CHAna - XXX

mB PRINCIgU OF VBRIFICA1'ION! A CRITERION OF MEANXNO

CHAP_ - III

mE PRINCIPLB OF VERIFICATION! A CRI2ERIOB OF MiASm

We ",lU divide tb1s ohapter into two parts. In

the £irst part we eheU cU.SCUSB the ver1cUcaUon

prlno1p1e of me&r11ng in the context of the d1s~1ncUon

between analytic and synthetic propos1t1ons resulting

10 the eUmlnatioo of • me tapbys1cs • and in the second

part we shall expound anei examine the emoU ve theory

of values.

In the preoee4lll8 ohapter we bave cU,sC\lsned that the sole function of ph11osophy accor4ing to logical positivlsts. is the 'analysJ.s' of language. The maift

purpose 01 J.ntroduclrag 'analysis'. as l~ 1s claimed by 1081081 posltivists, as a method 10 to clarity tbe

concepts of language and to prevent philosopher tram 'trespassing' into tbe world of 'metaphYsics'. Accor4-ingly they conceive that one of the malD t'uncUODS of

their pbj,losopbical actJ.v1ty 1s 'to 4raw a 1o~cal cU.s-~lnctioD between what is on tbe one hand ver1~iable an<1 'so1entiUe' and. bence mean1ngfu1. and what OD

l#V' the other bancl is not verlUable and /. ec1enUt'1c' anci hence 1l0~ 'meaD1ngfUl t • Here their term 'solent1£lc'

1s belns assumed that verification must always at least terminate in 'empirical observation'. 01" sense-experience.

Ayer c:lelines, veriUeaUon pr1no1p1e 8a ftilte

principle of verification 1s supposed to iUrDich a criterion by Wb1cb it can be determined whether or not. a sentenoe 1s 11 toraUy meanlDgfUl. A s1mple

way to £ormulate 1t would be to say that a sentenoe had 11teral meaning it and oDly if the propositions lt e~l"esee4 was e1ther analytio 01" emp1r1cal1y vel"l-flable1t •

1 Thus "t is tbe cri to rio n through whicb meaning-ful statements ere separated ~ meaningless asser-tlons. AyeI' tQrther states ~o say that 8 sentenoe 1s 1"sctually slsn1~loant to any given persoD, if. and only 1f. he knows how to verify the proposl tiOD wblcb 1 t purports to express - that is, 'f he knows that observations would lead blm, under certain coDdi tiones, ta accept the propos, Uon as bol.ng true, or re~eot 't 8S beJ.ns false". 2 In the Urst Instance 1 t can be seen as an att(lJJlpt to ellm1nate fmetephysJ.cs' ~l"Om 'the sphere

of pbllosopby. It can be deduced. tTom ~he above state-

A.J. Aye!:'.!. t;'tUBRets6rBth end AAs.1o (Hormonda-wortb. 1~'5, nCFe ., p.1. Ibid., p.48.

ment 01 Ayer.

RVcr1~1caUoJl. for the loglca1 1'081 U-Vlsts, consists of experiencing certa~ sensations ••• Thus all that ceD be slg-Dlfloe.ntly or Uleanlna~uUl' talked about ere e1 ther mathematical propos! Uons or propo-s1 Ucms about the 'objects o~ our sensa-tions'. These 'ob3gcta of sensations' are called. eense-4aton.~

It bas been clearl)f bl"OUBbt out by Suman Gupta In

the fol1owins wordsl

6L1ke their positivist pl~eces6or. Auguste Comte, they hold tbat 1 t 1s lmpoDsible to 60 beyond sub~ect1ve sensations. Consequeft'tl.y. all science must be lnterpl·etec1 1ft tel"mS o~ eonee laUoD and precu.cUon og sensot1ons or • sense-oontents' u. 0

69

Those statements wbleh cannot meet tbie stand are regarded as meaningless and consequently • metaphy-

slcal'. But a special exception bas been made in

favour of sucb analytical formulae as those of 10g1c end mathematics. For Ayer the term 'metapbySlos.

8M Me •

70

covers the transcendontal metapb¥sios whicb 1s beyond our sensory experience. But this attempt 1s not at al1 new til the b1story o~ philosophy. In 18th century Kume in his maula CpngerP1l:g tl!.!mAg Under,sHruUna conslgne all 'metaphysics' to the ~lamee aa worthless. Evon Kant at least 1n one phase o~ his critical work (Crl't~que o~ Pure Reason), attempts to show tbat 'meta-physics' of certain sort was impossible and that know-ledge aUlst have senaory content. Accor4ing to Rent tho human UDderetanding can know only what CaD be expe-

rienced, but reeeOD strives to 80 boyonCl the confines o~ tbe un4erstandJ.na, anel attempts to conceive the eupersenslb10, tbat ~or wblcb we have no ob~eo't 1n

percepUon, that wbleb 1s merely thought. This Is 19ha t happens. S8.)'s Kant, in tbe metap~8iC8 o~ the

traD$cendent. To quote Kant's remarks on nature of transoen4ental metaphysics. UNetaphysics is a completely 1so1ate4 speouletive sOience o~ reason. wbicb soars fer above the teacblDg8 01 experience. and ift ~Cb reason io indeed meant to be Its Ol1l1 pupil".' Thus. Kant argues tha~ we oan 110t have knowledge o~ the supGr sensible. 6

• s. Immanuel Kant. : Cit1~UO of lure Reasgn (Pre-

tace to DGCcnd ;al on !rahS. (lOndon. 1973), p.21.

Kant uses the woreS 'super-sens1.b1e t to d.enote • thlnsa in themse1ves t • For him, we can not ... /-

11

Because our knowledge 10 coDf1nad to tbe world of pbe-

J'lomel'la only, wbile the naumenal anti ties transcend our sphere o£ knowledge. Here, for Kant. experience .implies

sensory-experlence. This 1s whet Kan't tries to s~ about the tmposslb1U ty of certain sort of metaphysics.

In the early 20th century Auguste Comte attempts to show that tmetaphy.olca· belongs to an lntellectual1y darker pertod 1n man'S history than soience, wbicb s~ersede4 1t 1.e. to say Comete olaims tG re~ect 'metaphysics' aa a s tase on the l"Oa4 to poel t1 vs sOience whlCh the world has now outgrown. Comte envi-sages 'poeltJ.ve knowledse' 1s the culmination of the evolution or human thought, which had passed ;fran

atheologlcal stage" to the • metep~slcal' and the» to ~e 'poel Uve stase'. At the ~lrs' stage he Qacumes

reality ts made dependent on <uvine beings, at the second. these religiOUS idoas are replaCed by Q specula-

tive dootrine concernlng the .essenoet and 'causes' of phenomena and a~ 'the thlrd stage flthe human mind° recog-nises the imposslUllty o~ acqulr1ng absolute knowledge,

... /- -have un1versal and neoessary or e prlor£ knowledge or anyt~ng no~erce~vab1&. Hence, aoccrdlns to Kant. we csDllOt have a know1Gdae o~ a me~pb;VsJ.c the" ~ranscends experience (sense-experlenco) metap~slc o~ "hings 111 themselves' 1.e. o~ a non-phenomenal world (neumona) - rree win, i.mmortaU'tl'. and God.

72"

gives up the idea of investigating the or16iD and pur-

pose of the Wllverso. o~ knowledge of inner causes of phenomena. For blm. tbe sole ob3ect of 'so1ence' is to cUscover • na'ural laws' or the oonstant relations ex1st-1ns between 'tacts' end tbis can be done only by obser-vat10n and experience. Knowledge thus acquired, olaims Comte. 1s pos1 Uve knowledge al24 only sucb kftowledge

can be sucoeos1\lUy applied, in the various fields of bumane praotice. as is vorl~le4 by positive science.? In this way, for Comte. 'metaphysics' deals witb tho 'essenoes and causes' of tbift8s. ~e 10810al posit1-v1s ts conception of natural solences ub10b are concerned ld tb faote is the one vb10h is derived from the pbiloeo-phles of David Huma and Comte. Both Hums and ComtG

regard aature1 scienoes as concerned w1 th orderl118 of ccmsaUons. It is tbese sensations whicb bave been differently desianeted by these pbilosophers. Humo's ldealistic empiriCism ond his re.1eotlon of 'metaphysica-is the oharacteristic of the logical positivists. In 1'aot the c1oou-in.e o£ 1.081081 positivists oontalnec1 ell

the • metopbyslcal' elements.

13

AyeI' proclaims that the reason to oppose tmeta-phye.lcs· 1s that metaphysicians always try to explain reality as a whole and attempt to desoribe super-

sensible world which transcends the world of sense-experience. In thls sense, holds Ayer. 'metaphYsics' is not speculative but also nonsensical. To quote Ayert s remarks on • metaphysics t a

"The positivist flavour of their thought comes out most strong1y 1D their host1-11 ty to metaphysics. Metapbysl0.8. wblch they construed as covering such allegedly philosophical enterprises as the attempt to describe Reality as a whole, or to ~1DCi the purpose of universe, or to reach beyond the everyday world to some sUpra-sensible apir! tual order, was condemned by them not as be1ns unduly specu1etJ.ve. or even as being ~e1se. but as belng literally non-scn.slcal".8

Zn this way loglcal pOSitivists 4e~lne 'metaphysics' as asserting the existonoe o~ areal! ty wblob trans-cends senee-exper1enoe. To quo~e Swnan Gupta. ItLogical positiVists are metaphysiCians because they see nature as en arbltrery collection o~ sense-data, lnc1epenclent o~ and isolated ~rom one another without

a. A.J. Ayer. PThe Vienna C~rcleP in bis (ed.) book Ahe ~V01\!t.t.on J.a@11osgphJ (Lon4on. 196'>. p..

74

universal and basic relat1onsh1pso.9 Th1s aspect

we will 41ecus8 in detail when we deal wi tb Ayer' e theory o~ perception. .Basins on the above mentioned

I aesertions of 10g1cal poslt1v.lsts, we include them 10 tbe category 01 'metaphysicians t • Then the ques-

tion arises, how can they eUmlnate metaphysics? In order to answer thie question there is overy need to

d1sttneulsh between tbe aotual meanlng of tbe term

'metaphysics' and the meaning slven to it by logical positivists.

Trac11 ttonally 1 t haa been regarded that meta-physics deals with the essential and absolute nature of reality ao a Wholo or o~ the nature of being as Gucb .l.e. the searcb ~or 1"trst princJ.ples. Tbe tem

'metapbys1cs' is derived £rom tbe Oreek, 'ta meta ta phys1ka'. Which describes the first philosophy as a set of principles wbleh come ta~tert or 'beyond' phy-

sics. Tbis originally meaot 'what comes a~ter pbys1cs' and used orig1ne11y .for the works 01' Aristotle that .followed bis pbysics in tbe collect.loD made by Anclro-

Dicus. Aristotle de~1nes metopbVs1cs "as a science

9. Suman Gupta, ftBer~rand RUBsel and A.J. Ayera A D1aleotlo~~ater1a118t Approaeh~ in V1rendrs K. Roy, Ramesh Sarikwal (ed.) Marxian Socio1oV.

(De1bi, 1981). p.308.

whlcb 1nvestS.ga*es beiDa QS be1ns and the attributes whlcb belong to 1 t in v.lrtue of 1 ts own nature". 10

7S

Fo~ Aristotle, tbe fundamental questions of metaphysics

are concerned w1tb the concepts of be.t.ng and unity

what is o~~en referred to Aristotle's metaphysics 1s bis account of the universe. According to AriStotle that there are a large but ftnl te number of tbings

that for the most part belong to c1eUBl te species

1.e. of plant aDd al'lima1 kJ.ngdom. Aristotle holels that there is aD ultimate prime mover .bich is the

source of all observed motions Bnd change bu" 18 1t-sel~ completely immaterlal and tberefore completely motionless end ohangeless. EVentually, however, the tenD metapb,ysJ.os became popular in blstOry of philoso-

pby as slsn.t.1y1ns that branch of pb11osopblcal enquiry

which soes beyond pbyslcal events or substances and is hence metep~s1cal.

But. the real contrast between 'metaphysics' and

scJ.enU1'ic theories J.s the tact that metaphysics

rogards tb1ngs end phenomena as final and immutable. independent of one another and denieo that intema1

••

10.

76

contraci1ct1ons as the source of development of nature and

socJ.et). Metapbysics is one-sided mode o~ tblnkias that makes absolute and any particular ~eature ot the process obse~ed 1n the world. 11 'To exe~l1ty 1t. QTbis is eo because. tor them, ••• materiel ob3eots C8D1l0t be • given in sense-experience'. But the trutb 1s that 1 t ls the

material oC)~ects \'/blob ere given in senoe-experlence

end, on the contrary. 1t 1s tho 'red patches or colour',

or thardnesses' or 'smells' 10 abstraction wbJ.cb caQ not be gLven in sense-experlence". 12 In thle usy metaphysics 1s a distortion of ob~ect1ve materiel wor14. For example

metaphysicians separate mind trom body end assert m1nCl

bas independent existence apart trom body (Cartec18Jl

c1uaUem). But they tall to reoognise tbat mind 18 a

blgheat torm ot metter. Tbey ar8Ue ~or the existence of soul, g04, transmiSr8 tloD of soul, lmmortaU ty ot

SO\l.1 etc. Xt 18 tb1s kind of 'metaphysics. (transcen-dental part of It) logical posit1v18~ claim to d1ocard.

But in a comprehensJ. ve view ot metapbys1cs, the transoen-dental aspect as weU as entJ.-cUalect1cal view o~ rea 11 'ty

are £Doluded.

12.

M. Co~orth, etelect1c1~M,ter.lar.smJ A& lata:oduC-torY CourDe ,Ca cut£B. 76. P.S • Suman Gupta. "Bertrend Russell end A.J. Ayer, A Dialect1co-Materia11st APproacbP

1'NVJ.rendra K • Roy. Ramesh SarJ.kwal (ed.) ,,,JIlL en SoClg1og f (Del.b.l, 1981). p.308.

71

Hume tries to eUmlnate transcendental metaphysics througb Ms epletemolosy. Accordl.ftg to HWl\e any rea-sOnins whicb is beyond sense impressions on the one hand. Gftd which can not be defined in terms o~ ideas o~ reason on the other is metapbyslcal. Rougb1y speak-iDS. Hume d1 Vides statements into two kinds those of mathematics and 10610 which are deducecl trom the

fixed prem1ses and statements o~ tact based 01'1 empJ.-r1cal in"eetigation. In bis .BftquiJ'7 con.oeming Human Un4el'stancS1ng, Rume writes 8S follows,

"It \'Ie take in our hand any volume, of div1D1 ty or school metaphysics, .for Instance, let us ask, noes 1 t con.tain a~ abstract reasoDing ooncer.n1ng Quanti ty or number? No. Does I. t contain any experimental reaso:n1q conoerning matter 01 tact and existence? No. Commit 1 t then to .flames a £or it can oontain notbing but sophistry and illusion"."

l'hie has been discussed in the introductory obaptel' when we cu.scussed Hwne's epistemology_ If we substi-tute ~or the pbrase -sophistry and 111&l5ionrt the word 'meaningless t we ehall have tbe logical posl tivls t doctrine. ~us. "Tbe 1ogica1 positivists turD Hume's

epistemological doctrine regarding the classification

13.

76

of '~elatloft of .lc1eas' and 'matters of fact' into a seman-

t10 one. Tbey olassi~ aU meaningfUl statements into ana-

lytle .. , Duma's category of 'relation of ideas' and. synthet10

--Hume's oate80~Y of 'matters 01 factt 0.14

The fundamental question 1.e. the cleavage between a~tlc and synthetic. accor41n,g to Ayer. the former class (relations of ideas) comprises ~he 'analytical' propositions 15 of logic and mathematics, \'Ih1ch are a priori (independent of sense-exper.lenoe) 1n thdr

nature. The letter class (matters of taot) comprisos the empirical propositions of everyday science, are a postorlorl (c1erived from senGe-experlence). Accor4-hgly AyeI' considers tbat the propos1tions 01 1031c end mathema'tlcs are • tautologies' • Because "'tibet they 8re •• 14. Suman GuptCl. t1L1Dgu.lst1o Ph1los~hy. Ito Soclal

Impl1oat1oDs". ~urna~ ;; SchooA ~fxkansuases. Mon.soon 1977" Inlor1""8, p. ~~.

15. Ayer distinguishes 'statements' from 'propositions'. In the introduction of bis book MnRUast TI'U~ B4 ~.J;. he wd tea that what 1s expres~i' an 'In -~e sentence t Is called a statement. 1ft other words a statement 1s regtU"Cte4 as what is expressed by a sentence whether 1 t is meaningAl1 or not. %n 'this sense og AyeI' 'tbat tmetaphysical' utterances come under the category of statements. The phrase 'la41catlve', Ayer useo to rGfer to particulSr aspect. For .instance 'the sentence 'God is omnJ.-present' ls Lndlcating a particular quality of God. Whereas a 'propositiOD' 1s that which expresses a 'meaningfUl statement' i.e. to Bay 1. t 1s s\lbjeeted to the test of 'verJ.~1cat1on'. This is the reason w~ be claims to \We ana1yUc propos.1 t.lons and tsynthetlc p1"Opos1 tlons' • AU metepbys1ca1 utte-rances, for Ayer arG, 'metapbysical statements'.

19

ln4~endent o~ experience 1n the sense that they do not owe their valid1ty to emplr1cal verification. We may come to discover them through an lnduotive process, but once we have apprehended them wo see that they are necessarily true, that they hold good for every con-cel~able 1nstance. And this servos to distinguish them from empirical generalisations".16 From this, it follows that the propositions of log1c and mathematics are not sub~ecte4 to 'emp1rioal verification', 1f once we come to know the nature ot tbese propositions through the process of inductive reasoning \ben we caD say that thoy are universal and neoessary. Tbat 1s to say, they are invariable. Here Ayer uses the term 'inductive' in the sense that 1n the tlnduoUve' reasoning we pro-oeed ~rom particulars to generalisations. For instance, 2 + 3 .. , 1& particular Lnstance from wMch we can

generaUse thet 1n al.l the instances 2 + , co 5. Accord-ing to AyeI' this can not be refUted by s8nse-experi.enoe. That is why, Ayer olaims to say they are a priori in their nature. In tbJ.s way, ~or AyeI'. the proposi tiona of loglc sn4 mathematics d1~ter ~om 'emplr!cal proposi-tions'. Henoe, ~or Ayer there are two aDd on1y two kinds

of meanlns1\Jl statements, factual proposi tiona about the

80

world and. tautologies o~ 10g1c end mathematios. Accor4-1ngly, 10g1cal pos1tivists, hold that 'metaphysical' statements belong to neither of the two stated classes

they are neither factual nor tautological, \berefore, tbey aro meaningless. '

Kent 17 in 18th century mad.e a sharp cUstinction between • analytlc and synthetic'. 'l'h1s distinction 1s necessary. for Kent. beoause know1edaG always appears 1n the tor.m of synthetic a prior1 jUdgements,18 1n Wb1cb something is affirmed or denied. According to Kant every 3uc1sement does not fUlfil this criterion. In en 'ana-lytlc' ~ud3emeD~ tbe pred.ioate merely expresses wbat

1s already contalnecl in the subject. For instanoe, 'Body is an exten4ed thing' ls an 'analyt.1c .1ucigement'.

Because, holds Kant, the quality of extentlon is

1.alpllec1 1n the concept of Body. Likewise in the exam-ple 'a trlans1e contains three angles' expresses that

three angles are 1mpUed 1n the concept of triangle. In the synthetio ~ud8ement the predicate adds something to the 8ub3eot. extend our knowledge ftor merely express ita e.s. "AU bodies beve speci.tJ.c Brav~tytJ. Kant main-talns. however. synthetic judgements cannot be regarded

11.

18.

Immanue1 Kant, prit.t£e o£ Pure Reason (trans.) (London. 191'J_ PP. ,;; Accor41nS ~o Kant a 'Jud6ement 1s tbe mediate know1edge o~ an objeot' (A Cr1tique o~ Pure-Reason) _ p.10,.

81

as meaningful (senuine knowledge) unless they are orga-

nised by the catesoriee Gnd ~orms o~ .t.ntui Uon. Accord-ing to Kent that mind possesses the a priori torms (Catesor1es and space and time) Which organise the mani-

fo14 ot data turnished to it by the sensee. Kant empha-sizes Dconcepts wlthout percepts are empS,. perc~t8 wi thout concepts are bl1nc.t". 19 This shows for Kant. thoughts without the admixture of sensory experience, experience (sense-experienco) without the a priori forms

do not possess knowledge at all. Thus. Kant holdS, know-ledge consiSts 1n synthetic 3udgements a priori. Conse-

quently all the statements of mathemat1cs, for Kant, come under this category, e.g. 7 + , c 12. But it is

'ana1ytlc'for 1081c91 positivists.

~1'y1ns to vin41cate how he (AyeI') d.tffers trom

that of Kent's, AyeI' ma1ntaJ.ne that Kant's account of

the d1stinction between analytic and synthetic propo-sitiOns, is not clear because he could not sive ons straisbt .forward crt terion ~or tb1s separation. Ayer

claims that, Kant employs a psycho1ogical criterion ~or holding that the proposition 7 • 5 a 12 is synthetic a priori. whereas bis ground for hol4lng that the propo-sition 'all bodies are ex~endedt rests upon tbe prinCiple

82

of contrad1c~IOD alone. In this way, Kant. S8)'S Ayer. uses a psyoholoBical oriterlon in the cases of 'syn-tbetic' propos! tiona and • log1cal' crl tarton 1ft the case 01 'SJ1alyt1c' proposlt1ons and their equivalence tor sranted.20 Basins upon the above crl~erlon of Kant. holds Ayer, 8 proposJ.Uon wblch 1s 'S1DtheUo' accor41na to 'psychological' criterion may very weU be analytlo according to logical crltorton. Ayer, however. reoogp1ses the epistemolosloal importance of Kant's soparation between analytic and synthetiC 3udsements. Here It 1s very important to note that Ayer identifies, Kantlan use of • 3 udgement8, with his use of 'propos! tlons' •

In an attempt to distinguish 'analytic' proposi-tions from synthetiC propositions, Ayor maintains Da

propositlon 1s analytic wben 1~s validity depends

solely on the defInitions of the symbols it contains aJ.lcS synthetic when 1 te valid! ty 1& c1etermined by the

tacts of experiencen • 21 Th1s detlD1tlon o~ Ayer makes all the propos1 tiona 01' maOhematlce and 10g1c • analyUc· an4 the proposJ.tlons of natural sciences or empirical

20. A.J. AyeI'. ;;DSU9getnTrutb. anc& Logic (Hormom5s-worth. 1975~ 2nd e • 0 p~54.

Ib.ld •• p.10,.

8.3

sciences syrltbet1c. For instance, says Ayer, "There are ants wblch have establisbod a system o~ elaveryft is a synthetic proposition is not dete~iDed by the def1n1-tion of tbe symbols which constitute it but by the

actual observation of the bebav1ow' of ants. For 10810&1 positivists, all the meanlnafUl statements eXhaust in between theso two catesorles. Tbe very reaSOll to demarcate., os is held by 10g1cal positivists,

t analytic t from • synthetic' propos! tiona is to Isolate metapbysical assertions ~rom meaningfUl statements. To 3udge the meaoingfulnaos of a statement they intro-duced • the principle of verification' as a criterion.

Accor41ag to tbls criterion metapbysical asser-tions are consIdered as meanlaaless slnce they cannot be verl~1e4 emp1r.t.oally. Ayer holds that analytiC state-ments 40 no~ tall under the ~ur16d1ct1on 01 the prin-ciple, since tbey are verbal. Then tbe principle 1s applicablo to only those statements whioh are empiri-cally Verifiable. In putUns f'onrard the ver1.f1caUoD.

prlnciple 8S a cr1terion o~ meanics, Ayer waDts to cUsUnsu1sb bis use of the ~ord 'meaning' b'om other

uses. ~he word 'meaning' says Ayer. ~s used in 41~fe­rent ways. In some cases a statement is sal4 to be

• mean'ng~l' even i.f 1 t does not be10ng to the a1 ther

84

of the two categories i.e. 'analytic· or 'synthetic' wblcb. Ayer does not want to deny. Ayer maintains, however, there is onG pl'Oper use of the word tmean1ng' in which

it would not be oorrect to soy that a statement 1s meaoing-

1\11 unless it satis~les the verif1oatlon theory. Pre-

c1sell' tbJ.e 1s the reason, claims Ayer, wby he uses the

expression 'Uteral meaD1ng' to cllstingu1sh J.t £rom

the other uses. To quote Ayer's remarks on the use of biB expression • me8Jl1ns'. til do not overlook tbe !"act that tbe worci 'sean1ns' D is commonly used 1n a varlety ot senses, and I 40 not wish to deny that in Some of

these aensea e statement may pr~perly be sa14 to be meanlngrul even though it is neitber analytio nor empi-

rical.11 verifiable.- I should, however. claim that there

wss at least one proper use of the word 'meanins' in

whicb it would be incorrect to say tbet 8 statement was meaningfUl unless it satisfied the prinoiple of verifi-cation. and I have, perhaps tendentiously, used the ex-

pression t 11 ~era1 meanlng' to 4istltngulsh this use from the otbers, wb1le applylrlg the expression 'i'ectual mea-n1.ng' to the ease o~ statements wbleb sat1e1'y my erJ.-

teriOD without belng enslytl00 •22 Tb1s shows that Ayer

uses the oxpreesion • factua1 mean1ns t to the statements which are empirically verl.f1able. Aceor41nsly 1f we say en _

that El statement is 1.1 terally meaningful 1s to &lay

the tit oen properly be said to be e1 tber true or

false. According to Ayar's usage a statement 1s 11 teral1y 'meaningful' meane 1 t 1s a .proposl tlon'.

For Ayer, the principle of verlf1catlon CaDnOt be

regarded as empirical or a tautalogy but a defini-tion, e detln1t1on o~ cel~erlon 01 meaning.

85

Reducing the ~unctlon of philosophy to mere

analysis o~ logic of language. log1cal positiv1sts

attempt to show that metaphysical assertions are not false but non-senslcal. Ayar holds "Our charge

9gainst motepbyldean 1s not that he attempts to emplo)' the un4erstanci1ng 1n a field where 1 t cannot profitably venture, but that be produces sentenoes Wb1cb fail to conform to the conel! tiona under whieb

alone a sentenoe can be literally sisniflcGDto• 23

Thus the metapbysical statements are criticised, not

because they state something dubious or false, but on the basis that they comprise of words wblob in any cr1Ucal scrut1.oy reveals to be senseless. The criti-oism of 'metapbysics', thorefore, is based on the cri-teri.on of meaning because for 10810a1 pos1tivists veri-fication is 1dent1~ied with me~ng.

86

Ayer makes a sharp distinction between 'strong' and 'weak t sense of the term verlf1abi11ty_ Because &f the principle of verification 1s appUecS in this

.form J.'t will turn not on1y tbe 'metaphysical' state-ment as non-senaiesl. but 1 twill elso ~nder. 1) UDl-

versal st.atements; 2) statements about the pasts

') statements about other minds equally meaningless. It 1s to overcome th1s d1fflculty Ayar d.raws the dis-tinction between 'strona and the weak' of the verifia-bility. AyeI' mainta1ns 8A proposition 16 sai4 to be

verifiable, 1n the strong sense of the term, 1f and 001y if, Its truth could be conclusively established in experience. But it 1s verifiable, 1ft the weak sense, If It is possible for experience to render it probableO • 24

Hero what AyeI' means by 'conclusive' verifiability 1e that a p~posl tion sbou1d not be given B benefit of doubt under any circumstances once it is verified by

sense-experience. In fact Scbl1ck demands for the con-clusive verifiability. 11 a proposition io not conclu-sively verlf16ble. say a scblick, then it is not a propo-s1tion at 811.25 In tbat caGe all goneral propOSitions of 1611 and the propo61 tJ.OnB about the paat become non-

sens~ca1 s~nce they cannot be verified conc1uGlve1y.

Ibid., P.SO.

J .K. Welnbers. An IDtaminat!on 01 Lost-calc I!gSA.-~lvlem (London, 1936). P.' 5. I

For instance the genera1 propositions of law suoh as 'arsonic 1s poisonous'. 'all men are mortal' cannot be verified ooncluslvely since their trutb CaD not be esta-blished wi tb certe.lnty by any fin! te number of observa-tions. To me .... ·t this difficulty, Alyer claims to have ac1cptGd 'verifiability' 1n ita 'weak' sense. Accor4ing to the 'weak' fo~. says Ayer. of the verifioation prin-Ciple a proposition 1s significant if there are some observations wbleb would be relevant to its truth or falsify. Tbls aUows tor the s1gnlftcanoe of general proposit10ns, since it is clear that we can e~ least find evidence for or asalrm t them. In fact Ayar ldenti-fles the 'strong sense of the term' veriflcatJ.on with practical verification (Hav1ng direot sensory experience)

and the 'weak sense' of the term 01 ver1flcaUon wi tb

the 'ver1fication 1n principle'.

Wi tb tb1s I conclude the expos1 tiOD of .prine1ple of verificat10n as a cr1terion of meaning given by Ayer. Here it 1s important to AoUce that logical positivists.

c1aiming to reject 'metaphysics' with the a1d of prln-c~ple o~ veri~1cation. took over the conception of

analysis more or less complete. Nov I shall there~ore, critical).yexamine tbe Ayer's prinCiple o~ vt?ri~1cot~oft

by putting forward various criticisms oEtered by d1t~e­rent ph1losophers. Tbe most common object1on regarding

88

the cleavage between 'analytic' and. 'synthetic' comes

~rom Willard Quine. The principle o~ veFl~lcat1on 16 lnseparably linked w1 th 'the distinction between the 'analytic and synthetic and 1f we can show this 410-t~ctlon to be invalid tben the verification principle

would no longer hold va114.

Quine 1n his article ent! tled hTwo dogmas of

Emplrlclsmft attacks the separation between analytiC and synthetic as a dogma of empiricism. According to Quine ~hat there can not be any prec1se definition of 'analyticity' whicb does not presuppose, tbe notion of analytio. For this Quine deols with 'mean1ng',

'def1n1t10n'. 'lnterOhaDg~ab111tY't 'synonymity'. He reacbes the conclu.slon that 1n eaob case 1 t 1s nece-ssary to appeo1 to an a priori use of analytiolty. To start w1th. accord.1ng to Quine. moan1ng can not be 1dentJ.f1ed wi tb naming. He oi tea an example g1 ven by

Frege. 'EveDing star and Morning start. Quine argues that aoconUDg to astronomers the teveniDg star' 1s the planet venus, and the 'morning star' 1s the same.

Aoeordlng1y, for Quine, these two singu1ar terms name the same thing, but the meanJ.ag ~s treated as d1st~nct.

If both tbe terms, ho1ds Quine, were aUke in the meaD-

lnS, then the ~dentl ty "Evening star Q morning star"

89

Quine classifies 'saalyUc' statements .into two categor~es. According to ~Jthe tirst class Ie called

'logically true' propos 1 tiona. For example. No unma-rried man 1s marr~ec1'. The important feature of this example. says Quine, Is the t 1 t remains true under

aDy reinterpretation of 'man' and 'married'. The other class of analytlc statements, holds Quine. consists of statements like. 'No bachelor Is married'. Quine asserts that the nature of such statemonts 1s that the),

can be converted Into a 1061oa1 truth by providing synonyms for synonyms. In tbls way the statement

'No unmarried man Is married' by provlc11ng t unmarried.'

man for Its syDOQym 'bachelor'. Nevertheless, maintains

Quine, we ere lacking a proper orlterion to characterlse

the secon<1 class of analytic statements i.e. to say eM-11t1c6ty as such because we might say tbat a statement

Is analyt10 if the relevant terms are synonymous. Bu~

what 18 synonymy? This, eccon11ag to Quine, leads to the defJ.n1 tion of 10g1cal trutbs. Quine argues tbat the Question arises. that bow do we :find that tbacbelor' 1m de.fined as • unmarr1ed man'? He supposes that It is a

common practice to re1'er to the nearest c11ctlonary.

26. \Of. V. Quine, "Two c1ogmoe o.f EmpJ.r1cJ.smlt , Thomas r". Ol.shewsky (od.) Prob1ems tin the rb1loi§i~J of ~rmual3e (Holt. fiInehart aiiCi wInstOn t3. p.r. .

90

Quine says thet be does not acc~t the lex1cogr~bers formulation a8 law because the lexlcograher 1s an -empirical' eCientist who records antecedent tacts. Suppose 1f he 810eaes the term 'baChelor' as 'un-married man'. says Quine, becou.se 1. t 1s lexicogra-

pher's belie~ that there le a relation o£ synonymity between tbe two forms. But "The notlon otf synonymy

presupposed here haG sUll to be clarified,. presumably 1n terms relating to lingu1stlc behavlour. Certa~nlY

the '4of1.n1t1.cn' wbieb 1s the lexicographer's report

ot an observed synonymy can not be taken as the ground

for the synonymy". 21 From tb1s 1. t follows that to determine synonymity ODe baa to depend upon emp1rical facts that 1s synthetic knowledge.

In this way Quine says that tbe 1ntentional circle 1s vacuous or if the words can only be def1ned in terms of each otb~r then they depend upon syntbetic

knowledge. He bolds that 1 t is true that some 'terms

can be det.1ned 1n terms o~ others, in wbicb case these

1atter terms are basic ones. Here again J. t 1e impor-

'tant to notice. accorc111l8 to Quine, that these terms can not be exp1a1ne4 or de~ine4 1n the seme way as the less basic te~s. since they have a 4i~~erent

91

logical status, they can not be understood in olear CaGes ot their uses. Thus It logically ~ollows. that no sentenoe bas slgn1~lcance unless this s18n1~lcanoe 1s exp1al.ne4 by re~erence to others and ul tlmately on

Unguls tic behavlour. In this way Quine reiUtes the

cUe&1ncUoD between analyUc aJ14 syntbetic propoeJ.-tiona. From Quine's crit1cisms, it win ~oUow that the verl~lcatlon prinCiple wblch 1s beseel upon this cllstinct10D 1s invalid.

In sCientific knowledge the distinction bebcaen

analytiC and synthetiC is equally invalid because "exper1ence includes both the tbeoretical and the practioal aspects of knowledge. Thus language and 10g1c can not be divorced from rea11ty. Tbe validity of mathemat1cs lies 1n 1ts applioability to the ob~ec­t1ve world. Slmllarly. loglc, through its laws, grasps the dynamic objective reallty. In f'act 1n knowledge. 10glo and reality. theory an4 pract1ce, abstract and concrete, form end content, deduction and induction, unlversal and particular are all d1alect~cal1y interl"elatedn • 28 For instance, .it ~s now very cU.fflcult

26. Suman Gupta, "Bertrand Russell and A.J. AyeI" A D1.alectlc:o-Mater1a1J.st Approacb" in V1rendra K. Roy. Ramesh 8arlkwal (ed.) tyQI"X.lan Sool01061. (Delb1. 1981), p.,10. vol.III.

92

to find a field of knowledge where mathematical methods and research approaches are not use4 10 one way or tbe otber. It bas been spreading to ever new fields o~

knowledge, and intensively penetrating even deeper into the secret recesses of the sciences, helping them to solve problems whicb had onoe appeared to

de1'1' soluUon. fJIathemat.ic8 ls now becom1n.g one of the powerfUl instruments wbich belp to J.ntesrate into a s1ngle whole the great range og knowledge 1n all Its cUverslty.

Let us consIder ~lrst of all the philosophical view of mathematical 10glc and 1 ts relation to d1elec-

tIcal 10glc. It 1s very important because mathematical 10glc, being 10glc in subject matter and mathematIcs 1& method, eltcerta a stupendous and all round Innuence both on senerel1s1ns general Ideas, concepts and the language of mBthematles itself, and on the cognetive functions o~ the other sclenoes. The successfUl development o~ mathematical logic and its impact on

the cognetlve ~ctloDs of the other soiences. Tbe suocessfU1 development of mathemaUcal logiC ond its Impact on the other sCiences baa quite obviously re-sulted mainly £rom its close contact with dialectical logie, and wIth dialectiCS 1n general. In tb1s way we can not separate analytiC p~positlons (propositions o~

9' logic and mathematics) from synthet1c propositions (propos~tloD8 og natural sc1ence).

Besides the criticisms against '9mlyt1c' and

'8yntbet~c' there are also othtir criticisms wb1cb ere dlrectly levelled against the verification principle ot mean1ns of A.J. Ayer. Out of these, the most

curl0UB ls. tbe 'veriflablUty' principle ltsal1. on the ~ce Of it, 1s neither an emplrical proposltion nor a "tautology, what. tben 1s 1ts status. Tbis is an

Interesting question vb1ch comes from John Wisdom. He wrl tee in bis article Gntl tIed nr4etapbyslcB and verif1-oat.1onu _ "Well. shell we accept the verification prin-

Ciple? Wha~ 1s it to acoept it? When people br.1ns out with a dashing air of the worde 'The mean1ng of a

statement 1s really simply tbe method of Its verifi-

cation'. 11ke one who says 'The value ot a tblDS 1s really Simply 1ts power of exchange', in what sort of way are they uSing word.s? ~1b.at 18 the general. nature of their theory? The answer is 'it Ls a metaphysical theory.~

Th1s ~ol1.0l18. eccor41ns to John Wisdom, the prlnclp1e

o£ vorl~icatlon has been formulated in sucb a way that 1tEl purpose and nature 1s not clear.

29. Jobn Wisdom, QMetapbysics and Verification", tIled. vol.XLVII. no.47, 1936, p .• 4,4.

94

Almost 0 o1m11ar kind o~ attaok comes £rom Urmson. He argues that 1f one puts a question resard1ns the

status of tbe principle o£ veritloatlon, clearly the

adherents of the principle may sal' that .1 t is a tau-toloSY (a nale o£ langue) or an empirical proposition. But this is not poss1ble. Urmson contende.

UFlrst. it was a pbllosophers f statement, ond no pb110sopbers f statement can be empirical acoordlng to the positivist. Philosophy is for b1m tautological clar1-~.1cat1on of laDauage. Secondly, it waG quite clear that positivists did not put forward the principle as a generalisation resulting from an eXhaustive study of meta-pbysical statements, all of which bad been 10und meaningless 1ndepencient1y of tile principle. Nor were they prepared to exe-~e all metapnysical etatements on their merl ts and perbaps one day adm1 t thai; this or that metapbysical statement 12 an excep-tion and is meaningful, at the most one produced a few very peculiar metaphysioal utterances as examples, aDd perbaps diag-nosed what sor~ o~ linguist.ic contusion they embodied. Thirdly tit was qul to clear that those who proposed the verification prinCiple were trying to show that, inde-pendently of detailed examination, 1 t could be seen that a metapbl'slcal statement must be mean!nsless. It 1s evident. the~t as AyeI' ~or example claimed, that the verlncatlon principle bad to be called a priori by its supporters. But this elternotJ.ve was by no means a happy one, since for the posi-tivist all a priori propositions are rules o~ language of a convent1onal charaoter. 1~ the posit1vist admits that the verl~l­cation prinCiple 1s an orbltr~ rule ~or the use of the word tmeon1ng~ul., theD bie opponent bas only to say he 1s not going to follow this new fangled way of speak1ns J ... /-

95

he wl11 80 on using tbo 014 Gense of 'meaning-fUl-, whatever its defin1tion may be, ac~or4-ins ~o wbleb metaphysios 1s meaninsfUl".'"

In this way, Urmson pOints out that tbe principle o~ verlfJ.catlon CeD not be treated as an empirical pro-position because the statements of philosophors. as

it 1s held by logioal positivists, C8Dno~ be er4pirl-

cal. If he (logical positivist) tries to say, that

it is a rule of 8 language of 8 conventional Charac-ter (a priori). the cr1 tles of the principle mlsht say that the word 'meanlpg~l' will beuse4 1n a

sense that lt would cover entire 'metaphysics' 1s mea.a1ns~l.

0 • .1. Wamock. on the other hant'l. illustrates that we ordinarily 1nqu.lrp into the meaning 01 worels or sentences. A proposition is what a sentence meens, not sometb1ng that bas a meaning. But, accord1ng to

the principle of verification, It 1s proposl tlone

whicb we verlff. describe as true or ~alse. How, then can ver1~lab111ty be Identified with meanins? In this sense, says Wannock. it is absurd to speak

of the meaning o~ the meaning o~ a sentence, or 01 the meanJ.ng o~ what a sentence stands tor. To avoid

96

tMs co~usJ.on. Warnock suggests the epigram SMulet be modified as tiThe meaning of 8 sentence is tbe method

ot Its verl11c8tlon~.'1 Furtber Warnock, holds that

whenever we talk about vel'lfJ.caUon of a 'statement'. It is somehOw connected with truth end falsify i.e. to say to

verify .pl is to find out Whether 'P' 1s true or no~.

But there are, aays Warnock, CertaiD meanlngfU1 sen-tences which do not bave any concern whatever witb

trutb and falsity. To quote Warnock's comments OD

tbJ.s point:

UClearly thero is an enormous number of such sentences. There are imperativo sen-tences, ueGCl (mainly) to give orders, and interrogative sentences, used (mainly) to ask questions. Tbere are sentences used as prayers; to make promises, to gtve verdicts. to express decisionsl to pass moral 3udgemente, or to make proposals. It 1s nonsen-sical to ask of a question, an order, a prayer, or a proposal, whether It 16 true or false •• o And to these sentences veritlcation can have no possible agp11cat.lon, however • weak' or '1ncU.rect' .0'2

In this way, Warnock argues that the prinCiple of veri-

fication could bave no application at all to £orma of

words whJ.oh I.n DO way asp1red to the concU UOll o~

G.J. Warnock. °VerJ.~J.cat1.on and Use of Lang-uegett in Thomas M. Os1sh.ewSkl' (ed.) prob1ems !n the Eb11os0phY o~ LppsuaS9 (New York, 1969). p. "64. Ib1.d •• pp.184-e,.

97

sentences. It does not make sense to speak of the ver1-

.flcation of commands, prayers, promises. expressions of

wishes, and so on, tbese, accordJng to WarnOCk, do not 1a11 to be veri.flable. and to say ot 'them thet they

can not be verified is to make a somowhat trivial remark whioh Ln no way challenges tbeir llagu1etlc

respectabiUty, and of course in no way impUes that they are meaningless. T.bus. warnock ooncludes that nonnstistactlon ot tne Verification principle at onoe implied tbe verdiot 'meaningless', was always a foolish misunderstanding.

The other point at iSSll(;), £or Warnock, 18 the notion oZ ·verlfiability'. Warnook holds thot the phrase method o£ verl1'icatioD 1s Dot appropriate. He questions that what cloes it mean when we speak of

methode of verlfioation? Trying to show tbe vagueness

of the method of verification of logical positivist Warnock illustrates.

"We might naturally say that an estimate of the Na tiona1 income o~ Great Sri tfdn in 1926 CaD be ver.ltlecl by various methoCls I that there are various metboda of ver1£y-ing the statement 'that some glven Uqu1d is an Bcld, that there are dl~ferent Cle'thoc1s of ver.lfylng the c1a1m that a C)eJ'I-tain picture was painted by Vermer. In each oZ these cases, the methods in question ... /-

wou1d consist 1n the csrry1ns ou" o~ ce~ taln def1n1 te, qui to elaborate procedures -the handling of atatlotlcs, tbe performanoe ot obemical experiments, the syetcmaUc scrutiny of style, po.1n~f and CODvaa. The statistician, the ohem1s~. and the expert OD pGintalnge ere expected to have learned, to know o~. and to be able to follow, certa1u methods appropriate to their sub~ecte. But is tbero a method of ver1fy1na tbat grass 16 green and that the sky on 8 clear day is blue? What method of ver1.f1cat.lon could I follow 1n assur1ng myself that I have a headaohe?

98

If some Ofte says PHere 1s a book", holding It out to me, do I resort to a method ot verl-.fyiPS what he says? ~e look at the gross and the sky; I feel my headache. I see the book that Ie offered to me. Lo0k11l81 feeUns. and seeing are not methods of ver1f caUon, no one has to be taught bOlt to see and to teel, and no one c1a1ms to be an eXpert by reason of JUe master of these accomplishments°."

The upshot o~ this d1scuss.1on is that there 1s

no Axed method of verifies tion as such. AeconUng

to Warnock, the 'method' of verifJ.cation d1~fers from one Situation to other, as explslnecS in the

examples sucb as 'National Income o~ Great Britain

in 1926' can be Verified on the basls of statistical lnformation: 'Uquid is an acld' can be ver1fied on the basis of chem.1ca1 experiments etc. In the above

menUone4 a1 tuattons, Warnock c1aJ.ms. a stat1sUC£an. a chemist etc •• are expected to know certain 'methods' of ver1fioat1on regardlng their eub~ects. Whereas in

the statements sucb as 'Here is a book', 'I have bead-

99

ache- or 'we look at the grasf> and sky' do not have

any sort o~ 'method' 'to verify them. Because. ho14e Warnock, one 8bOu14 not consider 'looking', '~eellns' and 'aeolns t are methods at all. since no one taught

us how to look. bow to feel and how to see etc. In

thls way, he argues that tne method of 'verification'

is proper wi thin the purv1w og speclaUete - t scienti-

sts', .stetletlclens', 'dootors', 'detectives' etc., but not 1n our dally conversation.

Tbe other criticism comes Lrom Gilbert Ryle. Ryle in hie art,lol.e "The Verla-cation PrlnclpleP writes tho t the epigram • ebO meaning of Q propos1 tlon i8 the

method of 1 ts verification'. the word 'proposl tiOl'l' was made to cover 110t Just statements of natural law

(science) but statements of all kind. Ryle tries to

dlfferentiate statements of law from con3ectural state-ments. He says that the word 'HfPotbesis' 1s used ambi-guously in many cases. Accord1ng to Ryle there are two

41f~erent uses o£ the word 'Hypothesis'. In the ~irst place the word • bypothee1s'. 1s used to <lanota an.}'

true or false statement o~ law i.e. to say aD¥ var1a-b1e hypothet1ca1 statement of the kind ftwbenever •••• then" • The second use is that .1 t also denotes any

coa3eotura1 statement whatever 1 t may be. The statement that tmy neighbour 1s 1n pain' would not be a statement

100

og law, but a co~ectura1 statement. Hi8 main conten-

tion is to show that the prlllcipleof verif1oation

should be attached to con~ectural statements but not to statements of law, slnce statements o~ law can be

proved true or falSe on tbe basie of induction though

SODle degree of 'con3ecturalness o is in them. Ryle argues,

"The notions of verification and falsifi-cation are naturally attached very closely to the notion of conjeoture only con~ectures nee4 to be or can be verified or falsified. £Stab11sbe4 truthS, whether particular or general, need no further verification and are not open to falslflcat~on. Established ts.lsehoods need no further falsificatlon and are not open to verification. Ques-t.ions, commandS, rebukes, promises eJ14 J4 prayers need neither and are open to neitberG.

It follows trom Ryle's position tbat statements of science are not to be put for the test of verifica-tion. Since their trutbs ere well establlahed. Thus Ryle holds the generalised version ot prJ.·nc1ple of

verification is so narrow that it tries .to impose tbe test of ve11dl ty not only on the non-fJdent1f1c

statemeDts but alGo on the valid Gclentiflc laws.

Thus even from the poUt of vlew of Ungu1atlc philosophy the prinCiple of Verification is open to grave ob3ectlons • ..

Q. Ryleo nThe Ver1.~lcetloll Pr1ncJ.p1ett in bie $lo.1l.s gteA heers (London, 1971)0 vol.II. p.290.

101

The prUlciple 01 Verification of l.oSical posl t1-

v1sts, we find, 113 the result ot an abstraction ,"rom the tota11ty of human activities. Verification in

tbe tirst plaoe is a practical aotivity i.e. to say

it involves soU.e interaction between a person and his

surrounc11ngs. in wblcb man consciously alters his envi-

ronment .in some way. WheD 8D~ propos! tion is verified,

and is put to the test of experience, the method of

verl~lcetlon always involves tbat tbe person who 1s

verifying the proposi tlon perfoms some actioD, or

serlee of aotions, 1n whioh be arranges end alters things, in a manner to test the val1d.lty of the propo-

s1 tAon he is interested 1ft. Thus man verifles his

ideas about the world i.e. propositions about the world not by observa tiona but by acting upon It. We verity whether our ideas about the tsot'ld are risht or wrong

by ohonaJ,ng the world .t.n accordance wl tb our ideas of

it. Verification ls, then, a practlcal activity usually oarrled on by a number' of people in co-opera-

tJ.on I.e. the socia1 resul.t o~ thoir 301nt activity.

To conclude. verl.f1catlon is concerned with test-ing our knowledge of the obJects anc1 properties of the material wor14. But for Ayer to verify meaDS to have

102

certaln sort ot oeDsatlons. The principle 01 ver1tl-

catJ.on o~ AyeI' misinterprets the conoepteeuch as 'know-

ledge'. end 'experienoe'. Accordlng to AyeI' knowledge

is aCquire<l through sensing one's own sensations. This posl tlon of AyeI' boJ.ls down to sol1pa1em. Apart f'J'om

this the veriflcation principle of AyeI' rests, 1n the

last analysis, OD t.he prooess to which all sense-given

ob3ects are related. This shovs that knowledge for

log1cal positivlsts ls restr1cted to appearances of

the tbings or obJects.

The question 10 1f aocordins to the principle of

verifioation ODly the empirical stetemeDts or ana1ytlc

statements are meaningful then what tiOuld be the meaDlng-status of value-statements? Det'ore golng to

d1ecuss the meaning statue of value statements first,

we sbal1 deflne moral values. To defines

nValues ere alvaya values entertained by certatn 1nd1 v1ctuals these connot best be discussed 1n terms of value ~\lclsemen_. More1 values 1ndioate at the actions of peop1e or 800181 phenomena whicb may ba right or wrong. Rightness or wroapess ... /-

1s .1udge4 111 ttl reference to aD 1deal. 'lh1s ideal 1s created by the society to regulate the behaviour of the people. An4 £. t 18 embo-died In tb§ moral and legal laws of the socletyo.,:>

10'

Values are propertJ.es of o"~ects and phenomena of social. consc10usness wblch determine their impor-

tance to socletyo to a class, and man. Things or

ob.1ecte represent different values, since they are the ob.1eots of d1tterent human Interests (mater1al, soolal and splritual). For instance. a pot being a vassel, represents e material value, l.e. to Gay a use value. As a product of human labour the pot possesses econom.1c va1ue. It a pot 1s an ob~ect of art 1 t also has aesthetic value (beauty). But In all these rela-~ions pot appears not merely as a mater1al ob3ect but al.eo as a 80c1a1 phenomenon, an ob~ect of use, a commo-dity, a work of art, end is an object of human inte-rest. Likewise. 1n tbe phenomena of aoolal conscious-ness 1deas are values. In a4d1 tioD to material, eco-nomic and aesthetic values tbere are also moral, leeal, poUtlcal. cultura1. end h.1storical vellues. Actions of people and soclal phenomena may represent moral go04 or

Swnan Gupta, "Corruptlon and Valueso 1n Surendra Nath, K. (e4.) ~dar@9 Hewor's; Volume (Trlvan~'. p.47.

104

evil (ethical values) and be an ob~ect ot approval or

oondemnatlon. 7'0 direct and regulate tbe conduct of

people, society creates a system of morel-conceptG, 14eals, principles and assessments. There are also moral values. Morality Is the sum totel ot standards or rules of conduct 1n society, reflecting people's Ideas of ~uBt1ce and lnjustioe, good and eVil etc. UnlJ.ke legal standards 0 moral standards are malDtalned

by torce ot public oplnlonj customs, habits end eduoa-

tion, by force of mants oonvictlon. Moral standards ere not eternal. Thus value statements Can be in aQJ

fo~ i.e. material, economio, aesthetiC, moralo legal, political. cultural etc. Now I will discuss the emotive theory of values of A.J. Ayar.

AyeI' argues that ord.1nary system of ethics, as

illustrated 111 the \-Iorks of etblcal philosophers,

consists of pieces of metaphysics, and analyses of non-etb1cal oonoepts. AyeI' intends to classify the con-tents o~ such aye tem of ethics into ~our ma1.n classes. Aooor41ng to Ayer. the Urst cl.aas consists of proposl-

tJ.ons whioh expresses deflnl tJ.ons of ethical ~rms or ~udsements about the 1egltlmacy or poss~bl11ty o~ certa~n

defln1tJ.ons. Secondly, there are propositions wh1.cb

describe the phenomena of moral experience. and their

10'

causes. Thirdly. tbe eXhortations to moral virtue.

Flnallyo there are actual ethical ~udsemeDta. O£ all

these four olasses of propositions, accorc11ng to Ayer.

the first class of propos! tiona 1n which an ethical

term is used 1n a purely normative way, are oa14 to consts. tute ethical phi loeopby. For Ayer ou t of aU the

four classes of etb1cal propositions, the first class

consists of the genuine etblcal pb1losophy from which

be deve10ps temoUve theory of ethics t. Tbe otber

three classes of propositions, says Ayer, are not con-sidered as the part of etblcal pbilosoph1 on the groun4s

tbat. the second class of propositions (the propos 1 tiona

\,1b1ch describe tbe nature of morel experience) belongs

to the tscience of psychology' or 'sociology'. The

third class of propositions (the exhortations to moral

vlrtua) does not belong to any science. F1nally tbe

actual ethical ~udsements are not definitions or

comments upon definitions or quotat.lons. 10 8 strict

sense, declares Ayer. moral pbilosophy does no~ contain deelarations or announcements. 36

Ayer first considers and re-1ects the poaslblUty that, wb11e ethical statements can not be <l1reotly verl-

106

fled by appeal to sense-experience. yet they caD be

translated \i1thout loss 1nto statements wbJ.ch can be

so ver~l1ed. If this posslblUty ues acoepted. accol"d-ins to Ayer. va1ue ~udgements wou14 be mean1ng1u1. since

they cou14 tit ultimately, though not lmmediate1y. into

the second olass ot meanJ.ngful statements l.eo Gmpirloal

statements. AyeI' tries to consider two versions ot tbie view, Which be calle, respectively, 'subjectlvlsm'

and. • ut.ll.1 tarlanism' • But Ayer' e tbeory' of etblcs 1tself io subjeotlvlsm. This will be shown in due

course. Ayer argues tbot '8Ub~ectlvlstGt hold that to say a tblng 1s r1gbt 1s to say that Ie 1e generally

approved of. or 81 ternst! vely that 1s approvecS of by

the speaker. Ayer rejects this view on the grounds

that 1 t can not mean tbe same to sell the one as to say the other. slr1Ce 1t 1s possible without contradiction

to say of sometb1ng tbat J.s both generally approved of

and wrona. And even if the extreme .subjeotiv1st' v ••

is taken, stl11 it is not actually contradleto17 to

say 'I approve of th.1s and it is wrong'. Ayer ~hel"e~ore

re~ecte the conc1ue1on that ethlcal predicates such as

'right' or Igood' can be trene1ate4 into the emp1rical

pre41ctetes 'approved by everybody' or 'approved by met.

107

On exactly same grounds AyeI' zoe 3acts utiU tarla-nlsm. According to Ayer 1 t ls not actually 0 contra-

diction to say that 1t 1s sometimes wrons to perform the action wblcb would cause the sreatest happiness.

t tr1gbt action' and taction causing the greatest happi-

ness' can not mean the same tb1oS. AyeI' argues that it wou14 be contracU.ctory to say • It 1s someUmes wrong

to perfom tho r1Ght action'. 1 t is tberefore, 1n Ayer's view, that no translation of etblcal terms into empirical terms 1s poaslble.37

Next Ayer, considers 'abSolut1st' view o~ ethlos. AccorcUna to Ayer 1 t is "the view that statements of value are not controlled by observation, as ordinary empirical propositions are, but only by a mysterious tintellectual lntentlon,.p!8 AyeI' opines that to accept this would be Incompatible with tbe general theory tbat the on1y slg~flcant non-analytic propositions are those wbicb are empir1cal~y Verifiable. On tbls ground Ayer reJects 'absolutism. too anci adopts a third theory

which be cal1s the t lSmotlve theory o~ Ethics'. Acoord.1ng to til1s theo17. holds Ayer, eth1ca1 concepts are not analysable into ana1yUc or syntbetic, because they are

37. Ibld., pp.13e-39. 38. Ib1d., p.140.

108

not real concepts at all. They are, in bis view, pseudo-ooncepts. Ayar conceives that the predicates used in

value judgements are not proper precUca tea, they eto not

stan4 ~or quall ties 0 t tblngs w.b1cb can be picked out by

the sensee. He says.

"The fundamental ethical concepts ere unanaly-sable, 1n as much as there Is no criterion by \'Iblch one can test the vaUcU.ty of the ~udge­mente 1n whicb they occur. So far we are In agreement wJ.tb absolutJ.stG. But. unlike the absolutists, we are able to give an explana-tlon of thJ.S fact about etbioal CODCep ts. We say that the reason why tbey are unanalys1ble 1s that they are mere pseudo-conoepts. The presenco of an ethical symbol in 8 proposi tlon a44s notb1ng to ,. ts tactual content. Thus 1f I say to some one, t you acted wrongly 1n steeUns that money'. I am not stating anY-thing more tban 1f I had simply s814, 'you stole that money'. In ad<llna that tble actlon 1s wrong I am Dot making any :fUrther statement about 1 t. I am simply evinclns my moral dis-approval of it. It 1s as if 1 had sald, 'You stole that money', in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it w1th the ac1<l1t1on of some speCial exclamatlon marks. The tonef_ or the exclama-tion marks. aelds nothing to tile Uteral meaning ot the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of 1t 1s attended by Qertain feal-inas 1n the speaker".~

Tbus. accorcUng to Ayer, If noth1ns 1s stated 1n BD1 gJ.ven statement except that sometb1og J.s wrong 1 t

:follows tbat DOtb1ng 1s stated .in J.t at aU. It follows ~rom th1s theory a pure value statement does not quaUfy as mean1ngtu1.

109

Ayer tries to a681gn a different £unctlon to value statements. He argues, ftlt may be found that

they function so vary differently ~rom other types o~ statement that 1t 1s a4vlceable to put them into a

separate category altosetherJ either to say that they ere not to be counted as statements at all, or, if

tb1s prove inconvenient, at least to say that they do not express propos! tiona. and consequently there are no ethical ~aotso.40 Ayer's Vi~, thus, on ethios denies the obJeotive slgD1flcance ot moreUty. Ayer's dootrine of moraU ty 18 an extreme form of sub3ect1 v1em. Ayar says "moral 3udgements are emotive rather than descriptive, tbat they are persuasive expressiOns of attitudes an4 not statements of faots, and conse-Quently that they can not be elther true or ~e1se ••• 41

This 113 the reaoon wby bis theory of etb1c8 1s known

as emotive tbeol')' of ethlcs.

This pos! tion Ayer reasserts in bis recent in-

terview 1n the p.bserver when be eays "I do hove «lui te strong moral feellnsa. I feel roora1 1nd1gna~on eas1ly enough, and 1 react verN strongly to any man1~estat1on

40. A.J. Ayor, POn the Analys~s of Moral Judge-ments" 11'1 bis ~b110S0PhlCa1 Essays (London, 1965), pp.232- 3. IbJ.d.. p.246.

110

of cruelty. I tb1nk 1 bave a ~a1rly strong sense o~

pity. But 1 have always beUevec1 and thla 1s pb11oaof'

pbica11y a respectable view, that more1e are autonomous.

You CaD't 1n the last resort justify your moral stand

po1nt 1n terms o~ anythlns e18e". 42 Accor41nsly the

above statementtJ of AyeI' are merely of bis own emo-

tions. ACtually they do not correspond to anyth1ng.

In factt

tl Ayert s anti-scienti1ic approacb 1s in con-formi ty wi tb bis 6ub3eoUvlsUo. ldeaUsUe. plurallstio, ph1loeopby. AyeI' regards values as .lnd.epenc1ento unconnected, dlsoret8 UD1ts, wblcb are neither related to the 80a1s to be achieved nor to the b1s toricsl or eoolo- 4, economic conditions Ubloh give rise to tbemft •

CritiCising Ayer's emotive theory of values. Suman Gupta illustratesl

"It is true that moral statements oan not be verified in the way In wblcb we veri~ tbe material ob~ect statements. This is because moral attributes are not the oharac-ter-1stica of any aatural phonomeraa. They 40 not, ~ke the material objects snd their properties, stimulate our sense-orSaDS. That 18 why they cannot be seen or touchBd or manipulateci Uke the natura1 ob.1ecta. But ~s does not me en that they are pseudo-statements or sub3Gct1.vo-ooncepts expressJ.ng

A.J. Ayer, UHis DOt Reason Wby?" Interview with MJ.r1am Gross. Observer (London). February 24, 1980. Suman Gupta, "Bertrand !wssell ana A.J. Ayer: A D1a1ect~co-Materlallet Approacbo J.n Vlrendra K • Roy, Ramesb Sar1kwal (ed.) Marxian Soclomr (Delhi, 1981), p.314.

ollly our £eeUngs. Moral attributes are the soclal characteristics of our actions being detenn1ned In 'terms of the socla1. relations existing in a speclfic society. They constitute a part of the superstruc-ture of a specific soclety ••• Wbat we are trying to emphasize here Is that moral values cannot be s tutUed In lsola tion. as the 1081081 posl111 vists try to 40, bu~ they can only be examined 1n relation ~o other aspects of human activlty.tl44

111

Tbe metaphysical approaob ot 1.0810al positivists

towards the nature of ethical concepts bas been rightly

an4 clearly pointed out by Suman Gupta in her erUcle

ent! t1.ec.'l "Conceptual Ana1ysls of Mora 11 ty". She argues tha~ 10g1cal positivists deprive man o~ tbe eblllty to change the ob~ectlve rea11~y. This 1s because their approach (metaphysloal),

"demes the causal. Interpenetration and Inter-dependence of various phenomena in the world. Consoquently, 1 t oan no t explain any pheno-menon 1n terms of lawa of its development. Thus it denies the re1.eUon between the indi-vldual and re8ards them as discrete and ln4e-pendent ualts. From thls it tol:b1s that it equal1y dea1es the b1storically dete~ne4 eooJ.o-econom1c beals of moral! ty. Concep-tually, it completely separates the descrlp-tJ.ve 3udsements from the evaluative "veiga-menta ". '-,

%b14 •• pp.",.14. Suman Cupta, uConcep~al Analysis of ~orel~tyn, Socialist Paporama (New De1hi), vol.II. 110.10. P o 1'1.

112

TbUG tbe pr1Jloiple o~ verification according to

"bleb the truth of every statement about the \(101'1<1 must be ascertained by oomparins it ~1tb the ev1dence

o~ senaes 1eads to solipsism and deprives the cogneUve

significance of language that all statoments of natural

8cience are not tested by direct experience, compel

logical positivists to accept the wateredwon version

of the principle. The prinCiple of verification,

tbat meaning 01' a statement. is s1ven by its method or

mode ot verification 1n experienoe pelnstak.1nsly ex-plains that to describe the world in terms of 'percep-

tions'. The log1cal positivists rejeot the view tbet ~e l1orlc1 18 by its very nature mator1a1. In this way

they hold that noth1ng can be known or said about tbe

nature ot the objective world. Tbey interpret knowledge

in a way that koowlo6ge is the knowle4ge of objects of

sensations obtained throusb sense-eXper1ence. In this

way the ver1~1CQtlon principle of logical posit1vists

(tis based upon the misinterpretation o~ such concepts as 'know1edge'. 'sense-experlencet and 'ver1flcatlon, ••• n 46

But knowl.edge 1s product o~ a social labour and th.1Dk1ng

1n men end 1s J.deal peproduotl.on in languQ8e o~ the

ob-1ective laws.

46. Suman Gupta, "Bertran4 Russell end A.J. Ayera A D1a1eotlco-MaterlaUst Approach" in Vlrendra K. ROY, Ramesh Sarllafal (ed.) ~a!j!lan Sop,1slg& (Delhi. 1981). p.310.