maurseth_balanceofpower

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Balance-of-Power Thinking from the Renaissance to the French RevolutionAuthor(s): Per MaursethSource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1964), pp. 120-136Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/423251

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BALANCE-OF-POWER THINKING FROM THERENAISSANCE TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION*By

PER MAURSETHUniversity of Oslo and Peace Research Institute - Oslo

1. IntroductionIt is a question whether the idea ofthe balance of power be owing

entirely to modern policy, or whetherthe phrase only has been invented inthese latter ages.1Thus David Hume opened his essay 'Of theBalance of Power', published in 1752. Inthe first part of the essay he claimed tohave found sufficient evidence in ancienthistory to prove that states had been actingupon balance-of-power principles, and heconcluded his investigation so far bystating: In short, the maxim of preservingthe balance of power is founded somuch on common sense and obviousreasoning, that it is impossible itcould altogether have escaped anti-quity, where we find, in other particu-lars, so many marks of deep pene-tration and discernment.2

Long before this essay was written, theconcept or notion of a European balanceor equilibrium of power had become afundamental element in most seriouswriting on the problems of internationalrelations as well as a widely disseminatedpolitical slogan with a high degree ofpopular acceptance. Since then the notionhas survived, though for shorter periodsscornfully denounced, and in recent yearsit seems to have risen to greater promin-ence than ever before in Western politicalthought and debate on all levels. Thisbeing so, a historical study of the growthof the idea of the balance of power seemsan interesting subject in its own right withno need of further justification. However,

it may also be a reasonable expectationthat such a study can offer some valuablecontributions to those who like to thinkin terms of power balance.The present article shall carefully avoidthe intricate and very attractive problemsconcerning the many-sided and highlyvariable functions of the balance-of-powerdoctrine as a tool in international con-flicts, though an analysis along those linesmight yield the most important results.More modestly, the present article aimsonly at providing an introductory sketchof how the idea developed through threecenturies from the end of the fifteenthcentury. This too may prove helpful, iffor no other reason than that it is alwaysstimulating to be confronted with themarks of our predecessors' penetration anddiscernment.32. Early development. omplex . simplebalance

As far as we know, the idea of a balanceof power had no place in mediaevalthought. Its origin is usually attributed tothe Renaissance in Italy where the termcame into use at the end of the fifteenthcentury and the beginning of the six-teenth.

Throughout the whole period underexamination all thinking in terms of powerbalance has in common a starting-point ofunchanging basic assumptions that canbe crystallized into three statements:1. The security and independence ofany single state depend in thelast analysis on physical power.


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2. Power is relative, and power ofany single state must (and can) bemeasured in terms of the powerof the surrounding states.3. Hence any increase in the powerof one state means a decrease inthe power of its neighbours andrepresents a threat to their se-curity and independence.

From this common ground, however,thinking might proceed along many dif-ferent roads, and from the very beginningwe can distinguish two important types ofbalance-of-power models: a complex v.a simple balance scheme.At the end of the 15th century Philippede Cominesgrouped the principal states inEurope into pairs of natural rivals. Toevery great people God had given anotheras opponent: France/England, England/Scotland, Spain/Portugal, Italian princes/city republics, Austria/Bavaria, etc., and'chacun a l'oeil que son compagnon nes'accroisse'.4 Two of the pairs listed byComines are interrelated - Francel Eng-land/Scotland - and thus his formallybilateral presentation covers a complexbalance system in nuce. With only a fewmore interlockings established a full-fledged multilateral balance system wouldemerge, in which the vigilance of anymember would be extended to cover allthe others. A generalization of this com-plex kind was offered some 75 years laterby Jean Bodin. It is necessary to prevent aprince from climbing to such heights ofpower that he acquires the capacity toimpose his law on his fellow princes, hewrote, 'car la securite des princes et desrepubliques gist en un contrepoids egal depuissance des uns et des autres'.5A minimum version of a complex bal-ance system with three participants wasoutlined by Francis Bacon in his essay 'OfEmpire':

First for their neighbours; therecan no general rule be given (theoccasions are so variable), save one,which ever holdeth; which is, that

121princes do keep due sentinel, thatnone of their neighbours do over-grow so (by increase of territory, byembracing of trade, by approaches,or the like), as they become more ableto annoy them than they were. Andthis is generally the work of standingcounsels to foresee and to hinder it.During that triumvirate of kings,King Henry the Eighth of England,Francis the First King of France, andCharles the Fifth Emperor, there wassuch a watch kept, that none of thethree could win a palm of ground,but the other two would straightwaysbalance it, either by confederation,or, if need were, by a war; and wouldnot in any wise take up peace atinterest.... Neither is the opinion ofsome of the schoolmen to be received,that a war cannot ustly be made but upona precedent injury of provocation. Forthere is no question but a just fearof an imminent danger, though therebe no blow given, is a lawful causeof a war.6

This relatively short passage is loaded withelements highly illustrative of the widescope of problems involved in balance-of-power reasoning. Here we are confrontedwith the usual mixture of formulating amaxim of wise policy and providing adescriptive principle for events past andpresent. To the general maxim of keeping'due sentinel' are further cursorily addedsome suggestions concerning different di-mensionsof power to be taken into account,7and a clear recommendation of war-even preventive war - as a proper meansto re-establish a disturbed equilibrium.Finally, he brusquely does away withapprehensions as regards the compatibilityof this doctrine and international law.

Thinking in terms of an interdependentbalancing of many power-units in a com-plex or multilateral system, however, didnot for a long time become the prevailingline of thought. Soon it was completelyovershadowed by the simple balance mod-el. The term 'simple' is used to denote theinflexible bipolar structure of the systemand must not be taken to imply any re-striction in the number of system-members,


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122in which respect there is no theoreticaldifference between the two models.Favoured by the common etymologicalorigin, as well as by the everyday ex-perience of balancing the two scales in-dispensable in most economic transactions,the bipolar model was clearly easier tograsp and to popularize. Equally favouredby political experience, the simple modelnaturally prevailed. From the beginningof the 16th and well into the 18th centurythe conflict between the house of Austriaand the house of France was regarded asthe fundamental pattern of Europeanpolitics. From its Italian origin with theFlorentine scholars Rucellai and Guicciar-dini, who described Italian politics in the1480s as a simple balance system betweenVenice aiming at 'imperio di tutta Italia'and the alliances of Florence, Milan andNaples 'pro communi libertate',8 it waseasy to extend the idea to Europe with itstwo great powers alternating in the roleof ambitious claimant for universal mon-archyand with the weakerparty leading analliance in defence of freedom by re-estab-lishingtheinternationalpowerequilibrium.3. The 'Frenchperiod'From the middle of the 16th century tothe middle of the 17th, Hapsburg wasgenerally regarded as the most powerfulof the two rivals, and consequently themost important contributions to thebalance-of-power doctrine in this periodcome from French sources.In a pamphlet from the year 1584,Discours au roi sur les moyens de diminuerI'Espagnol,we can see very clearly how thegeneral and basic assumptions of balance-of-power thinking are translated into theterms of the simple balance system:

Tous estats ne sont estimes forts etfaibles qu'en comparaison de la forceou faiblesse de leurs voisins. Et pourtant les sages princes entretiennentcontre-poids tant qu'ils peuvent.9As long as this balancing succeeds, theycan live in peace; if the equilibrium is

disturbed, peace and friendshipwill cometo an end, depending as they do amongprinces only on mutual fear and awe.Because of their greatness, however, peaceand war in the whole of Christendomdepend on whether there be peace or warbetween France and Austria. The interestof all Christian states lies therefore inmaintaining the balance between the two.From this deduction, a concrete formu-lation of policy followed promptly:

Depuis quelque temps la maisond'Autriche s'estgrandement renforceeet accrue, et de reputation et de pays;tellement que la balance est sansdoubte trop chargee d'un cote; ets'en va temps de peser un peu surl'aultre, qui ne veult que nostreFrance en soit enfin emportee.l10The permanence of the Hapsburg-Bour-bon rivalry, and the long-lasting inferiorityof France, stimulated some refinements inthe simple balance scheme that becameof lasting importance.Firstly, the permanence of this rivalryitself made it possible to tie balance think-ing even more rigorously to its concretemodel, not only seeing the two powers aspermanently seated in opposite scales, buteven explicitly identifying them with thescales. In the last important contribution tobalance-of-powerthinkingfrom the Frenchperiod, the Duc de Rohanformulated thisin a somewhat different metaphor:

II y a deux puissances de laChrestiente qui sont comme les deuxpoles desquels descendent les influ-ences de paix et de guerre sur lesautres estats, i savoir les maisons deFrance et d'Espagne.l1Still in the second half of the 18th centuryprevious balance thinking was summed uplike this:

La Maison de France et la Maisond'Autriche ont ete regardtes commeles bassins dans la balance del'Europe.l2The oldest evidence of this identificationseems to come from England, where thehistorian William Camdennterpreted the


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same events which his younger contem-porary Bacon had described in terms ofthe complex balance scheme, in the fol-lowing words:And true it is which one hathwritten, that France and Spain areas it were the Scales in the Balanceof Europe, and England the Tongueor the Holder of the Balance.l3

Here we are confronted with anotherimportant contribution from the Frenchperiod: the concept of the role as 'holderof the balance'. This concept was not onlyperfectly compatible with the concretemodel of scales, it might even seem alogical completion of this line of thought.The role as holder of the balance must alsoby necessity be a particularly glorious one,and efforts were made to secure this rolefor the King of France. In 1616 Richelieuclaimed the title 'arbitre de la chrestiente'as an acquisition to the French Crowndating from the reign of Henry IV.14 Inthe following year an anonymous Frenchbalance-of-power writer rejected - forthe sake of the European equilibrium -the idea that Louis XIII should seek toobtain the imperial crown. Instead headvised him to use his influence to transferthe crown to another dynasty, by whichwise policy Louis 'tiendra la balance dumonde en ses mains, qu'il a apportee duCiel'.15This sublime function of arbiter orholder of the balance must neverthelessbe difficult to reconcile with the identifi-cation of France with one of the two scalesin the balance. The solution to this contra-diction was sought in another importantrefinement of the simple balance system.This took the form of introducing adistinction between the superior and gene-ral European balance in which France wasone of the scales, and a series of regionalbalances, subordinate but important tothe total equilibrium. As the weakerpart in the greater balance, France wasmotivated to restore the equilibrium, andtherefore well suited to 'hold' the minor

123balances. Such subsystems were Italy,where the power of Spain was balancedby Venice, Tuscany, Savoy and the PapalState, and Germany, where the compo-nents in the balance were imperial v.princely power.Still, the attribution of this double roleto France contained logical weaknesses,which were only removed when Englandfinally took over the role of holder of theEuropean balance in the literature, andbalance-of-power thinking entered whatmay fairly be called its classical stage.Before this happened, France had ex-plicitly abandoned the balance-of-powerdoctrine, as can be seen from the instruc-tion given in 1665 to the ambassador ofFrance to the Sublime Porte, concerningVenice:

Encore que la maxime de la Re-publique soit de vouloir tenir l'equi-libre entre les puissances de 1'Europe,et pour cet effet d'embrasser toujoursle parti du plus faible pour empecherqu'il ne devienne trop inferieur ilautre .. 16

and since Venice would not fail to employher forces against Louis XIV to the ad-vantage of Spain as the weaker part, theKing did not at all desire to work forpeace between Turkey and Venice.At this time the idea of the balance ofpower had been picked up by Austrianwriters arguing that the French theoryhad been basically sound, only wronglyapplied since France was the real chal-lenger to the balance. This short-livedAustrian period led directly into the Eng-lish period, as England was openly calledupon by the most prominentof the Austrianbalance writers, Franz Paul von Lisola, ina pamphlet entitled Appel de l'Angleterre,published in 1673.174. The 'British period'

Within a generation the balance-of-power doctrine had risen to the status ofa sacred principle in Britishforeign policy,and this new situation is amply reflected


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124both in continental literature and innumerous English contributions.

England's position as holder of thebalance was supported by the view thatEngland's interests in continental affairswere restricted to upholding the balance,and that she therefore could act with akind of impartiality. It was claimed byBritish writers:

It is manifest that the people of anisland can have no interest in makingforeign acquisitions.l8And the same opinion was given a spiritedexpression by the continental scholar,Emmerichde Vattel:L'Angleterre, dont les richesses &les Flottes respectables ont une tres-grande influence, sans allarmer aucunEtat pour sa liberte, parce que cettePuissance paroit guerie de l'esprit deConquete; l'Angleterre, dis-je, a lagloire de tenir en ses mains la BalancePolitique.l9In order to fulfil this beneficial function inEuropean affairs, howtever, England mustbe secured a powerful position, and mighteven claim a fair remuneration. In thisdangerous crisis, says an anonymous Eng-lish pamphlet in 1677, it has pleased Prov-idence Divine to appoint England asarbiter of the fate of Europe and to addsuch advantages to this office that thenation's honour, duty and security seeminextricably bound together.20This opinion too was echoed from thecontinent. In a doctoral dissertation fromGottingen (1744) the author declared thatat present Spain was disturbing Britishtrade and thereby the balance, since itwas necessary to the equilibrium of Europethat England was maintained in enjoy-ment of her advantages.21The most important theoretical contri-butions in English literature in the period,particularly as regards the specification ofthe role of holder of the balance, came,however, from the opposition againstBritain's active engagement in continentalaffairs in the decades after the treaty ofUtrecht. The most productive and insistent

of the contributors was Lord Bolingbroke,who had himself been leading in con-cluding the peace of 1713.To Bolingbroke the essential elementsin the balance-of-power doctrine arerestraint and moderation - restraint inentering into armed conflicts, moderationin the formulation and pursuit of war aims.For this opinion he argues from threedifferent angles: (1) England's uniqueposition and particular interests as anisland, (2) the general European balanceof power's not being endangered by everyconflict between the states on the conti-nent, and (3) the exact state of equilibriumbeing, for principal as well as practicalreasons, neither obtainable nor perceivable.As an island, protected by the sea andby a mighty fleet, rich in itself and richerby its commerce, England is not forced totake a regular part in continental politics,but neither can she turn her back onEurope:

We must always remember, thatwe are not part of the continent, butwe must never forget that we areneighbors to it.22The governments on the continent mustfor the sake of their own security beconstantly and restlessly active in foreignpolicy. Driven by necessity they mustengage themselves as mediators, guar-antors and participants in defensive andoffensive alliances. This continental systemhas its own automatism:

Their several interests are theobjects of their alliances; and as theformer are subject to change, thelatter must vary with them. Suchvariations, whether occasioned by thecourse of accidents, or by the passionsof men, tho made by a few, willaffect many; because there alwaysare, and always must be, systems ofalliances subsisting among these na-tions; and therefore,as a changein someof the parts of one system necessarilyrequiresa change in all the rest; so thealterationof onesystem necessarilyrequiresan alteration of the others. Thus arethey always tossed from peace to war,and from war to peace.23


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But if England, who had no need of it,indulged in 'the rage of negotiating', shewould lose her decisive influence. Only inextraordinary crises, in which the generalbalance of power was obviously threat-ened, would it be proper for England tointervene. This restraint in foreign affairswould

... place the British nation in suchcircumstances of happiness and glory,as the greatest empires could neverboast. Far from being alarmed atevery motion on the continent ...we might enjoy the securest peace,and the most unenvied plenty. Farfrom courting, or purchasing thealliances of other nations, we mightsee them suing for ours. Far frombeing hated and despised, for in-volving ourselves in all the littlewrangles of the continent, we might beloved and respected by all those whomaintain the just ballance of Europe,and be formidable to those alone whoshould endeavor to break it.24

On the other hand, untimely interventionwould result in the loss of these advantages,and in addition such intervention mightupset a balance still not imperilled.The safeness of a patient vigilance aswell as the dangers involved in rash actionBolingbroke tied to a further analysis ofthe nature of the balance:

The scales of the balance of powerwill never be exactly poized, nor isthe precise point of equality eitherdiscernible or necessary to be dis-cerned. It is sufficient in this, as inother human affairs, that the devi-ation be not too great. Some therewill always be.25This imperfection implies that at certainperiods a policy based on balance-of-powter estimates is doomed to fail:

They who are in the sinking scale,for in the political balance of power,unlike to all others, the scale that isempty sinks, and that which is fullrises; they who are in the sinking scaledo not easily come off from the habi-tual prejudices of superior wealth, orpower, or skill, or courage, nor from

125the confidence that these prejudicesinspire. They who are in the risingscale do not immediately feel theirstrength, nor assume that confidencein it which successful experience givesthem afterwards. They who are themost concerned to watch the vari-ations of this balance, misjudge oftenin the same manner, and from thesame prejudices. They continue todread a power no longer able to hurtthem, or they continue to have noapprehensions of a power that growsdaily more formidable.26

This theoretical deduction of a time-lag between actual and perceived disturb-ances of the balance is supported by thesame historical evidence in Bolingbroke'swritings as was invoked by the Austrianwriters who picked up the balance doctrinewhen it was abandoned by the French:from the last stages of the Thirty-Years'War and to the treaty of the Pyrenees,Europe had been fooled on false balancepremises to support an already too power-ful France.

The arguments for moderation in actionwere the same as called for restraint beforeacting:

A constant attention to these devi-ations is therefore necessary. Whenthey are little, their increase may beeasily prevented by early care andthe precautions that good policysuggests. But when they become greatfor want of this care and these pre-cautions, or by the force of unforeseenevents, more vigor is to be exerted,and greater efforts to be made. Buteven in such cases, much reflectionis necessary on all the circumstancesthat form the conjuncture; lest, byattacking with ill success, the devi-ation be confirmed, and the powerthat is deemed already exorbitantbecome more so; and lest, by attack-ing with good success, whilst one scaleis pillaged, too much weight ofpower be thrown into the other.27

Though Bolingbroke to a great extentpresents his reflections in the language ofthe simple two-scaled balance, in someimportant respects his work was a revivaland further development of the complex


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126balance model in his description of thenormal continental system, as will be seenfrom the italicized quotation on page124. To this system he attributed certaininherent mechanisms that kept the systemin incessant movement with continuallyshifting alignments and frequent wars.Only when the system degenerated intoa simple and unbalanced bipolarism,would it be the task of England to inter-vene and re-establish equilibrium.This same doctrine of moderation wasvoiced by David Hume, who made a bitingcriticism of the British wars in the nameof the balance of power by stating:Our wars with France have beenbegun with justice, and even, perhaps,from necessity; but have always beentoo far pushed from obstinacy andpassion. The same peace, which wasafterwards made at Ryswick in 1697,was offered so yearly as the yearninety-two; that concluded at Utrechtmight have been finished on as goodconditions at Gertuydenberg in theyear eight; and we might have given

at Frankfort, in 1743, the same termswhich we were glad to accept atAix-la-Chapelle in the year forty-eight. Here then we see, that abovehalf of our wars with France, and allour public debts, are owing more toour own imprudent vehemence, thanto the ambition of our neighbours.In the second lace, we are so declaredin our opposition to French power,and so alert in defence of our allies,that they always reckon upon ourforce as upon their own; and ex-pecting to carry on war at our ex-pence, refuse all reasonable terms ofaccommodation. ... All the worldknows, that the factitious vote of theHouse of Commons, in the beginningof the last parliament, with the pro-fessed humour of the nation, madethe Queen of Hungary inflexible inher terms, and prevented that agree-ment with Prussia, which wouldimmediately have restored the gene-ral tranquillity of Europe.28In the treaties of England in this periodthe balance of power is idealized as a pre-requisite to the peace of Europe. In mostcontemporary English literature we meet

the same doctrine as an expression of arobustand even merry scepticism explicitlytied to British commercial interests.This particular brand is amply demon-strated by DanielDefoeat the beginning ofthe 18th century, and I shall take theliberty of quoting him at length:

A just Ballance of Power is the Life ofPeace. I question whether it be in theHumane Nature to set Bounds to itsown Ambition, and whether the bestMan on Earth wou'd not be Kingover all the rest if he could. EveryKing in the World would be theUniversal Monarch if he might, andnothing restrains but the Power ofNeighbours; and if one Neighbour isnot strong enough for another, hegets another Neighbour to join withhim, and all the little ones will jointo keep the great one from suppressingthem. Hence comes Leagues andConfederacies . ..29

Thus the foundation of the balance ofpower and of international relations ingeneral; and faced with this reality justiceand legitimate accession to power are re-duced to factors of secondary importance:

This is the short History of thisLeague, which really has more ofPolicy than Right in it, for strictlyConsidered, the Right of Successioncan devolve but upon one Person, letthat one be who it will, is not thepresent Business. But publick good,the Peace of Kingdoms, the Generalquiet of Europeprevails to set asidethe Point of nice Justice, and deter-mine in favour of the Publick Tran-quility.30

Public tranquillity in the issue in question,i.e. the Spanish succession, then quicklyboils down to a matter of preservingBritain's commercial hegemony:If the French get the SpanishCrown, we are beaten out of the Fieldas to Trade, and are besieged in ourown Island, and never let us flatter

our selves with our Safety consistingso much in our Fleet; for this Ipresume to lay down as a fundamen-tal Axiom, at least as the Wars go oflate, 'tis not the longest Sword, but


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the longest Purse that conquers. Ifthe French get Spain they get thegreatest Trade in the World in theirHands; they that have the mostTrade, will have the most Money,and they that have the most Money,will have the most Ships, the bestFleet, and the best Armies; and ifonce the French master us at Sea,where are we then?31So far, we might still expect the argumentto conclude by eulogizing British trade asan instrument for promoting universalprogress and welfare. In Defoe's reason-ing, however, considerations of this kindare not only conspicuously absent, he evenfrankly admits a grave threat to Britishinterests from improvements in Spain:

The present King of France, ike awise Governor, puts his People uponall manner of Improvements; tho'the Spaniards re a slothful Nation, ifthe French Diligence comes once tothrive in Spain, he knows little ofSpain that does not know they arecapable of Improvements, severalways to the disadvantage of theEnglish Trade.I'll give but one Instance, Spain s avery hot Country, and yet such is theConstancy of the Spaniardo the Oldridiculous Custom, that they weartheir Cloaks of coarse black EnglishBays, should the French King'whenhe is Master of Spain, forbid theSpaniards he wearing of Bays, andintroduce some antick French Druget,or other thin Stuff, such as they makein Normandy,t wou'd at once destroyour Trade of Bays, which is thenoblest Manufacture in many re-spects that we have in England, andsend 40 Thousand People who dependon that Trade to beg their Bread .. .32

By the middle of the 18th centuryBritish balance-of-power tradition had- explicitly or implicitly - incorporatedpractically all the elements that have beenlaid down by an eminent social scientistof the 20th century as 'essential rules'characterizing the balance-of-power sys-tem, and a better summing up than thisformulation of the rules by Morton A.Kaplancan hardly by found:

1271. Act to increase capabilities butnegotiate rather than fight.2. Fight rather than pass up anopportunity to increase capabili-ties.3. Stop fighting ratherthan eliminatean essential national actor.4. Act to oppose any coalition orsingle actor which tends to assumea position of predominance withrespect to the rest of the system.5. Act to constrain actors who sub-scribe to supranational organizingprinciples.6. Permit defeated or constrainedessential national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable

role partners or act to bring somepreviously inessential actor withinthe essential actor classification.Treat all essentialactors as accept-able role partners.33Before turning to the continental con-tributions to balance-of-power thinkingin the same period, repeated emphasismust again be laid on the fact that Britishwriters never professed strong convictionsas to the theoretical possibility of a stable

balance of power. Neither did they exaltthe doctrine as the way to a lasting peace.The robust resignation in this respect, socharacteristicof most British writersin thefield, was concisely formulated by CharlesDavenant,contemporary of Defoe:

As the Earth is now divided intoseveral Kingdomes, PrincipalitiesandStates, between 'em Wars will hap-pen, but the Weaker fortifie them-selves by Alliances with the stronger;so that (unless some Great Oppressorrises up to disturb the World with hisAmbition) we have many more yearsof Peace than of War; whereas inUniversal Empires every day had itsdifferent Calamities ...34

5. Continentalpeace ideologuesin the 18thcenturyStrongly contrastingwith this attitude, aseries of important continental contribu-

tions to balance-of-power reasoning in the18th century emerged from a sincerepreoccupation with the problems con-nected with providing a basis for a lasting


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128peace. The period covered by this studyalso gave birth to a number of schemesaiming at organizing the European statesinto some sort of permanent confederation.Such projects, however, from the 'GrandDesign' attributed to Henry IV by Sullyto that outlined by ImmanuelKant, lies inthe main outside the scope of the presentarticle, as being directed towards a com-munity of power rather than towards abalance of power.35 Nevertheless, in ar-guing their case some federalist writersmoved within the sphere of balance rea-soning, though transcending it in theirconclusions.In this line of thought the simple balancemodel is seen to be completely replaced bya revival of the complex model with astrong emphasis on the common char-acteristics and common interests of thesystem members. Though echoing Britishwriters in their distrust of human nature,continental philosophers of the Enlighten-ment provided two different sets of ad-ditional premises which permitted an out-spoken optimism as regards the future ofthe European system of states.The first set of premises was a strongbelief in the value of education in affectingthe conduct of monarchs, both by im-proving their moral status and by sup-plying them with deeper insight into theirtrue interests, which in effect might beregarded as one and the same object.Fenelon,archbishop and tutor to the grand-son of Louis XIV, worked along theselines in his 'Supplement a 1'Examen deconscience sur les devoirs de la royaute':

Les Etats voisins les uns des autres,ne sont pas seulement obliges a setraiter mutuellement selon les reglesde justice et de bonne foi; ils doiventencore, pour leur surete particuliere,autant que pour l'interet commun,faire une espece de societe et derepublique generale.Il faut compter qu'a la longue laplus grande Puissance prevaut tou-jours et renverse les autres, si lesautres ne se reunissent pour faire lecontre-poids. II n'est pas permis

d'esperer, parmi les hommes, qu'unepuissance superieure demeure dansles bornes d'une exacte moderation,et qu'elle ne veuille dans sa force quece qu'elle pourrait obtenir dans laplus grande faiblesse. Quand memeun prince serait assez parfait pourfaire un usage si merveilleux de saprosperite, cette merveille finiraitavec son regne. L'ambition naturelledes souverains, les flatteries de leursconseillers et la prevention des nationsentieres ne permettent pas de croirequ'une nation qui peut subjuguer lesautres s'en abstienne pendant dessiecles entiers ...II faut done compter sur ce qui estreel et journalier, qui est que chaquenation cherche a prevaloir sur toutesles autres qui l'environnent. Chaquenation est done obligee a veiller sanscesse, pour prevenir l'excessif ag-grandissement de chaque voisin, poursa surete propre. Empecher le voisind'etre trop puissant, ce n'est pointfaire un mal; c'est se garantir de laservitude et en garantir ses autresvoisins; en un mot, c'est travailler atla liberte, a la tranquillite, au salutpublic: car l'aggrandissement d'unenation au dela d'une certaine bornechange le systeme general de toutesles nations qui out rapport at celle-la... Tous les membres qui composentle grand corps de la chretiente sedoivent les uns aux autres, pour leblen commun, et se doivent encore aeux-memes, pour la surete de la patrie,de prevenir tout progres de quelqu'undes membres, qui renverserait l'equi-libre et qui se tournerait a la ruineinevitable de tous les autres membresdu meme corps. Tout ce qui changeou altere ce systeme general del'Europe est trop dangereux et traineapres soi des maux infinis.36

Still only rather vaguely pointing in thedirection of a European federalism, thisopen advocacy of the balance-of-powerdoctrine supported by a vehement in-sistence on the identity of system interestsand single member interests, was a cou-rageous enterprise in absolutist France,deeply engaged in intrigues for securinga Bourbon succession to the Spanishthrone. More extreme in his belief in theeffects of offering a comprehensive solu-


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tion to the problems of European peace, aswell as in the scope and detail of his pro-posals, I'Abbede Saint-Pierre in his 'Projet depaix perpetuelle' can be seen as represent-ing the same line of educational optimism.The same author, however, provides thelink to the second type of optimism, inthat his work was picked up and rewrittenby Jean Jacques Rousseauin the latter halfof the century. In Rousseau's version weare presented with a sort of mechanisticsystem resembling that outlined by Boling-broke, but with an even greater emphasison its automatic processes:

C'est ainsi que toutes les puissancesde l'Europe forment entre elles unesorte de systeme qui les unit par unememe religion, par un meme droitdes gens, par les moeurs, par les lettres,par le commerce, et par une sorted'equilibre qui est l'effet necessairede tout cela, et qui, sans que personnesonge en effet a le conserver, neserait pourtant pas si facile a rompreque pensent beaucoup de gens...Le systeme de l'Europe a precise-ment le degre de solidite qui peut lamaintenir dans une agitation perpe-tuelle, sans la renverser tout-a-fait;et si nos maux ne peuvent augmenter,ils peuvent encore moins finir, parceque toute grande revolution est de-sormais impossible...Mais qu'on y songe ou non, cetequilibre subsiste, et n'a besoin quede lui-meme pour se conserver, sansque personne s'en mele; et quand il seromprait un moment d'un cote, ilse retablirait bientot d'un autre: desorte que si les princes qu'on accusaitd'aspirer a la monarchie universelley ont reellement aspire, ils montraienten cela plus ambition que de genie.37

This optimism concerning the self-re-adjusting and self-perpetuating propertiesof the system did not imply that Rousseaufound the system an ideal one. On thecontrary, he attacked it as involvingunnecessary suffering and expense, sinceit inspired unending but vain conflicts.

. . . de sorte que les peuples sont in-cessament desoles sans aucun profitsensible pour les souverains.38

129Therefore it was in need of perfection,which could be achieved by the aid ofReason. At this point Rousseau proceededto present the scheme taken over froml'Abbe de Saint-Pierre for a Europeanconfederation based not on lofty idealismbut on the true interests of each sovereignstate. As this transcends our limited pur-pose, we shall leave Rousseau at this stage,only noting that he insisted that his projectof perpetual peace did not at all pre-suppose any change in human nature:

... car on doit bien remarquer quenous n'avons point suppose les hom-mes tels qu'ils devraient etre, bons,genereux, desinteresses, et aimant lebien public par humanite; mais telsqu'ils sont, injustes, avides, et prefe-rant leur interet a tout.39Though strikingly different in other

respects, Kant's treatise, Zum ewigen Frie-den, voiced a similar kind of optimismconcerning the impersonal functioning ofthe state system. His conclusions, too,place him as a federalist thinker, but theEuropean community of states as envis-aged by Kant was a predestined end-in-view of Nature herself and the logicaloutcome of the operation of compellingforces inherent in the existing balancesystem, in spite of, nay even by means of,selfish and wicked dispositions of humannature:

Man kann dieses auch an den wirk-lich vorhandenen, noch sehr unvoll-kommen organisierten Staaten sehen,dass sie sich doch im aiusseren Ver-halten dem, was die Rechtsidee vor-schreibt, schon sehr nahern, obgleichdas Innere der Moralitat davonsicherlich nicht die Ursache ist (... .),mithin der Mechanism der Naturdurch selbstsiichtige Neigungen, dienaturlicherweise einander auch aus-serlich entgegenwirken, von der Ver-nunft zu einem Mittel gebrauchtwerden kann, dieser ihrem eigenenZweck, der rechtlichen Vorschrift,Raum zu machen und hiemit auch,soviel an dem Staat selbst liegt, deninneren sowohl als ausseren Friedenzu befordern und zu sichern. - Hier


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130heisst es also: Die Natur will un-widerstehlich, dass das Recht zuletztdie Obergewalt erhalte...Die Idee des Volkerrechts setzt dieAbsonderungieler von einander un-abhaingiger benachbarter Staatenvoraus; und obgleich ein solcher Zu-stand ans sich schon ein Zustand desKrieges ist (wenn nicht eine fodera-tive Vereinigung derselben dem Aus-bruch der Feindseligkeitenvorbeugt):so ist doch selbst dieser nach derVernunftidee besser als die Zusam-menschmelzung derselben durch einedie andere iuberwachsende und ineine UniversalmonarchieubergehendeMacht ... Indessen ist dieser dasVerlangen jedes Staats (oder seinesOberhaupts), auf diese Art sich inden dauernden Friedenszustand zuversetzen, dass er womoglich dieganze Welt beherrscht. Aber dieNaturwill es anders. - Sie bedientsich zweier Mittel, um Volker vonder Vermischung abzuhalten und sieabzusondern, der Vershiedenheit derSprachen nd der Religionen, ie zwarden Hang zum wechselseitigen Hasseund Vorwand zum Kriege bei sichfuiihrt,aber doch bei anwachsenderKultur und der allmaihlichen An-naiiherungder Menschen zu grossererEinstimmung in Prinzipien zum Ein-verstaindnissen einem Frieden leitet,der nicht wie jener Despotism (aufdem Kirchhofe der Freiheit) durchSchwaichung aller Kraifte, sonderndurch ihr Gleichgewicht im leb-haftesten Wetteifer derselben hervor-gebracht und gesichert wird.40

It is important to note that Kant, thoughregarding it as the irresistible will ofNature that one day the present warlikebalance system, by some conscious act ofthe heads of states, would be replaced bya voluntary confederation of free states,carried the notion of an equilibrium ofpower with him into the new system as apositive value in itself.6. Balanceof power n internationalawAt different periods we have seen theproblems of justice and international lawtouched upon by balance-of-powerwriters.Francis Bacon declared the balance-of-power doctrine perfectly compatible with

international law. Daniel Defoe admittedthe possibility of conflict between legaland political doctrines, but declared infavour of letting the latter prevail. Kant,finally, seems to have regarded both asexpressions of the same imperfect stage inthe development of international relations,and he is obviously less concerned withassessing their mutual relationship thanwith demonstratingthat Nature is workingto make them both obsolete.Some brief remarkson how those whosework was primarily in the field of interna-tional law approached the balance-of-power doctrine may therefore seem per-tinent.Both lines of thought aimed at formu-lating maxims forconducting internationalaffairs.Both also can be seen as proceedingfrom a common basic norm: the will orobligation of each individual state to seekto survive as such. Writerson internationallaw, however, willingly recognized anumber of legally impeccable ways bywhich any state might increase its power,and hence there arose serious difficultieswith regard to the balance-of-power doc-trine. The main problem may be formu-lated as follows: Shall it be consideredcompatible with international law, for thesake of preserving the balance of power,to intervene against a state which bynormal and legitimate means achievesdecisive advantages in its power position?Can a mere anticipation of a threat beregarded as sufficientlegal justificationforstarting a preventive war?To theorists of international law thisproblem presented a more painful puzzlethan to politicians:

La question n'est pas un probleme,pour la plupart des Politiques: Elleest plus embarassante pour ceux quiveulent allier constamment la Justicea la Prudence.41Many different solutions were offered,none of them, however, gaining sufficientacceptance to be regardedas the authorita-tive answer from the discipline of inter-


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national law as such. Some theorists werewilling to admit the legitimacy of preven-tive wars to preserve the balance of power,arguing that the inherent ambition ofhuman beings made it certain that powerwould be aggressively employed by anystate that felt sufficiently strong. Conse-quently, it was not only dangerous, buteven unnecessary to wait for concrete actsof aggression. Theorists of this kind notonly accepted balance-of-power doctrinesas legally defensible, but declared for theircomplete incorporation among the doc-trines of international law (Kahle). Othersinsisted that only manifest aggressionmight justify war (Grotius), or at leastindisputable evidence that concrete ag-gression was under preparation (Pufen-dorf).42 Vattel, himself deeply convinced ofthe need to preserve the balance of power,sought to reconcile the divergent opinionsby two different approaches. In the firstplace, he formulated a set of rather lenientrules as to how a state might produce suchindisputable evidence when feeling threat-ened by the growing power of a neigh-bour state. Secondly, he ranked war atthe bottom of a list specifying a number ofpermitted reactions towards anticipatedaggression.7. Balance reasoningattackedThe contributions to balance-of-powerreasoning hitherto examined have comeeither from professed protagonists of theidea or at least from writers displaying ageneral sympathetic attitude. The criti-cisms encountered so far have been of arather mild character, whether simplyaccusing balance practitioners of failureto comply with the demands of the doctrineproperly understood, or directed againstthe imperfections of the balance systemwith respect to maintaining peace, orstemming from legalistic apprehensions.

This presentation cannot be concluded,however, without dealing with the morefundamental criticism which altogetherdenied the ideas of a balance of power

131any tenability as a descriptive as well asa normative theory.

Already discernible as a growing trendin the 1740s, the total refutation of thewhole concept of a balance of power cul-minated in the massive frontal attacklaunched by Johann Heinrich Gottlob vonJusti in 1758 in his treatise 'Die Chimaredes Gleichgewichts von Europa'. A sum-mary of Justi's work seems therefore thesimplest method of doing justice to thewhole school of critics up to the end ofthe 18th century. Besides, this also seemsa convenient way of summing up thevarious difficulties which we have seenprotagonists of the balance striving tocope with. For, though never beforebrought together and never before formu-lated so sharply, the arguments by whichJusti sought to explode the total frame-work of equilibrist thinking, were not hisown inventions. As will be seen from thefollowing presentation of six of his majorarguments, we have already encounteredmost of them in other contexts:1. Only one type of war can be recog-nized as reasonable and thereby justi-fied: such wars that are caused by irre-concilably conflicting economic interests.But nine out of ten wars in modern historyhave been caused by irrational passions,ambition and envy. And the same pas-sions have given rise to the idea of abalance of power and used it to concealthe basic motives for war.

The first of these sentences reminds oneof the efforts of, e.g., Daniel Defoe tosupport a balance strategy by commercialinterests; the second and third will beseen to fall within the extension of DavidHume's argument.2. A balance-of-power policy presupposesthat power can be measured and com-pared, but power comes from many sour-ces, and there exists no common denomi-nator for comparing different forms ofpower. Moreover, even the same form ofpower cannot be reliably compared for


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132lack of a measure for estimating bothquantitative and qualitative variations.

Already Francis Bacon had touched onthis problem, and Bolingbroke had dis-cussed it in greater detail, finding only anindirect solution by allowing minor devia-tions from the strict balance to pass withoutreaction, recommending intervention onlyagainst obvious disturbances of the equi-librium.3. The actual power of any state can begreatly increased if its government pursuesa wise and enlightened policy of reformin domestic affairs. Thus, without in-creasing its territory by an inch of foreignsoil, a state might utterly disturb a settledinternational power equilibrium by a notonly perfectly legitimate, but even highlypraiseworthy policy. Acting in accordancewith equilibrist maxims, less enlightenedand more backward states would thenfeel entitled to intervene in order to redressthe balance. In its consequences, therefore,the balance-of-power doctrine will dis-courage human progress and greatly re-duce the freedom of individual states whichit claims to protect.

By this argument the dilemma whichwe have seen theorists of international lawstriving to solve is presented with ex-treme clarity, hardly permitting anyequivocal answers.4. Neither can the immense armamentsand public debts caused by concerns forthe general equilibrium of Europe bejustified by the dangers of universalmonarchy. Firstly, the chances that thesedangers shall materialize are microscopic.Secondly, if the almost impossible reallyhappened, and a single state rose to suchpreponderance, the only policy recom-mended by reason would be to concederather than irritate the invincible.

The former premise accords very wellwith Rousseau's opinion, but the latterone contradicted fundamentally one ofthe basic values underlying all balance-of-power reasoning.5. To Justi the most alluring but utterly

false pretence in equilibrist literature wasthe notion of a general European 'repub-lic' or community of states tied togetherby moral ties as well as common interests.In reality, a Hobbesian state of nature stillexisted in international affairs, and theaggregate of individual states did not at allform a higher unit with recognizablesystem interests.6. In conclusion, Justi denied the validityof the historical evidence invoked bybalance-of-power writers in support oftheir doctrine. On the contrary, he soughtto demonstrate that history as well ascontemporary politics would become in-comprehensible if described in equilibristterms. The truth was rather that no statehad ever acted on balance-of-power prin-ciples, but that all

... sich dieses Lehrgebaiudes be-dient haben, um sich Bundesgenossenzu verschaffen und ihr besonderesInteresse und ihre Leidenschaften ..darunter zu verstecken.43

8. ConcludingreflectionsHas there ever existed a balance ofpower between states? The question pre-supposes that it is possible firstly to specifythe conditions under which such a balancemay be said to obtain, and secondly torecognize to what degree the conditionshave been fulfilled in different internation-al situations. In other words, there mustexist both a theory of balance of powersufficiently precise to render it applicableto concrete circumstances, and a solidbody of the historical knowledge necessaryfor its application.To the question above, then, the ma-terial presented and commented upon inthis article can provide no answer. Itcertainly does not convey the right sort ofhistorical knowledge for such a purpose.Moreover, some readers will have notedthat I have shunned the use of the term'theory' with reference to the balance-of-power statements commented upon, andI have done so deliberately. These state-


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ments might deserve to be called theoriesin the broad sense, taken to cover allstatementswith a claim to give some gene-ralized description of reality. Nevertheless,it seems clear that none of them meets thecriteria of a scientific theory in a morerestricted sense.Then, what are the lessons, if any, tobe drawn from this body of past thinking?Perhaps its most striking characteristicis its high degree of similarity with currentdebate. If we penetrate beneath the surfaceof old-style language, it seems to me thatone can hardly escape being impressed

with a feeling that precisely this way ofreasoning still forms the core of balance-of-power thinking, widely circulated andhighly respected. Since the 18th centurysome refinements may have been addedto the doctrine, but it has scarcely under-gone any fundamental change.Some people may find comfort by thusseeing - to paraphrase Canning's words-the balance of the Old World calledback into existence to support their con-ceptions of the balance of the New. This,however, would be a particularly unhappyconclusion to draw, owing to the greatlack of consistency and general agreementthat the material displays.We have seen sharp disagreements asto how the balance doctrine ought to beemployed, but maybe the best illustrationis offered by the partitions of Poland inthe last third of the 18th century. Hailedby some writers as 'a desirable and evenoutstanding achievement of balance-of-power policy', by others the same eventswere described as 'a hideous breach ofbalance-of-power precepts'.44These dissensions, obviously due todivergent political as well as moral orien-tations, to some extent also stemmed fromthe many different meanings in which theterm 'balance of power' was used. Modernwriters have been keenly aware of thisdifficulty. HansJ. Morgenthau,or instance,lists four differentmeanings; ErnstB. Haasextends the number to eight; and A. F.

133Pollard felt so uneasy about it that heconsulted the Oxford English Dictionary,where he found twenty different meaningsof 'balance', sixty-three of 'of' and eighteenof 'power', leaving it to mathematicians tocalculate the possible number of combina-tions.45Nor is evidence lacking from cur-rent debate to demonstrate the same un-clarity as regards basic definitions.This being so, serious doubt is cast onthe operational and even on the educa-tional value of using balance-of-powercon-cepts. One function of this study maytherefore be that of inspiring both acertain scepticism and a rise in the de-mands for stringency and precision.In our days we are exposed to energeticefforts to persuade us that peace will bebest secured by a perfection of the inter-national balance of power. Even withoutraising at this point the question of defi-nitions, familiarity with the balance-of-power tradition in political literature mayincrease the power to resist such effortsbybringing to mind the awkward fact thatwar has always been regarded as a propermeans of creating or restoringthe desirableequilibrium. Although a balance of powerhas avowedly been regarded as a prerequi-site for peace, there can be no doubt thatthe doctrine of balance has frequently,and with astonishing success, served as ajustification for war.Maybe the greatest theoretical differ-ence between the balance models presen-ted in this article is between the models fora deliberate balance policy and the modelof the self-balancing system of states, themost typical exponent of this last beingRousseau.

According to descriptive models of theformer kind, states may or may not pursuea balance-of-power policy from which mayor may not result an actual balance ofpower. Regrettably enough, the evidenceneeded for the verification or falsificationof such theories is of a kind that in practicemust be immensely difficult to establish, ifnot impossible in principle.


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134The second type of balance modelseems closely related to classical economic

theory. From the individual efforts of allinteracting states to maximize some powerlsecurity function of theirs, there resultsunintentionally a state of equilibriumwithin the system of states as a whole, thisprocess being very similar to the equationof supply and demand within a market ofperfect competition. This way of reasoning,having brought great progress to thescience of economics, might seem a pro-mising way to follow for the science of

politics. If it is entered upon, however, theterm 'balance of power' might be dis-pensed with since it is used only to de-scribe general properties of the system assuch, and since in experience it is an easyprey to misunderstanding and confusion.It may also be added that the present stateof economics as a science, as well as thepresent state of world politics, might renderit a hazardous adventure for politicalscience to seek inspiration in the earlychildhood of today's most advanced socialscience.

NOTES* Paper presented at the First Nordic Conference on Peace Research, Oslo, 4-8 January 1963,here published as PRIO publication no. 11-1. The author wishes to express his gratitude tothe Aquinas Foundation, New York, for financial support.1David Hume, Essaysand Treatises,Vol. I, p. 300.2 Ibid., p. 305.3 As will be amply demonstrated by the following references, I have taken quite a lot of thequotations fromprevioussimilar studies in the field. My indebtedness to these authorsfor guidanceto the primary sources as well as to the problems in general may seem less obvious, but is possiblyeven greater. Those whom I would particularly like to mention in these respects are, in chrono-

logical order:Ernest Nys, 'La theorie de l'equilibre europeen', Revuededroit nternationalt delegislation omparee,t. XXV, 1893.E. Kaeber, Die Idee deseuropdischenleichgewichtsn derpublizistischeniteraturom16. bis zur Mittedes 18. Jahrhunderts, erlin 1907.Charles Dupuis, Leprinciped'equilibret le concerturopeenela paix de Westphalie l'acted'Algeciras,Paris 1909.A. F. Pollard, 'The Balance of Power', Journalof theBritishInstitute f Internationalffairs,Vol. II,no 2, 1923.Edward V. Gulick, Europe'sClassicalBalanceof Power,Cornell Univ. Press, N. Y. 1955.Gaston Zeller, 'Le principe d'equilibre dans la politique internationale avant 1789', RevueHistorique, . CCXV, 1956.4 Quoted from Zeller, op. cit., p. 26.5 Ibid., p. 27.8J. Spedding (ed.), The Worksof FrancisBacon,Vol. VI, London 1870, pp. 420 f.7 To this problem Bacon returned in greater detail in the essay 'Of the true Greatness of King-doms and Estates', ibid., pp. 444-52.8 See Kaeber, op. cit., pp. 12 f.9 Quoted from Zeller, op. cit., p. 28.10 Ibid.11Henri de Rohan, De l'interetdesprinceset estats de la chrestiente, 683. Quoted from Zeller,op. cit., p. 29.12 Gaspard de Real de Curban, La sciencedu gouuernement,aris 1765. Quoted from NYS,op. cit., p. 43.13 William Camden, The Historyof themostRenownednd Victorious rincessElizabeth, ate Queen

of England,3. ed., London 1675, p. 223. Quoted from Kaeber, op. cit., p. 28.14 Kaeber, op. cit., p. 33.15 Ibid., p. 32.16 Quoted from Zeller, op. cit., p. 31.17 Kaeber, pp. 50 f.


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13518 Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke, Works,Vol. I, London 1754, p. 427.19Emmerich de Vattel, Le Droit desGens,ou Principesde la Loi NaturelleAppliques i la Conduite& aux AffairesdesNations& desSouverains,. I, livre 3, Leyden 1758, p. 18.20 ThepresentState of Christendom,nd the Interestof England,with a regard o France.Kaeber,op. cit., pp. 58 f.21 L. Martin Kahle, CommentatiourispublicidetrutinaEuropae,quaevulgoappellaturDie BallancevonEuropa',Gottingen 1744. See Kaeber, op. cit., pp. 94 ff.22Bolingbroke, Works,Vol. II, p. 499.23Ibid., Vol. I, p. 426. (My italics)24Ibid., p. 431.2CIbid., Vol. II, p. 439.26 Ibid., p. 389.27 Ibid., p. 439.28 Hume, op. cit., pp. 306 f.29 Daniel Defoe, A trueCollectionf theWritings f theAuthor f the TrueBomrnnglish-man, ondon1703, p. 356.30 Ibid., p. 358.31 Ibid., p. 362.32 Ibid., p. 363.33 Morton A. Kaplan, Systemand Process n Internationalolitics,N. Y. 1962, p. 23.34 Charles Davenant, Essays,London 1701, p. 291.35This distinction was made by Woodrow Wilson in the US Senate on 22 Jan. 1917. SeePollard, op. cit., p. 52.36 Quoted from Dupuis, op. cit., pp. 26 f.37 Jean Jacques Rousseau, ExtraitduProjetdePaix PerpetuelleeM. I'AbbedeSaint-Pierre,Oeuvrescompletes, t. V, Paris 1823, pp. 408, 415, 416.38 Ibid., p. 419.39 Ibid., p. 444.40 Immanuel Kant, ZumewigenFrieden,Werke B. VI (Berlin 1914), pp. 453 f.41 Vattel, op. cit., t. I, livre 3, p. 14.42 In a special Appendix to his book Kaeber gives a brief outline of how these problems weretackled by several theorists. Op. cit., pp. 143-53.43 Quoted from Kaeber, op. cit., p. 121.44 Ed. V. Gulick, op. cit., p. 37.45 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics amongNations,3rd ed. N. Y. 1960, p. 167; Ernst B. Haas,'The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda', in James N. Rosenau, Inter-nationalPoliticsandForeignPolicy,N. Y. 1961, pp. 320 ff.; A. F. Pollard, op. cit., p. 58.

S U MM A R YThe article gives a survey of the development of balance-of-power thinking in thecourse of three centuries. Three stages of development are distinguished, each character-ized by important innovations in balance thinking.1. Early development.Originally used to describe Italian conditions, the idea wasgradually given a general European application. In the beginning a complex (multi-lateral) balance model can be seen to coexist together with a simple bipolar model.2. The Frenchperiod covers approximately the first half of the 17th century, the maincontributions to balance thinking coming from French quarters. Reflecting the domi-nating Hapsburg-Bourbon rivalry, balance thinking tended to prefer the simplebipolar model. The idea was further refined by the introduction of a number of inferiorregional balances and by developing the concept of a 'holder' of the balance.3. The British period. Abandoned by France at about 1660, the idea was picked up byAustrian writers, but soon handed over to England, which from the end of the 17thcentury became the leading exponent of a European balance of power. In British


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136literature the idea was further developed towards a re-introduction of the complexbalance model and a specification of assumptions and methods of balance-of-powerpolitics.Continental contributions to balance-of-power thinking in the 18th century fromadvocates of a European federalism, from theorists of international law and fromoutright critics of the balance of power are treated under separate headings.In conclusion the author emphasizes the great similarity between balance-of-powerthinking in the 18th century and current debate on international affairs. Granted thediversity of meanings in which the term 'balance of power' has always been used, andthe diversity of opinions as regards concrete formulations of balance-of-power policy,historical knowledge of the balance-of-power tradition may well inspire scepticismtowards today's revival of the idea, not only as a descriptive theory but as a politicaldoctrine as well.

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