Concepts, Intuition and ExpertiseImplications for Philosophy from Cognitive Science

2015 Philosophy Honours Presentation by Michael McKenzie

Introduction• Intuition and Concepts• The Restrictionist Challenge• The Expertise Defence• The Independent Theory View:

To ensure the reliability of intuitions philosophers require an independent theory of intuitions and concepts.

Intuitions and Concepts• Overly burdensome definition will make it

harder to know when a particular intuition counts.

• Minimal definition: unconscious, automatic cognitive state not arrived at by explicitly inferential means.

• Goldman: “It’s part of the nature of concepts… that possessing a concept tends to give rise to beliefs and intuitions that accord with the contents of the concept” (2007, p.15).

The Restrictionist Challenge

Survey responses to philosophical thought experiments indicate intuitions may be unreliable as they:• Vary according to demographic

factors such as gender, cultural background.

• Prone to distortions such as ordering effects, unpleasant noises and tastes.

The Problem of Unmitigated Error

• Other sources of evidence such as memory & perception are fallible without being completely unreliable.

• Experts especially are aware of the conditions in which the evidence is likely to be unreliable.

• Without a theory of intuition, philosophers lack such mitigation.

Expertise Defence• Sosa: Philosopher’s intuitions are

based on “sheer understanding of their contents” (2007, p.102).

• Intuitions of experts in other fields are presumed to be more reliable than the folk.

• Philosophers have analogous expertise which increases the reliability of their intuitions.

Three Problems for Philosophical Expertise

1. Theory contamination results in epistemic circularity.

2. First Person introspection unable to reliably control for theory contamination.

3. Introspection unable to reliably detect unconscious processes that govern intuition and concepts.

The Independent Theory View

• Philosophers require an independent theory of intuitions and concepts to support the use of intuitions as evidence. in philosophy.

• It must have:1. Intuition independent evidence for

cognitive mechanisms of intuition2. Be able to distinguish genuine intuition

from errors

What is at stake?• Bealer: The autonomy of philosophy• The method of cases relies on

assumptions about our ability to introspectively examine concepts.

• Experimental philosophy also requires an independent theory to distinguish errors from genuine conceptual intuitions.

The Need for Cognitive Science

• Laurence & Margolis: “that in spite of its impressive motivations, the Classical Theory simply can’t be made to work” (Laurence & Margolis 1999, p.26).

• Machery: ‘Concept’ should be eliminated• Kornblith: “The target of philosophical

analysis is not anyone’s concept at all, instead, it is the category which the concept is a concept of” (2007 p.35).

References• Images designed by Freepik.com

• Bealer, George (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield. 201-240.

• Kornblith, H. (2007). Naturalism and intuitions. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74(1), 27-49.

• Knobe, J. (forthcoming). Experimental Philosophy is Cognitive Science. To appear in Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (Eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy

• Ludwig, K. (2007). The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches. Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 31(1), 128-159. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00160.x

• Laurence, S., & Margolis, E. (1999). Concepts and Cognitive Science, In E. Margolis & S. Laurence (Eds.) Concepts: Core Readings (pp. 3-81). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

• Sosa, E. (2007). Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition. Philosophical Studies, 132(1), 99-107. doi: 10.1007/s11098-006-9050-3