Maneuver Warfare and Naval Tactics

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MANEUVER WARFARE--APPLICKI'ION TO NAVAL BA711.E AND TACTICS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U S . ArmyCommand and General Staffcollege in partialfulfillment of the requirem ents for thedegrecMAS'I'ER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIEN CE

KORERT P. GONZALES: LCDR: (!SNB.S., Villanova University, Villanova, Pennsylvania, 1986

Fort Ixavenw orth, Kansas1997

Approved for public rclcase; distribution is unlimited.


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. AGENCY USE ONLY ~ ~ e e v emy I Z REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AN

.- -- I ' 6 J u n e l 9 9 7 ~ M a s w r s t h e s i s l A u-TlTLE AND SUBTITLEManeuver Warfare-Applicationto Naval Banle and Tactics--. AUTHORISILCDR Roben P.Gonzales, USN

3. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBERSA CSGCA r n : A T Z L - S W L C DFort Leavenwonh,KS 66027-6SW-

IO.SPONSORING IMONITORINGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER

1. SUWLEMENTARY NOTES

.-.- --. - -2a. DlSTRlWTlON IAVAIIABIUTY STATEMENTAppmv edfor public release. Distribution unlimited

- -- --3. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)This study explo res maneuver warfare theory, naval ractics and if m aneuver warfare influence sor can be applied to nmics and battle. The concepts of amitio n warfare and maneuver warfare are investigated. The study is presented fromaval penp ective. To support this perspective, as p at s of war at sea and war on land are discussed. This comparison ofower helps develop the idea of naval maneuver warfare. Foundatio nsof naval tactics are outlined and the uniquinessofanle is also explored.

Thmu ghhistorical and tactical examples, and discussions this study shows maneuver warfare theory and concepts appaval Wtics and battle. Furth ermore, maneuver warfare is addressed with respect to military culture, the developingcof precision culture and other warfare theories includ ingam ition warfare theory. Maneuver warfare strengths andmilartions are discussed.The U.S. Navy has recently embraced maneuver warfare theory, perhaps too quick ly. Quite a heavy maneuver emphas developed lhat does not fully appreciare othe r warfare theo ries. This study presents a balanced discussion and con uib

) h e current debate tha~s shaping U.S. Navy Doctrine.

. -- .-t . SUBJECT TERMS 115. NUMBER OF PAGESI 93' 16. PRICE CODEI-- -- .-7. SE CU Rm CIASSIFICATION 1 8 . SECURITY CIASSIFICATION I 1 9 SE&ITY CIASSIFICATION i2 O U M n A no * OFI OF THIS PAGE !ABSTRACT

OF ~W&!~SSIFIED i UNCLASSIFIED I !OF ABSTRACT


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Namc o f Candidate: 1-CDR Kobcrt P. G on n~ lc s,U S . NavyThe sis Title: Maneu ver Warfarc--Application to Naval Rattle and Tactics

Approved by:

-%1 L f l e ,S/ ,Thesis Committee Ch airman

" "L C ~ ~ Rcot t A. Hastings, M.&M.M.A.s.. E.M.B.A.

,MemberLTC ~dw ar c& .Brennan, M.B.A.

,Member. Consulting FacultyLTC Robert G . ~ a n ~ n h n ,h.D.

Acceptcd this 6th day o f June 1997 by:

,Director, Graduate D egree P rogramsPhilip J. Brookes, PI1.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do notnecessarily represent the views of the 1J.S. Army Comm and and General Staff College o r anyothcr governmen tal agenc y. (Refere nces to this study should include the foregoing statement.)


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ABSTRACTMANEUVER WARFARE--AI'I'I.ICATION ' 1 ' 0 NAVA L HA'I'T1.E AND T AC TIC S byLCDR Kohert 1'. Go nzale s. I.!SN, 93 pages.Th is study explores maneuv er wartir e theor!, naval tactics and if mane uvcr warfare inlluen cesor can be applied to naval tactics and battle. The concepts of attrition warfare and man euverwarfare are investigated. The study is presented from a naval perspective. To supp ort thisperspective, aspe cts of war at sea and war on land are discussed. This comparison o f sea powerhelps develop the idca of nmrd maneuver warfare. Foundations of naval tactics are outlined andthe unique ness of naval ha ttle is also explored.Through historical and tactical cxarnples, and discussions this study sho ws maneuv er warfaretheory and concepts apply to naval tactics and battle. Furthermo re, mane uver warfare isaddressed w ith respect to military culture and other warfare theories includ ing attrition warfaretheory. Man cuvcr warfare strengths and limitations are discussed.The U.S. Navy has recently embraced maneuvcr warfare theory, pcrhaps too quickly. Quitc ahcavy man euvcr cn1ph;lsis has devcloped that d ocs not fully appreciate other warfare theories.This stud y presents a balanced discussion and co ntributes to the current deba te that is shapin gUS. avy doctrinc.


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ACKNOW1,EDCiM BN'I'S

In memory o f the Airmen. Marincs, Sailors and Soldiers that lost their liv cs in IronRottom Sound during thc Solomon Island Campaign of World War 11.


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TAD1.E O F CON I'ENTS&@

.APPROVAL PAGE .................................................................................................................. I I.. ...ABSTRAC I ........................................................................................................................ 111ACKNOWLEDGMENI 'S ........................................................................................................... iv

IJST O F I L LU S T R AT I O NS ...................................................................................................... vi iCI IAPTER

I . INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1..............................................................................................opic ...................... I

Rackground ......................... .................................................................................. 2Scope ........................................................................................................................ 7Significance ................................................................................................................ 7Levels of Warfare ....................................................................................................... 9

................................................................................................evels o f War.. Defi ned 12. . ..........................................................................................................t t r ~ t ~ o narfarc 13

............................ ..................................................eveloping Maneuver W arfarc .. 14Me lee and Autiraktik ................................................................................................ 19. .Definl t~on f Maneuver Warfarc ............................................................................ 23

2. I. ITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................ 273. RESEARCI I DESIGN ............................................................................................. 344 . WA R A T SE A AN D NAVAL. 'IAC'I'ICS ............................................................ 37

Introduction .......................................................................................................... 37Military Culturc ........................................................................................................... 38I'ocus and Ex ecution of thc Art oTWiirlighting ........................................................... 40

V


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......................................................................................ea Powers' Bond to the land 41.............................. ...................................ar on Land Vcrsus War at Sea .. .; 45

.................................................................................oundations of Naval Tactics 495 . APPLICA'I'ION OF NAVA L MANI3JVER WARFARE .......................................... 53

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 53I'echnology ................................................................................................................... 53Firepower .................................................................................................................... 5 5Scouting and Anti-Scouting .......................................................................................... 61Mobility and Movcnwnt .............................................................................................. 70Leadership .................................................................................................................. 73. . ........................................................................................................... CONCLUSIONS 77

...........................................................................................uture Research Q uestions 86BIBLlOGRAI'IIY ...................................................................................................................... 89

....................................................................................NITIAL DISTRIDI!TION LIST .. 93


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LIST O F FIGURES

Figure PageI . Notiooal Level of War ............................................................................................. 102 . Doubling ........................................................................................................................ 17

v i i


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LIST O F TABLES

'l'ahle Page1 . Land Battle Versus S ea Rattle ......................................................................................... 462 . Key Principles and Characteristics of Naval Tactics ..................................................... 513 . Attrition CulLure Versus Mancuvcr Culture .............................................................. 814 . Maneuver Culture Versus Precision Culture ................................................................. 83


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CHAPTER ONEINTRODIJCTION

"Naval maneuver w i~rfarc pplies to campaigns, not to battles. . .The aim of navaltact ics . . .was, and still is, attrition."' These words were writtcn recently by Captain W ayneHughes, lJSN (Retired), naval historian. theorist, and m embe r of the Naval W ar College ReviewAdvisory Board. l lis words provide the genesis for this thesis: an exploration of man euvcrwarfare theory, naval tactics, and whether ma neuver warfare influences or can he applied to .naval tactics and battle.

Bloodshe d, destruction, and material loss, typical of naval battles, clearly dcmo nstratcsan attrition nature. Contact with the enem y demand s attrition, usually on both sides. This givenmust not be igno red. Th e military leaders. ship designers and those on the deck plates must beprepared to strike hard and counter a tenacious foe. Yet, can the 1J.S. Navy tight sma rter? Wh ileaccepting the attrition nature of naval battle, can the battle grou p comm and er or ship'scommanding oflicer apply maneuver warfare concepts to naval tactics and battle to avoid andminimize attrition?

Sinc e the end o f the Cold War and the demis e (at least marginalization) of Ame rica'sneme sis, the Soviet Navy, the U.S. Navy has been aggressively redefining doctrine. As newdoctrine has developed and emerges. the U.S. Navy has been quick to embracc maneuver warfaretheo ry. Perhaps, like a sailor. fresh off thc bow in an cxotic liberty port, destined for a binge. theU.S. Nav y has become intoxicated with maneuv cr warfare. Major Gene ral Edward Atkeson,

1


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1J.S. A m y , has come to this conclusion and believes thc U S . Na vy is under the spcll o f he"maneuvcr ~a r fa reiren song."2 In part. this over exuberance i s due l o he I1.S. Navy'srelativ ely rcccnt adoption o f naval maneuver warfare theory. Nav al mancuver warfarc theoryi sso fresh that lit tlc has been wr ittc n about it insidc naval circlcs. TheUS. avy's principalrclcvant warfarc publications, Naval D octrinc Publication (NDP) 1, Na va l Warfarc, and Nava lWarfare Publication (NWP ) 3-20. Surface Shin Tactics, off er li ttl c beyond a gcneraldefinition o fmaneuver warfarc and a pow crfu l assertion tliat maneuver warfare i st h c prcferred and mosteffective rncthod o f warfarc.'

U.S. N av y mancuver warfare thcory i s sti l l maturing. Thc U S . Navy's warf ighting guidewhich fir ml y adopted maneuver warfarc, N DP I, Na val Warfare, was prornulgatcd in the springo f 1994. 'l'he process o fdoc trina l changc takes time to wo rk through all Icvels. As n cw conccptscome onlin e therc is both resistance and a learning curve to contcnd with. Thc 1j.S. N av y iswo rk ing through these issues. Hughesaccurately poin ts out, tha t the I1.S. N av y has yet to put the"flesh" on the "skeleton" o f naval doctrinc.' This thesis w i l l address mancuver warfare's impacton and application to naval bnttlc and tactics. A t the same timc. iti s hoped it w il l contr ibute totlic curren t dcbatc that i s shaping U.S. Na vy doctrine.

HackaroundWarfa rc theories and conccpts can hc traced back to thc origins o fman. The first cave

man that brandished a club to posture and drive away another was practicing thc philosoph y o fSun Tz u. Sun 'l'zu, whosc writin gs datc to 40 0 13.C.. is onc o f he earlicst recorded warf:?re .theorists. Sun 'l'zu taught, "To w in one hundred victories i n one hundred battles is not the acmco f ski ll . T o subdue thc cnemy without f ighting i s thc supreme exc c l l~ nc e. "~his i s a basicbelie f o f maneuver thcorists. The cave man untlerstood this: he knew hc co uld not a fford a


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broken hon c that might result liom a tight, cven a victorious fight. Convcrsely, the cavc mansoon discovcrcd another advantage of thc club: it enablcs one to dispatch or wear down theenemy morc efficiently (attrition warfarc). At times, no amo unt of posturing. rational o rcomm on scn se can avoid thc fight. Witncss the Gulf War of 1990-91. Would a rational enemyhave permitted the United S tates and Coalition forces timc to move Fort Ilood, F ort Bragg,Ca mp P endleton, n~ ult ipl e ircratl wings and hrigadcs, numerous ships, and supplies into strikingrange without any resistance. Would a rational cncmy have suffcrcd through weeks o fac ria lbomhardmcnt only to capitulate one hundred hours after hcing assaulted by ground troops. Ifenough is at stake or if onc is foolish enough, the enem y will fight in desp cration. 'Sbc cave manhelps illustrate the halancc hctwcen mancuv cr warfare and attrition warfare theory . It has beenhistorically com mo n to transition between the two theories.

On e is not thc "go od" typc of warfare and the other "had." Attrition bvarfare andman euve r warfarc arc two distinct styles of warfare. Sometimes only one stylc can be applied oris applicable, other timcs a choice must be made betwccn the two. Dcpcnding on ihccircumstances or i rt h e enemy comm ander has the initiative. hc may decidc which warfare styleis employed. Furthermore, warfitre is not limited to attrition w ar h re and maneuver warfare. Forexample, a third common warfarc style is gucrilla w arh re. G'uerre de course (commerceraiding) is sometimes considcrcd its naval counterpart.

Sun I'zu has been followcd by many grcat theorists and practitioners of wartiire.(ienghis Khan, Alexander thc Great, Napoleon, Clnusewitz, Malian, Patton. William DePuy, tohighlight only a few, h a w contributed to thc understanding of w arfare theory and tactics.Technology has providcd further impctus. The longbow, gunpow der, steel, steam engines, m assproduction, airplanes, and computers h a w shaped hattlc space and warfare.


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A contempo rary understanding of naval nar far e is mainly du e to theorists like Alfred'l 'haycr M;~lian,ulian. Corhctt and Ilaoul Castex . Hcrnard Rrodie affir ms this in A Lavman'sCiuidc to Naval S tra tew . He writes, "The underlying value of the teachings of men like Malian,Co rbe n and Castex is still largely intact."' M~nhan nd Co rbcn preceded Castex. 'l'hcy discusssom e aspec ts and foundation o f mancuver theory, but ncvcr dclined the concept or singled it out.In his work Stratceic 'l'hcories. Castex was the first to define naval mm eu vc r warfare anddcvclop a naval understanding of th c concept. I lowever, James 'l 'ritten, author of "'Maneuver' o r12.kmoeuvi-e W a r h e for the C1.S. Navy?" who is lavish i n his praise and admiration for Castex,warns that Castex's concepts arc not ideally suited to the U S . Navy. Castex, hc notes, was"providing a doctrinc for a second-ranking navy [France in the 1 93 0~ 1nd not one that wouldever hope to challcngc a first-rate fleet."'

Mancuv cr warfare theory m oved into thc forerront of Am erican military thinking withthe development of a "ncw opcralional view and tactics of battle tagged AirLand Battle." and thcpublication of U.S. Army Ficltl Manual (FM ) 100-5, O ~ e ra ti o n sn 1982.8 This firmlyestablished mancuvcr w ar hr c in American military doctrine and lexicon. Thc U.S. MarineCorp s aggressively embraced m aneuver w ar hr e in 1989 with the publication o f Fleet MarineForcc and (FM FM ) I, Warfinhting. These publications and subsequent writings haveprecipitated a lively dcbatc and a critical analysis of all aspec ts of land and amphibiou s warfare.Furthcn nore, Desert Storm helpcd to validate aspects of both services' doctrine. Whiledeveloping ma neuver w arfare doctrinc, cach service and academia have produccd a rich litany of

hooks, articles, and writing on land and amphibious mancuvcr warfare. By the mid-1990s theU.S. Navy would bccome a full participant in the debate.

In 1994, the I J S . Navy promulgated its vision of naval wartighting with the publicationof NDP 1, Naval W artire . 'I'hc imp clus for change was the collapse of thc Soviet Union and end


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o ft h e cold war. Sinc e the start of the cold war. in tlie late 1940s, through the latc 1980 s. the U.S.was actively containing com ~n un ism nd tixed on dctcrring war with thc United Sovict SocialistRepu blic (1JSSIt). The U.S. Navy conducted prcscnce ope rations to the shore lincs and backyardor th e USSR. Operations were conducted in the North Se a and B altic Sc a, under thc ice cap, andinto the Sovict underbelly, the B lack Sea. I n thc East, the 1J.S. Navy o pera ted in the NorthPacific and Sca of Japan. Embarrassed by their maritime unpreparcdness in the carly sixties, thcSov iets developed a fleet approac hing par with the 1J.S. by tlie late seventies and early eighties.To countcr this "perman ent foc," doctrine and tactics were dcvcloped . This doctrine servcd onepurposc--to defe at the Sovict Navy. Som e Inlay call this short sighted; however, i n tlie context o fthe timc it was survival.

I wil l never forget . whilc s c ~ i n gn a dcstroycr. being overflown by Soviet Badgerswhilc steaming in the S ca ofOkh otsk during my first deployment in 1987; and despite a foggyand moonless night in thc Sca of Japan, being denied permission to turn on thc ship's alternatenavigation rada r \\,lien its primary radar failed. l'h c alternate radar was the SPQ -9 radar, whichwas also tlie gunfire control radar. It was fcarcd bringing up thc SPQ-9 navigation and gunfirecontrol radar might alarm Soviet destroyers that wcrc operating close by. The U.S. Navy wascorisumed in forward presence operations against a capable, improving adversary.

'l'hc threat began to cn sc in the late eighties and early nineties with reforms in the So victUnion. In 1091; following thc collapse of thc Soviet Union, t l ~ c .S. Navy found itself withoutpccr or permanent adversary--for tlic ncar future. 'l'hc "c omforting certainties of the Cold War"'werc ovcr. In hand. tlic U S . Navy's doctrinc and tactics would soon be provcn out of datc. Th cend o ftl ie cold w ar found tlie 1J.S. Navy adrift (figuratively, not literally).

'fhc U S . Navy did not have to look f ir to prompt change. The Gulf War of 1990-91demo nstrated that the collapse of the Sovict Union did not change Am erica's g eograph ic position


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or need for permanent m aritim e superiority. I t also demonstrated that doctrine, tactics, comm andand control. weapons, and concept o f operations were not suitcd to this "N cw W orl d Ordcr."According to' Ad mir al W il l iam Owens, the Gu lf War was the US. avy 's "m idw i fe to c l~ an ge . " '~In H inh Seas: The Na val Passaee to an ilnchn rted Wo rld, Owens discusses nationa l strategy tofig ht in the deep hluc ocean, b ottle up the Soviet Na vy and protect the Na vy's sea lancs o fcom mun ication (SLOC). Fig hting was going to take place over lon g distances, at max imumrangc. The comm and and contr ol systcrn was designed to opcrate in a defensive mode andcounter a doctrinal adversary. Owens recognizes that thc maritim e stratcgy and battlc grouptactics wcrc products o f he tirncs. I- lowever, hey proved "illsuited to the G u lf War" and l ikelyscenarios for t lic future--the IJ.S. Na vy ha d to adapt and changc,""

W ith the lessons o f lic Gu lf War o f 1900-9 and the collapse o f he Soviet Navy, theU S . N a vy q u i ck ly a nd deliberately institutcd change. T o stimulate and guidc change, theLkpartment o f he Na vy produced a white paper, l i t led " . . .Fro m the Sea," in 1992, whichchartcd a ne w coursc for the naval servicc. ". . .Fro m the Sca" steered the naval service awayfrom the hlue watcr navy, open ocean maritime strategy dictatcd by the cold war. Recognizingtlic new challenges and changing world, it focused efforts toward development o f navalcxpc ditionary forccs (NEF) and further integrating the Navy -Ma rine Corps tcam. Also, thcservice was to prcparc for jo in t and multinationa l operations in the littoral. '2 Creation o f licNava l Doctr inc Command fol low cd in the spr ing o f 1993. Tasked with art iculat ing navaldoctrine, in 1994, the Nav y Doctr inc Command promulgated ND P 1 , Naval War fare. I n ts ownwords, N D P I:Na va l Warfarc, is a "capstone documen t for Na val W arfare that translates tlicvision and strategy o f ". . .Fro m the Sea" into doctrina l rcality.""

Thcse changes wcrc indeed far reacliing--and continuc today. In 1996 ". . . From theSca" was updated and sligh tly m odifi ed and a new white paper. "Fonv ard . . . Fr om the Sea,"


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was introdu ced. As a result of thcsc white papcrs, the entirc 1I.S. Navy 's focus chnngcd.1)octrine. co~iccpts. rocedures, battle group makeup and command and control structure wcreupdatcd or moditie d. In conjunc tion with these movements, NDP 1, Naval W arfare, cmb race smane uver warrare as "the prcfcrable and rnorc effective--albeit more difficult to master--fighting

The s cop c of this thesis is limited to thc study of naval maneu vcr warfa re thcory an dpractice and if it app lics to naval battle and tactics. In the process, this work w ill exp lorc kcydcfinitions, found ations of naval tactics and differences hem ccn land warfarc and naval warfare.Naval m ancuve r warfarc's influence on thc operational and strategic levels o f warfare will alsoappear within this study.

Siclnificance"'l'his ship is built to fight . . .you'd bctter know how."" With thcsc words as a

challenge to thc commissioning crew of USS Arlcigh Burke (DL)(; 1), Admiral Arleigh Burkecommissioned his namesake. I h c most capablc guided m issilc destroyer in the world.ARLEICiH BUIZKE is the lend ship of the 1J.S. Navy's newcst c lass of warsh ips. The sc are toughwords. Admiral h r k c intcnded these words for the entirc U.S. Navy. A war licro and brillianttactician, he kncbv the importance of knowing your profession and craft. His crafi kept him aliveand enabled him to achieve cxcmplary succcss against thc Japanese during World War 11 as adestroyer squadron comrnandcr.

In the spirit of Arlcigli Burke's challenge, this tlicsis will explore as pects of l!.S. Navy'scraft and naval warfighting . This tlicsis will look at newly developed n aval doctrine and cxplor ethc works o f naval thcorists. Spccificnlly. this tlicsis will dircctly look at mancuver warfare.


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naval tactics, and whether maneuver warfarc influences can be applied to naval tactics and ba ttle.Ad dit ion ally, this thesis w i ll high light, to somc degree, the foll ow ing sig nif icant issues:

I. Ma ny m aneuver wn rh re pract it ioners, cspccial ly o r naval maneuver warfare, bel ievemaneuver warfare is& ovcm cnt or m ob i l i ty. This thesis w i l l addrcss this misunderstandingo f maneuver warfare and demonstrate that maneuver warfare is more than g lor i l ie t l m ovement orm ob i l i ty. A n art and philosophy, m aneuver warfare may include lnovement and mob i l i ty but.should not bc lim ited to the non-linear battlefield. Ma ncuv cr warfare also seeks othcr avenues toexp loit thc in i t iat ive and defeat the enemy's w i l l to f ight .

2. Exp loit ing ma ncuvcr warfare o n the batt lef ield i s an earned righ t. The tactics, tempo,and tcclmology--amo ng othcr things--that the commander brings to a l ig ht promotes maneuverwa rf ire. Yet. f reedom o f maneuver cannot he imposcd on the cncniy; i t must be wrestcd fromthe enemy comrnandcr. Dcsp itc his best efforts, a maneuver pract i tioner may have to r ely in parton a ttrit ion tactics or actions.

3. A ttr it io n warfarc cannot always he avoided. Contact, soldier versus soldier, shipvcrsus ship. plane versus plane, even with o vcr wli eln ling odds or technological advantage, ma ylead to attrit io n. Even i n t l ic best circun~stances, onlact exposes forces to a linear ha ttletield ortwo-dimensional aspcct o f warfare. ' l'ypical ly, somconc wi l l experience at tr it ion, most l ik ely onho th sides.

4. "Man cuvcr w arfare is good whi le at t r i t ion warfarc is bad" is a f requent ly declaredgeneralization. Th is conclu sion is f lawed. The relationship and dyna mic are more com plex.

Yet. much o f what is wr i t ten relegates attrit ion warfare to a losing option. As stated above,leaders must understand that attrit ion warfare at t imes may he the only op tion. W hi le maneuverwarfarc offers m an y advantages, an indirect approach ma y not in it ia lly exist in tactics or battles.


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5. Lan d warfare and sca warfare arc distinct disciplincs. W hile sonlc concepts ovcrlap.thc ir uniqueness must be recogniZcd. Understanding these distinctions enablcs commanders toeffectively app ly land po wer and sca power.

6. Warfare thcory i s typ ica lly cast from a land warfare perspective. Yct, land warfareand sca warfare are uniqoc. When applying \ \ d a r e thcory to naval warfare i ts uniqueness musthe addrcsscd. Igno ring thcsc differenccs may lead to a misappl ication d w a rf a rc thcory.

- Lcvcls of WarfiwcToda y there arc three generally recognized lcvcls o r war: stratcgic. operational, and

tact ical. Ix ve ls o f war are a tool or model to l ink a nation's pol icy to m i l i t a y s t rategy to tact icalactions. Th is mod el has cvolv ed over thc ycars. Clauscw itz spoke of strategy and tactic^.'^Jom ini introd uce d concepts, such as grand tactics and elementary tactics." The current nio dc l i src lat ive ly recent and cxpands on many of the se idcas. The term "opcrat ional level o f war" or"opcrationa l art" bccatnc popular in U.S. mi l i tary Icxicon in the latc 1970s. Adop tcd f i rst by t l icArmy. i t was later incorporated into o int doctr ine. By thc late 1990s i t bcgan to appcar in na valwri t ing s and is no w fu l ly incorporated in naval warfare publ icat ions (NWPs) and naval doctr inepublications (NDPs).

I t has long hccn recognized that m il i tary pow cr and mil i tary act ion are instruments o f anat ion's power and an extension of pol icy. Both Clausewitz and Jomini concluded that militaryaction is a means o f achieving a nation's ob.jectivcs. Influenced b y the works o f Clausewitz andJomini. the great naval theorist Al frc d 'fhayer M aha n echoed this conclusion and declared in1879, "War i s s imply a vio lent pol i t ica l mo vem er~ t . " '~ igure I dcpicts the no t ional levels o f awar rno dcl and helps show how this m odc l l inks national polic y to tactical actions.


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War STRATEGIC NCACampaigns OPERATIONAL Theater, JTF, Fleet Commander,Major operations Task Force, Task Group, CVBGBattle TACTICAL Task Group. Task Element,Engagements CVBG, SAG, SAU, Ship,Submarine

Figure I . Notional Level of War Chart

Figure 1 is only a notional depiction o f th c rnodcl. In reality this model do es not hold tostrict boundarics or relationships. For example, tactical actions may have dircct impact onstrategic concern s and national policy. Thc Doolittle Raid ser ves to illustrate this point. In April1942. sixteen B-25 mcdium bombers. Icd by Jame s Doolittlc, were launchcd from the USSHorrrer (CV-X), against Tok yo and three othcr cities i n Japan. They condoctcd a relativcly minortactical action--especially in the sc opc of the military actions that irnmcdiately followe d the raid.(Th c Battle of Coral Sca (3 May 1942) would follow two weeks latcr. and M idway sho rtly aftcrthat.) Ik si dc s being tactically small, operationally it significantly hampcrcd Admiral Che sterNirnitiz's ac tions in the Pa cilic. With limited assets at his disposal, this raid dangcro uslydisoerseh his four availeblc carriers. IJSS Surtrroga (CV-3). N itnil2 fifth carricr in the Pacificdur ing this pcriod, had bccn crippled by a .lapnnese suhniarinc torpedo and would he unavailableuntil aftcr the Battle of Midway. With USS En~erprisc?CV- 6) escorting Hornet, Nimitz onlyhad two carricrs available for othcr operations. As a direct result o ft h e raid, only IJSS Yorkto~rn(CV-5 ) and Il SS Lexinglon (CV -2) would he in thc South Pacific for the Battle of thc Coral Sc a.Yet, this tactically insigniticant raid and operational mistake was a top national and strategicpriority for thc Unitcd States. 'l'hc strategic, political considerations were considere d para mo unc


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i t made th e Am crican people feel good and was perceived vcry positively in the press andconsidered a victory."

'l'hc Doolittle Raid clcarly illustrates the m odcl. I t also demonstrates a misapplication ofmilitary power. The D oolittlc Kaid was not tied to Admiral Nimitz's principal strategic mililaryobjectives of hold thc IJacific. Europe tirst and ope rate as a raider or spoiler o n the strategicdefensive. Where airc ralt carricrs could have been rnorc effectively positioned in the Sou thPacific, they wcrc scattered over the I'acific.'" Th e U.S. would address this early mistake atMidw ay. At Midwxy, the I1.S. would align its national military strategy and tactical actions.Admiral Nimitz would he able to concentrate his carricrs for the lirst time and deal a dev astatinghlow to Japan.

The level of war model is not limited to general war. It applies to any exccution of themilitary instrument of power in peacetime. Peacetime opcrations skew the model even morc.USS Vincennes'(CG-49) minor skirmish \\.it11 Iranian gun hoats and the accidental shootingdown of an Iranian civilian air lincr was a tactical action. Yct, its ramilications w r e felt in thehalls of the White Housc and Pentagon. Tilt hostage rescue attempt, Desert One and sendingaircraft carricr battle group s (C:VRGs) into the Taiwan Straits are two m orc cxam plcs that blurthe distinction bctwccn strategic: operational. and tactical levels of war. Yet, the model stillapp lies. 1)ecisions made by the National Com mand A uthority (NC A) influence action down othc tactical level and tactical actions stretch hack to the NCA . I:ailurc rcsulls when action s arenot properly l inked. Succcssf~~lxecution of national goals and objectives demand that thisrelationship bc understood and propcrly cxccuted.


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I.cvcls o f War--DefinedAck now ledg ing his dcbt to Clausewit7, M alian stated in 1x97: "It is not un til this

po lit ica l determina tion [national ob jectives and goals] has been reachcd that the data fo r cvcnstarting mil ita ry prob lems are in hand; for here, as always. the mi litar y arm w aits upon and issubservient to the pol i t ica l interests and ci vi l pow cr o f he state."" I t s at the strategic lcv elwhere m il i tar y mcans are developed to m cct M ahan's pol i t ical dctcrmination; the exccut ion ofthe m il i tar y instrumcnt o f power is t ied dircct ly to achieving nat ional goals and ohject ivcs at thestrategic lev el. I).pically. stratcgic p olic y is init iatcd by thc N C A assisted b y t l ic Nation alSccuri ty Co unc i l (NSC). Furthermore, at the stratcgic lcvcl, theater strategy and ope rationalgoals arc dcvelop ed. Theater strategies and operational goals l ink thc strategic le vel to thcoperational level o f war.

Operat ional icvcl or operat ional art l inks t l ~ c trategic and tactical lcvcls o f war.Commanders in C hi ef (CINCs) and Fleet Cornmandcrs conduct operational art. ' fhc K C Aprovides theater stratcgy and operational goals to thc CINC . The CI N C or t lcct com mandertranslates these into campaign plans and direct tactical action. Th is intertiiediate-lc\,clopcrationa l art and campaign p lanning is instrumental to ensurc tactical actions come togetherand support stratcgic plans.

' l h c tactical leve l o f war deals with indiv idua l engagements and battlcs. Tactics is the arto f ight ing . Ship-to-ship or ship-to-submarine encounters and air strikes are tactical execution.CVBCi and Am phib ious llc ad y Group (ARC;) actions arc typica lly tactical execution. Tacticsl in k hack to opcrat ional art b y support ing opcrat ional goals.


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At t r i t ion Warfare"A s the A llie s prcsscd thcir offensive. Germany's losscs cxcceded its war indu stry's

capacity to kcc p pace, at the same time, the all ics wc rc ablc to replace their dam aged merchan tfleet and even cxpand i t by add ing replacements numbc ring hvic c the losses suffcrcd." '* W itht l~es c ords. N DP 1 , Nava l Warfare, adept ly captured the essence o f he B att lc o f he At lant icdu r ing W or l d W ar 11. A daunt ing Gcrman submarine forcc, which expanded in the carly wa ryears and was dif f ic ul t to f ind and destroy, menaced All ic d SLOC s. These sea lanes wcrecri t ica l to A l l ie d s urvival and could not be abandoned or bypasscd. These, the Al l ic s had to massassets and rcsources to counter the G erm an tlircat and keep the sea lanes opcn. Thus, the B attl eo f thc At lant ic is an example o f hc classic at t r i t ion t ight.

Thc Ba ttle ol't l ie Atla ntic displays thc chie f characteristics o f attrit io n warfare: strengthversus strength, systematic destruction o ft l i c enemy, and engagement and battle focus. Att r i t io nwarfare sccks to dcstroy thc mass and physical force o f t l ic cncmy. I t s very cost ly and forcerat ios arc cxtrc lncly impo rtani. Cri t ica l to n succcssf111attr i t ion f ight is destroying t llc cnem yfaster than hc can recover. Em ploym ent o f rcscrvcs and rcsources in greater nurnbcrs or rasterthan the enemy w il l swin g t l ic batt lc or war. At tr i t io n warfare is of tcn cal led l inear warfarcwlicre neither s ide has freedom o f mancuvcr. I n addition to the 13attlc o f hc A t lant ic, t l lerc arcnumerous othcr cxamplcs o f at t r i tion w arfarc.

I n ma ny ways, at t r i t ion warfarc has bccn the dominant inf luence on the American w ay o fa At tr i t io n warfare complements America's strengths: economic might, industrialization. andvast rcsources. Signif icant aspects o f at t r i tion warfare can be clearly sccn in the C iv i l War,W or l d W ar I,W o rl d Wa r 11, and Victna m. I n each case, the 0 . S . l iarncssed its economic power,indu strial engine, and resources to br ing niacliines, personnel, f ircpow cr, mass, and technologyto bcar. We aring do wn the enemy. strcngtli versus strength, and dcstroying the encm y faster


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than he co uld destroy Arncrican or Al l ie d fbrccs charactcrizcd these conflicts. ' l 'hc co ld war wasanotlicr attrit io n f ig ht. The W est's massivc force and nuclear arscnal were b ui lt up to dctcr thcSoviets from bcc om ing an aggressor. The p osturing was mass versus mass.

Du ring the cold war America idcnt i l ied the Soviet mil i tary--army, navy, a ir force andnuclear arsenal-as n source o f strength arid s l~ccessl idly ountered i t with overw helmingsuper ior i ty o f he IJ.S. and NA TO . At t r i t ion warfarc i s bcst suited when thc cn cmies strength i shis n i i li tary . I t may be the only opt ion if riend ly p ower cannot influence or get at his othcrsources o f strcngth. Vietnam offers an cxamplc o f where America's culture o f at tr i t ion warfarewas ti l iabi l i ty . In Vic tnam the 0.S. m i l i tary faccd anothcr type o fwar fare-- d is t i~ ic t io mmaneuver warfare and at tr i t ion warfare--gueri lla warfarc. I n O n Strateuv: A Cri t ica l Analvsis o fthe Victnam War, Colonel I arry Sum nicrs rccal ls an A pr i l 1975 conversat ion i n which heremarked, " ' You know you never defeated us on the hattletield' to wh ich his Vietnamesccoun terpart rcp licd. 'T ha t ma y be so, hu t also irrclcvant.' "l' The Viet Cong and NorthVictnamcsc strength was not l imite d to thcir forces in the t ield. Where m il i tar y mass is not thcenemy's strength, attrition \barfare i s po orly suited. Morcover, a ttrit ion warfarc does not targetor ex plo it other enemy strengths or wcakncsscs other than mil ita ry mass. O n the othcr hand,maneuve r warfarc sccks to exp loit an enemy's will, cohesion, and mass.

I)cvclooinu Maneuver WarfarcA r l and phi losophy are the most con inion descript ive ternis encountered researching ihe

concept and dc finit i on o f maneuver warfarc. A t lcast one. and. t ie que ntly both terms nppcar i nmost def ini tions o f maneuver warfarc. Sincc i t is not an exact or hard scicnce, maneu ver warfaredoes not have a r ig id l is t o f heorems or foniiu las . As a result i t is often di f i cu l t to expla in,understand, and apply. In the Mancu vcr Wa rh re Handbook. Wil l iam Li n d blunt ly states, " ' l'here


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is no form ula yo u can Icarn. Wlien someone says. 'Cut al l thc bu ll about theory; jus t tell m e whatto do,' yo u can't. Yo u can talk about how to think, and ahout somc useful technique^."^' L i n deffec tively capturcs thc main point: maneuvcr warfarc i s very m uch a conceptual approach towarfare and painstaking to grasp.

Though i t i s not an exact science, l ik c all philosophies. there are core hc licfs that h oldtrue. Thc corc idcas o f maneuver warfare wi l l hc cxplaincd below. In addition, mancuverwarfarc w i l l bc div id cd into two themes. Lo ok ing at mancuver warfare as t \vo thcnics helpsexplain m aneuver warfare thcory dcvclopm cnt and defuse some confusio n surround ingmaneuver warfarc.

Before exp loring the corc idcas o f mancuver warfare. consideration o f how m aneuverwarfare measures succcss il lumin ates its conceptual and morc com plcx nature. I n he attrit ionlig ht success is measured b y tanks dcstroycd or ships sunk or aircraft sl ~ o t own . A ttri t io nwa rfm c is focused on force ratios and mass vcrsus mass. Success is easicr to mcasure. B ycomparison, for the maneuverists. thcsc nicasures o f success frequently h old lit t le value. Thc~i ianeuvcr is tmu st conccntratc on the effect his actions and initiative have on the enemy w i l l tocont inue. Often. the on ly measurc o f succcss for t l ie frien dly commander i s miss ionaccomplishmcnt.

As discussed earl ier, t l ie origins o f maneuvcr ua rfarc phi losophy date hack to grcntChinese m il i tar y thinkcrs that prcdatc Christ by hundreds of ycars. Aspccls o f mrtneuvcr t l icorywere also displaycd by t l ic ancient Greeks, Komans, and Phoenicians. Maneuve r warfarc theory

has cont inucd to mature over the years. I n fhc Ar t o f Maneuver, Robert Lconard details thecontr ibut ions of Sun 'l'zu, Cicnghis Khan. Napoleon , 1,iddel Hart, and others in the evo lutio n o fmaneuvcr warfarc ~ h co ry . ' ~ he genesis for mancuvcr warfare theory was thc real ization that thcw i l l and c ohes ion o f l ~ c n c ~ i i y an be broken w ithout destruct ion o f his mass. I e can bc broken


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cven if he has a numerical advantage or his notional strength is prcatcr. O n land, outtlanking anopponent to hit his vulnerable rear, massing forces at a point. and breaking his line aremanifestations of th is idea. Ih rin g the age of sail, crossing the "T" or the tactic of doubling.whcrc a column of ships would split to cnvelop an enemy column on both sides (figure 2)i"ctsto this idea. Here is t l ~ c hicfd irfere nce between m aneuver warfare and attrition warfare.Attr it ion w a r h e defeats an cncmy by destro>ing his mass. Mancuver warfare dcfeats thecncmy's will and cohesion by sccking a vulnerability and destroying mental, moral, or mass.(Aga in, m aneuve r warfarc is not an alternativc to attrition warfare. If no vulnerabilities orweaknesses exist, than mass versus mass--attrition--may be the only an s w r . )

Two themes emerge w l~i lc tudying mancuvcr warfare. Both themes have a t their corcdefeating the enem y's will and cohesion, avoiding strcngth vcrsus strength and exploitingweaknesses and vulnerabilities. These thcmcs did not develop one aftcr the other or separately;they dcvclopcd together. The first theme is simplcr and easier to understand. It is depend ent onmovement in relation to thc cnclny. The second theme is morc complex as it looks bcyondmovcm cnt. This theme looks for a vulnerability that permits weakening the enemy's sources ofstrcngth and cohesion . 'l'hcsc themes are not niutually cxclusive. and aspects of both may appearin battle. How cvcr, thcy simplify explainin g maneuver warrare.

The first theme can bc labclcd the basic theme or movcmcnt theme. The route to ancncmy's c ohesion is through his mass, not brute ibrcc (ma ss against mass ) but cxploiling~novement .Movcincnl in relation to the cncrny increases friendly com bat power. The cncmy'scohesion is broken , largely, by pitting strength against weak ness. Mancuver or movem cnt isuscd to increase friendly tighting power relativc to the enemy's.


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The a im of doubl ing w as t o ach ieve on e of the se pos i t ions :

B oth f l e e t s w e r e m o v in g , a t a b o u t t h e s a m e s p e e d w h e n w ell h a n d le d , s o it w a sdifficult to a t ta in th e posi t ions without spl i t ting a f leet temporar i ly an d r isking th eenemy 's c los ing on on e half o r the o th er and co unte rconcen t ra t ing . Admira l Nelsonsuccessful ly doubled on th e French a t the B at t le of th e Nile b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e a ta n c h o r a n d o t h e r c i r c u m s t an c e s w e r e f o r tu i to u s :Brlt ish underwayv b b- a 4 4 4 4 4 French a t anchor

b b b

Figure 2 . Doubling. Sourcc: Wayne Ilughcs. Flcct Tactics. Th co n. and Practicc (Annapolis. MDNaval Institute Prcss, 10x6). 45.

During the Battle of the Nile. August 1798. Admiral Lord Horatio Nclson displayed thehasic thcm c of mancuv cr warfarc theory. Falling. unexpectedly, on the French at Aboukir Hay.outside the mouth of the Nile Rivcr. he achieved a trcmcndous victory. Exploiting surprise,tcmpo and movcmcnt. thc English dccinlatcd and humiliated a superior French forcc.Abandoning a rigid linc formalion from the outset, he intended to double on the Frcnch. As theBritish column approached the French van, he split some of his ships to the landward side of theFrench. Thi s caught the French completely off guard and Admiral Nclson was able to douhle onthc anchored Frcnch ships. As thc Royal Navy column worked the French line it was always twoor mo rc ships against onc. " Admiral Nclson exploited movement and mobility to incrcase hiscombat powcr i n rclntion to thc Frcnch.

It is from this basic thcm c that mancuver w arfare gets its name . The hasic tltcmc isdepen dent on movement and mobility. However, rnaneuvcr warfarc is more than movem ent and. - . , . .. . . , .mobility; Thc cxpandcd thcm c will illustraie this point. I t is in the basit thcme where much of


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the confusion about maneuver w arfare sets in. I t is generated by i ts ow n namc: mancu vcrwarfare. Ma ny cannot get bcyond maneuver ~ a r f a r e eing about movem ent or m obility. '" l licexpanded theme belo w helps show maneuver warfare i s more than moverncnt or m obil i ty .

The second theme can be considered the expanded theme. The key h crc is that there areother ways t o break an enem y's cohesion besides increasing thc combat powcr relat ive to his. Inthe basic theme, p rim ari ly through movement. frien dly combat pow er is incrcascd. 'Shis increasein combat po wcr al low s conccntrat ion against sclcctcd port ions o f his mass. I n he basic thememass sti l l plays a key rolc. Thc cxpandcd theme lo oks at decreasing the enemy's com bat pow cr.Th is is accomplished by balan cing an enemy's strengths against his weakncsscs and\ ulncrabi l i t ics. Strengths arc not attacked. N o r arc al l \wakncsscs attacked. On ly thoseweakncsscs and vulncra bilit icr: that dire ctly reduce an enemy's strengths are attacked. I n hisway thc cncmy's intcm al strcngth and cohcsion are broken.

Am erican actions in t l ic Solomons between July 1942 and August 1943 in defense o f(iuadacanal are il lustrative. Am erican loc al air superiority dur ing dayligh t forced the Japaneseto opcratc at nigh t. Thc cam paign ccntcrcd on support for forccs ashorc and contro l ofHcndcrson Field. A t nigh t t l ic lmp crial Na vy wou ld attempt to resupply land forces and sl lc l lIenderson Fie ld. The Am erican N av y attempted to deny the Japanese lines o f communicat ion.De prive d of a ir c ra ll due to darkness: these were ship-to-ship clashes. ' l'he source o f Japancsestrength was the Lo ng Lance torpedo. They employed it with devastating effectivcncss.Mo un ted on cruisers and destroyers, i t outclassed the Am erican torpedo in rangc and payload.

The Am cricans were s low to apprcciatc i ts capabilities and init iall y rought the Japanese wi thbrute strength and attrit ion, attempting to counter t l ~ c ong Lance wi th gunf i re and torpedoes.These tactics resulted in spectacular failures. I.atc in t l ic cam paign, America n tacticians graspedthe key to success: the Japancse di d no t posscss radar and could not m atch Am crica n s couling


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and antiscouting. B y deve loping tactics that cxplo itcd this weakness, the Lo ng Lance wasmarginalized. Esse ntially the Americans kept their guns silcnt un til after they had closed wit hthe cncmy. f ire d thcir torpedoes, and hit their ma rk. The Japancse were surprised and unable toemp loy thcir torpedo ef fect ively.

Melee and Aufrue.sruk~ikCom mo n to both the basic and expandcd theme and a core be l ief o f n~an cuv cr arpare

theory is the idea o f Melee and Aujirupruklik. These are, respectively, the Br it ish R oya l N av yand the German A rm y. These terms emhody the conccpts o f retaining ini t iat ive at a l l levels ol 'comm;tnd, m iss ion orienta ted comhat. arid freedom ol' action fo r subordinates. Properlyhnrnessing the concept ensures unity o f ef fort without micromanagement or overreaching con trolb y superiors. Com mande rs emphasize "end state dcsircd" n ot "how to" and ensure ju ni or leaderskn ow the commander's intent and those o f i is superiors. Those closest to the action areempowered to take decisive action. Since each level is executing the commander's clca rly statedintcnt, al l parts o f he force are wo rking together. Rapid act ion results.

"Captains arc to look to thc ir particular Li ne as their ra lly-po int. But, i n case Signals canneither be seen or pc rfectly understood, noCaptain can do very wro ng if ic places his S hipalongside that o f an Enemy."" This famous quotc f io m Adm iral Lor d I oratio Nelson's 1803hatt lc nicmorandum was wriuen on his t lagship. t l M S Vicrory, pr ior to the Bat t le o f Trafalgar.This splendid quotc is rcprcscntat ive o f l l i e Meleeis t spi ri t. 4 s Ro yal Na vy t radi t ion andexperience developed i n the late 1600s. tw o camps or schools o f hooght s low ly emerged. Thelirs t school is sometimes referred to as the "Form alisl." ' l'his sch ool relied he avily on doctrineand l igh t ing instruct ions. Du ring the 1704 Ba t l le o f Ma lga an Anglo-1)utch f leet achievedvic lo ry w ith a we ll disc ipline d hattlc l ine. This school held that this was the key to victory. '"


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Thc sccond school was the Me lee school or "Meleeist." For the Meleeist doctrine was acrutch or shield to hidc bchind. Thcy fclt circumstanccs and opp ortun ity should dictate action.Commanders rcqu ired a fir m grasp o f he basics, maneuver and tactics, b ut must be allowedfreedom o f action. "Thc mancuvcr-oricntated M elee doctrinc attracted some dashing Englishcommanders who did not want to bc bound by rulc and had the skil ls to master the frccdom o fmaneuver warfare.""

The most noted Royal Nav y Meleeist is Admira l Nelson. I le was a charismatic leaderand highly skil led tactician. A Mclccist, Adm iral Nclson did not rely on doctrine, form al signals,and tigh t co ntr ol du ring hattlc. He relied on personal contact with his commanders. Rou tinelyand, sp ecifically. pri or to battle, he held meetings and dinners with his comman ding officers.A t these prebattle mectings. A dm iral Nclson assembled his "Band o f Brothers" and "personallyco~nrnunicatcd is perception o f he alternative courses the battle mig ht take and the basicactions that wcrc cxpected o f each."'2 Ad mi ral Nelson personally narncd his unconvcntionallcadcrship style "The Ne lson Touch." Cieorgc M. Hal l in ' l'hc Fift h Star: Hie h Comm and in anEra o f Global War highlights the Nelson touch in a discussion o f facets of leadership. TheNc lson touch. he states, "describes a commander wh o predisposes his rcsourccs to favo r astr ikin g victo ry (the mechanics of w a r) and thcn inspircs his subordinates to act as if hey werean cxtcnsion o f hin lsc lf whilc sti l l exercising their own initiative to deal with circumstanccs asneed bc (leadcrship).""

Auf/raptakrik or "mission tactics" i s very similar to thc conccpt o f Mclc c and TheNelson Touch. Alrfrrcrg.~faklikas been a guiding principle o f he German Arm y throughout thc20th Century. The concept i s formally dctincd and can bc found in numerous works o n warfaretheory. I t is more gcncrally rccognizcd than M clce. Lik e Melee it is a rather simple concept. I tinvo lves empowe ring a subordinate by tel ling h im the result or "end state" one wishes him to


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obtain. I t is up to the subordinate to determine "ho w" and gct it done. Ordcrs specify output, notinput. I n ordcr lo be ef fect ive this must hold truc at cvcry Icvcl, f rom general to f i re tcam andind iv idua l sold ie r a ~ l drom admiral to comm anding of f icers to tact ical act ion ot 't iccrs toweapons conso le opcrators. '1'0 complctc the empowerment, every lcvc l must know thecommander's intent and end state desired tw o lcvcls up."

In 1913, Vice-Admiral Si r Dav id Dcat ty , commander of th e R oyal Navy 's Grand F leetbattlc cruiscrs i n thc N or th Sea stated, ";~lthough tim e af icr t im c I iavc impressed . . . thericccssity o f always usin g. . . nitiativ e and discretion--that m y ordcrs arc expressions o fintentions and thcy arc nor to bc obcyed too l i teral ly. The M an on the Spot i s thc only one whocan judge certain si tuat ions."" I l l i s dcmonstratcs that t llc spir i t o f Ad mira l Nelson and thcNclson touch s t i l l inf luenced the R oyal Navy . Yet, i t is notcworthy that this statement is foundin Ad mira l Bcatty's c r i tique o f h is fa i lure to dec isively engage an isolatcd German Impe r ia l Nav ycruiscr forcc at Scarborough: "W e were wi thin an ace o f brin gin g about the complete destructiono ft h e Enemy Cruiser Force--and fai led." W li i lc Ad mira l Bcatty was an adherent to Mc lcc andthe N elson Touch, he demonstrates how dif f i cu lt i t is to cxccute.

' l' li c main cause of th e Roya l Navy 's h i lu rc at Scarborough was one o f Ad m ira l Rcatty'ssubordinates. Com modore W il l ia m Goodenough, cornniandcr o f Ad mira l Beatty's l igh t cruiserscreen. Cornmo dorc tioodcn oog h broke contact with enemy l ight cruisers wl lcn Ad m ira l Beattyordcrcd a change in disposit ion o f his screening forccs. Ad mira l Bcau y was unaware thatCo nim odo rc Cioodcnough was in contact with three enemy lig ht cruisers. I fCommodore

Cioodcnough had instcad "kccp in touch w ith [remained engaged] and rcportcd the presence o fthc En cmy Cruisers," Ad mira l Deatty would l iavc turncd lo support his l ig ht cruiser screeningforce and cut down: wi th ovc nvhclrnin g superiority, a German lm pcria l Nav y l igh t cruiser andhatlle cruiser force. As i t was: by thc t im c Atlmir:d Beatty \\.as info rme d o f the engagement and


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numh er of enem y cruiscrs he had movcd thc forcc too far to the wcst and, despite giving chase.was unable to overtake the enemy.

I n his report Admiral Ucatty focuses on one of the principal solutions for achievingAr!firc~g.stcrktik;~nd he N elso n T ou ch. "If I had only had the L.C. Squad'n [Light CruiscrSquadron] i n peace 1 would h a w guaranteed those mistakes w'd [would] not have o~ cu rr cd ," ~'iestates. Training and contact between juniors and superiors is critical. Com ma nders must clcarlyoutline expectations and intent. How-tos nlust be avoided. and juniors allomcd frcedom ofaction. The p rinciples of Melee and Aujirug.staktik must be taught at every lcvcl and by eve rycornmand cr. Howcvcr, Admiral Hcatty docs not discuss a second key point. Many comm ande rsfear they will lose contro l. 'l'liis is not a by-product of these concep ts. Clcar ly, Nelson, Pa tton,and Komm el and other students of M elee and Atrj,ragstaktik did not lose control. Ilence, the keyfor comm andc rs is they m ust execute con trol through the crctions ofsuhordinrrtes vice executionof co nlr ol thro ugh th eir own ucrcrions. Control is executed hy outli nin g expe ctution s, inlenr unclcrrdstute vicc micronrrmsrcr~ingrnd telling hoiv-lo. This is not easy; it is hard. I t requires dynam icleadership: building trust. and hard work.

W hile M clcc, th e Ne lson tou ch, and Aufrrtrgstsrcrktik arc co rc bcl iefs for man euv erwarfarc, tlicsc concepts arc not limited to maneuver warfare. This concept can be applied--andshould he applie d--to all types and levels of warfarc. NDI' I rccognizcs this im portantdistinction. NDP 1 adopts thc term "commander's inteli't" to describe Melee. the Nclson touch,and Alrfiragslaktik. '1 '11~concept is highlighted in ND P 1's delinition of maneuv er warfarc:"cmph asizcs the nccd to give the comm ander freedom ofa ctio n"" However, cornrnandcr's intentis not ticd cxclt~sivclyo maneuver warfare. I t is described in detail later in the publication'sdiscussion of "The Conduct or War." NDI' Ico nc ep t of Com mander's Intent is true to Melee.the Nelson Touch and A~frrrrpru ktik . NDI' I , states, cornmandcr's intcnt "rcflecls his vision


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and conveys his thinking through mission-type orders, in which subordinates are encouraged toexercise initiative and are givcn thc frccdonl to act independently."'x

llctinition o f Maneuver W arfareWh ile there are cor e heliefs for mancu vcr warfare theory, like any philosophy it is

suh,ject to intcrprctation . Som e interpretations are highly sclcctivc, others overarcliing. Thcdelinition provided bclow is found in NDP 1 . This definition was sclccted for several rcasons.I:irst, it is a stand ard delin ition presen ting generally acccptcd concepts of maneuv er warfare. I tis not highly sclcctivc or ovcrarc hing. Seco ndly, it is cstablishcd I1.S. Navy doctrine. This is astatement hy the US. avy of how it wants lo fight. Furthermore, it prom ulgates a com monlanguagc for articulating and critically analyzing naval doctrinc.

Nav al fo rces also have used the prcfcrablc and more effective--albeit rnorc difficult tomaster--tigh ting stylc known as maneuver warfare. Closely associated with the writings ofSun f z u and used hy tlic grcat practitioners ofe xpe dition ary , naval: and land warfare,man cuvcr warfa re is aphiIo.w~phy. ather than a formula-an approa ch, rather than rccipc.l i k e attrition warfarc, it has long served comm on doctrine for naval forccs. It em pha sizesthe nced to give rhe commcmd f;rfri~edon~~f crion to den1 with spccific situations. Man euverW art irc is further characterized by adaptability and is not limitcd to a particularcnvironmcnt. Tliough enhanced hy a variety of tcchnologics, it is not depend ent upon an y ofthem.Maneuver warfarc cmphasizcs the irrcliri,cr cpproach--not mcrcly in terms of mobilityand spatial rnovcmcnt, but also in terms of ti m e and our ability to take action before thcen em y can coun tcr us. Man euver warfare requires us to projcct com bat power. lJnlikc .attrition warfare, howcvcr, this powcr is focused o n key enem y wcakncss and vulnerahiliticsthat allow us to strike the source of his powcr--the key to his existence a nds trcng th a s amilitary thrcat [author's i t al ic ~ j. '~

' fhc NDP 1's definition oTmaneuver w arfare puts forth five main points that ad dress thecore conccpts of mm ~cuvcrwarrare (italicized above): ( I ) philosophy. (2) comm ander mustrctain lieedom of action, (3 ) adaptability, (4 ) indirect approach, and (5 ) fo cw power on keywcak ncsscs and vulne rabilities. These central thcmcs, critical to understandin g U.S. Navyrnancuwr warfare theory and practice, warrant rurther explanation.


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The first point squarely accepts maneuver warfare theory as a philosophy. NDP 1 is trueto thc definition throughout tl ~ c ublication. It ncver attempts to codify man euver warfar e o rprovide rigid routines. Tlic publ ication lays out broad ideas a ~ ~ doncepts. The second point, theidea that the com man der must retain freedom o f action is true to the idea of Melee andAufrta gstaktik. Discussed in the preceding section, these ideas cen ter on mission ordcrs andinitiative-keeping i t and allow ing juniors to exercise it.

'flic third point pronounces that mancuvcr w r f a r c is vcry adaptablc. This is quite true;rnancuvcr w arfarc can bc applied to a variety of situations. Howev er, here it is as imp ortant toundcrstantl what tlic dcfinition says as wliat it docs riot say. Yes, maneuv er w arfarc is ada ptab lcto mmny situation s. I lowcvcr. it is not adaptablc to ull situations. Th is thcsis will illuminate thispoint several times . The foul-th point embodies the second theme or expanded theme o fman euve r warf are carlicr in this chnp tcr. Mancuv cr warfarc looks for indircct ways, bcyondmass and m ovcmcnt. to dcstroy an cncmy's cohesion. Thc tifth point rccognizcs how thisindircct approach is achicvcd, primarily, through exploiting the balance between strcngths.

weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

'Wayne P. Iloghcs, "Comments Section." 1J.S. Naval lnstitutc Proce ctlincs, 122 (Ma rch1996): 17.'Edward H.Atkcson, "Maneuvering Past Maneuver Wa rfare," I ! .S . Naval lnstitutcI'roccedinas. 122 (Janua ry 19 96): 33-3 5.'I!.S. Nav y, NDP I, Naval Warfarc (W ashingto n, DC: U S . Govcrnm cnt Printing Office,28 Marc11 1904 ), 33.

'Sun 'l'zu, 'l'he Art of War, trans. Samuel U.Griftith @e w York, NY: Oxford llnivcrs ityI'ress, 1963). 1 12."Uernard Brodie: A Lawnan's Guide to Naval Strate= (London, 1J.K.: Oxford U niversityPrcss, 1943): x.


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'James Tritten, 'Mancuvcr' or ilf(~nocuvreWarfsre For the U.S. Navv?" Technical Report(Norfo lk, VA: Naval Doctrine Com mand , July 1995). 7.XJohn .. K onijue, American A rmv D octrine for [he Post-Cold W ar (Fort Monroe, V A:U S . Army Training and Doctrine Command. 1997). 16.YR.A.II.Applcg atc and J. Moore. "Warfare--an Option of Difficulties, An ExaminationoT1:orms of W ar and the Im pact of Military Culture," RUSl Journal (Autum n 1990): 13.'UWilliamA. Owens, I linh Seas: The Naval Passaac to an Uncharted World (Annapolis,MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995). 5."Owens, 4."James Tritten; Naval Doctrinc ...From the Sea Techn ical Report (Norfo lk. \'A: Nav alDoctrinc Command. Dccenibcr 1994), 3.

"NWSA 1404 Navy Wirc Scrvicc, ' '4DM Arleigh "3 I-knot" Rurkc Ilics" (Navy PublicAffairs Library, 2 January 1996), available from l~ttp:/lw\r~w.cliinl'o.navy.~nil/nav.palib!people/cno/burkobit.txt: intcrnct.'"Carl von Clausewilz.On Princeton, NJ: I'rinccton U~liversily ress, 1976), 75-79."Antoinc-Hcnri .lomini, Thc Art of War (Philadelphia, PA: 1862 and rcprinled Westpo rt,CT: 1966). 12."Alfred Thaye r Mahall, 1:rom Sail to Stcam : Recolle ctions of Nava l Lifc (London andNew Y ork, 1907). 283."Frank Uhlig. How Navies F iaht. 'l'lic IJ.S. Navv and its Allies (Anna polis. MD: NavalInstitute Press, 1994). 205-2 07.

"Alfred 'l'haycr Malian. Interest of America in Sca Powcr. Present and Future (Bos ton,MA: 1897): 180.

"NDP I . 32"Joseph A . Cintluso. "Set and Dritt: Warfare Theory," Nav al W ar Collcnc Review, X LlX(Autumn 1996): 115.2'William S. Lind. Maneuver Warfarc llantlbook (Boulder, CO: Westvicw Press, 1985),

7.


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'Sl lobert Leonard, The Art o r Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theorv and A i r l m dm.Nova to, C A : Prcs idio I'rcss, 1991): 2 i .'"Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Th eo w and Practice (Annapolis, M D : U.S. Na va l

Inst itu te Press, 11)86), 45."Hughes, Fleet Tactics. 20.?qJ.. Tritten, Maneuver or Manouvre Warfare for the U.S. Na vv? (Norfolk, V A : Nav al

Doc t rinc Comn~a nd echnical Rcpon, July 1995). O f note, to fu lly capture naval maneuvcrwarfare's uniqucncss, Jamcs l' ri tt cn proposed in "Maneuver o r Manoeuvre Warfare for thc U S .Navy," that thc U.S. N a vy adopt thc English and French spe lling o f maneuver: manoeuvrc.Trittc n fclt this wou ld highlight that maneuver wa rhr e i s more than movement and distinguishits uniqucncss from land mancuvcr warfare. Also, this spelling wou ld recognize Adm ira l Kau lCastcx's contribu lion to naval mancuvcr warfare theory. Nav al Doctrine Comma nd rejected hisproposal and optcd for thc common spclling for N D P I,Na va l Warfare; and U.S. N avy doctrine.(Recog nizing that one o f he ch ief purposes and advantages o f doctrine is establishing a commonvocabulary, h i s hesis w il l defer to doctrine vice academia.)

'"Bernard 1). Claxton, John M.Gurtclicff, and Jcf fcry J. I'ollcs, 'l'rafa lrar and Jutland: AStudv i n the Princinle or War (Montgomery, AL : Max wel l Air Force Base, A ir Comand andSt af f Collcgc , 1985), 77 .

I". J. 'l 'ritten: Doctrinc and Flcct Tactics in thc Kova l N av y (Norfolk. VA : Nava lDoctr ine Command Technical k p o r t . November 1994), 4.

"lhid.. IS.';George M. Iall,TheWestport,I : 'racgcr I'ublishers. 1994). 16 1."Richard D. Iloo ker, Jr., Man euver Warfare An Antholo=, (Novato, CA: I'rcsidioPress. 1993). l I."Arthur J. hlardcr, From the D~w ~dn ou. -hto Sc am Flow . Vo lum e 11. The Wa r Years:

To the Eve ofJ utl an d (London: Ox for d [Jniversity Press, 1965), 143."'Mardcr. 143.W D P 1.33.''h'DP 1, 38.'"1)P 1,33.


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CHAI'TEK TWOI.ITEKATUKE REVIEW

IntroductionMany books, articles and professional works have been devoted to the study, history and

application o f maneuver warfare. I-lowever. most of these w orks approach nianeuv cr warfarefrom an airlland battle or amp hibious warfarc perspective. Naval Doc trinc I'ublication (NDP) ,Naval Warfarc brought the concept of naval maneuvcr warfare to the forefront. and exposed thelimited writing available on thc subject. Sincc its publication in 1994, the professionalcom mun ity ha s rcspondcd wit11 numcrous works add ressing naval maneu ver warfare. U.S.NavalInst itute Proce ed in~ snd Naval Doctrine Command have precipitated a lively debate on thetopic, including puhlishing articles and wo rks on the suhjcct. Many of these works arc discussedin the following p aragraph s. Also discussed helow are the most noteworthy work s thatcontributed to this thesis. A full hihliography is provided at the end of the thesis.

BooksAdm iral Kaou l Castex's classic study of naval warfarc, St ra tw ic 'Sheorics, lirst published

in the 1930 s has ncvcr bccn fu lly translated into English. Tlic Nav al Institute Press's E nglishtranslation offers a large portion of the work. A French Navy admiral, Castex builds on thecon cep ts and ideas of the great naval theorists. Furthermore: he ofl'ers the tirst major wo rk thatspec ilically addresses naval maneuver warpare. This work is an indispen sable com panion toAlfrcd 'l'haycr Mahan and Julian Corbctt.

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Admiral C h sc pp c Fioravanzo's Naval Tactical Thou nht, providcs a concisc, lively studyof the history of naval strategy and tactics from the age of oar to the nuclear ag e. An ItalianNavy admiral, his insights into thc failurcs ofthe Italian Navy in the Mediterranean and U.S.succ ess in the P acific are refreshing.

Colin S. Gray's and Kohert W. Harnctt's work Sean owe r arid S tratefly is an antho logy.'l'hc book's tcmp crame nt truly reflects the Cold War. Reading the hook returns a chill that hasbeen too quickly forgotten since the demise of the Soviet Union. The tirst chaptcr "Scapowerand Landpowcr." writtcn by Colin S. Gray, prcscnts a broad picturc of the differences betweenscapow cr and landpow cr. l 'hc book docs not address how advancing technology will change orblur the distinction between seapower, landpower and airpower. Most of th e hook dcals withseapower's contribution to strategy.

Gcneral John K.Galvin's work M ancovcr Warfarc: An Antholony invitcs some ofAmerica's lincst minds to cxplorc thc idca ofman cuv cr bascd warfarc. Thc book p resentsradical and o pposing views on maneuver warfare. David A. (irossman's contribution, "Defeatingthc Enemy's Will: l'hc Psychological Foundations of Mancuvcr Warfare" is superb andapplicable to all warfare thcorics. Thc book is land warfare focused and do es not add ress navalwarfarc or naval man cuvc r warl'arc. It is an cxccllent sourcc for background inrormation andanalysis of maneuv er warfare theory.

Captain Wayne I lughes' comprehensive study Fleet Tactics Theorv and Practice is themost recen t book available on naval tactics. As the title suggests, the book concentrates on

tactics. Th e hook lays a foundation with a historical review and som e extensive a nalysis ofWorld W ar 11 naval battlcs and tactics. Hughcs' dcvclops a list of tactical constants and app liesthem to the present (publishcd 1986). Outside some vague references, Capt. I lughes does notaddress or definc naval maneuver w arlgrc.


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Thc firs t ha lf o f Robert Leonard's scholarly study, The A rt o fM an eu\ er: i s dedicated totlic evolution and theory o f maneuver warfare. This book provides excellent in tr od uc ti o~ ~material and background in to maneuver warfare theory. Again, it is str ictly land orientated.

Basil Lid del l Hart's concise, masterful history o f World War I, i'hc Kcal War 1914-1918,contains an excellent study of th e Battle o f Jutland and the difference between naval and landwarfare (pages 27 1-295).

Will iam S. Lind's mark Maneuver Wa rl i~r e-landbook i s an early contribution to thcmaneuvcr warfare debate wi th in the Ame rican m ilita ry. I'ublislicd in 1985, hc clear ly developsand cxplains tlic thco ry o f rnaneuvcr warfare. He dcvotcs considcrablc spacc to cxpla inin g andapplying thc Bo yd dccision making modcl, (tl ic OO DA Loop: Obsewc, Oricnt, Decide. Act) tomaneuver warfare. While he l i l ls out his delinition o f maneuver warfare with other kcy points,they are overshadowed by his emphasis o f he OO D A Lo op. I l i s discussions apply dire ctly t oground comhat, and naval maneuver warfare is not addressed

Al fre d Tliayer Malian's most recognized works are The Influence o f Sea Power onI-l istow . 1660-1783 and The ln tluenc e o f Sea I'ower unon the French R evolu tion and 1'1noirc.1793- 1812. Masterful works. tl icy oftcn ovcrshudow much o f his later writings. Tw o laterworks. lntc rcst o f Am crica in Sca Powcr and 1:rom Sail to Stcam: Rcco llcctions ofN a va l Life.are mo re theoretical and project int o the futurc. Also, they bc nefit fro m additional ycars ol'studyand research.

Arthur J. Mardcr's dctini t ivc naval history o f Wor ld War I,From tl ic Dreadnounht to

Scana Fl ow fi l l s scvcn volu ~iic s. l l ic work is outstanding; very detailed and authoritative.Vo lumc 11. 'l'hc War Years: '1'0 the Eve o f Jutland providcd additional dctnil on the strugglebetween the Royal Nav y and Imperial Nav y in thc No rth Sca. ' l'his v olumc supported many o fAd mi ral lla uo l Castcx's conclusions in Stratenic Theories. (Castex uses the No rth Sca during


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World War 1as a casc s t u d for his maneuver thcorics.) The outstanding work is cxtremelyu sc fd when conducting rescarch on naval warfare duri ng Worl d W ar I.

Samocl Eli ot Morison, a l arvard history professor: was com missioncd a LieutenantCommander in early 1942 wi th thc assignment to writc a naval history o f Worl d War I 1 from theinside lo okin g out. The product o f his endeavor was a scvcn volume w ork titled, Historv o fl ln itc d States Naval Ouerations in W orld War 11. Volume I.Battle ol'the Atlantic and Volum eII. The Stru cldc fo r Ciuadalcanal provide d excellent background information .

Admiral Wi l l iam A. Owens" in for ms tiv c book Hin h Sea: The 'aval I'assarrc t o anIJnchartcd Wo rld is truc to thc title. Published in 1994; hc sets thc stage wit h a discussion o f heCold W ar and the int lucncc o f he Gul f War on the U.S. Nav y and naval doctrine. Adm iralOwcn s' outlines the new dynamics and chaIIcngcs facing today's navy. Also, thc bo ok proposessolutions and recommends a coursc for thc future. Vice Chairman o f hc Joint Chiefs o f Staff in11ie early nineties, he offers a h ig hl y qualified and unique perspective.

Peter Parct's anthology Makers o f Mod ern Strater?\ from Ma chia vclli to the Nucle ar Aclcprovides a diversity o f hemes and broad pcrspcctive. The chapter on Alf red fh ay cr blahan."Al fre d Thayer Mahan: Tlic N aval Historian, " by Phi l ip A Crowl, was par t icdar ly he lpf i~ l .C h w l concisely captures Mahan's essence an d contribution to naval warfare.

I'rank Uh lig's work, I ow Navies Fiel it : T l ~ c .S. Na vv and Its All ies, i s ccntcrcd aroundthe U.S. Navy. I t combines a historical rccortl with in crit ical analysis. This boo k i s an excellcntsource for background and as an overview o f U S . Nav y operations, does not dirc ctly discusswarfarc theories.


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Serv ice Mar i~~alsnd PublicationsField Manual (FM) 100-5 O~ cratio ns, leet Marine Force Manual (FM FM ) 1

Warfiehting, Naval Doctrinc Publication (NIP I) ,Nava l Warfarc, and Nav al Wa rfarcPublication-(NWP) 3-20, S urh cc W arfare Tactics give simplc, broad definitions o f maneuverwarfare, attrition wa rfare and conccpts and principles o f war. 'l 'hcir d efinitions o f mancuvcr andattrition w arfare are compatihlc. Disturbin gly, their definitions: conccpts and principles do notalways mesh.

NI)P 1. Na val Warfare i s superb. Well writ tcn and w r y concise it captures thc cssenceo f naval warfighting in short order. Mos t o f he wo rk is applicable to all warfare, not on ly navalwa rh rc. The section "The Cond uct o f War," presents ideas very clearly." N D P I is an excellentpr imer ibr study o f naval warfare and warfarc in general. I t avoids jargon and its message iscffcctivcly complemented by short historical vigncttcs.

Na val W arfare Publication (NWI') -3-20,Surface W arf ire Ta ctics is classifiedCON FIL)ENl'IAL . Definit ions and principles o f war portions o ft h e publication arcUNCLASSIFIED.

Joint Pub 3-0: Ihc t r in c for Jo in t O~erat ionss a dcfinitiv c resource for IJ.S. M ili ta rydoctrine. terms and dcfinitions. Again, i t does not always agrcc wit h other service pu blications .I owever, it has the advantage o f bcing the l in sl say when it comcs to how the IJ.S. Militaryconducts business.

/\rticlesM ajo r K.A.D. Applcfn tc's and J. R. Moore's inform ative article, "Warfare--an O ptio n o f

I ~ i f t i c ~ ~ l t i c s , 'ffers concise definitions o f orms o f warfarc. They do not restrict thcrnselves to


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gcn crally accepted categories and proposc somc interesting arguments. l ' h c ir discussion o fevolution o f mil i tary culture and conclusions are unique and refreshing.

General Ed wi n Atkinson's articlc, "M aneu vering Past Maneu ver Warfare," is vc ryt h o~ gh t r ovok ing . H e questions thc U.S. Navy's emhrace o f maneuver warfare theory. H c fcelsthat the U S . Navy's exuberance w il l be tempered with real i ty, a better understanding o f he truedel in i t ion o f maneuver warfarc and an appreciation o f t s l imitations.

Gcncral Wi l l iam E. DePuy's article, "Infan try Combat," is an edited version o f a speechhc gave to the U.S. Ar m y Infa ntry Oft iccr Advance Course in October 1989. The speech iscentered around thc i~n po rtanc c f f reedom o f mancuvcr. He w r y clearly discusses ho wfrecdom o f mancuver is cr i t ical ly important and an earned r ight that mus1 he wrest lcd from thecncm y. The speech also provides kecn insight into US. mil i tary culture through o ul this century.

Captain Wayne Hugl~es.JSN, gives n pow erful defense o f at t r it ion warfare in the"Com mcn tary and Discussion" section o f 'roceedings. This short letter is a rcsponse to Ge neralAtkin sod s art ic lc discussed above. In this let tcr Captain Hughcs s~ ~p po rt seneral Atkinson'sassertions and clcarly i l lustrates that attrit io n warfare cannot always be avoided.

Uno uhlished Dissertations. ' l'hcsis and I 'a ~c rsDr. James i ' ri t ten has bccn w r y p rol i l ic and produced many outstanding works o n naval

warfare and naval rnancuvcr war fxe . M an y o f his works havc bccn developed for Nava lDo ctrine Comm and. H is inside seat and nava l maneuver warfarc perspective have heenpar ticula rly helpful. "Manouevre Warfarc a1 Sca" provides excellent background and depth intothe conccpt o f naval maneuver warfare. "Is Nav al Warfare IJnique" and "Doctr ine and FleetTact ics in thc R oyal Navy " also provided n wcalth o f n fo rmat ion .


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Timothy 1:isher and Matthcw Kohler explore naval mancuvcr warfarc from anoperational and strategic view. Thcir rcspcctive works, "Maneuver: Whe re Docs it Fit inOperational Art" and "M aneuver by the U.S. Navy in thc 20th Century Blue-Water Operations:Selected Historical Examples" provided background information and bibliographic sourccs.Contributing to thc dcvcloping concept of naval maneuver warfarc, they highlight how mancuvcrwarfarc concepts and theory k ~ l dnto the strateg ic and opcrational level of naval warfarc.


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C H A l Y f E K T H R E EK E S E A K C H D E S I G N

The f irst step in the construct ion o f a ship is layin g thc kccl. On en accompanied b ypom p and circumstancc i t i s t l ic birth o f a ship. Risin g from t l ie keel are framcs. Alo ng w ith thekccl, t l ic frames form the skclcton o f he ship. Decks, platforms, superstructure and equipmentrely o n the kc cl and frames fo r strength and support. This s kclcton dictates the shape, beam,s i x , c tc , o f l ic ship. A ship 's k cc l and f ran c arc inf lucnccd by many factors inc luding thc typco f material . M in e sweeper's, for example, in t l ie past were l im ited to al l w ood construct ion.Woo d introduced certain l imitat ions. Today m ine sweepers use glass reinforccd plast ic (GRP)nlon g with wood. ' l'his c l iangc o f ma tcrial has inf luenced a wl iole new generat ion o f mi ncsweepers. Sim ilarly: the newest destroyers are constructed w ith h igh gradc (H Y 80) steel.Again. this m atcrial inf lucnccs t lic f ina l design and outcome o f a destroyer. lnfluc ncc s arc no1l imite d to matcrial , another factor w hich inf luenced frames was the shif t f rom rivets to w eldin gwhen wo rking with steel. Numerous othcr cxamplcs o f nf luerices on keel and kam e design andoutcome are available.

Con sidcr nav al tactics as a ship. Foundations o f naval tactics make u p the k cc l andf rame o f h is ship. I f maneuver w ar f ir e t l ieory inf lucnccs thc foundat ions o f naval tact ics, ou rkeel and frames, then maneuver warfare wi ll influcncc o ur ship dcsign and nava l tactics in battle.' l 'his analogy is t l ic hnsis for m y rcscnrch design or method. B y exploring thc foundations o fnaval tactics. and seeing i f maneuver warfare affects t l icsc foundations, this wor k w il l dctcrm incif mane uvcr warfarc t l ieory influcncc s naval tactics and battle. 1:wthcrmorc. this mode l w i ll

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illuminate wh ere m aneuver warfarc concepts inlluence naval tactics and to what ex tent.Converscly. it may a lso show w here maneuver warfarc thcory docs not influence naval tacticsand battle.

Cha pter O ne, Introduction. establislics tlic key delin itions in suppo rt of tlic researc hqucs tion and research design . It also builds ncccssary backgro und. Th e literature and resourceswhich con tributcd to this thcsi5 arc rcviewed in Ch apter Two, 1.itcraturc Rcview. Only the mostsignifican t sourc cs are highlighted . All sourccs, of coursc, arc listed in the bihliography .

Cha pter Fo ur, War at Sea and Naval I'actics, will look at land warfare. air iizrfa re andnaval warfarc. Military culture, the focus of ea ch service and differences between war at seaand war on land will be explored. This will provide insight into tlic realities oTU.S. Army, US .Navy, U S . Marine Corps, and I!.% Air Force culturc and highlight the uniqueness of navalwarfarc. Oftcn ignored by warfare theory, it is important to undcrstand these differenc es. Nav alwarfarc is very distinct and cannot be studied from a strictly land warlare point of vicw.

Tlic sccontl lialfo f Chapter F our will be dcvotcd to thc construction o f the keel andframc s or foundation s of naval tactics. Predominately. the foun dations of naval tactics will bcdevelopcd from Hughcs' Flcet Tactics: Fioranzo's Naval 'Tactical Tliounht and NWP 3-20S urface S h i ~actics. A conse nsus will bc dcvcloped from these works.

Cliaptcr Five, Application of Naval Mancuvcr Warfarc. will explore if mancuvcr warfarethcory influences some of these found ations. This analysis will determine if niancuvcr w arfaretheory influcnc cs naval tactics. w here and to what cxtcnt. In cxploririg the fou ndations of tactics,

this thcsis will look for historical exam ples that supp ort this work 's analysis. In so mc cases, adiscussion of co ntcmporary naval doctrine and tactics may best illuminate how rnancuverwarfarc tlicory inlluences the principlc.


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M y linal chaptcr, Chapter S ix. Conclu sions and K ecornmcndations, will statc thecon clusio ns and discoveries that crncrge from an analysis oft h e research evide nce. IXrcctconclusions and interpretations will be provided. Also. some indirect conclusions: bu ilding onresearch ev idence, will be explored. Furthermore, rccornrnendations for application of theresearch and further research questions will be included in this chapter.


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C H A P T E R FOURW A R AT SEA A N D N A V A L T A CT IC S

Introduct ion"Perhaps one explanation . . . \.as that the admirals cxcrciscd thcir com mand i n the

forefront o f he ba tt le and generals f rom headquarters far i n the rcar. . . . while] some generalswere as ready to risk th eir o wt i l iv cs as thcir mcn's, . . .othcrs undou bt ly gained mora l couragcthroug h physical rcnioteness.'" Li dd el l Ha rt expressed this thought in his concise, masterf i~ls tudy o f W or l d W ar I, he K cnl War 1914-1918. H c was loo king for solut ions, reasons for theg u lf he observed betwccn thc conduct o f war hy the generals and the adm irals. M aj or sea batt leswere few du ring thc war. Yct, on land, Wo rld War I aw great carnage and waste. The condu cto f the gcncrals was m arred by fool ish ini t iat ives and unsound offensives. Adm irals and generalsdisplayed a f imdamental di f ference in the execut ion d t h c war. Adm irals wou ld not ini t iatebnttlc unlcss t l ic y had reasonably determined an in it ia l advantage. O n the other hand, generalswere typical ly ready to takc thc of fcns ivc rcgardlcss o f l ic d i~a dva ntag cs.~he di f fc rcncc i n thcexecut ion of th e war b y thc admirals and gcncrals can bc largely at t r ibuted to di f fcrcnccs inm ilit ar y culture am ong thc scrviccs, thc uniquc naturc o f sca. air and land warfare and thcpract ice and approach to the art o f warf ight ing b y each service.

These observations are not l im ited to W orld War I. M il i t ar y culture, the unique natureo f sea, land, and air warfare, and the pract ice and approach to thc art o f warf ig ht ing signif icant lyimpact thc interpretation and practice o f wa rfigh ting theory. App reciating these issues isimportant to understanding wh y and how each service t ights. W ith respect to mancuvcr warfare,

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i t is critical. Ma ncuv er warlbre theory is typica lly cast with rcspect to land warlare. Its lcxiconretlects land warfarc. Naval maneuver warfare. while based on thc sam c core ideas, issignificantly different than land maneuver warhre.

Th c first half of this chap ter will addre ss thcsc issucs. military culture. each service'sfocus and the differences between w ar at sca and war on land will be investigated. This study isnecessary to set the stage for dcvcloping the foundations of naval tactics and exploring iflnanc uver warfa re influences naval tactics. I'articularly, sincc warfare theories are typica llydiscussed from a land perspective it is important to dcvclop a sca perspective.

Militarv CultureThc s copc of this thesis precludes a detailed investigation of diffcrcnces in m ilitary

cult ure . How ever: it is important to apprc ciatc that thcrc arc truc, justilied differen ces in milita ryculture . Asp ects of military culture directly influcncc hob\ "thc military" thinks and its mark canbc seen on doctrine. So me milita ry culture is hound in tradition and custom and, perhaps,parochial and out o flo uc h. Most is a result of the uniqucrlcss and diffcrcnt missions and roles ofeach scrvicc. A fcw cxam plcs will serve to illustrate m ilitary culture.

Execution o f leaders hip is diffcrcn t in each service. It is not a result of tradition o rcustom but, hard fact. retlecting the diffcrcn t rolcs and missio ns of each serv ice. In thc U.S. AirForcc, the officers. the best and brightest, go off to light in combat. Today's 1J.S. Air Forcctightcrs and hom bcrs arc manned exclusively hy oflicers. Thc ofticcrs go into battle, not theairmen. crcw ch ic k or maintcnancc m en. The enlisted bury the officers. Also, inotivatingairmen has a different scnsc of urgcncy. Airmen are not motivated to go into hattlc but, supportin the rear. In the Arm y, hattlc is thc purvicw, primarily, ofj un ior officers and cnlistcd soldiers.Senior and mid-gradc oflic crs are frequently hehind the main cngagcment area . 1.eadership now


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dcmands mo tiva ting un io r ofl ic ers and soldiers to l ight, defend and; at t imes, charge into theenemy. Mo der n technology and an extensive logistics tail, at t imes, blu r t l ie distin ction b ctw ccnfro nt l incs and thc rcar. 'fhc rlatltrc o f lcadcrship at sea is once again differen t. Everyone on theship sliarcs thc samc fatc. 'fhc adm iral, tlic captain, tlie quartermaster, the coo k and tlieenginema n are exposed equa lly to the hattle. In a battlc group thcrc i s no rcar; a hi t o n a shipdocs not dist inguish who's who. Clcarly, t l icsc dif fcrcn t c ircumstmcc s inf luence leadershipstylcs and dcsircd traits in cach scrvicc. The dr ivi ng factor is no t trad it ion or parochialism; thesearc hard rcal i t ics that arc a dircct result o f hc naturc and uniqucncss o f cach form o f warfare.

Comm and orfers another windo w into mil i tary culture. I n he U.S. Arm y, of t icers takecomm and as ju ni or oft icers. Op po rtun ity for comm and continues as they progrcss throug h thcranks. Yet, at each level they are m d e r close supervision and scrutiny o f superiors and pcers.Alm ost instant fccdback and dircct ion is avai lable f rom superiors. Frequently, superiors are onl ya tent away or a short vehicle ride. Com mand in the [J.S. Na vy i s very d i fferent . l l ie rc arc vcryfc w un ior of f ic cr commands. Outside thcsc min or cxccpt ions, com mand fal ls on scnior leaders.W ith com ma nd at sea the Captain dominates t l ie scene. I-le s directly resp onsible fo r every thingthat occurs on the ship a soveign piece of1J.S. territory. I-l is oversight by superiors is w r yind irec t compared to the IJ .S . Army . I k n oday i t is common to go days or wccks and in somecascs mo nllis with out facc-to-face contact with superiors. Mo der n radio and satell itecomm unicat ions l iavc rcduccd thc isolat ion o f battlc group commanders and ship comma ndingoffice rs. Yet, physica l separation and tl ie l im its o f hese systems ensure that thc CO rctains

control i n rout inc mattcrs. I ;~~rt l lcrmorc, urin g high tcmpo operations or crisis these systemsqu ickly become saturated and only the most r i t i c a l communicat ions are permit tcd. Com mand atsca cntai ls lots o f ndependence. The U.S. A ir Force also of fers l imite d command op portunityIbr un ior of f icers. I 'urthermore, U.S. A ir I 'orcc com ~na ndcrs rc typica l ly in c lose pro xim ity


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and in dircct contact with superiors. As a rcsult, U

Maneuver Warfare and Naval Tactics

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