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MAR 4156 Semester Project

Euro Disneyland

Instructor: Sarah Lefebvre

March 26th, 2014

Group Members:

Tiffany Campton, Christopher Hansen,

Seth Moed, Justin Raffanello, & Ryan Winkler

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Company Mission

What is the company’s mission?

The mission of Euro Disneyland is unanimous with Disney as a whole. “The mission of

The Walt Disney Company is to be one of the world's leading producers and providers of enter-

tainment and information. Using our portfolio of brands to differentiate our content, services, and

consumer products, we seek to develop the most creative, innovative, and profitable entertain-

ment experiences and related products in the world” (Hill, 2000).

Where are they expanding to and why?

Disney decided to expand to Paris in 1992 after a strenuous process of exploring over two

hundred locations all over the world (Hill, 2000). Disney decided to expand after its success in

two U.S. locations (Anaheim and Orlando) and one location in Tokyo, Japan (Hill, 2000). Paris,

known as the capital of European high culture and society, was chosen mainly because of its de-

mographics and subsidies (Hill, 2000). “About 17 million Europeans live less than a two-hour

drive from Paris. Another 310 million can fly there in the same time or less” (Hill, 2000). The

opening of Euro Disneyland was expected to bring Paris 30,000 jobs and with that in mind, the

French government offered Disney more than $1 billion in incentives (Hill, 2000). Disney fo-

cused on external factors such as market size.

What is the firm’s orientation to global marketing?

Disney is no stranger to global marketing. They are a worldwide known company. Their

formula is quite simple, emphasizing value, quality, and guest services (Hill, 2000). However,

they did experience issues when they first opened Euro Disneyland (Hill, 2000). This was mostly

due to the fact that they changed certain aspects of the park to meet what they thought Europeans

would favor (Hill, 2000). For example, they thought guests would want a typical Parisian break-

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fast of croissants (Hill, 2000). This was a mistake. It turned out Europeans wanted the “Ameri-

can” breakfast of bacon and eggs (Hill, 2000). They also spent millions building resorts for

guests to stay, however, most Europeans treated visiting the park as a day trip, instead of a four-

five day vacation that Americans typically partake in (Hill, 2000). Disney’s biggest mistake was

trying to culturally match Europeans. In reality, guests wanted the “American” feel.

External Environmental Scanning

Opportunities in the Environment:

For every international country that The Walt Disney Company has expanded to, there

had to of been an enticing and profitable business opportunity in order for Disneyland to want to

expand internationally, for example, a future growth potential. The Walt Disney Company chose

to enter the European market, specifically, Marne-la-Vallée, France, for a number of reasons

(“Walt Disney,” n.d.). One of the reasons Disney decided to expand its presence into Europe had

to do with the success of Disneyland’s expansion into Tokyo, Japan (“japan-guide,” n.d.). The

launch of Disneyland into Tokyo was such a success that the Disney Corporation started search-

ing out other potential markets. Nevertheless, Disneyland’s success within the city of Tokyo was

not the only factor that steered Disney’s expansion into Europe. Disney ended up choosing

Marne-la-Vallée, France, due to its location (Holz, n.d.). Marne-la-Vallée, France, is approxi-

mately twenty miles east of Paris, which made it an appealing and highly profitable location for a

theme park for many reasons (“Walt disney,” n.d.). One of the main reasons is that Paris, France,

is one of the most visited cities in Europe by both Europeans and Americans (“Paris, France -

Guide, Places, Info & Activities,” n.d.). Another factor that influenced Disney’s decision to ex-

pand so close to Paris was the demographics (“Paris, France - Guide, Places, Info & Activities,”

n.d.). Paris, France, attracts a wide array of people from all over the world. It appeals to high

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fashion individuals, families, honeymooners, and most importantly, tourists (“Paris, France -

Guide, Places, Info & Activities,” n.d.). In addition, the very large and growing population of

Marne-la-Vallée, France, signaled that it was a very popular and sought after location (Holz,

n.d.).

Even though the distance between Marne-la-Vallée, France, and Paris, France, wasn’t in

walking distance of each other, its location was appealing because of France’s unique transporta-

tion systems (“Getting To The Magic,” n.d.). France made it incredible easy and convenient for

natives and tourists to reach multiple destinations in a timely and easy fashion. In France, there

are three different transportation systems that Europeans and tourists have access to: Réseau Ex-

press Régional or RER, Marne-la-Vallée/Chessy or Eurostar, and airport transfers (“Getting To

The Magic,” n.d.). Out of those three systems, it was Paris’s Réseau Express Régional that en-

ticed Disney to build Euro Disneyland in Marne-la-Vallée, France (“Getting To The Magic,”

n.d.). “The Réseau Express Régional is a regional express transit system serving the capital of

Paris and its suburbs in France” (“Réseau Express Régional(RER),” n.d.). Disney recognized that

this transportation system would be incredibly advantageous for the success of Euro Disneyland.

Guests who are visiting Paris can easily jump on the transit for a small fee and hit Marne-la-

Vallée in a matter of minutes (“Réseau Express Régional (RER),” n.d.). Another transportation

system that spiked Disney’s interest was the Marne-la-Vallée-Chessy or Eurostar (“Getting To

The Magic,” n.d.). “The Eurostar is a high-speed passenger train that travels from London to Par-

is” (“Guide to EUROSTAR TRAINS,” n.d.). Disney saw this as a huge advantage as well, pro-

vided the presence of Euro Disneyland, would likely bring in guests from London. Last but not

least, airports offered guests the convenience of shuttles, specifically VEA shuttles, which took

guests from the airport to the center of Paris (“Getting To The Magic,” n.d.). The transportation

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systems installed made traveling easy, convenient, and time efficient. It was the location of

Marne-la-Vallée, France, and its proximity to Paris as well as the unique transportation systems

that provided Disney with such an incredible business opportunity.

Threats in the Environment:

One of the threats that Euro Disneyland faced was Europeans comparing Euro Disney-

land to the Disneyland’s in America ("Disneyland Paris | SWOT Analysis,” n.d.). This was a

threat because guests soon realized Euro Disneyland did not compare to the Disneyland’s in the

U.S. in terms of size and attractions (Dolan, n.d.). Euro Disneyland was a lot smaller than many

of the Disneyland’s in America (Dolan, n.d.). Also, because Euro Disneyland was a lot smaller, it

did not offer the wide variety of rides and attractions (Dolan, n.d.). The Europeans and even the

tourists were very upset due to Euro Disneyland’s small size and attractions and because of this,

Euro Disneyland ended up facing another threat relating to attendance levels at Euro Disneyland.

Because so many people were unsatisfied, tourists and Europeans started traveling to America to

attend one of the many Disneyland’s located there ("Disneyland Paris | SWOT Analysis,” n.d.).

Unfortunately, many Europeans and Americans perceived Euro Disneyland as a “knock-off,”

therefore, many felt it wasn’t worth their money, not when they could spend a little more and

have a bigger park with a wider variety of rides and attractions in the U.S. Another threat that

Euro Disneyland faced had to do with retaining and generating new customers ("Disneyland

Paris | SWOT Analysis,” n.d.). Because Euro Disneyland lacked in size and attractions, it was

difficult for Euro Disneyland to retain customers as well as generate new ones, especially since

Europeans realized that the Disneyland’s located in America were bigger and had more to offer

in terms of entertainment. In the end, Euro Disneyland, because of its size and lack of attractions,

was perceived in a negative light.

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Competitive analysis: Who are their rivals?

The competition within a market is one of the most important factors to analyze when a

company is considering expansion. The competition within the theme park industry in France

was high, and therefore, was a threat to Euro Disneyland. Out of all the theme parks located in

and around France, Parc Astérix, poses the greatest threat to Euro Disneyland (“Disneyland Paris

Vs Parc Astérix,” n.d.). Disney expanded to Marne-la-Vallée, France, because of its close prox-

imity to Paris, which posed a threat because Parc Astérix was already established and it too was

in close proximity to Paris. However, unlike Disney, whose brand recognition is high and known

all over the world, Parc Astérix’s is not. “Parc Astérix is a theme park dedicated to the famous

Astérix’ Gaul and hero of the comic-book series that spawned a number of animated and live-

action films throughout France” (“Disneyland Paris Vs Parc Astérix,” n.d.). Comic book stuff is

very popular in France, which makes Parc Astérix highly enticing for the French, but not so

much for non-natives (“Disneyland Paris Vs Parc Astérix,” n.d.). This was a definite positive for

Euro Disneyland because Parc Astérix more than likely did not get a lot of traffic from outsiders

due to its image and unfamiliarity with people not native to France. Even though both theme

parks are relatively close to Paris, the familiarity of Disneyland pulls the majority of Europeans

as well as tourists to its park.

Another rival of Euro Disneyland’s is a theme park called Futoroscope ("Disneyland

Paris | SWOT Analysis,” n.d.). Futoroscope is a theme park geared towards providing its guests

with innovative activities that educate as well as entertain both the young and the old (“Attraction

Holidays In France,” n.d.). It’s also the second largest park in France (“Attraction Holidays In

France,” n.d.). Futoroscpe is viewed as a threat because of way the park positions itself. It posi-

tions itself both an educational and a fun and entertaining theme park.

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Last but not least, Disneyland, USA, is another rival of Euro Disneyland ("Disneyland

Paris | SWOT Analysis,” n.d.). Many Europeans and tourists choose to attend the Disneyland in

Orlando, Florida, due to its year-round warmth and size (“Disneyland Paris vs Walt Disney

World Orlando,” n.d.). Many Europeans migrate to the Disneyland in Florida during Winter,

which ends up causing Euro Disneyland to lose sales during that timeframe. Also, the Disney-

land park in Orlando offers guests a much bigger park with more rides and attractions than Euro

Disneyland, which has a significant impact on the success of Euro Disneyland as far as attend-

ance and sales levels go.

How will they compete?

Parc Astérix and Futoroscope are both positioned to attract very specific markets. Parc

Astérix is a theme park dedicated to appealing to those who are comic book lovers (“Disneyland

Paris Vs Parc Astérix,” n.d). Comic books are very popular in France and are enjoyed by many

and this park is positioned in a way to attract only those loyal to the comic book genre (“Disney-

land Paris Vs Parc Astérix,” n.d). In regards to tourists and non-comic book followers, this park

is unfamiliar and because it’s geared towards comic book fans, it’s not seen as appealing as

somewhere like Euro Disneyland or Futoroscope. Unlike Parc Astérix, The Walt Disney Com-

pany is known all over the world. Euro Disneyland has a definite advantage over Parc Astérix

because it has global awareness. Parc Astérix will always attract and entice those comic book

fans because the park is positioned that way. However, Euro Disneyland will more than attract a

wider scope of people due to its high level of brand awareness: Europeans, tourists, and even

loyal comic book followers will eventually migrate over to experience Euro Disneyland in their

hometown.

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Futoroscope provides guests with a very innovative experience (“Attraction Holidays In

France,” n.d.). This park is positioned to appeal to a wide variety of age groups and interests. Un-

like Euro Disneyland, it’s very technologically friendly. It’s positioned very differently than Parc

Astérix and Euro Disneyland. The park offers guests 3D rides, live shows, games, open air activ-

ities, among other exciting and innovative activities (“Attraction Holidays In France,” n.d.). Fu-

toroscope has been around over twenty-five years and its retention rate is extremely high (“At-

traction Holidays In France,” n.d.). Unlike Parc Astérix, this theme park is not geared towards a

specific target market. It appeals to everyone and because it offers education and entertainment,

it also appeals to adults, which is a definite competitive advantage of this park (“Attraction Holi-

days In France,” n.d.). Euro Disneyland is having a difficult time competing with this theme park

because Futoroscope has positioned itself as an educational and yet a fun and entertaining theme

park for all ages. However, Euroland Disney provides its guests with an emotional bond. The

Walt Disney Company has positioned itself around portraying to guests that if you come to Dis-

ney, you will be captivated by a severe level of happiness and love, all of which parents want

their kids to experience, which is unlike any theme park around.

In terms of how Disneyland, USA, will compete comes down to loyalty and conven-

ience. There are those loyal guests that will remain loyal to Euro Disneyland because of its loca-

tion, and typically loyal guests do not deter, however, due its small size and limited attractions,

the park does open itself up to guests switching Disneyland parks. Also, convenience plays a role

in how each park competes. Europeans who are in Paris as well as tourists will visit Euro Dis-

neyland because of the ease at which they can reach it. France has made it incredible easy

through their transportation systems for Euro Disneyland to attract guests and make going and

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leaving the park stress free and convenient, all of which is a competitive advantage of Euro Dis-

neyland and how they compete within the industry.

CAGE Distance Framework:

“Cultural differences include language, ethnicities, religion, values, and norms” (Alon,

Jaffe, & Vianelli, 2013). When Disney decided to expand to France, they failed to take European

culture into consideration. The biggest mistake Disney made when it expanded to France had to

do with not taking into consideration European lifestyles (“Why EuroDisney Failed,” n.d.). In

France, it’s not uncommon to see Europeans enjoying a glass of wine with lunch. Disney, being

an American company, did not take that into consideration when it expanded into France (“Why

EuroDisney Failed,” n.d.). The Disney Corporation originally installed a “no liquor” policy

throughout all its parks, therefore, when it expanded to France it extended the “no liquor” policy

to Euro Disneyland as well, thus signaling to Europeans that the Disney Corporation failed to

take into consideration cultural differences (Keegan, 2002). While it’s uncommon to see people

drinking liquor in public before five o’ clock in America, it’s not uncommon in Europe. In

France, having a glass of wine with lunch or even breakfast is viewed as a necessity and apart of

daily life (Keegan, 2002). Due to the “no liquor” policy, Europeans were very distraught with the

Disney Corporation in its failed attempt to incorporate French culture into its park (Keegan,

2002). Another mistake Disney made regarding European culture had to do with Disney’s per-

ception regarding the breakfast habits of Europeans (Keegan, 2002). Disney assumed that Euro-

peans did not eat breakfast, thus, when Euro Disneyland was being built, restaurants were built

with very limited seating (Keegan, 2002). As soon as the park opened, restaurants were flooded

with Europeans wanting to enjoy breakfast at a sit-down restaurant. Because Disney made an

assumption, the restaurants were not made to hold a large amount of people, therefore, Europe-

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ans were faced with long wait times and cramped quarters within the restaurants of Euro Disney-

land.

“Administrative distance measures differences in laws, political risk, and government

structure” (Alon, Jaffe, & Vianelli, 2013). When Disney was in the process of expanding into

Europe, it faced resentment from Parisian intellectuals who felt that the introduction of Disney

was an assault on French culture (Hill, 2000). The Parisian intellectuals felt that Disney could

not properly adapt itself to French culture and that Disney would not take into consideration

cultural differences (Hill, 2000). They were more so afraid that France would become

americanized and France’s culture would slowly dissipate within the walls of Euro Disneyland.

In addition to the Parisian intellectuals, the minister of culture threatened to boycott Disney (Hill,

2000). When Disney opened its gates, it was faced with farmers and their trucks blocking the

entrance to Euro Disney (Hill, 2000). This act of protest was not geared towards Disney, but at

the US government, which had been demanding that French agricultural subsidies be cut (Hill,

2000).

“Geographic distance includes country size, infrastructure, climate, and remoteness from

neighboring countries” (Alon, Jaffe, & Vianelli, 2013). Before Disney expanded to Europe, there

were other countries being considered (“A Master’s paper,” n.d.). “ From 1983 through 1987, the

company searched for sites in the U.K., France, Germany, Spain, and Italy. Finally, the possibili-

ties were narrowed down to Costa del Sol in Spain and Paris in France” (“A Master’s Paper,”

n.d.). Disney realized that both countries offered something different. Costa del Sol, Spain, was

gorgeous and offered year-round warmth. On the other hand, Paris, France, was known for its

unique transportation system and its incredibly high level of tourism. Both countries had its pros,

which made it difficult for the Disney Corporation to choose. To help them decide, Disney com-

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pared the climate of both countries to Japan’s climate (“A Master’s Paper,” n.d.). While Spain did

offer year-round warmth and gorgeous scenery, Disney discovered through comparison that

France’s climate was similar to Japan’s. Disney’s expansion into Japan was successful, therefore,

the Disney Corporation chose Paris, France, primarily because of that reason, but also because

the climates of both countries were very similar.

“Economic distance refers to differences in national income, costs of doing business,

prices, and availability of human and natural resources” (Alon, Jaffe, & Vianelli, 2013). When

Disney expanded to France, the country was in the middle of a recession (“A Master’s Paper,”

n.d.). Many Europeans, especially those who were unemployed, favored Disney’s choice to

expand into France because they knew Euro Disneyland would offer them a wide array of job

opportunities. “Euro Disneyland planned on hiring a total of 12,00 employees. 6,000 of those

employees would work in Euro Disneyland’s Magic Kingdom, 5,200 in hotels on the property,

and the remainder would work in the recreation and support facilities” (“A Master’s Paper,” n.d.).

The increase in job opportunities from the opening of Euro Disneyland helped strengthen

France’s overall economy.

PESTEL Framework:

Political: “When Euro Disneyland officially opened, the president at the time, Francois

Mitterrrand, referred to Euro Disneyland as “not exactly my cup of tea” (“Weather Is Cold,” n.d.).

President Francois Mitterrand did not show up when Euro Disneyland opened, which gave off

the impression that he did not support Disney’s expansion into Europe, which wasn’t the case at

all. He did support Disney’s expansion into Europe due to economic reasons, specifically, with

the high level of unemployment within France (“Weather Is Cold,” n.d.). Another political factor

that impacted Euro Disneyland was when French Framers blocked the entrance to Euro

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Disneyland (“A Master’s Paper,” n.d.). It was a protest against the U.S. government, which in

turn created uproar between the U.S. government and the French government (“A Master’s

Paper,” n.d.).

Economic: “One of the biggest problems was the timespan that Europeans spent at Euro

Disneyland” (Hill, 2000). This was a big problem economically because Europeans did not stay

and/or visit the theme park very long. In America, people usually will buy Disney tickets that

extend over a three to five day period, which requires many guests to get a hotel. In Europe,

many guests only stayed a day or two at the park, which didn’t require them getting a hotel

(“Weather Is Cold,” n.d.). This was a problem economically due to employees working in the

surrounding hotels. Because many Europeans only stayed in the park for a short amount of time,

the attendance levels at the hotels were slim to none. This was financially bad for the hotels, its

employees, and most importantly, the economy. Also, since Europeans spent so little time at

Euro Disney, they didn’t spend much inside the park on items such as food and souvenirs, which

economically was also not beneficial for the theme park as well as the economy.

Socio-cultural: When Disney expanded into Europe, it did not do a very good job at

taking European culture into consideration. This is best illustrated by Disney’s “no liquor” policy.

Originally, Disney made a law stating that none of their parks will serve liquor (Hill, 2000).

Disney extended this policy to Europe where liquor is viewed as a regular, daily beverage and

essentially a part of their daily lives. Europeans were very upset with this policy and with

Disney’s failed attempt to incorporate French culture into Euro Disneyland. This led to a

decrease in guests returning, and socially, it was seen as unacceptable.

Technological: Euro Disneyland offers its guests a mobile portal (“corporate disneyland

paris”). This mobile portal provides guests with information relating to all aspects of the park

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(“corporate disneyland paris”). It shows schedules, special offers regarding food and beverages,

and access to multimedia content (“corporate disneyland paris”). This was a huge advancement in

terms of a technological advancement for Euro Disneyland. Guests can easily access the site

through their mobile devices and best of all, it constantly updates, therefore, keeping guests

informed every minute that they’re in the park (“corporate disneyland paris”).

Environmental: When Disney expanded to Europe, it originally made it look and feel like

an American Disneyland, which ended up causing an uproar with the Europeans (“i-jibe”).

Disney failed to take into consideration French culture and because of that, Euro Disneyland’s

sales went down and many guests, specifically, natives, left the park upset and irritated. Disney

incorporated a global strategy when they should’ve used an adaptive strategy. Differing cultures

is a very important factor to consider when expanding internationally and unfortunately, the

Disney Corporation failed to recognize that, which led to unsatisfied guests and a loss in sales for

Euro Disneyland.

Legal: One of the legal issues Euro Disneyland faced had to do with language and

appearance policies (“Disneyland Paris - A short history,” n.d.). The Disney Corporation installed

a very strict policy in terms of communication skills and the look of each individual employee

working for Euro Disneyland (“Disneyland Paris - A short history,” n.d.). The Disney

Corporation made it very difficult for the Euro Disneyland to position itself as a true European

company because of the policies installed by the American Disney Corporation. Euro Disneyland

managers were required to speak English at all meetings and no one working for Euro

Disneyland was allowed to show any tattoos or body piercings (“Disneyland Paris - A short

history,” n.d.). The Disney Corporation even went as far as to not allow employees, specifically,

women, wear a lot of makeup and jewelry (“Disneyland Paris - A short history,” n.d.). Men were

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also not allowed to have excessive facial hair (“Disneyland Paris - A short history,” n.d.). These

policies were seen as outrageous within the park of Euro Disneyland, and many viewed these

policies as an attack on individual liberty (“Disneyland Paris - A short history,” n.d.). The French

embrace individualism and expression, which is why the employees and managers working for

Euro Disneyland were so upset because the Disney Corporation made it impossible for them to

do that. Disney, again, did not take cultural differences into consideration and instead tried to

integrate its policies and regulations into Euro Disneyland, which essentially denied French their

individual liberties. This was illegal under French law, which the Disney Corporation failed to

acknowledge at the time (“Disneyland Paris - A short history,” n.d.).

Internal Capability Assessment

The Walt Disney World Company had reached a peak in its business expansion in 1984

when former ABC executive Michael Eisner took place as the new CEO, replacing short-termed

Ron W. Miller. Under Eisner’s control of the company in 1984, the Walt Disney Company shift-

ed its focus to internationalizing its current product that was growing rapidly in the states: The

family entertainment/themed parks. With two world renowned resorts located in the U.S., and a

successful venture expanding the hit theme parks into Japan and China, Eisner sought out the

opportunity to gain the attention of the European market, which furthered Disney’s direct in-

vestment into France to construct a Disney owned and operated world class resort: Euro Disney-

land. (Hill, 2000)

During the initial expansion of the firm into the foreign market, Disney was experiencing

astonishing feedback from its other products and business projects taking origination back in the

states (Amine, 2009). Disney had a successful opening of its two theme parks in Orlando, Flori-

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da, — both the Magic Kingdom and EPCOT Center had reached global awareness and attracted

travelers from all over the world. Along with strong product and service standards taking place in

the U.S., Disney also saw positive feedback coming from its sister parks in the newly interna-

tionalized parks in both Japan and China (Hill, 2000).

Weaknesses of the firm:

It would make sense for Disney to expand its parks to another country, especially during

such a rewarding time for “the mouse” in the mid 1980’s. The Walt Disney World Resort in Or-

lando, Florida, saw a growing number of guests from the European nations traveling on holiday.

With this number growing rapidly, Disney analysts composed a direct relation to the reason for

those visits from the European travelers that they’ve come to see the new Disney World! Howev-

er, the correlation does not imply causation, in fact European travelers would come to the U.S. as

a means for leisure travel to see a different country and culture—a trip on Space Mountain and a

picture with Mickey Mouse was only an added benefit, if they chose to visit Florida. Disney had

made the mistake to project theme park attendance for the new Euro Disneyland based on the

numbers of European guests that attended the parks in Orlando, and not a strong enough empha-

sis on the French locals’ interest in the theme park resorts. It turned out the year the European

park had opened, park attendance fell drastically below the projected attendance—Euro Disney-

land only saw a small 9 million guests walk through the turnstiles (Loveman, Schesinger, & An-

thony, 1992).

After miscalculating the small amount of visitors in the park, Disney had even further

misjudged its European guests. When considering the average day of an American theme park-

goer, they consider a trip to the parks to be an extended vacation: Staying at the resort for four to

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five days at a time, buying tickets and merchandise for the entire stay, choosing to eat fanciful

meals, etc. However, that would be the case for the European travelers, too, if they were not in

their home country. To Disney’s surprise, the European guests visiting Euro Disneyland would

stay at the resort for only a day— not partaking in the nighttime festivities or choosing not to

stay on resort property (Amine, 2009). Europeans do not seem to consider a trip to a theme park

to be worth more than a day excursion, thus caused the decline in hotel sales.

The Walt Disney Company witnessed more and more miscalculations from the research

and development of the Euro Disneyland project that eventually caused the company’s merit and

brand name to become a bit of a problem in the French region where locals were becoming frus-

trated with the “dream factory” located only a short thirty-minute drive outside of Paris. Disney’s

daily operations grew to be a strong weakness for the French resort. Since the American-

operated Disney Company decided to take total control over management of Euro Disneyland, it

adopted management strategies similar to Disneyland and Walt Disney World resorts located in

America and Japan. However, it once again turned out to upset a large amount of the French lo-

cals, a good amount of them employed by Disney, for over 1,000 employees to leave the compa-

ny within the first nine weeks because of work-related grievances (Hill, 2000).

Guests to the theme park were greeted by a well-known character, Mickey Mouse, just as

expected when visiting a Disney park. Along with the mouse, the guests visiting Euro Disney-

land expected to witness the same “magic” they would experience visiting the Magic Kingdom or

Disneyland in Anaheim, California. Unfortunately, guests were dissatisfied with the small num-

ber of attractions, the few available meal options, and the lack of “theme park merchandise”

when visiting Euro Disneyland. The perceived price of a dissatisfied guest’s day greatly differed

from the price paid for the entrance into the park, considering all other factors that must have

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been paid for by the guest. The price of admission to Euro Disney was 200 French Franc ($40) in

1992 when the park first opened (Amine, 2009).

Strengths of the firm:

Along with the weaknesses that came with the Walt Disney World Company in its at-

tempts to internationalize its theme parks, the firm still held a strong presence as a pioneer in the

theme park industry since the conception of Disneyland Resort in Anaheim. Apart from the weak

operations in Paris, the firm was growing worldwide at a rapid pace. With animated feature films

taking over the silver screen around the world every year since 1977, such as Pete’s Dragon, The

Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh, and The Fox and The Hound. There is a high correlation

with the release of new feature length films produced by the Disney Company to the expansion

of future projects, and the potential increase in theme park attendance succeeding the release of

the film. Eisner announced the Disney Decade in 1989 with the release of the first musically in-

clined animated film, The Little Mermaid, and the soon to be opened Euro Disneyland in 1992

(Loveman, Schesinger, & Anthony, 1992).

Since Disney was cultivating a strong brand recognition around the world with the Dis-

ney film characters during the “Disney Decade” (1990’s), consumers alike would come to the

park nearest Disney Resort to buy merchandise, to ride their favorite character’s roller coaster,

and to even meet their star in person for a photo op. Euro Disneyland was the closest resort for

the 350 million Europeans that live within a mere two-hour flight of the resort. Despite its park

attendance in Paris, Disney’s in-park merchandise sales continued to rise—just like the growing

sales in the other parks around the world (Amine, 2009).

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Goals, objectives, Strategic Alternatives

When Disney looked to open a fourth park, the company turned to Europe. Disney chose

Europe since historically, their films have done significantly better than in the U.S. The question

then became of which country to expand to. Paris was elected because of its large population and

transportation network. Also, Paris was picked since it shared similar climates as Japan, where

their park was a success already. Disney had been too optimistic with their venture over to Eu-

rope as well as with their multiple strategic and financial decisions such as believing that they

could change European habits and failing to see that a European recession was incoming.

Of the several mistakes that Disney made, one was buying too much real estate. Disney

wanted to own and profit not only from its park, but from hotels, homes, and apartments as well,

but they ended up not receiving expected revenues from their property development as they

hoped to. Within the overall operation, there were multiple errors such as with the staffing. The

Paris staff was irritated by the inflexible scheduling and being sent home when they aren’t need-

ed. Even the bus drivers had a hard time with parking since Euro Disneyland made their spaces

too small, which made it difficult for busses to fit in their designated spots.

Even culturally, Disney failed to adapt to certain European customs and the culture of the

people of France. Disney decided to follow its policy within their other parks to not serve alco-

hol. The French people were outraged since in France, a glass of wine is part of a meal whether

it’s lunch or dinner. Disney also didn’t understand that the French did care for sit-down break-

fasts, therefore, their restaurants became too crowded. This also relates to how the French like to

have a certain time for meals and other events. Disney thought that the French would carry their

food around the park just like the Americans did, but this was not the case. Also, Disney was un-

19

aware that the French did not like to take their children out of school to go on trips like Ameri-

cans did. The French also preferred longer holiday breaks rather than several short ones.

So what could of Disney done to fix these problems? A simple answer could just be that

they should have researched better. Disney made multiple mistakes that could’ve easily been

avoided. Disney seemed to rely too much on their success in other markets, especially their

American markets.

Disney should have been aware that there was trouble with the European economy with

the recession in the real estate market hurting their revenues. Disney could have planned to build

their park smaller and expand with success or they could have even held off on buying more land

than they needed to. If their park was a huge success then Disney could have bought more land

and began to build hotels and other spots on their property. Another problem Disney had was

with their staffing. Disney treated the way they handled French employees the same way they

handled their American employees. To keep the French happy, Disney should have become more

flexible with their scheduling and not call people in if they did not need them, which goes the

same way by not sending them home when they didn’t need them. This leads to a huge waste of

time and you can imagine them getting frustrated with the company. Also, with Disney’s strict

dress codes, the French felt that they lost their individualism by having to “look” American. Dis-

ney should have made an exception to their rules since the French aren’t American and don’t

want to give up who they are to work there.

Disney could have really been more culturally aware of the French people and not have

based their habits and behaviors on Americans. Had Disney looked into what the French lifestyle

was then they might of known that the French like their wine and had it available on day one of

opening the park. Instead, they gave their guests something to complain and become upset about.

20

Also, maybe Disney could have done surveys or focus groups on what the French enjoy or how

they spend their days, further learning about their behaviors. They could have even done obser-

vational research where they could explore French lifestyles from day to day. For example, Dis-

ney hadn’t known that the french enjoy sit-down restaurants instead of walking around with food

like Americans do. Disney could have expanded restaurants to accommodate the huge crowds of

people they were getting.

Marketing Mix :

For the product category, Disney has several of them, which are also services they pro-

vide. The theme parks should be the most obvious of their products, but they have others, which

complement them. Disney has seven different hotels to accommodate guests during their stay

and in addition they also have many restaurants on their property. Of course they needed to cover

selling their merchandise with stores set up to have a large category of products. Also, they had

parking, which counted as a product/service since each guest had to pay to park. For Disney

though, part of their product is the service that they offer. It’s their service that sets the experi-

ence for the guest.

This leads to the pricing part of the marketing mix. For the theme parks, Disney has a va-

riety of prices and choices for their guests. The first one being that they have separate prices for

children and adults with the children’s prices being much cheaper. Next, they have prices set up

to where a guest can choose from one or two park passes and then they can choose how many

days their passes are for. One day and one park costs a guest 62 euros for an adult and 57 euros

for children. A one day two park pass costs a guest 73 euros for and adult and 67 euros for chil-

dren. A two day two park pass costs a guest 136 euros for an adult and 124 euros for children

(“Site officiel de Disneyland® Paris,” n.d.). These are just a couple examples of their pricing

21

with their theme park. When converted to dollars, they are pretty similar to American prices. One

suggestion could be that Disney set lower prices upon opening to increase demand and interest.

As demand would eventually rise, then Disney could gradually increase their prices and offer

several vacation packages.

For the promotion aspect of the marketing mix, Disney formed strategic partnerships with

other companies. These companies included travel agencies and transportation companies that

would advertise Euro Disneyland. Disney also used all inclusive packages, which means that it

would cover hotel accommodations, transportation, and of course tickets to their park. Disney

also advertised certain special events that they held throughout the year.

Finally, we get to the placement area of the marketing mix. Disney chose France to build

their theme park and sell their product. Within France, they decided to build just outside of Paris.

In this location, they benefit from the huge population of possible guests. They also made sure

that there was easy access to their parks with nearby highways, railways, and airports. Of course,

the colder climate helps bring more guests in and holds them comfortably since they aren’t deal-

ing with high temperatures and brutal heat. Disney also figured that with the success of their To-

kyo venture, which is also in a colder climate, they’d be successful in Paris.

Implementation

Execution of the plan

Euro Disneyland opened in 1992 as The Walt Disney Company’s fourth theme park loca-

tion after California, Florida, and Japan being the first international location. Disney eyed at Eu-

rope as its next landing spot in the 1980’s and decided on France because of its central location

since 17 million Europeans live less than a two hour drive away from Paris. Paris also served as

a strong center of culture.

22

When first opening, the amusement struggled greatly to a point of going bankrupt. Dis-

ney went with a global strategy (standardization) approach rather than a local strategy that ap-

pealed to local French and European people (Rugman & Hodgetts, 2001).

Another issue Disney faced was with its management. The first boss of Euro Disneyland

was an American named Stephen Burke, which they eventually changed to a French citizen

named Andre Lacroix in 2003. The new management brought more French culture to how the

park should operate. They added new shows and also ditched Disney’s ethnocentric approach by

using a more localized appeal.

The main reason Disney was initially unsuccessful in its implementation of Euro Disney-

land was its overall ethnocentric approach. They tried to impose their whole American culture in

Paris, and Europeans did not respond well to this. The conclusion drawn was that the ideal Euro

Disneyland would be a hybrid of French and American culture, creating a balance of attributes of

American culture that attracted Europeans to visiting a Disney theme park, but maintaining some

French and European identity so that citizens were not offended by or did not understand certain

parts of American theme parks and culture.

One interesting thing that Disney discovered after the park was opened for a little was

that Europeans wanted their food served in an American style or quick-serve. This was a coun-

ter-cultural characteristic that caught Disney off guard and they promptly responded to this by

fixing the solution and changing the food service style (Matusitz, 2009).

Evaluation

What performance measures will be used? Why?

23

According to the National Performance Management Advisory Commission, Disney uses

three proverbs to measure its performance by: “Proverb 1: Adopt a few, or only one, core founda-

tional measures. Proverb 2: Develop measures that can maintain focus on the core of what you

are attempting to accomplish. Proverb 3: Apply the measures in a positive, progressive manner”

(“gfoa”).

These values ultimately focus on one thing and that is customer satisfaction, which is

Disney’s number one goal. Disney uses customer surveys to determine the satisfaction received

by guests.

Secondly, and most important for shareholders are the financial measures. Disney

measures their performance based on attendance and profits. Park sales, resort revenues, and

product sales all come into account to measure the performance of the park as a whole from the

business side of things.

For Disney, it all comes down to one thing, and that is the guest experience. They know

their company is known for the experience they provide, not the actual park, services, or rides.

“Part of the Disney success is our ability to create a believable world of dreams that appeals to all

age groups” (“Walt Disney World Resorts Celebrates 40 years,” n.d.).

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