Market Power and Competition Policy in the Telecommunications ...
Transcript of Market Power and Competition Policy in the Telecommunications ...
Market Power and Competition Policy in the Telecommunications Market
Apr. 8, 2013 Director for Policy Planning
Tariff and Telecommunications Access Policy Division Telecommunications Bureau
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
Atsushi UMINO
1
Current Status of the Telecommunications Market In JAPAN
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140 138.4
53.6
33.5
30.5
Mobile Telephony
Fixed Telephony
Broadband
IP Telephony
(Broadband)
(Fixed Telephony)
(IP Telephony)
2 Telecom Service Subscriptions in Japan
As of End Dec. 2012 (millions)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
Dec.'00
Mar.'0
1Jun.'01
Sep.'01
Dec.'01
Mar.'0
2Jun.'02
Sep.'02
Dec.'02
Mar.'0
3Jun.'03
Sep.'03
Dec.'03
Mar.'0
4Jun.'04
Sep.'04
Dec.'04
Mar.'0
5Jun.'05
Sep.'05
Dec.'05
Mar.'0
6Jun.'06
Sep.'06
Dec.'06
Mar.'0
7Jun.'07
Sep.'07
Dec.'08
Mar.'0
8Jun.'08
Sep.'08
Dec.'08
Mar.'0
9Jun.'09
Sep.'09
Dec.'09
Mar.'1
0Jun.'10
Sep.'10
Dec.'10
Mar.'1
1Jun.'11
Sep.'11
Dec.'11
Mar.'1
2Jun.'12
Sep.'12
Dec.'12
FTTH 23.6M
BWA 4.7M
CATV 6.0M
ADSL 5.7M
Total:53.6M
LTE 13.6M
3 Broadband Subscriptions in Japan
(millions) As of End Dec. 2012
International Comparison of Broadband Technology 4
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Japan US UK France Germany S. Korea
65%
7% 2.7% 1.1% 0.6%
60%
18%
35%
77% 93%
85%
13%
17%
57%
20% 6%
14% 28%
1.1% 0.2%
OthersCATVDSLFTTH
Source: OECD (As of June 2012)
Current Status of Broadband Spread in Japan
Area Coverage Rate
Penetration Rate
Broadband*2
Ultra-High-Speed Broadband*1
ー
86.5%
End of Mar. 2008
99.7 %
90.1%
(98.8 %)
100%
97.3%
99.9 %
91.6%
(99.1 %) (99.2 %) (98.3 %)
92.7%
100 % ( 99.7%)
*1 FTTH, CATV Internet, FWA, BWA (only services whose downloading speeds are over 30Mbps, other than FTTH) *2 FTTH, DSL, CATV Internet , FWA, Satellite Broadband, BWA, 3.5G Mobile Broadband *3 FTTH, DSL, CATV Internet, FWA, BWA (only Local WiMAX)
Fixed Ultra-High-Speed
Broadband*4
Fixed Broadband*3
0.1 0.7 3.6
14.4
0
5
10
15
20
2010.3 2011.3 2012.3 2012.12
65.2%
(%)
Inside ( ) : only fixed broadband
( 96.5%)
47.6%
5
End of Mar. 2009
End of Mar. 2010
End of Mar. 2011
End of Mar. 2012
End of Dec.2012
End of Dec.2012
Mobile Ultra-High-Speed
Broadband*5
*4 FTTH, CATV Internet (only services whose downloading speeds are over 30Mbps) *5 3.9G Mobile Broadband, BWA (other than Local WiMAX)
6
Current Status of Telecommunications Policy
¥0
¥5
¥10
¥15
1985 2011
NTT DoCoMo
SoftBank Mobile
NTT \5.1 trillion
KDD \0.2 trillion
KDDI (Fixed)
NTT Com
NTT East
NTT West
SoftBank Telecom
\5.4 trillion
\15.8 trillion
Status of Sales Volume in the Domestic Telecommunications Market (FY2011)
Others
NTT \8.8 trillion
KDDI \3.6 trillion
Softbank \2.5 trillion
KDDI (Mobile)
trillion
trillion
trillion
Growth in Telecom Market 7
NTT (Holding company)
NTT International Network
IIJ
CWC NTT DoCoMo
NTT Group ・NTT (Holding) ・NTT East ・NTT West ・NTT Communications
・NTT DOCOMO
Major Changes in Japanese Telecommunications Carriers
KDD
Teleway (TWJ)
DDI
IDO
7 Cellulars
TTNet
IDC
J-Phone J-Phone Vodafone
Digital Phone
Vodafone HD
NTT East
NTT West
NTT Communications
Japan Telecom
eAccess
Japan Telecom
DDI Pocket Willcom
DDI Pocket
Vodafone (UK)
Cable and Wireless IDC
BB technology
Japan Telecom IDC
ACCA Networks
eAccess
eMOBILE
Astel Tokyo
Powered.com
UQ Communications UQ Communications
NTT
(Divided/reorganized in July ’92)
(Divided/reorganized in July ’99)
(Merged in Oct. ’99)
(Main shareholder in Sept. ’03)
(Assigned sales in Dec. ’03)
(International phone calls inaugurated in April ’53, relay phone calls inaugurated in July ’87)
(Relay phone calls inaugurated in Sept. ’87)
(Subscribed phone calls inaugurated in May ’88)
(Merged in Dec. ’98)
(Mer
ged
in O
ct. ’
00)
KD
DI (Merged in Oct. ’01)
Buyout by Carlyle, new company established in Oct. ’04
(Merged in Oct. ’05)
Phone companies other than NTT East/West inaugurated in Feb. ’05)
KDDI
3 Tu-ka companies
Yozan (PHS in Aug. ’02)
Powered.com (Merged in April ’03)
(End PHS in June ’06)
(Invest)
(International phone calls inaugurated in Oct. ’89) (Buyout in June ’99)
(Buyout from Ripplewood in July ’04)
(Merged in July ’05)
(Buyout and name change in Feb. ’05)
( Buyout by Ripplewood in Nov. ’03)
(Name change in Oct. ’03)
(Name change in Dec. ’03) (March ’02)
(Invest)
(Invested in Sept. ’99)
(acquired stock in Sept. ’01) (Invest)
ITJ
(International phone calls inaugurated in Oct. ’89)
BT (UK) AT&T (USA)
Japan Telecom (Relay phone calls inaugurated in Sept. ’87)
(Relay phone calls inaugurated in Sept. ’87)
(Merged as one company in July. ’08)
(Merged in April ’99)
(Merged in Oct. ’97)
(Inaugurated ADSL in Jan. ’01)
(Inaugurated ADSL in Sep. ’01)
(Inaugurated PHS in July. ’95)
(Inaugurated Mobile in March. ’07)
(Invest in August ’07)
(Inaugurated ADSL in Oct. ’00)
(Making a subsidiary in August ’08)
(Japan Telecom sold shares of eAccess in Oct ’04)
(Soft-Bank BB built by merging 4 companies in Jan ’03)
Privatized in April’ 85
(Merged in June. ’09)
(Making a subsidiary in June ’10)
au
(Name change in Feb. ’05)
SoftBank Telecom
(Buyout in April ’06, Changing the company
name in Oct ‘06)
SoftBank Mobile
SoftBank BB
(Changing the company name in Oct ‘06)
Softbank Group
Willcom (Invest in Dec.’10)
(Merged in Jan. ’06)
Wireless City Planning
(Merged in Dec. ’10)
(Merged in Mar. ’11)
C&W(UK)
Japan Telecom
Japan Telecom HD
(Equity-method affiliate Jan. ’13)
Okinawa Cellular Okinawa Cellular
KDDI Group
8
Market Share of NTT Group Companies
Fixed Telephony IP Telephony Mobile
Telephony Broadband
As of End Dec. 2012
NTT East/West
77% NTT East/West NTT Com
58% NTT DoCoMo
44%
ADSL NTT East/West
34%
NTT East/West
73%
FTTH
9
Changes in Fixed Broadband Share by Operator
38.6 41.0
30.4 31.9
6.6 11.0
10.8 8.9 6.2 2.2
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2007.3 2012.12
FTTH
36.8 39.6
19.9 16.2
18.1 18.1
13.7 23.2
7.8
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2007.3 2012.12
ADSL FTTH+ADSL+CATV
23.4 30.0
19.7 24.2
2.2
7.3 19.9
6.5 7.3 3.8
27.5 28.2
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2007.3 2012.12
NTT East
NTT West
KDDI
Power Co. subsidiaries
UCOM
Others
NTT East
NTT West
SoftBank
eAccess
Others
NTT East
NTT West
SoftBank
KDDI
eAccess
Others
10
ACCA
Competition in the Broadband Market
Metal access
Fiber access
NTT East & West 99.8%
Others 0.2%
NTT East & West 77.3%
Others 22.7%
Facility-based competition Service-based competition
ADSL
FTTH
NTT East & West 34.3%
Softbank 39.6%
e-Access 23.2%
Others 2.9%
NTT East & West 72.9%
Power Co. subsidiaries
8.9% KDDI 11.1%
UCOM 2.2%
Others 5.0%
As of the end of Dec. 2012 As of the end of Mar. 2012
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52.2 49.7 48.7 48.2 47.1 45.3 44.1
27.7 28.3 27.5 27.4 26.8 26.4 26.6
15.6 17.3 18.4 18.8 20.6 21.8 22.6
4.5 4.7 5.3 5.6 5.6 6.5 6.7
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2007.3 2008.3 2009.3 2010.3 2011.3 2012.3 2012.12
NTT DoCoMo KDDI SoftBank Mobile Others
12 Changes in Mobile and PHS Service Share by Operator
13
Development of Competition Policy
Changes in Competition Policy in Telecommunications Market • Introduction of the principle of competition Enactment of Telecommunications Business Act, privatization of NTT Public
Corporation
• Introduction of asymmetric regulation Institutionalization of interconnection rules for fixed telecommunications services • Deregulation of market entry Abolition of supply & demand adjustment and across-the-board foreign investment
restriction • Deregulation of retail rate regulation Abolition of authorization system • Reorganization of NTT
• Expansion of asymmetric regulation Institutionalization of interconnection rules for mobile telecommunications services
Introduction of rules for prohibition of anti-competitive activities • Establishment of the universal service system
• Deregulation of market entry Abolition of permission system • Deregulation of retail rate regulation Abolition of general retail rate/tariff regulation • Reinforcement of consumer protection rules Accountability of important terms and
conditions
1997 ~
From Monopoly To Competition
Development of Fair Competition
Rule
From Ex-ante Regulation
To Ex-post Regulation
• Response to shift to mobile Introduction of accounting separation • Ensuring equivalence between NTT East & West and competitors Functional separation of NTT East & West
Response to Changes of
Market Environment
14
1985 ~
2001 ~
2004 ~
2010 ~
1985~ 1990~ 2000~ Entry
Exit
User
Charge
Consumer
Protection
Interconnection
Asymmetric Regulation (Fixed)
Asymmetric Regulation (Mobile)
Universal
Service
‘04~ Registration/Notification
‘99~ Authorization of reference interconnection offers, Unbundling
‘85~ Permission/Notification ‘04~ Notification
‘98~ Notification
‘98~ Price cap regulation (ex. fixed phone provided by NTT E&W)
‘04~ Basically, no regulation
‘04~ Accountability of important terms and conditions
‘99~ Obligation of acceptance of request for interconnection
‘99~ Accounting separation
‘01~ Notification of reference interconnection offers
‘06~ Start of operation
‘01~ Prohibition of anti-competitive activities
‘85~ Permission/Registration/Notification
‘10~ Accounting separation
‘11~ Functional separation
‘85~ Authorization (partly, Notification)
15 Changes in regulations on Telecommunications Business
Current Framework of “Asymmetric Regulation”
Fixed Telecommunications Market Mobile Telecommunications Market
Operators that have over 50 % share of all access lines
Operators that have over 10 % share of all terminals
Interconnection Authorization of reference offers Accounting separation Unbundling etc.
Interconnection Notification of reference offers Accounting separation etc.
Retail rate(partly)
Notification of tariffs Price cap regulation etc.
Prohibiting anti-competitive activities
【Prohibited activities】 Abuse of information gained through
interconnection Discriminatory treatment among operators Unjust intervention with manufacturers or
others
Operators specifically designated whose revenue shares are over 25%
Others
NTT East, NTT West NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, Softbank Mobile
Prohibiting anti-competitive activities 【Prohibited activities】
Abuse of information gained through interconnection
Discriminatory treatment among operators Unjust intervention with manufacturers or others Concurrent executive posts in specific operators
etc.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
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“Category 1 designated facilities” Rule “Category 2 designated facilities” Rule
N/A
N/A
N/A
Others
NTT DoCoMo
Criteria for Designation of “Dominant Carriers” in Mobile Market
(3) Basically, a criterion of (1) or (2) shall be considered, but the suitability of designation shall be comprehensively judged by service area, considering the following factors:
Size of business (capital, revenue, employment number), influence in market, brand power, substitutability between supply and demand, price elasticity, predominance in the selling or distribution of services/handsets or others, joint dominance etc.
● This operator shall be designated, only in the case where it is specifically presumed to have market power after considering a level of share and each factor stated at (3)
(2) When some operators have over 25% but not more than 40% market share
(1) Over 40% market share throughout period of time
Over 25 % revenue share
A The largest share
B Other than above
17
Over 10 % terminal share
● This operator shall be presumed to have market power and be designated, unless special circumstances are acknowledged, after considering each factor stated at (3).
● This operator shall be designated, only in the case where it is specifically presumed to have market power through the fact that the difference of share to the operator with the largest share is small and after considering the level of said share.
Framework of Regulations on NTT Group
NTT
NTT East
NTT Communications
NTT Data
NTT DoCoMo
NTT West
Holding company
Local telecommunications business in eastern Japan
Long distance/international telecommunications business, and ISP
System integration business
Mobile telecommunications business
100%
100%
100%
54%
63%
Foreign investment restriction (below 1/3) Governmental possession of over 1/3 of all stocks
Regulation on special companies
1. Regulations regarding interconnection [Main regulations] Authorization/notification and publication of
reference interconnection offers Accounting separation
2. Prohibiting anti-competitive activities [Main prohibited activities] Abuse of information obtained through
interconnection Discriminatory treatment among operators Unjust intervention in other companies (including
content providers, manufacturers and sales companies)
3. Functional separation (only NTT East/West) Separation of the “facility department” and the
“sales department”
Regulation on dominant carriers
NTT Act
Telecomm
unications B
usiness Act
Responsibility to provide universal services Line-of-business restrictions
18
Local telecommunications business in western Japan
Facility department
Sales department
Monitoring department
MIC
Annual report
(If necessary) - On-site Inspection - Administrative order
Supervision for effective functional separation
Chief information manager on
interconnection
• The MIC has assured a certain level of equal access to the bottleneck facilities of NTT East & West through such measures as accounting separation and access/interconnection rules.
• For further assurance of equal access, the firewall between the facility department and the sales department was strengthened by such means as (1) establishing an exclusive facility department, (2) appointing a chief information manager on interconnection in the facility department, and (3) establishing a monitoring department on interconnection affairs.
NTT East/West
“Functional Separation” of NTT East & West 19
Came into effect in November 2011
Review of Operators Subject to Mobile Regulations
(1) Curtailment of the disparity of negotiating power
(2) Development of MVNO entry
All the major 3 operators should be subject to the designation.
“10% share” should be the threshold, in reference to the competition law.
The threshold was reduced from “25% share” to “10% share”.
44.1%
26.6%
22.6%
6.7% NTT DoCoMo
KDDI
Softbank Mobile
Others
(Reference) Share(*) of mobile phone and PHS
(Dec. 2012)
(*) shares in the number of mobile phone terminals
• The MIC amended the ministerial ordinance in June 2012. By way of this amendment, the threshold of the designation concerning the “Category II designated telecommunications facilities” rule, which imposes regulations for fairness and transparency of interconnection charges, etc. on specific mobile operators, has been reduced from “ over 25% terminal share” to “over 10% terminal share”.
• As a result of this amendment, Softbank Mobile has become subject to said designation, in addition to NTT DoCoMo and KDDI.
20
Disparity of negotiating power in interconnection among 3 operators (NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, and Softbank Mobile) has decreased as their market shares close.
While more MVNO entries are desirable, even MNOs with a small market share can have stronger negotiating power vis-à-vis MVNOs.
21
Competition Evaluation
Outline of “Competition Evaluation” ‘The amendment to the Telecommunications Act’ in 2003, has converted the regulatory framework
from ex-ante regulation to ex-post regulation. The MIC has introduced the “Competition Evaluation” as a means to comprehend rapidly changing
market trends accurately. Results of the evaluation are used as fundamental data for policy making.
22
Scope of analysis and evaluation in the “Competition Evaluation in FY2011”
Field Market Notes
Voice Fixed Fixed phone (including 0ABJ-IP phone)
Relay phone ・Not evaluated
050-IP phone
Mobile Cell phone, PHS
Data Mobile Cell phone, PHS, BWA, LTE
Fixed Broadband as a whole
FTTH
ADSL ・Not evaluated ・Comprehend relationships to FTTH in “broadband as a whole”
CATV internet
Narrowband (including ISDN) ・Out of scope
ISP ISP
Wholesale WAN
Leased line
Main topics of the results of “Competition Evaluation in FY2011” (1) 23
NTT DoCoMo’s position of possibly exercising market power might have a tendency to subside gradually, partly in light of the recent trend of its share decrease (even at a high level), the average rates of a monthly increase in the numbers of subscribers, and the status of number portability.
There might be little possibility for NTT DoCoMo to exercise its market power individually or collectively, partly in light of the status of campaign development of retail rates or others, the potential pressure of MVNOs and the status of each operator’s service including those in cooperation with OTT players/handset makers or others.
There is no indication that a certain mobile operator forms its market power through cooperation with OTT players/handset makers at this time, judging partly from circumstances where no specific operators might enclose their own customers through cooperation with OTT players/handset makers or other means.
Mobile market
Through “Competition Evaluation”, the MIC found as follows:
24
NTT East in eastern Japan and NTT West in western Japan have positions of possibly exercising their market power individually, partly in light of the shares by operator, the degree of market concentration, and concern about leverage from the fixed phone market.
There might be little possibility for NTT East & West to exercise their market power in reality under the regulation on “Category 1 designated telecommunications facilities,” partly in light of the fact that rates of increase in numbers of FTTH subscribers have a tendency of slowing,.
NTT East & West and other operators with large shares would have possible positions to exercise their market power collectively, judging only from shares by operator. However, there might be little real possibility of this considering the current status of competition in the fixed broadband market.
Fixed broadband market
Main topics of the results of “Competition Evaluation in FY2011” (2)
25
FTTH Market
In eastern Japan, NTT East might be in the position of possibly exercising its market power individually. However, there might be little real possibility under the regulation in “Category 1 designated telecommunications facilities,” in light of the fact that the rates of increase in the numbers of FTTH subscribers have a tendency of slowing, analysis of wholesale transactions, and the status of recent service-based competition.
In western Japan, NTT West might be in the position of possibly exercising its market power individually, which is degrading when compared to NTT East. In addition, as well as eastern Japan, there might be little real possibility under the regulation on “Category 1 designated telecommunications facilities,” in light of analysis of wholesale transactions, and the status of recent service-based competition.
Main topics of the results of “Competition Evaluation in FY2011” (3)
Implementation Plan of “Competition Evaluation in FY2012” 26
New subjects for analysis
Analysis of competitive conditions from the viewpoint of new entrants (MVNOs)
Trends of the spread of collaborated services, such as collaboration of smartphone and FTTH, and influence thereof on competitive conditions
Partial change of market definition
Reinforcement of analysis and evaluation of demand-side data
Defining “Mobile ultra-high-speed broadband”(LTE/BWA) as a partial market of “Data”(mobile), in accordance with rapid changes in the telecommunications market structure
Adding “Quality of services” and “Costs of changing services” to analytical indicators, besides “Rate,” which is already in use
The result of the evaluation is to be published around summer of 2013