MSC/DIPLOMA TITLE: Gender and International Relations

CANDIDATE NUMBER: 65824

UNIT NUMBER: POLIM3106

UNIT TITLE: Gender, Masculinity/ies and International Relations

UNIT TUTOR: Terrel Carver

ESSAY TITLE:Is there a non-gendered way to understand inter-state violence?

WORD COUNT: 3890

Is there a non-gendered way to understand inter-state violence?

Introduction

In this essay I shall analyse the BBC News article, “Ukraine Crisis: The Little Green Men” (Rosenberg 2014a), with references to a few other articles linked to the same topic. I find that there is not a non-gendered way to understand inter-state violence. This is due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the terminology in the question points to inherently gendered constructs. As I shall argue in the next section, violence is gendered as it creates power hierarchies, and inter-state relations are often seen in a ‘rational’ masculine framework. Even generally speaking it is not possible to understand anything in a non-gendered way as even objects are gendered. Secondly, by analysing the article’s depictions of men I discover that in times of inter-state conflict there is an emphasis on military masculinities and masculine hierarchies. These serve to reinforce traditional masculine discourses surrounding international state violence, and lead to gendered consequences in which feminised identities and issues are neglected. The ‘Ukraine Crisis’ is thus inherently gendered, which leads me to conclude that it is impossible to understand inter-state violence in a non-gendered way.

Is inter-state violence gendered?

It is impossible to have a non-gendered understanding of anything, let alone inter-state violence. The world is made up of discourse, and this discourse is constrained by binaries, including that of male/female. Even apparently ‘gender neutral’ objects can be understood as masculine or feminine, either through the propensity of gendered language, or through gendered connotations or expectations. For example, a table seems like a neutral object, however in French it becomes feminine due to its grammatical gender. Language aside, one could analyse the gendered use of labour to make the table. If it was handmade, was the carpenter a man or a woman? If it was mass produced in a factory, who was in charge of the factory and which factory workers were deemed acceptable to use heavy machinery? One could argue in this case that the table is a masculine object. But of course, if the table happens to be small, delicate, and with jewellery covering the surface, it becomes feminine. Hence, through association, language, and socially constructed discourse, even the plainest objects have a gendered understanding. Arguing for a non-gendered understanding results in a cover up of gendered meanings and practices, conversely making them all the more powerful, as their invisibility hampers the ability of society to question them. Hence, even a so-called ‘non-gendered’ understanding turns out to be extremely gendered as it supports the status quo.

‘Inter-state’ and ‘violence’ are therefore both gendered. While there are many ways to analyse their gendered construction, I shall read them as part of a realist discourse of IR, as the article I analyse seems to be written in a realist voice. Inter-state, in this instance, is therefore understood as two or more genderless states existing separately from each other, much like the billiard balls that are often used to explain neorealist IR theory. This is obviously extremely reductionist, and obscures the masculine traits that make up this discourse. ‘Violence’, on the other hand, is easier to read as a gendered term as it implies a power hierarchy in which masculinity is usually dominant. In the article violence comes across as purely physical (as opposed to economic, social or psychological), and the natural domain of men. This serves to undermine the multitude of effects violence might have on women, even if they’re not directly engaged in physical combat. Both ‘inter-state’ and ‘violence’ are therefore highly gendered terms, as they are understood in a hyper-masculine sense. I shall now illustrate the way this plays out in the article, highlighting the gendered depiction of individuals, society and institutions related to the ‘Ukraine Crisis’.

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Gendering the ‘Ukraine Crisis’:

Military masculinities

The article’s heading reads: “Ukraine Crisis: Meeting the Little Green Men” (Rosenberg 2014a). Firstly, there is a clear gendering of the inter-state crisis through the connection with the word ‘crisis’ and ‘men’. This illustrates the masculinised context of inter-state violence, with men being the main perpetrators of physical violence. Secondly, it is interesting to analyse the notion of ‘little green men’. In another BBC News article the phrase is explained as stemming from the colour of the pro-Russia activists’ uniforms, and the extent to which they are unknown (Shevchenko 2014, Fig. 1). However the phrase also has connotations with miniature model army sets for children. This is not an inaccurate portrayal of the military institution, with the homogeneity illustrating ideals of discipline and order. Just like the plastic models, real soldiers are expected to look the same as each other, a trait often shown off in military parades. It is interesting to note that Russia’s annual victory parade was 14 minutes longer than usual this year (Rosenberg 2014b) – another example of muscle flexing. While the plastic soldiers are by no means natural, neither are the ‘real’ green men. They too have had to fit into pre-prepared moulds in the form of military training. As Enloe (1993: 55) argues, if boys had the ‘raw’ potential to become men, then they wouldn’t need a drill sergeant. Here it becomes clear that the military makes men out of people, thereby masculinising, and therefore gendering, matters of inter-state violence. Finally it is interesting to note the tone of the article. Rosenberg is highlighting the might of the pro-Russians while also belittling them by using the word ‘little’. The different masculinities are playing off against each other and competing for dominance. This all contributes to a gendered understanding of the Ukraine crisis, as the battle of masculinities becomes a legitimate focus of debate.

Fig. 1: The “little green men” (Shevchenko 2014).

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As the article is focusing on soldiers, there is understandably a large emphasis on military service. However, the use of some of the interviewee’s veteran status as a part of their character serves to bolster their masculinity and in turn their integrity and legitimacy in the context of the inter-state violence in Ukraine. For example Nikolai is referred to as a “veteran military intelligence officer” who happens to mirror the concerns of the West, thereby legitimising their views. The veteran identity has always carried a lot of credibility and power, with American presidents often capitalising on their own veteran experience in order to gain votes from the public in elections (Tickner 1992: 41). The emphasis on military service suggests the military is a kind of insider’s club, a group that all men should aspire to. The importance of the group construct cannot be understated. Kimmel (1994: 129) argues that masculinity is a homosocial phenomenon, where men are seeking group approval. It is this need for approval that leads to a fear of being labelled feminine, which in turn results in an exaggeration of traditional masculinity. In the context of inter-state violence the military represents this insider group, as it displays traditional masculine behaviour that centres around power and control in order to garner respect. As the military plays a central role in conventional matters of inter-state violence, it therefore masculinises the process and hence undermines any notion of a non-gendered understanding.

Masculine hierarchies: Grandfathers, soldiers and boys

The article also demonstrates the salience of masculinity through the depiction of multiple masculinities. Masculinity is not a singular trait; it is a set of diverse and adaptable expectations about gender roles. This diversity and adaptability serves to maintain masculinity’s dominance in the gender hierarchy, with a prime example being the introduction and legitimisation of soldier-scholar masculinities (Khalili 2011: 1491). The article opens with the description of a disgruntled old man: “Nikolai stood near the local council building in Konstantinovka, leaning on his walking stick and shaking his head at the scene in front of him” (Rosenberg 2014a). His identity at first leads the reader to sympathise with him, as he comes across as a gentle grandfatherly figure. However, his perspective is later concretised when the reader learns he also worked for the military intelligence service when he was younger. The combination of grandfather and veteran legitimises his view that the pro-Russia activists are actually Russian soldiers, and the rest of article rests on this claim. Whether it is true or not is beside the point, what is of note here is that this particular identity has the power to command respect and legitimacy. It is arguable that interviewing a disgruntled old woman would have been less valid.

In addition to the old man, the second type of masculinity depicted is the militarised masculine identity. This includes the pro-Russia activists/militants/guards, the Military Commandant Vadim Ilovaisky, and the military officer Igor Strelkov/Girkin. They arguably form the hegemonic masculinity in this particular context as they display key traits of masculinity – power and control – through their invasion of public offices. It is important to note that hegemonic masculinities are constantly changing depending on social context. As Hooper (2001: 62) argues “Hegemonic masculinity can then be seen not as a fixed set of dominant traits but as a constantly negotiated construct that draws on a pool of available characteristics which… can be put together in different combinations depending on circumstances”. For example, not all soldiers can be put in the hegemonic masculinity class, it depends on what their role in the military is, and whether they are losing or winning. In this article there is a clear sense that the Russian military is more powerful and hence more manly than the Ukraine military, with the invasion of offices presented as a symbolic as well as strategic victory over the other side. The symbolism is indeed a powerful tool, as the article concludes, “If President Putin's plan is to weaken, or even split Ukraine, he may not need to send in Russian tanks” (Rosenberg 2014a). Thus, the badge of manliness that pro-Russia

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militants embody is powerful enough to suggest that the physical firepower of tanks may not even be needed.

Fig. 2: The militarisation of youth, and the emasculation of Ukraine (Rosenberg 2014a).

A third type of masculinity portrayed is that of the boy in the photograph (Fig. 2), being raised up by the pro-Russia militants as he holds an automatic rifle. Here the boy represents a lower tier of masculinity that is used to feminise the Ukrainian military, suggesting that they can’t even defend its buildings against young boys. Indeed the image and caption clearly emasculates Ukraine, with the caption reading “Pro-Russia activists have occupied government buildings with relatively little difficulty” (Rosenberg 2014a). It could also be argued that the celebration or championing of the boy (he’s being held above the activists’ heads) shows a willingness to fight on in the long term, or that the pro-Russians are here to stay. This once again comes across as a challenge to the Ukraine military, emasculating them further. Of course if the boy is representing the future of pro-Russian conflict, then he also represents the maintenance of military masculinities. They are championing a boy, they have not put a girl in that position, and hence the gender order/hierarchy will remain the same. In this way the image highlights the discourse that suggests the military is a natural place for males. Not only is he wearing a camouflage hat and holding a gun, he is also smiling which confers a sense of naturalness to the image. It seems that overall these different types of masculinities – old, young, militarised, winning, losing etc. intersect with each other, and depict a masculine power hierarchy, which in this inter-state violence context, puts the pro-Russia activists on top. The formation of masculinities in this context shows the extent to which inter-state violence is gendered, and hence it becomes clear that a non-gendered understanding is impossible.

Defensive discourse

Language and discourse are what lead to the formation of masculinities. Cohn (1987: 705) describes learning to use technostrategic language as “…learning a new language, but by the time you are through, the content of what you can talk about is monumentally different, as is the perspective from which you speak”. The constraining nature of discourse is apparent here,

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as the only acceptable way to talk about defense structures is in a masculine, rational, unemotional tone. This kind of discourse is inherent in the military as an institution, with snappy nicknames for high tech equipment and abbreviations that only military personnel will understand, leading to the creation of insiders and outsiders. This militarised discourse is apparent in the article, with the EU claiming Igor Girkin is a staff member of the “Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU)” (Rosenberg 2014a). This excessive use of military labelling clearly militarises and masculinises Igor’s identity removing him and the issues surrounding him from the feminine, or everyday insecurities of Ukraine’s general population. This kind of language/discourse also leads to a sense of urgency, where military issues are perceived as superior to that of all others, legitimising realism’s version of world politics by downplaying the attractiveness or feasibility of alternative solutions (Tickner 1992: 50). Language and discourse is therefore key in masculinising inter-state violence.

Further evidence of the confines of masculine discourse during inter-state violence is apparent in the article when Vadim Ilovaisky, Kramatorsk’s new Military Commandant (note the militarised title), is asked where he is from. The reply, “I’m Cossack… my grandfather and great-grandfather were from Stavropol region (in southern Russia)” highlights the use of patriarchal ties to justify his identity in the now militarised setting of a Mayoral office that has been taken over by pro-Russian soldier activists. If he were asked the same question in a different setting which was outside of the inter-state violence context, he may well refer to where his mother, grandmother, or generally grandparents were from. But this is not possible now that he is wearing army fatigues in a building that he has taken by force. Suddenly his masculinity must be asserted, his identity strengthened, in order to be taken seriously in a time of masculinised conflict. By only mentioning his male relatives he is implicitly creating a hierarchy between the sexes, suggesting that the men in the family are more important or of higher value than the women. Furthermore he is described (and pictured in Fig. 3) as “poring over the maps of the region” (Rosenberg 2014a) which demonstrates another military ideal – ‘rational’ thinking. As Enloe (2007: 40) argues, “National security thinking has left no room for sentimentality: one has to be able to confront unpleasant facts ‘without blinking’; one has to be ‘hard nosed’. Rational manly security experts must be capable of ‘muscular thinking’; they must never show themselves to be ‘soft’”. Once again it is clear that the military/masculinity discourse is extremely powerful and pervasive, effecting how inter-state violence is conducted.

Fig. 3: Vadim Ilovaisky in the deputy mayor’s (now occupied) office (Rosenberg 2014a).

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The article also includes a reference to popular culture, a form of ‘low politics’ that arguably has a huge impact on society’s conception of international relations. In paragraph two Rosenberg writes, “Pro-Russia activists were building barricades with concrete blocks and sandbags and singing along to а pop song about the Soviet Union.” The activists singing while barricading the invaded government building conveys a sense of ease, confidence, or even invincibility, once again serving to emasculate and belittle the Ukrainian authorities. The pervasiveness of popular culture, here represented by a pop song, reflects the importance of ‘low politics’ in contributing to discourses that effect society. For example, Power (2007: 286) argues that the simplification of cultures and histories in popular culture can become a form of violence as they are separated into categories leading to the exclusion of negative ‘others’. Carruthers (2003: 172) also argues that popular culture can reshape memories and histories, promoting nationalist ideals, especially in depictions of conflicts, where the duty and brotherhood of soldiers often trumps the politics that are causing the fighting, leading to a lack of meaningful questioning of violence and war. Popular culture is also deeply gendered, whether in its depiction of inferior, feminised cultures, or in ideals of masculinity being promoted by action hero soldiers. As popular culture is intrinsic to every day life, it also applies to inter-state violence, and hence provides another extremely gendered discourse in understanding conflict.

The consequences of masculinised inter-state violence

Having analysed the central depiction of various masculine and military identities to inter-state violence, I shall now discuss the gendered consequences that these powerful discourses have on society. Firstly the importance attached to masculine identities means that nationalist issues such as defence strategies tend to be prioritised over more general societal security. By security I mean an absence of not only physical violence, but also of inequalities that lead to feminised members of society experiencing unfair social and economic adversity. Enloe (2000: 59) argues that nationalist policies often trump issues concerned with bettering women’s place in society. This is because national security is a military issue, and the masculine connotations associated with it give it credence in the political sphere. As Cohn and Ruddick (2003: 13) explain, non-violent approaches are delegitimised through an association with the feminine, hence making it embarrassing to be caught ‘thinking like a woman’. Furthermore Anand (2008: 175) argues that nationalism is an extremely sexualised issue, comparing it with groups of men who are anxious about their own sexuality and need to impose a strong sense of manliness to be able to garner nationalist respect. Evidently Ukraine is experiencing a similar crisis, as the sizing up of masculinities laid out in the article illustrates. A focus on masculinities competing against one another has the consequence of making feminised identities and issues invisible, hence gendering any understanding of inter-state violence.

A second consequence stemming from a focus on masculine identities is the sheer absence or misrepresentation of women. Rosenberg’s article uses a number of perspectives to understand who the ‘little green men’ are, but none of these perspectives are female. There are six named men in the article, as well as mentions of male soldiers and ancestors, however there is no mention of women, despite the fact that the presence of these pro-Russia activists affect all of Ukraine’s population – women included. Female voices are discounted as they are not part of the masculinised realm of inter-state violence, despite the fact that it affects them equally or even more. Two of the men highlighted in the article were state leaders, ‘President Putin’ and ‘acting President Olexander Turchynov’. It is unsurprising that they are both male, as political leadership has traditionally been reserved for men, being ten times more likely to hold political office than women (Connell 2005: 82). Despite this, women are still struggling to break into this masculinised sphere. The masculine discourse of international politics is

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extremely powerful and difficult to change, resulting in many women essentially becoming men to facilitate their integration. For example Enloe (2000: 4) describes women lowering their voices an octave just in order to fit in. These are clear examples of how gender effects international politics, and this in turn means that it is not possible to have a non-gendered understanding of inter-state violence.

The article also alludes to an absence of women in politics more generally. Rosenberg writes of a closed door meeting held in the US where Secretary of State John Kerry was present. These closed door meetings represent a barrier to female perspectives being taken on board as they are often for political elites only, who again are mainly men. This is demonstrated in another article, “Ukraine crisis: Russian officials targeted by sanctions” (BBC News 2014, Fig. 4). Out of twenty-two officials pictured, only one is a woman. Furthermore she is depicted as being outside Putin’s ‘inner circle’, a list consisting of seven males. This gender disparity is problematic as it contributes to the gender hierarchy in which men are dominant and have more power. It is arguable that this power imbalance is a form of violence, as it leads to the exclusion of people associated with femininity. This in turn has an effect on international relations and the way that countries are governed as there is an over-reliance on masculine values and discourse. Therefore it is evident that gender contributes to both politics ‘on the ground’ as well as in ‘high’ politics. This correlation means that inter-state violence cannot be understood in a non-gendered way from any perspective.

Fig. 4: The male-dominated sphere of Russia’s ‘high politics’ (BBC News 2014).

The article also illustrates how the language surrounding matters of international relations hides a hidden masculinised gender order. Thus, when it is written that “Washington had already accused Russia” (Rosenberg 2014a); it is taken for granted who is representing these place-names. Obviously neither Washington nor Russia can speak because they are geographical territories. But they are written about in this way as these names are supposed to represent the people within those geographical spaces. However, this is not the case. A more accurate rephrasing would be “(mainly) old, white, powerful men in Washington accuse (mainly) old, white, powerful men in Russia”. The gender hierarchy is hidden in the discourse of traditional international relations, which assumes the world is genderless. Thus, “IR symbolically becomes a wholly masculine sphere of war and diplomacy, at the furthest extreme of families, women, and reproduction… personal life, domestic and family life, and even much of civil society has been evacuated from IR” (Hooper 2001: 92). Once again it becomes plain that apparently gender-neutral ways of discussing international relations actually tend to hide the gender order where masculinity is dominant. This applies to inter-state violence as it must be recognised that states are an extremely masculinised phenomenon.

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Conclusion

“If we do not redefine manhood, war is inevitable” – Paul Fussel (in Tickner 1992: 27)

In conclusion, there is not a non-gendered way to understand inter-state violence. This is firstly because everything is gendered, and hence the terms ‘inter-state’ and ‘violence’ must also be gendered. Furthermore, when combined, the concept of ‘inter-state violence’ is also extremely gendered, as I have shown regarding the article “Ukraine Crisis: The Little Green Men” (Rosenberg 2014a). By analysing the article’s depictions of men I have illustrated that in times of inter-state conflict there is an emphasis on military masculinities and masculine hierarchies. These serve to reinforce traditional masculine discourses surrounding international state violence, and lead to gendered consequences in which feminised identities and issues are neglected. Overall it is clear that gender is inherent in everything, and in this case particularly the ‘Ukraine crisis’. It is not possible therefore, to state that there is a non-gendered way of understanding inter-state violence. While, as a Gender and IR student, I find this conclusion obvious, it is troubling that for most people this answer might be surprising. The masculine nature of international relations (and in this case coverage of inter-state violence) is as pervasive as it is hidden. In order to even attempt to reduce violence the gender order must become visible so that is can be questioned, which might ultimately lead to change.

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Anand, Dibyesh (2008) ‘‘Porno-Nationalism’ and the Male Subject’, in Parpat, Jane. and Zalewski, Marysia. (eds) Rethinking the Man Question, London: Zed Books, pp. 163-180.

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Carruthers, Susan. (2003) ‘Bringing it All Back Home: Hollywood Returns to War’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 14 (1): 167-182.

Cohn, Carol. (1987) ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals’, Signs, 12 (4): 687-718.

Cohn, Carol. and Sara, Ruddick. (2003) ‘A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, Working Paper No. 104, available online at http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf, accessed 12th November 2013.

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Hooper, Charlotte. (2001) Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics, New York: Colombia University Press.

Khalili, Laleh. (2011) ‘Gendered Practices of Counterinsurgency’, Review of International Studies, 37 (4): 1471-1491.

Kimmel, Michael. (1994) ‘Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity’, in Brod, Harry. and Kaufman, Michael. (eds) Theorising Masculinities, California: Sage, pp. 119-141.

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April, available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27231649, accessed 4th

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Rosenberg, Steven. (2014b) ‘Ukraine crisis: Russian victory parade buoyed by Crimea’, BBC News, 9th May, available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27336461, accessed 10th May 2014.

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Shevchenko, Vitaly. (2014) ‘“Little green men” or “Russian Invaders”?’, BBC News, 11th

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