Don Marquis’s Innovative Approach to Abortion

By John Peters

Word Count: 1592

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Abortion is one of the most divisive issues of modern times. For some, it is a matter of

life and death, and for others, it is an issue of freedom of choices regarding one’s body.

Frequently, debates between those who are pro-life and those who are pro-choice end with

nothing accomplished. Viability and sentience of fetuses are often hotly debated, and countless

specific case studies (including rape, incest, and when the life of the mother is at risk) are

analyzed and reanalyzed. Don Marquis ventures away from the general arguments, though, in

his essay, “Why Abortion Is Immoral.” Instead, he focuses on one claim: “Abortion is murder.”

Marquis explores this concise statement by defining murder and determining whether or not it

applies to fetuses. He concludes that because fetuses have a distinctly human future, killing

them is immoral. Furthermore, Marquis’s thesis is supported by Kant’s Categorical Imperative,

one of the most highly regarded philosophies in modern times. Not only is Marquis’s

straightforward and efficient approach to abortion attractive, but also the validation he receives

from Kantian ethics is extremely appealing.

Don Marquis begins by countering one of the most common arguments against

abortion: the rhetorical onslaught that the pro-life movement frequently receives from the

opposition. Marquis claims that his beliefs are not purely “a symptom of irrational religious

dogma” (109) but rather are based on philosophy and logic and that his thesis is applicable in a

vast majority of abortion cases. None of his remarks are purely theological which few other pro-

life arguments can boast. Herein is where the first appeal to Marquis’s theory lies; no particular

religious affiliation is required to adhere to his thesis. Though this seems fairly simple, it is a

vital aspect of a moral theory. In order to be universal, a moral theory must be accessible to all.

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The greatest advantage of Marquis’s moral theory is that it does not rely on the

“category of personhood” (111). Regularly, stages in development are arbitrarily labeled as the

“moment of personhood.” These vary from the time of conception to maintaining a heartbeat

to feeling pain and to birth. Each of these instances in a pregnancy has grounds as to why it

could be the defining moment when person status is gained. Pro-life supporters can claim that

having forty-six chromosomes makes a person indeed a person. A more liberal-minded

individual may believe that a fetus does not become a person until it can feel pain like most

humans can. Even further along the spectrum, one may choose to say that not until a fetus is

birthed and no longer dependent on the mother’s womb can it be truly called a person. Each of

these approaches appears to have a relatively equal likelihood of being true. This alone disturbs

Marquis, but he also discovers another error in personhood-centered arguments. Marquis

points out that personhood logic, in regards to some standards (such as independence and

social interaction), “cannot straightforwardly account for the wrongness of killing infants and

young children” (110). Marquis believes that no abortion theory should condone infanticide,

inadvertently or not. Due to these complications, Marquis decides to establish his own

argument.

Marquis chooses not to consider whether or not a fetus is a human; to him, this is

irrelevant. As opposed to deciphering different biological qualities of a fetus, Marquis instead

determines the validity of the pro-life claim that abortion is murder. In order to do this, Marquis

analyzes why he believes murder is wrong. Murder is a multi-dimensional moral issue that

negatively impacts the murderer, the murdered, and the significant others of the murdered. In

order to determine the moral implications of murder, the extent to which each group gets

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affected must be evaluated. Marquis starts by claiming that it is not the “brutiliz[ing of] the one

who kills” that makes murder wrong (109). Because even though it is obvious that this is a

negative impact, it is not the most significant. Marquis then furthers his argument by identifying

that it is also not the “loss others would experience due to our absence” that makes killing

ultimately wrong (109). It is clear to Marquis that this consequence outweighs the first, but

even so he believes there is a greater consequence. According to Marquis, “. . . killing is wrong,

primarily because the killing inflicts (one of) the greatest possible losses on the victim” (109).

Killing someone deprives him of all of which he currently values and enjoys and all of which he

will come to value and enjoy later in life. A man’s future is the most precious thing that can be

taken from him. Consequently, Marquis concludes that anyone with a “future like ours”

deserves the right to live (110). Therefore, killing a fetus is murder and abortion is immoral.

Marquis criticizes other abortion essays because they are often personhood-centered

and consequently extremely crippled. The ambiguity of the biological definition of “person”

prevents these arguments from ever being definitive; their questionable view on infanticide

prevents these arguments from ever being universal. Marquis notes that his moral theory,

based on the “future like ours” principle does not conflict with accepted beliefs on infanticide

and does not rely on a vague definition. These make Marquis’s argument more effective and

appealing.

Despite the advantages to Marquis’s argument, there is what appears to be a significant

weakness. Some may allege that Marquis’s thesis implies that contraception is immoral: that

the logic that follows for fetuses can also follow for sperm and eggs. Marquis addresses this in

his paper by saying, “Nothing at all is denied such a future by contraception. . . because there is

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no nonarbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception” (112). Marquis

elaborates saying that there are “millions of possible combinations” prior to fertilization (111).

Because there is no entity to which you can assign moral standing, there is no need to consider

its rights. Therefore, contraception is morally permissible by Marquis’s standards.

Others may have an issue with some of the specific, less common abortions. In regards

to abortions that occur because the life of the mother is at risk, Marquis appears to believe that

they are morally acceptable. He states “. . . abortion could be justified in some circumstances,

only if the loss consequent on failing to abort would be at least as great [as the loss entailed in

an abortion]” (111). The loss of the fetus is significant, but because the loss of the mother is as

great as the loss of the fetus, abortion when the life of the mother is at stake is allowed.

However, there is no evidence that Marquis would be willing to declare abortions in the cases

of rape and incest as morally permissible. Because Marquis does not explicitly mention any

exception in his rule, the reader must assume that Marquis’s “future like ours” theory still

applies.

New ideas about moral issues are often rejected if the logic behind them is not

supported by past, established schools of thought. Certain philosophies have persisted through

the years because people adhere to their principles. Therefore, if a new proposal on an issue

fails to find roots in a philosophy, it will also most likely fail to find roots in the contemporary

society. Modern authors must substantiate their arguments with sound logic and support from

the past in order for their work to be considered valid.

Marquis’s logic in his essay holds parallels with Kant’s Categorical Imperative and

deontological ethics. Kant states that “to be beneficent when we can is a duty” (55). It is not the

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end result of an action that should be considered before behaving but rather the extent to

which the action meets the Categorical Imperative. Each action performed must follow this

imperative for it to be moral: “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will

that it should become a universal law” (57). Marquis uses this philosophy (without specifically

mentioning it) to outline the immorality of abortion.

As previously explained, Marquis begins his argument against abortion by defining

murder. Then, using this definition that Marquis created, one can apply the Categorical

Imperative to abortion. Unjustified killing is murder and is immoral in all situations. For if

murder became universal law, the law “would necessarily destroy itself” (56). The thesis that

Marquis creates is consistent with Kantian principles. Frequently, philosophers make exceptions

for the morality of abortion in cases of incest and rape, but Marquis refuses to compromise his

principles. As Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands, Marquis’s assertions are unwavering,

even on a universal scale. Marquis believes that it is a duty to prevent unnecessary killing ergo

abortion is immoral.

Marquis’s focused and poignant argument is one of the most powerful defenses of the

pro-life movement. Though some may criticize it for its simplicity, it does the task it is supposed

to: it determines the morality of abortion. Marquis, himself, realizes that he has created an

“elementary theory of the wrongness of killing” that fails to address some other moral

dilemmas, but this does not faze him (110). He acknowledges that his theory may have

implications for animal rights and euthanasia (and that those implications may be serious) but

claims that it “is another matter” to discuss these issues (110). The focus of his thesis is

abortion, and Marquis outlines a defense of the pro-life movement that is applicable in most

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situations. Backed by Kantian deontological ethics and thoroughly scrutinized argumentation,

Marquis’s “Why Abortion Is Immoral” effectively establishes an accessible pro-life philosophy.

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