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MarineriskassessmentmethodologyusingformalsafetyassessmentintheBlackSeabasinARTICLEJANUARY2012

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METODOLOGIA DE EVALUAREA A RISCULUI MARIN UTILIZND EVALUAREA FORMAL A

SIGURANEI N BAZINUL MRII NEGRE

MARINE RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY USING FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT IN THE

BLACK SEA BASIN

Sef lucrari dr. ec. ing. Gasparotti Carmen Universitatea Dunarea de Jos Galati

Abstract: Formal safety assessment (FSA) is a structured and systematic methodology, aimed at enhancing maritime safety by using risk and cost-benefit assessment. Formal safety assessment (FSA) represents IMOs response to the necessity of a modern approach of the process of establishing regulations in order to improve safety at sea. Black Sea pollution has now reached an unprecedented level, the biggest polluter being hydrocarbons. While the level of safety at sea has in general improved in recent years, accidents still occur and improvements are still desirable. An important role in oil pollution is played by the offshore and the tanker accidents. The aim of the work proposed herewith is to present the steps of risk assessment methodology that could be incorporated in the whole process of the FSA. Risk assessment results stay on base of risk management to the adoption of measures for risk control, prevention and reduction in operating ships at sea and to the recommendation for decision-making bodies and regulators to bring risk to the lowest possible level. The best reduce measures of risk are established based on cost-benefit analysis.

Keywords: formal safety assessment, risk assessment, hazards identification, decision making.

1. INTRODUCERE

Poluarea Mrii Negre a atins n ultimul timp proporii dramatice. Sursele i cauzele sunt multiple: evacurile de ape uzate, deeurile industriale, scurgeri de hidrocarburi din activiti de foraj i extracie n zonele marine, operaii de transport, transfer, rafinare i depozitare. n bazinul Mrii Negre sunt descrcate anual 110 000 tone de petrol, din care cel mai mare poluator sunt sursele continentale, Dunrea fiind cel mai mare poluator. El aduce anual 53 000 tone de petrol n mare, dar i sute de tone de cadmiu, mercur, plumb, zinc, crom. De asemenea, sunt

1. INTRODUCTION

Black Sea pollution has lately gotten dramatic proportions. Sources and causes are multiple: discharges of domestic sewage, industrial wastes, hydrocarbon spills from drilling and extraction activities in marine areas, the operations of transport, transfer, refining, and storage. In the Black Sea basin is discharged 110,000 tons of oil annually, of which the worst polluter are continental sources, the Danube being the main polluter. It brings annually 53,000 tones of oil into the sea, but hundreds of tons of cadmium, mercury, lead, zinc, chromium. Also, are spilled significant

deversate cantiti semnificative de silicon, nitrai, fosfai, pesticide n Marea Neagr. Pe sectorul romnesc printre poluatorii majori ai Mrii Negra sunt platforma industrial Petromidia-Nvodari, oraele Constana i Mangalia i operatorii de transport pe mare, care spal tancurile de petrol, produse chimice sau gaze lichefiate, nainte de a intra n port. Totui, accidentele cu consecine serioase se datoreaz navigaiei. Astfel, pe 11 noiembrie 2007 a avut loc cel mai mare dezastru ecologic din istoria Mrii Negre. n strmtoarea Kerci, care leag Marea Neagr de Marea Azov, petrolierul Volga-Neft transportnd 4000 tone de pcur, n timpul unei furtuni s-a rupt n dou, deversnd n mare aproximativ 2000 tone. n aceiai zi, trei alte nave ce transportau sulf, tot datorit furtunii s-au scufundat, deversnd n mare 7000 tone de sulf. Accidentele maritime nsoite de scurgeri masive de petrol, dei rare, reprezint riscuri serioase pentru poluarea marin i de coast, cauznd dezastre ecologice reale. Evaluarea riscurilor din accidentele pe mare au determinat luarea de msuri de ctre industrie, guverne, IMO (Organizaia Maritim Internaional) trebuid s revizuiasc regulile, procedurile, tehnicile i materialele din industria de transport maritim, aa nct din etapa de proiectare pn la operare aceste riscuri trebuie luate n mod corespunztor n considerare. Accidentele tancurilor Erika i Prestige n 1999 care au cauzat poluarea pe scar larg a rmurilor europene, au dus la luarea n discuie a procedurilor de urgen asupra tancurilor cu corp simplu, care n final au condus la un acord internaional asupra construciei tancurilor petroliere cu dublu corp. Scopul acestei lucrri este de a prezenta paii ce trebuie urmai n metodologia de evaluare a riscului maritim i de a sublinia importana acesteia pentru managementul riscului n adoptarea celor mai eficiente msuri de reducere a riscului la un nivel rezonabil posibil.

2. EVALUAREA RISCULUI I LUAREA DECIZIILOR

Evaluarea riscurilor este un proces complex ce implic identificarea riscurilor i a surselor

amounts of silicon, nitrates, phosphates, pesticides into the Black Sea. On the Romanian sector among the major polluters of the Black Sea include Petromidia-Navodari industrial platform, the cities of Constanta and Mangalia and sea carriers which washing their oil tankers, chemical or liquefied gas carriers, before entering the port. However, the accidents with serious consequences are due to shipping. Thus on November 11, 2007 has been the biggest environmental disaster in the history of the Black Sea. In the Kerci Strait that connects the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, Volga-Neft tanker carrying 4,000 tones of fuel oil, during a storm broke in two, spilling into the sea about 2000 tones. In the same day, three other vessels carrying sulfur, all because of the storm sank, spilling into the sea about 7000 tones of sulfur. Shipping accidents accompanied by massive oil spills, although rare, represent serious risks to marine and coastal pollution, causing real ecological disaster. Evaluating the risk of accidents at sea has determined taking of measures by industry, government, IMO (International Maritime Organization) being to revise the regulations, procedures, techniques and materials in the shipping industry, so that from the design to the operation stage these risks should be properly taken into account. Accidents of Erika tanker (1999) and Prestige which caused widespread pollution of European shores, have resulted in making discussion on emergency procedure of single body tankers, which in the end led to an international agreement on construction of oil tankers with double body. The aim of this paper is to present the steps must be followed in the marine risk assessment methodology and to highlight its importance for risk management in adopting the most effective measures of reducing risk to a reasonable possible level.

2. RISK ASSESSMENT AND DECISION-MAKING

Risks assessment is a complex process involving the identification of the risk and its sources, as well as of the occurrence and severity of their consequences. This is used to elaborate strategies

acestora, precum i apariia i gravitatea consecinelor lor. Aceasta este folosit pentru a elabora strategii pentru diminuarea riscurilor i mbuntirea siguranei pe mare prin adoptarea de msuri de prevenire, control i reducere a riscurilor. Pentru creterea siguranei pe mare, IMO a dezvoltat o metodologie structurat i sistematic pentru o evaluare formal a siguranei (FSA), prin folosirea analizei de risc i a unui management eficient al riscurilor. FSA este un proces sistematic i raional pentru evaluarea riscurilor i pentru evaluarea costurilor i beneficiilor a diferitelor opiuni de reducere a acelor riscuri. Metoda ofer un mijloc de a fi proactiv, permind pericolelor poteniale care urmeaz s fie luate n considerare nainte de produce un accident grav. FSA este folosit de autoritatea de reglementare pentru a evalua riscurile pe o nav reprezentativ "generic" i s decid care sunt normele de siguran ce ar trebui s se aplice tuturor navelor din flot. Acest lucru este destinat s asigure ca toate navele din flot s respecte un standard acceptabil de siguran. Modelul generic nu ar trebui s fie privit ca o nav izolat, ci mai degrab ca o colecie de sisteme, incluznd aspectele de organizare, de management, operaionale, umane, electronice i hardware-ul. FSA reprezint o schimbare fundamental de la ceea ce a fost anterior o abordare n mare parte fragmentat i reactiv la una care este proactiv, integrat, i mai presus de toate pe baza evalurii i managementului riscurilor ntr-un mod transparent i justificabil ncurajnd astfel o mai mare conformitate cu cadrul de reglementare maritim,la rndul su conducnd la mbuntirea securitii i proteciei mediului. Principalul cadrul al FSA const din urmtoarele cinci etape: -Identificarea pericolelor. -Evaluarea riscurilor asociate cu aceste pericole. -Modaliti de gestionare a riscurilor. -Evaluarea cost-beneficiu a opiunilor i, -Deciziile asupra cror opiuni trebuie selectate. Primele trei implic utilizarea tehnicilor de

for risk diminishing and safety improvement at sea by the adoption of measures for prevention, control and reduce the risks. To increase safety at sea, IMO has developed a structured and systematic methodology for a formal safety assessment (FSA), by using risk analysis and an efficient risk management. FSA is a rational and systematic process for assessing risks and for evaluating the costs and benefits of different options for reducing those risks. The method provides a means of being proactive, enabling potential hazards to be considered before a serious accident occurs. FSA is used by the regulator to assess the risks on a representative generic ship and decide which safety rules should be applied to all ships in the fleet. This is intended to ensure that all ships in the fleet meet an acceptable standard of safety. The generic model should not be viewed as an individual ship in isolation, but rather as a collection of systems, including organizational, management, operational, human, electronic and hardware aspects. FSA represents a fundamental change from what was previously a largely piecemeal and reactive regulatory approach to one which is proactive, integrated, and above all based on risk evaluation and management in a transparent and justifiable manner thereby encouraging greater compliance with the maritime regulatory framework, in turn leading to improved safety and environmental protection. The main FSA framework consists of the following five steps : -The identification of the hazards. -The assessment of the risks associated with those hazards. -Ways of managing the risks. -Cost benefit assessment of the options and, -Decisions on which options to select. The first three involve the use of risk assessment techniques, while the fourth one is, as stated, cost benefit assessment. The fifth step is nothing else but the logical outcome of the cost benefit assessment (Fig. 1).

evaluare a riscurilor, n timp ce al patrulea este, dup cum s-a declarat, evaluarea cost-beneficiu. Al cincilea pas este nimic altceva dect rezultatul logic al evalurii cost-beneficiu (Fig.1)

Fig. 1 Evaluarea i managementul riscului

2.1. Identificarea pericolelor

Identificarea riscurilor const n identificarea pericolelor, care ar putea provoca poluarea grav a mediului nconjurtor. Acesta reprezint primul pas care este esenial ntr-o evaluare a riscurilor. Un pericol este identificat ca o situaie cu un potenial de vtmare a siguranei umane, mediului, proprietii sau afacerii, indiferent de modul n care ar putea sau nu un astfel de eveniment s se produc. Identificarea pericolelor trebuie s fie un proces bine structurat sistematic i critic. Scopul acestui pas este de a identifica pericolele legate de o zon problematic specific i de a genera o list a acestora, n funcie de probabilitatea lor de apariie i severitatea consecinelor lor fa de viaa oamenilor, bunurilor i mediului, n scopul de a asigura baza sau punctul de referin pentru urmtorul pas. Principalele pericole identificate din bazele de date pot fi clasificate n urmtoarele tipuri de accidente generice: coliziuni nav-nav, deriv pe uscat, insuficiena structural, incendiu /explozie n

Fig. 1 Risk Assessment and Management

2.1. The identification of the hazards

Risk identification consists of hazards identification, which should caused severe pollution of environment. It represents first step which is essential in a risk assessment. A hazard is identified as a situation with a potential for causing harm to human safety, the environment, property or business, regardless of how likely or unlikely such an occurrence might be. The hazards identification must be a well-structured systematic and critical process. The aim of this step is to identify the hazards related to a specific problematic area and generate a list of them, according to their likelihood of occurrence and the severity of their consequence towards human life, property and the environment, in order to provide the base or the reference point for the next step. The main dangers identified from databases can be categorized into the following generic accident types: ship-ship collisions, powered groundings, drift groundings, structural failure, fire/explosion whilst underway, powered ship collision with fixed marine structures such as platforms or wind turbines.

timp ce n curs de navigare, coliziuni ale navelor cu structurile marine fixe, cum ar fi platforme sau turbine eoliene. Expresia cea mai popular utilizat pentru ntregul proces de identificare a pericolelor se numete tehnica "brainstorming". Aceasta tehnic implic personal calificat i cu experien care combin cunotinele lor de a identifica pericolele prin abordri diferite, cum ar fi urmtoarele: -Analiz preliminar a riscurilor (PHA). -Modul eecurilor i analiza efectelor (FMEA). -Studiul pericolelor i al operabilitii (HAZOP). O analiz grosier a cauzelor posibile i a rezultatelor din fiecare categorie de accident ar trebui s fie efectuat. Este unanim acceptat faptul c un accident marin nu este cauzat de o singur cauz, ci de o multitudine de cauze, factori individuali, factori tehnologici i organizaionali. Pornind de la o cauz imediat a deversrii anchetatorul poate examina lanul de evenimente i poate identifica unul sau mai muli factori care au contribuit la accident sau cauzele de baz. Analiza cauzelor de baz ncearc s neleag "de ce", a avut loc un accident i s rspund la ntrebri de genul "ce s-a ntmplat, cum s-a ntmplat", i "de ce s-a ntmplat. Cauzele care contribuie la riscuri includ: densitate mare de trafic, condiiile meteo nefavorabile i a obstacolelor de navigaie, condiiile de mare (adncimea apei i natura fundului mrii), vizibilitate, erorile umane, eurile de nave necunoscute, emisiile de gaze produse n cisterne. Acestea pot aprea individual sau n orice combinaie i ar putea avea ca rezultat o deversare de petrol major. Datele statistice arat c cele mai multe accidente s-au produs din cauza condiiilor hidro meteorologice nefavorabile i a erorilor umane (erori ale comandanilor sau erori ale echipajului). Baza de date CTX (Centrul de Excelen pentr petroliere) susine c eecul structural este, pe departe, singura cauz cea mai important, att pentru distrugerea navei ct i a deversrilor, iar eecul mainilor i instalaiilor este cea de a doua cauz cea mai important a deversrilor.. Nivelul actual de risc al petrolierelor n Marea Neagr este mic, dar acesta nu ar trebui s fie

The most popular expression used for the whole process of hazard identification is called brainstorming technique. This technique involves trained and experienced personnel combining their knowledge to identify the hazards through various approaches, such as the following: -Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). -Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). -Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study. A coarse analysis of possible causes and outcomes of each accident category should be carried out. It is widely accepted that a marine accident is not caused by a single cause, but a multitude of causes, individual factors, technological and organizational factors. Starting from an immediate cause of discharge the investigator may examine the chain of events and may identify one or more factors that contributed to the accident or basic causes. Analysis of the basic causes seek to understand "why" an accident occurred and seek to answer questions like "what happened, how happened" and "why happened". Causes contributing to the risks include: high traffic density, bad weather conditions and navigational obstacles, sea conditions (water depth and the nature of the seabed), visibility, human errors, unknown ship failures, gas emissions produced in tankers. These can occur individually or in any combination and could have as a result a major oil spill. Statistical data show that most accidents were produced due strong hydro meteorological conditions and human errors (commandants errors or team errors).The CTX (Center for Tanks ship Excellence) database claims that structural failure is by far the single most important cause of both tanker deaths and spillage and machinery failure is the second most important cause of tanker spillage. Identification hazards make use of a number of techniques. Generally, for hazard identification comprises a combination of both creative and analytical techniques, the aim being to identify all relevant hazards. This creative element is to ensure that the process is proactive and not confined only to hazards that have materialized in the past. The current level of risk of tankers in the Black Sea is low, but it should not be neglected due to the

neglijat, datorit consecinelor grave ale accidentelor marine, nsoite de scurgeri de petrol masive pentru mediul nconjurtor.

2.2 Evaluarea riscurilor asociate pericolelor identificate

Evaluarea riscului reprezint, de fapt, o analiz a riscurilor generate de pericole diverse, identificate n pasul 1. Aceasta presupune evaluarea probabilitii, respectiv de ct de des sau de probabil este apariia riscului i de ct de severe sunt consecinele acestuia. Acest lucru permite ca atenia s se concentreze pe zonele de risc ridicat i s identifice i s evalueze factorii care influeneaz nivelul de risc. Aa cum arat statisticile ITOPF (Federaia Internaional de Poluare a proprietarilor de petroliere), frecvena deversrilor de petrol din baze privind dezastrele marine a sczut n mijlocul anilor 80, iar acum ele sunt foarte rare. Exist o variaie considerabil n ceea ce privete incidena anual a polurii cu hidrocarburi i volumul de petrol evacuat, care ilustreaz, de asemenea, natura aleatorie a accidentelor. Acest lucru reduce deversrile de petrol ce pot fi atribuite n mare msur eforturilor industriei de transport maritim i guvernelor (prin intermediul IMO) pentru mbuntirea siguranei navigaiei i prevenirea polurii. Probabilitatea poate fi abordat fie din punct de vedere calitativ ct i cantitativ. Abordarea calitativ se bazeaz pe experiena i judecata experilor, n timp ce abordarea cantitativ are bazele de date naionale i internaionale, rapoartele istorice i statisticile accidentelor i nregistrrile locale. Consecinele accidentelor marine, nsoite de deversrile de petrol sunt orientate pe trei direcii: pierderea de viei/rniri grave, pierderea proprietii i de deteriorare a mediului. Criteriul care ar trebui s fie utilizat pentru a evalua consecinele asupra mediului este vulnerabilitatea socio-economic a mediului la expunerea de petrol. Evacurile masive de petrol din accidentele de transport maritim care cauzeaz daune grave pentru ecosistemele acvatice i de coast,

severe consequences of marine accidents accompanied by massive oil spills for the environment.

2.2. The assessment of the risks associated with those hazards

The risk evaluation represents in fact an analysis of the risks generated by various dangers, identified in step 1. It assumes the evaluation of the likelihood, respectively how often or probable is the risk occurrences and how severe are their consequences. This allows attention to be focused upon high risk areas and to identify and evaluate the factors which influence the level of risk. As shown by statistics from ITOPF (International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation) oil spill database frequency of marine disasters decreased in the mid 80s and now they are very care. There is a considerable annual variation concerning the incidence of the oil pollution and the volume of oil discharged that illustrates also the random nature of the accidents. This reduces of the oil discharges can be related in great measure with the efforts of the industry for maritime transportation and of governments (through IMO) for improving the safety navigation and preventing the pollution. The likelihood can be approached either from qualitative and quantitative point of view. The qualitative approach is based on the expert experiences and judgments, while the quantitative approach has national and international databases, accident history reports and statistics, local records. Consequences of marine accidents accompanied by oil spills are orientated on three directions: loss of lives/serious injuries, loss of property and damage to the environment. The criterion that should be used to evaluate the consequences on the environment is the socio-economical vulnerability of the environment to the oil exposure. Massive discharges of oil from shipping accidents causing serious damages to aquatic ecosystems and coastal, socio-economic activities such as tourism, fishery, crustaceans farming and other marine products.

activitilor socio-economice, cum ar fi turismul, pescuitul, fermele de crustacee i alte produse marine. Natura i durata prejudiciului depind de o serie de factori, inclusiv, tipul i cantitatea de petrol i de comportament odat deversat; condiiile meteorologice i de sezon, caracteristicile zonei afectate; tipul i eficiena rspunsului privind curarea. Din toi factorii critici tipul de petrol este foarte important. ieiul brut i pcura grea prezint cele mai mari probleme din cauza vscozitii lor ridicate. Ele sunt foarte persistente n mediul marin i astfel pot cltori distane mari de la locaia original a scurgerii, provocnd contaminarea pe scar larg a resurselor costiere. Pierderea de proprietate const n pierderea sau deteriorarea navei i pierderea mrfii transportate. Figura 2 prezint costurile anuale estimate globale de daune pe un petrolier reprezentativ.

Fig.2 Estimri generale de risc dup FSA pentru o nav petrolier

Pentru a determina statistic cele dou elemente cheie pentru evaluarea riscului, probabilitatea i consecinele, sunt identificate diferite tipuri de accidente pe baza analizei datelor istorice i scenariilor practice. Probabilitatea i consecinele sunt evaluate prin evaluarea nivelurilor. Probabilitatea poate fi evaluat ca fiind foarte puin probabil, ndeprtat, ocazional, frecvente, iar consecinele ca fiind catastrofal, critic, majore i minore. Urmtorul pas este evaluarea riscurilor. Pentru estimarea riscului probabilitatea i consecinele evenimentelor sunt combinate pentru a cuantifica

The nature and duration of the damage depend on a number of factors including, the type and amount of oil and behavior once spilled; weather conditions and season, the characteristics of the affected area; the type and effectiveness of the clean-up response. Out of all critical factors the type of oil is very important. Heavy crudes and heavy fuel oil posing the greatest problems because of their high viscosity. They are highly persistent in the marine environment and so can travel great distances from the original spill location, causing widespread contamination of coastal resources. Loss of property consists in the loss or damage to the ship and loss of the goods transported. Figure 2 shows the estimated overall annual costs of damage on a representative tanker.

Fig.2 Overall risk estimates from oil tanker FSA

In order to determine the statistical of two key elements for risk assessment, likelihood and consequences, based on the historical data analysis and practical experience scenarios for different types of accidents are identified. The likelihood and the consequences are evaluated by assessing levels. The likelihood can be evaluated as being very unlikely, remote, occasional, probable, frequent, but the consequences as being catastrophic, critical, major and minor. The next step is risk assessment. For risk estimation the likelihood and consequences of events are combined to quantify risk. The calculated risks are then compared and ranked, take into account the ALARP criteria of acceptability. Spill Risk = spill likelihood x spill consequence On this basis the risk classification can be done in priority order for the effort to reduce them,

riscul. Riscurile calculate sunt apoi comparete i ierarhizate, lund n considerare criteriile de acceptabilitate ALARP. Riscul de deversare = probabilitatea x consecin Pe aceast baz clasificarea riscurilor se poate face n ordinea prioritii, pentru efortul de a le reduce, luarea de decizii pentru noi msuri de siguran i mbuntirea celor existente. Evaluarea riscurilor de scurgeri de petrol este foarte dificil din cauza multiplelor consecine i a factorilor, care au influenat gravitatea lor. Acest lucru face imposibil utilizarea unui singur criteriu de evaluare a riscului total. Un risc ar trebui s fie considerat inacceptabil, n cazul n care pierderea de viei omeneti a depit 10-3/ persoan pe an, dar poate fi, de asemenea, inacceptabil, la niveluri mult mai sczute de risc marin, n cazul n care alte componente de risc sunt ridicate. Chiar dac pierderea de viei omeneti este de 10-6 sau mai puin, nu poate fi descris ca "acceptabil", deoarece acest termen se aplic numai la riscul total. n cazul n care alte consecine ale riscurilor sunt necunoscute, evaluarea riscurilor poate fi obinut prin utilizarea ponderii lor. Aceast abordare va recurge la cerina criteriilor de acceptabilitate pentru riscul combinat. O abordare alternativ este de a calcula riscul de poluare a mediului, riscul pentru viaa i riscul de proprietate separat, iar apoi riscurile calculate sunt verificate pe baza a trei criterii de acceptabilitate separate. Un rol esenial n definirea acceptabilitii riscurilor marine este atribuit experienelor i judecii experilor. Matricele de risc sunt cele mai utilizate pentru evaluarea riscurilor n activitile marine, fiind simplu de aplicat i uor de neles. Riscurile inacceptabile nu pot fi justificate n circumstane obinuite. Astfel de riscuri, dac ele exist, trebuie s fie reduse, astfel ca acestea s fie tolerabile sau acceptabile sau pericolul asociat s fie eliminat. Figura 3 prezint riscurile individuale pentru tipurile de nave generice. Riscul este redus la un nivel la care, beneficiul ctigat din viitoarea reducere a riscurilor este compensat de costul de obinere a acestei reduceri a riscului.

making decisions for new safety measures and improving existing ones. Risk assessment of oil spills is very difficult due to multiple consequences and factors, which influenced their severity. This makes impossible using of a single criterion for total risk assessment. A risk should be considered unacceptable, in case in which the loss of lives exceeded 10-3 per person-year, but it may also be unacceptable at much lower levels of marine risk if the other risk components are high. Even if the loss of lives is 10-6 or less, it cannot be described as acceptable, because this term applies only to the total risk. In case in which the other consequences of risks are unknown, the risk assessment can be obtained by using their weight. This approach will resort to the requirement of acceptability criteria for the combined risk. An alternative approach is to calculate risk to environmental pollution, risk to lives and risk to property separately, and then the calculated risks are checked against three separate acceptability criteria. An essential role in defining the acceptability of marine risks is assigned to expert experiences and judgments. Risk matrices are the most common approach used for risk assessment in marine activities, being straightforward to apply and easy to understand. The unacceptable risks cannot be justified in any ordinary circumstances. Such risks, if they do exist, must be reduced so that they are tolerable or acceptable or the associated hazard must be eliminated. Figure 3 shows the individual risks for generic ship types. The risk is reduced to a level to which the benefit gained from further risk reduction is outweighed by the cost of achieving that risk reduction.

Fig. 3 Riscuri individuale pentru diferite tipuri de nave

Un risc care a fost redus n acest fel este considerat a fi fost redus la un nivel care este la fel de "mic pentru a fi rezonabil practicabil", este ALARP.

2.3. Modalitati de gestionare a riscurilor. Recomandri pentru luarea deciziilor

Obiectivul la aceast etap este de a propune msuri eficiente i practice de control a riscurilor (RCMs) pentru zone cu risc ridicat identificate din informaiile produse de evaluare a riscurilor n etapa anterioar. n aceast etap implementarea costurilor i a beneficiilor poteniale ale msurilor de control a riscurilor nu sunt de interes. n general, exist trei caracteristici principale n conformitate cu care RCMs sunt evaluate i care pot fi rezumate dup cum urmeaz: - Cele referitoare la tipul fundamental de reducere a riscului ca msurile preventive care fac "bariere de securitate", care nu permit un incident pentru s progreseze. -Cele cu privire la tipul de aciune necesar (de exemplu, de inginerie sau de procedur). -Cele cu privire la ncrederea c pot fi plasate n cadrul msurilor (unice sau redundante, active sau pasive). Reducerea probabilitii de apariie i / sau gravitatea consecinelor pericolelor se pot realiza reducerea riscurilor. Exist trei metode principale utilizate pentru reducerea riscului, i anume cele de management, inginerie i cele operaionale Soluiile manageriale implic activiti legate de managementul fiecrei organizaii.

Fig. 3 Individual risks for generic ship types

A risk that has been reduced in this way is considered to have been reduced to a level that is as low as is reasonably practicable, is ALARP.

2.3. Ways of managing the risks. Recommendations for decision-making

The aim at this stage is to propose effective and practical Risk Control Measures (RCMs) to high-risk areas identified from the information produced by the risk assessment in the previous step. At this stage the implementation costs and potential benefits of risk control measures are not of concern. In general, there are three main characteristics according to which RCMs are evaluated and which can be summarized as follows: - Those relating to the fundamental type of risk reduction like the preventative measures forming safety barriers not allowing an incident to progress. -Those relating to the type of action required (i.e. engineering or procedural). -Those relating to the confidence that can be placed in the measure (single or redundant, active or passive). Reducing the likelihood of occurrence and/or the severity of the consequences of hazards can achieve risk reduction. There are three main methods used for risk reduction, namely the management, engineering and operational ones. Managerial solutions involve activities related to the management of each organization. Engineering solutions involve the design and/or construction of the ship.

Soluiile de inginerie implic proiectarea i / sau construcia de nave. Soluiile operaionale implic dezvoltarea i introducerea de proceduri adecvate pentru efectuarea sarcinilor "de risc-critice", precum i mbuntirea eficienei personalului in cadrul acestor sarcini. Rezultatele evalurii riscului stau la baza gestionrii riscurilor, pentru adoptarea de msuri de control a riscului, de prevenire i reducere n operarea navelor pe mare, n scopul de a mbunti sigurana n transportul de produse petroliere. Pe baza evalurii riscurilor pot fi luate decizii mult mai n cunotin de cauz pentru a ajuta la reducerea probabilitii si severitii deversrilor de petrol viitoare. Acest lucru este, de fapt, scopul evalurii riscurilor. Att riscurile istorice ct i riscurile recent identificate (de la etapele 1 i 2), ar trebui s fie luate n considerare, obinnd o gam larg de msuri de control a riscurilor. Managementul riscurilor trebuie s rspund la urmtoarele ntrebri: ce msuri sunt necesare pentru a reduce riscurile, care sunt diferitele opiuni, care implic diferite combinaii de siguran i de cheltuieli ce ar trebui s fie selectate, ct de mult ar trebui s se investeasc n mbuntirea siguranei. Msurile adoptate de managementul riscurilor sunt luate n considerare prin nivelul de risc. n cazul n care riscurile sunt considerate acceptabile din punct de vedere tehnic i social, atunci alte msuri de control a riscurilor, nu vor fi necesare. Cu toate acestea, este esenial s se dezvolte programe de monitorizare a situaiei, astfel nct s nu se deterioreze pe o perioad de timp. Auditurile de securitate se numr printre instrumentele utilizate n acest scop. Pentru riscurile considerate tolerabile, n funcie de criteriile de risc, este practic s se identifice msurile de reducere a riscurilor, pe baza celor mai moderne practici, astfel nct acestea s se gseasc ntr-o gam care este considerat acceptat. n cazul n care riscurile depesc criteriul maxim tolerabil, atunci trebuie luate msuri pentru a le face tolerabile; altfel operaiunile care au generat aceste riscuri trebuie s nceteze. Managementul riscului ofer posibilitatea de a

Operational solutions involve the development and introduction of appropriate procedures for carrying out risk-critical tasks, as well as improving the effectiveness of personnel in these tasks. Risk assessment results stay on base of risk management, to the adoption of measures for risk control, prevention and reduction in operating ships at sea, in order to improve safety in transportation of petroleum products. Based on risk assessment more informed decisions can be taken to help reduce the probability and severity of future oil spills. This is, in fact, the aim of assessing risk. Both historical risks and newly identified risks (from steps 1 and 2) should be considered, producing a wide range of risk control measures. Risk management must respond to the questions: what measures are necessary to reduce the risks; which of various options, involving different combinations of safety and expenditure should be selected; how much should be invested in improving the safety. The adopted measures by risk management are taken into account by risk level. If the risks are considered to be technically and socially acceptable, then further risk control measures will be not required. However, it is then essential to develop programs to monitor the situation so that it does not deteriorate over a period of time. Safety audits are among the tools used for this purpose. For risks considered tolerable, according to the risk criteria, it is practical to identify risk reduction measures, based on most modern practice, so that they are found in a range that is considered accepted. If the risks exceed the maximum tolerable criterion, then measures must be taken to make them tolerable; otherwise the operations which generated these risks must cease. The risk management offers the possibility to identify the most appropriate and effective risk measures so that they are reduced to a level at which they are reasonably practicable. The risk management requires a systematic evaluation of the identified risks and of control and reduction risk measures. The risk can be reduced by active preventative measures (mainly aimed at reducing the likelihood of accidents) and active mitigation and control measures (mainly aimed at reduction the

identifica msurile cele mai adecvate i eficiente de risc, astfel nct acestea sunt reduse la un nivel la care sunt "rezonabil practicabile". Managementul riscului necesit o evaluare sistematic a riscurilor identificate i a msurilor de control i de reducere a riscurilor. Riscul poate fi redus prin msuri preventive (obiectivul principal de reducere a probabilitii de accidente) i de msuri active de atenuare i de control (n special pentru reducerea consecinelor accidentelor). Pentru petrolierele existente, accentul se pune pe controlul riscului i adoptarea msurilor de reducere a acestuia. Pentru noile modele, accentul se pune pe abordarea proiectrii navelor tanc raional, prin integrarea analizei de risc n procesul de proiectare, evaluarea riscului sistematic folosind principii i abordnd prevenirea//reducerea riscului de poluare prin mijloace active i pasive. Msurile de reducere a riscurilor (RCM) ar trebui s vizeze n general una sau mai multe din urmtoarele aspecte: -reducerea frecvenei eurilor printr-o mai bun proiectare a tancurilor, proceduri mai bune la bordul navei, o mai bun organizare, politici mai bune, pregtire mai bun, practici de operare mai bune, tehnologii i practici mai bune, sisteme mai bune de detectare, sisteme de protecie mai bune i tehnici de lupt mai bune; -reducerea efectului eurilor, pentru a preveni accidentele; -atenuarea circumstanelor n care pot apare defeciuni; -reducerea consecinelor accidentelor. Pentru a identifica noile msuri de reducere a riscurilor RCM sunt utilizate de obicei tehnici de atac structurate. Aceste tehnici pot ncuraja dezvoltarea unor msuri adecvate i include atribute de risc i lanuri cauzale. Atributele de risc se refer la modul n care o msur ar putea controla un risc, i lanurle cauzale se refer la cazul n care, n secvena "inierea evenimentului pentru fatalitate", controlul riscurilor poate fi introdus. Scopul de atribuire a atributelor este de a facilita un proces de gndire structurat pentru a nelege modul n care lucreaz o msur de reducere a riscului (RCM ), cum se aplic i cum

consequences of accidents). For existing tankers, the focus is to control risk and adopting its reduction measures. For new designs, the focus is to approach the design of tankers rationally by integrating risk analysis into the design process, assessing risk systematically using firs-principles and addressing prevention/reduction of pollution risk by passive and active means. Risk control measures (RCMs) should in general be aimed at one or more of the following: -reducing the frequency of failures through better tanker design, onboard procedures, organizational, polices, training, operating practices, guidelines, technologies and practices, detection systems, protection systems and fighting techniques; -mitigating the effect of failures, in order to prevent accidents; -alleviating the circumstances in which failures may occur; -mitigating the consequences of accidents. To identify new RCMs for risks structured review techniques are typically used. These techniques may encourage the development of appropriate measures and include risk attributes and causal chains. Risk attributes relate to how a measure might control a risk, and causal chains relate to where, in the "initiating event to fatality" sequence, risk control can be introduced. The purpose of assigning attributes is to facilitate a structured thought process to understand how an RCM works, how it is applied and how it would operate.

2.4. Evaluation of alternative prevention, protection and mitigation measures. Cost-benefit assessment of the options

Selected RCMs must also be cost-effective (attractive) so that the benefit gained will be greater than the financial loss incurred as a result of the adoption. The purpose of this step is to identify and compare benefits and costs associated with the implementation of each RCO identified and defined previous. Each potentially option of risk reduction is evaluated both its contribution to risk reduction as

va funciona.

2.4. Evaluarea alternativelor de prevenire, protecie i msuri de atenuare. Analiza cost-beneficiu de evaluare a opiunilor

Msurile RCM selectate trebuie s fie, de asemenea, atractive din punct de vedere al eficienei costurilor, astfel nct beneficiul obinut va fi mai mare dect pierderile financiare suferite ca urmare a adoptrii. Scopul acestui pas este de a identifica i compara beneficiile i costurile asociate cu punerea n aplicare a fiecrei RCO identificate i definite anterior. Fiecare opiune potenial de reducere a riscului este evaluat att din punct de vedere a contribuiei sale la reducerea riscului ct i din punct de vedere al beneficiilor opiunii i a costurile punerii n aplicare. Se efectueaz analiza cost-beneficiu a opiunilor i, astfel, se decide care opiune trebuie selectat i pus n aplicare. Criteriile cost-beneficiu definesc punctul de la care beneficiile unei opiuni de control a riscurilor au o pondere mai mare dect costurile sale, i, prin urmare, arat dac RCO este necesar a face riscurile " aa de mici nct s devin rezonabil practicabile" (ALARP). O reprezentare grafic a principiului ALARP este prezentat n Fig. 4. Costurile sunt exprimate n termeni de costuri ale ciclului de via i pot include iniial, costuri de operare, de formare, de inspecie i certificare, etc.

Fig.4 Principiul ALARP

Beneficiile pot include reduceri a numrului de

benefits of option and implementation cost. It is carried out the cost-benefit analysis of the options and thus is decided which option must selected and implemented. Cost-benefit criteria define the point at which the benefits of a risk control option outweigh its costs, and hence show whether the RCO is needed to make the risks As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). A graphical representation of the ALARP principle is shown in Fig. 4 . Costs are expressed in terms of life cycle costs and may include initial, operating, training, inspection and certification, decommission etc.

Fig. 4 The ALARP principle

Benefits may include reductions in fatalities, injuries, casualties, environmental damage and clean-up. The most common approach is to use Cost-Benefit to select the most cost effective safety measure from a set of alternatives. Comparisons of cost effectiveness for RCOs may be made by calculating some indices: indices which express cost effectiveness in relation to safety of life, indices based on damage to and affect on property and environment. The evaluation of the above costs and benefits can be carried out by using various methods and techniques. Cost-benefit assessment (CBA) method is an important decisional support. It takes account of

decese, vtmri, numrul de victime, daune ale mediului. Abordarea cea mai comuna este de a utiliza analiza Cost-Beneficiu pentru a selecta msura cea mai eficient din punct de vedere al costului dintr-un set de alternative. Comparaiile din punct de vedere al eficienei costurilor pentru RCO poate fi fcut prin calcularea unor indici: indicii care exprim eficiena costurilor, n ceea ce privete sigurana vieii, indicii pe baza daunelor i care afecteaz proprietatea i mediul. Evaluarea costurilor i beneficiilor de mai sus poate fi realizat prin diferite metode i tehnici. Metoda de evaluare Cost-beneficiu (CBA), este un important punct de sprijin decizional. Acesta ia n considerare doi dintre cei mai importani factori n multe decizii privind msurile de siguran, i anume costul i sigurana. Se face analiza acestor factori n mod explicit. Succesul analizei cost-beneficiu depinde de identificarea corect a opiunilor adecvate de control nainte de analiz. n cazul n care opiunile de control a riscurilor sunt prost concepute, fr o calculare adecvat pentru cea mai bun tehnologie sau cea mai bun practic, atunci este inevitabil ca multe dintre opiuni s aib un raport cost-beneficiu relativ slab, i toate ar putea fi respinse ca fiind nefezabile.

2.5. Luarea deciziilor

Ultimul pas al FSA este "luarea deciziei", care are drept scop s ofere recomandri i luarea deciziilor pentru mbuntirea siguranei, lund n considerare concluziile din cadrul ntregului proces. Astfel, piesele de informaii generate n toate cele patru etape anterioare sunt utilizate n selectarea opiunilor de control a riscului, care combin cel mai bine eficiena costurilor i o reducere acceptabil a riscului, n conformitate cu criteriile "de risc" stabilite, de ctre autoritile de reglementare. Rezultatele din analiza de control a riscurilor, msurile de prevenire i de reducere sunt baza de recomandare pentru organele de decizie i de reglementare pentru a aduce riscul la cel mai mic nivel posibil.

two of the most important factors in many decisions on safety measures, namely cost and safety. It makes the analysis of these factors explicit. The benefit/cost analysis success depends on the correct identification of suitable control options prior to the analysis. If the risk control options are poorly conceived, without adequate accounting for best technology or best practice, then it is inevitable that many of the options will have relatively poor benefit/cost ratios, and all might then be rejected as infeasible.

2.5. Decision making

The final step of FSA is decision making, which aims at giving recommendations and making decisions for safety improvement taking into consideration the findings during the whole process. Thus the pieces of information generated in all four previous steps are used in selecting the risk control option which best combines cost effectiveness and an acceptable risk reduction, according to the set risk criteria by the regulators. Results from analysis of risk control, prevention and reduction measures are the basis for recommendation for decision-making bodies and regulators to bring risk to the lowest possible level. The formulated recommendations would be based upon the comparison and ranking of all hazards and their underlying causes; the comparison and ranking of risk control options as a function of associated costs and benefits; and the identification of those risk control options which keep risks as low as reasonably practicable. They will take in consideration the areas where legislation or rules should be reviewed or develop, so that the safety at sea increase. Adoption of risk management throughout the life cycle of ship, design and operation, can provide the best practices for reducing risks in the maritime transport of petroleum products.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The current level of risk of tankers in the Black Sea is low, but it should not be neglected due to the severe consequences of marine accidents accompanied by massive oil spills for the environment.

Recomandrile formulate ar trebui s se bazeze pe compararea i ierarhizarea tuturor pericolelor i a cauzelor lor; compararea i clasificarea opiunilor de control a riscurilor n funcie de costurile i beneficiile aferente; precum i identificarea acestor acelor opiuni de control a riscurilor, care menin riscurile la un nivel ct mai sczut rezonabil posibil. Ele vor lua n considerare domeniile n care legislaia sau normele ar trebui s fie revizuite sau dezvoltate, astfel nct sigurana pe mare s creasc. Adoptarea managementui riscului pe parcursul ciclului de via al navei, proiectare i funcionare, poate oferi cele mai bune practici de reducere a riscurilor n transportul maritim de produse petroliere.

3. CONCLUZII

Nivelul actual de risc al petrolierelor din Marea Neagr este mic, dar nu ar trebui s fie neglijat, datorit consecinelor grave ale accidentelor marine, nsoite de scurgeri de petrol masive pentru mediul nconjurtor. Consecinele accidentelor marine, nsoite de deversri de petrol sunt severe i sunt orientate pe trei direcii: pierderea de viei omeneti, rniri grave, pierderea proprietii i de deteriorare a mediului. Definirea gradului de acceptabilitate al dezastrelor marine este dificil datorit consecinelor i a factorilor care au influenat gravitatea lor. Evaluarea riscurilor permite identificarea noilor msuri de control, de prevenire i reducere a riscului n operarea navelor pe mare, cu scopul de a mbunti sigurana n transportul de produse petroliere. Cele mai bune msuri de prevenire i reducere a riscului la nivelul ALARP sunt stabilite pe baza analizei cost-beneficiu. Ele sunt recomandate pentru luarea deciziilor organelor de decizie i autoritilor de reglementare din domeniul naval.

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The consequences of marine accidents accompanied by oil spills are severe and are orientated on three directions: loss of lives, serious injuries, loss of property and damage to the environment. Defining the acceptability of marine disasters is difficult due to several consequence and factors which influenced their severity. Risk assessment permits to identify new measures for risk control, prevention and reduction in operating ships at sea, in order to improve safety in transportation of petroleum products. The best prevention and reduce measure of risk to the ALARP level are established based on cost-benefit analysis. They are recommended for decision-making bodies and regulators from naval field.

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