Marshall and Truman

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TRUMAN DOCTRNEAND MARSHALL PLANHISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY

EUROPE

MELEK BILGILI SAKARYA UNIVERSITY

TURKEY


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CONTENTS

1. ABSTRACT2. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND3. THE REASONS OF MARSHALL PLAN AND TRUMAN DOCTRNE4. PRELUDE TO THE MARSHAL PLAN5. CRISES IN GREECE AND TURKEY6. AIDS TO TURKEY AND GREECE7. MARSHALL PLAN RESULTS


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ABSTRACT

After World War the Second, European economy had collapsed. During the war, the

production sources had been used for gun machinery and people started to starve. The Soviet

Union, who had ended the war getting stronger, started to make pressure over Eastern

European Countries to spread communism. The only country which could stand againstSoviet Union was America. After United Kingdom had declared that, she wouldnt be able to

continue economic aid to Greece; The United States, decided to help Greece and Turkey in

order to stand against communism and Soviet Union.

Five months after the Truman Doctrines declaration, the United States decided a more

comprehensive aid plan called as Marshall Plan. The United States,sixteen

European countries and occupant countries representing Germany except Soviet Russia

met at Paris Conference and decided European Recovery Program.

In spite of a considerable opposing camp, the Marshall Plan had been voted on Congress andgot admission. This admission initiated the economic aid process between 1948-1952. First

reason that pushed United States for this help was, the Soviet Union threat. The second reason

was the economic ruins of Europe, and the probability of losing her biggest market. The

Marshall Plan, that was declared also due to Soviet Unions umcomprimising behaviour,

made United States predominant in Europe. United States, protected her export amount from

ecreasing, thanks to the Marshall Plan. At the same time, she had the European countries

economically bounded to her by interfering the Europen countries where to use the aid she

gave.

Turkey had get closer to the Western countries and United States, since she wanted to get rid

of her loneliness policy during the war. She thouht that the only way to solve her economical

problems was to get aid. Even the success of the government was measured according to the

amunt of aid.

Turkey wasnt icluded in the Marshall Plan due to either her exchange and gold reserves or

the reason that she hadnt enter the war. Turkey had been included in the plan after very long

bureaucratic efforts but she would have to expect being the grain ambar for Europe and give

up heavy industry. Turkey had always been one of the countries, who got the least amount of

aid. Also she couldnt have used the aid properly or made long term plans. She usually had

used the aid to close the budgetary deficit for saving the day. As United States canalizedTurkey to the agriculture Turkey couldnt develop her industry. The loans had increased

becouse she used big amunts of outer credits and the import amount was always bigger than

the export amount.

As conclusion, The Marshall Plan helped United States to get stronger and more efficient in

World policy. Europe developed in a short time. But Turkey became junior America. She

couldnt use the aid properly and she never got what she expected. She paid for her mistake

that she never tried to solve her problems on her own.


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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

December 7, 1941 is remembered as the day Japan "awakened a sleeping giant." However,

America was never fully awakened until the latter years of the Second World War and the

post-war period, when it finally began to accept its international responsibilities as the leaderof the free world. During this time, American leaders and citizens alike began to understand

the necessity for the U.S. to play a more active role in world affairs and abandon its

longstanding policy of isolationism. They also realized that a healthy European and global

economy was essential to U.S. prosperity, as was the promotion, growth and survival of free

institutions. Thus the period 1944-1951 was one of the most important and decisive in U.S.

and indeed world history.

The Marshall Plan played a key role in this historic era of American foreign policy by

helping reconstruct and integrate Western Europe. It also bolstered the U.S. economy andcreated the framework for a political and military alliance that not only contained the spread

of communism but has also produced over forty years of peace on that continent. Thus the

Marshall Plan unquestionably played a central role in furthering U.S. post World War II

interests in Europe. In fact, by integrating Western Europe economically, politically and

militarily, this magnificent and enormously successful foreign policy initiative is still serving

America's interests today.

After the World War II., the world system which was become double polarized has

prepaired cold war. At this new system repulsiveness of Soviets and attractiveness of America

have determined the pole which Turkey would be situated in. Turkey became a member of

doctrine, plan and ideological organizations of this war.

America, who was disturbed because Soviets were following an antropology diffusionist

attitude, with the aim of encircling Soviets firstly performed The Military Aid Agreement

(Truman Doctrine) which included military aid to The Turkey and Greece. With the help of

Truman Doctrine, Turkey abandoned the impartiality politics which carried out from the times

being a republic.

After Truman Doctrine, America put into force the Europe Economic CooperationAgreement military, political, economic and cultural characteristics had more extensive aims

and aimed developing the ruined Europe. As a member of Truman Doctrine and Marshall

Plan, Turkey experienced economically, politically, militarily and culturally changes whose

results are reached nowadays. Marshall Aids started a process for Turkey. f we consider that

today is shaped with these past relations we can understand the importance of Marshall Aids

very much.


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THE REASONS OF MARSHALL PLAN AND TRUMAN DOCTRNE

Europe and Powers Balance after the Second World War

Almost all countries had felt on a large scale difficulties and demolitions after WW II.

Unfortunately, an atmosphere of peace had not been occurred as requested. The world hasentered into period that called the cold war by being worry about that will start the third world

war.

While the Marshall proposal for aid by the United States toward European recovery is often

called a corollary of the Truman Doctrine, they differ essentially in their aims. While both are

directed against the expansion of Soviet Russia the Truman Doctrine looks to military aid to

Greece and Turkey, and the outcome is unknown. The Marshall proposal, on the other hand,

looks purely to economic aid for the countries of Western Europe and professes to disregard

political considerations. The so-called Truman Doctrine is often called an extension of the

Mon- roe Doctrine. But this is surely an error. The Monroe Doctrine was limitedgeographically to this continent. It announced that American arms would protect the

Continent against any effort of Europe to extend its system across the Atlantic. Several efforts

at European intervention were made during the nineteenth century, efforts which always

failed.

The Truman Doctrine has no geographical limits and promises American intervention in

places where the United States has little or no interest. One of the major premises of the

Monroe Doctrine was the traditional American policy of not intervening in European feuds.

The bottom has, therefore, been taken out of the Monroe Doctrine by American intervention

abroad, so that the United States has now little moral claim to ask Europe to refrain from

extending its political philosophy to this continent. Moreover the Truman Doctrine is not a

self-denying ordinance but a promise to use American dollars, if not more, to stop

Communism. Apart from the fact that Soviet Russia exemplifies not Communism but

National Socialism the Communist Utopia not having yet arrived-it remains to be proved that

dollars can stem the advance of a doctrine which finds its major source and soil in poverty and

misery. President Truman recently announced, in describing the Potsdam Declaration that

chaos had been brought to Germany by the Nazi Party.' Regardless of the accuracy of his

ascription, the fact is that -chaos prevails in most of Europe and that American money, which

European peoples naturally are delighted to spend, can hardly shore up countries thatsurrender to the- inevitable. It shows how fantastic was the half-truth of the idea of "One

World." As Senator Root said to Senator Bacon of Georgia in a famous debate on Mexico,

many ideas, like world government, are logical, but not practical.

One of the primary interests of the founders of this country, who are entitled to be heard in

such a dilemma as now confronts the United States, is that European ideology must not be

imported into this heterogeneous population. The founders' warning was prophetic. The major

opposition to the Italian Treaty comes from Italian-American societies who resent the fate

meted out Italy. In that- opposition they have a good ground for protest, but it seems pitiful to

transfer European problems to this soil in the alleged interests of an unachievable Utopia.


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The Marshall Proposal; The so-called Marshall Plan is no plan at all but merely undertakes

to finance some plan satisfactory to Secretary Marshall and the United States Congress if the

European countries can come to agreement. Russia and her satellites have already declined

American aid and profess to see in it danger to the aided. They promise to defeat the proposal.

If we should advance any money to Europe in addition to the twenty billions alreadydevoted to relief and other purposes it will show that the United States is the only country

really paying reparations in addition to what Russia has looted out of Germany and Austria

and her satellites, mostly private property. It may be questioned why the United States should

pay reparations, but it is a result of failing to think about what will happen after a war. The

psychology of merely defeating the enemy is manifestly inadequate. Yet the mores of war

forbid thought beyond this point. First we spend billions, not, it is true, with a view to

destroying Europe but having that effect. Now we are to spend new billions to restore Europe

with the promise that it will be interpreted as American imperialism. It may also have that

result, since Secretary Marshall promises to supervise the expenditure of any funds whichCongress may advance. But that is not the initial intention. The Russians are wrong in

charging that it positively will have that result. We can accept Secretary Marshall's statement

that he, at least, has no such intention. He may, however, find himself in the position of the

British in Egypt after 1882'; then the United States, already a Balkan power, will become an

imperialist power. It is simply too early to forecast all future developments.

The chances are not weak that the reparations of Italy and other countries payable to Russia

and her satellites may be siphoned off from American loans to Italy and other reparation

paying countries.

The Marshall Plan seems particularly to lack consideration because no one can tell what it

may cost the United States. We have seen figures mentioned of three billions for three years,

five billions for four years, and seven billions for ten years. The President states that we have

already contributed twenty billions to Europe since the end of hostilities in 1945. Europe is

now based on the unsound political plan of Potsdam, and no amount of American money can

change that fact. So long as that basis stands any American money raised, as it must be on

credit, will be the sheerest palliative and can serve no purpose of recovery. There are other

dilemmas that must be faced. Europe's condition is not only due to the unfortunate features of

the Potsdam agreement, of which Russia seems to have taken full advantage, but Eastern

Europe has also been separated from the West to a considerable extent by the so-called Iron

Curtain. Eastern Europe normally exports foodstuffs and raw materials, as does Russia, but

they are not getting in exchange industrial goods from the West, goods which they badly

need. Although Russia hurries to make agreements with her satellites, they can hardly make

good the deficiency. Eastern Europe, therefore, seems likely to suffer an industrial famine,

although the Marshall proposal does not contemplate a termination of the bilateral treaties

made between Eastern countries and the West.

The Marshall proposal seems more likely to finance state socialism, although the word

"recovery" is frequently employed. At this writing (September, 1947), it is unsafe to predict


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developments, but since Russia and her satellites have declared war on the plan, the financing

of Western Europe might turn into a military measure, leaving recovery an un- achieved aim.

We now learn that France objects to increasing the German output, though the joint chiefs-

of-staff have already issued a directive to that effect. Great Britain is also said to protest

against part of the program. Perhaps this is the most significant event of recent years, since itthrows light on the origins of the war in 1914, however justified the protest. If Europe is not

to be allowed full production, it seems idle to throw American money into the breach. The

plan is stymied at the source.

The countries which possess the fifteen million dollars of gold and foreign exchange that the

National City Bank reports are not the countries with which the bulk of American trade is

done. But some exchange is possessed by those countries.

Should Secretary Marshall insist first on their spending their assets on American goods

before receiving American bounty? Or will they say, as a British cabinet minister threatenedthe other day, that default in certain loans will follow or that the United States in its own

interest must finance exports up to eight billions a year-the difference between exports and

imports-since other- wise unemployment will result in the United States?

There are thus many obstacles which the Marshall proposal must over- come. Will the

proposal founder on one or more of these obstacles? Only the future can give an answer.

PRELUDE TO THE MARSHAL PLANand TRUMAN DOCTRNE

It should be noted that while the Marshall Plan deserves much of the credit for

reconstructing and integrating Western Europe as well as helping America fulfill its

leadership role in world affairs, these processes had actually begun during the war. For

example, in July 1944, the U.S. took the lead in

making arrangements for the post-war world by hosting and orchestrating the celebrated

nation Breton Woods Conference in Breton Woods, New Hampshire. At this meeting

(officially known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference), the U.S. and

other nations discussed post-war reconstruction needs and subsequently created the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the international Bank for Reconstruction and

development (commonly known as the World Bank). Like the Marshall Plan, these

institutions not only helped make capital available to rebuild Europe but, ultimately, built the

framework for free trade and lasting economic partnerships.

At the end of World War II, the European economy was shattered. Its industrial base and

cities were largely reduced to ashes and rubble. Financial institutions were decimated and

cash reserves were all but depleted. Unemployment was alarmingly high and there was a

severe shortage of both food and housing. In other words, the basic fabric of Europe's

economy was falling apart. These chaotic conditions caused tremendous anxiety not only inEurope but also in the United States which had been Europe's best trading partner before the


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war. Thus many Americans feared the economic collapse of Europe would also result in the

economic collapse of the U.S. However, despite this anxiety and the widespread devastation,

U.S. policymakers believed the recovery would be fairly rapid because of the cooperation it

expected from alliances that helped bring the war to a conclusion.

The seeds of optimism about Europe's future had been planted at Yalta and Potsdam, where

Roosevelt and Truman believed amicable relations had been established.At Yalta, Roosevelt

had high hopes of big power cooperation and thought it laid the foundation for a stable world

order. Truman, like Roosevelt, hoped the Potsdam agreements would help solve the economic

and political problems of Europe in accordance with democratic principles.

Stalin reinforced the allied good will at these historic meetings by making concessions on a

number of vital issues and promising good will for the future." Thus President Truman's

immediate post-war goals were to maintain the peace, restore Europe's economy, re-establish

and revitalize U.S. economic ties, prevent territorial changes and expansion, and allowdefeated enemy states to establish peaceful, democratic overnments. However, the post-Yalta

record showed it meant different things to its Anglo-American and Russian articipants. As

Stalin had written in 1944, the existence of the Soviet Republic side-by-side with imperialist

states is unthinkable... one or the other must triumph in the end.

If we look to situation of Turkey and Truman Doctrine, after the Second World War, Turkey

exposed two main economic problems. Difficulties that because of reducing the exported

products, which had been increased during the war, are one of them. The second problem is

effort is order to open the new working area and improve industry while keeping the armiesover war.

Actually, U.S.s the main reason of the inserting Turkey to aid program is problems that can

occur because of Soviet controls. According to notification, the reasons of aid to Turkey had

gathered in two categories. Firstly, Turkeys encouragement to Soviet presses and improving

of Turkeys army for prevent from possible Soviet attacks.

Truman decided to aid 400 million $ to Turkey and Greece. And he also ensured to train

civil and military staffs of both countries at U.S. (12 April 1947) But Truman paid attention

to Greece more than Turkey.

On 12 March 1947, President Truman spoke to Congress. His speech is very

famous. What he said became known later as the Truman Doctrine.

Truman began by outlining the situation in Greece. Assistance is imperative if Greece is

to survive as a free nation, he told Congress. Greece must have assistance if it is to become

a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. Without help, Greece would fall to

Communism. Nearby Turkey, he added, was in a similar situation.


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The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the

majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections,

and the suppression of personal freedoms.

In such a world, he told Congress, America was OBLIGED to get involved:

Ibelieve that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are

resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is

essential to economic stability and orderly political processes

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world -- and we shall surely

endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.

I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

CRISES IN GREECE AND TURKEY

The Soviets attempted to establish a foothold in Greece and Turkey by exploiting their loss

of military and financial aid from Great Britain. In Greece, a communist guerrilla movement

threatened to topple the conservative government which had been elected after the war. This

guerrilla threat came from both inside and outside Greece's borders. However, the most severe

threat came from a team of communist guerrillas that kept pouring over Greece's northern

border terrorizing towns, the countryside and threatening to build up to a full strength attack

force.

Turkey also became a target of Soviet expansionism after the Second World War, when the

Soviets demanded certain Turkish territory be transferred to its control. Additionally, the

Kremlin also tried to force Turkey to sign a treaty of cooperation and security similar to those

it had with Eastern

European nations. Prior to 1947, British assistance enabled both Turkey and Greece to resist

severe Soviet pressure. But without this help, the situation was utterly precarious and their

eventual collapse was inevitable.

The situation in Greece and Turkey was of particular concern, because their loss would havea profound impact on other European nations struggling to survive and recover from the war.


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The U.S. was also concerned about the potential loss of these nations because "they controlled

the access to sea trade to the Middle East and were close to important oil resources on which

Anglo-American interests depended. President Truman wanted to retain access to these vital

resources and keep them out of the Soviet sphere of influence.Hence the spectre of growing

communism did not simply outrage American humanitarianism but, more importantly, it

seriously threatened U.S. national interests in the largest sense. Consequently, it became

apparent that the crises in Greece and Turkey were indications of a much wider, impending

catastrophe that also had dire implications for all of Europe and for theU.S.

Therefore, Truman and other American leaders realized America's security and prosperity

were directly affected by events in Greece and Turkey, and spread of communism, and the

possible denial of U.S. access to world markets.

The situation in Greece and Turkey caused American leaders to reassess Soviet foreign

policy as well as their own. They realized that peace, freedom and world trade wereinseparable. Additionally, they recognized that economic stability went hand-in-hand with

political stability. This fact was especially worrisome since the political situation in Europe

was a mirror image of the grim economic conditions. There was no question that U.S.

prosperity was inextricably tied to Europe's economy. President Truman and others realized

that without economic assistance Europe would be unable to defend itself and thus would be

lost and World War III would be inevitable.

He also realized that an economically vibrant Western Europe would not only help stop the

spread of communism but could also pay large, long-term dividends to the U.S. economy.Additionally, access to European markets and raw materials were necessary for the

development of atomic energy. Therefore, America's new strategy would necessarily have to

focus on the economic reconstruction of Europe in a manner that produced not only economic

recovery and integration but political and military partnerships as well.

AIDS TO TURKEY AND GREECE

W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was one of the first administration

officials to propose America attempt to solve its problems with the Soviets by using its

economic power. He suggested the U.S. use its economic resources to assist those countriesthat were naturally friendly to our concepts. Harriman's position was a realization that U.S.

security had become directly dependent on the creation and maintenance of partnerships that

insured its economic well-being as well as resisted communist expansionism.

President Truman agreed with his Soviet Ambassador and others who advocated this

approach. Thus he embarked his administration on an effort to develop a strategy and policy

that would ameliorate the catastrophes in Greece and Turkey and expedite the recovery of

Europe. Therefore, U.S. objectives in

Europe was to restore Europe, re-establish economic ties, contain Soviet expansionism, andcreate a defensive security alliance.


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Truman Doctrine; President Truman first proclaimed his doctrine and the policy of

containment in March 1947, when he requested military and economic aid to help Greece and

Turkey defeat communist encroachments. In an emotional speech before Congress, Truman

stated that a number of countries had totalitarian regimes forced upon them and that such

action undermined international peace and hence the security of the United States. He

declared that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are

resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. Truman also pointed out

that the consequences of failing to provide aid would be far reaching to the West and to the

East. He concluded by saying that U.S.assistance "should be primarily through economic and

financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. President

Truman's request for aid received overwhelming bipartisan support from Congress, which

shared his fears and mistrust of the Soviets. Thus American began what Kennan described as

a "long-term patient but firm policy of containment.

Marshalls proposal; Shortly after Congress approved aid for Greece and Turkey, SecretaryMarshall made his famous speech at Harvard University in June 1947 in which he proposed a

much larger comprehensive program be undertaken to restore Europe's economy. In his

speech, Marshall described the bleak situation in Europe and its potential long-term

consequences for America. Thus his proposal rested squarely on the American conviction that

Europe's economic recovery was essential to U.S. security and prosperity.

Marshall's plan called for a program of massive aid to revive Europe's economy and create

conditions in which free institutions can exist." 2 He emphasized that substantial help would

be needed and that "the initiative for such a program had to "come from within Europe.Inother words, it could only succeed with Europe's full participation. The Marshall Plan was

more than just a reaction to a particular crisis. It reflected more than just a desire to alleviate

distress. It was recognition that these goals could no longer be pursued in isolation. Thus the

Marshall Plan had a much broader objective...based on the proposition that its success would

require close cooperation among aid recipients and, more importantly, that Western Europe's

economic as well as political strength would ultimately lead to European unity and a coalition

security alliance.

MARSHALL PLAN RESULTSEconomic Results

By 1951, support for the Marshall Plan began to decline as both Europe and America shifted

their attention to events in Korea and began focusing more on security matters. When it

officially ended in December 1951, the ERP had distributed over $12 billion in aid, mostly in

the form of grants to OEEC members. This amount represented approximately 1.2 percent of

the total U.S. gross national product (GNP) for calendar years 1948-1951. Contrary to popular

opinion, through the counterpart fund program, Europe bore the brunt of the financial burden

by providing seventy-five percent of the aid (the other twenty-five percent coming from the

U.S.).


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amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000

which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and

suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In this way, the Truman Doctrine led directly to the Marshall Plan the plan to contain

communism by helping the economies of Europe to get going againwhich was ratified byCongress in 1948.

In his speech, also, to convince the Congress that it was essential to confront the Soviets,

Truman introduced an idea which had been explained to him a fortnight earlier by

Undersecretary Dean Achesonthat if America let one country fall to Communism, all the

countries roundabout would follow like a line of dominoes. This idea later became known as

the domino theory, and it was later to inspire the American interventions in Korean and

Vietnam:

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greeknation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the

control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbour, Turkey, would be immediate and

serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound

effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to

maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against

overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse offree institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the

world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples

striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to

the West as well as to the East.

Another result of the Truman Doctrine was that (by sending military aid to friendly

nations) it set a precedent for the principle of collective security building up a network of

allies and friendly states to which the US gave military aid free of charge (this became knownas the Military Assistance Program). Ultimately, it was to lead to NATO.

In America, Trumans presentation of the global threat of Communism whipped up ananti-

Communist hysteria which was to end in the Red Scare of the 1950s. In Russia, the

rhetoric of Trumans speech convinced the Soviets that America was indeed a threat to Soviet

Communism, and it substantially enflamed the Cold War.


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CONCLUSION

Unquestionably, the Marshall Plan played a pivotal and central role in helping the U.S.

achieve its post World War II objectives in Europe. It did so by rehabilitating Western

Europe's economy and producing the political stability necessary to both resist and contain

communist subversion and

aggression. Thus it is clear that the designers of the Marshall Plan understood not only its

short-term economic significance but, more importantly, its long-term political and military

implications as well.

The Marshall Plan was a "key element" in America's goal for a stabilized Europe and

launched the U.S. into an era of unprecedented partnership and cooperation with its (Western

Europe) allies. It also led to the creation of institutions such as the Common Market,

European Economic Council and Organization for Economic Development that are the pillars

of the free world's economy.

Marshall's European Recovery Program also laid the groundwork for the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization a collective security mechanism that has furthered U.S. interests through

a coalition of forward deployed forces. This alliance is one of the longest and most successful

in history. The Marshall Plan began as an economic initiative but evolved into a larger more

comprehensive program. It combined reconstruction with the building of an economic,

political and military alliance. Thus it demonstrated the linkage between prosperity and

political stability and is a superb example of enlightened diplomacy.

In conclusion, the Marshall Plan was a phenomenal foreign policy success that was brilliant

in its design, sophisticated in its execution and far-reaching in its effects. America's interests

were indeed well served by the Marshall Plan and the forty years of peace, prosperity and

political stability it helped bring about in Europe.

Marshall and Truman

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