Marking to Market, Liquidity and Financial Stability
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Transcript of Marking to Market, Liquidity and Financial Stability
Marking to Market, Liquidity and Financial Stability
Guillaume PlantinHaresh Sapra
Hyun Song Shin
12th International ConferenceIMES, Bank of Japan
May 30-31, 2005
Themes
• Mark-to-market accounting impacts on financial stability
• The phenomenon of “reaching for yield” (much discussed at the moment) owes much to marking to market.
• Monetary policy has far-reaching implications for financial stability
Case for Marking to Market
• Market price reflects current terms of trade between willing parties
• Market price gives better indication of current risk profile– Market discipline– Informs investors, better allocation of resources
What about volatility?
• If fundamentals are volatile, then so be it.
– Market price is volatile…
– …but it simply reflects the volatility of the fundamentals
Theory of the Second Best
• When there is more than one imperfection in an economy, removing one of them need not improve welfare.
• In the presence of other imperfections (agency problems, feedback, etc.) marking to market need not be welfare improving.
Dual Role of Market Prices
• Two roles of market price– Reflection of fundamentals – Influences actions
• Reliance on market prices distorts market prices
Actions Prices
Balance Sheet Propagation
• Accounting numbers influence financial institutions’ decisions– They provide certification, and hence provide
justifications for actions– Emphasis on management accountability and
good corporate governance sharpens these incentives
– Marking to market creates externalities in the form of balance sheet spill-over effects
Simplified Financial System
Households
Financial Intermediaries
Pension Funds
Households
Assets Liabilities
Property
Other assets
Net Worth
Mortgage
Financial Intermediaries
Assets Liabilities
Mortgage
Other Assets
Net Worth
Bonds
Pension Funds
Assets Liabilities
Bonds
Cash
Net Worth
PensionLiabilities
Bonds
• Bonds issued by financial intermediaries are perpetuities
• Price p, yield r
• Duration is/dp dr
pp
Pension Liabilities
1 2 3
Duration of bond
Duration of pension liability
Price of bond
duration
Pension Funds
• Pension funds are required to mark their liabilities to market (e.g. FRS 17).
• Pension funds are required to match duration of liabilities with assets of similar duration
Pension funds’ demand for bonds
Price of bonds
demandfor bonds
durationof bonds
duration of pension liabilities
Weight of Money into Property
• Financial intermediaries accommodate increased demand for bonds by new issues of bonds
• Households are always willing to increase borrowing– Increase in balance sheet size of financial
intermediaries
Property Market
“Cash in the market” pricing (Shapley-Shubik)
supply
vv
Property Price as Function of Bond Price
p increase bond issue v increase
v(p)
p
Credit Quality
• Credit quality of bonds depends on household net worth
v increase + net worth p increase
Bond Price as Function of Property Price
p(v)
v
Define h(.) as inverse of v(p)
p
v
h(v)
p(v)
Step Adjustment:Fall in Treasury Yields
p
v
h(v)
p(v)
p(v)
Link between Credit SpreadTreasury Yields
• As price of risk-free perpetuity increases, the credit quality of bonds improves
• link between level of yields and credit spreads
• Monetary policy has financial stability implications
Contrast with Historical Cost Accounting Regime
p
v
h(v)
p(v)
p(v)
Step Adjustment:Property Price Fall
p
v
h(v)
p(v)
new equilibrium
Property as Sole Real Asset
• In this simplified model, the only asset propping up the financial system is property
• Property price can be rationalised in terms of present value of future housing services
• But “housing service” is not fungible.
• It cannot be used to meet mortgage liabilities
Channels of Contagion
• The main channel of propagation is change in asset prices (property, bond)
• Even without “domino effect” of defaults contagion can be potent (Cf. European insurers, summer 2002)
• Counterparty risk will reinforce the price effects
v
s
s(v)
d(v)