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Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the Egyptian National DebateAuthor(s): Rudi MattheeReviewed work(s):Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May, 1989), pp. 151-169Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/163072 .

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 21 (1989), 151-169. Printed in the United States of America

Rudi Matthee

JAMAL AL-DIN AL-AFGHANI AND

THE EGYPTIAN NATIONAL DEBATE

A remarkable man in his own lifetime, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani became a legendafter his death.' For

many people, Afghanievokes an

imagethat combines the

medieval ideal of the cosmopolitan Islamic scholar with the romantic aura of the19th-century revolutionary. Since the late 1960s, Afghani has been the object ofparticular attention and controversy in both the West and the Islamic world.Iranian and Western scholars have radically reinterpreted his background andbeliefs.2 This reevaluation of Afghani on the basis of new information about himhas, however, not been generally accepted in the Islamic world. If anything,recent attention to Afghani's unorthodoxy and possible irreligion has only servedto harden his defenders by giving credence to his own statements. Afghani playsan important role in the historical image of Muslim unity and sophistication

presented by manyIslamic

groupsand

governmentsin this

ageof revived

pan-Islamism. His plea for Islamic renewal through solidarity never lost its relevanceas a powerful symbol linking the past with hopes for the future. The image ofAfghani as the indefatigable fighter against Western imperialism who helped makethe Muslim world aware of its distinct identity remains equally as suggestive.

The following discussion will not deal with the broad question of the appraisalof Afghani in the Islamic world at large, but will rather concentrate on hiscontinuing role in Egypt, the country where his legacy is most strongly felt. It isin Egypt that the interpretation and reinterpretation of Afghani has most ex-pressedly carried into the 1980s the discussion that has surrounded him since his

death. The story of Afghani is interwoven with a crucial episode in Egyptianhistory; when, in 1983, the Egyptian intellectual Louis 'Awad drastically rein-terpreted Afghani's role, he implicitly offered a revisionist view of Egyptianhistory. At a time when every ideological current searches the past to legitimizeits own beliefs and above all its vision of Egypt's future, the political dimensionsof revisionist history are more significant than ever. That is why the scope of theintellectual controversy that followed 'Awad's work on Afghani far exceeds thatof academic discussion. That is also why the following discussion, aside fromaccepting the now-established fact that Afghani was born and raised in Iran, willfocus less on the accuracy of the various points raised in the debate than on the

political context of the controversy. Thus, the divergence of opinion this con-troversy has brought out is seen to reveal something of the stakes involved in thecurrent Egyptian debate on the country's identity and future direction. More

? 1989 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/89 $5.00 + .00

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152 Rudi Matthee

specifically, this divergence directly reflects the current struggle in Egypt betweenthe adherents of what is called the "Islamic alternative" and those who fear afurther extension of the place religion occupies in public life.3 The EgyptianAfghani polemic, in addition, is seen to reflect important issues in the widerArab and Muslim intellectual discourse, such as the nature and task of historicalinvestigation and criticism.

AFGHANI IN IRAN AND EGYPT

Iran and Egypt are the two countries where the current attention to Afghaniraises the most interesting questions of self-perception and historiography. Iranwas Afghani's birthplace, and Iranian scholars were the first to question some ofthe information he provided about himself.4 It should be stressed, however, thatin Iran Afghani never attained the popularity and the symbolic stature he enjoysin Egypt. He has never been a symbol of Iranian nationalism, a nationalism thathas been overwhelmingly secular and has rarely had a pan-Islamic componentinto which Afghani would fit. In Iran, moreover, a reappraisal of Afghani'sbackground has been possible without straining nationalist beliefs or religioussensitivities. Indeed, the Iranian self-image only stood to gain from the Iranianversion of Afghani's birth and childhood. If Jamal al-Din had been dishonestabout his homeland and Shi'i upbringing, the true story added a figure ofrenown to the Iranian kin and the ShiCi

community.In today's Iran, Afghani

enjoys unprecedented fame. His anti-imperialism, expressed in Islamic terms,makes Afghani an deal symbol for the mixture of Islam and "Third Worldist"ideology espoused by the Islamic Republic.5 His present stature ostensibly haslittle bearing on questions of national identity. But as national and religiousimages overlap considerably in present-day Iran, Afghani is, in practice, more ofan official national hero than he ever was before. He ranks with figures likeSheikh Fazlollah Nuri and Ayatollah Kashani as a precursor of the IslamicRepublic.6

Egypt is the country where Afghani spent several of his most fruitful years andwhere his influence has been most

far-reaching.In

Egypt,as

elsewhere, Afghaniis seen as an intellectual giant whose capacity to grasp the West's cultural andscientific secrets enabled him to resist the West, as well as to institute reform inthe Muslim world. In Egypt, in addition, this perception of Afghani is intimatelylinked with a national image that traces the beginnings of the Egyptian-Arabcultural "reawakening" not to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, but to the Egyptianresistance against Ottoman and Western domination in the second half of the19th century.

Although there are good reasons for the special Egyptian respect paid toAfghani, his prestige in Egypt goes far beyond his accomplishments during his

eight-year stayin Cairo.

Paradoxically,the

non-Egyptian Afghanihas become a

most vital element in the Egyptian repository of nationalist symbols. He sharesthat quality with Salah al-Din and Muhammad CAli, hough for different reasons.Salah al-Din fits into the Egyptian national context as the Kurdish-Arab sultanwho withstood the early imperialism of the Crusades.7 Muhammad 'Ali's


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Afghani and the Egyptian National Debate 153

Albanian-Ottoman background is generally minimized to emphasize his role asthe ruler who laid the groundwork for modern Egypt.8 But where Salah al-Dinlinks Egypt with the Arab world in a common struggle against the West andMuhammad 'Ali symbolizes the dawn of modern Egypt, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani combines Egypt, the Arab world, and the Islamic community in a self-image that traces Egypt's modern national identity to a 19th-century story ofrenewal and resistance.9 Afghani epitomizes the self-view of a 19th-centuryEgyptian reform movement leading the country to national emancipation whileguiding the Arab world in its rise against the Ottoman Empire and its struggleagainst the West. In his later years, Afghani is known to have favored theOttoman political framework. Furthermore, he seems to have referred mostly toancient Egypt in inciting Egyptian national pride. Yet, an important current inEgyptian historiography views him as a crucial link in establishing Egypt as theleader of the Arab world and the united Muslim defiance of Western imperialism.Afghani's dual role as reformer within Egypt and as its defender against theoutside world has become enshrined as national history through the hagio-graphic portrayal of him begun by his closest disciple Muhammad 'Abduh, whois himself a crucial figure in the Egyptian myth of 19th-century reform andrenewal. 10

This renewal myth has, in the last two decades, gained new relevance as it hasbecome integrated into the renewed search for, and reassertion of, indigenousreligious-cultural Arab-Islamic legacy (turath) by predominantly leftist intel-lectuals. The turath debate, which has strong Arabo-centric overtones and is notconfined to Egypt, should be seen as the expression of a search for a collectivereassertion of identity in the face of a continued, and still growing, presence ofWestern patterns and symbols. In Egypt, it joins the century-old discussion overthe nature of the country's affiliation with the Arab and Islamic world. In the1980s, this discussion has come to dominate the country's intellectual agenda as aresult of the reemergence of religious extremism in and around Egypt andcontinued pressure to institute the Shari'a as a component of the Egyptianlegislature. Afghani figures in this discussion in a powerfully symbolic way.Insofar as the desire to "Islamize"

Egyptis combined with the desire of the

faithful to apply the divine law and the sociopolitical wish to "respiritualize" anEgyptian society that is seen as too receptive to Western materialism, Afghani ishailed as a precursor by groups across the Islamic political spectrum. 1 Ironically,Afghani, who neither was Arab nor saw Arabs as privileged Muslims, is not onlypresented as a founder of the quest for the Arab-Islamic legacy, but has alsobeen incorporated as an essential part of that legacy itself.

THE CAWAD CONTROVERSY

In the 20thcentury,

the intellectual debate onEgypt's identity

hasgonethrough various stages. The aftermath of the 1919 Revolution marked the

heyday of Egyptian-territorial "Pharaonism," a trend that took pride in Egypt'spre-Islamic civilization rather than in Islam or Arabism. Pharaonism was fol-lowed in the 1930s and 1940s by the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic currents that


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154 Rudi Matthee

attacked the idea of Egypt being the heartland of a Nilotic civilization as a

Western-inspired fiction and proclaimed that the country was an indivisible partof the Arab and Muslim world.'2 More recently, an Islamic component infusedwith new notions of ideology and resistance has emerged as an important factorin discussions about Egypt's identity. Throughout the flux and reflux of thisprolonged discussion, certain themes have periodically led to controversy andscandal. Among these are the question of the orthogenesis of Islamic culture andthe issue of adherence to traditional methods of inquiry. In the 20th centuryfigures like Jurji Zaydan, 'Ali CAbd al-Raqiz, and Taha Husayn have touched offreligious and cultural sensitivities because they questioned the cultural autonomyand integrity of early Islam on the basis of methods and interpretations used in

Western scholarship.13 Those who have questioned Egypt's indissoluble bondwith the Arab and Islamic world have provoked similar accusations of treasonand disbelief. A good example of this in the cultural realm is the heated debatearound Tawfiq al-Hakim in the late 1970s.14

An example of a case in which religious and national issues and sensitivitiesconverge is the controversy that arose in the mid-1980s over the portrayal ofJamal al-Din al-Afghani by the renowned literary critic Louis 'Awad. Theimmediate cause of what may be called the "'Awad case" was the appearance, inthe spring of 1983, of a serialized study of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani by Louis'Awad in the Arab magazine at-Tadamon.'5 At-Tadamon, which is published in

London, is ordinarily available in Cairo but seems not to have been on sale forthe duration of the Afghani series.16 The reactions in the Egyptian press werenevertheless quick and hostile. Al-Ahram led the national press in a series ofreactions to cAwad's reinterpretation of al-Afghani that were unanimous in theircondemnation of what was seen as an impermissible downgrading of this re-former-scholar.17 In 1984, the reaction to cAwad's "bold study" culminated in arebuttal in book form by the well-known scholar Muhammad 'Imara, entitled,The Maligned Jamal al-Din al-Afghani.'8 Finally, in 1986, 'Awad's originalseries was published in book form in Cairo in a volume on Egyptian thoughtfrom the period of the Khedive Isma'il until 1919 that included shorter studies of

the 19th-century men of letters Ya'qub Sanuca and 'Abd Allah Nadim.19The following discussion will focus on the polemic between Louis 'Awad andMuhammad 'Imara as a case study that assembles the various ideologicalcomponents of the current debate in Egypt (and beyond) over collective identityand the role of politics and culture in tomorrow's society.

LOUIS CAWAD AND AFGHANI

Louis 'Awad is no stranger to the Egyptian debate on national identity, andfor a good understanding of the Afghani controversy it is necessary to sketch his

role and reputation in Egyptian intellectual circles. 'Awad enjoys particularnotoriety for his criticism of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism. In numerouswritings, cAwad has equated both ideologies with primitive desert origins alien toEgypt and, politically, with racial arguments similar to those of Nazism.20 For


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'Awad, who is a Copt, Egypt's roots go back to Pharaonic times, and many of

the country's rituals and beliefs can be traced to that origin. Evidently an heir tothe Pharaonic "wave" of the 1920s in this respect, 'Awad's nationalism similarlygoes back to earlier notions about the uniqueness of Egyptian civilization. Heargues that those who have advocated Egypt's affinity with a wider Arab orIslamic community, such as al-Afghani, al-Kawakibi, Rashid Rida, and Sati'al-Husri, have mostly been non-Egyptian.21

Equally infuriating to many are 'Awad's ideas about language as a vehicle ofnational identity, another area where he is preceded by a minority intellectualcurrent in the 1920s. 'Awad's religion makes him insensitive to the metaphysicaldimension of Arabic as the language of the Holy Writ. To 'Awad, the various

spoken Arabic dialects are comparable to the Latin dialects that evolved intoseparate languages after the breakdown of the Roman Empire. Since a similarprocess is taking place in the Arab world, 'Awad sees no reason to hold on to amyth of Arab or Arabic unity and to deny the reality of a distinctly Egyptianlanguage characterizing a unique nation.22

'Awad has never concealed his adherence to a secularist and liberal ideologythat draws heavily on humanistic European values.23 Atypical as his bourgeois-liberal style, religious affiliation, and age may appear, his position is similar tothat of a sizeable group of younger Egyptian intellectuals who, in the 1980s, haveshown themselves gravely concerned about what they see as an extremist-religious

threat to the political and social order. In the last few years, leading intellectualfigures such as Farag Fuda, Ghali Shukri, Fu'ad Zakariyya, and Husayn AhmadAmin have written a great number of books and articles and participated innumerous debates and symposia organized around issues such as the degree towhich the religious law should be applied, the lack of vigilance of the pressregarding religious presumptuousness, and other topics concerning the relation-ship between religion and the state.24 The common line connecting these intel-lectuals could be described as secularist ('ilmani), provided that term is notinterpreted as indifference to religion or loss of faith, but rather as a convictionthat the religious law and the civil law and constitution are distinct bodies that

should be kept separate. Their "secularism" or "neo-secularism"-to put theirideology in the context of newly politicized religion-is above all reflected in anintellectual concern about the preservation of a climate of free artistic activitywhere freedom of thought and expression is guaranteed.25 That this preoccupa-tion has not yet received much Western attention, academic or otherwise, doesnot mean that those who voice it are marginal or that they do not reflect widersentiments in Egyptian society.26

The relevance of 'Awad's Afghani study lies less in its factual content than inhow it has been interpreted and its place in the "Islam versus secularism" debatein contemporary Egypt. cAwad offers no new information on Afghani beyondwhat has become known in the West through the writings of Homa Pakdaman,Nikki Keddie, and others. In fact, one of the problems with the study is itssource material. CAwad does refer to British Foreign Office Records, but hisreferences to other sources, such as the Cabul Precis and Iranian documents, are


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156 Rudi Matthee

not supported by adequate footnoting and parallel what was earlier cited by theauthors mentioned earlier. 'Awad, however, has clearly not written his book toplease Western reviewers. His study is an attempt to demythologize Afghani forthe Egyptian home audience and thereby to counter newly politicized Islam'sclaim to legitimacy and appropriation of history. Interestingly, 'Awad finishedhis Afghani study in 1975, but published it in Egypt only in 1986-in a climatewhere the study's contents were bound to be very controversial politically andalso when the Egyptian government was clearly interested in abetting forces thatresist further religious intrusions upon the country's political structure.27

What are 'Awad's main points? Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, 'Awad argues in hisintroduction, has become the Socrates of Islam: he wrote little and spoke muchand created a

legendaround himself that was further elaborated

byhis

disciples.In the course of time Afghani has become such a revered figure that he is beyondcriticism-indeed, beyond research-in Egypt.28

'Awad next proceeds to furnish his revisionist conclusions about Afghani. Themain points of his argument can be summarized as follows:

a. Afghani was born in Iran and, hence, was a Shi'i.b. Afghani's growing up in a Babi and Shaikhi milieu accounts for his unorthodox

tendencies and his habit of dissimulating his real views.c. Afghani's own account of his life cannot be trusted. He had the tendency to present

himself in an aggrandized role. Hence, the traditional biographies, which all derivefrom his own

word,have to be

questionedas well.

d. Afghani was a religious progressive who saw religion as a means for the ignorant toattain happiness and political independence, but a political conservative who favored abenevolent despotism based on education. His goal was to rejuvenate the Muslimworld within the framework of the Ottoman caliphate and political structure.

e. While Afghani was fervently anti-British, he did not spark the 'Urabi revolt. On theother hand, his anti-British zeal overshadowed every other concern, including a desirefor social and religious reform.

f. In sum, Afghani was a man of contradictions. He was a religious thinker dealing inpolitics as much as a political thinker dealing in religion, and this mixture led to hisfailure.

MUHAMMAD CIMARA AND AL-AFGHANI

'Awad's portrait of Afghani has the clear ideological purpose of illustratingthe incompatibility of religion and politics and the inevitable failure of anyattempt to combine them. This theme most conspicuously connects his historicalstudy with the present and would alone have been enough to elicit reactions fromvarious sides; indeed, it did not go unnoticed in the criticism that followed theTadamon series. The most formidable of his critics was the aforementionedMuhammad 'Imara. Imara, an Afghani specialist who has edited the (incomplete

and uncritical) "complete writings" of Afghani, is a representative of a tendencyin contemporary Egyptian intellectual circles to integrate a newly politicizedIslamic point of view into an Arab nationalist framework.29 cImara is one of theearly protagonists of the idea that a retrieval from the Arab-Islamic turath of theauthentic elements, which have been neglected and forgotten under foreign-


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Ottoman and Western-domination, is the only way for Egyptians and Arabs towithstand the

underminingeffects of the West and

preservetheir

identity.30Imara sees the conflict between East and West as a perennial struggle ofessentialist dimensions that stretches all the way from the Sasanian-Byzantinewars, via the Crusades and the 18th-century trade domination, to 19th-centuryimperialism. In the 7th century, the Eastern resistance took on an Islamicappearance and the Arabs assumed a leading role.31 In this historical scheme, therole of Afghani is invaluable, as he is seen as one of the founders and inspirers ofthe belated counter-movement in the 19th century. CImara resembles the Egyptianprotagonists of Arabism in the 1930s in his insistence that the idea of an Arabcommunity is based on cultural-and above all, linguistic-criteria, not racialand territorial ones.32

In the political and intellectual climate of the 1980s, 'Imara is one of those(formerly) leftist intellectuals who base their arguments about legitimacy partlyon the QurDan and the Sunna and who favor the incorporation of the ShariCainto Egyptian legislation. These reformist thinkers seek to bridge the gap betweenthe old pan-Arab Left-where most of them have their roots-and newly politi-cized Islam in an attempt to turn religion and its heritage to progressive use.Sometimes called "neo-salafiyyin" (salafiyyin judad), after the original salafiyya,the Islamic reformist movement around the turn of the century, this group isdiverse and no more monolithic or organized than the "secularists." It includes

well-known intellectuals, such as Tariq al-Bishri, CAdil Husayn, and FahmiHuwaydi.33 A common characteristic of this group is that, ultimately, theirarguments for a "return" to Islam and the turath, and for the application of theShari'a, appear to be based more on a wish to end the Egyptian-Arab culturaland political dependence on the West and to "respiritualize" society than on theconviction that the Shari'a should be instituted because it is the divine law.

Clearly, 'Awad and 'Imara occupy two opposing positions in the Egyptianpolitical and intellectual spectrum. Hence, CImara's eaction to 'Awad's Afghanistudy is based on more than disagreement over details. Before discussing thesubstance of CImara's objections to CAwad, it is useful to look at the general

approach 'Awad's critics have taken in trying to discredit him. Three elementsstand out in the way Imara and other commentators have attempted to refute'Awad's arguments. The first is to question CAwad's redentials and competence.CAwad, the critics agree, is a literary critic whose expertise in his own field isunquestioned. He should, however, have kept to his profession. Jamal al-Dinal-Afghani respected the Arab-Islamic heritage, but CAwad does not subscribe tothat heritage, or at least does not include Egypt in it. He is, therefore, notqualified to handle the subject he has chosen to write on.34 According to cImara,CAwad does not acknowledge an Islamic component to Egypt's heritage andholds that "modern Egypt is Napoleon's gift."35 This viewpoint disqualifies him

from writing on something this vital to the Arab-Islamic cause with the necessaryobjectivity.

The second allegation brought against CAwad by his critics concerns hismotives. Interestingly, no one ascribes evil and anti-Muslim motives to CAwadbecause of his being a Copt. clmara, for one, is cautious to avoid any impression


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158 Rudi Matthee

of Muslim-Christian antagonism as the cause of cAwad's bias. CAwad's attackson Arabism and Islam, 'Imara notes, while

precededand shared

bythe territorial

nationalists (iqlimiVyun), are not attributable to his Christian beliefs. In fact,'Awad himself is a controversial Christian who has praised Islam for its human-ism and rationality.36 This praise, however, 'Imara claims, is only reserved forIslam in its traditional form. 'Awad is not against al-Azhar as the bastion oftradition, and he has praised Muhammad 'Abduh for his contribution to Egyp-tian thought. He is, however, against "renewed" Islam, the form of politicizedIslam that integrates religion, culture, and politics. And that, 'Imara insists, iswhy 'Awad is opposed to Afghani who, after all, was the founder of this integralform of Islam.

Thethird,

and mostwidely

advancedcomplaint

about 'Awad concerns hismethodology. CAwad, his critics claim, has written an unscholarly study based onspecious documents. The argument CImara and others use in this context is asfollows. It is a customary scholarly procedure to build on previous sources. Thecloser these sources are to the events or people they relate to, the more reliable

37and relevant they are. Hence, the most important sources are the original ones.3'Awad, however, is said to have violated this most basic of all rules. He wentover all the traditional sources, noted that they express a consensus, and pro-ceeded to reject this consensus. This would only be legitimate if he had presentedother, more reliable source material that would support his revisionist view.

Instead, cAwad spent time in the United States at the University of California inLos Angeles and used his time there to collect a series of spy reports.38 Inaddition, he was given a number of works written by Zionists and semi-Zionists.'Awad used both kinds of sources to write his book under the pretense that hehad opened Afghani's dossier. It is unforgivable that 'Awad has more faith inthose sources than in the primary material, that is, Afghani's own words andthose of his foremost biographer, 'Abduh.39

The argument about sources, while strongly reminiscent of the Islamic isnadtradition, whereby information is generally considered more reliable the closerthe informant is to the sources, exemplifies a general tendency among believers

to resist critical inquiries into the lives of their religion's founders. The issue ofsources is particularly important in this case, as it goes to the heart of theAfghani controversy. Nikki Keddie, in her biography of Afghani, based herargument against the conventional wisdom about Afghani on the contention thatmost of this wisdom ultimately derived from Afghani's own descriptions abouthimself as recorded by his most devoted disciple, Muhammad 'Abduh. Shefurther noted that 'Abduh had been the principal source for many subsequentaccounts of Afghani, both Muslim and Western, which, therefore, cannot beconsidered independent sources.4

cAwad follows this line of reasoning in his study of Afghani and uses the

breakup of the "traditional account" as a crucial part of his attempt to de-mythologize the man. In the reactions to 'Awad, one finds no real discussion ofreinterpretations of Afghani's background based on new material that has cometo light since Afghani's death. Much of this material, such as many of theunpublished documents collected by Afshar and Mahdavi and the recollections


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of Afghani's nephew Mirza Lotfollah Khan, is in Persian. Lotfollah Khan'sbook, however, has been translated into Arabic. Moreover, the Afshar-Mahdavicollection of unpublished Afghani material includes many Arabic documentsrelevant to Egypt. A number of these documents, which obviously are moreprimary than 'Abduh's apologetic account, are even reproduced, often photo-graphically, in the published book in which this collection is catalogued. Yet,'Imara and his fellow critics unanimously dismiss this material as irrelevant, andits findings and contentions as irrational.4' In their attempt to preserve thecanonized version of "true" Islamic history against the attempt to historicize animportant aspect of its modern mythical foundations, they have to preserveJamal al-Din al-Afghani both as Afghan (and hence presumably Sunni by birth)and as a

trustworthyand honest source about himself. In the face of critical

historical scholarship done by other scholars, cAwad's critics opt for a reiterationof the conventional account, in combination with references to foreign slander,as the true source of the revisionist interpretation. A circular argument, then,reestablishes the conventional account.42 Cmara, for example, attacks 'Awad byfirst presenting Afghani as the latter emerges from 'Abduh's description. Hesubsequently mentions Jurji Zaydan, Ernest Renan, Wilfried Blunt, and IgnacGoldziher to demonstrate that not just Muslim scholars have praised Afghani.'Imara's ultimate purpose clearly is to ridicule 'Awad's deviant opinion in theface of what is supposed to look like a Muslim, Christian, and Jewish scholarly

consensus. To achieve this, he has to omit a reference to the crucial fact that thisconsensus was not the result of any independent inquiry, but was only establishedfor lack of the additional primary information now available.

AFGHANI'S ORIGINS AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

The effort by 'Awad's critics to reassert Afghani's Afghan and Sunni origins isnot merely a question of trying to arrive at the truth. What is at stake isAfghani's prestige and standing in the Muslim world as an important protagonistof 19th-century Muslim defiance of Western imperialism. The image of this

defiance serves as a source of legitimacy for present-day calls for Muslimresistance against the West. If Afghani is shown to have dissimulated his trueorigin, little stands in the way of accepting the allegation that his defense ofIslam was equally expedient. This, in turn, would undermine the solidity of theMuslim tradition that undergirds the contemporary call for Muslim authenticity.cAwad's secular ideology does not impose any such considerations on his inter-pretation of Afghani. If anything, he seems intent on showing that Afghani,though he was an inspired and dedicated activist, ultimately did not further thecause of Islam. Following the now-accepted belief that Afghani was Iranian bybirth, 'Awad does not hesitate to see logical connections between Afghani's

dissimulation of his background and his presumed heterodoxy, even where mostrecent critical scholars have not wanted to go beyond speculation. Thus, herelates Jamal al-Din's background directly to an education along heterodox Babiand Shaikhi lines, ascribes Afghani's "taqiyya tendencies" to this experience, anddoes not fail to emphasize Afghani's opportunism.43 Awad goes well beyond any


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160 Rudi Matthee

critical scholar in his view that Babism was important to Afghani. The mostimportant of Afghani's convictions, linked by 'Awad to his Iranian-Shi'i back-ground as well as to the 19th-century intellectual climate in Europe, concernsAfghani's religious beliefs. Afghani's preoccupation with Muslim weakness vis-a-vis the West, CAwad asserts, made him a participant in the 19th-century debatebetween Romantic idealism and positivist materialism. In this debate, he rejectedboth positions. Instead of returning to traditional religion or to reason, however,he founded his rejection upon the idea that the Muslim belief in miracles and anafterlife would be the best form of resistance against imperialism and culturaldomination.44 Here, 'Awad insists, Afghani adopted a typically Shi'i distinctionbetween the elite and the common people but also followed the antiegalitarianarguments of such Western philosophers as Hobbes and Voltaire. Afghani'saversion to notions of egalitarianism, 'Awad notes, is further reflected in hisattack on all schools of thought that preached the equality of men-includingcommunism, anarchism, and nihilism. Afghani's religious beliefs were pragmaticand utilitarian. His writings, in particular, the Refutation of the Materialists,demonstrate that the form of religion he thought useful for the strengthening ofsociety did not represent his own religious convictions. Afghani was contra-dictory in the expression of his religious beliefs as well as in his politicalconvictions. Thus, in India, he wavered between propagating a common linguisticidentity of Muslims and Hindus against the British and calling for Muslim unitybased on religion. His inconsistencies lead to the conclusion that Afghani was areligious thinker dealing in politics as much as a political thinker dealing inreligion. Afghani's tragedy, 'Awad concludes in a clearly ideological verdict, wasthat he had no sense of priorities. He did not know what he wanted, but wantedeverything-religion and politics (din wa dawla)-and therefore failed.45

Aside from referring to the biographical consensus about Afghani's origin andtruthfulness, 'Imara and others use various standard arguments to counter'Awad's allegations on these subjects. Thus, 'Imara dismisses the evidence forAfghani's Iranian origin as based on a report by an Afghan spy working for theBritish who speaks of a "Sayyid Rumi." There is no proof, 'Imara asserts, thatAfghani is meant here.46 The idea that

Afghaniwas Iranian, 'Imara claims,

originated with the Persian Shah Mozaffar al-Din, who tried to have Afghaniextradited from Istanbul so the latter could stand trial in connection with theassassination of Mozaffar al-Din's predecessor, Shah Naser al-Din, and there-fore wrote a request to Sultan Abdulhamid attesting that Afghani was reallyIranian.47 Afghani's Sunni beliefs, 'Imara further affirms, are clear from the factthat the books he used in his lectures all reflect Sunni views and that Afghanihimself criticized taqiyya and extremist tendencies in Islam.48

Ultimately, however, 'Imara cautions, Afghani's origin is unimportant in thathis fatherland was the Muslim world. While it is understandable that Afghansand Iranians, Sunnis and

Shi'is,are all

eagerto claim

him,he was on

balancea

Muslim of whom the entire Muslim world can be proud.49 'Imara is similarlycircumspect when he attacks 'Awad for presenting Afghani as concerned aboveall with the social utility of religion. Does Afghani, by talking about Islam'susefulness, deny Islam as reality and truth?, 'Imara rhetorically asks. There is no


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reference in 'Awad's study to Afghani's religious writings, 'Imara further notes.'Awad relies on books and papers collected for him by the Orientalists whohosted him at UCLA. These people gave him an English translation of theRefutation of the Materialists, the work in which Afghani criticizes the Indianswho collaborated with British imperialism. 'Imara claims that this translationdoes not contain the sections in which Afghani refutes all materialist, naturalist,and cosmological beliefs on religious grounds.50

AFGHANI BETWEEN NATION AND UMMA

The implication in the criticism of CAwad s unmistakable: 'Awad is malicious,but ultimately naively follows the West in its disingenuous portrayal of Afghani.In 'Imara's rebuttal, Afghani himself stands firm as the sage and teacher who"has become an important and dear part of the heart of the Islamic Umma"5'and who even led Egypt's struggle for emancipation against the Ottoman Empireand the West. It is in the discussion about the nature of this struggle and Egypt'srole in the Arab and Islamic world that the Afghani debate becomes mostrelevant to the identity question in which Egyptian intellectuals have beenintensely involved for over a century. The intensity of the debate is understand-able if one realizes the complexity of Egyptian self-awareness, a shifting amalgamof Pharaonic-Mediterranean, Arab, Muslim, and purely national ingredients.

Two everpresent components

in this awareness that alsofigure

in theAfghanicontroversy are (1) the historiographically sensitive, because ambivalent, Egyptian

relationship with the Ottoman Empire, and (2) the cultural and religious axisthat connects Egypt with the Arab world and Islam. The first involves the natureof the Egyptian resistance against Ottoman domination around the time of the'Urabi revolt in the early 1880s, followed by the British occupation in 1882. Itfurther concerns the problematic status of the late Ottoman Empire, which iswidely seen as a despotic state yet at present enjoys something of a rehabilitationin "neo-salafi" circles as the last Islamic empire and the seat of the caliphate anda mighty military force that for a long time shielded the Arab lands fromWestern

penetration.52 Todaythe

questions posedare: was the Ottoman

Empirean oppressive occupying power that stifled the Arab genius or did it function as abuffer between the West and the Muslim World?) The second component revolvesaround paradoxes of territorial, religious, and linguistic nationalism and thecriteria of Egypt's incorporation into a wider entity; but above all it concerns thecountry's supposed uniqueness which either sets it apart from the Arab-Islamicfold or gives it a special place among Arabs and Muslims.

'Awad's Jamal al-Din al-Afghani does not perform the role assigned to him inthe standard Egyptian account. 'Awad argues against a significant role forAfghani in either inciting Egypt to rebellion against its Ottoman suzerain or in

strengthening Egypt's ties with the Arab and Muslim world. Afghani, 'Awadinsists, was not really any more in favor of the 'Urabi revolt than Muhammad'Abduh was. In fact, he was probably working with the Porte and Tawfiq Pashaagainst the Khedive Isma'il-and getting paid by the Turks and the French whowere on his side in his opposition against the British. In addition, Afghani


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worked with the British during their campaign against the Khedive IsmaCil, orhow else could they have allowed him to be elected president of the EgyptianMasonic Lodge Kawkab al-Sharq? The British only turned against him and hadhim expelled from Egypt under the pretext of his having propagated nihilismafter he turned against them with the formation of the Nubar Pasha govern-ment.53 Finally, instead of Afghani's sparking the "Egypt for the Egyptians"movement as 'Anhuri, one of his biographers, has claimed, it was that movementthat forced Afghani to downplay his connections with Tawfiq Pasha, RiyadPasha, and the Porte.54 CAwad does stress Afghani's active resistance against theWest and notes that this resistance overshadowed every other motive he mayhave had. In fact, cAwad argues, Afghani was faced with a dilemma betweenOttoman despotism and Western colonialism. He realized that

combatingthe

former would facilitate the latter and thus chose to fight colonialism, within theframework of Ottoman unity.55 Afghani's opposition to Ottoman despotism,'Awad further notes, implied just as little preference for democracy or parlia-mentary rule as did his struggle for freedom from foreign domination.

Afghani's concern with knowledge and education, 'Awad states, extended tohis conception of rule and authority. The Babi and Shaikhi ideas of his youthexplain Afghani's ideal of the Perfect Man (al-murshid al-kamil) who, as thebenevolent despot (al-mustabidd al-Cadil), reigns in the virtuous city (al-madinaal-fadila). Hence, Afghani's choice was not between despotism and republican

democracy,but between

ignorantand

enlightened despotism.56In his reply to cAwad's treatment of Afghani's role in Egypt, 'Imara concen-trates on reaffirming Afghani's commitment to Egypt's liberation and his role inthe reawakening of Egyptian consciousness. 'Imara dismisses CAwad's questionsabout Jamal al-Din's sources of financial support as absurd, given Afghani'swell-known ascetic life style, and reiterates Afghani's firm opposition to anyforeign powers. He refuses to accept Afghani's membership in the MasonicLodge as proof of his support for the British. But, above all, he denies thedilemma 'Awad claims Afghani faced between opposing Ottoman rule andresisting the West. Afghani, 'Imara insists, advocated independence, unity, and

reform; he was as much concernedwith

wardingoff Western intrusion

as withcombating internal stultification, backwardness, and oppression.57 The mostrevealing moment in 'Imara's argument comes when he states that Afghanibelieved in the Ottoman Empire, not as the ultimate Islamic state, but as a bufferagainst the ultimate enemy, Western imperialism.58 Here 'Imara imputes toAfghani an opinion he himself has expressed on numerous occasions. 'Imara'srevisionist view deviates from the conventional Arab position on Turkish rule asan unqualified disaster for the Arab world, and for Egypt in particular. This viewis often advanced to explain why the Arab world, after centuries of glory andachievement, declined and failed to keep pace with postmedieval Europe. The

more subtle revisionist view agrees that the rule of Mamluks and Ottomansstifled Arab creativity and rationality, but is careful not to cast the West in therole of liberator from this Turkish yoke. The Ottoman Empire may have been anobstacle in the way of Arab emancipation, and the cultural development ofEgypt, the leader of the Arab world, may have been especially impaired; but this


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does not warrant the equation of Turkish rule with Western imperialism. Afterall, the Ottoman Empire performed an Islamic duty: it defended the Arab worldagainst Western imperialism and it preserved the identity of the Umma.59 Afghaniis turned from a pan-Islamic believer in the Ottoman Empire into a precursor ofpan-Arabism with 'Imara's wholly unsubstantiated claim that one of Afghani'saims was to Arabize the Ottoman Empire-and indeed the Turks, so that theymight benefit from Arab achievements-so that, in turn, the Arabs might resumetheir leading role within the Umma. Here, too, Afghani anachronistically servesan ideological objective. Afghani's "Islamic League" (al-jamiCa al-islamiyya),CImara states, called for Islamic unity but, unlike other movements, recognizedArab preeminence within Islam.60 Where 'Awad, as an opponent of Arabism,does not make a connection between Afghani and Arab or Egyptian particu-larity, 'Imara claims Afghani gave a special role to Arab civilization. Cautiousto exclude the racial and ethnic elements singled out by opponents of Arabism tocondemn the concept as well as to exclude Egypt from it, 'Imara emphasizes thecultural character of the Arab community's particularity.61 To strengthen hispoint, he uses Afghani's linguistic argument that a community (umma, meaningany community) can only be distinguished by its language and that the Arabcommunity, like any other, is marked by language before religion. Ignoring thatthis argument, rather than proving Afghani's belief in Arab prominence withinIslam, supports the idea that, for Afghani, language was a more importantmeans of identity than religion, cImara further claims that Afghani even empha-sized the distinguished role of Egypt in the revival of Arab preeminence.62 Tosupport the latter thesis, 'Imara quotes Afghani in excerpts of praise for Egyptwithout discussing the more plausible explanation that this is in line withAfghani's habit, until he became a pan-Islamist in the 1880s, of awakeningnational pride, vis-a-vis the West, in the countries he visited. CImara, further-more, ignores the fact that Afghani, like others in the 19th century, had noconcept of Arabs as a nation.

With the central role of Egypt thus established, 'Imara concludes by elabo-rating on the legacy left by Afghani's "Islamic League," a legacy whose essence isa revival based on the Islamic civilization and in which Islamic and nationalelements coalesce. The three protagonists of this revival presented by 'Imara areAhmad 'Urabi, Mustafa Kamil, and Hasan al-Banna, three widely divergentfigures whose communality does not go far beyond their central position inEgyptian history.

CONCLUSION

CImara's integration of Egyptian nationalism, Arab unity, and Islamic uni-versalism by reference to Afghani's goals and principles reflects a conception ofIslam that is centered in Arab

lands, virtuallyexcludes non-Arab

Muslims,and

has Cairo for its real capital. This conception only avoids an explicitly nationalistlabel by stripping any territorial emphasis on Egypt of all secular and ethnicimplications. cImara's nationalism rejects the Pharaonic heritage, draws on acultural mixture of Islam and Arabism, and ostensibly does not allow for


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164 Rudi Matthee

Western secularist intrusions. Instead, it follows Afghani in his eclectic modern-ism and hails him as the first to seek to distinguish the useful from the harmfulwith regard to Western influence. CImara's Afghani embodies the conviction ofmany contemporary Islamic activists that now, just as in the late 19th century, itis possible to borrow from the West only those elements that do not undermineone's own cultural tradition.

If the ideological strand in 'Imara's defense of Afghani is easily identified, thegreater plausibility of 'Awad's interpretation of Afghani should not obscure'Awad's political preferences. 'Awad did follow recent Western Middle Eastscholarship in his interpretation of Afghani; this alone would have been enoughfor his critics to cast him as a traitor. These critics were furthermore correct inpointing to cAwad's underlying aim. 'Awad's religious minority status preventshim from attacking the "Islamic revival" in any explicit way; the study of acrucial historical figure like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, however, enabled him towarn, in an indirect and perhaps more effective way, that a struggle againstimperialism and oppression does not equal a quest for democracy and freedom,in either the past or the present.

A further point that emerges from this historical polemic regards differences inscholarly traditions and, therefore, in premises, methodology, and presentation.'Awad's references are often wanting and his conclusions tenuous, but hisapproach generally conforms to modern Western standards of critical historicalanalysis and argumentation. His narrative shows the self-assurance of the rationalrevisionist fighting obscurantism with Enlightenment tools. 'Imara's method, onthe other hand, has its roots in a discursive tradition in which analogical andsyllogistic reasoning are important and in which the authority of the originalsource is held to be preeminent, indeed, inviolable. 'Imara, in addition, writesfrom an apologetic position and is often reduced to calling his opponent'snationalist integrity into question. Yet, 'lmara, too, aspires to "modern" scholar-ship when he criticizes 'Awad and tries to counter the latter's arguments byadvancing his own evidence. The result is an ambivalent work that aims toportray Afghani in his true historical dimensions, yet is marked by an ahistorical

approachwhich reifies

Afghaniand refuses to consider him in his own context.

'Imara's Afghani is the incarnation of Muslim wisdom and resistance for alltimes and all places. He does not develop his views or show the influence of theplaces and societies he visits. Similarly, 'Imara, by not placing Afghani in hishistorical context, fails to consider that Jamal al-Din, regardless of his truemotives, was progressive and revolutionary in the 19th-century context in largepart because he was fascinated by Western technology and philosophy. The factthat today this would make him suspect does not in the least detract from hisstature and importance.

The problem, though, reaches beyond the mere conclusion that 'Imara doesnot conform to a

conceptionof

scholarshipwhich is called modern and is

therefore widely accepted. For 'Imara's insistence on the inviolability of thestandard Afghani account in response to cAwad's critical attack on that accountpoints to a painful dilemma in the historiography and, indeed, the collectiveconsciousness of the Arab and Muslim community. Part of this dilemma con-


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cerns the question of how to criticize, analyze-in short, historicize-a corpuswhen that same corpus retains its status as a sacred text? Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's case demonstrates the complexity of reconsidering a national figure ina community that has canonized that figure as an integral part of its cultural andreligious heritage.63 Afghani is equally illustrative of the second part of thisdilemma. He is a figure of mythical proportions who personifies a heritage in itsquest for authenticity in opposition to an outside threat. Any revision of thatimage is likely to be seen as emanating from the outside force. We may call itironic that Afghani himself has been shown to conform little to his reputation asthe exemplary Muslim fighting unbelief and oppression alike. It should not comeas a surprise, however, that many will look at these reinterpretations as eitherOrientalist distortions or treacherous collaborationist schemes to "undress" acrucial national figure in front of a hostile audience. The Afghani polemic thusillustrates how the influence of Western Middle East scholarship on the domesticArab and Muslim intellectual discourse lends particular sensitivity to the con-tinued discussion over the acceptance or rejection of methods of research andcriticism associated with the West.

LOS ANGELES

NOTES

Author's note: I would like to thank the participants in the 1987 summer seminar on Iran atUCLA and Ibrahim Karawan for their criticism and suggestions, and Juan Cole for providingliterature.

1I use this generally accepted name, although it has been proven he was born in Iran.2The most important of these reinterpretations are, in chronological order, Iraj Afshar and

Asghar Mahdavi, Majmu'eh-ye asndd va maddrek-e chap nashodeh dar bdreh-ye Sayyed Jamal ad-Din mashhur beh AfghanT (Tehran, 1963); Elie Kedourie, Afghani and 'Abduh: An Essay onReligious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam (London, 1966); Homa Pakdaman,Djamal-ed- Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani (Paris, 1969); and Nikki R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din"al-Afghani": A Political Biography (Berkeley, 1972).

3Egypt is not the only Arab country in which reinterpretations of Afghani have provoked angryreactions. For an Iraqi attempt to reestablish the notion that Afghani was born in Afghanistan, onthe basis that those who claim Iranian origins for him are by definition his detractors, see MuhsinCAbd al-Hamid, Jamdl al-DTn al-AfghanT, al-musallih al-muftard calayhi (Beirut, 1403/1983).

4The first author to mention the discrepancy between Afghani's own account of his origins andthe true story was apparently the Iranian historian of the Constitutional Movement in Iran, Nazemal-Eslam Kermani, in his TdrTkh-e TddrT-ye rdniydn, 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1945-46), pp. 60-61.

5For a perspective in line with the present regime's ideology, see Mortaza Motahhari, Nahiathd-ye EsldmTdar sad sdleh-ye akhTr Tehran, 1362/1983), pp. 14-20; idem, A Discourse on the IslamicRepublic (Tehran, 1405/1985), pp. 32-36. An official Islamic Republican view on Afghani can befound in Hojjat al-Eslam cAmid Zanjani, MabdnY-yefeqhT-ye dnun-e asdsi-ye Jomhuir-ye EsldmT-vyeIrdn (Tehran, 1362/1983), pp. 12-13. At the same time, material on Afghani continues to bepublished in the Islamic Republic in which his position and role is examined critically. See, forexample, Kanim Mojtahedi, Sayyed Jamal al-Din Asaddbddi va tafakkor-e jadid (Tehran, 1363/1984). For a recent Iranian study of Afghani, see CAli Asghar Halabi, ZendegT va safarhd-ye SayyedJamal al-DTn AsaddbddT Tehran, 2536/1977-1978).


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166 Rudi Matthee

6An illustration of this is a series of stamps the Islamic Republic of Iran has issued in honor of"precursors of the Islamic movement" (pTshgdhdn-e nahzat-e EsldmT), with, among others, Jamal

ad-Din al-Afghani, Fazlollah Nuri, and Ayatollah Kashani. See P. Chelkowski, "Stamps of Blood,"The American Philatelist 101, 6 (June 1987), 556-66.

7See Werner Ende, "Wer ist ein Glaubensheld, wer ist ein Ketzer?, Konkurrierende Geschichts-bilder in der modernen Literatur islamischer Lander," Die Welt des Islams, 23-24 (1984), 70-94.

8After the 1952 revolution in Egypt, the non-Egyptian background of Muhammad 'Ali's familywas emphasized in order to stress the claim that with Nasser Egypt had its first authenticallyEgyptian government after 2,000 years of foreign domination. In the 1970s, however, Muhammad'Ali's foreign origin was once again downplayed. He was now presented as the ruler who, like Nasser,contributed to Egypt's independence and whose national project was brought down by the imperialistWest.

9For a discussion of Egyptian self-perceptions, see Shimon Shamir, ed., Self-Views in HistoricalPerspective in Egypt and Israel (Tel Aviv, 1981).

'?See, for example, Ahmad Husayn, MawsCuat drTkh Misr (Cairo, 1973), pp. III, 1042-43; SubyaWahTda, FT usul al-mas9ala al-Misriyya (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 225 ff. For a more balanced account ofAfghani's role, see Salah 'csa, al-Thawra al-'urdbiyya (Beirut, 1972), pp. 223 ff.; GhalT Shukri,al-Nahda wa al-suqt tfT l-fikr al-MisrT al-hadith, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1978), pp. 164 ff.

"The Muslim Brotherhood interpretation of Afghani may be found in numerous references in themagazines al-Da'wa, al-I'tisdm, and al-Mukhtdr al-isldmi until they were surpressed in September of1981. Lack of access has prevented me from checking these publications since their reappearance in1984. An Islamic leftist interpretation, which hails Afghani as an advocate of social justice and anIslamic Luther, may be found in Hasan Hanafi, ed., al- Yasadr l-isldmT Cairo, 1981).

12See Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search forEgyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930 (New York, 1987).

'3For some of these cultural and intellectual controversies and scandals, see Albert Hourani,Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (London, 1962); Donald Malcolm Reid, "CairoUniversity and the Orientalists," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 19, 1 (1987), 51-76.

14Theprominent Egyptian author Tawfiq al-Hakim argued, after the 1978 peace accord with Israeland Egypt's expulsion from the Arab camp, for Egyptian neutrality in the superpower conflict and apolitical and military withdrawal from Arab allegiance. For the important discussion that ensued, seeSa'd al-Din Ibrahim, ed., cUrubat Misr, Hiwar al-saba'cndt (Cairo, 1978).

'5See Luwis 'Awad, "Bahth jari can Jamal al-DYn al-Afghani; al-Irani al-ghamid fT Misr,"at-Tadamon, 1:1-1:22 (April 16-Sept. 10, 1983).

16Information n "Gamal al-Din al-Irani," Revue de la presse egyptienne, 11 (Dec. 1983), 48.'7Al-Ahrdm, from August to October of 1983, published the comments of a series of critics under

the title "al-Afghani. . . bayn al-haqiqa wa al-iftira." See, for example, Samih Karim, "al-Afghaniwa taqarlr al-jawasis," al-Ahram, Aug. 29 and 30; Jabir Qamiha, "Qusuir al-bahth ... wa ghiyabal-minhaj," al-Ahram, Sept. 5; idem, "al-tazwir ... wa amanat al-kalima," al-Ahrdm, Sept. 6.

SAl-Duktir Muhammad 'Imara, Jamdl al-DTn al-AfghanT al-muftard 'alayhi (Cairo, 1984).9Luwis 'Awad, Tdrnkh al-fikr al-Misrf al-hadTth min 'asr Ismd'Tl ild thawrat 1919. Al-Bahth al-

thdnt. al-Fikr al-siydsi wa al-ijtimdi (Cairo, 1986), vol. II, pt. 1.20See cAwad, "al-Asatir al-siyasiyya," al-Ahrdm, April 7, 1978. This article is part of the Tawfiq

al-Hakim debate referred to earlier. Incidentally, 'Awad also took part in that debate and agreedwith al-Hakim that Egypt is a separate and unique entity. Contrary to al-Hakim, however, 'Awadargued that Egypt was inevitably part of the Arab world in strategic and political terms, that thecountry's security could therefore only be ensured in a larger Arab framework, but that this fact didnot imply the existence of an Arab nation or umma.

21See Awad, "Misr tuwajihu mad. ha," al-Musawwar, Sept. 12, 1982. 'Awad contributes regularlyto al-Musawwar. He mostly reports on Western culture and discusses literature and philosophy.

22'Awad, "Ma'na al-qawmiyya," al-Ahrdm, May 11, 1978. See also, Luwis 'Awad, The Literatureof Ideas in Egypt, Pt. I (Atlanta, 1986). For a critique of 'Awad's ideas and theories, see RajaNaqqash, al-Inizaliyytun f Misr (Beirut, 1981).

23'Awad calls himself a 20th-century humanist (in the autobiographical part of his The Literatureof Ideas in Egypt, pp. 210-25). A good overview of 'Awad's interpretation of the history of


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secularism and humanism in Egypt may be found in his "Qissat al-cilmaniyya fi Misr," al-Musawwar,Sept. 23 and 30, Oct. 7, 1983.

24See, for example, Farag Fuda's "secularist" response to the radical-Islamic treatise al-Faridaal-ghd'iba; al-HaqTqa al-ghdaiba (Cairo, 1986), and the eloquent plea for the separation of religionand state by Husayn Ahmad Amin, Dalil al-Muslim al-hazTn, 3rd ed. (Cairo, 1987). Recent examplesof debates are "al-Tatarruf al-siyasi al-dinl fi Misr," al-Fikr ITal-dirdsdt wa al-ittijdhat, 2, 8 (Dec.1985), 31-111; and the 1987 discussion series in the magazine al-Watan al-ArabT led by GhalTShukri. It should be emphasized that what distinguishes the "secularist" intellectuals from others isless their concern about religious extremism and terrorism-which is shared by all-than theirapprehension that a growing political role for religion threatens the country's pluralism and chancesfor democracy.

25For a discussion of the origin and present-day Egyptian interpretation of the term Cilmaniyya,see GhalT ShukrT, ed., "al-Salafiyya wa al-Cilmaniyya fT Misr," al-Watan al-ArabT, July 3, 1987,pp. 28-32. Following the definition of "'ilmaniyya" given in this debate, which comes closer to the

French term "laicite" than to English "secularism," Muhammad 'Abduh was as much "'ilmanl" asthose who today oppose the interference of religion in state affairs.

26The nature of the case makes it impossible to speak about the degree of representativeness ofthese intellectuals and their ideas. However, the fact that many write for widely circulated, albeitgovernment-endorsed, dailies and weeklies like al-Ahrdm and al-Musawwar indicates that they arenot marginal.

27The Afghani part of cAwad's 1986 book is dated January 1975. That copies of his study musthave circulated prior to its publication is indicated by the reference to it in GhalT Shukri, al-Nahdawa al-suqfit, p. 165.

28CAwad, TdrTkh l-fikr, p. 9.29Muhammad clmara, ed., Jamdl al-Din al-Afghani: al-Acmdl al-kdmila, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Beirut,

1979). See also cImara's Muslimin thuwwdr (Cairo, 1972), especially the chapter on Afghani,pp. 143-206.

30See,for example, 'Imara, NazrajadTda ild al-turdath Beirut, 1974). 'Imara has continued to writeon the relationship between Arabism and Islam and on the history of the 19th-century renewalmovement as a model for the present. For some of his more recent writings, see "al-Islam wa al-qawmiyya al-cArabiyya," Qa.dayd Arabiyya, 7 (1980), 67-92; "al-Azhariyyun al-mujaddidun wa al-taghrib," al-Hildal, 91 (July 1983), 48-55; "Tamaddun IslamT am tahdith gharbl?" al-Hildl, 91 (Oct.1983), 6-9; "al-'Uriiba wa al-lslam," al-Hildl, 91 (Nov. 1983), 32-36.

3'cImara, Muslimun thuwwdr, pp. 148-49.32clmara argued that Islam and Arabism represent above all a culture and a civilization; most

recently in an interview on the topic of the Islamic movement in al- Watan al-ArabT, July 24, 1987,pp. 28-33. His (vague) ideas about Islamic economics are to be found in an interview in al-Ahrdmal-Iqti.sdi, Jan. 4, 1988, pp. 32-40, 65.

33For a recent classification and critical discussion of the different religious and secular intellectualtrends, see Mahmud Amin cAlim, WacT wa al-wa'T al-zdaiff f al-fikr al- ArabT al-mu'dsir (Cairo,1986), pp. 229-45. An excellent analysis is also Alain Roussillon, "Islam, islamisme et d6mocratie:recomposition du champ politique," Peuples mediterraneens, 41-42 (Oct. 1987-March 1988), 303-40.An inspired example of the kind of intellectual debate between representatives of the trends discussedhere, made possible by the new political climate under Mubarak, appeared as "L'Etat: transforma-tions et devenir," idem, pp. 27-66.

34c mara, Jamdl al- Dn, pp. 6 ff.3Ibid., pp. 9-10.36Ibid., pp. 22 ff.37See Imara, Jamdl al-DTn, pp. 77; Samih Karim, "al-Afghani wa taqarir."38CAwad as visiting professor at UCLA in 1974-1975. The Afghani part of the 1986 book version

of his Afghani study is dated Los Angeles, January 1975.39CImara ses the terms "spy reports" generally for the French and English diplomatic sources on

Afghani. The usage of this term parallels that of "Zionists," which, though not explained, seems torefer to the secondary literature on Afghani.

40See Nikki F. Keddie, introduction to Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani."


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4'See CImara, Jamdl al-Dn .. al-aCmal al-kamila, 2nd ed., pp. 20-21, in which the author mentionsthe fact that Iranian and Western scholars have reinterpreted Afghani and subsequently tries to

reestablish the Afghan origins of Afghani by maintaining that his family members bear non-Iranianor non-Shi'i sounding names and by claiming an overall lack of evidence for an Iranian background.All this does not appear in the introduction to the first edition of the collected works. See also'Imara, Jamal al-Din, pp. 53-55; Samih Karim, "al-Afghani wa taqarir."

42An interesting apologetic variant is found in Muhammad Hasan, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani(Cairo, 1982). The author introduces his book by noting that Arab interest in Jamal al-Din has beenlagging behind that of Western scholars who have dramatically reassessed his role. He subsequentlyproceeds to discuss Afghani's life and works along established uncritical lines.

43CAwad, Tirikh al-fikr, pp. 25 ff.44Ibid., pp. 159 ff."Ibid., pp. 130-32.46CImara, Jaml al-Din, pp. 53-55.4Ibid., pp. 142-43.48Ibid., pp. 147-54.9Ibid., pp. 127-29.

50lImara, as usual when dealing with non-Arabic sources, does not specify his references here, butpresumably refers to Nikki Keddie and Hamid Algar's translation of the Refutation, in An IslamicResponse to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani"(Berkeley, 1968). While this translation was done from the Persian original, 'Imara evidently haslooked only at the Arabic translation which is indeed longer due to the translator's additions tounclear passages on the basis of what he thought Jamal al-Din must have meant. On the other hand,the Arabic version contains no sections not found in the Persian original or its English translation(personal communication by Prof. Keddie). See also the introduction to the 1983 edition of AnIslamic Response.

5icImara, Jamdl al-Din, p. 40.52For his current revisionist view, which does not seem to be restricted to "Muslim revivalists," see

Fathi Radwan, "al-Dawla al-cUthmaniyya, dawla muftara calayha," al-Hilal, 93 (Jan. 1986), 42-46;Salah al-cAqqad, "Yucaddu al-hukm al-'Uthmani masilan Can akhalluf al-cArab?" al-Hildl, 93(April 1986), 46-52. For a discussion of the Arab perception of the Ottoman Empire, see UlrichHaarmann, "Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity: The Arab Image of the Turk from thecAbbasids to Modern Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 20 (1988), 175-96.

53CAwad, Tarikh al-fikr, pp. 18-19. It should be stressed that none of these allegations regardingAfghani in Egypt is supported by Keddie or Pakdaman.

54Ibid., pp. 94-95. Tawfiq Pasha succeeded Isma'il as Khedive of Egypt in 1879 and subsequentlyexpelled Afghani from the country. Riyad Pasha was Minister of Education and Afghani's patronduring the latter's stay in Egypt.

"Ibid., p. 170.56Ibid., pp. 109-11.57c Imara, Jamil al- Dn, p. 178.5Ibid., pp. 176-77.59For his view, see 'Imara, Jamdl al-Dmin, p. 170 if.; idem, "al-Janfma al-cArabiyya." lmara has

been criticized for this revisionist view of Mamluk and Turkish rule by Ahmad Baha al-Din in thelatter's al-Ahrdm column "Yawmiyat" (Diary), in a series entitled "Difacan Can al-Islam," June 10-19, 1987.

60Although c mara makes it sound as if this Islamic League was an institution or an organization,it never existed in reality. clmara alternates the term with Islamic project (mashrac IslamT), whichpresumably means the same.

6'See clmara, "al-'Uruba wa al-lslam," al-Hiill, 91 (Nov. 1983), 42-46. For CImara, Islamacquired nationalist traits as soon as it spread among the Arabs, who mixed Islam's universalismwith the national reality. Henceforth, Islamic universality was expressed in a national framework. Atendency to exclude non-Arab Muslims from the Islamic heritage is similarly expressed in 'Imara'sconception of turath. The usage of just Arab turath, Clmara states, would not sufficiently distinguishbetween pre-Islamic (jahiliyya) and Islamic times; just Islamic turath, on the other hand, has the


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drawback of incorporating non-Arab Muslims such as Indians and Indonesians. See lImara,"Turathuna: al-Nazra al-'cmma wa 1-minhaj

al-'ilml," Nazrajadida, p.17.

62clmara, Janml al-Din, pp. 188-90. For a summary account of Afghani's belief that languageconstitutes a more essential ingredient of national identity than religion because of the relativelyunchanging nature of language, see Mehdi Hendessi, trans., "Philosophie de l'union nationale baseesur la race et l'unite linguistique," Orient, 2, 6 (1958), 123-28.

63A recent critique of the traditional approach of much Arab historiography, its determinism,romanticism, and tendency to portray in moral, black and white terms can be found in HusaynAhmad Amin, Dalal al-muslim al-hazmn, pp. 265-76. The differences in approach between the Arab"apologetic" and the "revisionist" schools are discussed in Emmanuel Sivan, "Arab RevisionistHistorians: Historiography and the Second Nahda," idem, Interpretations of Islam: Past and Present(Princeton, 1985), pp. 45-72.

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