Mateo Carino (plaintiff in error) vs. Insular Government of the Philippines (defendant in error)212 US 449, 41 Phil Justice Holmes How it reached the court:-

Plaintiff applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it was granted by the court, but the Government of the Philippines and the government of the United states appealed to the Court of first instance of Benguet (they were taking the property for public and military purposes. The CFI dismissed the application (for registration) and this was affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court. This was brought to the US Supreme court by writ of error. Facts:-Plaintiff, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 30 years before the treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors had held the land for years. The local community recognizes them as the owners of the said land. His grandfather lived upon it and maintained fences around the property. His father raised cattle on the property and he had inherited the land according to Igorot custom. Although no title was issued to them from the Spanish Crown. He tried twice to have it registered during the Spanish occupation but to no avail. In 1901 he filed a petition alleging ownership of the land but he was only granted a possessory title.

I s s u e s :1.) Whether the mode of reaching the US supreme court was right (this was a writ of error,

some were saying that it should have been an appeal) – Holmes said that the mode was correct. Writ of error was the general rule, appeal is the exception. He saw no reason not to apply the general rule to this case.

2.) Another issue was that even if Carino was able to have a title over the land, he could not have it registered because Benguet was one of the excluded provinces in the Philippine Commission’s act no. 926 (AN ACT PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONSGOVERNING THE HOMESTEADING, SELLING, AND LEASING OF PORTIONS OF THEPUBLIC DOMAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS…). But that law dealt with acquisition of new titles and perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. Carino argued that he could register the land under Philippine Commissions Act no. 496 which covered the entire Philippine archipelago. Holmes held that he could register the land if ownership can be maintained-

Main issue: whether Carino owns the land.Government’s argument: Spain had title to all the land in the Philippines except those it

saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired. That there was a decree issued bySpain that required registration within a limited time. Carino’s land wasn’t registered and so in effect it became public land.

USSC: Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it does not follow that the US would view plaintiff to have lost all his rights to the land – this would amount to a denial of native titles throughout Benguet just because Spain would not have granted to anyone in the province the registration of their lands.

Organic act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property and rights acquired there by the US would be for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof. This same statute made a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the constitution, it provides that “'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws”. It would be hard to believe that “any person” didn’t include the inhabitants of Benguet. Nor it meant “property” to refer only to those lands which had become such under a ceremony (of registration) many of the people of the land may have not even heard of. Although in sec. 14 of the organic act, it is said that the Philippine commission may prescribe rules and regulations for perfecting titles to public lands, it should be noted that this section refers to those cases where the land was admitted to be public land. The US SC hesitates to suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper title, a trespasser. The question still remains: what property and rights did the US acquire? In cases like this one, the presumption would and should be against the government. As far back as memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it was never public land. It would not be proper to just let the conqueror to dictate how to deal with the Philippine tribes if it really meant to use the rights acquired by them “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof”. The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. They didn’t intend to turn all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle of prescription was admitted: that if they weren’t able to produce title deeds, it is sufficient if they show ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription. Although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that required everyone to get a document of title or else lose his land, it does not appear that it meant to apply to all but only those who wrongfully occupied royal lands. IT doesn’t appear that the land of Carino was considered as Royal land nor was it considered to have been wrongfully occupied. Two articles of the same decree provided that titles would be attributed to those who may prove possession for the necessary time. There were indications that registration was expected but it didn’t mean that ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof was not to confer title to them but to establish it.

“Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. “ Judgment reversed.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA (Public Estate Authority), which was tasked with the development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road

and Reclamation Project. Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered into a JVA (Joint Venture Agreement) with AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public bidding.

__1988: Pres. Aquino issued Special Patent granting and transferring to PEA parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP. Subsequently she transferred in the name of PEA the three reclaimed islands known as the “Freedom Islands”__1995: PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands and this was done without public bidding__Pres. Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres approved the JVALater, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda

denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA. Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA") to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI") to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. PEA asserts that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to “definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."

ISSUE: W/N  stipulations  in  the  amended  JVA  for  the  transfer  to  AMARI  of  the lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.  HELD: The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.    The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine.  It declares that all

natural  resources  are  owned  by  the  State  and  except  for  alienable agricultural  lands  of  the  public  domain,  natural  resources  cannot  be alienated.The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares.  Only 157.84 hectares of the 750 hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the areas are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.  Further,  it  is  provided  that  AMARI  will  reimburse  the  actual  costs  in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred.    The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the  public  domain,  waters  and  other  natural  resources  and  consequently owned by the State.  As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable  unless  they  are  classified  as  agricultural  lands  of  the  public domain.  The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesn’t convert these  inalienable  natural  resources  of  the  State  into  alienable  and disposable lands of the public domain.  There must be a law or presidential proclamation  officially  classifying  these  reclaimed  lands  as  alienable  and disposable  if  the  law  has  reserved  them  for  some  public  or  quasi-public use.

BUENAVENTURA V. REPUBLIC (LTD)Confirmation of Imperfect TitleApplication for registration of title before the RTC, whether personally or through duly authorized representatives: Who may file?1.Those who, by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest:

_have been in OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE, AND NOTORIOUS possession and occupation of the subject land;

_which land must be ALIENABLE and DISPOSABLE land of public domain; and

_that such possession must be under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or

earlier; and

2. Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by PRESCRIPTION under the

provisions of law.

Petitioners Angelita and Preciosa are the applicants for registration of title over the subject property. They are the heirs of spouses Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores (spouses Buenaventura) from whom they acquired the subject property.The subject property was acquired by the spouses Buenaventura from the Heirs of Lazaro de Leon, before World War II. However, it was only on 30

January 1948 that the corresponding Deed of Sale4 was executed in favor of the spouses Buenaventura. 

An Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 were filed before the RTC of Paranaque wherein petitioners presented witnesses in order to establish the fact that petitioners and their predecessors have acquired vested right over the subject property in the manner and for the period required by law; likewise, to prove the alienable and disposable character of the property since 3 January 1968 as certified by the DENR.  RTC granted the petition.

Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that petitioners failed to prove continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest and by themselves. The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and declared the subject property a public land.

ISSUES:I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the Decision of the trial court confirming petitioners’ title over the subject property for not being allegedly supported by substantial evidence as required by law. (YES)

II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subject property as public land and ignoring petitioners’ evidence of over 30 year possession in the concept of an owner and completely unmolested by any adverse claim. (YES)

HELD:Petitioners offered in evidence a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to prove that the subject property was alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Such certification is sufficient, in the absence of contrary evidence, to prove the character of the land.

Furthermore, petitioners were able to prove sufficiently (through their witnesses) that they have been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which possession is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, in the concept of an owner. By this, the subject alienable and disposable public land had been effectively converted into private property over which petitioners have acquired ownership through prescription to which they are entitled to have title through registration proceedings. Petitioners’ right to have their title to the subject property registered cannot be defeated simply because the possession of petitioners commenced on a date later than 12 June 1945, for the law and supplementing

jurisprudence amply, justly and rightfully provides the necessary remedy to what would otherwise result in an unjust and unwarranted situation. It would be the height of injustice if petitioners’ registration of title over the said property will de denied solely on that ground.(Note: The court granted the petition for registration based on Sec. 14 Par. 2 of PD 1529)

Cruz v Executive Secretary347 SCRA 128Facts of the Case:

RA 8371 was assailed as unconstitutional on the ground that it deprived the State of itsownership over lands of the public domain and the natural resources in them. RA 8371 definedwhat are ancestral domains and ancestral lands.Issue:

Whether or not RA 8371 is unconstitutional?Held: 

No.Ratio: The vote was 7-7 which meant that validity was upheld. The opinion defending constitutionality held the following: (1) ancestral domain and ancestral lands are not part of lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to indigenous people. Section 5 commands the state to protect the rights of indigenous people. Cariño v. Insular Government recognized native title held by Filipinos from time immemorial and excluded them from the coverage of jura regalia. (2)The right of ownership granted does not include natural resources. The right to negotiate terms and conditions over natural resources covers only exploration to ensure environmental protection. It is not a grant of exploration rights. (3) The limited right of management refers to utilization as expressly allowed in Section 2, Article XII. (4) What is given is priority right, not exclusive right. It does not preclude the State from entering into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements with private entities. The opinion assailing the constitutionality of the law held the following: (1) the law amounts toan abdication of state authority over a significant area of the country’s patrimony; (2) It Relinquishes full control of natural resources in favor of indigenous people; (3) the law contravenes the provision which says that all natural resources belong to the state.