownership. The concept of issue ownership (Petrocik 1996) emerged in the

framework of issue-based vote choice theory (Budge/Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Damore

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2004; Bélanger/Meguid 2008; Meguid 2005; Meguid 2008) and describes a public conviction

that a given party is most competent and credible in handling a particular issue (Petrocik

1996: 826).

Mainstream parties can further choose from three particular competition modes while

approaching (new) issues presented by the radical right: the dismissive, the adversarial and

the accommodative strategy (Meguid 2008: 24f.). The dismissive strategy aims at rhetorically

ignoring the competitor and its issues. The adversarial strategy aims at actively opposing

radical right positions and engaging in the issue via opposition. The third strategy of

mainstream parties is the accommodative strategy, characterised by moving towards the

position of the radical right competitor and co-opting its issues as part of the own agenda.

Admittedly, scholarship on the dynamics and mechanics of party competition and competitive

strategies is still in its starting blocks (Mudde 2007), but as the analysis will show, party

strategies towards the radical right as an aspect of spatial competition (Ivarsflaten 2003; Bale

2003; Arzheimer/Carter 2006; Art 2007) can be perceived as one of the most visible

dimensions of radical right impact on the shape and dynamics of CEE party systems.

Taking into account these considerations, a model of radical right parties‟ impact on party

systems shall focus on issue competition of mainstream competitors in regard to identity

politics along the GAL/TAN axis, a dimension central to radical right parties. By so doing,

the following mixed-methods analysis attempts to find general patterns of spatial as well as

ideological shifts linked to the agency of radical right parties. In spite of different issues

shaping value-related politics in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania, this paper

holds that the participation of radical right parties in party competition within the fields of

identity politics causes mainstream parties to shift „rightwards‟, i.e. towards the TAN end of

the conflict dimension. A further assumption is that radical right parties influence the salience

of conflicts along the GAL/TAN axis visible by the extent of spatial convergence on identity

issues. Given the assumption of strong rightward shifts, e.g. in absence of a strong cordon

sanitaire among the mainstream parties, RRPs seem to be political actors with a potential to

„arm‟ and „disarm‟ this area of conflict.

Quantitative analysis: measuring spatial shifts

A prerequisite for the quantitative analysis of spatial shifts in the party system is the

identification of parties‟ positional stances. The most frequently used methods to measure

party positions are expert surveys and the comparative analysis of party manifestos. While

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several researchers and research groups have carried out expert surveys that include various

issue positions of political parties, the approach of manifesto analysis has been applied most

extensively by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) which has coded party manifestos

from most relevant parties in more than 50 countries (Volkens et al. 2012). The general

validity and reliability of the data has been attested to both methods. Nonetheless, they come

each with specific advantages and disadvantages (Benoit/Laver 2009, Marks et al. 2007,

Budge 2013).

The strength of manifesto-based estimates is the huge body of data that allows for

comparisons across countries and over a considerable period of time. Expert surveys do not

cover such a broad range of parties and countries and are available for a limited period of

time, albeit the number of surveys has increased in recent years. A problem of the CMP

dataset, however, is the incomplete nature of many manifestos (Kitschelt 2007). This is of

particular importance in regard to radical right parties which tend to avoid or tone down

unpopular positions not appealing to a large share of voters in order to disguise a hidden,

more radical agenda (Mudde 2007). In contrast, expert surveys overcome these problems by

providing an assessment of party positions by not only relying on publications but further

taking into account the parties‟ activities. In other words, expert surveys „[combine] what

parties say and what parties do‟ (Netjes/Binnema 2007, quoted in Bakker et al. 2012: 7).

Thus, they can balance the incongruity between publicly expressed stances and secretly

pursued goals of parties. A major objection to expert surveys criticised the bias included in

the subjective assessment of party positions. Recent tests indicate, however, that an assumed

bias does not affect the validity of the data (Hooghe et al. 2010).

Altogether, the disadvantages of expert surveys hardly apply for this study while the use of

CMP data might cause problems, particularly regarding radical right parties. Consequently,

the quantitative analysis will rely on expert surveys, more precisely on the 2002, 2006 and

2010 waves of the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (Hooghe et al. 2010, Bakker et al. 2012).

These surveys not only include all countries under examination, they further provide the

possibility to identify positional shifts as they include data at three different points of time.

Moreover, all three waves of the survey include an indicator for a general position regarding

identity politics. This GAL/TAN variable measures party positions between a left „green-

alternative-libertarian‟ and a right „traditionalist-authoritarian-nationalist‟ pole (Hooghe et al.

2002: 966). Hence, this indicator allows for cross-national comparison as it takes into account

not only specific identity-based issues such as religion, integration of minorities or

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homophobia which might be highly relevant in one country but not on the agenda in others.

Thus, the following quantitative analysis aims at illustrating the influence of radical right

parties on spatial shifts along the GAL/TAN dimension.

Bulgaria

Figure 1: Spatial shifts along the GAL/TAN dimension in the Bulgarian party system between 2002 and 2010

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2002-2010 (Hooghe et al. 2010, Bakker et al. 2012).

Beginning with the 2001 elections, the Bulgarian party system witnessed a significant change.

Regular bipartisan alternation in government between the communist successor Bulgarian

Socialist Party (BSP) and the oppositional Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) gave way to

multi-party competition that saw the emergence of new, strong parties (Smilov 2008;

Karasimeonov 2010). One of them, the National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) was founded

by and named after Simeon II, the returned pre-WW II tsar of Bulgaria. The rise of the party

after its formation shortly before the 2001 national elections has to be seen in the light of a

high degree of populism which is perceived as characteristic for the political arena of Bulgaria

(de Waele/Cholova 2011). It provides an excellent ground for parties like NDSV, offering no

comprehensive political agenda but a distinct anti-establisment appeal personified by a

charismatic leader. In that manner, the party gained a landslide success with more than 40%

of the vote by campaigning on the popularity of its leader and the promise to install a

technocratic expert government which would solve the most pressing economic problems and

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effectively fight corruption. Since this promise was not kept, the party rapidly lost popular

support and finally dropped out of parliament in 2009 (Cholova/De Waele 2011).

In the meantime, the former member of NDSV and popular mayor of Sofia, Boyko Borisov,

founded the party Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), an equally

populist party which also gained the majority of votes when running for the first time in the

national elections of 2009. Apparently, there are certain structural similarities between NDSV

and GERB regarding their position in the party system. Both took over government in their

first legislature with an incoherent political programme mostly based on anti-establishment

populism (Smilov 2010; de Waele/Cholova 2011). Nevertheless, Fig. 1 illustrates a

substantial difference regarding identity politics between NDSV and GERB. While Simeon II

emphasised the more liberal and „European‟ nature of himself and his party, Borisov

portrayed himself as the advocate of the Bulgarian people simultaneously marking Simeon II

as a foreigner not belonging to it (de Waele/Cholova 2011). In that regard, the emergence of

GERB indicates a substantial shift to the right within the Bulgarian party system.

In spite of the favourable breeding ground for right-wing radicalism in Bulgaria

(Beichelt/Minkenberg 2002) no significant radical right party emerged until 2005. Until then,

the electoral coalition around the BSP occupied the position farthest to the right which can be

seen as a remainder of the patrimonial communist regime in Bulgaria (Kitschelt et al. 1999).

The data of 2002 indicates that, in the absence of a radical right party, competition on identity

politics took place in the left and right centre. Until 2006, the parties have been moving even

further to the centre even though the radical right party ATAKA appeared in the political

arena in the course of the 2005 national and the 2006 presidential election campaigns and

gained parliamentary representation immediately. Founded as an electoral coalition of several

radical right parties and organisations, ATAKA merged into a single party after the 2005

elections. The internal struggles of the ATAKA in the first period in parliament (Meznik

2011) combined with a dismissive strategy not unusual for mainstream parties facing the

exposure to emerging radical right parties for the first time (Meguid 2005) might account for

further convergence indicated by the data for 2006.

However, following the stabilisation of ATAKA the data for 2010 points at a clear shift to the

right within the Bulgarian party system on the GAL/TAN axis. First, ATAKA has remained a

serious competitor on the formerly empty right fringe of the political spectrum in the second

half of the 2000s and, second, the emergence of GERB as a new and strong force which also

positions on the right end of the centre regarding socio-cultural issues further signifies the

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overall rightward shift. In contrast, the more liberal camp has almost vanished with NDSV

losing parliamentary representation in 2009 and the SDS suffering from a split-off in 2005.

Hungary

Figure 2: Spatial shifts along the GAL/TAN dimension in the Hungarian party system between 2002 and 2010


In the Hungarian case, data from the expert survey sample shows a relatively constant pattern

of ideological polarisation along the GAL/TAN dimension (Fig. 2). The liberal camp consists

of the social democratic Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP), the successor of the Hungarian

communist party, and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz) which has its roots in

the oppositional forces of 1989. Fidesz, stemming from the oppositional forces as well, has

gradually transformed from a liberal into a national conservative party and, thus, become the

hegemonic force in the conservative camp. Moreover, Hungary also witnessed the rise of two

radical right parties into parliament. The first of them is the Hungarian Justice and Life Party

(MIÉP) which could cross the five per cent threshold once in 1998. When the party was about

to repeat this success four years later it closely missed parliamentary representation gaining

only 4.4% of the vote. In the same year the conservative camp lost its majority and had to

hand over the power to a coalition government of the culturally liberal parties MSzP and

SzDSz. During its period of government between 1998 and 2002, however, Fidesz already

introduced measures weakening liberal democratic institutions (which was also supported by

MIÉP) and deepened its national conservative ideological platform (Bayer 2005). The strict

opposition of MSzP and SzDSz towards those policies and ideological positions is mirrored in

the 2002 data showing a highly polarised party system in Hungary at that time.

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Between 2002 and 2006 MIÉP vanishes not only from parliament but also largely from the

political arena. Additionally, the other parties, particularly Fidesz, move towards the centre.

The 2006 data in Fig. 2 clearly depicts this convergence of party positions on identity-based

issues in Hungary in that period. The fact that Fidesz has lost a competitor on the right might

– at least partly – account for the party‟s centripetal movement since there is no serious

danger of losing the votes of the right fringe to another party. Consequently, the degree of

identity-based polarisation in the Hungarian party system in 2006 seems to be at the lowest in

the whole period under examination. Moreover, the middle of the 2000s marks the most

liberal average positions of the mainstream parties in Hungary.

After the 2006 elections and the following mass public protests against the re-elected MSzP

prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány1, the radical right party Jobbik gained momentum. The rise

of Jobbik resulted in the party‟s entry into the European and national Parliament in 2009 and

2010 respectively with turnout of more than 10% each. Moreover, the public visibility of

Jobbik and its affiliated associations, especially the paramilitary Hungarian Guard increased

significantly (Biró Nagy/Róna 2013). Although the 2010 elections equipped Fidesz with a

two-thirds majority of seats in parliament, the party implemented several policy proposals

stemming originally from Jobbik (Verseck 30.01.2013) in order to co-opt the agenda of the

radical right and appeal to its voters.2 Taking into account this legislation and further

authoritarian and nationalist policies introduced by the Fidesz government after its

inauguration in 2010, the impact of Jobbik on Fidesz appears to be much higher than the

GAL/TAN value for this year indicates. Here, qualitative data presented in the following part

of the paper will shed further light on the ideological impact of Jobbik.

Moreover, the liberal camp faces a difficult situation after the incidents of 2006. SzDSz could

not even re-enter parliament in 2010 and MSzP lost dramatically both votes and trust (Biró

Nagy/Róna 2012). Consequently, new political forces emerged on the liberal end of the

spectrum including the Green party LMP3, Gyurcsány‟s Demokratikus Koalíció, certain social

1 After the 2006 elections, a Hungarian radio station broadcasted an internal speech of Ferenc Gyurscány, known

as the “Őszöd-speech”, in which he admitted lying to the population in order to win the elections (Cf. Lendvai

2010: 149-152.). The leaked speech caused long-lasting and partly violent protests against the MSzP

government. 2 Public opinion surveys in late 2011 and early 2012 reveal that the radical right threat towards Fidesz increased

further after the 2010 elections since public support for Jobbik rose to more than 20% (Szonda Ipsos

16.02.2012).

3 In 2013, several members of the LMP, including Timea Szabó and Gergely Karácsony, left the party over the

dispute regarding the participation in Együtt 2014. The newly founded Párbeszéd Magyarországért Párt

(Dialogue for Hungary), joined the platform of Bajnai.

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movements like Milla, Szolidaritás or 4K! as well as the recently created united opposition

platform of Gordon Bajnai‟s Együtt 2014 Movement, representing a clear-cut opposition to

the national conservative and authoritarian government of Fidesz. Since these organisations

are still in a phase of consolidation the liberal camp has remained rather weak so far.

Thus, the emergence of Jobbik goes along with two phenomena: increasing polarisation

between the liberal and the national conservative camp as well as a general shift to the right as

not only Jobbik occupies the right fringe but Fidesz also becomes stronger and moves further

towards this end of the spectrum (which should be even more evident in its positions after

2010).

Poland

Figure 3: Spatial shifts along the GAL/TAN dimension in the Polish party system between 2002 and 2010


The Polish case shows some similarities to the Hungarian one as there is also quite significant

polarisation of the party system in regard to identity politics (Fig. 3). In the 2001 national

elections the newly founded radical right League of Polish Families (LPR) experienced a

head-start and entered the Sejm with almost 8% of the vote. Even though internal differences

characterised the first legislature, the party could stabilise organisationally and ideologically

and establish as an important force of the Polish right during the first half of the 2000s. The

ultra-Catholic radio station Radio Maryja certainly contributed to the rise of LPR in the early

years by overt support for the party in its programme (Pankowski/Kornak 2005; de

Lange/Guerra 2009; Pankowski 2010).

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In reaction, the conservative party Law and Justice (PiS) intensified its Catholic-nationalist

and authoritarian appeal in order to take over issue space from LPR. Data for 2006 indicates

that both parties shared almost identical positions on identity politics during their government

period of 2005 and 2006. Further evidence is provided by the common support of the

manifesto for the „Fourth Republic‟ published by PiS during the 2005 election campaign

(Millard 2010). When LPR became a junior partner of the PiS-led government, the whole

coalition of LPR, PiS and Self Defence (SO) suffered from several scandals and internal

conflicts which particularly affected LPR and finally resulted in the collapse of the right-wing

government (Millard 2010). LPR subsequently lost not only its credibility but a large share of

its electorate to PiS (Pacewicz 2007 quoted in Pytlas 2009) which co-opted the agenda of the

LPR and successfully took back issue space and voters on the right fringe. The data for 2010

illustrates that PiS moderated its position only gradually after LPR had largely vanished from

the political arena. Applying a strategy of co-optation of large parts of LPR‟s agenda, PiS has

not only consolidated its hegemonic position on the right but shifted the centre of the

GAL/TAN spectrum further to the ultra-conservative end.

While the major parties of the right approximate each other in 2006 regarding their positions

on identity politics, the liberal parties, Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Civic Platform

(PO), distance themselves even further from the conservative camp with a peak of

polarisation during the time of the governing coalition of PiS, LPR and SO. Thus, it rather

seems to be the perception of PO as the „arch-enemy‟ of PiS in the mostly bipartisan

competition in Poland at that time that accounts for the dramatic shift to the GAL end of the

spectrum.

The fact that PiS largely remained on the far right end of the spectrum opened up issue space

in the centre. PO seized this opportunity and occupied a much wider ideological spectrum,

including more centrist and conservative positions on identity politics in 2010 than in 2006.

The electoral and organisational decline of the SLD further contributed to that shift of PO

since there was no serious competitor left in the liberal camp before Ruch Palikota entered the

scene with 10% of the popular vote in the 2011 elections.

Political competition on identity politics in Poland was fairly polarised in the beginning of the

2000s. The polarisation intensified even further in the course of the rise of LPR. After the

party lost power again, a tendency towards convergence is visible as the distance between PiS

and PO in 2010 returns to the level of 2002, although both parties are situated further to the

right. In the light of a weakened left, the data not only indicates increasing polarisation as an

15

immediate effect of the emergence of LPR but also a general shift to the right, particularly

after the demise of LPR.

Romania

Figure 3: Spatial shifts along the GAL/TAN dimension in the Romanian party system between 2002 and 2010


In Romania, the positions of mainstream parties on the GAL/TAN dimension show a clear

trend of convergence between 2002 and 2010. Like in Bulgaria, the post-communist Social

Democratic Party (PSD) also occupies a centre right position on identity politics while the

more liberal wing of the former National Salvation Front, which then formed the Democratic

Party (PD), holds almost identical positions as the National Liberal Party (PNL), an old party

that was re-established after the fall of Ceauşescu in 1989. After the radical right Romanian

National Unity Party (PUNR) vanished in the end of the 1990s, the Greater Romania Party

(PRM) became the hegemonic force in the Romanian radical right spectrum. Having been

electorally outnumbered by the PUNR in the 1990s, the PRM achieved a landslide success in

the 2000 parliamentary elections with almost 20% of the votes – the best result of all radical

right parties in CEE. In the following elections in 2004 the party still received a considerable

turnout at the polls with more than 10%. Nevertheless, its decline had already started after the

year 2000 as it faced a cordon sanitaire for the first time, because the EU made clear that

distancing from an openly anti-Semitic, anti-European and racist party like PRM by the

political elite is a necessary condition for Romania‟s quick EU accession. As a result of the

isolation, the leading figure of the PRM, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, decided to tune down his and

the party‟s message, which caused internal struggles and a loss of credibility among the

party‟s supporters. In result, the PRM dropped out from parliament with only 3.2% of the vote

in 2008 (Turcanu 2010).

16

Fig. 4 indicates that the demise of the PRM is paralleled by a clear trend of convergence of

the mainstream parties on identity politics. When the PRM was still present in parliament and,

thus, had better access to the main channels of party competition in spite of the cordon

sanitaire, the positioning of PSD, PD and PNL show moderate polarisation in the left and

right centre. In 2010, however, the three major parties converged within a range of one point

around the centre indicating that their positions on identity-related issues hardly differed at

all. By losing its parliamentary faction, the PRM might have also lost its power to politicise

identity politics and place its issues on the agenda, while the other parties rather focused on

the pressing socio-economic issues and the implementation of the acquis communautaire

required for Romania‟s accession to the EU.

Slovakia

Figure 3: Spatial shifts along the GAL/TAN dimension in the Slovak party system between 2002 and 2010

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2002-2010 (Hooghe et al. 2010, Bakker et al. 2012)

After 2000, party competition in Slovakia has to be seen in the light of the autocratic regime

under prime minister Vladimir Mečiar between 1992 and 1998. The governing coalition was

led by Mečiar‟s autocratic and populist „catch all‟ Movement for a Democratic Slovakia

(HZDS) and further consisted of one of the most constant radical right parties in CEE, the

Slovak National Party (SNS). Not before 1998 a broad coalition of the social democratic Party

of the Democratic Left (SDL‟), the conservative parties Slovak Democratic and Christian

Union (SDKÚ) and Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) as well as the Party of the

Hungarian Coalition (SMK) could bring about a change of government resulting in a re-

democratisation and a rapid orientation towards the EU (Haughton/Rybar 2009). At this

moment, a new party, Direction (SMER), slowly emerged as an established competitor on the

17

political scene of Slovakia. Founded in 1999 by Robert Fico, a highly popular former

politician of SDL‟, SMER at first focused mostly on a vague platform of „non-ideological‟

political pragmatism (Marušiak 2006), law and order policies as well as establishment and

redistributive populism (cf. Pytlas 2013: 169).

Data for 2002 in Fig. 5 depicts a moderate polarisation on the cultural dimension between

SMER and SDKÚ occupying the left centre and KDH, HZDS and SNS in the conservative

and ultraconservative end, though it is not possible to speak of a right-wing camp given the

opposition of KDH and the other two parties stemming from the 1990s. Taking this historical

division further into account, the 2002 data might be interpreted as a result of convergence

after the harsh divide in the 1990s. Moreover, the decline of SDL‟ in the early 2000s has

already caused a shift of the party system towards the conservative pole as force closest to the

left-libertarian pole regarding identity politics lost power.

In 2002, the SNS failed to enter the national parliament for the first time due to a party split

resulting from internal differences between the party‟s most famous figure and long-term

party leader Ján Slota and the then-leader Anna Belousovová. Though both wings reunited in

2003 and the split did not considerably harm the internal structure of the party, the SNS could

not make use of the privileges of parliamentary representation for four years. During this

period, SMER, SDKÚ and HZDS show a trend of convergence in the centre while KDH

moves further to the right. The constant centre-left position of SMER regarding identity

politics suggested by the data from 2002 and 2006 seems to represent the obscure positioning

until then.

After 2006, however, the data signals a shift of SMER to the right which is also in line with

the party‟s choice of coalition partners after the national elections in that year. Desite a

possible coalition with KDH and SMK, SMER preferred to form a government with HZDS

and SNS. Even though the SNS was backed by the best turnout in its history (11.6%), the

party was not able to negotiate the aspired ministerial posts and thus influence its most

important policy fields directly (Haughton/Rybář 2009). Nevertheless, the comeback of the

party corresponds with a rightward shift of all parties (except KDH which had already

occupied a position quite far to the right and largely kept it). In fact, the data reveals that in

2010 none of the established parties occupied a position on the liberal side of the spectrum

any more. After its time in government, SMER is thus perceived to have abandoned its

undefined socio-cultural profile and peaks even higher than the moderate conservative SDKÚ,

a result surprising for a self-ascribed nominal social democratic party. The qualitative analysis

18

will further illustrate the impact of the adoption of radical right narratives on the spatial shift

of Robert Fico‟s party.

Summary

The spatial shifts of party positions in the five countries under examination reveal interesting

patterns regarding the impact of radical right parties on the respective party systems. When

radical right parties have the means (i.e. at best through actual or viable parliamentary

representation) to take part in party competition, potentially threatened mainstream parties

always shifted to the right indicating a strategy of co-optation. This is the case in Hungary,

Poland and Slovakia, where PiS, Fidesz and SMER as major mainstream government parties

take more traditionalist stances on identity-based issues. In Bulgaria, the emergence of GERB

mirrors this phenomenon since the party replaced the former centre-populist but socio-

culturally rather liberal NDSV with a programme loaded with law and order policies

sometimes combined with nationalist ideas after taking over government in 2009 (Genov

2010).

Instead, the absence of radical right parties tends to favour convergence of mainstream parties

on identity politics. This is clearly visible in Romania where all parties converge almost

exactly in the centre once the PRM has lost influence. Also in Bulgaria, before ATAKA

enters the political arena, the main parties show a relatively small difference in their positions

on the socio-cultural dimension, too. Even in Hungary and Poland, the distances between the

mainstream parties decrease when radical right parties lose influence as was the case with

MIÉP in the beginning of the 2000s in Hungary and LPR after its participation in government

in 2005 and 2006. It seems therefore, that the forces that „light the fuse‟ of dormant conflicts

on socio-cultural issues are indeed the radical right parties.

Qualitative analysis: measuring ideological shifts

The qualitative part of the analysis shall focus on the dynamic of framing efforts (Snow et al.

1986; Snow/Benford 1988; Gamson 1988; Gamson/Meyer 1996; Zald 1996; Benford/Snow

19

2000) between radical right parties and their mainstream competitors.4 Competition over

frames is a constitutive mechanism of any party competition process. Contentious politics in a

specific framework of political opportunity structures can be seen as struggle or contest over

meaning (Gamson/Meyer 1996: 289; Gamson 2004: 245; cf. Benford/Snow 2000: 613).

Frame competition is relevant not only on the level of public discourse but also in the area of

policy making, as noted most notably by Frank Fischer (Fischer 1980; Fischer 2003). In both

cases, frames understood as narratives articulated by political actors, guide collective action

as well as help to organize, explain, justify and legitimate political agency. In other words:

„The frame suggests what the issue is about‟ (Gamson 1988: 222). Therefore, the analysis of

frame competition is seen to provide qualitative indices of radical right impact on ideological

shifts within party systems.

Having said that, it is crucial to note that the framing approach has hitherto largely lacked an

established methodological framework that would allow a comprehensible identification of

frames and a reproducible verification of framing mechanisms (Johnston 1995: 217; Johnston

2002; Matthes 2007: 44). As one of the few methodological contributions suitable for

answering the research question in this study, Thomas König points to advantages of the

application of computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) for frame

measurement within the discourse analytical method (König 2004a; König 2004b). The

CAQDA is a qualitative method that allows for a standardized, verifiable measurement of

discursive patterns within texts. The analysis is performed by means of text segment coding

and the evaluation of absolute and relative frequencies of the identified codes as well as their

mutual relationship, among other their co-occurrence or textual nearness (Kuckartz 2004;

Kuckartz 2007; König 2004a; König 2004b; Bazeley 2003).

For the qualitative analysis, cases shall be looked upon, where empirical observations

supported by quantitative data pointed to particularly strong accommodative strategies of

major government parties in regard to radical right narratives: Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

Having previously noted the strong activity of radical right parties along cultural cleavage

lines (cf. Minkenberg 2003; Bornschier 2010), the researched discourse was narrowed down

to party policies related to questions of national identity and values, expected to be most likely

cases for the observation of radical right impact on narrative shifts of mainstream

4 The methodological design, the collected qualitative dataset on radical right frames and its CAQDA analysis

are an extract from the research conducted by Bartek Pytlas for the purpose of his forthcoming dissertation

project.

20

competitors. In Poland, the analysis focused on the debates regarding the question of

reproductive rights (abortion) and issues in regard to rights of sexual minorities. In Slovakia

and Hungary, the analysis focused on policies regarding the issues of these states‟

relationships with the Hungarian minority.5 In each country, online news reports shall be

gathered, 6

with the name of the particular party and the description of the issue as keywords.

In all cases therefore – due to the vast size of the sample – the material shall thus only include

statements of radical right parties and their nearest mainstream competitor (LPR and PiS in

Poland; SNS and SMER in Slovakia; Fidesz and Jobbik in Hungary).

The gathered textual data material was coded, mapped and evaluated non-automatically7

using CAQDAS (MaxQDA Version 11.0.1). The text was mapped with marker codings

(descriptors of „year‟ and „actor‟) as well as content codings (first, metaphorical fields

describing particular frames, summarized into clusters such as „catholic traditional values‟,

„martyrology/trauma‟, or „organic nationalism‟; as well as, second, diagnostic meta-frames

warning against a perceived „threat‟ or calling for „protection‟). The codings were then cross-

analysed in regard to their co-occurrence within the text using the MaxQDA analytical tool

„Code-Relations-Browser‟. In the analysis, the paragraph distance between marker and

content frames were set to zero (the co-occurrence of actor and statement needed to take place

only within a single paragraph). The data has then been disseminated by year and recalculated

from absolute to relative numbers using the overall number of statements identified for a

particular year.

5 In Hungary, the analysis shall revolve around the debates on the citizenship status of Hungarian minorities

living in adjactent countries, most notably the debate on the Status Law in 2001, the failed double citizenship

referendum in 2004 and the successful Dual Citizenship Law in 2010. In Slovakia, it will concentrate on debates

in regard to the minority politics of the Slovak state towards the country‟s Hungarian minority, such as the State

Language Law debate of 2009. For a detailed description and analysis of these debates see Pytlas 2013. 6 In Poland, due to search limitations even within the paid archive of the Gazeta Wyborcza, news reports from

the websites of PiS and LPR shall be added to the analysis. In Slovakia, to achieve a comparable size of the

sample, articles from both biggest dailies SME and Pravda shall be included. In Hungary, due to a large

ideological polarization of the media, the analysis of the biggest FIDESZ-associated daily Magyar Nemzet shall

be supplemented by news reports from the Jobbik party organ, Barikad. 7 i.e.: the codes were not applied „blindly“ by sheer automatic string search of keywords within texts, but instead

manually by reading the text material and applying the coding dependently on the context fit of a particular

word, phrase or metaphor.

21

Poland

In the case of Poland, the „highly conflicted‟ (Dillon 1996: 26) issue of reproductive rights

appeared on the Sejm‟s agenda already shortly after the onset of the post-communist

transition and remained a pat situation in a conflict between left-liberal and conservative-

nationalist political forces. The law adopted in 1993 (cf. Hennig 2012) constituted a largely

conservative „abortion compromise‟ (kompromis aborcyjny) that, despite several future

attempts (Hennig 2012), has remained basically untouched.8 Also in regard to bills on equality

for same-sex civil partnerships, fierce debates started in 2001, polarized during the years

2005-2007 and failed to end in successful adoption of a binding law (Hennig 2010).

The most prominent radical right narrative in this regard touched upon the question of a threat

to the fabric of Polish identity, Catholic faith, „traditional Polish values‟ and the role of

traditional family as the basic cell of Polish society, seen as a vehicle for transmission of

identity, patriotism and faith (cf. Giertych 2006, quoted in Minkenberg/Pytlas 2012: 218).

Opposition to liberalization attempts in regard to moral politics issues were depicted by the

LPR as counter-modernization rhetoric. Therein, „the West‟ – most notably the European

Union, one of the main, if not the crucial issue owned by this religious-fundamentalist party

(cf. de Lange/Guerra 2009) – were depicted as decadent, debaucherous, immoral and godless,

and therefore incompatible with Poland‟s cultural and historical tradition, threatening its

national identity and sovereignty.

Results presented in Fig. 6 confirm the findings of the quantitative analysis of spatial shifts.

Over time, PiS turned its attention to the issue of moral politics and shifted towards the

application of radical right frames. As the name suggests, in the early years, the party‟s main

issue was law and order (legalist issues such as tightening the penal code, anti-corruption,

death penalty) which rose to importance via corresponding anti-crime measures of a highly

popular President of Warsaw, Lech Kaczyński, future President of Poland. Any references to

national identity were rather clad in the robes of patriotism derived from historical

independence struggles and traditions (PiS 2001 in Słodkowska 2002: 92) and articulated as

real-political raison d´etat. The data confirms this finding, as in the period of 2002-2003

radical right frames relating to Catholic, traditional Polish values, and traditional family are

8 The last amendment that made it through to the third reading was a conservative constitutional amendment

proposed by the PiS/LPR/Samoobrona government in 2007. A liberal amendment submitted in 2012 by Ruch

Palikota did not even make it through the first reading.

22

not prominently represented. If at all, they were articulated in singular debates on the issue

especially by the rightmost wing of the party personified by Marek Jurek and Artur Zawisza.9

Fig. 6. Distribution of summarized narratives of „Threat‟ to „Catholic Values‟, „Traditional Polish Values‟ and

„Traditional Family‟ among LPR and PiS, in percent of total party statements in the Polish moral politics

debates.

Source: Authors‟ calculations.

Nonetheless, as again visible in Fig. 6, at least since the 2004 referendum on Poland‟s EU

accession and the 2005 elections, PiS readily started to feature narratives of threat to Catholic,

Polish traditional values and traditional family. In 2005, PiS published a separate document

called „The Catholic Brochure‟ (authored mostly by the aforementioned rightmost fringe of

the party) that described religion, as a „fundamental fact of our national life‟ (PiS 2005: 7) and

the necessity to defend it coming from allegedly raising threat of modern „moral relativism‟

and „revolution aimed at the pillars of our civilization‟ (PiS 2005: 9). In that period, the

salience of the EU-issue helped the hard eurosceptic LPR to repeatedly enter the parliament.

Still, after 2005, the issue lost its salience, giving way to socio-economic issues and the PiS-

induced polarization between „social‟ and „liberal‟ Poland (de Lange/ Guerra 2009: 537;

Minkenberg/Pytlas 2012: 218). In this context, PiS successfully completed its ideological

shift and obtained ownership over the LPR narratives of threat to Catholic values, applying

9 Both politicians left the party in 2007 over the dispute surrounding the failed attempt to introduce a ban on

abortion into the constitution. The politicians later formed the splinter party Prawica Rzeczpospolitej. In 2012,

Artur Zawisza became one of the leaders of the extreme right Ruch Narodowy (National Movement).

23

them to their liberal internal counterparts, the Civic Platform, and their voters (Pytlas 2009;

Minkenberg/Pytlas 2012: 219).

With the LPR vanishing from the Parliament and the Polish political life, PiS kept its

religious-fundamentalist profile, now not on the fringes, but in the middle of the party

ideology. Whereas the extent of its use was reduced in the years 2008-2009 by the diminished

salience of this issue, the parliamentary elections of 2011 again reinforced the latent liberal-

traditionalist conflict. The issue salience of religiously derived narratives was further

enhanced by the growing popularity of the left-liberal Ruch Palikota with its anti-clerical and

liberal moral politics stances. As visible in Fig. 6, since 2010 PiS not only upheld, but also

enhanced its positional shift to the religious-fundamentalist right. This finding, assumed also

in the quantitative part of the analysis, clearly confirms the enduring impact of parliamentary

presence of radical right parties on the Polish party system. As of 2013, the liberal-

traditionalist conflict remains one of the most crucial axes of cleavage division in Polish

politics.

Slovakia

In Slovakia, the issue of minority politics has been widely associated with the Hungarian

community living mostly in the southern areas of the country. Due to historical legacies of

Hungarian domination over Slovak lands during the time of the Hungarian Kingdom and

Habsburg Empire, the issue of the relationships between the ethnic majority and minority in

the country has been a crucial issue for the radical right SNS. On a regular basis, Ján Slota

and his party used radical right narratives to depict the Hungarian minority as a „fifth

collumn‟ within Slovak borders. In a radicalized and non-differentiating fashion, he accussed

the Hungarian minority and the Hungarian state of enduring imperialism prolonged from the

Habsburg times and warned about the threat to Slovak sovereignty coming from alleged

hidden irredentist and revanchist goals of the Hungarian minority and the Hungarian state

(Mesežnikov 2008; Pytlas 2013: 173).

After 2006, the social-populist SMER – still ascribing itself to the social-democratic tradition

– intensified its ideological shift towards radical right value positions (Mesežnikov 2008: 31).

In 2003, expert surveys placed SMER nine percentage points below the party mean for

support of nationalism whereas surveys conducted after 2006 saw this indicator rise to 13

24

percentage points above the mean (Rybář/Deegan-Krause 2008: 511). This fact is also

confirmed by the CAQDA analysis depicted in Fig. 7.

Fig. 7. Distribution of summarised narratives of „Irredentism‟, „Historical Dominance‟ as well as „Threat‟ to

„Sovereignty‟ among SNS and SMER, in percent of total party statements in the Slovak debates on the

Hungarian minority


Since 2006, the ratio of SMER‟s articulation of notions related to Hungarian historical

dominance, irredentism and threat to Slovak sovereignty in debates on the Hungarian minority

has followed the trend of the SNS. In the year 2008 – in the wake of the adoption of the

notorious Slovak Language Law of 2009 (cf. Pytlas 2013: 171-176) – SMER even topped the

ratio of similar SNS statements with over 50% of all articulated party frames in this field.

Before the Hungarian and Slovak elections 2010 and 2011 and amidst the adoption of the

Hungarian Dual Citizenship Law in 2010, the ratio of SMER‟s radical right rhetoric peaked

again. As it turns out, SMER used the frames of the SNS much more punctually and

strategically than PiS in the case of Poland. This is surely partly due to the fact that Fico and

SMER wanted to keep their social-democratic label, also on the European level of party

politics. Nonetheless, the figure provides proof of the impact of SNS on the rhetoric of SMER

in regard to the Hungarian minority issue, traditional for the radical right parties in Slovakia.

Hungary

In Hungary, the question of the Hungarian diaspora living in adjactent countries as a result of

the Trianon peace treaty after World War I constitutes a long-term and crucial part of the

25

country‟s foreign policy, or rather its specific, unique facet of nemzetpolitika („nation policy‟)

(cf. Pytlas 2013: 176-181). In contrast to the cases of Poland and Slovakia, Fidesz has pursued

a strong traditionalist stance on this issue at least since their volte-face from a liberal to a

national-conservative party in the mid-1990s (Kiss 2002). In 2001, the first Fidesz

government adopted a legislation known as Status Law, granting the Hungarian diaspora the

status of Hungarian ethnic affiliation, along with numerous social benefits. In a follow up in

2004 – now in the opposition – Fidesz engaged in a referendum to grant dual citizenship to

Hungarians living abroad. The referendum failed as a result of low turn-out, but – especially

due to the campaign of the MSzP against the adoption of dual citizenship legislation –

remained a legitimizing tool for party competition in the field of national politics between the

left-liberal and national-conservative camps (Pytlas 2013: 178).

Jobbik, founded in 2003 as a movement party, has already taken active part in the pro-

referendum debate. After the failed plebiscite, Jobbik accentuated – more or less directly

depending on the context – its radical rhetoric on the revision of Trianon and the re-

unification of Hungary‟s diaspora within the borders of historical Greater Hungary. Thus, as

Fig. 8 shows, historical overlaying narratives referring to the need to abolish the Trianon

treaty gained in importance for the Jobbik especially in the election year of 2010. Another

unique feature visible in Fig. 8 was the extensive use of martyrology narratives (notions such

as historical suffering, humiliation, a „wound‟ torn into the body of the organically imagined

nation) related to the „Trianon trauma‟ experienced by the Hungarian diaspora living outside

the „Motherland‟s‟ borders, again peaking in 2010. In this regard, the 2004 referendum has

been portrayed as a „second‟ or „spiritual‟ Trianon and a further wound torn into the Nation,

this time by the Socialists (cf. Jobbik 18.04.2004; Barikad 22.10.2008). With the growing

street visibility of Jobbik and the Magyar Gárda, together with its success in the 2009

elections to the European Parliament, these notions became much more resonant in the public

sphere – especially among the profound public anti-Socialist mood against the government of

Ferenc Gyurcsány.

Fig. 9 shows the impact of the aforementioned narratives on the ideological shift of Fidesz..

Assumed by the quantitative analysis but still not visible in the survey data, the CAQDA

analysis clearly confirms a considerably strong impact of Jobbik on the TAN-shift of Fidesz

in the electoral year of 2010.

26

Fig. 8. Distribution of summarized „historical/mythic‟, „martyrology/trauma‟ and „organic/spiritual‟ national

identity narratives of Jobbik, in percent of total Jobbik statements in the Hungarian debate on dual citizenship


The distribution of Fidesz‟ narratives in regard to organic or spiritual imagination of the

Hungarian nation remain stable. This points to the fact, that Fidesz has already in the past

argued strongly along the lines of ultranationalist, organic or cultural ethnic identity of the

Hungarian diaspora in the region. Nonetheless, the rightward shift of Fidesz is noticeable by

their growing co-optation of Jobbik-articulated ultranationalist narratives relating to Trianon

as well as martyrological visions of the suffering of the Hungarian diaspora. Here, Fidesz

together with his satellite party KDNP has – among other – adopted the Jobbik interpretation

of the failed referendum as the „second Trianon trauma‟ brought upon the nation by the

Socialists (Magyar Nemzet 03.05.2010; Orbán 17.11.2011; Orbán 05.05.2012; cf. Pytlas

2013).

Therefore, already prior to its entry into the national parliament only by means of street

visibility and electoral success on the European level, Jobbik had a profound impact on the

ideological shift of Fidesz toward even more rightist positions. Furthermore, the already

virulent polarization of the political scene between national-conservative and left-libertarian

parties has been enhanced not only been fuelled in the socio-economic field, but also

encroached upon the ultranationalist dimension related to „national politics‟. In this matter,

the primary, direct impact of Jobbik has been the introduction of these polarizing narratives

into the public discourse, as well as their adoption and legitimizaton by Fidesz.

27

Fig. 9. Distribution of summarised „historical/mythic‟, „martyrology/trauma‟ and „organic/spiritual‟ national

identity narratives of Fidesz, in percent of total Fidesz statements in the Hungarian debate on dual citizenship


Concluding Remarks: Radical Right Parties as ignition for identity conflicts?

This study has aimed at analysing and measuring the impact of radical right parties on spatial

and ideological shifts in CEE party systems. It has shown that in order to understand the role

of radical right parties in this regard, there is a crucial need for a comparative approach on

both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the mechanisms of party competition between

radical right and mainstream parties

The findings of the quantitative analysis illustrate a correlation between the presence of

radical right parties in parliament or their viable perspective of such electoral success, and

spatial shifts of mainstream party positions regarding identity politics. The growing

participation of radical right parties in issue competition came with a general shift to the

TAN-end of identity politics among their primary mainstream competitors, visible in Poland,

Hungary and Slovakia. Such a decisive shift of existing parties did not take place in Bulgaria,

but instead a new party emerged there to occupy the ideological space between the center and

the radical right actor (GERB), resulting in a similar rightward movement of the party system

as a whole.

Furthermore, the establishment of radical right parties seems to have an effect on party system

convergence and polarization along the GAL/TAN axis. First, the lack or disappearance of a

28

meaningful radical right party on the political scene tends to result in a convergence of

mainstream parties in regard to identity politics. This effect is visible in Bulgaria until 2006,

in Romania in 2010, as well as in Hungary and Slovakia between 2002 and 2006. Second,

next to the finding on convergence, some indications can be additionally observed in regard to

polarization on the GAL/TAN axis after a resulted or expected success of a radical right party.

Growing polarisation vis-à-vis a radical right party is clearly visible in Hungary in 2002 and

in Poland in 2006, whereas in Romania a joint strategy of cordon sanitaire disarms this

dimension.

The CAQDA analysis of qualitative data supports the results of the quantitative analysis. In

Poland, a clear adoption of radical right narratives is observable for the conservative PiS and,

despite a slight trend of convergence after the lost elections, between 2007 and 2009, effect of

LPR parliamentary success for the rightward ideological turn of PiS seems to be long-lasting.

In Slovakia, the analysis also confirms a clear co-optation strategy of SMER and a takeover of

the minority issue from the scandal-weakened SNS. Here, partly due to the trade-off between

their social-democratic self-ascription and their rhetoric, the narrative takeover is rather

punctual and opportunistic, coinciding with thematically related debates or elections. In

Hungary on the other hand, due to the already strong TAN-profile of Fidesz and lack of post-

2010 data, the quantitative analysis depicts only a narrow rightwards shift. Nonetheless, the

CAQDA analysis supports empirical observations of a much stronger accommodative strategy

of Fidesz in regard to Jobbik narratives, mostly concerning their ultranationalist narratives in

the field of nemzetpolitika.

The combined findings of the proposed mixed-method analysis thus suggest that radical right

parties seem to be able to place their issues like ultranationalism, (religious) traditionalism,

restriction of minority rights or law and order on the political agenda and force other parties to

react in order to compete over the electorate on the right fringe. Their impact is most visible

here, as they seem to „ignite‟ conflicts on identity politics, otherwise rather diffused when a

party system is lacking a radical right party, and „force‟ mainstream competitors to react to

these issues. As it turns out, these reactions mostly took the form of accommodative framing

strategies and thus resulted in spatial and ideological shifts towards the TAN-end of the

conflict.

The mixed-method approach applied in the study thus seems to grant us with preliminary

confirmations of radical right parties‟ significant impact on CEE party systems and political

29

competition. This fact encourages further research on the topic including a broader range of

countries and other relevant issues resulting in a more detailed and consistent comparative

database in regard to the described phenomenon.

30

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