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Transcript of Measuring differences in public service motivation between the public and private sector Paul A....
Measuring differences in public service
motivation between the public and private sector
Paul A. Grout
17th November 2006
Centre for Market and Public Organisation
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Two connected pieces of ongoing research on donated labour/public
service motivation(both joint work)
• Quick summary of theoretical model of not-for-profit in a bureaucratic environment
• Evidence on donated labour from British Household Panel Survey
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Not-for-profit in a bureaucratic environment
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Donated labour:• Private sector difficult to supply donated
labour because of residual claimant expropriates the effect of donated labour
• Not-for-profit is able to provide an environment that favours donated labour because of the non-distribution constraint.
• Public sector? – bureaucratic environment
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• Three organisation ‘stories’
Uni. Dept.
NGO
Marketised example
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Parties• Worker
- paid w - chooses e: donated labour (non-contractible)- cares about output
• Outside agent
- makes ‘contribution’ of q to organisation
• Third party• ‘distant’ outsider
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Output and pay-offs
• Output/quality:v(e,(1-t)q,w)
• Worker welfare: v(e,(1-t)q) – c(e) + w
c(e) - convex c’(0) = 0
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• Outside agent
v(e,(1-t)y,w) – k(q) k(q) - convex k’(0) = 0
• [Third party
v(e,(1-t)y,w) – kT(q)]
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Time line
• Worker offered wage
• Worker makes e
• Outside agent offers of q
• Managers accepts or rejects
• If reject wait for non-stochastic arrival of qm
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Single outside agent
• Suppose single outside agent -
then their contribution is qs:
)](),)1(,(max[arg qkwqtevq s
outcome with single outside party S
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Introduce third party
0
)()()( eqr
dteeeqeq mtrtmT
•Introduce third party -
their contribution ‘would be’ qm:
‘outcome‘ with third party T
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Elasticity condition
)(
)(
)(
)(
eq
e
de
edq
eq
e
de
edqs
s
m
m
for all e
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Proposition
If the elasticity condition holds, then there is a unique θ, θ*, such that
• (i)
• (ii)
*),,(*),,( sssTTT weuweu
sT ee
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BHPS evidence
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• Years 1991-2001, 11 waves• Caring sectors defined as working in Education,
Health or Social Services.• 42,831 observations
• Logit analysis of whether doing any unpaid overtime• Controlling for gender, age, marital status, children,
education, wage, normal working hours, part-time, occupation, union or staff association at workplace, tenure, firm size, region & time indicators
• Career concern: we further control for whether the worker has opportunities for promotion.
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pricare pubcare nfpcare noncare
Total
Number of observations 1301 6682 919 32,929
41,831
% 3.11 15.97 2.20 78.72 100
% overtime 42.12 46.42 48.75 49.73 48.94
% paid overtime 24.29 13.42 11.10 31.22 27.17
% unpaid overtime 18.68 33.85 38.63 19.48 22.17
% paid overtime, o>0 55.66 27.08 20.76 60.83 54.70
% unpaid overtime, o>0 42.34 71.08 77.23 37.23 43.37
% both, o>0 2.01 1.84 2.01 1.94 1.92
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Pooled Logit Fixed Effects Logit
Coeff Std err Coeff Std err
N=11833 41828 N=2403 13571
Noncare .207 0.117 0.045 0.179
Pricare - - - -
Pubcare .853 0.123 0.518 0.187
Nfpcare .989 0.159 0.644 0.238
Wage 0.120 0.006 0.088 0.010
Prom opp 0.204 0.039 0.222 0.055
Tenure -0.023 0.004 -0.009 0.007
Union -0.458 0.049 -0.313 0.078
Parttime -1.367 0.100 -1.711 0.141
Kids -0.382 0.051 -0.475 0.087
School -0.415 0.053
No qual -0.904 0.106
Male -0.139 0.052
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Pooled Tobit “FE” Tobit (add means)
Coeff Std err Coeff Std err
Noncare 0.494 0.664 0.358 0.729
Pricare - - - -
Pubcare 4.809 0.704 1.604 0.765
Nfpcare 4.612 0.911 1.663 0.979
Wage 0.700 0.028 0.376 0.039
Prom opp 1.154 0.216 0.716 0.205
Tenure -0.138 0.024 -0.024 0.025
Union -2.545 0.267 -0.803 0.324
Parttime -6.108 0.547 -6.320 0.662
Kids -1.912 0.276 -1.859 0.352
School -2.189 0.297 -1.867 0.305
No qual -4.523 0.565 -4.114 0.572
Male -0.338 0.288 -0.668 0.297
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Preliminary Conclusions
• Empirical evidence supports basic the theoretical literature that donated labour is sensitive to organisational/ownership.
• Suggests not-for-profit may have a role to play in public service delivery
• However, bureaucratic structure may make donated labour ‘delicate’ in this environment.