Martin-Two Cities in Augustine's PP

8/6/2019 Martin-Two Cities in Augustine's PP

1/23

The Two Cities in Augustine's Political PhilosophyAuthor(s): Rex MartinSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1972), pp. 195-216Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708869 .Accessed: 14/06/2011 11:04

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=upenn. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Journal of the History of Ideas.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=upennhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2708869?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=upennhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=upennhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2708869?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=upenn


2/23

THE TWO CITIES INAUGUSTINE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

BY REX MARTINThere has been a surprisingly wide divergence of interpretations ofAugustine's conception of the state, especially with respect to the po-litical bearing of his concept of the Two Cities and to his position onthe nature and role of justice in the governance of states. In this essayI wish to develop a single, coherent reading of Augustine's theory out

of the themes and passages that are generally regarded as the matrixof his conception of the state and, then, to confirm and extend thisreading by directing it against some of the major alternative interpre-tations of his theory.What are these themes and passages which provide the agreedupon field of interpretation and reinterpretation? There is, first, theconcept of the Two Cities and the political interpretation given it.Then, second, there is the well-known passage in the City of God (IV.4, pp. 112-13) where Augustine draws an analogy between a kingdom(regnum) and a robber band. Finally, we have Augustine's reflec-tions on, and apparent reworking of, Cicero's definition of a common-wealth (res publica).' These themes and passages are all of a piece.The political interpretation placed on the idea of the Two Cities willaffect the reading one gives to the "robber band" and "common-wealth" passages. The conception that one develops of the state inthese passages will be a feature of the way that the idea of the TwoCities is construed. Most commentators appear to regard Augustine'sbasic position as a consistent one. Differences have come, however,in determining exactly what this position is.I think the simplest approach to Augustine's position is by way ofthe Two Cities. According to Augustine, the twofold division of theuniverse into the "City of God" and the "City of Earth" originated inthe prideful revolt of the (now fallen) angels in heaven. As it had beenin heaven so it was on earth. Men had primevally lived on earth inpeace and comity (joined with one another in natural, familial af-fection) until the Fall, which brought sin into the world. The two cities

'References to and citations of the text of Augustine's City of God will generally oc-cur in the body of the paper and will follow a single style-e.g., IV.4, pp.112-13, wherethe numbers denote, respectively, the book (IV), the chapter (4), and the page numbersof the passage in question. The page references are to the Modern Libraryedition of theCity of God, trans. by Marcus Dods and others (New York, 1950). For Augustine's dis-cussion of Cicero's definition see, in particular, II.21, pp.60-63 and XIX.21, 23, 24, pp.699-701,706.195


3/23

196 REX MARTINon earth had their germ in Cain and Abel. Cain, the fratricide, builtthe first earthly city, "but Abel, being a sojourner, built none" (XV.1,p. 479). Thus, Augustine can say,Accordingly,wo cities have been formedbytwo loves:the earthlybythe loveof self, evento the contemptof God;the heavenlyby the love of God,even tothe contemptof self. ... In the one, the princesand the nationsit subduesare ruledbythe love of ruling.... But in the othercity thereis no humanwis-dom,butonly godliness,whichoffersdueworship o the true God,andlooksfor its reward n the societyof the saints,of holy angelsas well as holymen,"thatGodmaybe all in all"(XIV.28,p.477).

One model for interpreting Augustine's Two Cities is to identifythe Earthly City with the state and the City of God with the institu-tional church. Assuming for the sake of argument that this model isfundamentally sound, we can ask what consequences for the evalua-tion of political life would follow from the model. As regards thestate as such, when taken on its own terms, the consequence would ap-pear to be a radical devaluation of the political side of things and aconsiderable measure of pessimism respecting the means and ends ofman's political condition. On the other hand, the institutional church-at least in the Christian dispensation-would literally be the Cityof God on earth.What political implication this would have, however, is not alto-gether clear. It would seem, though, that if the state could be Chris-tianized through some special relationship with the institutionalchurch, then a fundamentally different evaluation of such a statewould be warranted. The basic point here would be to distinguish thestate per se, on its own principles, from the state as Christianizedthrough some organic relationship with the institutional church.2Thefunction of the identification model would be to validate this distinc-tion, to justify this way of looking at politics, and to legitimate the no-tion of a Christianized state.

The twofold identification which I have described, of the state withthe City of Earth and of the church militant with the City of God,could lead to a "clericalist" doctrine of the state. This seems to havehappened in the Middle Ages, when there was a strong current of

2Avariety of possible arrangements could be suggested as suitably satisfying the "or-ganic relationship"in question. Among the alternatives are: (a) some sort of theocracy,(b) Caesaro-papism of the Byzantine sort, (c) a cooperative relationshipbetween churchand state withina single polity, as in Charlemagne's conception of the Holy Roman Em-pire, or (d) a cooperative relationship between two types of authority within a singleChristian society, as in the "formula" of Pope Gelasius. It has even been said that themere establishment of the Christian church or simply the official toleration of Chris-tianity would be sufficient. See J. N. Figgis, The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's"City of God"(Gloucester, 1963;originally published n 1921),60-61.


4/23

AUGUSTINE'S TWO CITIES 197"clericalist" rhetoric in which the identification model was asserted,or at least presupposed.3 That we should accept this tradition of po-litical rhetoric as an interpretation of Augustine is doubtful. For itmay well be that the medieval analysis was about medieval politicsrather than about Augustine and, hence, not fundamentally an inter-pretation of the political doctrine of the City of God. In moderntimes, however, scholarly interpretations have been advanced whichlend weight to taking the clericalist doctrine, and the identificationmodel, as a substantially correct account of Augustine's own position.As Figgis says, "Their views are stronger evidence of what Augus-tine meant, than is the constant use that was made of him by medievalthinkers. The medieval habit of taking tags as text-proofs, apart fromthe general purpose of the writer, discounts their value as evidence.Besides this there was an immediate polemical interest at stake."4

Although the identification model would appear to have a certainvalidity, or at least great historical interest, its acceptability as a sub-stantially correct account of Augustine's position would require thesupport of Augustine's text, as it bears on the notion of the TwoCities and his analysis of the state. It is my own opinion that theidentification model is altogether too simple to fit the salient details ofAugustine's own rendering of the Two Cities, as I shall try to makeclear in what follows.Let me begin by elaborating the contention that Augustine hadan essentially tripartite conception of the city of God. The first concep-tion is that the city of God is an "eternal city"; as such it is composedof the Trinity, the unfallen or loyal angels, and the eternally pre-destined-to-grace portion of the human race. The eternal citizenshipof the human portion, which is potentially eternal "in time" and ac-tually eternal "at the end of time" (i.e., in the Heaven of Book XXII),is referred to by Augustine in phrases such as "the eternal life of thesaints" (XII.19, p. 402) and "a future eternal priesthood" (XVII.6,p. 583).The second conception of the city of God is that it is an associa-

3Theterm "clericalist" is Figgis's (64). A numberof medieval thinkers can plausiblybe cited as holding the clericalist doctrine on grounds of the identificationmodel: Hilde-brand (see Figgis 88-89 for discussion and citation); Engelbert of Admont (Figgis, 85,97-98); James of Viterbo (C. H. McIlwain, The Growthof Political Thoughtin the West[New York, 1932], 159; McIlwain also cited Hildebrand, 160); the anonymoussource cited in the anti-papalist tract Rex pacificus (H. A. Deane, The Political and So-cial Ideas of St. Augustine [New York, 1963], 232-33); and Giles of Rome (Deane,232, 332, n. 25; Giles is also cited by McIlwain, 159n).

4Figgis, 77. Ritschl, for example, appears to identify the state with the City ofEarth (Figgis, 55, 128, n.6 for discussion and citation). Gierke holds a theocratic inter-pretation of the state based, again, on identifyingthe City of God with the church (Fig-gis, 77, 131,n.9). Similarviews are held by Dorner and Ritschl (Figgis, 131, nn.8, 10).


5/23

198 REX MARTIN

tion (a collective only "in concept" but taken distributively in fact)of individual persons who love God, as distinct from those who lovethemselves and the things of this earth. By this rubric of "two loves"Augustine divided all mankind into two groups, those who live after"the flesh" and those who live after "the Spirit" (XIV.1, p. 441).Members within each group have nothing in common except the pe-culiar characters of the "love" (or "will") which motivates them.These individuals are not corporately embodied as such in any singleinstitution or set of institutions on earth; yet they are spoken of asforming two "cities." Accordingly, I shall refer to this as the "indi-vidualistic" conception of the city of God, for it denotes only indi-viduals and their love.The third conception of the city of God is that it is a visible and in-stitutional entity. Before Christ, this entity was the Hebrew nation(not state). Christ "took away the kingdom" from Israel, becauseIsrael had become his "enemy" (XVII.7, p. 585), and put it underhis own headship in his church, the catholic church. It is especiallynoteworthy that Augustine used this terminology to describe what hebelieved to have been an historical occurrence, the transfer of God'sinstitutional "kingdom" on earth from the Hebrew nation to theChristian church.Too many roadblocks stand in the way of any literal and completeidentification of the city of God with the church. The term"church" should properly refer only to the New Testament "King-dom" of Christ. Thus, all the individual persons who lived beforeChrist can never be included within the church. Furthermore, the God-head and the angels who compose part of the "eternal" city can in nosense be called part of the church (although Christ is called "head" ofthe church). These two exceptions will hold true no matter how broadlyone chooses to interpret the term "church" (providing,of course, thatthe term is strictly confined to the New Testament or Christiandispensation).If one prefers to limit "church" to the "institutional" or "visible"church, then one must be prepared to admit that the "individualis-tic" church can never be fully comprehended in it. There will alwaysbe some predestined individuals (i.e., members of the "eternal"city) who at any given time are not members of the "visible" churchand even individuals who love God but, for one reason or another,have not affiliated themselves with the "visible" church (e.g., martyrswho die for Christ but outside the church and who are admitted tohis kingdom by the "baptism of blood" rather than to his church bythe "baptism of water"). Finally, there are always members of the"visible" church who do not belong to the "eternal" or "individualis-tic" cities; their presence within the "institutional" city or church


6/23

AUGUSTINE'S TWO CITIES 199thus makes it impossible to "identify" that city with either of the othertwo cities.Sometimes texts in the book which explicitly identify the city ofGod with the church are seized upon as proving some kind of completeidentification. (See, for examples, VIII.24, pp. 273-74; XIII. 16, p.424; XVII.4, p. 573; XVIII.29, p. 634.) However, such grasping attextual straws is futile, if it is admitted (as it must be) that neither"city of God" nor "church" is used unequivocally. We are merelypushed back to examining the specifics, and such examination will in-variably show that no wholesale identification is possible. But to saythis is not to dismiss the claim that there is an "institutional" sense ofthe term "city of God." And it is clearly true that the institutionalchurch, for Augustine, is to be regarded as exemplifying this sense inthe Christian era.5 His point was that the city of God on earth shouldnot be identified exclusively with either of the two Christian "socie-ties"; rather, it was that the institutional view of the church mustbe set over against and integrated with that of the "individualistic"church of the true saints.The individuals who compose the "individualistic" church aremembers of that city of God by virtue of their love; they are also-forthe most part-members of the institutional church. The institutional

5The problem here is to establish unmistakably that Augustine did refer with onesense of the term "city of God on earth" to the institutional church. Our locus classicusis Augustine's exegetical discussion of Noah's ark (XV.26, 27, pp. 516-20). He said aboutthe ark: "This is certainly a figure of the city of God sojourning n this world; that is tosay, of the church, whichis rescued by the wood on whichhung the Mediator of God andmen, the man Christ Jesus" (516). The conditionof the church's "sojourning" s the con-dition of the animals in the ark (i.e., "the clean and unclean together," 519). This inclu-sion of both "clean" and "unclean" in the ark (i.e., saved and unsaved in the church) isan image appropriateto the visible or institutional church but hardly to the church con-ceived as an association of individuals bound together solely by their love of God.Hence, the image of the ark providesnot only the looked-for proof text but also the prin-ciple of differentiating the individualisticfrom the institutional sense of the term "cityof God on earth." Augustine's clearest statement of his twofold conceptionof the churchunder the single heading of "Kingdom of heaven" (or City of God) is found in XX.9,which deals with the millennial reign of Christ; see esp. pp. 725-27. This chapter pro-vides another discussion of the church/city of God along the same lines as in the Noah'sark sections. On the theme of the institutional church as itself a mixed community, seeAugustine's discussion of heretics in the church (XVIII.49, p. 660 and, esp. 51, pp.661-63). The notion of the city of God as a sacramental body seems, also, to point to theinstitutional church. At two points this is unmistakable, where Augustine conjoins thethemes of the church as a mixed communityand as a sacramental body. (See the Noah'sark chapters, especially the analogy of the door of the ark with the wounded side ofChrist [p. 516], and 1.35, p. 38.) Finally, there is his idea that the city of God inthe Christian era is prefiguredby the Hebrew nation. Augustine several times treated ofthis foreshadowingwith special reference to public, corporate worship. (See especiallyX.1, p. 305; VII.32, p. 238; X.32, p. 343.) The presence of the concept of public worshiphere definitelypoints to an institutionalchurch.


7/23

200 REX MARTINchurch conceived as a divine and providentially directed institutioncan be said to act for and in the interest of the individualistic church.It is the historical "deputy" of God and, as divine, "stands for" Godand his people (the "individualistic" church); the institutional churchhas the mission of carrying the religion of Christ throughout theChristian era and of guaranteeing the truth of this religion, with re-spect to both cult and doctrine.As long as the institutional church is divinely directed to do God'swork it is the city of God on earth in a most important and indispens-able way. Regardless of the general character of its membership andbecause it always contains the greater portion of the saints onearth, the catholic church (in Augustine's opinion) goes on its pilgrim-age, inheritor of the "kingdom" of God from the Hebrews, house ofworship, dispenser of the sacraments, and teacher of scripture. It isthe peculiar medium through which God's will is worked and is asharer in God's grace as truly as is the "individualistic"church. Eachchurch, admittedly in its own way and in a nonexclusive and limitedsense, is an aspect of the city of God on earth. The conclusion I drawis that Augustine did not treat "City of God on earth" and "institu-tional church" as identical in meaning. But I have argued that there isa unique relationship here, between the City of God and the visiblechurch, which requires some term to describe it.Figgis has suggested the notion of a "symbol."6While Noah's Arkmay be a symbol of the church (by way of analogy), the institutionalchurch is not in that sense a "symbol" of the City of God. For somefeatures of the church are not simply analogous to traits of the City ofGod but are, rather, actual historical functions of the City of God onearth. Perhaps the word to describe the relationship is a strongerone: the institutional church represents or is the agent of the divineCity in certain of the functions the church actually performs, i.e., inworship, sacraments, scripture, and authoritative discipline. Ratherthan a simple identity there is an identification at certain points andfor certain purposes. It is this claim which I would urge against bothFiggis and Deane.7 Although I endorse their contention that Augus-tine does not identify the City of God on earth with the institutionalchurch, I claim that this fact alone does not require us to withdrawthe notion of a Christianized state, since there is still the relationshipof special representation.

6Figgis, 51, 68. Bluhm refers to the "identification," of the city of God with theinstitutional church, as "only figurative": Theories of the Political System (EnglewoodCliffs, 1965), 163.7BothFiggis (51-52, 121) and Deane (24, 34, 121)do, of course, deny the simple iden-tification model. Figgis does it with the qualification "sans phrase"; Deane's denial isunqualified: t is "absolutely impossible to identify the City of God . . . with the visibleChristian Church in this world"(24).


8/23

AUGUSTINE'S TWO CITIES 201Deane, however, wants to deny the Christianized state interpreta-tion altogether. To accomplish this, he wants to deny not only thesimple identification model but also any notion of special representa-

tion. His claim here is quite uncompromising: "No earthly state, city,or association can ever claim to be a part or a representative of theCity of God. . . . Even the visible Church, which contains many ofthe reprobate along with the elect, is not an earthly division of theCity of God, although ... it is more closely related to that City thanany earthly state or society can ever be."8One might well agree with Deane, as I do, that the Christianizedstate is not an Augustinian notion. But I do not think that one can giveas his reason that there is no basic relationship, either of identity or ofrepresentation, between the City of God and the institutional churchin Augustine's eyes. It seems to me to run against the grain of Aug-ustine's text to say that the institutional church is "not an earthly divi-sion of the City of God" and to suggest that it differs from (other)earthly states or societies only in degree. Rather, I contend that thereis a special relationship-representation-and this might provide war-rant, although an attenuated one, for retaining the notion of a Chris-tianized state as a possible interpretation of Augustine. Indeed, Sabinehas managed to squeeze the whole Christianized state doctrinethrough the needle's eye of the relationship of representation. Hehas alleged, though noting that the City of God could not be "identi-fied precisely" with "existing human institutions," including thechurch, that the Kingdom of Christ was "embodied" in "the churchand Christianized empire." This "conception of a Christian common-wealth" is, Sabine says, Augustine's "most characteristic idea" and isbased on "a philosophy of history [i.e., the idea of the Two Cities]which presents such a commonwealth as the culmination of man'sspiritual development."9 I would agree with Sabine to this extent:the Christianized state idea must at least be left open as a possibility,

8Deane, 29 (see also 28). It is difficult to say here whether Deane is expoundingJesus' opinion or Augustine's. But he is clearly expounding Augustine later, when hesays that the City of God "has no earthly representative" (120). If this remark is takento refer exclusively to states I would agree, but if it is meant to include the church mili-tant as well (as it does on 121), I cannot agree.9The passages cited are from G. H. Sabine, History of Political Theory(3d ed.; NewYork, 1961), 190-91. It is interesting to note that Sabine presses the Christianized Statenotion on Augustine, by reference to the Two Cities concept, while specifically assertingthat the church "represents" the City of God "even though the latter cannot be identi-fied with the ecclesiastical organization" (190). It is difficult to say exactly what Sabinewas referring to with the phrase "Christian commonwealth." I presume that it re-ferred, at least in part, to the "Christianizedempire" of the next page. In any case, wedo find Sabine endorsingthe claim of James Bryce that "the theory of the Holy RomanEmpire was built upon Augustine's City of God" and we do find him talking aboutAugustine's espousal of the notionof "a Christian state" (191-92).


9/23

202 REX MARTIN

given the idea of a partial identification-i.e., in the relationship ofagent representation-of the city of God with the Church.But what about the other basic member of the Two Cities, the Cityof Earth? Do we have any textual license to identify the state quastate and the City of Earth? In dealing with this question, I think ana priori move might prove helpful: I would suggest that we try to de-velop a parallel between the institutional church in its relation to theCity of God and the state in its relation to the City of Earth. On thesea priori grounds, we could rule out the relationship of simple identifi-cation. Moreover, Figgis' notion of a symbolic relationship would ap-pear warranted-as the text, at a number of points, would confirm.(For example, Cain, who is the first man to be a citizen of theCity of Earth, also founded the first city. He was a fratricide, as wasRomulus, who founded Rome. [See XV.1, p. 479; XV.8, pp. 488-89;XV.5, pp. 482-83.].) Finally, the idea of some sort of agent repre-sentation would,on apriori grounds, appear appropriate.10The question is, How would this representation take shape?At whatpoint(s) would the identity hold? For an answer I think we can revertto the passage where Augustine spoke of Two Cities formed by twoloves, "the earthly by love of self." There are many forms of self-love,of concern for the things of this life, that could be cited but the oneAugustine specifically mentions is the "love of ruling." Obviously,this is a notion relevant to politics. But does it imply that the state assuch, through the love of ruling, specifically represents the City ofEarth? I do not think it was the state per se that Augustine had inmind, for he says, "In the one, the princes and the nations it subduesare ruled by the love of ruling" (XIV.28, p. 477).It is not the state as such, i.e., any particular state taken at randomor all of them taken together, but the imperial state that peculiarlyrepresents the City of Earth. The imperial state (e.g., Assyria, Egypt,Rome) plays a role toward the City of Earth analogous to that playedby the institutional church towards the City of God. This basic paral-lelism descends even to details. The translation of empire theme,which we have already noted in relation to the church, is found alsoin the succession of the great earthly empires (for example, XVIII.21,p.627).It has been observed by Figgis (p.53) and Deane (p.171), in particu-lar, that Augustine was personally an anti-imperialist. (See, for

'0It is interesting to note that Figgis will allow only a "symbolic" representationof the City of God by the church, and Deane not even this; but the relationshipbetweenthe City of Earth and the State is treated, in each case, in a non-parallelfashion. Deane,for example, suggests that "states of this world are in some sense regarded as parts ofthe earthly city" (31, italics added;see also Deane, 30, and Figgis, 51, and 58).


10/23

AUGUSTINE'S TWO CITIES 203example, IV.15, p.123.)" However, the connection of this attitude tothe notion that the imperial state "represents" the City of Earth hasnot been sufficiently noted. At several points Augustine asserts theessential similarity of all imperial states in their motivation by love ofdomination and their imposition of rule by war and force, and assertsthe connection of this feature of imperial states with what he calledthe City of Earth, a connection such that we could call these greatimperial states the exemplars and institutional representatives of theCity of Earth. The earthly city is the city of earthly "loves" or lusts andthe master lust is the lust of domination. This lust is a form of pride;it is the pride which apes God himself. This, then, is the principle ofthe imperial state in its role as the agent representative of the City ofEarth: "The earthly city,... though it be mistress of the nations, isitself ruled by its lust of rule" (I. preface, p.3; also V.19).The notion of a basic parallelism within the Two Cities concept is,I think, substantially sound. Sabine puts the institutional aspect of theparallelism well: "Augustine did think of the Kingdom of evil as atleast represented by the pagan empires, though not exactly identifiedwith them. He also thought of the church as representing the City ofGod, even though the latter cannot be identified with the ecclesiasticalorganization" (p.190;italics added).

My analysis of Augustine's political philosophy is based on theclaim that he does not identify either of the Two Cities with institu-tions on earth. The two cities have a simple corporate character andidentity only beyond the Final Judgment, in Heaven and Hell. Withrespect to this world, the concept of the Two Cities refers primarily totwo types or classifications of men. However, I have argued that thereare earthly institutions that "represent" and do the work of the twocities in human history: the imperial states are special embodiments ofthe City of Earth and, after the advent of Christ, the institutionalchurch is the unique and indispensable representative of the City ofGod.

"Augustine had an ambivalent attitude toward the Romans' acquisitionof empire.He does not trace it simply to the love of ruling but, also, includes the provocationsofRome's neighbors among the causes of empire. The empire accrued to Rome in part asthe result of fighting "just wars" (IV.15, p. 123; Augustine makes this same point atIII.10, p. 81). He also provides a special reason (or cause) for Rome's empire: God"helped forward the Romans, who were good according to a certain standard of anearthly state" (V.19, p. 173). At another point he says that by Rome "God was pleasedto conquer the whole world, and subdueit far and wide by bringing t into one fellowshipof government and laws" (XVIII.22, p. 628; also XIX.7, p. 683). It is, in the light of this,understandable that Augustine would be reluctant to accept the "fall" of Rome (seeIV.7, p. 115). The hold of the Roman myth was powerfulon its loyal subjects, Christianandpagan.


11/23

204 REX MARTINThis conception of the institutional church as the special representa-tive of the City of God allows us neither to dismiss nor to validate thenotion of a Christianized state. For it is possible that the churchmight appropriate some sort of political apparatus for its own purposesjust as the Hebrew nation had generated a state, the Hebrew Kingdom.The issue remains open. On the other hand, it is the imperial state,and not the state as such, that represents the City of Earth. This factwill allow us to dispense with any identification, whole or partial, of thestate per se with the "earthly City."12 In short, the concept of the TwoCities on its own, although it provides the superstructure of Augustine'spolitical doctrines, does not give us all the essential details of Augus-tine's political philosophy. In particular, the concept does not provideus with sufficient information to determine Augustine's notion of thenature and role of justice in the state, or to establish whether Augustinewas advocating the notion of a Christianized state. It does not, in fact,provide us even with Augustine's conception of the state, since anyessential link between the state as such and the City of Earth has beenbroken.Exception could well be taken to my claim. It has been pointed out,for example, that Cain, the germ of the City of Earth, founded the firsttown. But even if we allow that this first city is the first state, I wouldask what we might conclude about the nature of the state. For the cru-cial question is, What is the nature of the state in Augustine's opinion?The connoisseur of the City of God might here invite attention to oneof Augustine's most famous political passages, the one that begins:"Justice being taken away, then [Remota itaque iustitia], what are

kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves, butlittle kingdoms?" and ends: "Indeed that was an apt and true replywhich was given to Alexander the Great by a pirate who had beenseized. For when that king had asked the man what he meant by keep-ing hostile possession of the sea, he answered with bold pride, 'Whatthou meanest by seizing the whole earth; but because I do it with a pettyship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who dost it with a great fleetart styled emperor' " (IV.4, pp.112-13).I would suggest, however, the importance of considering this pas-

'2Insofaras Augustine can be said to be concerned with the political state as such, Ithink we can say that he saw the state qua state as belongingto the things of this world,as distinct from the things of heaven. Certainly this much can be read into Augustine'soft repeated observation that Cain founded the first city (XV.1, p. 479). This, togetherwith the fact that Augustine pointed Abel out as a shepherd,not as a ruler of men, indi-cates that Augustine did not regard the rule of man over men as part of the economy ofEden.


12/23

AUGUSTINE'S TWO CITIES 205

sage in its context, as many commentators have failed to do (e.g.,Carlyle, Mcllwain, d'Entreves). Its context is precisely that discussionof imperial states and their imaging forth of the City of Earth in their"lust for domination" which I have been discussing. (Indeed, the mostextended treatment of the theme of the imperial state is found in BookIV of the City of God.) I suggest that the context of this passage is cru-cial, that the systematic import of the passage is overlooked if the con-text is ignored, and that we obtain a very different reading of it if wekeep these points in mind. Let us read the passage as being, not aboutjustice in Kingdoms, but about the nature of imperial states. Augustinecan be taken as saying: set the issue of justice aside, for imperial statesare not particularlyjust. They are really nothing but big robber bands.While robber bands and empires do have certain features in commonwith the conventionally more acceptable political arrangements (allhave princes, pacts of confederation, binding rules), the crucial pointthey have in common is how they do their business: by imposition. Inprinciple there is no difference: if a robber band could take possessionof cities and subdue people, it would be an imperial state. What makesan imperial state is not that the gang is rid of the robber instinct but,rather, that they have gotten too big to be called to account.The force of this reading of IV.4, as being about the nature of theimperial state, is broughtout not just from the general context but alsofrom the explicit reference to empire on which the passage concludesand, finally, from a passage which comes in another chapter shortlyafter. Here we find Augustine explicitly linking Rome to Assyria andultimately tying in both, as imperial states, with the City of Earth; heconcludes the chapter, speaking of the Assyrians, on this note: "But tomake war on your neighbors and thence to proceed to others, andthrough mere lust of dominion to crush and subdue people who do youno harm, what else is this to be called than great robbery?" (IV.6,p.114). It would seem that this passage clearly refers back (in thephrase "great robbery") to IV.4. But, more important, the passageconnects IV.4 with the theme of the imperial state (Assyria and Rome)and the essential tie-in of the imperial state, through the "lust of do-minion," to the City of Earth. (See also, for examples of this complexlinkage, IV.7, p.114;XVI. 17, pp.541-42, XVII.2, pp. 610-11.)In saying all this I am not meaning to suggest that Augustine's dis-cussion of the "Kingdom" and the "removal of justice" has no politicalbearing beyond the imperial state theme at all. If we make a distinc-tion between an imperial state and a "domestic" state, I think it wouldbe true to say that Augustine's discussion does have a bearing on thelatter as well. But what that is exactly can be brought out more clearlyby relating it to Augustine's discussion of Cicero's definition of the


13/23

206 REX MARTIN"commonwealth" (res publica).13At the same time, in turning to thisdiscussion of "commonwealth," we shall be able to remedy certaindefects mentioned earlier in our discussion of Augustine's politicalphilosophy by roundingout the political meaning of his Two Cities.Cicero's famous "definition" of the ideal political community isgiven in his Republic throughhis spokesman Scipio.Well, then, a commonwealths the propertyof a people (res publica respopuli).But a peopleis not any collectionof humanbeingsbrought ogetherin anysort of way,butanassemblageof people n largenumbersassociated nan agreementwithrespecttojustice(iurisconsensu)and a partnershiporthecommon ood.This definition can be effectively divided into two basic political ideals:(1) law andjustice and (2) the common good. 14 Augustine takes up thisdefinitionat two points in the City of God, in Book II and Book XIX.In 11.21, pp.60-63, he begins by claiming that Cicero himself hadsaid that "even in his time [the Roman republic] had become en-tirely extinct, and that there remained extant no Roman republic atall" (p.60). Now, the natural question is why Cicero would say this, andAugustine leads up to answering this question. Scipio is cited as say-ing that the concord (i.e., "concord of the upper, lower, and middleclasses") which is required in a republic "by no ingenuity can beretained wherejustice has become extinct" (p.61). Indeed, according toAugustine, Scipio asserts that a republic "cannot be governed withoutthe most absolute justice [summa iustitia]" (p.61). Here Augustine,who is following Cicero's own text closely (De Republica, pp.67, 183,

l3The term res publica is normally translated either as "republic" (which is etymo-logically related to it) or as "commonwealth." Since "republic"has misleading connota-tions and since "commonwealth" conveys more in the way of content, this latter termseems preferable. See A. P. d'Entreves, The Notion of the State (Oxford, 1967), 28-35, esp. 33, and, 75, n. 2.'4Cicero,De Republica, trans. by C. W. Keyes (Cambridge,Mass., 1928),65. Ciceroemphasizes the primacy of justice in his definition: "For what is a state except a part-nershipin justice" (77). D'Entreves has raised the interesting question whether Cicero'siuris consensu should be translated "agreement with respect to justice," as many trans-lators (including Keyes) have it, or, alternatively, as "consent to law" (d'Entreves, 24,n.2). I have seen one translation that renders the phrase "agreement about rights." InEnglish the difference in sense is striking and the whole meaning of the passage wouldappear to change, depending on which of these renderings was used. However, theLatin iuris, whether it is translated justice or law, conveys the basic notion of moralrightor rightness. Hence, even if we translate the term as "law," it has the connotativeforce of "just law" or "law according to justice." (See d'Entreves, 75-77.) This samepoint could be derived, philosophically, by noting that Cicero grounds civil law injusticeand ultimately in "right reason" or "natural law": De Legibus (Keyes translation),317, 345, 381, 385, and De Republica, 211. Augustine, to all appearances, takes iuris asmeaningiustitia (justice); although his argument wouldgo throughif it were put in termsof"rights" as well.


14/23

AUGUSTINE'S TWO CITIES 207and 219), points out that Scipio later "repeats with commendationhis own brief definition of a republic" and that Scipio goes on to arguethat a "republic, or 'weal of the people,' then exists only when it is wellandjustly governed, whether by a monarch, or an aristocracy, or by thewhole people" (p.61). Augustine, then, paraphrases the conclusion ofScipio (Cicero): a republic given over to injustice is "not only blem-ished . . . but by legitimate deduction from those definitions, it alto-gether ceases to be" (pp.61-62).Augustine's point is ultimately a moral one. His claim is simplythat Cicero (through his spokesman Scipio) regarded the "morality ofthe community" as essential to a republic (by making justice and thecommon good part of its "definition"), and that the Rome of Cicero'sday had lost this morality to the degree that Cicero himself regarded itas no longer a republic. But at this point Augustine strikes a newnote. He suggests that, perhaps, Cicero and other admirers of theantique Roman republic have failed to inquire "whether, even in thedays of primitive men and morals, true justice flourishedin it; or was itnot perhaps even then, to use the casual expression of Cicero, rather acolored painting than the living reality" (pp.62-63). But Augustineimmediately adds that he will "consider this elsewhere," and thenbrieflyindicates what he will take up later on.He wants, first, to show that by Cicero's own definition Rome wasnever a republic "because true justice had never a place in it." But,second, Augustine says that a "more feasible" (probabiliores)definitionthan Cicero's would allow us to say, as Cicero had wanted to say, that"there was a republic of a certain kind, and certainly much betteradministered by the more ancient Romans than by their modernrepresentatives." Finally, Augustine wishes to show that "true justicehas no existence save in that republicwhose founder and ruler is Christ,if at least any choose to call this a republic; and indeed we cannot denythat it is the people's weal. But if perchance this name [republic],which has become familiar in other connections, be considered alien toour common parlance, we may at all events say that in this city is truejustice; the city of which Holy Scripture says, 'Glorious things aresaid of thee, O city of God' " (all passages:II.21, p.63).Augustine's new points, which he promised to develop later on, aretaken up again in Book XIX. Before I turn to his remarks there, I thinkit would be helpful to note certain things that can serve as guidelinesin working our way into Augustine's own position. First, I think it clearthat Augustine in 11.21has not been talking about the state as such butrather about a more specialized notion, that of the republic, withparticular reference to the Roman republic. Again, it is clear that"republic" is not a descriptive term but primarily an evaluative termdenoting a principle, that of the "weal of the people." Second, the


15/23

208 REX MARTIN

evaluative point that Augustine wanted to make is put in terms of"true justice," as differentiated, presumably, from Cicero's idea ofjustice. What historic Rome lacked is "true justice" but the "republicwhose founder and ruler is Christ" has it. But, third, this true repub-lic-and Augustine is reluctant to call it a republic at all-is bettercalled, he tells us, the City of God. This might be taken as the lookedfor textual evidence which would proclaim a politicized church insome sort of Christianized State. But I think the context ought togovern our judgment here. We have already been told that the state,the Roman or any other, is not going to be Christianized: rather "thepeople of Christ . . . are enjoined to endure [not take over] thisearthly republic, wicked and dissolute as it is" so they can "win forthemselves" a place among the "assembly of angels" in that "republicof heaven" where "God's will is law" (see 11.19, p.59). The "truerepublic" is clearly this "republic of heaven" or heavenly City of God,which Augustine is reluctant to call by a political name at all (like"republic") since it is not even of this earth, let alone a political state.There is, I think, an obvious but implicit dichotomy introducedhere: between the "earthly republic" and the heavenly, between thepolitical and the celestial city, between the temporal-historical andthe eternal-divine, between philosophical and theological categories,as it were.

Finally, I think we can take Augustine as endorsing Cicero's dis-tinction between the antique republic (existing before Christ and theRoman emperors and coming to an end in Cicero's own day) andRome's "modern representatives," which include the Romans of theimperial state, under the emperor, of Augustine's own day. Ratherthan contrasting the Christianized State with the pagan state, Augus-tine was indicating that he favored the antique Roman State, whichwas pagan, over the "modern" Roman empire in which Christianitywas established! But we have no paradox here, if we allow thatAugustine's basic distinction was between the "republic of heaven"and the "earthly republic."It is important, in this context, to note that Augustine nowheremakes an explicit distinction between heathen and Christian states (seeDeane, 123). This fact in itself and his obvious preference for theantique Roman republic, which is repeated at XIX.24, p.706, make itdifficult to see how the Christianized State interpretation has come tohave the credibility that it has in recent scholarship.15That Augustineshould prefer the earlier republic of Rome over the later empire is,unlike the basic distinction between the "earthly republic" and the

'5Augustine's basic attitude towards politics, following the Pauline tradition, ispassive, negative, almost indifferent. It would seem that one could hardly advocate theChristianized State on the one hand and say, on the other, "What does it matter under


16/23

AUGUSTINE'S TWO CITIES 209heavenly, not grounded on theological considerations. It is a politicalpreference, and a regard for the grounds of this preference is crucialwhere we are concerned with his political philosophy.It is important in analyzing Augustine's reformulation, in BookXIX, of Cicero's definition of a commonwealth to separate the the-ological from the political motif. Theologically, Augustine seems tohave two motives in undertaking his reformulation: (1) to show thattrue justice depends on the correct apprehension and worship of God,and (2) to suggest that no secular or political state could claim to bea true commonwealth because it could not institutionalize true justiceand ultimately would not serve the true common weal of men.16The key to his political point is provided in Augustine's proposedalternative definitionof the commonwealth:A peopleis an assemblageof reasonablebeingsbound ogetherby a commonagreementas to the objectsof theirlove;then,in order to discover he char-acter of any people,we haveonlyto observewhatthey love. Yet whatever tloves, if only it is an assemblageof reasonablebeingsand not of beasts, andis boundtogether by an agreementas to the objectsof love, it is reasonablycalleda people;and it will be a superiorpeople n proportion s it is bound o-gether by higherinterests,inferior n proportionas it is boundtogether bylower.According o this definition f ours,the Romanpeople s a people,anditsweal s withoutdoubta commonwealthrrepublicXIX.24,p.706).

This new definition is, presumably, the "more feasible" definitionwhich Augustine had promised in 11.21 and it is a definition whichwhose government a dying man lives [and we are all dying men], if those who gov-ern do not force him to impiety and iniquity?"(V.17, p. 166). This observation wouldappear to be doubly telling against those who assert that Augustine wanted to turn thewhole body of true saints (the "individualistic"city of God) into a political state. See,for example, Otto Butz, Of Man and Politics (New York, 1964), 60-62 and G. Combes,quoted in Deane, 303, n.67. Indeed, to attempt to institutionalize the "individualistic"city in any way on earth is what Gilbert Ryle wouldcall a category mistake.

16Augustine's primary reasons for challenging Cicero's definition are theological,not political. This interpretation can be confirmed by the text of Augustine's argument.(a) As to justice he says: "There is no republicwhere there is nojustice. Further,jus-tice is that virtue which gives every one his due. Where, then, is the justice of man, whenhe deserts the true God and yields himself to impure demons? Is this to give every onehis due? Or is he who keeps back a piece of ground from the purchaser, and gives it to aman who has no right to it unjust, while he who keeps back himself from the God whomade him, and serves wicked spirits, is just?" (XIX.21, p. 699).(b) Augustine repeats his charge at a later point: "For in general, the city of the un-

godly, which did not obey the command of God that it should offer no sacrifice save toHim alone ... is void of truejustice" (XIX.24, p. 706).(c) As to the common good Augustine says: "And why need I speak of the advantage-ousness, the common participation in which, according to the definition [of Cicero]makes a people? . . . If you choose to regard the matter attentively, you will see that

there is nothing advantageous to those who live godlessly, as every one lives who doesnot serve God but demons" (XIX.21, p. 700).


17/23

210 REX MARTINAugustine acknowledges as his own.17 But why is Augustine's owndefinition so radically different from Cicero's? Why didn't he stick,basically, to Cicero's definition?He could, for example, have amendedCicero's definition easily enough. He could have said that "truejustice"and the "true weal" of men are not political goods at all; they are ap-propriate only to the church as a community of the righteous. In thefinal analysis, the only "true republic" that, by strict Ciceronian defini-tion, could ever exist is the Kingdom of Heaven, the celestial city ofGod; and this is not in human history at all. However, he could haveadded that certain moral qualities, like justice and concern forcommon well-being, qualities that are radically imperfect over against"true justice" might still serve to define a political "common-wealth."18Why did Augustine not retain Cicero's definition and foot-note it, as it were, to draw the basic differentiation between a correcttheological and a correct political usage of the terms "republic,""justice," and"well-being"?In answering this question I shall argue that Augustine's departurefrom Cicero is more apparent than real. Cicero had wanted to dis-tinguish a republic from a tyranny, the crux of the differentiationbeing justice. Why justice? Because Cicero thought that justice isthe cement that binds a state, made up of different classes, into aharmonious whole (see De Republica, 75, 183). In other words justicebelongs to the definition of a "republic" because what a republic is, ares populi, i.e., partnershipof classes, requiresjustice in order to exist.In short, without justice the orders (classes) would clash, and therewould be no social harmony and no "commonwealth." Cicero's evalu-ation is that a concord of the classes, a res populi or republic, is thehighest political good and he claims that justice, since it is factually

17This definition is consistent with what Augustine had said earlier and in a less liti-gious context: "A civic community ... is nothing else than a multitude of men bound to-gether by some associating tie" (XV.8, p. 489; also 1.15, p. 21). Similar statements canbe found in Augustine's letters and other works. Although Augustine developed his new"definition"in response to Cicero and with respect to historic Rome, he intended it tobe applied generally: to every society "which had a public government" insofar as thebasic sense of the definition ("reasonable beings bound together by a common agree-ment as to the objects of love") could be satisfied (XIX.24, p. 706).

'8Oneof the most important features of Deane's analysis is to show that Augustinemade an explicit distinction between "true justice" (vera iustitia) and an "image"(imago) of justice: Deane, 96-103, esp. 98, 125. If Augustine were to make the pointthat "true justice" is not a political category, it would not follow that justice (i.e., the"image of justice") did not belong in the "definition"of the republic. So far as I can tell,Deane is the first one to insist on the importance for Augustine's political theory of thisdistinction. The failure of Carlyle, Figgis, McIlwain, and Sabine to draw the distinctionintroduces a serious distortion into their analysis; in addition, Carlyle and McIlwaindidnot seem sufficientlyalert to the fact that Augustine was concerned with a definition.


18/23

AUGUSTINE'S TWO CITIES 211necessary to social peace and harmony, belongs to the basic agenda ofany republic.This is the way that justice gets into Cicero's definition of therepublic. But here we are using "definition" in an extended sense. Itincludes a definition in the strict sense: the statement "republic = df.res populi or social partnership." And it includes a non-definitionalelement as well; the factual claim that the practice of justice is neces-sary for the existence of a harmony of the classes. Further, I think itworth noting that the content of this extended definition can be lookedat either descriptively (we can describe and, presumably, verify aharmony of the classes) or evaluatively (a harmony of the orders isthe highest political good).19Augustine's new "definition" follows this pattern of analysis quiteclosely. Augustine's basic distinction is drawn between a republic anda "kingdom" of the robber band variety. Now these terms do not de-note constitutional entities but, rather, principles of political and socialorganization. A republic is a matter of "common agreement" (whichrecalls Cicero's harmony of social classes) but a kingdom or regime(regnum) is not organized on the principleof agreement but, rather, onthe principle of imposition from above. And this recalls Cicero's notionof tyranny where social harmony was replaced by the dictatorship ofone man over all or of one class over the others. The only difference ofany apparent importance, and it is really incidental at this point, isthat Cicero's notion of popular concurrence referred to a harmony ofsocial classes whereas that same notion in Augustine referred to aharmonyof individualpersons, without reference to class.

Regimes or kingdoms are structured on the principle of the lust ofdomination. They are in essence exactly like imperial states, and thisis why the word "kingdom" (regnum) can be indifferently appliedeither to imperial states or to "domestic" regimes. The only differenceis that imperial states lord it over subject peoples who were once in-dependently organized politically while "domestic" regna are juntasthat rule over other men in a single state. In either case a regnum, beit an imperial state or a regime ruling in a state, is not the property of'1Cicero apparently thought that a harmony of the classes (i.e., the ideal of a respublica) could best be achieved in a "mixed constitution," one which combines a mon-archial element with a consultative senate and a popular assembly: De Republica, 71,83, 105, 125, 151, 179. His analysis is somewhat hard to follow since he sometimesuses terms designative of political institutions (like "kingship"or "senate") and some-times class terms (like "leading citizens" or "the masses"). Indeed, much of the vocabu-

lary of classical political philosophy is ambiguous on this score: for example, "aristoc-racy" and "democracy" have both an institutional and a class reference. In any case,Cicero's intent seems clear enough, despite the ambiguity; and his precise position onthis question of the constitution is not an issue in this paper, since it has no exactcorrelate in Augustine's politicalphilosophy.


19/23

212 REX MARTINthe people but of their masters. I think Augustine's political philosophyrests on two fundamental distinctions: the one between the heavenlycity of God and the "earthly republic"; the other, within the "earthlyrepublic," between a res publica and a regnum. But the nature of thislatter distinction requires further mapping.The distinction of regnum/res publica is drawn by Mcllwain (seep.156 where he puts civitates and regna on one side, over against respublicae on the other). McIlwain's point is, I think, fundamental but hisway of drawing it is defective. First, he treats it as a terminologicaldistinction which Augustine explicitly drew, whereas I suggest thatAugustine's distinction was not drawn at the terminological level atall. Second, he treats the distinction as having to do with kinds ofstates, not so much constitutional kinds as religious kinds (pagan/Christian).20But I would assert that Augustine is not contrasting kindsof states but rather, polar political styles, principles of political or-ganization. His distinction is drawn by preference and reflects thegroundson which the preference is based.If anything is clear, it is that Augustine regards a state organizedon the principle of "common agreement" as preferable to one or-ganized on the principle of subjection. This is clear for the simplereason that Augustine endorses the first principle (for it is the prin-ciple of organization in Augustine's own definition), and the principleof subjection he condemned (in IV.4) as nothing better than a "grandrobbery." I regard the crucial point of difference between theseprinciples, i.e., the difference between agreement and imposition,as the ground of his basic evaluation. And it is a political evaluation(for there is here no contrast intended between the divine and thepolitical but, rather, only between the political good and the politicalbad).21It is also clear from other passages that Augustine took a negative

20Deanerejects McIlwain's distinction of regnum/res publica because he does notsee that Augustine uses his terms in the way McIlwain has indicated: Deane, 297,n.28. Even more objectionable is the interpretation McIlwain puts on the distinctiononce he has drawn it terminologically. He says that all pagan states are regna, sincethey are, as pagan, deprived of justice but that republics would have the quality of jus-tice; and he suggests, but does not say, that a Christianized State would be a republic.Even so, I think the distinction of regnum/res publica, if interpreted along the lines Iam suggesting, can be used to point to a genuine principleof distinction in Augustine'spolitical thought.2'D'Entreves construes Augustine as offering a value-neutral definition of the state(23-27). This view is, I think, mistaken. The whole notion of a "republic" was intro-duced and discussed in an evaluative way. In contrast to d'Entreves I would say thatAugustine was "defining" a "republic," where that term referred to a political valuewhich could be exemplifiedor not in any state. The very notion of a republic, as we findit in XIX.21, for example, is itself an entirely favorably evaluated notion. (For addi-tionaldiscussion, see d'Entreves' chapter, "The State-A Neologism," 28-36.)


20/23

AUGUSTINE'S TWO CITIES 213view, morally, of the whole principle of imposition and subjection.He speaks of robbers who "invade the peace of other men" andultimately would have a city or nation "submit itself" to their brigand'speace in a passage (XIX. 12, p.687), recalling his earlier robber bandpassage (in IV.4). He also speaks of "wicked men [who] wage war tomaintain the peace of their own circle, and wish that, if possible, allmen belonged to them, that all men and things might serve but onehead, and might, either through love or fear, yield themselves topeace with [them]! It is thus that pride in its perversity apes God.It abhors equality with other men under [God]; but, instead of Hisrule, it seeks to impose a rule of its own upon its equals" (XIX.12,p.689).We have then, in Augustine's theory, two basic kinds of politicalvalues in the organization of states: the community principle, definedby basic social agreement, and the regime principle, defined by animposed order. However, Augustine's evaluations do not end here, forhe recognizes that human freedom (in its political form, i.e., commonagreement as to desired political ends) can have a variety of objects.And these objects will themselves vary in moral quality, "higher in-terests" as opposed to "lower." What Augustine called "true justice"can never be an interest or object of the state (at least, Augustinenever allowed that it could). Even strict Ciceronian justice might beunattainable, for Augustine appears to believe that humanjustice, withor without a proper relationship to God, would always be imperfect,even when judged by internal or human standards, like those of Cicero(XIX.23-27, pp. 705-08). But if a state were to dedicate itself to someattainable "image of justice" (but not to the impossible goal of "truejustice") then presumably it would have chosen a "higher interest."Or we might infer that, if a state were to undertake certain tasks inthe interest of the church, as, for example, the use of its coercive powerin the maintenance of the doctrines and discipline of the church, thenthat would be a "higher interest." If we interpret the ChristianizedState notion as meaning, not that a republic can only be a Christianstate or that political justice is ultimately a theological and ecclesi-astical category, but simply that service to the church is a politicalgood (a "higher interest"), then Augustine might be said to hold thisnotion.22Whether the highest attainable political goal is service to the churchor an image of justice, I will not venture to say. But if a commonwealthcan have "lower" interests and still remain a commonwealth, then it

22Augustinecame, rather reluctantly and rather late, to advocate state coercion ofheretics and the suppression of schism by political means. See his Correction of theDonatists, in Works(trans. J. R. King; Edinburgh,1872), III, esp. 485; also the very ex-cellent chapter 6 on heresy by Deane, 172-220.


21/23

214 REX MARTINis clear that virtues like justice (i.e., an "image of justice") or serviceto the church are not essential to its being a commonwealth, althoughsuch virtues may be essential to its merit as a commonwealth. The"image of justice," although it is a high aspiration, is not-perhapsfor that very reason-necessary to maintain the conditions for theexistence of the commonwealth. Justice belongs then (in ReinholdNiebuhr's phrase) "not to the esse but to the bene esse of the com-monwealth."There may be, however, something other than justice that is es-sential to the very existence of a commonwealth as defined, and,hence, that belongs of necessity on its agenda. This is, of course, aquestion of fact. Put in this way, it would seem that Augustine's con-clusion is not difficult to fathom. What does belong to its basic agenda,according to him, is peace.The earthlycity, whichdoes not live by faith,seeksan earthlypeace,and theend it proposes, n the well-ordered oncordof civil obedienceandrule,is thecombination f men'swills to attain the thingswhichare helpfulto this life.The heavenlycity [on earth]makesuse of this peace only becauseit must,until this mortal conditionwhich necessitates it shall pass away. . . . [Theheavenlycity] makes no scrupleto obey the laws of the earthlycity,wherebythe thingsnecessaryfor the maintenance f this mortal ife are administered;andthus,as this life is common o bothcities, so thereis a harmonybetweenthem nregard o whatbelongs o [thismortal ife](XIX. 17,pp.695-96).

Augustine's notion of peace is complex, but if we take it just inreference to the theme of commonwealth, I think it is clear that hemeant it to be more than simply "law and order," the policemen'speace. It does, however, include the suppression of civil commotionand riot; but if this were all, there would be no ultimate distinctionbetween a commonwealth and a regime. Rather what he points to isa "well-ordered concord" in which obedience follows from a rationalconception of permanent and mutual interests and not from fear andrepression. Augustine says, "The peace of all things is the tranquillityof order. Order is the distribution which allots things equal and un-equal, each to its own place" (XIX. 13, p.690). At the basis of theAugustinian commonwealth is "order," which requires a rough, prag-matic, but effective "distribution." The Augustinian minimum politicalagenda is Pax, ordo, lex, societas.23 Under his new definition of com-monwealth, the necessary condition for one to exist is "the tranquillityof order."How different, really, is this "tranquillity of order" fromCiceronian justice? Not very. What ultimately divides the two men,

23ErnestBarker, "Introduction"to J. Healey's translation of the City of God (Lon-don, Everyman, 1947)I, xxvii.


22/23

AUGUSTINE'S TWO CITIES 215after we make the true justice/image of justice distinction, is a fineline. Augustine's "tranquillity of order" can be achieved with a roughand ready justice (i.e., imperfect even by human standards). It does notrequire an "absolute justice," in Cicero's phrase. If Ciceronianjustice(strict fair dealing between men and between classes, giving to eachhis own) is an "image" of the "true justice," then Augustinian justice(the "order" requisite to tranquillity) is an image of this image. Thedegree to which Augustine has moved from Cicero is marked in thisproposition:the true test of any state is an appropriatetranquillity.This marks a difference, a relative devaluation of strict justice infavor of a lesser but more comprehensive good, civil peace. But it isnot a rejection of justice as a political category, as Carlyle seemed tothink, or of the need for some sort of rough justice; rather, it is aprudential appeal to the strictly necessary conditions for the continu-ing existence of the "republican"political style.24Augustine's point here is simply a factual one, as was Cicero's, butthey differ as to the facts. Cicero thought that a strict justice was re-quired for the existence of a people's state (res populi). Augustinebelieved that a less than strict or perfect justice, i.e., by human stan-dards, was required as a matter of fact. The "tranquillity of order"replaces "absolute" justice on the basic agenda for the commonwealthand this shift is reflected in the difference between Cicero's "defini-tion" of a republicand Augustine's own "more feasible" one.25Augustine's real break with Cicero came, not on the "definition"of the commonwealth (for they agree that it is a matter of popularconcurrence in res populi) nor on the empirical determination of itsnecessary conditions (for the difference here is only one of degree and

24Carlyleseemed to hold the view that Augustine, in effect, simply got rid of thenotion of justice as a political category: A. J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval PoliticalTheory in the West (New York, originally published in 1903) I, 170, 174. Carlyle re-garded this as quite momentous, out of line with literally centuries of earlier and subse-quent political thought (see 169, 221). At the same time Carlyle is bemused that "Aug-ustine seems to take the matter lightly" (166). And he was even led to conclude in an-other place that Augustine may not have "realized the enormous significance of whathe was saying," in F. J. C. Hearnshaw, ed., Social and Political Ideas of Some GreatMedieval Thinkers (London, 1923), 50. But I would suggest that all this represents toosimplistica readingof Augustine's text.

25Figgis,of course, recognizes the important role peace plays in Augustine's politi-cal thought but he does not see that what Augustine meant by peace (the "tranquillityoforder") is essentially continuous with Ciceronianjustice (62-64). Deane, on the otherhand, tends to equate Augustinian peace with what Augustine called the "image" ofjustice (125, 136). I do not think there is adequate textual warrant for Deane's treat-ment; moreover, it makes the difference between Augustine's definition and that ofCicero, admittedly more apparent than real, wholly inexplicable. I would suggest thatAugustine's "peace" and Cicero's "justice" do differ in name but that they point to thesame kindof thing;the only difference between them is one of degree.


23/23

216 REX MARTINof vocabulary), but on the question of the moral status of politics.Cicero, like the great classical political philosophers Plato and Aristo-tle, had idealized politics. Politics had as its end the highest humangood; the state was, in principle, morally adequate to men. Men couldrealize their true end in political association: in Aristotle's famousphrase, man is a "political animal." Cicero's emphasis on strict orabsolute justice was symptomatic of this basic evaluation just asAugustine's devaluation of justice as a political necessity was symp-tomatic of a different evaluation.The point is that Augustine rejected the classical idealization ofthe state; this is far more central than how he stood on Cicero's defini-tion. There is a gulf of radical discontinuity between Augustine andclassical politics. In this sense, Augustine can be said to have writtenan anti-politics. His program was to put the things of this world, eventhe best of states, under the things of the next, to commit oneselfwholly only to what is absolute, to idealize nothing. Christian politicalphilosophy, like the Christian himself, is a stranger here below; it canbe in the world but not of it. The good state, the "republic" withmeritorious common interests, can be pointed out, but the state isnot a church and the church should not become a state. The churchmust look beyond, to the heavenly republic. This is the basic truth ofthe Christian religion, as it must be the constant theme of Christianpolitical philosophy. This is, I think, the political theme of the City ofGod. It is the political meaning of the concept of the Two Cities.

University of Kansas.

Martin-Two Cities in Augustine's PP

Documents

Transcript of Martin-Two Cities in Augustine's PP