MASTER’S THESIS M -1587

WICKHAM, J r ., Benjamin YUGOSLAV-GERMAN RELATIONS: 26 MARCH-6 A PR IL, 1941.

The A m erican U niversity, M j\.., 1968 P o litica l Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, M ichigan

TUGOSIAV-GERMAN REIATIONS: 26 MARCH-6 APRIL, 19^1

S

by

Benjamin Wickham, J r .

Subm itted t o th e

F h c u lty o f th e School o f I n te r n a t io n a l S e rv ic e

o f th e American U n iv e rs ity

In P a r t i a l F u lf i l lm e n t o f

th e R equirem ents f o r th e Degree

o f

M aster o f A rts

I n te r n a t io n a l R e la tio n s

S ig n a tu re o f Cosm ilttee:

Dean o f th e School

Date AMERICAN UNIVERSITY ' L I B R A R Y

JUN111968

T h . u n i « r . l t , ""«HINGTON. O. CW ashington, D. C.

2>^(= S '

ABSTRACT

The in t r o d u c t io n o f B r i t i s h fo rce s in to Greece a f t e r the

I t a l i a n in v a s io n o f t h a t coun try in 1940, fo cu sed German a t te n t io n on

th e Balkans to a c o n s id e r a b le d egree . Four c o u n t r ie s la y between Greece

and th e Third R e ic h - B u lg a r ia , Hungary, Rumania, and Y u g o s la v ia . Bulgaria

was to s ig n th e T r i - P a r t i t e Pact on 28 February 1941. Hungary and Rumania

w ere a lr e a d y v i r t u a l German s a t e l l i t e s . Only n e u tr a l Y ugoslavia presented

any p o t e n t i a l o b s t a c l e w hich might have impeded German troop tr a n s it in to

G reece . B e r l i n ' s a t tem p ts to r e s o lv e t h i s problem through diplomacy

r a th e r than w it h v i o l e n c e were to be tem p orarily s u c c e s s f u l , for on 25

March, 1941, a Y ugoslav d e le g a t io n signed the T r i - P a r t i t e Pact in Vienna.

However, l e s s than f o r t y - e i g h t hours l a t e r , th e government in Belgrade

was to p p le d and i t became th e ta sk of th i s new, seem in g ly pro-Western

government to e x e r c i s e i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f in s u r in g Y u gos lav ia 's sur­

v i v a l under m ost d i f f i c u l t c o n d i t io n s . I t was a b le t o do so for e x a c t ly

t e n d a y s .

T his s tu d y a t tem p ts to d escr ib e and a n a ly z e th e major events lead­

in g up to th e coup d ' e t a t in Belgrade as w e l l as th e f r a n t i c ten days that

f o l l o w e d , w ith primary emphasis being p laced upon th e fo r e ig n p o lic y o f

Y u g o s la v ia v i s - - v i s Germany. The various f a c t o r s and c o n d it io n s which

n ot o n ly h in d e r e d but a c t u a l l y prevented the e s ta b l is h m e n t and perpetua­

t i o n o f a s u c c e s s f u l p o l i c y by Belgrade are examined, a lon g w ith the p o l ic y

w hich was u l t i m a t e l y employed. F in a l ly , the major r e s u l t s of these ten

days in Y ugoslav h i s t o r y are p resen ted , a lo n g w ith an a n a ly s i s of th e ir

im pact on su bseq u en t German fo r e ig n p o l ic y .

TABLE OP CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . p . i

CHAPTER I Y ugoslavia Signs th e T r i - P a r t i t e F a c t . . . p . 1

CHAPTER I I The Coup D‘E t a t p . 12

CHAPTER I I I German R eaction to th e Coup ...................................p . l8

CHAPTER IV Y ugoslavia A ttem pts to S u r v i v e p . 22

CHAPTER V The German S o l u t i o n ......................................................... p . 33

CHAPTER VI C o n c lu s io n ............................................................................. p . kk

BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................... p . 51

CHAPTER I

YUGOSLAVIA SIGNS THE TRI-IARTITE PACT

The German in v a s io n o f Y ugoslav ia began a t 7 :0 0 on th e m orning

o f 6 A p r i l , 19k l . I t opened w ith in te n s e and r e p e t i t i v e a i r bombardments

on B e lg rad e , th e c a p i t a l , fo llo w ed by a m assive p e n e tr a t io n in to Yugo­

s la v i a b y G enera l Wilhelm L i s t ' s 1 2 th Army. By 10 A p r i l , th r e e Germain

aurmored columns were converg ing upon B elg rade from th e Rumanian Bauoat

and Hungary, th e Webrmacht had ta k e n D je v d je l i ja , s e v e r in g th e l a s t

p o s s ib le l in k betw een Y ugoslav ia and G reece, and th e n o r th e rn c i t y o f

Zagreb had f a l l e n . The Y ugoslav Army had, f o r a l l in te n t s and p u rp o ses ,

been s t r a t e g i c a l l y c ru sh ed w ith in fo u r d ay s . N e ith e r B elg rade nor B e r l in

was p a r t i c u l a r l y s u rp r is e d t h a t th e sequence o f e v e n ts w ith in th e p re ce d ­

in g th r e e months had concluded w ith t h i s v io le n t denouement. Y et b o th

c a p i t a l s had hoped t o a v o id i t . O bviously th e p o licy -m ak ers o f most

n a tio n s would concur t h a t an in v a s io n o f t h e i r n a t io n a l t e r r i t o r y by

fo re ig n tro o p s i s in im ic a l t o t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s and th e Y ugoslav g o v ern ­

m ent, by th e f o u r th month o f 19^1, was no d i s s e n te r from t h i s p r in c ip l e .

Germany, on th e o th e r hand, a l s o d id n o t p a r t i c u la r l y welcome th e p ro s ­

p e c t o f an in v a s io n , b u t f o r q u i te d i f f e r e n t re a so n s .

H i t l e r , i n 19^1, would have had no m oral com punctions in m i l i ­

t a r i l y sm ashing Y ugoslav ia in o rd e r t o g a in a c ce ss t o G reece. He had

e v in ced l i t t l e s c ru p u lo s i ty in p rev io u s en co u n te rs w ith r e lu c t a n t n e u t r a ls

and i t would be n a iv e t o b e l ie v e t h a t i t would be any o th e r way in th e

fu tu re . Yet th e u t i l i z a t i o n of fo rce in t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t io n and

a t t h i s p re c ise tim e was u n prqp ltious due t o s e v e r a l f a c t o r s : ( l ) a l ­

though no match f o r th e Germans, th e Y ugoslar Army was w e ll-eq u ip p ed ,

had $00 plans o f th e most modem ty p e which had come, in c id e n ta l ly , from

Germany,^ a f a i r amount of tan k s, and many am m unition f a c t o r i e s in opera­

t io n tw en ty -fo u r h o u rs a day; (2) Germany, s in c e 19^0, depended upon

Yugoslav b a u x ite t o th e e x ten t o f 60$ o f h e r n eed s , in t h a t s u p p lie s from

th e Dutch E ast In d ie s had been cu t o f f ,^ suid th e R e ich co u ld i l l - a f f o r d

any in te r ru p t io n in i t s shipment; (3 ) a war w ith Y u g o slav ia would b o th

delay and be d e t r im e n ta l to the proposed German casqpaign in Greece and

a ls o t o "O peration B arb aro ssa , " th e German in v a s io n o f th e S o v ie t Union,

which was a lre a d y on th e drawing b o a rd s . T h e re fo re , i t had been decided

by B e r lin a t th e b eg in n in g o f 19^1, t h a t Y u g o slav ia , b ecau se o f h e r po­

l i t i c a l and economic im portance, should be l e f t i n t a c t , b u t a t th e same

tim e drawn in to th e A xis c i r c le . In Jan u a ry , 19^1, th e n , th e c o u r tsh ip

f o r B e lg rad e 's ad h eren ce to th e T r i - P a r t i t e P a c t and th e s o l i c i t a t i o n f o r

her support in th e G reek venture had been i n i t i a t e d b y th e German F oreign

O ffic e .

Talks betw een B e rlin and B elgrade " ju s t d ragged a lo n g , acco rd in g

R oot, S e c M t H isto ry o f th e Balkans (New Y ork, C harles S cribner and S ons, 1 ^ 5 ) , p . 6 lo .

^ ' Ib ld . , p . 218.

^ 'J . B. H op tner, Y ugos^via in C r i s i s , 193^-^1 (New York, Columbia U n iv e rs ity P re s s , 1^3 )» p."?OYI

t o s t a t e S e c re ta ry S rn e t w e itsa c k e r , aad a t f i r s t proved f r u i t l e s s f o r

th e Germans. B e r l in had s tro n g c o m p e titio n from London, th e form er

u s in g th e hard f a c t s o f power, b o th economic and m i l i t a r y , a s a le v e r ­

a g e , th e l a t t e r em plc^ing more em o tio n a l a p p e a ls such a s th e Y ugoslav

R egent P a u l 's p e rso n a l and fa m ily t i e s w ith England (a lo n g w ith prom ises

o f a id from b o th B r i ta in and th e U nited S t a t e s ) . However, th e le a d e r ­

s h ip in B elgrade was sh a rp ly d iv id e d . On th e one hand, P a u l, a lth o u g h

sy m p ath e tic w ith England—"along w ith th e m a jo r i ty o f S erbs^—was p a in ­

f u l l y aware o f h is c o u n try 's p o s i t io n v i s - à - v i s Germany. A ccording to

him, b l a t a n t c o o p e ra tio n w ith England was d e f i n i t e l y u n ten ab le in t h a t

i t would b r in g th e w ra th o f Germany down upon Y ugoslav ia . "Y ugoslav ia , "

P au l l a t e r s t a t e d , "wm p o l i t i c a l l y q u ite i s o la te d and i t s army n o t

re a d y . D efea t would be ixxev ltab le , and Y ugoslav ia would s u f f e r th e f a t e

o f P o la n d ."5 Prime M in is te r D rag isa C vetkovic was, to a g r e a t e x te n t , a

t o o l f o r th e P r in c e , and went a lo n g w ith him, w h ile th e F o re ig n M in is te r ,

A lexander C incar-M arkovic, has been c h a ra c te r iz e d a s "an o u t and o u t a p -

p e a s e r ." ^ The C ro a tian m in is te r s in P a u l 's c a b in e t were a l s o r e lu c ta n t

to a l i e n a te Germany, f o r C ro a tia , because o f h e r g e o g ra p h ic a l p ro x im ity

t o th e R eich , fe a re d t h a t i t would be th e f i r s t t o f e e l th e e f f e c t s o f

a German o n s lau g h t. On th e o th e r hand, th e S e rb ia n m in is te r s , among

^B. Seton-W atson, E a s te rn Europe, I 918-U1 (Rev Haven, Archon,1962) , p . U05 .

^G. L. W einberg, Germany and th e S o v ie t Union (L eiden , E. J . B r i l l , 195k ) , p . 158.

L. Langer and 3 . E. G leason, U ndeclared War, 1940-4 l (Hew York, Harper B ro s ., 1 9 5 3 ^ p . 4o6.

them th e M in is te r o f J u s t i c e , M ih a ilo B »nstan tinov ic—th e o b je c t t a

c o n s ta n t a t t a c k in th e Axis p r e s s —and S rd jan B u d isav ljev lc , M in is te r

o f S o c ia l W elfa re , were veh em en tly opposed to cooperation w ith th e

A x is . B ecause th e y b e lie v e d i n th e e v e n tu a l v ic to ry o f the A l l i e s , th e y

w ere co n ce rn ed w ith th e image o f Y ugoslav ia and wanted to e l im in a te any

p o s s i b i l i t y o f h is to r y i n t e r p r e t i n g th e a c tio n s of Y ugoslavia a s a h e lp

t o th e A x is .

More p re ssu re was b ro u g h t t o b e a r on th e Yugoslav governm ent in

th e b e g in n in g o f February . On th e fo u r te e n th of th a t month, b o th

C v e tk o v ic 8uad Cumcar-Harkovic w ere summoned to Salsburg to m eet w ith

Jo ach im von R ibben trop , th e German F o re ig n M in is te r, and su b se q u e n tly ,

t o B e rch te sg ad en f o r t a lk s w ith S i t l e r . The Fuehrer s ta te d t h a t th e

B r i t i s h w ere ab o u t t o send a la r g e c o n tin g en t of tro o p s to G reece and

t h a t i t was Im perative t h a t Germany o b ta in Y ugoslav ia 's a s s i s ta n c e .

"Would sh e h e lp by jo in in g th e T r i - P a r t i t e Pact?**^ H it le r a sk e d . Cvetkovic

r e p l i e d t h a t t h i s was no t p o s s ib le , b u t o ffe red in s te a d a new p a c t o f

f r i e n d s h ip w ith I t a ly , hop ing t h a t a se ttle m e n t w ith th e ju n io r p a r tn e r

w ould draw o f f soom o f th e p r e s s u re b e in g ap p lied by th e s e n io r p a r tn e rO

o f th e A x is . This was u n a c c e p ta b le t o H i t le r . The Yugoslavs were ab le

t o h o ld th e Germans o ff f o r a few weeks through sm all co n cessio n s (such

a s s ig n in g a p a c t o f f r ie n d s h ip w ith Hungary, i t s e l f a s ig n a to ry t o th e

^ J . B. Hoptner, Y u g o slav ia in C r i s i s , 193^-^1, p . 206.^ The Ciano D ia r ie s in d ic a te t h a t M ussolini was v ery a n x io u s to

a t t a c k Y u g o slav ia e a r l i e r and had marked June, 19^0, a s th e p ro p e r tim e , n o t in g t h a t "we must a c t q u ic k ly in Y ugoslav ia ." However, l a t e r i n May, M u sso lin i changed h is mind, announcing h is in te n tio n t o a t t a c k F rance in ­s te a d . He b e l ie v e d th en t h a t a Y ugoslav adventure "would be a h u sd .H atin g s i d e l i n e . " See The Ciano D ia r i e s , 193^ '^3 (Hew York, Heinemann C o ., 1946),p . 182 .

T r i- P a r t l t« P act) b u t th e s e d e la y s s tre n g th e n e d n o t th e Y ugoslav d e t e r ­

m ination to m ain ta in t h e i r n e u t r a l i t y b u t th e German r e s o lu t io n t o p u t

her in th e Axis camp.

On 1 March, Bulgenria, Y u g o s la v ia 's e a s te r n n e ig h b o r, added h e r

s ig n a tu re to th e T r i - P a r t i t e P a c t and on 2 March, th e German T w elfth

Amy, a lread y in Rumania, marched tow ards S oph ia . W ith th e fo rm a tio n

o f a German;/army base in B u lg a r ia , Y ugoslav ia had h e r "back t o th e w a l l ." ^

With p ressu re mounting. P r in c e P au l s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y v e n t t o see H i t l e r

a t Berchtesgaden. The F u eh rer s t a t e d t h a t in a l l p r o b a b i l i ty Germany

could not p ro te c t Y ugoslavia from I t a l y u n le s s Y ugoslav ia s ig n ed th e

T r i - P a r t i te P ac t.^^ H i t le r th e n h e ld o u t th e G reek p ro v in ce o f S a lo n ik a

as b a i t f o r P a u l 's adherence t o th e P a c t. P a u l rem inded H i t l e r t h a t

th e Yugoslav people would n ev er p e rm it th e A xis t o use t h e i r t e r r i t o r y

fo r m i l i ta ry purposes, t o w hich th e F uehrer r e p l ie d t h a t "Germany would

no t req u e s t th e passage o f tro o p s th ro u g h Y ugoslav t e r r i t o r y . Here

i t must be noted th a t H i t l e r w e l l cou ld have been s in c e r e . F o r , a lth o u g h

access t o th e Veyàar V a lley in Y ugoslav ia m ight have been a more p r a c t i c a l

ro u te fo r th e German army, t r a n s i t th ro u g h B u lg a r ia was b e in g p r im a r i ly

considered . I f t h i s was t r u e , th e n H i t le r was r e a l l y more concerned w ith

a favorab le Yugoslav p o l i t i c a l p o s tu re tow ard th e Greek v e n tu re th a n

w ith u t i l i z in g Y ugoslavia a s an a c c e ss t o G reece. As H i t l e r im parted

^ J . B. Hoptner, Y ugoslav ia in C r i s i s , 1934-41, p . 205.^ ^ If t h i s was t r u e , i t would have b een , a t l e a s t t o P a u l, a r a th e r

curious m an ife s ta tio n o f A xis s o l i d a r i t y .

G ilb e r t, E d ., H i t l e r D ire c ts His War (London, Oxford U n iver­s i t y P re ss , 1951) , p . 102.

l a t e r to C iano, " i f one c o n s id e rs th a t f o r 350 t o 400 k ilom eters the

Im portan t l i n e o f communication th rough B u lg a r ia ru n s w ith in twenty

k ilo m e te rs o f th e Y ugoslav b o rd e r , one cam judge t h a t w ith a dubious a t ­

t i t u d e o f Y u g o slav ia , am u n d e rtak in g a g a in s t Greece would have beenIPm i l i t a r i l y an extresM fo o lh a rd y a d v e n tu re ." I t has been rep o rted t h a t

H i t l e r o f fe re d P au l a n o th e r inducement t o jo in th e P ac t through the

h in t t h a t i f a Germam-Soviet c la s h o ccu rred , Germemy, a s she was bound

t o w in , would have to c o n s id e r th e q u e s tio n o f a f u tu re r u le r o f Russia

and t h a t th e cho ice m ight be a member o f th e house o f Barage orge vie

( P a u l 's f a m i ly ) .^3 any r a t e , P au l made no c<»miti8ent amd returned

t o B e lg rad e .

On 6 March, th e Prime Regent c a l le d a m eeting o f h is m in iste rs

in o rd e r t o d is c u s s Y u g o s la v ia 's r a th e r b le a k p o l i t i c a l fu tu re . Sur-/

p r is in g ly , C vetkovic d is s e n te d v ig o ro u s ly , a lo n g w ith th e m alcontent

S e rb ia n m in is te r s , t o h is c o u n try 's s ig n in g th e P a c t. His argument was

t h a t i f Y ugoslav ia s ig n e d , she would be p u t in to th e German p o l i t i c a l

system and th e r e fo r e cou ld n o t oppose th e Nazi o ccu p a tio n o f Salonika.

By t h i s a c t io n , G em ax^ would have com plete ly e n c ir c le d Yugoslavia and

would th e re fo re be in th e p o s i t io n to e x a c t more and more m il i ta ry and

p o l i t i c a l co n cessio n s from B elg rad e . His a l t e r n a t iv e was to continue

t o evade German demands, o f f e r t o s ig n a n o n -ag g ress io n pac t w ith

B e r l in , and u t i l i z i n g h is somewhat l im ite d M ach iav e llian im agination,

^^The T r i a l o f th e ^ j o r war C rim inals b e fo re t ^ In ^ ra a tio n a j. M il i ta ry T rib u n a l? K cm nents in Evidence (Nbremburg, 1947-49), Vol. iX, p . 7Ü4.

^^See V. D e d ije r , T i to (New York, Simon and S ch u s te r , 1953); P« 134.

" e x p lo i t "1^ th e c o n f l ic t o f i n t e r e s t betw een H i t le r and M usso lin i and

p la y th en o f f a g a in s t one a n o th e r . B ut P a u l , ta k in g a more r e a l i s t i c

a t t i t u d e , r e a l is e d th a t th e s i t u a t i o n was becoming in to le r a b le and b e ­

gan t o prepare fo r th e e v e n tu a l exm pliance t o H i t l e r 's demands. On 10

March, he arranged f o r th e t r a n s f e r o f Y ugoslav a s s e ts from th e U n ited

S ta te s to B ra z il , f e a r in g t h a t , a s Lukacs p u ts i t , " th e Americans would

'f r e e z e ' th ese a s s e ts when Y u g o slav ia d e c la re d h e r adherence t o th e

P act. "̂ 5

The Germans were a l s o becom ing more anx ious a s th e days p a s se d .

One o f the bases fo r t h i s a n x ie ty was th e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t th e B r i t i s h

w ould be ab le t o e s t a b l i s h a b a se in G reece from which to bomb Rumanian

o i l f i e l d s . A c c o r d i n g l y , on 13 M arch, B e r l in issu e d in s t r u c t io n s t o

B e lg rad e , s ta t in g t h a t German demands must be m et. On th e f i f t e e n t h ,

i t was understood th a t Y u g o slav ia , a d a p tin g C v e tk o v ic 's p ro p o sa l, had

su g g ested a n o n -ag g ressio n p a c t . A p o s s ib le r a t io n a le f o r t h i s ad v an ce­

ment can be illu m in a te d f o r u s i n th e l i g h t o f o th e r e v e n ts , f o r p a r a l ­

l e l i n g the ta lk s betw een Y ugoslav ia and Germany was a n o th e r d ia lo g u e —

t h i s one between B elgrade and Moscow. The maxim cav ea t em ptor, w hich

had enveloped th e M oto tov-R ibbentrop P a c t o f 1939, by t h i s tim e , was b e ­

coming more ev id en t t o b o th s ig n a to r s . The Xkemlin, never a d i s i n t e r e s t e d

o b se rv e r in th e B alkans, was q u i te concerned w ith th e ev en ts o c c u r r in g i n

^^H. Seton-W atson, E a s te rn E urope, 1 9 l6 -4 l , p . 4o8.A. Lukacs, The G re a t Powers and E a s te rn Europe (New Y ork,

American Book C o., 19537» P« 350*^^See W. S h ire r , The R ise and F a l l o f th e T h ird R eich (new Y ork,

H arper B ro s ., I 960) , p . 857.

8

Y ugoslav ia and I t I s ap p a re n t t h a t B elg rade began t o a p p re c ia te t h i s .

Here vas a chance t o " e x p lo i t" a much more v a l id " c o n f l i c t o f I n te r e s t "

and " fo r a moment i t seemed a s i f Y ugoslavia cou ld f in d a s o lu t io n f o r

h e r problem by conclud ing n tm -ag g ressio n p a c ts w ith b o th Germany and

R u s s i a . Y e t t h i s th in k in g vas b ased , f o r th e most p a r t , on unsound

lo g ic and was in d ic a t iv e o f B e lg rad e ’s f re n z ie d attenq>ts t o e x t r i c a t e

h e r s e l f from a r e l a t i v e l y u n e x tr ic a b le p o s i t io n . Even i f th e S o v ie t

Union was so In c lin e d , ^ H i t le r would nev er have been s a t i s f i e d w ith a

mere n o n -ag g ress io n p a c t , m ain ly because o f i t s i r r e le v a n c e t o him.

The Yugoslav c o u n te r -o f fe r was th e r e fo r e sum m arily r e je c te d a s i n s u f f i c i ­

e n t and B elgrade was g iv en u n t i l 19 March f o r th e accep tan ce o f th e

o r ig in a l demands.

C onsequently , on th e even ing o f 24 March, b o th C vetkovic and

CÛMcar-M arovic l e f t B elg rade f o r Vienna f o r th e purpose o f s ig n in g th e

T r l - p a r t i t e P a c t. The ceremony th e n ex t day was d ig n i f ie d by th e

F u e h re r 's p resence and a f t e r two s ig n a tu re s bad been a f f ix e d , b o th G er­

many and I t a l y p re se n te d a w r i t te n d e c la r a t io n s t a t i n g t h a t th e y would

"no t d i r e c t a demand t o Y ugoslavia t o p e rm it th e march o f t r a n s p w ta t io n

o f tro o p s th ro u g h Yugoslav n a t io n a l t e r r i t o r y . T r u e t o t h e i r word,

th e Germans never made t h a t demand.

J . D a l l ln , S o v ie t R u s s ia 's F o re ig n P o lic y (Hew Haven, Yale U n iv e rs ity P re s s , 1942), p .

^®The S o v ie t Union d id u rge B elgrade t o r e b u f f th e Germans b u t , because she fe a re d a s tro n g German r e a c t io n , i t i s d o u b tfu l t h a t she would have gone so f a r a s t o conclude a n tm -ag g ressio n p a c t a t t h a t tim e.

^^Tbe T r i a l o f th e Major Ifar C rim inals b e fo re t ^ I n te r n a t io n a l M il i ta r y T rib u n a l; Documents in E vidence, V o l. IX, p . '782.

" In t h e i r lo n g and d i f f i c u l t h i s t o r y ," w r i te s C onstantine F o t ic ,

" the Serbe have had t o fa c e s e v e ra l t r a g ic s i t u a t i o n s , b u t t h e i r cho ice

s in ce th e days o f th e m edieval S erb ian Kingdom h as always been th e same:

n o t to make any compromise when th e Independence o f th e i r co u n try and

p e rso n a l l i b e r t i e s w ere a t s t a k e . I n 1389 , T sa r Laaar, th e S e rb ia n

Kin§, found h im s e lf i n th e p o s it io n o f d e c id in g w hether he should com­

m it h is tro o p s t o a h o p e le ss s tru g g le w ith th e m ighty Turkish Army o r

a ccep t a d ip lo m a tic compromise w ith th e S u lta n and submit to c e r ta in

n a t io n a l i n d i g n i t i e s . In th e end. L aser, knowing th a t d e fe a t was i n ­

e v i ta b le , chose t o f a c e th e enemy in b a t t l e and th e re b y gained h i s t o r y 's

r e s p e c t . In 1941, P r in c e Paul chose th e o p p o s ite course and ga ined h i s ­

t o r y 's w ra th . Y et th e r e were g re a t d if f e r e n c e s between th e p o s i t io n in

which P au l found h im s e lf and th e p o s it io n o f th e T ear, among them th e

f a c t t h a t in 1941, th e German war machine was v a s t ly su p e rio r t o t h a t

o f th e Y u g o slav s, w h ile in 1389, the S lavs w ere n o t m i l i t a r i l y outnum­

bered by th e T u rk s . I n I 389, th e enemy was on S erb ian s o i l , w h ile in

1941, th e Germans, a lth o u g h th re a te n in g , had n o t a s y e t invaded. And

f in a l l y , i t m ust be remembered th a t th e d e c i s io n by Laaar to f ig h t r a th e r

them com prom ise, a l th o u g h h e ro ic , proved f a t a l , f o r th e B a tt le o f Kosova

proved t o be a d e c is iv e v ic to ry fo r th e T urks and one from which th e

Serbs n ev er r e a l l y reco v e re d . Almost s ix hundred years l a t e r , in a tim e

when d ec is io n -m a k in g was supposed to be a more s o p h is tic a te d and th e r e ­

fo re more complex p ro c e s s , th e op tions l a i d down t o Paul by th e m a jo r ity

20k . F o t ic , The Wwr We (Hew Y ork, V ik ing P ress , 1948), p . 75.

10

o f h is peop le were s t i l l t o be b la c k auod w h ite —honor o r d is g ra c e . Y et,

th e P rin ce h im se lf d ec ided t o in s p e c t th e shades and d eg rees o f th e

s i t u a t io n c o n fro n tin g him and h is p e o p le , and chose h i s co u rse o f a c t io n

from t h i s r e a l i s t i c in s p e c tio n o f f a c t s , d is r e g a rd in g a ch o ice betw een

b la c k and w h ite a s proposed by n a t io n a l e t h i c s .

There were p ro b ab ly s e v e ra l re a so n s w hich swayed P au l away from

re fu s in g t o s ig n th e T r i - P a r t i t e P a c t . In th e f i r s t p la c e , be was ob­

se sse d —and q u ite j u s t i f i a b l y —by th e m i l i ta z y unp rep ared n ess o f h is

co u n try . He knew t h a t th e dem ocracies were in no p o s i t io n t o s u b s t a n t i ­

a l l y h e lp . He a l s o r e a l i z e d t h a t h is northezm f r o n t i e r was in d e fe n s ib le

and t h a t th e ra ilw a y system was co m p le te ly in ad eq u a te f o r p u rp o ses o f

w ar.

A somewhat l e s s o b v io u s, b u t perhaps more d e c is iv e m otive f o r

s ig n in g th e P a c t becomes a p p a re n t in an ex am in a tio n o f P a u l 's p o l i t i c a l

p o s i t io n a t home. In 1939» & s o lu t io n t o th e lo n g -s ta n d in g S erb o -C ro a t

d is p u te , a s i t u a t i o n w hich w i l l be touched upon l a t e r , was found w ith

th e s ig n in g o f th e Sporazum, o r "A greem ent," P a u l had g en u in e ly sough t

th e end o f t h i s d is p u te , b u t had demanded t h a t D r. Vladko Hawdkti th e

le a d e r o f th e C ro a ts , consen t t o b ase any s o lu t io n on d i r e c t n e g o t ia t io n

and agreem ent betw een h im se lf and P a u l, in s te a d o f in v o lv in g a l l th e po­

l i t i c a l p a r t i e s in Y u g o slav ia . The P r in c e f e l t , and j u s t i f i a b l y so ,

t h a t a r e p re s e n ta t io n o f a l l p a r t i e s in th e Sporazum would foreshadow

th e f a l l o f h is regim e and th e r e -e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a democracy in Yugo­

s la v i a . To t h i s he was f irm ly opposed. In e x a c t ly th e same way, t o

have y ie ld e d t o p x ^ l a r demand by n o t s ig n in g th e P ac t in 1941, would

have p ro b ab ly in v o lv ed th e rem oval o f th e cv e tk o v ic Government, w hich by

I l

In la r g e w as, in re g a rd s th e P a c t , swimming a g a in s t th e t i d e o f popu lar

o p in io n in th e S t a t e . A c o a l i t i o n government would have had t o been

form ed in th e fa c e o f w hich P a u l 's d ic t a to r s h ip would p ro b ab ly have c o l­

la p s e d . So f o r P a u l, a s ig n a tu r e on th e Vienna Agreement was n o t only

an e x p e d ie n t means o f s o lv in g h i s f o re ig n p o lic y dilemsm b u t a l s o a des­

p e r a te b id f o r r e t e n t io n o f power a t home.

CHAPTER I I

THE COUP D'ETAT

H i t l e r was h ig h ly s a t i s f i e d w ith th e r e s u l t s o f th e V ienna

Agreement; y e t t h a t cou ld h a rd ly he s a id f o r th e m a jo r i ty o f th e Yugo­

s la v p eo p le . F o r w ith th e s ig n in g o f th e P act and th e dem ise o f

Yugoslav freedom , what popular support th e re had b een f o r th e Regency,

q u ick ly e v a p o ra te d . A rev o lu tlo n o u s c lim a te was b eg in n in g t o fo rm . A

preview o f t h i s developm ent had been in evidence th e n ig h t b e fo re th e

s ig n in g when a group o f locom otive crewmen s ta g e d a p r o t e s t s t r i k e a t

th e f r o n t i e r th ro u g h which th e Yugoslav M in is te rs p a ssed on t h e i r way

t o V ienna. A lread y on 23 March, G eneral Dusan Sim cvic o f th e Y ugoslav

A ir Force had made known to P rin ce Paul h is o p p o s it io n t o Y u g o slav ia a d ­

h e r in g t o th e T r i - P a r t i t e P a c t. He went on t o s t a t e t h a t i t m igh t be

d i f f i c u l t , i f n o t im p o ss ib le , t o r e s t r a in o f f i c e r co rp s o f th e A ir Force

frxxB d em o n stra tin g a g a in s t th e Government i f th e P a c t w ere s ig n e d . By

Wednesday m orning (26 M arch), tw en ty -fou r hours a f t e r th e V ienna A gree­

ment, rumors began sp read in g throughout B elgrade t h a t a coup was in th e

o f f in g . The German M in is te r in Belgrade re p o r te d t o th e F o re ig n O ffic e

t h a t th e " in t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l s i tu a t io n ( in Y u g o slav ia ) was s t r a i n e d , "

and t h a t " .. .ru m o u rs a re c u rre n t concerning p lan s f o r & coup d 'e t a t by

a group o f younger o f f ic e r s who have gained su p p o rt o f G en e ra l Sim ovic'.'^

^Documents on German Foreign P o lic y , 1918-194$, (W ashington, D. C ., Ü. S. Government P rT n îln g lS ff îc ë , 1962), "Series D, V o l. X II , Ho. 211.

13

l a t e r t h a t m orning Cvetkovic and Curtcar-Merkovlc a r r iv e d in

B elg rade and went d i r e c t l y to th e Royal P a lace t o r e p o r t t o P au l. As

th e y drove th ro u g h th e r e l a t i v e l y q u ie t c i t y , sm a ll groups o f sch o o l

c h i ld re n were in th e s t r e e t s dem o n stra tin g a g a in s t th e Government, no

doubt encouraged by t h e i r p a ren ts* l a t e r , th e M in is te r o f I n te r io r

o rd e red th e p o lic e t o c lo se th e schoo ls and d isp en sed guards abou t th e

U n iv e rs ity o f B elgrade in o rd e r t o p rev en t f u r th e r d em o n stra tio n s .

While P au l was b e in g b r ie f e d on th e s i tu a t io n by th e Prime M in is te r and

F o re ig n M in is te r , in a n o th e r p a r t o f th e c i t y , th e A s s is ta n t Ccmmander

o f th e A ir F o rce , G eneral B o riv o je M irkovic, inform ed Simovic t h a t p la n s

were read y f o r a ta k e o v e r o f th e Government. Somewhat ta k e n aback ,

Simovic co u n ce lled Markovic t o w a it , b u t a s th e A s s is ta n t Camnander had

a lre a d y g iv en in s t r u c t io n s t o th e o th e r main c o lla b o ra to rs and was s e t

on Immmediate a c t io n , Simovic r e lu c ta n t ly consen ted t o a c t . ^

The P rin ce Regent was n o t o v e rly concerned abou t th e rumors o f

coup which d r i f t e d back t o th e P a la ce , b u t a p p a re n tly f e l t t h a t some r e ­

a ssu ran ce shou ld be g iv en t o h is co u n try in re g a rd t o h is d ip lo m a tic

a c t io n s w ith B e r l in . A cco rd ing ly , Radio B elgrade re c e iv e d o rd e rs to

s ta n d by fo r a r a d io a d d re ss by P au l. However, a t e ig h t o 'c lo c k th a t

even ing , th e speech was postponed two h o u rs . As f u r th e r r e p o r ts f i l t e r e d

in o f growing r e v o l t and d is o rd e r in so u th and c e n t r a l S e rb ia , B osnia

and M ontenegro, th e P rin c e Regent postponed h is scheduled b ro a d c a s t to

m idn igh t. At m id n ig h t, he c a n c e lle d i t a l to g e th e r and boarded th e ro y a l

^See P e te r I I , A K in g 's H eritag e (London. C u s se ll , 1955)» P* 4$.

14

t r a i n heading t o a r e s t sp o t In th e n o r th .3 The c o n s p ir a to r s were

e v id e n tly d is q u ie te d b y th e news t h a t th e P r in c e p lan n ed t o le a v e B e l­

grade f o r th e n o r th , i f P su l f e l t t h a t a coup was im m inent, w hich

Simovic had no way o f a s c e r ta in in g , i t was th o u g h t t h a t he m igh t a p p e a l

f o r a s s is ta n c e from th e Axis in o rd e r t o q u e l l th e r e b e l l i o n . Because

th e ro y a l t r a i n co u ld re a c h th e b o rd e rs o f Hungary by th e tim e o f th e

coup, many in th e S im ovic c liq u e co n s id e red a c t in g im m ed ia te ly b y fo rc e -

a b ly s to p p in g th e R e g e n t 's t r a in b e fo re I t l e f t B e lg ra d e . However, a t

m idnight " i t w is le a rn e d from th e g e n e ra l s t a f f t r a n s p o r t departm en t

th a t P au l was due t o a r r i v e in Brdo, S lo v e n ia i n th e m orn ing . The

t r a i n would be somewhere n ear Zagreb, w e l l w ith in th e Y ugoslav b o rd e r ,

a t th e zero -hour o f t h e c o u p . T h e te n s io n a b a te d .

At two o 'c lo c k i n th e morning o f 27 M arch, th e c o n s p ir a to r s

a c te d . An A ir F o rce o f f i c e r led a p a r ty o f s o ld i e r s t o Prim e M in is te r

C vetkov ic '8 home on D ed ln je H il l in B elg rade and p ro m p tly p la c e d him

under a r r e s t . A t 2 :2 0 a . m ., th e f i r s t r e p o r t s o f th e s u c c e ss o f th e

p lan began f i l t e r i n g in to S im ovic 's q u a r te r s . P o lic e h e a d q u a r te rs in

Belgrade had been ta k e n w ithout a s h o t f i r e d and soon a f t e r i t was a n ­

nounced t h a t a g ro u p o f f o r ty A ir F orce men had ta k e n "M akis, " th e B e l­

grade ra d io s t a t i o n . I t was here t h a t th e o n ly c a s u a l ty o f t h e re v o lu ­

t io n occu rred . A po licem an guarding th e r a d io s t a t i o n a c c id e n ta l ly

sh o t h im se lf in h i s hand . Colonel Z u id jin R a d o jlc ic o f th e A ir Force

^For an i n t e r e s t i n g account o f P a u l 's a c t io n s d u r in g t h i s p e r io d , see R. Brock, Hot Aiqr V ic to ry (Hew York, R eynolds and H itch co ck , 1942), pp. 160- 174 .

^D. N. R i s t i c , Y ugos^v R ev o lu tio n o f 1941 (U n iv e rs i ty P a rk , P a . , Pennsylvania S ta te U n iv e rs i ty P re ss , 19bb), p . 84 .

15

r e p o r te d t h a t th e Wkr M in is try and th e h ea d q u a rte rs o f th e G eneral

S t a f f had been occup ied , a lo n g w ith th e head p o s t o f f ic e s in B elgrade

and Zemin. At l a s t came th e announcement o f th e a r r e s t o f C vetkovic '

and th e members o f h is gov e rnm ent. I t was c l e a r th e n t h a t th e coup

was a su c c e s s .

As p re v io u s ly n o ted , P au l, e i t h e r a t ta c h in g l i t t l e im portance t o

th e w hispers o f a coup d 'e t a t , o r because he had a n t ic ip a te d th e w o rs t,

l e f t B elgrade by t r a i n s e v e ra l hours b e fo re i t s f a l l . At XUtuna, o u t­

s id e B elg rad e , th e in s p e c to r on th e ro y a l t r a i n was c a l le d t o th e t e l e ­

phone by an o f f i c i a l o f th e S ta te Railw ays and was inform ed o f th e coup.

H urrying back t o th e t r a i n , th e in s p e c to r asked th e P r in c e 's a id e -d e -

camp t o inform P au l o f what bad o ccu rred . W ith some p e rsu a s io n , th e

aide-de-cam p ag reed t o awaken th e P r in c e , who re fu s e d , however, t o ta k e

th e news s e r io u s ly . Even a t Zagreb, hours l a t e r , th e P rin c e a g a in r e ­

fu se d t o b e l ie v e th e news o f what had happened, a s he was su re t h a t

e i t h e r th e young King o r th e p a la c e o f f i c i a l s would have inform ed him.

Then, d ra m a tic a l ly , a te leg ram a r r iv e d from B elgrade o rd e rin g t h a t th e

ro y a l t r a i n shou ld r e tu r n im m ediately .

Simovic met P au l a t th e B elgrade t r a i n s t a t i o n and demanded t h a t

th e P rin ce leav e th e co u n try im m ediately . Any te n a c i ty t h a t th e P rin c e

Regent migpit have p o ssessed q u ic k ly ev ap o ra ted w ith th e en co u n te r and

P au l gave in q u ic k ly . A ccording t o S im ovic, P au l was n o t t o be p e rm itte d

t o go n o rth t o Germany, b u t so u th t o A thens. R e c a llin g t h e i r c o n v e rsa tio n

o f S3 March when Simovic had warned th e P rin c e o f th e p o s s ib le d i s a s t e r -/

ous r e s u l t s o f conclud ing a p a c t w ith Germany, P au l now t o l d Sim ovic t h a t

l6

he was " th e o n ly one t o t e l l me what would happen. With t h a t . P rin c e

P a u l s l ip p e d o f f th e pages o f h i s to r y .

The new government began t o ta k e shape ra p id ly . King P e te r I I ,

th e s e v e n te e n -y e a r o ld son o f th e l a t e King Alexander, A ssass in a ted by

t e r r o r i s t s in 1934, had escaped th e R eg e n t’s o f f i c ia l s by s l id in g down

a r a i n p ip e o u ts id e h is ap artm en t. The young h e ir was ab le t o make

c o n ta c t w ith Simovic and alm ost im m ediately was proclaimed a c t in g r u l e r . ^

P e te r was t o be o f f i c i a l l y crowned in a solemn ceremony a t th e S e rb ia n

Orthodox C a th e d ra l th e next day .

S upport f o r th e new King and h is governsmnt was sw ift in com­

in g . C e le b ra tio n s were h e ld in th e s t r e e t s of Belgrade and a n ti-A x is

d e m o n s tra to rs dragged the Swedish Ambassador from h is c a r , b e a t in g him

s e v e re ly , b e c au se , accord ing to a Hew York Times r e p o r te r , " th e M in is­

t e r was sp eak in g German and was b e l ie v e d to be a German c i t i z e n . "7

The German A m bassador's car was s p a t upon by the crowds and Serbs in

th e m arket p la c e s throughout th e c i t y chan ted a doggerel v e rse , "B o lje

r a t n eg ro p a b t , b o l je grab negro rob ! Support came frcm o u ts id e th e

C. F . M e lv ille , B alkan R acket (London, J a r ro ld s , L td . , 1941 ) ,p . 6 3 .

^King P e te r in h is memoirs n o te s th a t " . . . a fu r th e r d e c is io n was t h a t I (P e te r ) should b ro a d c a s t a p roclam ation to th e people o f Y u g o s lav ia , s t a t i n g th a t I was p a r ty t o th e rev o lu tio n and u rg in g th e p e o p le t o u n i te around me and t o g iv e me t h e i r d isc ip lin e d and co u r­ageous su p p o rt in th e days t o come. As I was to be in a c c e s s ib le t o th e new Government fo r some tim e , b e in g i s o la te d a t th e P alace , th e v o ice t h a t made t h i s p roclam ation in my name over Belgrade ra d io on t h a t v ery day (27 M arch) and heard by th e peop le o f Yugoslavia, and w ith sosm a s ­to n ish m en t by me, was the v o ice o f a young o f f ic e r im ita tin g m in e ." P e te r I I , A K ing’s H eritag e , p . 66.

^Hew York Times, 27 March, 1941."R ath er war than P a c t , r a t h e r d e a th than s lav e ry !"

17

country , to o , w ith b o th th e S o v ie t Union and th e West welcoming th e

new government. Pravda c o n g ra tu la te d th e Y ugoslav p eo p le a s "b e in g

worthy o f t h e i r g lo r io u s past.**^ The U. 3 . S ta te D epartm ent in s t r u c te d/

Ambassador A rthur Lane t o inform G enera l Simovic o f th e " e x c e l le n t im­

p re ss io n made by t h e i r de term ined a c t i o n . . . and t h a t th e U n ited S ta te s

would, under th e Lend Lease A ct, p ro v id e a s s i s ta n c e t o Y u g o slav ia in

r e p e l l in g ag g ress io n .

The dem onstra tion o f su p p o rt b y th e v a s t m a jo r i ty o f Y ugoslav

peoples and th e acc la im g iv en Sim ovic and h is governm ent by th e West

and R ussia a l l c o n tr ib u te d t o th e c r e a t io n o f an a lm o st eu p h o ric a t ­

mosphere which q u ick ly perm eated m ost o f th e c o u n try . U n fo r tu n a te ly ,

t h i s co n d itio n of ju b i l a t i o n and co n fid en ce c o n ta in e d th e seed s o f d e ­

cep tio n and impermanence. For th e f u tu r e o f Y ugoslav ia h inged n o t upon

th e support o f th e people o r o f th e W est, b u t upon th e r e a c t io n o f

B e r lin .

% . B. H optner, Y ugoslav ia in C r i s i s , 1934-41, p . 171.L. Langer and S . E . G leason , U ndeclared War, 1 9 4 0 -4 l, p . 409<

CHAPTER I I I

GERMAN REACTION TO THE COUP

H i t l e r was I n f u r ia te d vhen th e news o f th e coup reached him.

I t bad come a t a s in g u la r ly u n p ro p itlo u s moment, f o r p re se n t in B erlin

was th e Jap an ese F o re ig n M in is te r , Yoauke M atsuoka, and an entourage

o f Jap an ese d ip lo m a tic o f f i c e r s , a body which H i t l e r f e l t should be

s t ro n g ly im pressed w ith German's m igh t. In s te a d , Matsuoka w itnessed

th e a c t io n s o f a sm a ll co u n try which was supposed t o c rac k under the

w eigh t o f German p re s s u re , b u t w hich, c o n tra ry t o e x p e c ta tio n s , had

d e f ie d th e om nipotent T h ird R eich f o r a l l th e w orld t o s e e . The fa c t

t h a t th e S erbs in B elg rade were "knocking down anyone who spoke Ger­

man" and "w recking German b u s in e ss e s ta b lis h m e n ts " ^ added t o H i t l e r ’s

w ra th .

On T hursday, th e 2 ? th , a t 1 :00 in th e a f te rn o o n . H i t le r held

a s p e c ia l co n fe ren ce in th e R eich C h an ce lle ry t o d e a l w ith th e s i t u ­

a t i o n in Y u g o slav ia . To th o se assem bled , he d e c la re d t h a t he was not

go ing t o w a it f o r any d e c la r a t io n o f lo y a l ty by th e new government in

B elg rade b u t w ould, in s te a d , " c a r ry o u t p re p a ra tio n s f o r th e d e s tru c ­

t i o n o f th e Y ugoslav armed fo rc e s and o f Y ugoslav ia i t s e l f as a n a tio n a l

u n i t . " ^ The F u eh re r th e n s ig n ed E n te rp r is e 25 f o r th e German High Com­

mand w hich reeid in p a r t : "as soon a s th e c o n c e n tra tio n o f s u f f ic ie n t

V o e lk is c h e r B eobach ter, 28 March, 1941.2 —N azi C onsp iracy and A ggression (W ashington, U. S . P r in tin g

O ff ic e , l945 ::4b). V ol. IV, p . 1?46.

19

fo rc e I s concluded (by Oennaziy) and m e te o ro lo g ic a l c o n d itio n s p e rm it

. . . th e c i ty o f B elgrade m ust be d e s t r x ^ d by con tinuous day and n ig h t

a i r a t ta c k . F ranz von B a ld e r , C h ie f o f th e German G eneral S ta f f ,

was ordered t o draw up an o p e r a t io n a l p la n f o r th e campaign a g a in s t

Y ugoslav ia . The o rd e r was g iv e n t o B a ld e r on in c re d ib ly s h o r t n o t ic e

and he obviously had t o im p ro v ise a b i t . However, th e perform ance o f

t h i s iap ro v lsa tico i was ex trem e ly e f f e c t i v e and l a t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s

" e in Hochst Lied d e r G e n e r a ls ta b s a r b e i t" ( th e song o f songs o f G en era l

S t a f f ' s work)*^ G enexal L oehr, Commander o f th e F o u rth A ir F le e t o f

th e German A ir F o rce , whose a i r u n i t s e v e n tu a lly c a r r ie d o u t th e r a id s

on B elg rade, was c a l le d from S o f ia , where G oering re q u es te d him t o

p re p a re fo r a i r o p e ra tio n s a g a in s t Y u g o slav ia .

L ater on th a t T hursday a f te rn o o n . H i t le r gave some o f h is

re a so n s behind h is p lan s f o r th e s w if t and b r u t a l m i l i t a r y campaign

a g a in s t Y ugoslavia, in a tw o-hour lo n g harsuague t o h is s t a f f . " P o l i t i ­

c a l l y , " H itle r s ta t e d , " i t i s e s p e c i a l l y im p o rtan t t h a t th e blow a g a in s t

Y ugoslav ia be c a r r ie d o u t w ith u n m e rc ifu l h a rsh n ess and t h a t th e m i l i -

tanry d e s tru c tio n i s done in a l i g h tn in g - l i k e u n d e rtak in g . In t h i s way,

Turkey would become s u f f i c i e n t l y f r ig h te n e d and th e campaign a g a in s t

G reece l a t e r on would be In f lu e n c e d i n a fa v o ra b le w ay .. . The war

a g a in s t Y ugoslavia shou ld be v e ry p o p u la r in I t a l y , Hungary and B u lg a r ia ,

a s t e r r i t o r i a l a c q u is i t io n s a r e t o be p ro v id ed t o th e se s t a t e s , th e A d ria

^The T r ia l o f th e M ajor War C rim in a ls b e fo re th e I n te r n a t io n a l M il i ta r y T rib u n a l; Documents i n E v id en ce , V ol. IX, p .

P . Bor, O esprache m it B a ld e r (W iesbaden, Limes V erlag , 1950),p . iBO.

20

c o a s t f o r I t a l y , th e B anat f o r Hzngary, and Macedonia f o r B u lg a r ia ." ^

H i t l e r was e s p e c ia l ly anx ious t h a t h is A xis c o u n te rp a r t in Rome—

M u sso lin i—h e n o t i f i e d o f h i s p la n s . A cco rd in g ly , H i t l e r c a l le d in

G en era l Anton von R in te le n , who happened t o be in B e r l in on Thursday

t o re c e iv e d i r e c t iv e s from th e German High Command f o r th e o p e ra tio n

a g a in s t G reece, and gave him w r i t t e n in s t r u c t io n s which d e a l t w ith th e

ta s k s a s s ig n e d th e I t a l i a n s in th e o p e ra t io n s . In th e e a r ly m orning

o f th e 28t h , von R in te le n l e f t by p la n e f o r Rome to convey th e s e in ­

s t r u c t io n s t o M u sso lin i. l a t e r . H i t l e r w ro te th e Duce p e r s o n a lly , r e ­

q u e s tin g him t o h a l t m i l i t a r y o p e ra tio n s in A lb an ia in o rd e r" to cover

and s c re e n th e m ost im p o rtan t p a s se s from Y ugoslav ia in to A lban ia w ith

a l l a v a i la b le fo rc e .

R e a liz in g t h a t an in v a s io n o f Y ugoslav ia re q u ire d some p r e te x t

—i f n o t f o r i n t e r n a t io n a l consusqption, a t l e a s t f o r home consum ption—

H i t l e r o rd e red th e German popaganda m il ls t o produce th e a p p ro p r ia te

in v e c t iv e s a g a in s t Y u g o slav ia . The German p re s s to o k up th e theme

t h a t a f t e r th e coup, th e German m in o r i t ie s in Y ugoslav ia were t r e a t e d

b a d ly (a p r e te x t w hich had become m ost f a m il ia r th ro u g h o u t H i t l e r 's

r e ig n ) and l a t e r , a commentary in th e D ie n s t aus D eu tsch lan d , The Ger­

man News Agency, d e c la re d t h a t "one co u ld n o t go wrong in assum ing t h a t

Germany in ev e ry r e s p e c t ho lds f a s t t o th e b a s ic co n cep tio n s o f so u th ­

e a s te rn p o l i t i c s in th e l i g h t o f th e id eo lo g y o f th e Three-Pow er P ac t

^Razi C onsp iracy and A g g ress io n , V ol. IV, p . 1749.g------ —— — — — -----------------------------The T r i a l of th g Major War C rim inals b e fo re t ^ I

M il i ta ry T r ib u n a f? Documents in Evidence, Vol. Dt, p . 183$

21

and holds h e r s e l f re sp o n s ib le fo r peace, la v and o rd e r in S o u th eastern

Europe."^ T h is r e s p o n s ib i l i ty fo r peace, law and o rd e r was to be a c te d

upon as soon a s a c o n ce n tra tio n o f German fo rc e s was in p lace and m ete­

o ro lo g ic a l c o n d it io n s p e rm itted .

^Hew York Tim es, 27 March, 1941.

CHAPTER IV

yuOOSLAVIA ATTa«PTS TO SIRVIVE

The coup in Y ugoslav ia , w hich was t o u n le a sh H i t l e r 's fu ry

and w hich p r e c ip i ta te d th e t r a g i c e v e n ts t h a t fo llo w e d , was c e r t a in ly

no t s o le ly th e r e s u l t o f P rin ce P au l s ig n in g th e Vienna A greem ent, n o r

was i t s o le ly th e r e s u l t o f th e ch a in o f e v e n ts o f th e f i r s t th re e

months o f 19^1. March 27 m erely marked th e f r u i t i o n o f th e seed s o f

d is c o n te n t w hich had been sown long ago , inrobably a s f a r back a s I 918 ,

when Y ugoslav ia was e s ta b l is h e d a s a n a t io n a l u n i t . W hile h e r b i r t h

in 1918, a lth o u g h p a in f u l , was a p ro d u c t o f h i s t o r i c a l n e c e s s i ty and

was welcomed by a la rg e m a jo r i ty o f th e p o p u la tio n o f th e South S lav

n a t io n s , i t cannot be s a id she had a s u c c e s s fu l ch ild h o o d . Y u g o slav ia ,

d u rin g h e r u p b rin g in g in th e in te rw a r p e r io d , showed l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l ,

id e o lo g ic a l o r s o c ia l co h esio n and h e r le a d e rs e x h ib i te d sm a ll concern

f o r th e g e n e ra l w e lfa re o f th e Y ugoslav p e o p le . Y ugoslav ia o f th e

in te rw a r p e r io d was r e a l l y never c o n s o lid a te d , b u t was k ep t to g e th e r

by l i t t l e more th a n fo rc e a lo n e . P a c t io n a l d is p u te s were ranqpant,

w ith th e Serbs u s u a lly g a in in g th e upper hand. The S erbs en joyed

s e v e ra l ad v an tag es . They were th e most numerous o f th e Y ugoslav

n a t i o n a l i t i e s , a S e rb ian s t a t e had been in e x is te n c e f o r a lm ost a cen ­

tu r y , and th e Serbs haid le d th e f ig h t f o r l i b e r a t i o n in th e l a t e 19 th

and e a r ly 2 0 th c e n tu ry .

By 1918, th e Serbs a lre a d y had a c o n s t i tu t io n , an army, and a

b u reau cracy , and i t seemed to many Serbs t h a t th e lo g i c a l co u rse would

be t o ex ten d th e se i n s t i t u t i o n s t o th e r e s t o f th e c o u n try , th u s e r e -

23

a t i n g in a f f e c t a G re a te r S e rb ia . When a c o n s t i tu t io n a l aaeem bly

v as e l e c te d in 1920, th e S e rb ia n n a t io n a l i s t s succeeded w ith th e a id

o f p re s s u re and b r ib e r y in push ing th ro u g h the ad o p tio n o f a s tro n g ly

c e n t r a i t S t ic c o n s t i t u t i o n , w hich was l i t t l e more th a n a r e v is e d v e r ­

s io n o f th e S e rb ia n C o n s t i tu t io n . In th e long ru n , t h i s proved a

ho llow v ic to r y w hich le d o n ly t o f u r th e r c o n f l ic t . Many C ro a ts , S lo ­

v e n es , fliontenegroans and M acedonians re sen te d S erb ian dom ination and

demanded th e autoncmiy th e y f e l t th e y had been prom ised. The C ro a ts ,

le d by Stephsm R ad ie , a t f i r s t re fu s e d to p a r t ic ip a te in th e N a tio n 's

l e g i s l a t u r e (S k u p s t in a ) , b u t f i n a l l y took t h e i r s e a ts in 1924. F ee l­

in g s rem ained b i t t e r , how ever, and reached a clim ax in 1928, when /

R adie was a s s a s s in a te d on th e f lo o r o f th e Skupstina by a deputy of

th e o p p o s it io n . Thereupon, th e o th e r C roat depu ties w ithdrew and s e t

up t h e i r own p a r lia m e n t in open d e f ia n c e o f the c e n t r a l governm ent.

King A lexander responded in Jan u ary , 1929, by suspending the

c o n s t i t u t i o n and p ro c la im in g a ro y a l d ic ta to r s h ip . The S k u p stin a

was a b o l is h e d , a s were a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t ie s , and th e name o f th e

S ta te was changed from "Kingdcmi o f S e rb s , C roats, and S lovenes" to

"Y u g o sla v ia ." Two y e a rs l a t e r , th e King prom ulgated a new c o n s t i tu ­

t i o n w hich le g a l iz e d h is d i c t a to r s h ip w ithout s ig n i f i c a n t ly a l t e r in g

i t s e s se n c e , and w ith o u t, o f c o u rse , p ac ify in g th e C ro a ts . Under

th e s e c irc u m sta n c e s , many C ro a ts l e n t t h e i r support t o th e "U staseV

an extrem e c h a u v in is t ic group modeled a f t e r the F a s c is ts and N azis.

Members o f t h i s p a r ty p ro b ab ly a rra n g e d th e a s s a s s in a t io n o f King Alex­

a n d e r in 1934 .

24

S ince A lex an d e r’s son and h e i r , P e te r , was o n ly e le v e n a t

th e tim e o f th e a s s a s s in a t io n th e th ro n e was tu rn e d o v e r t o a re g e n c y ,

dw ninated b y P r in c e P a u l, who co n tin u ed t o r u le th e c o u n try in much th e

same fa s h io n a s had A lexander. The C ro a tian problem rem ained unchanged

u n t i l A ugust, 1939, when a f t e r th re e y e a rs o f n e g o t ia t io n s , an a g r e e ­

ment (Sporasum ), was reach ed between th e c e n t r a l governm ent and th e

C roat P easan t P a r ty , beaded by D r. VladlCo Macek. A p a r t i a l l y a u to n o ­

mous C ro a tia was c r e a te d w ith i t s own p a rlia m e n t and a l a r g e ly in d ep en ­

d en t governm ent. A lthough t t e agreem ent gave th e C ro a ts much o f w hat

th e y had lo n g been demanding, i t came to o l a t e t o e x t in g u is h th e f i r e s

o f C ro a tia n chauv in ism . M oreover, th e o th e r n a t i o n a l i t i e s r e s e n te d

th e f a c t t h a t th e C ro a ts had been g iv en s p e c ia l r i g h t s w h ile th e r e s t

o f th e co u n try s t i l l s u f fe re d under th e regim e a t B e lg ra d e . The S e rb s ,

however, co n tin u e d t o dom inate Yugoslav p o l i t i c s , a s th e y bad b e f o r e . ^

So th e coup t h a t to o k p lace in B elg rade was a s much a p ro d u c t

o f th e c rack s and f i s s u r e s which had farmed betw een v a r io u s n a t i o n a l i ­

t i e s w ith in Y u g o slav ia and th e i n a b i l i t y o f p re v io u s Y ugoslav reg im es

t o s u c c e s s fu l ly cope w ith th e problem , a lo n g w ith th e g e n e ra l d i s s a t i s ­

f a c t io n f e l t f o r P a u l, a s i t was o f an y th in g e l s e . The e v e n ts o f 27

March p re se n te d th e new Government o f Y ugoslavia n o t o n ly w ith th e

th o rn y q u e s tio n o f how t o avo id a German a t t a c k b u t p erh ap s th e more

In th e p e r io d o f Jan u ary , 1929 to March 1941, Y u g o s lav ia had seven Prim e M in is te rs and f i f t e e n c a b in e ts in w hich 121 M in is te r s s e rv e d . Of th e se 121 M in is te r s , 73 were S e rb s , 33 were C ro a ts , t e n S lo v en e , and f iv e B osn ian Moslems. In a d d it io n t o th e c o n tro l o f a l l m ain m i n i s t r i e s , th e Serbs were a l s o in a b s o lu te c o n tro l o f th e arm ed f o r c e s . Of th e 165 g e n e ra ls in a c t iv e s e rv ic e in 1941, 161 were S e rb s , 2 w ere C ro a ts , and 2 S lo v en es .

25

te d io u s problem o f c o n s o lid a tin g power and ach iev in g n a t io n a l u n i ty ./

The f i r s t dom estic t a s k o f th e Simovic Government invo lved

th e o rg a n iz a tio n o f a new c a b in e t . R ecognizing th e n e c e s s i ty f o r/ Y

n a t io n a l u n i ty , Simovic approached D r. Macek, th e Croat le a d e r , inV

o rd e r t o de term ine h is f e e l in g s on e n te r in g th e governm ent. Macek

h e s i t a t e d , s t a t i n g t h a t b e fo re he co u ld jo in th e governm ent, c e r ta in

c o n d itio n s had t o be f u l f i l l e d . T alks w ith th e Germans, Macek s a id ,

shou ld recommence a s soon a s p o s s ib le , no a c t io n should be tak en which

would provoke German a igg ression , and th e S erb -C roat agreem ent (Sporazum)

had t o be confirm ed by th e new governm ent.I y

Simovic ag reed t o th e c o n d itio n s and Macek jo in e d th e g cv ern -o

m ent. T h is was th e f i r s t tim e in tw e n ty - th re e y e a rs t h a t th e C roats

had been c o n su lte d on a n y th in g , and i t p ro b ab ly was more a tem p ta tio n

f o r Macek t o demand more f o r th e C roats a s c o n s id e ra tio n f o r th e b a r -

g a in . Whether a s tro n g e r s ta n d on th e p a r t o f Macek cou ld have worked

o r n o t i s r e a l l y academ ic. P ro b ab ly i t cou ld no t have, f o r even inV

1941, Macek and th e C roats d id n o t h o ld th e s c a le s . Y et th e f a c t r e -

mains t h a t D r. Macek jo in e d th e Simovic Government, a c t in g n e i th e r a s

a good C roat o r S erb , b u t a s a p a t r i o t i c and p r a c t i c a l Y ugoslav, and

a s a man who d id n o t want t o see h is co u n try commit s u ic id e .

O ther members o f th e new C ab inet in c lu d ed lead in g r e p re s e n ta ­

t i v e s o f a lm o st ev e ry s ig n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l g roup . The new M in is te r

o f F o re ig n A f fa ir s was Momcilo H in c ic , a member o f th e R ad ica l P a r ty ,

1941.^Macek d id n o t o f f i c i a l l y jo in th e Government u n t i l 2 A p r i l ,

26

vho had occupied t h a t p o s t in the Government o f N iko la i n 1921.

Bovidar Markovic and M ilan G ro l, bo th o f th e Y ugoslav D em ocratic

P a r ty , a ls o to o k s e a t s i n th e new Government. F e e lin g t h a t I t v as

e s s e n t ia l to in c lu d e S lovenes in o rder t h a t th e Government be f u l l y

re p re se n ta tiv e of th e p e o p le , th e new P rem ier to o k members o f th e S lo ­

vene P eo p le 's P a r ty , i t s le a d e r being Fran Xhlovec, and s iss ig n ed them

to th e same p o sts th e y h e ld in th e form er C vetkovic Governm ent. Thei

nev second V ice-P rem ier v a s P ro fesso r Slobodan Jo v an o v ie o f th e U ni­

v e r s i ty o f B elgrade, th e o u tstan d in g s o c ia l s c i e n t i s t i n th e c o u n try

and P resid en t o f th e S e rb ia n Academy o f S c ien ces .

That th e members o f th e se d is s id e n t f a c t io n s co u ld amd would

accep t menbership i n to a government which was dom inated b y S erbs i s

only su rp r is in g i f one d is re g a rd s th e f a c t t h a t th e le a d e r s o f th e s e

fa c tio n s must have r e a l i z e d th a t i f th e y had n o t a c c e p te d th e coup and

had not a s so c ia te d th em se lv es w ith th e Simovic reg im e , a c i v i l war

would have been more th a n l ik e ly , in which German I n te rv e n t io n co u ld

no t have been avo ided .

The new Government accep ted th e s t a t e b u d g e t s e t up by th e d e ­

posed Paul w ithout any d isc u s s io n or change, and a l s o a c c e p te d en b lo c

th e economic p o lic y o f th e overthrown governm ent. As f a r a s f o re ig nI

p o licy was concerned, S im ovic, the f i r s t day he to o k pow er, n o t i f i e d

a l l Yugoslav d ip lo m a tic re p re s e n ta t iv e s ab ro ad , by means o f i d e n t i c a l

telegram s from th e M in is try o f Foreign A f fa i r s , t h a t th e new governm ent

f u l ly accep ted th e V ienna P ac t o f 2$ March. In f a c t , a t f i r s t g la n c e ,

i t was hard to d i s t in g u is h th e o ld p o lic y from th e new. In e f f e c t , th e

27

/nev a d m in is tra tio n o f Simovic accep ted a s i t s own, th e v ery p o lic y

a g a in s t which i t had re v o lte d le s s th an tw e n ty -fo u r hours b e fo re .

On 28 March, in an e f f o r t t o p a c ify th e Germans, Simovic t o ld

V ic to r von Heeren, th e German Ambassador t o Y ugoslav ia , t h a t he r e ­

g r e t te d th e anti-G erm an in c id e n ts in B elgrade and a s su re d him th a t

th e y would " in no case be r e p e a t e d ."3 Simovic th e n decided th a t th e

new M in is te r o f F oreign A f fa i r s , H incic , shou ld leav e f o r Germany to

d isc u ss th e p o l i t i c a l s i tu a t io n w ith H i t le r , w h ile Jovanovie would go

to Rome f o r t a lk s w ith M usso lin i.

The requ irem en ts o f n a t io n a l defense a g a in s t a German in v as io n

p re se n te d Simovic w ith what would seem a most d i f f i c u l t dilemma. On

th e one hand, th e Arlme M in is te r recogn ized th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f an a t ­

ta c k by Germany and th e r e fo r e , in o rd e r t o p rep are an adequate d e fen se ,

a m o b iliz a tio n o f Y u g o slav ia 's armed fo rc e s was n e c e ssa ry . Y et, on

th e o th e r hand, la rg e tro o p movement o rdered by B elgrade m ight provoke

Germany in to a t ta c k in g im m ediately . A pparen tly , Simovic d id n o t h e s i ­

t a t e f o r long in re ach in g a d e c is io n . When asked by th e King w hether

he had o rdered m o b iliz a tio n , Simovic r e p l ie d t h a t " th e re w i l l be tim e

enough f o r t h a t in a few days tim e . We do n o t w ish t o show any f e a r o fk

war a lre a d y , nor do we w ish to provoke th e Axis Powers. P robab ly

f e e l in g th a t th e Yugoslav Army would h a rd ly be judged an overwhelming

o b s ta c le by H i t le r , Simovic opted f o r a le s s b e l l i c o s e s ta n c e . I t

^Documents on German F ore ign P o lic y , 1918- I 945 , S e r ie s D,V ol. X II. HÔ7 225”

4.P e te r I I , A K in g 's H eritag e , p . 72.

28

w ould a l s o seem t h a t th e Prime M in is te r m ight a lso have been concerned

ab o u t xreneging on th e assu rances he had g iv en Macek not t o n e t t l e

H i t l e r . Added t o th a t were th e e rro n eo u s b u t rea ssu rin g c a lc u la t io n s

o f Y ugoslav G en era l S ta f f which had concluded e a r l i e r th a t the Germans

c o u ld n o t p o s s ib ly d e l iv e r an a s s a u l t a g a in s t Yugoslavia before 20 A p r i l ,

more th a n th r e e weeks hence.^

F in a l ly , and perhaps most im p o rta n tly , i t would appear t h a t by

h i s a c t o f d e la y in g m o b iliz a tio n , Simovic was d esp era te ly hoping t h a t

B e r l in m ig h t, in th e days to come, d is p la y in te n tio n s of s e t t l i n g th e

problem o f Y u goslav ia , o th er th a n by v io le n c e . In order to p re se rv e

t h i s hope, th e Prim e M in is te r d ec id ed t o fo llo w the lin e of l e a s t r e ­

s is t a n c e tow ard Germany, in an a tte m p t t o p a c ify H itle r . On th e d ip lo ­

m a tic f r o n t , however, Simovic*s perform ance was more p o s it iv e .

On S a tu rd a y , 29 March, th e Y ugoslav Ambassador to Germany, Ino

A n d ric , c a l l e d upon German S ta te S e c re ta ry Weizacker, w ith in s t r u c t io n s

In a d d i t io n t o being u l t im a te ly wrong in th e i r c a lc u la t io n s a s t o th e le n g th o f tim e necessary f o r Germany to d e liv e r a s t r ik e , th e G en era l S t a f f was b ad ly d iv ided on th e s t r a te g y to be emplcyed in th e e v e n t o f an in v a s io n . As M ilvio S u d jic , in h is book, Yug o s la v ia in Arms, has p u t i t , " th e q u es tio n was w hether to defend th e e n t i r e t e r r i ­t o r y o f th e c o u n try in ch by in c h o r w hether to concentrate on d e fen d in g o n ly th o se re g io n s which to p o g ra p h ic a lly co n ferred th e g re a te s t advantage on th e d e fen d in g tro o p s . . . From a s t a t e g i c p o in t o f view, the l a t t e r p lan was o b v io u s ly th e sounder. I t would have involved th e abandonment o f n o r th e rn Y ugoslav ia and an immediate r e t r e a t "̂ o the mountains o f S e rb ia , B osn ia and M ontenegro, to form a l in e s t r e tc h in g frcsn th e ju n c tio n o f th e B u lg a r ia n , G reek and Yugoslav f r o n t i e r s northw ard toward B elgrade, and th e n a lo n g th e Danube and Sava, w es t-n o rth w est across th e Bosnia and C ro a tia n m ountains to th e A d r ia t ic . Some ex p e rts have expressed th e o p in io n t h a t had t h i s p lan been ad o p ted , th e Yugoslav Army might have h e ld o u t f o r a t l e a s t s ix to e ig h t weeks and in f l i c te d enormous c a s u a l­t i e s on th e Germ ans." M. J . S u d jic , Y ugoslavia in Arms (London, L. Drummond, L td . , 1942), p . 51.

29

from h is Government which u rged t h a t B e r l in have p a tie n c e w ith th e new

Yugoslav regim e. He to ld W eizacker t h a t h is Government would soon

"form ulate a c le a r p o licy "^ tow ard Germany. W eizacker l i s t e n e d in s i ­

lence and a f t e r Andric had f in is h e d , m erely s ta t e d t h a t h e , W eizacker,

was in no p o s it io n to g ive an o p in io n on th e s i t u a t i o n . Be s a id t h a t

a s f a r as he was concerned, h is l a t e s t in fo rm a tio n was t h a t th e German

Ambassador had been t r e a te d t o "p u b lic d em o n stra tio n s o f i l l - f e e l i n g " ^

and t h i s spoke fo r i t s e l f . A ndric th e n to o k h is le a v e . On th e same

day. Ambassador Barren in d ic a te d in a message t o R ih b en tro p t h a t , a l ­

though Yugoslav Foreign M in is te r H incic and Macek (as le a d e r o f th e

C ro a tian wing) want to av o id a c o n f l i c t w ith th e A x is , " th e S e rb ia n

C abinet members a re fundam entally opposed t o a c c e s s io n t o th e T r i ­

p a r t i t e P a c t," He then went on t o co u n se l R ib b en tro p t h a t "a ten d en cy

a t l e a s t toward th e lo o sen in g o f t i e s (betw een Y ugoslav ia and Germany)Û

i s to be ex p ected ."

On th e a fte rn o o n o f 29 March, w h ile Sim ovic was e x p la in in g to

King P e te r th a t inonedlate m o b iliz a tio n would o n ly n e e d le s s ly provoke

th e Germans, H it le r seemed t o t u r n h i s b ack on any chance o f r e c o n c i l i ­

a t io n by inform ing th e German Embassy in Y ugoslav ia t h a t i t sh o u ld n o t

" a tte n d any fu n c tio n s w hatsoever and av o id b e in g p re s e n t a t such e v e n ts ,

i f necessary g iv in g i l l n e s s a s th e re a so n . The n ex t day . G enera l von

documents on German Foreign P o licy , 1918-194$, S eries D ., Vol.XII, No.

^Ibid. , Ho. 235.A. Freytagh-Loringhaven, Deutschlands A u ssen politik , 1933-1941

(B erlin , 0 . Stollberg, 1943), p. 45T^Documents on German Foreign P o licy , 1918-194$, S eries D, V ol.

XII, No. 232.

30

B ra u c h lts c h , under o rd e rs from H i t l e r , is su e d t o h is o f f ic e r s in s tru c ­

t i o n s f o r c a r ry in g ou t th e a s s a u l t on Y u g o slav ia . As f a r a s B e rlin was

co n cern ed , d ip lom acy, a s re g a rd s th e Y ugoslav s i t u a t i o n , had o u tliv ed any

u s e fu ln e s s i t m ight have once had .

As has been p re v io u s ly n o ted , one o f th e most im portan t objec­

t i v e s o f th e Simovic Government was t o secu re th e b ack ing o f as many of

th e v a r io u s p o l i t i c a l , e th n ic g roup ings w ith in th e Y ugoslav s ta te as

was p o s s ib le . The new Government f e l t t h a t i f even a semblance o f a

u n ite d f r o n t co u ld be ach iev ed , i t s c r e a t io n m ight h e lp f o s t e r second

th o u g h ts in th e mind o f H i t l e r on th e p r a c t i c a b i l i t y o f invad ing Yugo­

s la v i a .^ ^ To a la rg e d e g re e , a sem blance o f n a t io n a l u n i ty , however

tenuous and im perm anent, was ach iev ed , f o r th e f i r s t tim e in th e tw enty-

th r e e y e a r h i s to r y o f th e S ta te , molded n o t so much by any rig o ro u s e f -

f o r t s o f S im ovic, b u t b y th e common f e a r o f th e German sword which was

p o ise d t o s t r i k e in to th e h e a r t o f th e n a t io n . Y et i t must be noted

t h a t one p o l i t i c a l f a c t io n o b s t in a te ly r e fu s e d t o e n te r in to th e c o a li­

t i o n o f p u b lic o p in io n , begging o u t because i t d e r iv e d i t s s tre n g th from

d is o rd e r and f e a r , and because i t had a p rev io u s commitment elsew here.

N um erically , th e Communist P a r ty o f Y ugoslav ia (CPY) in 1941,

^ ^ h a t a u n i te d p o l i t i c a l f r o n t in Y ugoslav ia cou ld be an e f ­f e c t iv e d e te r r e n t t o th e pow erfu l German Hèhrmacht, e s p e c ia l ly in 1941, seems a b i t r id i c u lo u s . But t h a t th e Government in B elg rade could even e n t e r t a i n such an id e a seems in c r e d ib le . Only i f one ta k e s in to account t h a t H i t l e r , b e fo re th e 27 March coup d id n o t want o r in te n d to invade Y u g o slav ia , t h a t B elg rade r e a l iz e d t h i s ; t h a t , f o r H i t l e r , a f t e r 2$ March, e v e ry th in g changed, and t h a t B elgrade d id n o t f u l l y r e a l i z e o r ap p rec ia te t h i s change, does B e lg ra d e 's th o u g h ts become u n d e rs ta n d a b le .

31

vas in s ig n i f i c a n t . In 1937, Jo s ip Bro* T i to , a t th e age o f f o r ty -

f i v e , moved in to th e le a d in g p o s i t io n w ith in th e Communist P a r ty b y

l i t e r a l l y s tepp ing over th e dead b o d ie s o f many o f h is p re d e c e sso rs .

The CPY was id e o lo g ic a lly com m itted t o th e Communist P a r ty o f th e

S o v ie t Union and up u n t i l A ugust, 1939, vehem ently condemned b o th

H i t l e r ' s Germany and M u s s o lin i 's I t a l y , w h ile c u r ry in g th e fa v o r o f

S t a l i n . The R ibbentrop-M olotov F a c t s ig n a le d a n a b ru p t h a l t t o th e

o b s tre p e ro u s d en u n c ia tio n o f F asc ism b y th e CPY and th e P a r ty 's v o ic e

h a i le d th e fo rg in g o f t h i s m ariage de convenance a s "a s ig n o f p eace .

Even by 19^1, when the bonds o f matrimony between Moscow and B erlin

were beginning to break, T ito maintained a p o s itio n of friendship

toward Germany and I ta ly . Therefore, when the 27 March coup took

place in Yugoslavia, the CPY did not Jo in the u p risin g . Instead, they

organized counter-demonstrations w ith a n t i-B r it ish overtones in accord­

ance w ith the lin e o f the Comintern. On the 20 March, a Communist d e le -

gat ion headed by Ino Lola Ribar spoke to Sava Xbsanovic, one o f th e min­

is t e r s in Simovic'8 Cabinet, to express the fea r th at the "new Government

might lead the country in to war a t the s id e o f im p er ia lis tic B r ita in .

Even when th e Germans invaded Y u g o s la v ia , th e Communists in M ontenegro

c o n tin u e d to c a l l f o r th e d o w n fa ll o f th e Y ugoslav S ta te . Of c o u rse ,

a f t e r th e German in v a s io n o f R u ss ia in J u n e , 194-1, th e Communist a t t i t u d e

underw ent a r a d ic a l change.

M. L acik , T i to e t l a r e v o lu t io n y o u g o slav ie (P a r is , F a s q u e lle , 1957), p . 43. ̂ ------------------------------------------- --------------------

^ K . F o tic , The War We L o s t, p . ?4 .

32

I t l8 in te r e s t in g t o n o te th e p o s it io n ta k e n hy some of th e

le a d e rs o f th e CPY a f t e r th e v a r when th e P a r ty was f i n a l l y en tren ch ed

in power. M ilovan D ji la s has rem arked th a t th e overthrow o f th e C vet­

kovic Government was b ro u g h t ab o u t by th e Yugoslav people "under th e

le a d e rsh ip o f th e Communist P a r ty o f Y u g o slav ia ."^3 would seem th a t

D j i l a s , a t l e a s t in t h i s in s ta n c e , was q u ite u n in h ib ite d by f a c t s .

T ito was more c a u t io u s . In a speech in J u ly , 1948, he s ta te d t h a t " fo l-/

lowing th e Simovic coup th e Communist P a r ty a t once began p re p a rin g f o r

r e s is ta n c e t o th e Nazi a t t a c k which seemed in e v i ta b le . " l4 xa t o th e

coup i t s e l f , T ito went on to s t a t e th a t th e Cvetkovic Government f e l l

"under p re ssu re from th e m asses," a lth o u g h " th is d id n o t f in d our P a r ty

unprepared" because "on t h a t day our p a r ty was com plete m aster o f th e

s i tu a t io n d u rin g th e g re a t dem onstra tions in B e l g r a d e . O n t h a t day,

however, T ito , a lo n g w ith most o f th e le a d e rsh ip o f th e CPY, was in

Zagreb, 200 m iles from th e c a p i t a l .

Dedijer, T ito (ifew York, Simon and Schuster, 1953), P» 8 3 .Halperin, Triumphant Heretic (London, Heinemann, 1958), p . 32.

^^ Ib id . , p . 56 .^^The Yugoslav Communist t h e o r i s t , Eduard R h rd e lj, s ta y s f a i r l y

c lo se t o s o l id ground when he rem arked th a t " i t i s t r u e th a t th e r e a l n a t io n a l u p r is in g began on ly a f t e r Ju n e , 1941. This i s q u ite n a tu r a l . To s t a r t a n a t io n a l u p r is in g w h ile H i t l e r 's main powers were n o t engaged on any f r o n t would have been a hazardous p o l ic y ." U nited Committee o f Yugo­s la v ia , 5̂ March o f Y ugoslavia (London, 194$), p . 25.

CHAPTER V

THE GERMAN SOLUTION

D e sp ite th e la c k of response from B e r l in , Belgrade con tinued

t o p ro c la im i t s d e s i r e fo r accord w ith Germany. On 30 March, In a com­

munique t o B e r l in and Rome, Foreign M in is te r HinHic confirmed t h a t

Y ugoslavia w ould a b id e by the re c e n tly s ig n e d V ienna P act and th e n asked

fo r e n lig h te n m e n t a s t o "how th e o b lig a tio n s r e s u l t i n g from th e T rea ty

could be f u l f i l l e d so th a t th e in te g r i ty and Independence o f Y ugoslav ia

would be p re se rv e d ? " ^ There was never any r e p ly from e i th e r o f th e Axis

c a p i t a l s . On th e same day, Ninclc approached H eeren, th e German Ambas­

sador in B e lg ra d e , and begged th a t Germany a llo w th e Simovic Government

tim e so t h a t i t "would be in a p o s it io n t o g u a ra n te e much b e t t e r th a n

th e o ld Government co u ld ever have done, th e c o n tin u a n c e ... o f th e

p o lic y o f g e n u in e f r ie n d s h ip w ith th e Germans. The German Ambassador

d id n o t an sw er, b u t th e German Foreign O ff ic e d id . Beeren was r e c a l le d

t o B e r l in th e n e x t day .

On Sunday, 31 March, th e Simovic Government requested th e d i s ­

con tinuance o f th e "excessive and e x a g g e r a te d " 3 B r i t i s h and American

propaganda s ta te m e n ts which had been spewed o u t , condemning H i t le r and/

p r a is in g th e King and Simovic. To th e Prim e M in is te r th ey were h ig h ly

^K. F o t i c , The War ^ L ost, p. 86 .d o c u m e n ts on German Foreign P o lic y , 1918-1945, S e r ie s D, V ol.

X II, No. 235T^Dokumeni o J u g o s la v i j i , Martu 1941 ( P a r i s , 1951), p . 253»

34

em barraaalng and made h is p o s i t io n j u s t t b d t more d i f f i c u l t . (B e lg rad e ,

e a r l i e r , had a l s o d isco u rag ed B r i t i s h F o re ig n M in is te r Eden from mak­

ing a proposed t r i p t o th e Y ugoslav c a p i t a l ) . On th e same day , th e

German C o n su la te in Zagreb r e c e iv e d th e fo llo w in g message from R ibben­

t r o p : " S e c re t m a te r ia l , a l l cod ing and r a d io in s t r u c t io n s , a s w e l l a sou

codes, must b e p re p a re d f o r d e s t r u c t i o n . . . a l l th e German C o n su lte s in

Y ugoslav ia , e x c e p t f o r th e C o n su la te in S ^greb , must c lo se in th e co u rse

o f Thursday, A p r i l 3 . . . As soon a s you re c e iv e from h ere th e code w ord,

'T r i p a r t i t e P a c t ' , you a r e t o d e s tro y a t once a l l s e c r e t m a te r ia l , con­

c e a l th e r a d io u n d er th e c o a l p i l e o r th e l i k e , a n d . . . l e a v e th e c i t yk

l i m i t s . . . i f poss i b l e .

On Tuesday, 2 A p r i l , th e Y ugoslav Ambassador A ndric a g a in went

t o th e F o re ig n M in is try in B e r l in , d e s p i te th e r e b u f f from W eizacker

tW p rev io u s S a tu rd a y . Simovic had t o l d A ndric t o d e c la re t h a t Yugo­

s la v ia was more th a n w i l l in g t o co o p e ra te w ith Germany. A ndric was t o

c o n ta c t anyone be co u ld in th e F o re ig n M in is try in o rd e r t o o f f e r any

co n cessio n s co m p atib le w ith n a t io n a l h o n o r. F or th e n ex t two d ay s , th e

Yugoslav M in is te r t r i e d t o see any o f f i c i a l o f th e German F o re ig n Of­

f ic e to whom he co u ld t r a n s m it th e p ro p o sa ls o f h is Government. However,

no one would t a l k w ith him . The o n ly in d iv id u a l he f i n a l l y d id see was

th e German C h ie f o f P ro to c o l, who handed him h is p a s s p o r t .^

^Documents on German F o re ig n P o l ic y , 1918-1945, S e r ie s D, V ol. X II, No. 248:

^M. M irkovich , " Y u g o s la v ia 's C h o ice", F o re ig n A f f a i r s , O cto b er,1941, p . 143 .

35

A p p a re n tly , a s f a r a s B e r l in was concerned, th e door t o any

d is c u s s io n w ith Y u g o slav ia had lo n g s in c e been slammed s h u t . There

w as, how ever, one c h a n n e l o f ccsnm unlcation from B e r l in t o Y ugoslav ia

w hich rem ained open . T h is d ip lo m a tic l in e was d i r e c te d a t one s p e c i­

f i c g roup in Y u g o slav ia and f o r pu rposes o f communicating w ith i t ,

B e r l in had o rd e re d t h a t th e German C onsulate in Zagreb, th e c e n te r of

C r o a t ia , sh o u ld n o t c lo s e .

The C ro a ts , and t o a l e s s e r d eg ree , the Serbs found th e A gree­

ment o r Sporazum o f 1939 n o t t o t a l l y s a t i s f a c to r y . The Sporazum gave

a n e n la rg e d C ro a tia p a r t i a l autonom y, b u t th e e x tr e m is ts , a lo n g w ith

many o th e r C ro a ts , w anted m ore. Because th e Sporazum gave C ro a tia

some autonom y, many S erb s were a l s o d i s s a t i s f i e d . B efore th e coup

th e r e were th o s e Y ugoslavs who f e l t t h a t Macek and o th e r C ro a t le a d e rs

w ere w i l l i n g t o e n t e r i n t o a n agreem ent w ith the A xis on a lm o st any con­

d i t i o n so t h a t C ro a t ia co u ld —r e c e iv e com plete autonomy. T his was not

t r u e . However, t h e r e p ro b a b ly was a s tro n g e r d e s ir e in C ro a tia n o t to

have B elg rad e ta k e any a c t io n w hich would provoke th e Germans th a n

th e r e was in th e r e s t o f Y u g o s la v ia , p r im a rily because i f th e r e was war,

C ro a t ia would be th e f i r s t t o f e e l th e blow . This a t t i t u d e was evidenced

in two e d i t o r i a l s in M acek'a p a p e r , Hrvabski Dnevnik, th e f i r s t th re e

days b e fo re th e V ienna P a c t was s ig n e d . I t s ta te d t h a t " th e w i l l t o co­

o p e ra te " had b een p re s e n te d t o Y ugoslav ia by the Axis in such form " th a t

n o t a s in g le argum ent w hich w ould s ta n d r e a l and s e r io u s c r i t i c i s m could

have b een r a i s e d . " ^

^ I b i d . , p . l 4 l .

36

The second e d i t o r i a l , w r i t t e n Im m ediately a f t e r Y u g o s la v ia 's a d h e ren ce

to th e T r i - P a r t i t e P a c t , s a id t h a t "C ro a tia 'n p u h lic o p in io n had a l r e a d y

been f o r such a s o lu t io n f o r a long t lm e .”^ However, in f a i r n e s s i t

must be s a id t h a t s im i la r a r t i c l e s had a l s o ap p eared i n th e B e lg rad et

p ress d u rin g th e C vetkovic reg im e.

B e r l in was c o g n iz an t o f and sym pathetic t o th e s e d i v i s iv e a t ­

t i tu d e s in C ro a tia and , a lth o u g h i t ex ag g era ted t h e i r e x t e n t , th e G er­

man F o re ig n M in is try a ttem p te d to e x p lo i t them f o r a l l th e y m igh t be

w orth . R ibbon trop had hoped t o b u ild a la rg e s e p a r t i s t movement a ro u n d

a core o f C ro a tia n e x t r e m is ts , th e U stase , th e F a s c i s t P a r ty le d b y aAnte

man named/^Pavelie, w hich was a p o te n t i a l f i f t h column f o r t h e Germans

in Y ugo slav ia . W ith t h i s in mind, R ibben trop had w ire d th e German co n ­

s u l in Zagreb on 31 March, in o rd e r t o " u rg e n tly a d v is e (Macek) and

o th e r C ro a tia n le a d e r s a g a in s t co o p e ra tin g in any manner w ith th e p r e -o

se n t B elgrade G o v e r n m e n t " L a te r t h a t a f te rn o o n , th e German F o re ig n

M in is te r added , " p le a se inform th e C ro a tian le a d e rs c o n f i d e n t i a l l y . * •

th a t we would p ro v id e f o r an independent C ro a tia w i th in th e fram ew ork

o f th e new o rd e r f o r Europe should th e Y ugoslav S ta te c o l la p s e th ro u g h

i t s own m is ta k e s . They co u ld pr<xaote t h i s g o a l . . . b y a b s ta in in g from

f u r th e r c o o p e ra tio n w ith B e lg ra d e ."^

However, th e o n ly r e a l resp o n se t o B e r l i n 's d ip lo m a tic f o r a y s

^ Ib id ., p . 144.o------

Documents on German Foreign P o licy , 1918-1945, S er ie s D, Vol. XII, Ho. 2 3 8 .

^ Ib id ., Mb. 2 3 9 .

37

/came from th e U s ta se . On 5 A p r i l , l e s s th a n tw en ty -fo u r hours b e fo re

V ' fth e German o n s la u g h t, th e le a d e rs o f th e U s ta se , in c lu d in g P a v e lie and

S lavko K v ate rn lk , is su e d a m a n ife s to , p ro c la im in g th e end o f Y ugoslavia

and th e e s ta b lish m e n t o f a " f r e e , independent C ro a tia S ta te " which

would in c lu d e " the a re a s t h a t a r e C ro a tia from th e h i s to r i c and e th n ic

p o in t o f view."^®

In th e l a s t few days b e fo re th e German in v a s io n , Simovic r e ­

mained r e l a t i v e ly o p t im is t ic . Even a s l a t e a s 5 A p r i l , th e Prime Min­

i s t e r to ld K o n stan tin s F o t ic , th e Y ugoslav Ambassador in W ashington,

t h a t , a lth o u g h he f e l t t h a t th e s i t u a t i o n was c r i t i c a l , "he s t i l l hoped

t h a t peace cou ld be m a i n t a i n e d . T h e r e was some b a s is f o r t h i s o p t i ­

mism, b u t no t much.

Simovic was p ro b ab ly encouraged by s e v e ra l f a c to r s , one which

occu rred th re e days b e fo re th e German in v a s io n . B elgrade had been a b le

t o in te r c e p t a message s e n t from th e German Embassy in B elg rade, a day

a f t e r Beeren, th e Ambassador, l e f t . I t was d a ted 2 A p r il and s ta t e d

t h a t " th e ex cesses t h a t o ccu rred in B elgrade on th e f i r s t day ( a f t e r th e

coup) were o rg an ized by th e Communists and Jews and undoubtedly o ccu r­

re d a g a in s t th e w i l l o f th e Government and a l s o a g a in s t th e w i l l o f th e

. . . p o p u l a t i o n . . . A c tu a lly no f u r th e r ex cesses have o c c u r r e d . . . P u n i­

t i v e a c t io n (v e rsu s Y ugoslav ia ) would n o t be understood and would be

f e l t to be u n ju s t even in Y ugoslav c i r c l e s w hich aure f r ie n d ly t o u s . " ^

^ ° I b id . , Ho. 270.

F o t ic , The War We L o s t, p . 93*12_ ---------------------------^D ocum ents on German F o re ig n P o lic y , 1918-1945, Series D,

V ol. XII, Ho. 259.

38

The message in d ic a te d th a t someone in th e German m is s io n , p e r ­

haps even th e Ambassador h im se lf , d e s ire d peace and was a d v is in g cau tio n *

Of course, th e obvious f la w in th e whole m a tte r was t h a t th e in d iv id u a l

w r itin g th e message d id n o t make p o lic y . H i t l e r bad ta k e n t h i s re sp o n ­

s i b i l i t y upon h im se lf e ig h t years b e fo re , and th e p o l ic y f o r Y u goslav ia/

had a lread y been fo rm u la te d . But t h i s was unknown t o S im ovic.

A second f a c t o r , and one which gave more o f a s u b s t a n t i a l b a s is

f o r encouragement, in v o lv e d a communique, re c e iv e d b y Nini^ic on 4 A p r i l ,

f r a n th e I t a l i a n A m bassador, G iorgio M am elli. At a C a b in e t m ee tin g onf

th e f i f t h , Ninclc e x p la in e d t h a t , a cco rd in g t o th e I t a l i a n s , Germany

was w ill in g to re a c h a p e a c e fu l s o lu t io n w ith Y u g o slav ia on th e c o n d i­

t io n th a t th e Yugos la v Army would occupy th e Yugo-Greek b o rd e r f o r th e

purposes of covering th e German r ig h t f la n k d u r in g th e in v a s io n o f

G reece. According t o Macek, who a tten d ed th e C ab in e t m e e tin g , " th i s

co n d itio n made th e P a c t o f March 25 le s s d i g e s t i b l e , b u t I r e f l e c t e d

th a t by accep tin g i t , Y ugoslav ia could n o t a c tu a l ly v i o l a t e h e r n eu ­

t r a l i t y . We would m ere ly (be banning) fo re ig n tro o p s from c r o s s in g our

t e r r i t o r y . I ex p ec ted Sim ovic to oppose t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n b u t was aunazed

to hear him say t h a t be had no o b je c t io n s . . .o n th e c o n t r a ry , he went

f u r th e r and proposed t o occupy Salon ika a t th e same t im e ." ^

There was san e d i f f i c u l t y w ith th e p ro p o s a l , how ever. The com­

munique had not been d i r e c t l y rece iv ed by B elg rade b u t v ia th e I t a l i a n s ,

Macek, In th e S trugg le f o r Freedom (New Y ork, R . S p e l le r C o., 1957), p . 222.

39

which r a is e d doubts a s t o i t s a u th e n t ic i ty . Rome had been anxious t o

av o id a m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t betw een th e Axis and Y ugoslav ia , f e a r in g t h a t

I t a ly , i f th e re was a w ar, m ight be fo rc e d ou t o f A lban ia by th e Yugo­

s la v Army b e fo re Germany could send re in fo rc e m e n ts . B esides t h a t , Rome

had l i t t l e d e s ir e t o see Germany occupy Y ugoslav ia , a co u n try in which

I t a l y bad lo n g , h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t s . T h e re fo re , i t would have been in

Rome's b e s t i n t e r e s t s t o f a b r ic a te a German peace p ro p o sa l, in hopes o f

p rev e n tin g h o s t i l i t i e s . I t i s n o t reco rd ed as t o w hether th e p ro p o sa l

a c tu a l ly d id o r ig in a te o u t o f th e German F o re ig n O ff ic e . However, even

i f i t d id , in view o f what o ccu rred in th e nex t few days, th e p ro p o sa l

was p robab ly a d iv e rs io n a ry t a c t i c , issu ed in o rd e r t o l u l l B elgrade in ­

t o a f à l s e sense o f s e c u r i ty fo r th e coming in v a s io n .

The th ird factor which gave Simovic some cause for hope, and

one about which l i t t l e has yet been mentioned, was the rela tion sh ip be­

tween Belgrade and Moscow.

I f th e March 27 coup was in s p ire d by any hopes o f a s s is ta n c e

frcsB a fo re ig n power, t h a t power was th e S o v ie t Union. I t has been s a id

t h a t th e Yugoslav r e v o l t was "a dem o n stra tio n o f p ro -R u ssian se n tim e n t,

a s opposed t o p r o - B r i t i s h se n tim e n t. This i s , to an e x te n t , t r u e ; y e t

i t would be wrong t o a t t r i b u t e any d e c is iv e r o le in th e coup to Moscow.

In 1941, th e S o v ie t Union was no t r e a l l y in a p o s i t io n to d i r e c t a

g re a t p o p u la r movement in Y ugoslav ia , due, in th e m ain, t o h e r p o s i t io n

1943) , p . 162.MacKhnzie, Winds of Freedom (London, Chatto and Windus,

40

v l s - a - v i s Germany. Other than sp o ra d ic acc la im in Pravda, fo r th e new

Simovic^ Governm ent, a f t e r th e coup, th e S o v ie t Union gave l i t t l e , i f

an y , d i r e c t su p p o rt to B elgrade. Y et th e coup had placed Moscow i n a

th o rn y dilemma* The Germans w ere o b v io u s ly encroaching upon an a re a

w hich th e U# 3 , S* R* f e l t was w ith in i t s own sphere o f i n t e r e s t . I f

Y u g o slav ia were t o be shoved in to th e A xis camp, o r worse y e t , occup ied

by th e Germans, S o v ie t in flu e n c e would p ro b ab ly d isappear e n t i r e ly from

th e B a lk a n s . However, S ov ie t in te r v e n t io n in favor o f Belgrade m ight

d ra g R u ss ia in to a war w ith Germany. Now S ta l in c e r ta in ly d id n o t want

a w ar. He w anted i t no more in A p r i l , 1941 than be had wanted i t in

A ugust, 1939 . But B elgrade, im m ediate ly a f t e r the coup, began p re s s in g

Moscow t o s ig n a m i l i ta r y co n v en tio n . S t a l i n h e s ita te d , spending a week

in c a lc u la t in g th e b e n e f i ts and r i s k s o f a c le a r -c u t p u b lic s ta n d . F in ­

a l l y , on 4 A p r i l , reco g n iz in g th e im pending doom s la te d fo r Y u g o slav ia ,

S t a l i n had M olotov summon Count F r ie d r ic h Schulenburg, th e German Ambas­

sa d o r t o th e S o v ie t Union, t o th e K rem lin in order to inform B e r l in t h a t

th e U. S . S . R. had accep ted a Y ugoslav o f f e r o f a non-aggression p a c t .

A f te r h e a r in g t h i s , Schulenburg p o in te d o u t th a t "the moment was u n fo r ­

tu n a te by Y u g o s la v ia 's a t t i t u d e tow ard Germany was a m b i g u o u s . B u t

M olotov r e fu s e d t o accep t t h i s view and d ec la red h im self convinced o f

th e Y u g o s la v 's "p eace fu l in te n t io n s .

^M. B e lo f f , Foreign P o l ic y o f th e S ov ie t Union (London, Oxford U n iv e r s i ty P re s s , 194?), p . 355:

16,Ib id .

4 l

In Belgrade, th e news t h a t s e c r e t t a l k s w ith th e R u ssian s

had been undertaken and th a t a p a c t was ab o u t t o be concluded , d id

n o t meet w ith unanimous a p p ro v a l. There were many in th e Government

who f e l t th a t th i s would on ly se rv e t o provoke th e Germans. A ccording

t o th e German Charge d 'A f f a i r s , F o re ig n M in is te r N inclc "was in d ig n a n t

o ver th e f a c t th a t , w ithout h is b e in g t o l d a n y th in g ab o u t i t , th e i n i ­

t i a t i v e had been undertaken f o r a c o n v e rsa tio n w ith th e S o v ie t Govern­

m e n t.. .N inclc d id not want an u n d e rs ta n d in g w ith Moscow, b u t one w ith

B e r l in . A t any r a t e , on 5 A p r i l , th e Y ugoslav d e le g a t io n met w ith

S o v ie t o f f i c i a l s in Moscow, hoping t o s ig n a m i l i t a r y co n v en tio n . How­

e v e r , Andre V yshinski, th e R u ssian r e p r e s e n ta t iv e , o f fe re d in s te a d an

o rd in a ry t r e a ty o f f r ie n d s h ip w ith a c la u s e p ro v id in g f o r n e u t r a l i t y

in case o f war. The Yugoslavs argued and p lea d e d most o f th e day t o

g e t a t le a s t t h i s c lau se re p la c e d w ith one p ro v id in g t h a t in case o f

w ar, " f r ie n d ly r e la t io n s " would c o n tin u e . F in a l ly , th e R u ssian s ag reed

t o t h i s s u b s t i tu t io n . In th e end , th e P a c t bound b o th c o n tr a c t in g p a r ­

t i e s n o t only to a b s ta in from a c t s o f a g g re s s io n a g a in s t each o th e r ,

b u t a ls o to m ain ta in f r ie n d ly r e l a t io n s sh o u ld e i t h e r o f them be a t ­

ta c k e d by a t h i r d power. Concluded f o r f iv e y e a r s , th e P ac t went in to

fo rc e a t once, r a t i f i c a t i o n t o ta k e p la c e a t a l a t e r d a te . D a l l in says

t h a t " th ere was good reason t o b e l ie v e t h a t R u ss ia a l s o had p ro v id e d to

supp ly Y ugoslavia w ith arms."^® However, th e r e was never any m ention o f

17Documents on German F o re ig n P o lic y , I 918- I 945, S e r ie s D, V ol. X II, No. 272.

^^D. J . D a llin , S o v ie t R u s s ia 's F o re ig n P o lic y , p . 305.

42

d i r e c t m i l i t a r y a id by th e R u ssian s d u rin g th e n e g o t ia t io n s . On 6

A p r i l , s e v e ra l hours b e fo re th e Germans a t ta c k e d , Molotov signed the

P ac t w ith Y ugoslav ia w h ile S t a l i n watched w ith s a t i s f a c t i o n . I t vas/

upon th e s e n e g o t ia t io n s , th e n , t h a t Simovic p ro b ab ly p inned most of h is

hope t h a t "peace cou ld be m a in ta in e d ."

News and in te l l ig e n c e r e p o r ts o f th e c o n c e n tra tio n o f German

tro o p s a lo n g th e Y ugoslav f r o n t i e r s began f i l t e r i n g in to B elgrade. On

5 A p r i l , th e Yugoslav A ir Camnand inform ed th e Government t h a t two un­

id e n t i f i e d reco n n a issan ce p la n e s , f ly in g v e ry h ig h , had c ro ssed the/

Rumanian b o rd e r and were head ing f o r B elg rad e . Y et Simovic s t i l l r e ­

fu sed t o m o b ilize h is tro o p s o r p rep a re h is co u n try f o r w ar. C iv il de­

fe n se was a lm ost n o n -e x is te n t . The b lac k o u t system in B elgrade consis ted

o f sim ply c u t t in g o f f th e e l e c t r i c i t y th roughou t th e c i t y . On th e a f t e r ­

noon o f 5 A p r i l , Simovic re c e iv e d a r e p o r t from th e Yugoslav M ilita ry

A ttach e in B e r l in , who a p p a re n tly had access t o a v e ry r e l i a b le source,

and upon whose In fo rm a tio n Simovic had r e l i e d in th e p a s t . The M ilita ry

A ttach e gave d e t a i l s on th e German p lan fo r in v a s io n , th e s tre n g th and

com position o f th e a t ta c k in g tro o p s and th e f a c t t h a t a German a i r bom­

bardm ent o f B elgrade was schedu led f o r th e morning o f 6 A p r i l . To th is

Simovic f i n a l l y d id resp o n d , b u t on ly h a l f -h e a r te d ly . On 5 A p r il, he

gave o rd e rs f o r a s e c r e t m o b iliz a tio n o f th e Yugoslav Army which would

ta k e a lm ost t e n days t o e x e c u te .

1956), p . 194.^^See W, Schellenberg, Labyrinth Memoirs (New York, Harper Bros.,

43

On th e a fte rn o o n o f 3 A p r i l , a co rre sp o n d en t o f th e German News

Agency in Belgrade t ra n s m it te d t o Macek th e a d v ice o f Ambassador H eeren,

an o ld f r ie n d , to "keep away from B e l g r a d e . O n Sunday, 6 A p r i l ,

1941, w h ile Macek s a t e a t in g o y s te r s a t th e H o te l B r i s to l in B elgrade

(he d id n o t tak e H eeren 's a d v ic e ) , w h ile Ambassador F o tic was b e in g a p ­

p lau d ed a t a d in n er a t th e G r id iro n Club in W ashington, D. C. (S a tu rday

n ig h t , EST), w hile th e p re se n t le a d e r , S im ovic, was a t te n d in g h is daugh­

t e r ' s wedding in B e lg rad e , and w h ile th e f u tu r e le a d e r , T i to , was ly in g

in bed in Zagreb l i s t e n in g t o th e r a d io , th e rem nants o f th e s t a f f in

th e German le g a tio n in Zagreb re c e iv e d th e fo llo w in g cab le from B e r l in :

" 'T r i p a r t i t e P ac t, ' acknowledge r e c e i p t . " E n te rp r is e 25, th e a t t a c k up­

on Y ugoslav ia , had begun.

20,V. Macek, to th e S tru g g le f o r Freedom, p . 220.

CONCLUSION

We a re n o t here t o a v a i l o u rse lv es o f th e lux u ry o f h in d s ig h t

and m o ra lize upon what th e Simovic^ Government should o r should n o t have

done in i t s e f f o r t s t o in su re th e s u rv iv a l o f Y ugoslavia d u rin g th e se

t e n day s . I t must he no ted however t h a t in l ig h t o f th e coup o f 27

March, one does n o t i-e a lly ev e r reach th e is su e o f what Simovic' shou ld

o r shou ld n o t have done. For once th e coup took p la c e , B e r l in , n o t B e l­

g rad e , became th e c a p i t a l which was t o determ ine th e subsequent cou rse

o f e v e n ts . Because o f t h i s , th e is su e changes ccmiplexion and tu r n s , n o t/ /

upon what Simovic should o r should n o t have done, b u t upon what Simovic

could o r could n o t have done. In in sp e c tin g t h i s is s u e , one must remem­

b e r t h a t a c o u n try 's fo re ig n p o lic y fo rm u la tio n s a re always c ircu m scrib ed

by th e b o u n d aries o f th e f e a s ib le . For Y ugoslavia betw een 27 March and

6 A p r i l , 1941, th e b o u n d aries were q u ite l im ite d . The answer as t o whe­

th e r th e coup i t s e l f was w orthw hile a f t e r a l l , w hether i t "saved th e

so u l and fu tu re (o f Y ugoslav ia )"^ a s C h u rc h ill f e l t o r w hether i t was

" th e s t a r t i n g p o in t o f i r r e p a r a b le trag ed y "^ as o th e rs f e l t , w i l l a l s o

be l e f t f o r th e re a d e r t o d e c id e .^ However, i t does rem ain f o r us to

^W. C h u rc h ill , The Grand A llia n c e (Boston, Houghton, M if f l in C o., 1951), p . 243.

^M. H orthy, Memoirs (New York, S p ie l le r and Sons, 1957), P» 102. «, ^Some Yugoslav s ta tesm en argued a f t e r th e war t h a t i f th e Cvet­

kovic Government had n o t been overthrow n and had l iv e d up to th e s t i p u l a ­t io n s o f th e i r i - F a r t i t e F a c t, Y ugoslavia would have been saved from dismembennent and from th e h o rro rs o f c i v i l w ar. There i s much t o t h i s argum ent. On th e o th e r hand, i t i s q u e s tio n ab le a s t o w hether a v ic to r io u s H i t le r in 1942-43, o r more im p o rta n tly , a v ic to r io u s S ta l in in 1944-45 would have honored Yugoslav p a r t ic ip a t io n in th e T r i - P a r t i t e P act and would have sp ared Y ugoslavia th e ravages o f w ar.

45

ascertain some of the more important r e su lts o f these ten days, for

both Yugoslavia and Germany.

For Y ugoslavia, the primary and most obvious resu lt of these

ten days was the penetration of her national te r r ito r y . But, as has

been pointed out, in a rea l sense the German invasion was a resu lt of/

only one o f th ese ten days, that day being 27 March, when the Cvetkovic

Government was overthrown. Hitler had taken the coup as a personal in ­

su lt and f e l t th a t those who perpetrated the coup should be treated in

the same manner as he would have treated a group o f dissidents w ithin

Germany who had conspired against the Third Reich. Bad Simovic and h is

government been more fu l ly cognizant of H it le r 's fee lin g s , thereby an­

t ic ip a tin g an e a r l ie r invasion, Yugoslavia's m ilitary defenses probably

would have been b e tte r prepared to cope w ith the attack . However, in

any case, i t i s doubtful that Yugoslavia would have withstood the German

onslaught for long.

A second and more positive resu lt fo r Yugoslavia was that these

ten days saved her from becoming the rec ip ien t o f the ignominious t i t l e

of "Axis s a t e l l i t e " as had two of her neighbors, Hungary and Rumania.

The b en e fits of t h is resu lt accrued a fter 1943 when the tide of the war

began turning aga in st the Germans.

I t i s a lso probable that the coup o f 27 March helped, to some

extent, t o make p o ssib le T ito's successfu l resis ten ce to S ta lin 's attempt

to incorporate Yugoslavia into the Soviet Bloc a fte r the war.

World \far II exerted a profound in fluence on organized Ccaununism

throughout Eastern Europe. In the la tter stages o f the war, when the

46

Germans were being pushed out of countries such as Hungary and Rumania,

the Communist leaders of those countries were compelled to p reva il upon

the Soviet Union to a id in the task of in s ta llin g these leaders in p o s i­

tions of power w ithin th e ir resp ective nations. I t then became neces­

sary for th e ir leaders to r e ly heavily upon Moscow in order to preserve

th e ir p o s itio n s . I t was p a r tia lly because of th is p o l i t ic a l debt which

these leaders owed Moscow th at enabled the Soviet Union to exercise such

r ig id control over these nations a fter the v&r. This, however, was not

the case in Yugoslavia. T ito and h is a sso c ia te s , unlike th e ir counter­

parts in other s a t e l l i t e nations, grasped the reins of power in Yugo­

s la v ia on th e ir own w ith scant help from the Russians. A fter the war,

much to the consternation of S ta lin , the CPY asked for l i t t l e i f any

help frcsn the Kremlin in i t s attempt to consolidate power w ithin Yugo­

s la v ia . T ito was obligated to no one and therefore could not be compared

to the Communists elsewhere who, as Ulam puts i t , "were lik e clumsy pup­

i l s , always running to the teacher to t e l l them what to do next and to

ex tr ica te them from a d i f f ic u lt s i t u a t i o n . S o T ito su ccessfu lly de­

fied S ta lin a fter the war because he had propelled him self in to leader­

ship without any help from S ta lin . But the question of how T ito was

able to assume power alone, remains. I t is an exceedingly long and complex

issue and therefore one which cannot be covered e n t ir e ly here. However,

i t is su ff ic ie n t to say that the Communist governments which were in s ta lle d

^A. Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge, Harvard U niversityPress, 1952 ) , p. 337

47

In most o f the Eastern European countries at the end o f World War II

owed th e ir in s ta l la t io n mainly to the fa c t that the forces of the Red

Army p h y sica lly occupied th e ir c a p ita ls . Stalin was able to ju s t ify

the occupation to h is A ll ie s because they had aided or abetted the Ger­

mans during the war. Even B ulgaria, who had never declared war on the

Soviet Union, was deemed a part o f the Axis by Moscow because of her

a sso c ia tio n w ith the T r i-P a rtite Pact throughout the war, and therefore

occupied in order to insure a Communist takeover. Of the Eastern Euro­

pean cou n tr ies, only Yugoslavia was excepted. She was not vulnerable

to such an indictment by S ta lin because of her actions in 1941. Had

she reta ined her a sso c ia t iv e sta tu s with Germany throughout the war as

an a l ly , the Soviet Union would have had cause to invade Yugoslavia as

she did in the case o f Bulgaria. T ito would not have been l e f t alone

in order t o con so lid ate h is power a t home but instead, would have been

obliged to r e ly on Moscow for help whether he would have needed i t or

not. Therefore Yugoslavia would have been precluded from str ik in g out

on an independent course from the Bloc in 1948.

A fourth r e s u lt was in evidence almost immediately a fte r the

coup. With the German k n ife a t Yugoslavia's throat, the m ajority of

the population came c lo ser to speaking with one voice than i t ever had

b efore . I t can a lso be sa id without exaggeration that no government be­

fore the Simovic regime, or for that matter since, that has held o ffice

in Yugoslavia has been so rep resentative of a l l section s o f Yugoslav

opinion, from the l e f t to the r igh t o f the p o lit ic a l spectrum. Yet th is

un ity was impermanent. The cracks and fissu res w ithin Yugoslavia were

U6

to o g r e a t and th e f e e l in g th a t th e S ta te was c o u n te r f e i t and u n n a tu r a l ,

to o p e rv a s iv e . For when th e in v a s io n came, th e whole f a b r i c o f th e

n a tio n sim p ly d i s in te g r a te d . The g re a t b u lk o f th e n a t io n a p p a r e n t ly

f e l t t h a t Y u g o slav ia in th e form in which she e x i s t e d was n o th in g t h a t

r e a l l y b e lo n g ed t o i t , and th u s , was no t w orth f i g h t i n g f o r .

By f a r th e m ost Im portan t long»range consequence o f th e s e t e n

days f o r Germany was t h a t th e campaign a g a in s t Y u g o s lav ia d e la y e d "Op-

e z a t io n B a rb a ro ssa " f o r f iv e w eeks. What would have happened i f th e

Germans had re a ch e d th e o u t s k i r t s o f L eningrad and Moscow in th e l a t e

summer in s te a d o f th e l a t e f a l l when w in te r was a p p ro a c h in g , o n ly th e

c lo se d Red Army a rc h iv e s can r e v e a l . As a c o r o l la r y , th e in v a s io n o f

Y ugoslav ia may have a l s o had some e f f e c t on H i t l e r ' s d e c is io n t o p e r ­

s o n a lly d i r e c t th e R u ss ian campaign, a d e c is io n w hich many f e e l i n th e

long ru n proved d is a s te ro u s f o r Germany. P r io r t o th e a t t a c k on Yugo­

s la v ia , G en era l B ra u c h itsc h and G eneral B a ld e r, among o th e r s , had b een

ab le t o p re v e n t th e F u eh rer from p e rso n a lly i n t e r f e r i n g in any d e c is iv e

sense w ith th e m i l i t a r y , e s p e c ia l ly d u rin g th e F ren ch and Norwegian cam­

p a ig n s . However, in J u ly , 19^1, le s s th a n a month a f t e r th e German

th r u s t in to th e S o v ie t Union, H it le r began to become i n t e r e s t e d i n p e r ­

s o n a lly d i r e c t in g th e German war machine in R u s s ia . By A ugust, he had

counterm anded H a id e r 's p la n s to advance on Moscow and in s te a d , o rd e re d

an o f fe n s iv e in to th e U kraine , a t a c t i c which a t t h a t tim e had been

c r i t i c i z e d a s m i l i t a r i l y unsound. H i t le r had o b v io u s ly l o s t c o n f id e n c e

in th e German G en era l S ta f f and t h i s lo ss o f co n fid en ce may have b een a

49

r esu lt of the Yugoslav campaign. On 2 June 1941, H itler made some

revealing remarks to M ussolini which indicated h is changing a ttitu d e

toward h is generals and the growing confidence in h is own m ilitary

a b i l i t i e s .

The Fuehrer was ju st then describ ing the d i f f ic u l t i e s o f the Serbian campaign to the Duce (noted the in terp re ter ). A su b stan tia l r isk had been taken with the m ilitary opera­t io n in the Balkans. One had not known how the tanks would stand the t e s t of that moun­tainous terra in . The experts had been very sk ep tica l. They had pointed to the lack of bridges and terra in obstacles which, in th e ir opinion, made the employment of armored un its almost im possible for purely geographic reasons.Thus he (the Fuehrer) had a t times been greatly worried about the extraordinary re sp o n s ib ility he had to bear in that campaign. Fortunately, here too , as on many previous occasions, the experts had been mistaken and everything had gone w e l l .>

The second r e su lt for Germany was that the subsequent p a rtitio n

of Yugoslavia revealed the true re la tion sh ip th at ex isted between Ita ly

and Germany. As Alan Bullock has pointed out, " Ita ly 's claims were

treated on a le v e l w ith those o f the other sa te llite s" ^ and th is tr e a t ­

ment was very unpalatable to M ussolini. The th ird consequence of these

ten days, although le s s ta n g ib le , was the dent which was in f l ic te d in to

the facade o f German omnipotence. Here was the f i r s t slap in the face

that H itler had received and i t was in f l ic te d by a sm all Balkan country

^Documents on German Foreign P olicy , 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. XII, No. ^45:

^A. Bullock, H itler , A Study in Tyranny (New York, Bantam,1961) , p. 5 3 7 .

50

with an army less than a f i f t h the s ize of the Germaji Wehrmacht. For

reasons which have a lready been presented, peace and cooperation with

Yugoslavia were in te n se ly desired by Germany. But, in the eyes o f

H itler, th is slap could not be in flic ted w ith impunity, not only for

m ilitary reasons but a ls o because of the adverse p sych o log ica l e f f e c t s

i t might have on the German people. Therefore, punishment was necessary.

In the long run, however, the decision to postpone the Russian invasion

in order to administer t h is punishment was fa ta l .

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