Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9005             June 20, 1958

ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA, petitioners, vs.FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.

Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for petitioners.Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.

BENGZON, J.:

Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of the validity of the marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.

It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea became seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra1 visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis,2 Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.

After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.

On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.

Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal question-which they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief — whether the events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and binding marriage.

According to the Court of Appeals:

There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo Bautista, solemnized the marriage in articulo mortis of Defendant Apelan Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on January 29 and 30, 1945, under the circumstances set forth in the reverend's testimony in court. Fr. Bautista, a respectable old priest of Pasay City then, had no reason to side one or the

other. . . . Notwithstanding this positive evidence on the celebration or performance of the marriage in question, Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the same was not in articulo mortis, because Matea de la Cruz was not then on the point of death. Fr. Bautista clearly testified, however, that her condition at the time was bad; she was bed-ridden; and according to his observation, she might die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so apprehensive was he about her condition that he decided in administering to her the sacrament of extreme unction, after hearing her confession. . . . .The greatest objection of the Appellees and the trial court against the validity of the marriage under consideration, is the admitted fact that it was not registered.

The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.

There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife."

The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:

(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the witnesses and the priest, as required by section 3 of the Marriage Law; and

(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the local civil registry.

The factual basis of the first proposition — no signing — may seriously be doubted. The Court of Appeals made no finding thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held such marriage contract to have been executed, since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis was a fact", and the only question at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send copies of the certificate of marriage in question  to the Local Civil Registrar and to register the said marriage in the Record of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the said marriage invalid." And such was the only issue tendered in the court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record on Appeal.)

However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause for nullity?

Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage Law which provides:

Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. . . . (Emphasis ours).

In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.

In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two

witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife" — which in this case actually occurred.3 We think the signing of the marriage contract or certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing the act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an essential requisite — not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we believe it is. The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite another.

Certificate and Record. — Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriage usually provide for the issuance of a certificate of marriage and for the registration or recording of marriage . . . Generally speaking, the registration or recording of a marriage is not essential to its validity, the statute being addressed to the officials issuing the license, certifying the marriage, and making the proper return and registration or recording. (Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" p. 197-198.)

Formal Requisites. — . . . The general rule, however, is that statutes which direct that a license must be issued and procured, that only certain persons shall perform the ceremony, that a certain number of witnesses shall be present, that a certificate of the marriage shall be signed, returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed to persons in authority to secure publicity and to require a record to be made of the marriage contract. Such statutes do not void common-law marriages unless they do so expressly, even where such marriage are entered into without obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is the purpose of these statutes  to discourage deception and seduction, prevent illicit intercourse under the guise of matrimony, and relieve from doubt the status of parties who live together as man and wife, by providing competent evidence of the marriage. . . . (Section 15 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp. 188-189.) Emphasis Ours. (See also Corpus Juris Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)

And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several formal requirements of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)

In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41) implies his obligation to see  that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and its environs.

Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit required by sections 20 and 21. It was the priest's obligation; non-compliance with it, should bring no serious consequences to the married pair, specially where as in this case, it was caused by the emergency.

The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the requisites. (Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.

The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the issuance of a marriage license. The first practically substitutes  the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613),5 this marriage should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.

In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and women who have lived publicly in a state of concubinage6, (section 22), we must hold this marriage to be valid.

The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased than the plaintiffs who are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children of the former, . . . the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.)

Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1 Now a nun at Sta. Escolastica College.

2 In his presence, Matea and Felipe expressed mutual consent to be thenceforward husband and wife.

3 p. 49 Record on Appeal.

4 And to prevent fraud, as petitioners contend, p. 30 brief. See Corpuz Juris Secundum, Vol. 55 p. 899.

5 Because it is a formal requisite" (Section 7 as amended. See American Jurisprudence, supra. However, the New Civil Code seemingly rules otherwise. (Art. 80 (3) ).

6 Section 22 Act 3613; Article 76 New Civil Code.

Lack of affidavit and non-registration of the marriage; and non-signing of the marriage contract

ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA, petitioners, vs. FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent

G.R. No. L-9005June 20, 1958BENGZON, J.:

Facts

Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. Matea became seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter ratified the union the two. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis, Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945. After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness but died in January 1946. On May 12, 1952, Arsenio and Ricarda de Loria, grandchildren of Matea’s sister filed a complaint to complthe delivery of the property left the deceased however, Felipe resisted the action setting up his rights as widower. The CFI ruled in favor of the complainants but the CA reversed and dismissed the complaint. They appealed before this Court. The appellants contend that the marriage is invalid because, first, there was no marriage contract signed as required by Sec. 3 of the Marriage Law; and second, the priest did file an affidavit with the Local Civil Registry.

Issue

Whether or not the marriage is valid

Held

The marriage is valid. On the ground of lack of affidavit and non-registration of marriage, the celebration of the marriage in articulo mortis, where all requisites for the validity were present, the marriage is not voided by the failure of the priest to make and file the affidavit required in Sec. 20 and 21 of the Marriage Law and to register said marriage in the Local Civil Registry.

The signing of the marriage contract is a formal requirement for evidentiary value, the omission of which does not render the marriage a nullity. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

G.R. No. L-5877 September 28, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant.

Nestor A. Andrada for appellant.Office of the Soalicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for appellee.

PARAS, C.J.:

The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding him guilty of the crime of bigamy and sentencing him to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, with costs.

The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.

The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.

The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is not controlling. Said case is essentially different, because the defendant therein, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without merit.

In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:

Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.

This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.1âwphïl.nêt

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.

Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved".

Though the logical may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. As Viada says "La santidad e importancia del matrinonio no permite que los casados juzguen por si mismos de su nulidad; esta ha de someterse precisamente al judicio del Tribunal competente, y cuando este declare la nulidad del matrimonio, y solo entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no exista esta declaracion, la presuncion esta siempre a favor de la validez del matrimonio, y de consiguente, el que contrae otro segundo antes de dicha declaracion de nulidad, no puede menos de incurrir la pena de este articulo."(3 Viada, Codigo penal p. 275.)

"This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs. Jose Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz., 3145, "and is in line with the well-known rule established in cases of adultery, that "until by competent authority in a final judgment the marriage contract is set aside, the offense to the vows taken and the attack on the family exist."

Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

Bigamous Marriage--THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant.G.R. No. L-5877

September 28, 1954PARAS, C.J.:

Facts

On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.

The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited. The cited case was essentially different therefore the decision invoked by the Solicitor General is not controlling.

Issue

Whether or not there is a need for a judicial annulment of a bigamous marriage

Ruling

In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:

Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.

This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-49084 October 10, 1985

MATILDE ALAVADO in her own right and as natural guardian of IDA VILMA, IMELDA AND ROLANDO, all surnamed ALAVADO petitioner, vs.CITY GOVERNMENT OF TACLOBAN (ENGINEER'S OFFICE AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, now the LABOR APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF), respondents.

Bonifacio L. Ramo for petitioner.

Francisco C. Pedrosa for respondent City Government.

Ernesto H. Cruz and Emilia Andres for respondent labor.

 

CUEVAS, J.:

Assailed in the instant petition is the decision 1 dated November 29, 1975 of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission which dismissed petitioner's death benefits claim for the death of her husband, Ricardo Alavado, a former employee of the City Engineer's Office in Tacloban City.

The evidence on record discloses that the late Ricardo A. Alavado was employed as a carpenter-foreman by the City Engineer's Office, Tacloban City with a daily wage of P13.12. His last day of service was on April 19, 1974 since he was on leave from April 23, 1974 to May 23, 1974. On August 6, 1974 when he reported for work, he was no longer under the supervision of respondent city. He suffered severe headache when he was supervising laborers on a construction project in Tolosa, Leyte. He died the following day of CVA-Cerebral Hemorrhage.

Petitioner, the surviving spouse, filed a claim for death benefits in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children. Respondent city filed a notice of controversion of the claimant's right to compensation on December 10, 1974. On March 31, 1975, the hearing officer of Regional Office No. 9 in 'Tacloban City issued an award granting petitioner the sum of P5,200.00 as death benefits and P200.00 as reimbursement of burial expenses.

Respondent city appealed. On November 29, 1975, a decision was rendered by the Commission dismissing petitioner's death benefits claim, holding that—

xxx xxx xxx

While it is true that the deceased has suffered from the ailment which resulted in his death while he wall the performance of his work as a Carpenter Foreman this case must be denied on tile ground of lack of filiation between the herein claimant and the deceased. It is a settled rule that the status of dependency of a spouse arises from the fact that a marriage exists. A showing of marital status is essential. In this case the herein claimant Matilde Alvarado presented a marriage certificate issued by the Sto. Nino Parish of Tacloban City as proof of her marriage to t he deceased. This certification is not an authentic proof of marital status. To prove filiation as a spouse and, therefore claim as a dependent 'within the meaning of the Act, the suviving spouse-claimant must show either the original of the marriage contract or the marriage certificate duly issued by the local Civil Registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. In the absence thereof, as when the records are destroyed or not available due to fire or other causes, secondary evidence may be presented consisting of an affidavit of the claimant and at least three witnesses to the marriage cohabitation. As to the filiation of the children the same is establish by the presentation of the birth certificate. In this case only the baptismal certificates of all the children were presented in evidence by the claimant. A baptismal certificate is not sufficient because it merely proves the fact that originated its execution, and the date of the same, namely the administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date specified. It is not an authentic proof as to the statements made therein respecting the kinsfolk of the person baptized and the presentation of such baptismal certificate does not prove filiation for the purpose of establishing the status of dependency.

Dissatisfied with respondent Commission's decision, claimant spouse filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

I

May a marriage certificate attesting to the fact that claimant and deceased were in fact married be considered satisfactory proof of marital status in the absence of any evidence to the contrary? and

II

Whether or not the respondent commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the matter.

The petition is impressed with merit. Its grant is therefore in order. While admitting the compensability of the claim, respondent Commission nevertheless dismissed the same due to the alleged failure of petitioner claimant to prove that she was legally married to the deceased. In making the said pronouncement, respondent Commission relied solely on the absence of a copy, or a certified copy of petitioner's marriage contract with the deceased Alavado. What was submitted by her is a mere copy issued by the church authorities where the questioned marriage was solemnized. 2 The said document shows that petitioner claimant and the deceased were married on August 9, 1939. Since then, they lived together as man and wife continuously for a period of 35 years in their conjugal abode up to the time of Alavado's death.

Section 5(bb) of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Disputable Presumptions.—The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Courts look upon this presumption with great favor and it could not be lightly repelled. It may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary or by evidence of a higher than ordinary quality. The rationale behind this presumption could be found in the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 3 which runs this wise—

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties qwere not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper — praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.

So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact. 4

Likewise, the declaration of the husband is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage. Similarly a witness who was present at the time the marriage was solemnized, is a competent witness to establish the existence of said marriage. 5 Indeed, public and open cohabitation as husband and wife, birth and baptismal certificates of children born unto them after the celebration of the questioned marriage, and a statement of such marriage in subsequent document were held to be competent evidence as proof of said marriage . 6

A review of the records of this case failed to disclose any evidence whatsoever which will overthrow the aforementioned presumption in favor of claimant's marriage to the deceased Alavado. But what wrote finish to this issue-legality of the claimant's marriage to the deceased is the marriage certificate submitted later by the claimant.7 In the said document. the contracting parties appeared to be Ricardo Alavado and Matilde Valdesco The marriage was solemnized on August 19, 1939 by Fr. Ignacio Mora, priest of Tacloban, Leyte. It is certified to be a true copy of the original issued by the local Civil Registrar of the City of Tacloban. The said document indubitably establishes claimant marriage to the deceased Alavado,

In the answer filed by City Fiscal Pedroza for respondent City, he averred that Alavado was on longer an employee of respondent city government at the time of his death, hence the city is not liable to pay compensation benefits.

We find respondent city's contention untenable. Such a defense should have been raised before the Commission within the period prescribed by the Workmen's Compensation Act 8 within fourteen (14) days from death or within ten (10) days from knowledge thereof. Having failed to controvert the said claim within the prescribed reglementary period, its compensability is now beyond challenge. Respondent city's failure to controvert the claim within the aforesaid period is a waiver of its right to do so. 9

The Workmen's Compensation Act, being a social legislation, aimed at protecting the rights of the workingmen in consonance with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution, its provision must be interpreted liberally in favor of laborers or workers. This basic mandate should guide all tribunals and agencies in the resolution of cases of this nature more specially those involving poor claimants who have come to court as pauper litigants.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 29, 1979 of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. The award of the Hearing Officer of Regional Office No. 9 of Tacloban City is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, C.J., Concepcio, Jr., Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., in the result.

Aquino J., took no part.

Melencio Herrera is on leave.

 

Footnotes

1 Decision in WCC Case -No. R09-14107, Matilde Alavado, claimant vs. City Government of Tacloban (City Engineer's Office), respondent.

2 Page 28, Rollo.

3 43 Phil. 43. 56.

4 US vs. Villafuerte, 4 Phil. 476: People vs Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106: Labuca vs NCC -17 SCRA 331; Perido vs Perido, 63 SCRA 97.

5 US Memoracion et al., 34 Phil. 63.

6 Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849.

7 Page 28. Rollo.

8 Act No, 3428.

9 Security Service Unlimited, Inc. vs. WCC, 29 SCRA 274; La Mallorea vs. WCC. 30 SCRA 691; Blanco vs. WCC, 29 SCRA 12; Fuentes vs. Dinamira, 2 SCRA 1133.

Presumption of Marriage --

MATILDE ALAVADO in her own right and as natural guardian of IDA VILMA, IMELDA AND ROLANDO, all surnamed ALAVADO petitioner, 

vs.CITY GOVERNMENT OF TACLOBAN (ENGINEER'S OFFICE AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

COMMISSION, now the LABOR APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF), respondentsG.R. No. L-49084October 10, 1985

CUEVAS, J.:Facts

Late Ricardo A. Alavado was employed as a carpenter-foreman by the City Engineer's Office, Tacloban City with a daily wage of P13.12. His last day of service was on April 19, 1974 since he was on leave from April 23, 1974 to May 23, 1974. On August 6, 1974 when he reported for work, he was no longer under the supervision of respondent city. He suffered severe headache when he was supervising laborers on a construction project in Tolosa, Leyte. He died the following day of CVA-Cerebral Hemorrhage.

The surviving spouse, filed a claim for death benefits in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children. Respondent city filed a notice of controversion of the claimant's right to compensation however, on March 31, 1975, the hearing officer of Regional Office in Tacloban City issued an award granting petitioner the sum of P5,200.00 as death benefits and P200.00 as reimbursement of burial expenses.

Respondent city appealed. On November 29, 1975, a decision was rendered by the Commission dismissing petitioner's death benefits claim on the ground of lack of filiation between the claimant and the deceased. The Commission held that the marriage certificate from the Parish where the claimant’s marriage was solemnized is not a valid proof. It should be the original marriage contract or marriage certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar. The baptismal certificates of their children which was presented by the claimant, according to the commission was not a valid proof of filiation.

Issue Whether or not a marriage certificate attesting to the fact that claimant and deceased were in fact

married is considered satisfactory proof of marital status in the absence of any evidence to the contrary

RulingSection 5(bb) of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court provides for the disputable presumptions which

states that such presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. It includes “That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.”

Courts look upon this presumption with great favor and it could not be lightly repelled. It may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary or by evidence of a higher than ordinary quality. The rationale behind this presumption could be found in the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, which runs this wise --- The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper — praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.

Likewise, the declaration of the husband is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage. Similarly a witness who was present at the time the marriage was solemnized, is a competent witness to

establish the existence of said marriage. Indeed, public and open cohabitation as husband and wife, birth and baptismal certificates of children born unto them after the celebration of the questioned marriage, and a statement of such marriage in subsequent document were held to be competent evidence as proof of said marriage. Therefore, the decision dated November 29, 1979 is set aside and the award of the earing Office of Tacloban City is reinstated. 

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118904.  April 20, 1998]

ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be proven?

The Case

This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari   challenging the Court of Appeals[1] Decision promulgated on December 1, 1994[2] and Resolution promulgated on February 8, 1995[3] in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed petitioner’s action for partition and damages.

On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint[4] for partition and damages against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I.[5] On October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not substituted as a party.[6]

On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision [7] in favor of the petitioner, in which it ruled:[8]

“Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of this case.  Although the plaintiff had testified that he had been receiving [his] share from said land before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as to what year he stopped receiving his share and for how much.  This court therefore cannot rule on that.”

In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in.  The assailed Decision disposed:[9]

“WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES  the appealed decision.

In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES  the [petitioner’s] complaint and the counterclaim thereto.

Without costs.”

Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads:[10]

“The Court DENIES defendants-appellants’ motion for reconsideration, dated December 15, 1994, for lack of merit.  There are no new or substantial matters raised in the motion that merit the modification of the decision.”

Hence, this petition.[11]

The Facts

The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows:[12]

“On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land.  Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix.  In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.

In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.  Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff’s birth.  Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.

Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix.  When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.

Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.

Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23).  Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but defendants refused.

In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court hereby reproduces pertinent portions of the trial court’s decision:[13]

“EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she testified in 1981) who is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972.  She testified that before being elected as barrio captain she held the position of barrio council-woman for 4 years.  Also she was [a member of the] board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association of

Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan.  That she knows the plaintiff because they are neighbors and she knows him from the time of his birth.  She knows the father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad Molato; both were already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife died very much later.  Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943.  At the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness was about 30 meters away from plaintiff’s parents[‘] house and she used to go there 2 or 3 times a week.  That she knows both the defendants as they are also neighbors.  That both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.  She testified she also knows that the father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad who is already dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels subject of this litigation.  That she knows all these [parcels of] land because they are located in Barrio Tigayon.

When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness answered and mentioned the respective adjoining owners.  That she knew these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of Barrio Tigayon.  Said Patricio died before the [war] and after his death the land went to his 3 children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes.  Since then the land was never partitioned or divided among the 3 children of Patricio.

A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a woman in the picture as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad.  A man with a hat holding a baby was identified by her as Felix Trinidad, the defendant.  The other woman in the picture was pointed by the witness as the wife of the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad.  When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case, witness answered yes.

Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification.  She testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad.  In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child which witness identified as the child  Arturio Trinidad.  When asked by the court when xxx the picture [was] taken, counsel for the plaintiff answered, in 1966.  When asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness answered yes, as she had gone to the house of his parents.  Witness then identified the certificate  of baptism marked as Exhibit C.  The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the name of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2.  The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was also marked. The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.

On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as she used to pass by it always.  It was located just near her house but she cannot exactly tell the area as she merely passes by it.  When asked if she [knew] the photographer who took the pictures presented as Exhibit A and B, witness answered she does not know as she was not present during the picture taking.  However, she can identify everybody in the picture as she knows all of them.

At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this case.

Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow.  She testified having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are brothers and sister and that their father was Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land.  That she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay.  That she knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a farmer she also owns a parcel of land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during

planting and harvesting season.  That she knows that during the lifetime of Inocentes the three of them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited from their father, Patricio.  That upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in possession of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes any share of the produce.  As Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the one possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the present.  The witness testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he was still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married.  That while Arturio was growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was being taken care of by Lourdes Trinidad.  That a misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his father’s share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.

Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness.  He testified that defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they being the brother and sister of his father. That the parents of his father and the defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones.  That both his father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad Molato, were already dead having died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944 and his mother about 25 years ago.

As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism which had been previously marked as Exhibit C.  That his birth certificate was burned during World War 2 but he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.

When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their nephew as his mother was already dead.  Plaintiff’s mother died when he was 13 years old.  They treated him well and provided for all his needs.  He lived with defendants for 5 years.  At the age of 19, he left the house of the defendants and lived on his own.  He got married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then they were invited by the defendants to live with them.  So he and his wife and children lived with the defendants.  As proof that he and his family lived with the defendants when the latter invited him to live with them, he presented a picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiff’s daughter, his uncle and his wife.  In short, it is a family picture according to him.  Another family picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiff’s son.  According to him, these 2 pictures were taken when he and his wife and children were living with the defendants.  That a few years after having lived with them, the defendants made them vacate the house for he requested for partition of the land to get his share.  He moved out and looked for [a] lawyer to handle his case.  He testified there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which parcel 1 is an upland.

Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing.  The harvest is 100 coconuts every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each.  The boundaries are : East-Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.

Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1 bamboo groove; also located in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan.  Adjoining owners are : East-Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio; West-Patricio Trinidad and South-Gregorio Briones.

Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the deceased father of the defendants and Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.

Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters.  The harvest is 40 cavans two times a years [sic].  Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.

Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.

Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area of 540 square meters is the subject of litigation.

Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with reference to one of the owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones, one-half share.

Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo.  The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones.

Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and another Tax Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the name of Patricio Trinidad.

On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were getting the share in the produce of the land like coconuts, palay and corn.  Plaintiff further testified that his father is Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato.  They were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay.  When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does not know because he was not yet born at that time.  That he does not have the death certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it was wartime.  That after the death of his father, he lived with his mother and when his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and uncle, the defendants in this case.  That during the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother receiving the share of the produce of the land.  That both defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single and they have no other nephews and nieces.  That [petitioner’s] highest educational attainment is Grade 3.

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed and a resident of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.  They being his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by the name of Anastacia Briones and his father are sister and brother.  That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix and Lourdes and he is already dead.  According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his death Inocentes Trinidad was not married.  That he knew this fact because at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing with his aunt, “Nanay Taya”, referring to Anastacia Briones who is mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad.  That at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and with his children before 1940 for only 3 months.  When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with anybody before his death, he answered, “That I do not know”, neither does he kn[o]w a person by the name of Felicidad Molato.  Furthermore, when asked if he can recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband and wife, witness, Pedro Briones, answered that he could not recall because he was then in Manila working.  That after the war, he had gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad.  When asked if after the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones, answered: “I do not know about that.”.

On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he started to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property of their father was located there.  When asked if he was aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the subject matter of this case before the court, witness answered that he does not know.  What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio Trinidad, Inocentes is the eldest.  And that at the time of the death of Inocentes in 1940, according to the witness when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was around 65 years old.  That according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead before the war.  When asked on cross examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was buried when he died in 1940, witness answered that he was buried in their own land because the Japanese forces were roaming around the place.  When confronted with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture of the plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in the picture, which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and the man wearing a hat on the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad.  However, when asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said he does not know him.

Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD.  She stated that she is 75 years old, single and jobless.  She testified that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan.   That before the death of her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, he had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon in 1941.  According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he died.  While his brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not aware that he had married anybody.  Likewise, when he arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get married.  When asked if she knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness answered she knew her because Felicidad Molato was staying in Tigayon.  However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife.  When asked if she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she said, ‘Yes,’ but she denied that Arturio Trinidad had lived with them.  According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by the name of Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died already.  When asked by the court if there had been an instance when the plaintiff had lived with her even for days, witness answered, he did not.  When further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in her house, witness also said, ‘He did not.’

Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children, namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself.  But inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead, she is the only remaining daughter of the spouses Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones.  Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that her brother, Felix Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the same manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and children.  She herself testified that she does not have any family of her own for she has [no] husband or children.  According to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in their private lot in Tigayon because nobody will carry his coffin as it was wartime and the municipality of Kalibo was occupied by the Japanese forces.  When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true that Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war broke out in December 1941 and March 1941 was still peace time, the witness could not answer the question.  When she was presented with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture wherein she was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she answered; ‘Yes.’ and the child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad.  According to her, she was only requested to hold this child to be brought to the church because she will be baptized and that the baptism took place in the parish church of Kalibo.  When asked if there was a party, she answered; ‘Maybe there was.’  When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the picture carrying the child, witness

identified herself and explained that she was requested to bring the child to the church and that the picture taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the latter’s child was taken during the time  when she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in court yet.  She likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix.  When asked if the child being carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff, witness answered she does not know because her eyes are already blurred.  Furthermore, when asked to identify the woman in the picture who was at the right of the child held by her brother, Felix, and who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife, witness answered that she cannot identify because she had a poor eyesight neither can she identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture for the same reason.  When asked by counsel for the plaintiff if she knows that the one who took this picture was the son of Ambrosio Trinidad by the name of Julito Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness testified that she does not know.

Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that she knew Arturio Trinidad because he was her neighbor in Tigayon.  In the same manner that she also knew the defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all  surnamed Trinidad because they were  her cousins.  She testified that a few months after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their lola’s house whose names was Eugenia Rufo Trinidad.  She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime in Manila and he went home only when his father fetched him in Manila because he was already sick.  That according to her, about 1 ½ months after his arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died.  She also testified that she knew Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes Trinidad.  According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad died.  According to her she was born in 1928, therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old when the war broke out.  When asked if she can remember that it was only in the early months of the year 1943 when the Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure.  She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their private lot because Kalibo was then occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody would carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.

For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old and a resident of Tigayon.  Rebuttal witness testified that xxx she knew both the [petitioner] and the [private respondents] in this case very well as her house is only around 200 meters from them.  When asked if it is true that according to Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15 days and died, witness testified that he did not die in that year because he died in the year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad lived with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only across the street from her house.  According to the said rebuttal witness, it is not true that Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had a wife by the name of Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan.  That she knew this fact because she was personally present when couple was married by Lauriano Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.

On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived from Manila he was in good physical condition.  That she knew both Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics but that according to her, their marriage was solemnized by a Protestant minister and she was one of the sponsors.  That during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad were also present.

When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not able to present a marriage contract of his parents but instead a certification dated September 5, 1978 issued by one Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were destroyed during the Japanese time.”

Respondent Court’s Ruling

In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent Court ruled:[14]

“We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.  But the action to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.

Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, or that he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants that Inocentes Trinidad never married.  He died single in 1941.  One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942, solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4).  Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes’ acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born on July 21, 1943.

The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).  Where one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958) acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497).  Admittedly, the defendants have been in possession of the parcels of land involved in the concept of owners since their father died in 1940.  Even if possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff attained the age of majority, still, defendants possessed the land for more than ten (10) years, thus acquiring ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines).”

The Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:[15]

“1.      Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence the marriage of his parents.

2.       Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.

3.       Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision of the Regional Trial Court having been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after the Family Code became effective on August 3, 1988.

4.       Whether or not petitioner’s status as a legitimate child can be attacked collaterally by the private respondents.

5.       Whether or not private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired ownership of the properties in question by acquisitive prescription.”

Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:

1.       Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents’ marriage and of his filiation?

2.       Was petitioner’s status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the action for partition?

3.       Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?

The Court’s Ruling

The merits of this petition are patent.  The partition of the late Patricio’s real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent’s estate. [16] His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes).  This Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.

First and Second Issues:  Evidence of and CollateralAttack on Filiation

At the outset, we stress that an appellate court’s assessment of the evidence presented by the parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.  But in the face of the contradictory conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts, such rule does not apply here.  So, we had to meticulously pore over the records and the evidence adduced in this case.[17]

Petitioner’s first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was born during the subsistence of their marriage.  This, according to Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.

This Court disagrees.  Pugeda vs. Trias[18] ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation,   said  marriage  may  be  proven  by relevant evidence.  To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.[19]

In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification [20] from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality.  This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner’s case.  Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner’s failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place.[21]

In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified  that  she  was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage.  Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers’ association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad’s house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. [22] On July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes’ house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner.  She also attended petitioner’s baptismal party held at the same house. [23] Her testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting marriage.[24] It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a

man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[25] Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child’s father and mother.[26]

On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:

“ART. 265.     The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.

ART. 266.      In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

ART. 267.      In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.”[27]

Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification[28] that records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956.  To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal certificate and Gerardo’s testimony.

The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioner’s first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1).  Exhibit B is another picture  showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioner’s first child (Exhibit B-2).  These pictures were taken before the case was instituted.  Although they do not directly prove petitioner’s filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes’ legitimate sonante litem motam.

Lourdes’ denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive.  While she admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioner’s daughter, she demurred that she did so only because she was requested to carry the child before she was baptized. [29] When shown Exhibit A, she recognized her late brother -- but not petitioner, his wife and the couple’s children -- slyly explaining that she could not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect.[30]

Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of “the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws” to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:[31]

“What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by ‘any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,’ according to the Civil Code, or ‘by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,’ according to the Family Code.  Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.  [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]”

Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by either consanguinity or affinity,[32] her testimony does not constitute family reputation regarding pedigree.  Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish petitioner’s legitimacy.

Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents’ self-serving negations.  In sum, private respondents’ thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents’ witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the Japanese forces.  His

testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months, and his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and evasive:[33]

“Q:   At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or not?A:    Not married.

Q:    In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?A:    I was staying with them.

Q:    When you said ‘them’, to whom are you referring to [sic]?A:    My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.

        xxx                                       xxx                                       xxx

Q:    Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad and his children before 1940?

A:    For only three months.

Q:    Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single.  Do you know if he had cohabited with anybody before his death?

A:    [T]hat I do not know.

Q:    You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?A:    No, sir.

Q:    Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of anybody with whom he has lived as husband and wife?

A:    I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.

Q:    After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?

A:    Yes, sir,

Q:    How often did you go to the house of your aunt?A:    Every Sunday.

        xxx                                       xxx                                       xxx

Q:    You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?A:    I do not know him.

Q:    After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad?

A:    I do not know about that.”

Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified that, when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in March 1941, one and a half months after his return to Tigayon.  She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes.[34]

Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes died in March 1941.[35]The  Japanese forces occupied Manila only on January 2, 1942;[36] thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied until then.  It was only then that local residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery in Kalibo, because of the Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area.[37]

Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes’ surname (Trinidad) without objection from private respondents -- a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes’ legitimate child.[38]

Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party.[39] Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Court’s holding that petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing.  In determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their personal credibility.[40] Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in petitioner’s favor.  It declared:

“xxx [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the status of being their nephew xxx before plaintiff [had] gotten married and had a family of his own where later on he started demanding for the partition of the share of his father, Inocentes.  The fact that plaintiff had so lived with the defendants xxx is shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B.  These family pictures were taken at a time when plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting his father’s share.  xxxx His demand for the partition of the share of his father provoked the ire of the defendants, thus, they disowned him as their nephew.  xxxx In this case, the plaintiff enjoyed the continuous possession of a status of the child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the defendants themselves, which status was only broken when plaintiff demanded for the partition xxx as he was already having a family of his own.  xxxx.

However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being her nephew is offset by the preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio captain.  This witness was already 77 years old at the time she testified.  Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff.  She had been a PTA officer and the court sized her up as a civic minded person.  She has nothing to gain in this case as compared to the witness for the defendants who are either cousin or nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no husband nor children.”[41]

Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. [42] Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his parents’ marriage.  Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of this doctrine to petitioner’s cause.

Third Issue:  No Acquisitive Prescription

Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership, and because private respondents had been in possession -- in the concept of owners -- of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.

The Court disagrees.  Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive prescription.   In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership.[43] Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of the land in dispute.  Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was beyond question.  There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of petitioner’s father Inocentes over the land.  Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in their father’s

name.  Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership.  In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals,  the Court held:[44]

“x x x Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership.  In the other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]).  Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).”

Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that petitioner’s claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The trial court’s decision dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

[1] Fifteenth Division composed of J. Bernardo P. Pardo, ponente; and JJ. Justo P. Torres, Jr., (now a retired associate justice of this Court) and Antonio P. Solano, concurring;

[2] Rollo, pp 114-117.

[3] Rollo, p 141.

[4] Records, p. 1.

[5] The case was later transferred to Branch VI, presided by Judge Jaime D. Discaya, and then to Branch VIII, presided by Judge Emma C. Labayen.

[6] Records, p. 68; TSN, July 17, 1984, p. 2.

[7] Penned by Judge Labayen.

[8] Rollo, p 90; Regional Trial Court’s decision, p 20.

[9] Rollo, p. 90.

[10] Rollo, p. 141.

[11] The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by this Court of the private respondents’ two-page Memorandum on August 15, 1997.

[12] Rollo, pp 114-115.

[13] Rollo, pp. 74-85.

[14] Rollo, pp. 115-116; Decision, pp 2-3.

[15] The 51-page petition was signed by Attys. Al A. Castro, Florecita V. Bilbes and Teresita S. de Guzman of the Public Attorney’s Office; Rollo, pp 21-22.

[16] De Mesa vs.   Court of Appeals,  231 SCRA 773, 779-780, April 25, 1994, per Regalado, J.

[17] Quebral vs.  . Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, 364, January 25, 1996; Edra vs.   Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 344, 350, November 13, 1989; and Pacmac, Inc. vs.   Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 555, 560, May 29, 1987.

[18] 4 SCRA 849, 855, March 31, 1962, per Labrador, J.

[19] IbId.

[20] Exh. I, Folder of Exhibits.

[21] Balogbog vs.   Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 259, 266-267, March 7, 1997; Lim Tanhu vs.   Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425, 469, August 29, 1975.

[22] TSN, July 30, 1981, p. 6.

[23] IbId., pp 1-17; TSN, October 30, 1981, pp 18-26; TSN, March 5, 1982, pp 27-36.

[24] Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.

[25] Section 3(aa), Rule 131, Rules; and Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, revised ed., 1993, p. 131, citing Rivera vs.   Intermediate Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 322; De Labuca vs.   Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 77 SCRA 31; and Alvado vs.   City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230.

[26] Exhs. C-1 and C-2, Folder of Exhibits.

[27] Now Arts. 170 & 171 of the Family Code; and Vitug, supra., pp.223-224.

[28] Exh. D, Folder of Exhibits.

[29] TSN, February 3, 1988, p. 6.

[30] IbId., p. 8.

[31] 201 SCRA 675, 684, September 24, 1991, per Cruz, J.; and Uyguangco vs.   Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 684, 689, October 26, 1989.

[32] Sec. 40, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence.

[33] TSN, August 29, 1986, pp. 4-6.

[34] TSN, March 17, 1988, pp. 2-5.

[35] RTC Decision, p. 16; Rollo, p. 86.

[36] Zaide, Philippine Political and Cultural History, Vol. II, revised ed., 1957, p. 341.

[37] Rollo, p. 86.

[38] Mendoza vs.   CA, supra, pp. 683-684.

[39] Summa Insurance Corp. vs.   Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175, 185, February 5, 1996; New Testament Church of God vs.   Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 266, 269, July 14, 1995; Sapu-an vs.   Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 701, 706, October 19, 1992; Republic vs.   Court of Appeals, ibid.

[40] IbId.; and Francisco, Basic Evidence, 1991 ed., p. 491.

[41] Rollo, pp. 89-90.

[42] Sayson vs.   Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 321, January 23, 1992; Rosales vs.   Castillo Rosales, 132 SCRA 132, 141-142, September 28, 1984; and Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., pp. 535-536.

[43] Art. 494, Civil Code.

[44] 205 SCRA 337, 345-346, January 24, 1992, per Bidin, J.

Absence of Marriage Contract and birth certificate – proof of filiation

ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.

G.R. No. 118904April 20, 1998

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts

On August 10, 1978, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused and alleged in their answer filed on September 07, 1978 that plaintiff was not the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.

Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not givenplaintiff a share in the produce of the land. Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes,Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan. Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late InocentesTrinidad.On October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not substituted as a party. On July 4,1989, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in.

Issue

Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturio’s filiation are sufficient.

Ruling

The merits of this petition are patent.  The partition of the late Patricio’s real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent’s estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.

In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of marriage: fact of marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate of the child, and other documents.  Arturio presented the first 3.  For filiation, when the birth certificate can’t be produced, other evidence like the baptismal certificate, is admissible.  Use of surname without objection is also presumptive evidence of legitimacy.

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.

Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

 

PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge-

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and

(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315.

Void or Voidable Marriage – Requirement of the Judicial Declaration of Nullity of the Marriage

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.

G.R. No. L-53703August 19, 1986

PARAS, J.:

Facts

Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage, assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties: Was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? It was also asserted in the pre-trial that Eduardo was already married to someone else even before the marriage with Lilia.

Issue

Whether or not there is a need to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage in order to validly enter into a subsequent marriage.

Ruling

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.

THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070.  February 12, 1997]

MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO CANTERO, complainants, vs. JUDGE ESMERALDO G. CANTERO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, and more advised than confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion and proper virtue.[1]

The eminent Francis Bacon wrote the foregoing exhortation some 400 years ago. Today, it is still relevant and quotable. By the nature of their functions, judges are revered as models of integrity, wisdom, decorum, competence and propriety. Human as they are, however, magistrates do have their own weaknesses, frailties, mistakes and even indiscretions. In the case before us, respondent Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero was charged administratively in the twilight of his government service, as a result of a failed love affair that happened some 46 years ago. After an otherwise unblemished record, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of 70 years on August 8, 1997 had death not intervened a few months ago on September 26, 1996. Notwithstanding his death, this Court still resolved to rule on this case, as it may affect his retirement benefits.

Antecedent Facts

In a letter-complaint[2] dated November 10, 1993, Maria Apiag Cantero with her daughter Teresita A. Cantero Sacurom and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged the respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pinamungajan-Aloquinsan, Cebu, with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents.

After receipt of the respondent's Comment, the Court on February 5, 1996, referred this case[3] to Executive Judge Gualberto P. Delgado of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu for investigation, report and recommendation. The latter submitted his Report and Recommendation[4] dated July 26, 1996. Thereafter, the Court referred this case also to the Office of the Court Administrator[5] for evaluation, report and recommendation.

According to the complainants:

"Sometime in August 11, 1947, defendant (should be respondent) and plaintiff (should be complainant) Maria Apiag, joined together in holy matrimony in marriage after having lived together as husband and wife wherein they begot a daughter who was born on June 19, 1947, whom they named: Teresita A. Cantero; and then on October 29, 1953, Glicerio A. Cantero was born. Thereafter, defendant left the conjugal home without any apparent cause, and leaving the plaintiff Maria Apiag to raise the two children with her meager income as a public school teacher at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte. Plaintiffs suffered a lot after defendant abandoned them for no reason whatsoever. For several years, defendant was never heard of and his whereabout unknown.

Few years ago, defendant surfaced at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, whereupon, plaintiffs begged for support, however, they were ignored by defendant. x x x"[6]

On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Atty. Redentor G. Guyala, wrote a letter to respondent as follows:

"Judge Esmeraldo Cantero

Pinamungajan, Cebu

Dear Judge Cantero:

We are writing in behalf of your legal wife, Maria Apiag, and your two legitimate children by her, Teresita (Mrs. Sacurom) and Glicerio.

It appears that sometime in the 1950's for reasons known only to you, you left your conjugal home at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, and abandoned without any means of support your said wife and children. Since then and up to now, they have not seen or heard from you.

They would wish now that you do them right by living up to your duty as husband and father to them, particularly that expressly provided under Art. 68 and Art. 195 of the Family Code (Art. 109 and 195 of the Civil Code) in relation to Art. 203 of the same Code.

You will please consider this letter as a formal demand for maintenance and support for three of them, and a request that they be properly instituted and named as your compulsory heirs and legal beneficiaries in all legal documents now on file and to be filed with the Supreme Court and other agencies or offices as may be required under applicable laws, such as, the insurance (GSIS) and retirement laws.

We hope this matter can be amicably settled among you, your wife and children, without having to resort to judicial recourse.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) REDENTOR G. GUYALA"[7]

The letter elicited no action or response from the respondent. Subsequently, complainants learned that respondent Judge had another family. In their own words,

"x x x The plaintiffs later on learned that defendant has another wife by the name of Nieves C. Ygay, a Public School teacher from Tagao, Pinamungajan, Cebu. According to some documents obtained by plaintiffs, the herein defendant and Nieves C. Ygay have children of their own, named as follows

with their date of births: Noralyn Y. Cantero -- May 19, 1968; Ellen Y. Cantero -- February 4, 1970; Erwin Y. Cantero -- April 29, 1979; Onofre Y. Cantero -- June 10, 1977; and Desirie Vic Y. Cantero -- December 2, 1981.

It was shocking to the senses that in all of the public documents required of defendant Judge Cantero to be filed with the Supreme Court such as his sworn statement of assets and liabilities, his personal data sheet (SC Form P. 001), income tax returns and his insurance policy with the Government Service Insurance System, defendant misrepresented himself as being married to Nieves C. Ygay, with whom he contracted a second marriage. The truth of the matter is that defendant is married to plaintiff Maria Apiag with whom they have two legitimate children, namely: Teresita A. Cantero and Glicerio A. Cantero."[8]

The respondent Judge, in his Comment, explained his side as follows:

"x x x I admit the existence and form of Annex 'A' of the said complaint, but vehemently deny the validity of its due execution, for the truth of the matter is that such alleged marriage was only dramatized at the instance of our parents just to shot (sic) their wishes and purposes on the matter, without my consent freely given. As a matter of fact, I was only called by my parents to go home to our town at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of my sister's birthday from Iligan City, without patently knowing I was made to appear (in) a certain drama marriage and we were forced to acknowledge our signatures appearing in the duly prepared marriage contract(.) That was 46 years ago when I was yet 20 years of age, and at my second year high school days."[9]

Furthermore, Judge Cantero related that:

"x x x sometime in the year 1947, when both respondent and complainant, Maria Apiag were still in their early age and in their second year high school days, they were engaged in a lovely affair which resulted to the pregnancy of the said complainant, and then and there gave birth to a child, named Teresita Apiag, having (been) born out of wedlock on June 19, 1947, now Mrs. Teresita Sacurom, one of the complainants. That in order to save name and shame, parents of both the respondent and the complainant came to an agreement to allow the respondent, and the complainant (to) get married in the (sic) name, but not to live together as husband, wife for being close relatives, thereby forcing the respondent to appear in a marriage affair where all the pertinent marriage papers were all ready (sic) prepared (sic), and duly signed by somebody; that after the said affair both respondent and the complainant immediately separated each other (sic) without living together as husband, and wife even for a day, nor having established a conjugal home. From that time respondent and the complainant have never met each other nor having (sic) communicated (with) each other for the last 40 years; that respondent continued his studies at Cebu City, and eventually became member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examination in the year 1960, that is 14 years after the affair of 1947; that in 1964, respondent was first connected in the government service as Comelec Registrar of the Commission on Elections, assigned at Pinamungajan, Cebu(,) that is 16 years after the affair of 1947; that in the year 1982, respondent was appointed as CLAO lawyer, now PAO, of the Department of Justice, that is 35 years after the after the affair of 1947; and finally, on October 3, 1989, respondent was appointed to the Judiciary as Municipal Circuit Trial Judge (MCTC) of the Municipalities of Pinamungajan and Aloguinsan, province of Cebu, that is 42 years from August 11, 1947; that respondent is (sic) already 32 years in the government service up to the present time with more than 6 years in the Judiciary; that respondent is already 69 years old, having been born on August 8, 1927, and retirable by next year if God willing; that respondent has served in the government service for the last 32 years, faithfully, honestly and judiciously without any complaint whatsoever, except this instant case; that respondent as member of the Judiciary, has live-up (sic) to the standard required by the (sic) member (sic) of the bar and judiciary; that the charges against the respondent were all based or rooted from the incedent (sic) that happened on August 11, 1947 and

no other; that the complainants are morally dishonest in filing the instant (case) just now, an elapsed (sic) of almost 42 years and knowing that respondent (is) retirable by next year, 1997; that this actuation is very suspicious, and intriguing;

x x x  x x x     x x x

That complainant Maria Apiag has been living together with another man during her public service as public school teacher and have begotten a child, name (sic) Manuel Apiag and respondent promised (sic) the Honorable Court to furnish a complete paper regarding this case in order to enlighten the Honorable (Court) that, he who seek (sic) justice must seek justice with cleab (sic) hand;

That respondent did not file any annullment (sic) or judicial declaration (of nullity) of the alleged marriage because it is the contention and honest belief, all the way, that the said marriage was void from the beginning, and as such nothing is to be voided or nullified, and to do so will be inconsistent with the stand of the respondent; that this instant case (was) simply filed for money consideration as reflected in their letter of demand; (t)hat as a matter of fact, respondent and the complainant have already signed a compromised (sic) agreement, copy of which hereto (sic) attached as Annex '1', stating among other things that respondent will give a monthly allowance to Terecita (sic) Sacurom in the (amount) of P4,000.00 and the complainant will withdraw their complaint from the Supreme Court., and that respondent had already given the said allowance for three consecutive months plus the amount of P25,000.00 for their Attorney to withdraw the case, and that respondent stop (sic) the monthly allowance until such time the complainant will actually withdraw the instant case, and without knowledge of the respondent, complainant proceeded (sic) their complaint after the elapsed (sic) of three (3) years."[10]

Relevant portions of said compromise agreement which was executed sometime in March 1994 by Esmeraldo C. Cantero and Teresita C. Sacurom and witnessed by Maria Apiag and Leovegardo Sacurom are reproduced thus:

"That this COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is executed and entered into by ESMERALDO C. CANTERO, of legal age, married, Filipino, and with residence and postal address at Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines, otherwise called as the FIRST PARTY, and TERESITA C. SACUROM, also of legal age, married, Filipino, representing her mother and her brother, and a residence (sic) of 133-A J. Ramos Street, Caloocan City, after having duly swirn (sic) to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say:

1. That the First Party is presently a Municipal Circuit Trial Judge of Pinamungajan-Aloguinsan, Cebu, is charged by Second Party for Misconduct before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court now pending action;

2.  That the parties have came (sic) to agreement to have the said case settled amicably in the interest of family unity and reconciliation, and arrived at compromise agreement based on law of equity, as follows:

(a)  That both parties have agreed voluntarily, the Second Party will get ONE FOURTH (1/4) of the retirement that the First will receive from the GSIS, and the rest of it will be for the First Party;

(b)  That the Second Party and his brother will be included as one of the beneficiaries of the First Party, in case of death;

(c)   That the Second party and his only brother will inherit the properties of the First party inherited from his parents;

(d)  That the Second Party, representing her brother, is authorized to receive and collect P4,000.00, monthly out of the second check salary of the First Party (The second half salary only);

3. That it was further voluntarily agreed that the Second Party will cause the withdrawal and the outright dismissal of the said pending case filed by her and her mother;

4. That it was also agreed that the above agreement, shall never be effective and enforceable unless the said case will be withdrawn and dismiss (sic) from the Supreme Court, and said dismissal be received by the First Party, otherwise the above-agreement is void from the beginning; and the Second Party must desist from further claining (sic) and filing civil abd (sic) criminal liabilities.

5.  That this agreement is executed voluntarily, in good faith, and in the interest of good will and reconciliation and both parties is (sic) duty bound to follow faithfully and religiously."[11]

In line with the foregoing, the respondent wrote a letter dated 14 March, 1994 addressed to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) designating Teresita Cantero Sacurom and Glicerio Cantero as additional beneficiaries in his life insurance policy.[12]

The Issues

The respondent Judge formulated the following "issues":

"1. That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 is void;

2. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag for more than seven (7) years raise the presumption that she is already dead, that there was no need for any judicial declaration;

3. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to him because assuming that he committed the offense, he was not yet a member of the judiciary;

4. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already prescribed;

5. The charges have no basis in fact and in law."[13]

Report and Recommendation of  Investigating Judge and Court Administrator

Investigating Judge Gualberto P. Delgado recommended in his report that:

"After a careful perusal of the evidence submitted by the parties, this Office finds respondent Guilty of the crime of Grave Misconduct (Bigamy and Falsification of Public Documents) however, considering his length of service in the government, it is recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year without pay."[14]

The Office of the Court Administrator also submitted its report[15] recommending respondent Judge's dismissal, as follows:

"After a careful review of all the documents on file in this case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the investigating judge.

Extant from the records of the case and as admitted by respondent, he was married to complainant Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 and have (sic) two (2) children with her. Respondent's contention that such marriage was in jest and assuming that it was valid, it has lost its validity on the ground that they never met again nor have communicated with each other for the last 40 years cannot be given a (sic) scant consideration. Respondent's argument that he was not yet a lawyer, much more, a member of the bench when he contracted his first marriage with the complainant, is unavailing for having studied law and had become a member of the Bar in 1960, he knows that the marriage cannot be dissolved without a judicial declaration of death. Respondent's second marriage with Nieves Ygay was therefore bigamous for it was contracted during the existence of a previous marriage.

We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion of the respondent that he cannot be held liable for misconduct on the ground that he was not yet a lawyer nor a judge when the act(s) complained of were committed. The infraction he committed continued from the time he became a lawyer in 1960 to the time he was appointed as a judge in October 23, 1989. This is a continuing offense (an unlawful act performed continuously or over and over again, Law Dictionary, Robert E. Rothenberg). He can therefore be held liable for his misdeeds.

On the charge of falsification, it was shown with clarity in his Personal Data Sheet for Judges, Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth, Income Tax Return (pp. 99-102, rollo), that he had committed a misrepresentation by stating therein that his spouse is Nieves Ygay and (had) eight (8) children (with her) which is far from (the) truth that his wife is Maria Apiag with whom he had two (2) children.

Aside from the admission, the untenable line of defense by the respondent presupposes the imposition of an administrative sanction for the charges filed against him. 'A judge's actuation of cohabiting with another when his marriage was still valid and subsisting - his wife having been allegedly absent for four years only — constitutes gross immoral conduct' (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran Jr., 249 SCRA 447). It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. While deceit employed by respondent, existed prior to his appointment as a x x x Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with x x x began and continued when he was already in the judiciary. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guidepost to(sic) self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Atienza vs. Brilliantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32-33).

ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recommended that respondent judge be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-appointment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations."

As earlier indicated, respondent Judge died on September 27, 1996 while this case was still being deliberated upon by this Court.

The Court's Ruling

In spite of his death, this Court decided to resolve this case on the merits, in view of the foregoing recommendation of the OCA which, if affirmed by this Court, would mean forfeiture of the death and retirement of the respondent.

Gross Misconduct Not Applicable

The misconduct imputed by the complainants against the judge comprises the following: abandonment of his first wife and children, failing to give support, marrying for the second time without having first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage, and falsification of public documents. Misconduct, as a ground for administrative action, has a specific meaning in law.

"'Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of man from the character of an officer. x x x  It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties x x x .' More specifically, in Buenaventura vs. Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against a judge of the court of first instance, the present Chief Justice defines misconduct as referring 'to a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.' That is to abide by the authoritative doctrine as set forth in the leading case of In re Horilleno, a decision penned by Justice Malcolm, which requires that in order for serious misconduct to be shown, there must be 'reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.'"[16]

The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his personal life and have no direct relation to his judicial function. Neither do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his official responsibilities. Therefore, said acts cannot be deemed misconduct much less gross misconduct in office. For any of the aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero" x x x (t)o warrant disciplinary action, the act of the judge must have a direct relation to the performance of his official duties. It is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer."[17]

Nullity of Prior Marriage

It is not disputed that respondent did not obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Maria Apiag prior to marrying Nieves C. Ygay. He argued however that the first marriage was void and that there was no need to have the same judicially declared void, pursuant to jurisprudence then prevailing. In the en banc case of Odayat vs. Amante, [18] complainant charged Amante, a clerk of court, with oppression, immorality and falsification of public document. The complainant Odayat alleged among others " x x x that respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still alive x x x."   In order to rebut the charge of immorality, Amante " x x x presented in evidence the certification (of the) x x x Local Civil Registrar x x x attesting that x x x Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondent's contention is that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio,

because of her previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales." This Court ruled that "Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of the New Civil Code, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages."[19]

Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs x x x a judicial declaration of such fact"[20] before any party thereto "can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void."[21] This was expressly provided under Article 40[22] of the Family Code.  However, the marriage of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born before the promulgation of Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family Code.  Hence, the doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante applies in favor of respondent.

On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it is based on a finding of guilt in the bigamy charge. Since, as shown in the preceding discussion, the bigamy charge cannot stand, so too must the accusation of falsification fail. Furthermore, the respondent judge's belief in good faith that his first marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up these public documents, a valid defense in a charge of falsification of public document, [23] which must be appreciated in his favor.

Personal Conduct of a Judge

However, the absence of a finding of criminal liability on his part does not preclude this Court from finding him administratively liable for his indiscretion, which would have merited disciplinary action from this Court had death not intervened. In deciding this case, the Court emphasizes that "(t)he personal behavior of a judge, not only upon the bench but also in his everyday life, should be above reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety. He should maintain high ethical principles and sense of propriety without which he cannot preserve the faith of the people in the judiciary, so indispensable in an orderly society. For the judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to observe faithfully as the price he has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice."[24] It is against this standard that we must gauge the public and private life of Judge Cantero.

The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short of this standard because the record reveals he had two families. The record also shows that he did not attend to the needs, support and education of his children of his first marriage. Such is conduct unbecoming a trial magistrate. Thus, the late Judge Cantero "violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that '[a] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach,' and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that '[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.'"[25]

A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted

Finally, the Court also scrutinized the whole of respondent's record. Other than this case, we found no trace of wrongdoing in the discharge of his judicial functions from the time of his appointment up to the filing of this administrative case, and has to all appearances lived up to the stringent standards embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering his otherwise untarnished 32 years in government service,[26] this Court is inclined to treat him with leniency.

Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a mistake. But we should not look only at his sin. We should also consider the man's sincerity in his repentance, his genuine effort at restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation of his life.

This respondent should not be judged solely and finally by what took place some 46 years ago. He may have committed an indiscretion in the past. But having repented for it, such youthful mistake should not forever haunt him and should not totally destroy his career and render inutile his otherwise unblemished record. Indeed, it should not demolish completely what he built in his public life since then. Much less should it absolutely deprive him and/or his heirs of the rewards and fruits of his long and dedicated service in government. For these reasons, dismissal from service as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator would be too harsh.

However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the needs of his children of his first marriage -- children whose filiation he did not deny. He neglected them and refused to support them until they came up with this administrative charge. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

[1] Bacon, Francis (1561-1626), Essays: Of Judicature. See also Handbook for Judges, p. 276, The American Judicature Society, 1975.

[2] Rollo, pp. 6-7.

[3] Ibid., p. 21.

[4] Ibid., pp. 138-143.

[5] Ibid., p. 149.

[6] Memorandum for Plaintiffs, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 104-105.

[7] Ibid, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 103-104.

[8] Ibid, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 104-105

[9] Comment for the Respondent, p. 1; Rollo, p. 13.

[10] Memorandum for the Respondent, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 52-54.

[11] Rollo, p. 51.

[12] Ibid, p. 115.

[13] See Evaluation, Report, and Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, p. 3; Rollo, p. 152.

[14] Rollo, p. 143.

[15] pp. 5-8; Rollo, pp. 154-156.

[16] Amosco vs. Magro, 73 SCRA 107, pp.108-109, September 30, 1976; citing Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456, (1953), Buenaventura vs. Benedicto, 38 SCRA 71, March 27, 1971, and In re Impeachment of Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212, (1922).

[17] Babatio vs. Tan, 157 SCRA 277, p. 280, January 22, 1988; citing Salcedo vs. Inting, 91 SCRA 19, June 29, 1979.

[18] 77 SCRA 338, June 2, 1977.

[19] Odayat vs. Amante, 77 SCRA 338, 341, June 2, 1977

[20] Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499, 501, August 19, 1986.

[21] Sempio-Diy, Alicia V., The Family Code of the Philippines, p. 46, 1988.

[22] "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

[23] Reyes, Luis B., Criminal Law, p. 211, Thirteenth Edition, 1993; citing People vs. Unico, et al., C.A., 56 O.G. 1681.

[24] Agpalo, Ruben, Legal Ethics, p. 465, Fourth Edition, 1989; citing Canon 3, Canon of Judicial Ethics; Candia vs. Tagabucba, 79 SCRA 51, Sept. 12, 1977; Canon 1, Canons of Judicial Ethics; and Jugueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27, Sept. 30, 1974.

[25] Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239, 254-255, December 7, 1993.

[26] Except perhaps his occasional ungrammatical language and typographical errors.

Void Marriage

MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO CANTERO, complainants, vs. JUDGE ESMERALDO G. CANTERO, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070February 12, 1997PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts

The wedding of Maria Apiag (one of the complainants) and Esmeraldo Cantero(respondent-judge) took place on August 11, 1947. They begot two children, Teresita andGlicero (complainants). Thereafter, Esmeraldo left the conjugal home and abandoned his wife and children without any means of support. Later on, the complainants learned that Esmeraldo contracted another marriage with Nieves Ygay and they have 5 children of their own. In all the documents filed by Esmeraldo such as his sworn statement of assets and liabilities, personal data sheet, income tax return, and insurance policy with GSIS, he misrepresented himself as being married to Nieves. Herein complainants charged Esmeraldo with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and for falsifying public documents. In his comment, Esmeraldo denied the validity of the marriage alleging that it was dramatized and that his parents called him to appear in a certain drama marriage and was forced to sign a duly prepared marriage contract. He pressed the idea that his consent was notfreely given. The fact, however, is undisputed that he and Maria were engaged in a love affair which resulted in the pregnancy of the latter prior to the marriage. It is only for the preservation of the family name that their parents agreed to their marriage but not to live together as husband and wife. To bolster his defense, Esmeraldo alleged that Maria has been living with another man during her public service as a teacher and have begotten a child, named Manuel Apiag. He argued the “he who seek justice must seek justice with clean hands.” He didn’t file any annulment or judicial declaration of the alleged marriage because he believed that said marriage was void from the beginning. Thus, nothing is to be nullified because the marriage never existed. However, in view of the complainants’ request in their letter to the respondent dated September 21, 1993, both parties have agreed that Teresita shall: (1) get ¼ of the retirement that Esmeraldo will receive from GSIS; (2) be included as one of the beneficiaries in case of the latter’s death; (3) inherit the properties of the latter; and (2) receive and collect Php4000 monthly as support

Issue

WON the previous marriage of the judge was valid.

Ruling

No. Since the second marriage occurred before the promulgation of Wiegel v Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the FC, the doctrine of Odayat v. Amante (will be applied in favor of the respondent. Although there did not exist any grave misconduct (since the acts were committed in relation to the judge’s personal life), he will still be held administratively liable because of his position as a judge of high principles and ethics.

Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a mistake. But we should not look only at his sin. We should also consider the man's sincerity in his repentance, his genuine effort at restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation of his life. This respondent should not be judged solely and finally by what took place some 46 years ago. He may have committed an indiscretion in the past. But having repented for it, such youthful mistake should not forever haunt him and should not totally destroy his career and render inutile his otherwise unblemished record. Indeed, it should not demolish completely what he built in his public life since then. Much less should it absolutely deprive him and/or his heirs of the rewards and fruits of his long and dedicated service in government. For these reasons, dismissal from service as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator would be too harsh.

Considering that he was remiss in attending to the needs of the children of his first marriage (whose filiations he did not deny), the court would impose a penalty. But since he is dead, the case will merely be dismissed.