Managing the Nation's Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

Managing the Nation's CommercialHigh-Level Radioactive Waste

March 1985

NTIS order #PB86-116852

Recommended Citation:Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste (Washington, DC: U.S.Congress, Offlce of Technology Assessment, OTA-O-171, March 1985).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 84-601154

For sale by the Superintendent of DocumentsU.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

Foreword

This report presents the findings and conclusions of OTA's analysis of Federal policyfor the management of commercial high-level radioactive waste. It represents a major up-date and expansion of the analysis presented to Congress in our summary report, Manag-ing Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste, published in April of 1982 during thedebate leading to passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA). This newreport is intended to contribute to the implementation of NWPA, and in particular tocongressional review of three major documents that DOE will submit to the 99th Congress:

. Mission Plan for the waste management program;● a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) proposal; and● ❁ report on mechanisms for financing and managing the waste program.

The assessment was originally undertaken at the request of the House Committeeon Merchant Marine and Fisheries and focused on the ocean disposal of nuclear waste.OTA later broadened the study to include all aspects of high-level waste disposal afterexpressions of interest and support by the Senate Committees on Energy and Natural Re-sources and on Commerce, Science, and Technology; by the Senate National Ocean Pol-icy Study; and by the House Committees on Science and Technology and on Foreign Af-fairs. Additional requests for related analysis were later received from the Senate Committeeon Environment and Public Works and from the House Committees on Interior and In-sular Affairs and on Energy and Commerce. The major findings of the original analysiswere published in OTA’s 1982 summary report.

Following passage of NWPA, the House Committee on Rules asked OTA to analyzethe Act from the perspective of the policy conclusions of our 1982 study. The major con-clusion of that review, included as chapter 5 of this new report, is that NWPA providessufficient authority for developing and operating a waste management system based ondisposal in geologic repositories. Substantial new authority for other facilities will not berequired unless major unexpected problems with geologic disposal are encountered.

In addition, the House Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs and on Energyand Commerce asked OTA to provide information on the Mission Plan required by NWPA.OTA concludes that DOE’s Draft Mission Plan published in 1984 falls short of its poten-tial for enhancing the credibility and acceptability of the waste management program. Thesummary of this report, included as chapter 1, presents the key findings and options con-cerning the Mission Plan and the other documents mentioned above.

OTA is grateful for the assistance of the advisory panel for this assessment, as wellas the support and guidance received from many other people and organizations. OTAhas also benefited from the full cooperation of the Department of Energy, the NuclearRegulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other Federal agen-cies. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report.

‘Director

. . .Ill

Advisory Panel on Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

Hans Frauenfelder, ChairmanDepartment of Physics, University of Illinois

Seymour AbrahamsonDepartment of ZoologyUniversity of Wisconsin

Frank CollinsConsultant

Floyd CullerPresidentElectric Power Research Institute

J. William FutrellPresidentEnvironmental Law Institute

Edward GoldbergScripps Institution of OceanographyUniversity of California

William W. HambletonDirectorKansas Geological Survey

Hon. Harriet KeyserlingHouse of RepresentativesState of South Carolina

Terry LashDirectorIllinois Department of Nuclear Safety

Kai LeeInstitute for Environmental StudiesUniversity of Washington

Hon. Jeanne MalchonSenateState of Florida

Peter MontagueCenter for Environmental StudiesPrinceton University

Glenn PaulsonVice President for ScienceNational Audubon Society

Howard RaiffaHarvard Business School

William A. ThomasResearch AttorneyAmerican Bar Foundation

Mason WillrichVice President—Corporate PlanningPacific Gas & Electric Co.

Donald WodrichRockwell International-Hanford Operations

John YasinskyAdvanced Power Systems DivisionWestinghouse Electric Corp.

NOTE: The Ad\isor} Panel pro~’idcd advice and comment throughout the assessment, but the. mcmbcrs do IIO( ncccssaril}’ appro~c’, disap-

proic, or endorse the report, for which CYI’A assumes full responsibility.

iv

OTA Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTAScience, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Robert Niblock, Oceans and Environment Program Manager

Thomas Cotton, Project Director

William Barnard, Assistant Project Director

John Burns, Editor and Writer

Daniel Kevin, Analyst

Kathryn Van Wyk, Editor and Writer

Administrative Staff

Kathleen Beil

Jacquelynne Mulder

Contributing Staff

Prudence Adler Junior Bridge Anne Fenn Linda Garcia

Emilia Govan Barry Holt Peter Johnson Robert Leachman* James Payne

Paul B. Phelps Richard Raymond** Ralph Smalley Lucia Turnbull

Contractors

Academy for Contemporary ProblemsAmerican Planning AssociationApplied Decision AnalysisBattelle Memorial Institute

Human Affairs Research CentersDavid CarrWilliam ColglazierDavid DeeseForecast Systems, Inc.William GieseHarvard University

Barbara KatzTodd LaPorteDaniel MetlayGene RochlinSanford Strenger* *Teknekron Research, Inc.The George Washington UniversityThe MITRE Corp.Toner & Associates, Inc.Patrick WindhamDavid Zellner

Public Participation Working Group

Susan Bistline Alfred Carter, Jr. Mildred Clark

Barbara Jackson Janet Kramer William Pounds

Barbara Ruff Gregory Smith James Stewart

● NR(; (1(,1,111((““in-h(mw ( (JIIII<i( [(JI

Contents

Chapter Page

I. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. Radioactive Waste: Its Nature and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3. Technology of Waste Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

4. History of Waste Management: Setting the Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

5. Policy Analysis: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 in Perspective . . . . . . . . . . 99

6. The Mission Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

7. Federal Institutional Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

8. Addressing State and Public Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Appendix Page

A-1. Radioactive Waste Management Policymaking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

A-2. Major Events in Waste Management History—1944-81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

B.

c.D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

Waste Management System Issues Resolved

in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

Performance Requirements for a Geologic Repository as Specified

in Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation 10 CFR Part 60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

Procedure for Establishing a Repository for Commercial Nuclear Waste.. . . . . . . 329

Spent Fuel Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

Repositoryor MRS Loading Capacity Required To Remove Spent Fuel From

Reactor Sites Within 10 and 15 Years After Reactor Decommissioning. . . . . . . . . 334

Glossary, Acronyms, and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

vii

—

Chapter 1

Executive Summary

Contents

Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . ***. *,** ***. *o** ... o.*. ... oo. .**. *.** ..o. ..*. ,.. o., ,*. .oThe Mission Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Monitored Retrievable Storage Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Alternative Means of Financing and Management. .., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Background . . . . . . . ...*.*** ● *O*..*. ● *.*.... ....0.,. . . . . . . . . ● **...** ● *..***. ● . .

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 .*,.**. . . . . . . . . ..*.**.* ● .*.*.*. ● ..*..** ..**Waste Management Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Relations With States and Indian Tribes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Institutional Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Remaining Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..**... ● *..*... .*.**... . . . . . . .Issues in the Mission Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Issues in the MRS Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Institutional Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

‘3356

6

88

1011

12121516

FIGURESFigure No. Page

l-1. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7l-2. Mined Geologic Disposal Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9l-3. Dry Storage Concepts for Spent Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Chapter 1

Executive Summary

OVERVIEW

With the passage of the Nuclear Waste PolicyAct of 1982 (NWPA), Congress for the first timeestablished in law a comprehensive Federal policyfor commercial high-level radioactive waste man-agement, including interim storage and permanentdisposal. NWPA provides sufficient authority fordeveloping and operating a high-level radio-active waste management system based on dis-posal in mined geologic repositories. Authoriza-tion for other types of waste facilities will not berequired unless major problems with geologic dis-posal are discovered, and studies to date have iden-tified no insurmountable technical obstacles to de-veloping geologic repositories.

The 99th Congress will receive three key docu-ments that NWPA requires the Department of En-ergy

1.

2.

3.

(DOE) to prepare:

a Mission Pkm, containing both a waste man-agement plan with a schedule for transferringwaste to Federal facilities and an implemen-tation program for choosing sites and devel-oping technologies to carry out that plan;a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) pro-posal, with designs for long-term Federal stor-age facilities, evaluations of whether they areneeded and feasible, and analysis of how theywould be integrated with the repository pro-gram if authorized by Congress; anda study of alternative institutional mechanismsfor financing and managing the radioactivewaste system, including the option of estab-lishing an independent waste management or-ganization outside of DOE.

Each of these documents will raise issues of poten-tially significant concern to Congress and theNation.

The Mission Plan

The crucial next step for stabilizing the U.S.radioactive waste management program, and for

building confidence that nuclear waste can andultimately will be disposed of safely, is to de-velop a credible Mission Plan that is widely viewedas achievable and responsive to the concerns ofthe major affected parties. According to NWPA,the document to be submitted by DOE is intendedto provide “an informational basis sufficient to per-mit informed decisions to be made. To do this,it must identify the key decisions in developing thewaste management system, analyze and comparethe technical and programmatic options, and there-by provide the information that would supportDOE’s choice among the options. In OTA’S view,the Draft Mission Plan published by DOE in April1984 does not meet this test. OTA believes that thepreparation of a final Mission Plan offers DOE amajor opportunity to enhance the credibility andacceptability of the waste management program.

As part of its analysis of NWPA, OTA has iden-tified the elements of a Mission Plan that can meetthe requirements of the Act using only the author-ity it provides. Comparison between this ‘‘OTAMission Plan” and DOE’s Draft Mission Pkm pro-vides a basis for identifying the major strategic deci-sions in the Mission Plan. Comparison also revealsseveral areas in which additional analysis by DOEwould provide valuable information for congres-sional deliberations during the 30 working days thatthe Mission Plan lies before Congress before be-coming effective. In general, the OTA Mission Planrepresents an expansion, rather than a redirection,of the approach in DOE’s Draft Mission Plan.None of DOE’s ongoing repository siting or devel-opment activities need or should be deferred pend-ing development of a final Mission Plan.

The major difference between the two MissionPlans lies in the measures used to provide confi-dence that spent fuel will be removed from reactorsites within a reasonable period, despite the tech-nical and institutional uncertainties associated withsiting and licensing the first geologic repository.DOE’s Draft Mission PZan is based on a reposi-

3

4 ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

tory loading schedule that allows for no problemsor delays in choosing or licensing the first reposi-tory. The repository siting program includes nobackups for the sites that NWPA requires to beevaluated at key stages of the siting process. To pro-vide confidence that waste can be accepted in theevent that this siting program encounters signifi-

#cant delays, the Draft Mission Plan proposes to askCongress for new legislative authority to site andlicense an MRS facility so that one could be con-structed as early as 1998, if needed.

The OTA Mission Plan, on the other hand, relieson the existing authority in NWPA to the maxi-mum extent possible. It recognizes that the first geo-logic repository required by NWPA is the only fa-cility DOE is now authorized to site and use toaccept high-level radioactive waste. 1 It uses a re-pository loading schedule that can be met despitetechnical or institutional difficulties, and an aggres-

&e implementation program designed to reducethe risk of extended delays in the repository pro-gram. In particular, it adds one backup site to thoserequired by NWPA at critical siting steps. TheOTA Mission Plan would ask for new legislativeauthority to construct MRS facilities or alternativedisposal facilities only as a last resort, if major prob-lems call into question the feasibility of geologicdisposal.

The repository program in the OTA MissionPlan differs from that in DOE’s Drafit Mission Planin three key respects: the repository loading sched-ule, the repository siting strategy, and the strategyfor developing the first repository. The issues inthese areas are discussed in the remainder of thissection; issues concerning the role of the MRS arediscussed in the following section, which deals withthe separate MRS proposal required by NWPA.

Repository Loading Schedule

A schedule for loading the geologic repositoriesis needed as a basis for contractual commitmentsby DOE to accept waste from utilities. The crucialdecision concerning the repository loading scheduleis the balance between the degree of certainty that

‘ NWPA requires DOE to site and license a second repository, andlimits the amount of waste that can be emplaced in the first beforethe second begins operating. NWPA does not explicitly authorize con-struction of the second repository.

the schedule can be met, and the promised speedof the schedule. The more optimistic the schedulefor contractual commitments, the more likely it willbe that they cannot be met using the first geologicrepository, @@@other means will be needed tomeet Federal obligations. DOE’s Draft MissionPlan uses an optimistic repository schedule that canbe met only if no significant delays are encountered.If all goes well, loading at the repository (using lim-ited packaging facilities) would begin by 1998, theyear in which NWPA requires initial disposal inthe first repository. Operation of full-scale facilitieswould begin by about 2001. DOE does not specifywhen loading might begin if there are problems ordelays.

The OTA Mission Plan also uses the 1998 tar-get as a management goal for initial disposal of asmall amount of waste packaged during the tech-nology development program. However, it basescontractual commitments with utilities on a con-servative schedule for full-scale repository opera-tion. This loading schedule can be met despite thedelays that can be expected in the effort to site thefirst repository. Specifically, OTA concludes thatuse of an aggressive implementation program(discussed below) can give considerable confi-dence that the two repositories required byNWPA can be operating full-scale by 2008 and2012, respectively, even if significant delays areencountered. If such delays do not materialize, full-scale loading could begin years earlier, and the ac-tual schedule could match that proposed by DOE.

Repository Siting Program

The credibility of any repository loading scheduledepends on the credibility of the implementationprogram supporting it. The major decision con-cerning the implementation. program is the balancebetween the initial costs of the program and the cer-tainty of getting the job done without major prob-lems or delays. This is particularly important inthe repository siting program.

DOE’s Draft Mission Plan uses a reactive ap-proach in its implementation program. In particu-lar, the siting program considers only the numberof sites required by NWPA: that is, for each re-pository, three sites would be investigated at depth(“characterized”), and one site would be recom-

Ch. 7—Executive Summary ● 5

mended for licensing. Backups would be developedonly after it is certain they are needed. This strat-egy is unchanged from the one in use before theNWPA made a commitment to a schedule for oper-ation of a repository.

By contrast, the OTA Mission Plan uses a pre-ventive approach involving development of backupsites before they might be needed, to minimize thedelays that could result if there are difficulties withthe primary candidate sites. In particular, it pro-vides for characterization of four sites, and recom-mendation of two for licensing, for each repository.

Adding one backup to the number of sitesNWPA requires at each stage significantly re-duces the risk that the siting process will be de-layed by problems at any one site. This approachmay cost more at the start, but over the long runits financial and political costs may well be less thanthose of a program that makes no allowance for ma-jor delays or problems. Among those potential costsis the risk that programmatic failures could dam-age the credibility of the Federal program. Thusany extra initial costs can be seen as the price ofinsurance against these difficulties. Congress maytherefore wish to ask DOE to analyze the additionalcost of this approach, if any, and its effectivenessin raising the confidence of the proposed reposi-tory loading schedule.

Technology Development Plan

In DOE’s Draft Mission Han, the schedule fordeveloping the final designs for the repository andwaste package is driven by the optimistic reposi-tory loading schedule, which requires rapid con-struction of packaging facilities at the site after theNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) construc-tion authorization is granted. This approach makesinitial disposal dependent on the construction sched-ule of the packaging facilities. The pressure to com-plete those facilities in time to meet the 1998 dead-line may preclude use of one of the new integratedsystem designs now under development that havethe potential for significantly reducing the costs andimpacts of waste management.

To avoid this potential problem, the OTA Mis-sion Plan suggests that the first repository be de-veloped in two phases. A small-scale demonstra-tion phase would begin as soon as allowed by NRC

following its approval of a construction authoriza-tion. This would involve licensed emplacement ofa small amount of waste packaged during the re-pository research, development, and demonstration(RD&D) program using a conservative system de-sign, one that emphasizes certainty in meetingNRC’s requirements for disposal, rather than over-all efficiency of waste management operations.

The full-scale operational phase would begin afterthe development and licensing of an integrated, op-timized system design that takes advantage of themost advanced available technology to reduce therisks, costs, and impacts of the entire waste man-agement operation, from discharge of spent fuelfrom the reactor to final disposal in a repository.Planning for initial licensed disposal before the re-pository’s own packaging facilities are constructedmaximizes the likelihood that the 1998 deadline willbe met, and allows the schedule for constructionof those facilities to be determined by the time re-quired for an aggressive RD&D program to developthe integrated system design.

The Monitored RetrievableStorage Proposal

It now appears that MRS facilities will notbe necessary for safe waste management. NWPArequires that the utilities themselves provide interimspent fuel storage until a repository is available.This storage can probably be provided at reactorsites, even after the 1998 deadline. OTA’s MissionPlan provides for MRS facilities to be available asa long-term backup to repositories, but only in theevent that major unanticipated difficulties areencountered with geologic disposal.

The major storage issues to be addressed in boththe Mission Plan and the MRS proposal are whenand whether DOE should be authorized to con-struct a centralized MRS facility, and what role itwould play in the integrated waste management sys-tem. OTA’S analysis suggests that, to aid congres-sional deliberations, the MRS proposal submittedby DOE should evaluate at least three alternatives:

1. Early siting, licensing, and construction ofan MRS facility. This option, which is im-plicit in DOE’s Draft Mission Han, would re-


2.

3.

quire congressional authorization in the nearfuture. It would allow DOE to accept wasteon a large scale beginning in 1998, even ifthere are delays in the repository program. Itinvolves a commitment of additional manpow-er and resources over the next decade, aboveand beyond those already involved in the re-pository siting process.Federal at-reactor storage beginning in1998. This might be accomplished throughrulemaking, by modifying contracts with util-ities to provide that the Federal radioactivewaste program would pay the costs of addi-tional storage beyond the contractual deliv-ery date, thus spreading the costs of delays inthe repository program among all utilities pay-ing the waste disposal fee. If so, no congres-sional action would be required.Deferral of the decision on a centralizedMRS facility until at least 1990, when thefirst repository site is to be recommendedto Congress. This allows the decision to bemade based on much more information aboutstorage options, integrated waste managementsystem designs, and the progress of the repos-itory program than is currently available. Italso avoids the risk that an early effort to sitea large-scale storage facility would delay therepository program. This option would re-quire no congressional action at this time.

Alternative Means ofFinancing and Management

NWPA also requires DOE to submit a study ofalternative institutional mechanisms for financingand managing the radioactive waste system, includ-

ing the options of an independent agency or evena private corporation. A public advisory commit-tee established by DOE to address this subject rec-ommended consideration of a federally charteredpublic corporation. OTA’s analysis suggests thatthe credibility of NWPA’s commitment to thedevelopment of a first-of-a-kind technologicalsystem on a firm schedule could be significantlyenhanced by the establishment of an independ-ent waste management agency with more fund-ing and management flexibility than is typicalin a Federal program. The more independent theinstitution and its funding, the surer the guaran-tee that a complex program will be carried out onschedule and will not be disrupted by other fiscalor political priorities of the Federal Government.

Balancing independence and accountabilityis a key challenge in designing an independentwaste management agency. A congressionally ap-proved Mission Plan could serve as the principalmechanism for balancing effective congressionalcontrol with increased flexibility of operation. Infact, it may not be possible to gain broad supportfor the creation of an independent institution withindependent funding until a generally acceptedMission Plan—one that spells out exactly what theagency is to do— is developed. If it were formallyapproved by Congress, the Mission Plan couldserve as the main yardstick for overseeing the activ-ities and expenditures of tbe waste managementagency and for measuring its progress. Since ap-proval of the Mission Plan is not now required byNWPA, consideration of mechanisms for such ap-proval might be included in any congressional de-liberations on establishing an independent wastemanagement agency.

BACKGROUND

When the 97th Congress began considering com- mately 8,000 metric tons (tonnes) of commercialprehensive waste management legislation in 1981, spent (used) nuclear fuel, containing highly radio-there were 74 commercial nuclear powerplants in active waste products, had already been generated.operation in the United States, and some 85 addi- Yet the United States still had not decided how totional plants were under construction. Approxi- deal with the problem of isolating those waste prod-

Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 7

ucts from the environment for the thousands ofyears required for the radioactivity of the waste todecay to low levels.

Nearly all of the spent fuel produced thus far bycommercial nuclear powerplants is temporarilystored in water-filled basins at operating reactors.The original expectation—that all spent fuel wouldbe reprocessed to recover usable uranium and plu-tonium, and that the radioactive byproducts wouldbe separated as high-level waste—has not been real-ized. It now appears possible that much of the spentfuel will be discarded directly as waste (see fig. l-l).

The lack of final isolation facilities raised two keyproblems for the nuclear industry. First, some cri-tics questioned the continued use of nuclear power,arguing that the failure to develop final isolationfacilities was evidence that waste isolation mightbe an insoluble problem. Second, the lack of re-processing or disposal facilities to accept spent fuelleft utilities that owned nuclear reactors with agrowing spent fuel storage problem. In the nearterm, operating reactors were running out of stor-age space, and some faced the possibility of hav-ing to shut down unless additional storage capac-ity were made available in a timely manner. In thelonger term, the absence of a firm schedule for ei-ther reprocessing or turning spent fuel over to theFederal Government left utilities uncertain abouthow much additional storage capacity they wouldhave to provide, when they would end their liabil-ity for growing inventories of spent fuel, and howmuch storage and disposal would ultimately cost.

The storage problem was complicated by increas-ing opposition to the efforts of utilities and the Fed-eral Government to provide additional storage ca-pacity. This opposition resulted from concern thatthe easy availability of interim storage would re-duce the pressure for developing a Federal disposalsystem, thereby turning interim storage facilitiesinto de facto permanent waste repositories. Thisopposition, in turn, had increased utilities’ fearsthat they might not be able to gain approval foradditional storage facilities quickly enough to pre-vent reactor shutdowns.

The problems facing the nuclear industry, com-bined with the broader societal concern that nu-

Figure 1-1.–The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

f

Reactor

/ Interim storage

/

IUF6 conversion

I

IJ

a

I iI /I /I I

+ I

/’

MillingA

Front end Back end

Fuel cycle todayProspective “closed” fuel cycle

The commercial nuclear fuel cycle includes activities for preparingand using reactor fuel and for managing spent fuel and other radioac-tive wastes produced in the process. It was originally intended thatspent fuel be stored for 6 months in water-filled basins at reactor sitesto dissipate thermal heat and allow decay of short-lived fission pro-ducts. The spent fuel would then be reprocessed and the resultantliquid high-level waste solidified and disposed of in a Federal re-pository. Since no repository has been developed and no commer-cial reprocessing is being done, spent fuel will remajn in storage un-til repositories are available to close the nuclear fuel cycle.

SOURCE: Council on Environmental Quality.

8 ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive waste

clear waste be dealt with responsibly, generatedconsiderable pressure to proceed promptly to de-velop final isolation facilities. The challenge fac-ing Congress was to develop a comprehensive wastemanagement policy: one that dealt with interimstorage in the context of final isolation and providedthe stability of purpose and direction that had beenlacking in previous Federal waste managementefforts.

Earlier problems in the Federal program com-plicated the development of such a policy. First,some doubted that the existing Federal institutionalarrangements were capable of successfully imple-menting waste management policy over a periodof decades. Second, the distrust that had developedbetween the Federal Government and those Statesaffected by waste management activities seriouslycomplicated efforts to reach agreement on a pro-gram for siting permanent repositories. On the onehand, potential host States and other groups fearedthat the Federal Government might cut corners,simply to be able to say that the problem had been

solved. On the other hand, some in the FederalGovernment feared that a: least some States mightseek to block any waste management activitieswithin their borders, no matter what assurances ofsafety were provided.

Congress addressed all of these problems inNWPA by including measures that specify:

1.

2.

3.

a comprehensive Federal policy for high-levelradioactive waste management that spells outthe responsibilities of the utilities and the Fed-eral Government;relationships between the Federal Govern-ment and the States and Indian tribes affectedby waste management activities; andimprovements in the institutional mechanismsthrough which the Federal Government willcarry out that policy.

These measures are summarized briefly below, asbackground for discussion of the issues that remainto be resolved during implementation of the Act.

THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1982

Waste Management Policy

Final Isolation of Nuclear Waste

NWPA establishes a schedule for DOE to site,and for NRC to decide on licenses for, two geologicrepositories (see fig. 1-2) for permanent disposalof civilian high-level radioactive waste. This sched-ule requires that DOE begin disposing of waste atthe first repository not later than January 31, 1998.The repositories are to be able to handle both com-mercial spent fuel and high-level waste from reproc-essing. They are also to be used for high-level wastefrom defense nuclear activities unless the Presidentdetermines that separate repositories for defensewaste are needed. (A draft DOE study concludesthat disposing of defense and commercial wastesin the same repositories would be the most cost-effective option. )

The two repositories required by the Act ap-pear to be both necessary and sufficient to dis-pose of the waste from commercial reactors that

are now operating or under construction, as wellas currently projected amounts of defense high-level wastes. Nearly 30 years of study have re-vealed no insurmountable technical obstacles to thesuccessful development of mined geologic reposi-tories, although suitable sites must still be found.OTA believes that small-scale disposal couldbegin by the 1998 target for initial operation ofthe first repository, if a suitable site can be selectedfrom among those under investigation at the timeNWPA was passed. (Measures to increase the like-lihood of success are discussed below.) OTA alsoconcludes that an expanded siting and develop-ment program can give considerable confidencethat the two repositories required by NWPAcould be operating at full scale by no later than2008 and 2012, respectively, even if there aremajor delays or if backup sites must be used.2

‘These dates are conservative in corr parison with DOE’s schedulefor the second repository, which sugges s that a repository using a siteand a geologic medium not among the}.e under consideration for thefirst repository could be available by 2005.

Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 9

Figure 1-2.–Mined Geologic Disposal Concept

The site-’

Backfill,, Overpack

ContainerWasteform

(e.g., salt, basalt, granite, tuff)

Thesystem

Mined geologic disposal will use a system comprised of engineeredbarriers (the waste package and the mined repository) and naturallyoccurring barriers (the host rock formation and the chemical andphysical properties of the reposito~ site itself) to provide long-termisolation of waste from the biosphere. Three decades of extensivestudy have revealed no insurmountable technical obstacles to thedevelopment of mined geologic repositories, provided suitable sitesare found.

SOURCE: Department of Energy.

OTA’s review of the history of the waste man-agement program concludes that a commitment inlaw to a firm schedule for operation of a Federaldisposal facility (as enacted in NWPA) would playa central role in a comprehensive, broadly sup-ported waste management policy. This commit-ment is needed for three major reasons. First, thehistory of opposition to proposals for Federal stor-age facilities suggests that, to satisfy public con-cerns, it will be necessary to develop permanent dis-posal facilities (see box). Second, a firm andbelievable schedule for a repository decreases con-cern that spent fuel would remain in interim stor-age indefinitely, a major source of resistance to pastefforts to provide additional interim storage. Final-ly, the key measures needed to give that commit-ment credibility (i. e., an aggressive implementa-tion program involving backup repository sites and

disposal technologies) would address a major con-cern about the Federal waste management programin the past—the concern that crucial decisions mightbe compromised by the lack of options.

Interim Storage of Spent Fuel

NWPA gives utilities that operate nuclear reac-tors the primary responsibility for storing spent fueluntil it can be delivered to a permanent repository.The Act also contains measures to help utilities pro-vide such storage at reactor sites using new dry stor-age technologies (see fig. 1-3). DOE now expectsthat these measures can preclude the need to usethe 1,900 tonnes of ‘‘last resort’ Federal storagecapacity, which the Act makes available to utili-ties that are unable to provide their own storagein time to prevent disruption of reactor operations.

The Act also ensures that long-term storageunder active human control will be available, ifneeded. It requires DOE to submit to Congress aproposal for construction of one or more MKS fa-cilities, including an analysis of the need for suchfacilities, their feasibility, and how they might beintegrated into the waste management system. Therole of retrievable storage in the waste management

98-948 0 - 85 - 2 : QL 3

10 ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Leve/ Radioactive Waste

Figure 1=3.—Dry Storage Concepts for Spent Fuel

—

I --

-W&f?

Each drywell would hold a steal canister containing about 0.5Each cask would c

tonnea of apent fual (1 or 2 fuel assemblies depending upon52 assemblies),

the type of reactor).

3“

=

n about 10 tonnes of spent fuel (24 to

II Iiceneed, dry storage lechnologiee like these may provide a relatlvaly Inexpensive, flexible alternative to waler.filled be]ina for m

There appear to be no fundamental technical questions about the ability to design, construct,and operate storage facilities for spent fuel or reprocessed waste to meet applicable ‘adiationprotection standards, as long as continuing surveillance and maintenance of the facilities isprovided. Safe storage in water basins has already been demonstrated for periods of up to20 years. New dry storage technologies (storage casks, drywells, and concrete silos) that canbe added in small increments or modules as needed are potentially much more flexible, quickerto implement, and less expensive for at-reactor use than water basins.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

system is an important issue that remains to beresolved. However, the Act requires disposal in geo-logic repositories to proceed, regardless of what isdone about MRS facilities.

It now appears that MRS facilities will not benecessary for safe management of high-level ra-dioactive waste unless major unexpected diffi-culties with geologic disposal are encountered.NRC has determined that spent fuel can be safelystored at reactor sites for at least 30 years after thereactor is decommissioned. Analysis by OTA in-dicates that if the two repositories required by theAct are operating at full scale by 2008 and 2012,respectively, spent fuel could be removed from allreactor sites within 10 to 15 years after the reactorsare expected to cease operation. MRS or otherbackup isolation facilities, if operating by the samedates, would provide the same margin of safety.

Relations With StatesIndian Tribes

and

State and Tribal Role in Siting Decisions

NWPA requires DOE 1:0 engage in an extensiveprocess of consultation with States and affected In-dian tribes throughout the repository site selectionand development process. The Act gives the Stateor tribe the right to veto the President’s selectionof a repository site, a veto that can only be over-ridden by joint action of both Houses of Congress.Similar provisions apply to other waste manage-ment facilities addressed by the Act. Because of thedistrust that had arisen between the Federal wasteprogram and the States, legislated guarantees ofclearly specified rights in the siting process wereneeded to provide a stable basis for intergovern-mental relations during the implementation of theAct.

Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 1 1

Impact Compensation

Waste management activities will produce manyof the negative impacts associated with other in-dustrial activities, such as the “boomtown” effectsof large construction projects in small communi-ties, as well as less familiar ones arising from theradioactive nature of the waste. NWPA requiresDOE to make payments from the Nuclear WasteFund (see below) to States, affected Indian tribes,and in some cases local governments, to compen-sate for the negative impacts of development andoperation of waste management facilities. These ar-rangements should help assure those States and lo-calities that they will not bear a disproportionateshare of the burden of radioactive waste manage-ment. However, there will probably be positive im-pacts as well. For example, the first repository—which is likely to be the first such facility in theworld—may become an international research cen-ter on high-level radioactive waste disposal. Sucha center would produce long-term benefits for thecommunity that might offset the more immediatebut short-term adverse impacts of repository con-struction.

Institutional Measures

Waste Disposal Fee

DOE estimates that the total program outlays forhigh-level radioactive waste management throughthe year 2028 could range from as little as $16 bil-lion to as much as $114 billion, depending on in-flation and technical variations. A middle range,assuming 3 percent inflation, is from $35 billionto $64 billion.

To provide the assured source of funds to main-tain steady progress over a period of decades,NWPA establishes a Nuclear Waste Fund financedby a mandatory fee on nuclear-generated electri-city. The fee is initially set at 1 mill (O. 1 cent) perkilowatt-hour. The rate must be reviewed annuallyby the Secretary of Energy and adjusted as needed

to ensure that the full costs of the Federal waste dis-posal program are recovered. (Studies by DOE andthe Congressional Budget Office conclude that somefee increase will likely be needed to cover inflationand possible increases in program costs, ) This ar-rangement allows funding levels to be determinedby the legislated goals, rather than having theachievable goals limited by the availability of funds,as occurred in the past. In return for this fee, DOEis required to sign contracts with utilities to disposeof waste after the first geologic repository is avail-able. DOE will take title to the waste at the owner’ssite and transport it to the repository for disposal.

Single-Purpose Waste Management Office

NWPA establishes within DOE a single-purposeOffIce of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management,headed by a Presidential appointee and separatefrom the other nuclear activities of DOE. This stepwill help to insulate the program from the competi-tion for manpower and policy-level attention thathas adversely affected the program in the past. Itcould also help to provide the degree of central, in-tegrated planning and management that is neededto meet long-term commitments on schedule. Atthe same time, the Act requires DOE to submit astudy of alternative means of financing and man-aging the waste management program, includingsuch options as establishing a private corporation.

Radioactive Waste ManagementMission Plan

NWPA also requires DOE to submit to Congressa detailed Mission Plan for fulfilling the require-ments of the Act. Such a Plan would provide a keytool for program management and for congressionaloversight of DOE’s waste management activities.In OTA’S view, development of a highly credi-ble Mission Plan is the crucial next step in build-ing confidence that the job of waste managementwill get done in a safe and timely manner. Theissues to be resolved in the Mission Plan are dis-cussed below.


REMAINING ISSUES

Issues in the Mission Plan

According to NWPA, the Mission Plan is in-tended to provide ‘‘an informational basis sufficientto permit informed decisions to be made. To dothis, the Mission Plan needs to identify the key stra-tegic decisions and options involved in developingthe proposed waste management system, and toprovide information and analysis to support achoice among the options. The major strategicissues in the Mission Plan concern:

1. the long-term waste management plan—aplan for transferring spent fuel or high-levelwaste from the owners’ storage facilities toFederal disposal facilities—involving a repos-itory loading schedule, a plan for spent fuelstorage after 1998, and a plan for providinglong-term alternatives if major difficulties areencountered with geologic repositories; and

2. the implementation program for carrying outthat plan, involving a repository siting pro-gram and a technology development program.

The choices among options for the repositoryschedule and the technology development and re-pository siting strategies represent key decisions inthe Mission Plan. Because the implications areso significant, the Mission Plan should includea comparative evaluation of alternative reposi-tory development and siting strategies, includingthose developed in the OTA Mission Plan. Thiswould enable Congress to evaluate the strategy se-lected by DOE in the light of a more detailed com-parison of alternatives than OTA was able to per-form. It would also allow DOE to explain andjustify its choices, thereby increasing the credibilityof the Mission Plan and the entire waste manage-ment program. The Draft Mission Plan publishedin 1984 does not explain the choices DOE hasmade, nor does it evaluate alternatives to thosechoices.

In OTA’S view, development by DOE of anachievable, responsive Mission Plan is the cru-cial next step for stabilizing the waste manage-ment program and for establishing the necessarylevel of confidence and support. If the Mission

Plan leaves some affected parties strongly dissatis-fied with the way major questions are resolved,there will be a continued risk of future policy shiftslike those that have characterized the program inthe past, and the credibility of long-term Federalcommitments will suffer. An acceptable MissionPlan might provide a key tool for program man-agement and for congressional oversight of DOE’swaste management activities, but dissatisfactionwould probably result in strong opposition to giv-ing the program greater managerial and financialindependence than it already has. In fact, it maynot be possible to gain broad support for the cre-ation of an independent waste management or-ganization until a widely accepted Mission Planis developed.

While analyzing NWPA, OTA identified the ba-sic elements of a Mission Plan that meets these re-quirements. This “OTA Mission Plan” is conserv-ative in goals but aggressive in action, and OTAbelieves that it will be widely regarded as feasibleand achievable. Its major elements are summarizedbelow, in order to support OTA’s conclusion thatthere is at least one workable approach to manag-ing nuclear waste using the authority provided byNWPA. In general, it represents an expansion,rather than a redirection, of the approach DOE fol-lowed in the past and presented in the Draft Mis-sion Han. DOE can proceed with its ongoing re-pository development activities without precludingconsideration of the strategic options suggested byOTA.

The following discussion highlights the key stra-tegic choices to be made in implementing NWPAand identifies areas in which additional analysis byDOE would provide valuable information for con-gressional deliberations.


Geologic repositories are the only facilitiesauthorized and required by NWPA for DOE to usefor fulfilling its legal responsibility for waste dis-posal. For this reason, the repository program isthe heart of the OTA Mission Plan. The crucialdecision concerning the repository loading schedule

Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 1 3

is the balance between the degree of certainty thatthe schedule can be met, and the promised speedof the schedule. Developing a geologic repositoryinvolves many first-of-a-kind technical and institu-tional steps. The faster the promised schedule, theless margin there is for delays or problems at anyof these steps, and the less confident one can bethat the schedule can be met.

DOE’s Draft Mission Plan uses a repositoryschedule that can only be met if no significant de-lays are encountered. Initial loading at the first re-pository is scheduled to begin in 1998, the dateNWPA requires, with full-scale operation expectedby about 2001. DOE does not specify when loadingmight begin if there are serious problems or majordelays. Questions about the credibility of the Fed-eral waste management program in the past havestemmed in part from similarly optimistic schedulesthat have not been met. The credibility of DOE’sMission Plan would be enhanced if contractualcommitments do not assume that everything willgo right the first time.

OTA concludes that small-scale operation ofthe first repository probably can begin by theNWPA deadline of January 31, 1998, if asuitable site can be found from among those al-ready under consideration at the time the Actwas passed. The OTA Mission Plan therefore usesthis date as a management target for initial opera-tion, to maintain pressure for steady progresstowards a licensed repository site. It also includesadditional measures, discussed below, to increaseconfidence in that target.

Although NWPA establishes a deadline for ini-tial disposal in a repository, however, it does notspecify how quickly the full-scale transfer of wastefrom utilities to the repository is to occur. The Mis-sion Plan needs to do so. This repository loadingschedule then becomes the basis for contractualcommitments, in order to give utilities a basis forplanning interim storage. The OTA Mission Planuses a conservative repository loading schedulebased on two repositories in full-scale operation by2008 and 2012, dates that can be met despite ma-jor delays or problems. If the contingenciesallowed for in this schedule do not arise, full-scale operation could begin years earlier—per-

haps as earlyschedule.

as provided in DOE’s proposed

Repository Siting Strategy

The major issue in siting and developing the geo-logic repositories is the balance between: 1) thedesired degree of certainty that a repository will beavailable without major delays; and 2) the initialcosts of the program, both financial and political.It is impossible to both maximize the certaintyof the repository schedule and minimize the ini-tial costs at the same time. The implementationprogram in the OTA Mission Plan emphasizes cer-tainty and places great weight on the importanceof minimizing the risk of major programmatic de-lays. This approach increases the level of con-fidence in the repository schedule and perhapsreduces overall costs, but it may also increasethe initial costs. The repository siting strategy iscrucial to this approach.

DOE’s Draft Mission Plan provides for consid-ering only the number of sites required by NWPAat key stages of the siting process. Specifically, threesites would be characterized for each repository, andone site would be submitted to NRC for construc-tion authorization. This is unchanged from the pro-gram that was in place before NWPA made a ma-jor Federal commitment in law to operating arepository on a firm date. OTA’s analysis in-dicates that expanding that program to includeone additional site at those key stages is bothnecessary and sufficient to substantially increasethe level of confidence that the new commitmentmade by NWPA will be met.

The siting process is the principal source of un-certainty in the repository program. Because thereis no previous experience with most of the techni-cal and institutional problems involved, there is noconsensus on how much time will be required tocomplete each stage or the likelihood that a givensite will be rejected at any stage. The best way toincrease confidence that major delays will beavoided, in the face of these uncertainties, is to carrymore than the required number of sites througheach stage. This ensures that backups are availablewithout delay if needed, so that extended delays


or failures at any one site will not hold up the en-tire process.

The OTA Mission Plan includes a siting pro-gram that exceeds the requirements of NWPA intwo principal areas: characterizing four sites foreach repository, instead of three; and recommend-ing two sites for each construction authorization,rather than one. Using an expanded siting strat-egy significantly increases the likelihood of meetingthe 1998 deadline for initial operation. This strat-egy is the principal assumption underlying OTA’sconclusion that the first repository could be in full-scale operation by 2008 despite difficulties withsome sites.

NWPA requires that characterization be com-pleted at three sites before one can be recom-mended. Beginning the characterization stage withfour sites allows a site to be recommended as soonas the fastest three sites are finished; if only threesites are characterized, the schedule depends onprogress at the slowest site. Similarly, submittingtwo sites to NRC for licensing, rather than one,means that construction could proceed as soon aseither site receives authorization.

It is also possible that NWPA may be interpretedas requiring three sites that, after characterization,appear suitable for licensing, before one can be rec-ommended for licensing. Characterizing four sitesprovides insurance against the delay that could re-sult from a lawsuit to resolve this question. Thisapproach also increases the credibility of the Stateveto provisions of NWPA by increasing thelikelihood that Congress will have a readily avail-able alternative, if and when it has to decidewhether to overrule a State’s objection to the finalsite. (The Act requires DOE to recommend a sec-ond site within one year in the event that Congressupholds a State objection. This can only be doneif a second suitable site is available from among thefirst set of sites that are characterized. )

The OTA Mission Plan calls for only one addi-tional site at each stage for reasons of cost effec-tiveness. Again, the Act requires characterizationof three sites before one can be recommended; evenif there is only a 20 percent risk of delay or rejec-tion at an individual site during characterization,there would be nearly a 50 percent risk of delayin having all three sites ready for the next stage.

Adding a fourth site during characterization reducesthat overall risk to 18 percent, a significant improve-ment, but adding a fifth site provides a smaller im-provement, to 6 percent. Similarly, if there is a 20percent risk that a single recommended site will berejected for construction authorization, recom-mending two sites reduces the risk to 4 percent,while recommending a third reduces the risk onlyto 1 percent.

OTA’s analysis suggests that the additional costsof an expanded implementation program wouldproduce offsetting benefits that are not readilyquantifiable. First, it increases the credibility of theprocess by allaying concerns that key decisionsmight be compromised by lack of suitable alterna-tives. Second, it substantially reduces the risk thatthe credibility of the Federal program might bedamaged by major delays in the repository pro-gram. Because of its troubled history, any majorprogrammatic failure—real or perceived—couldhave grave consequences for both the waste man-agement program and the continued use of nuclearpower. The greater initial costs of the OTA Mis-sion Plan may thus be regarded as insurance fora program that cannot afford any major failuresor delays. NWPA provides authority for such anapproach, as well as a source of funding that canbe adjusted to cover its costs. DOE’s Draft Mis-sion Han, on the other hand, proposes measuresto speed up the repository development process, atsignificant cost, but these measures do not providethe insurance against major delays offered by con-sideration of additional sites.

Technology Development Strategy

The OTA Mission Plan calls for developmentof the first repository to be accomplished in twostages: 1) a demonstration phase, to show that alicensable disposal technology exists; and 2) anoperational phase, to dispose of radioactive wasteon a large scale.

The demonstration phase would use a conserv-ative system design that emphasizes certainty inmeeting regulatory requirements. A small amountof waste (e. g., several hundred tonnes) would beplaced in conservatively designed packages duringthe packaging and handling RD&D program re-quired by NWPA. Permission would be requested

Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 7 5

from NRC to emplace this material in the reposi-tory as soon as possible following construction au-thorization— before the repository’s packaging fa-cilities are built instead of after, as indicated inDOE’s Draft Mission Plan. (If DOE builds an un-licensed test and evaluation facility at the reposi-tory site, as authorized by NWPA, the demonstra-tion phase could be simply a licensed extension ofthe activities conducted in that facility. ) Using aconservative system design, involving low reposi-tory temperatures and a waste package whose life-time exceeds NRC’s requirements, would reducethe number of technical issues to be resolved beforeinitial licensed emplacement is allowed. This ap-proach would allow early demonstration of both thetechnology and the institutional steps required forlicensed disposal. It should thereby maximize thelikelihood of meeting NWPA’s 1998 target for ini-tial repository operation.

The operational phase would use an optimized,integrated system design, aimed at reducing theoverall risks, costs, and impacts of waste manage-ment operations, from discharge of spent fuel froma reactor to final disposal in a repository. For ex-ample, recent analysis suggests that significant oper-ational benefits, including substantially reducedcosts, might result from using a universal contain-er—a package into which spent fuel would be placedat the reactor and in which it would remain for allsubsequent waste management steps, unless it wereremoved for reprocessing. Because this containerand other relatively new technologies will re-quire additional RD&D, the schedule for theoperational phase would be determined by thetime required to develop and license an opti-mized system design.

This two-stage approach may increase initialcosts compared to DOE’s Draft Mission Plan, be-cause it requires development of two disposal sys-tem designs and may defer full-scale operation fora few years. At the same time, it may reduce totalcosts in the long run because: 1) it removes the con-struction of the repository’s packaging facility fromthe critical path for initial disposal; and 2) it therebyavoids the risk that attempting to meet the 1998deadline using those facilities, as proposed by DOE,might preclude the use of a significantly improvedsystem design at the first repository. In addition,it increases confidence in the schedule for full-scale

operation, because the conservative system designcould still be used if problems were encounteredwith the optimized design.

Issues in the MRS Proposal

The second document to be submitted to the 99thCongress is the MRS proposal, containing both de-signs for such facilities and an analysis of the needfor them and their feasibility. As noted earlier, itnow appears that MRS facilities will not be neces-sary for safe waste management unless major unex-pected difficulties with geologic disposal are encoun-tered. The OTA Mission Plan provides for a de-layed decision to construct MRS facilities (or al-ternative disposal facilities) as a long-term backupto repositories, in the event that major unantici-pated difficulties are encountered with geologicdisposal.

The major storage issue to be considered in theMission Plan and the MRS proposal is whether toauthorize earlier construction of an MRS facility.To facilitate congressional consideration of MRSoptions, both the Mission Plan and the MRS pro-posal should evaluate at least three alternatives:

1

2.

Early siting, licensing, and construction ofan MRS facility. This could be done for sev-eral reasons: to provide a cushion againstdelays in the repository program; to play anoperational role in an integrated waste man-agement system; or to allow more time to betaken in finding repository sites. This option,which is implicit in DOE’s Draft MissionPlan, would require congressional authoriza-tion in the very near future. It involves a ma-jor additional commitment of manpower andresources over the next decade, which mightraise concerns that this effort would adverselyaffect the repository siting process.Federal at-reactor storage beginning in1998. Under this option, the Nuclear WasteFund would pay the costs of additional stor-age beyond the contractual delivery date. Thisavoids the costs of siting and licensing a largenew facility, and it would spread the costs ofdelays in the repository program among allutilities paying the waste disposal fee. This op-tion might be accomplished through rulemak-ing, by modifying contracts with utilities; if


3.

so, no congressional action would be required.This approach is compatible with a later deci-sion to construct a centralized storage facil-ity, if needed, but it would also allow plan-ning for at-reactor storage as an integral partof the waste management system. If it weretaken by DOE soon, it would separate theequity issue of who should be responsible forpost-1998 interim storage from the technicalquestion of where that storage can best beprovided.Deferral of the decision on a centralizedMRS facility until at least 1990, when DOEexpects to recommend the first geologic re-pository site to Congress. This allows enoughtime to: 1) evaluate the demonstrations of at-reactor dry storage technologies required byNWPA; 2) complete the analysis of an opti-mized integrated waste management systemdesign that has recently been initiated byDOE; and 3) determine from the results ofsite characterization whether the repositoryprogram can expect significant delays. It alsoavoids the risk that an early effort to site alarge-scale storage facility would delay the re-pository program. If a decision were made in1990 to construct an MRS facility, it couldbegin operation by 2001, DOE’s current tar-get date for operation of the full-scale loadingfacilities for the first repository. Even if thedecision were made as late as 1998, it wouldstill allow alternative facilities to be availablequickly enough to remove spent fuel from re-actor sites within 15 years after decommission-ing. This option would require no congres-sional action at this time.

Institutional Issues

Finally, DOE will submit to the 99th Congressa report on alternative institutional mechanisms forfinancing and managing the commercial high-levelradioactive waste program. The central componentof NWPA is its commitment to developing a com-plex technological system, faced with technical andinstitutional uncertainties, on a firm schedule ex-tending over a period of decades. The confidencein and credibility of this commitment could be

enhanced by establishing an independent wastemanagement agency with more funding andmanagement flexibility than is usual with atypical Federal program. Creating such an agencymay be the best way to ensure that implementa-tion of NWPA would not be adversely affected byother fiscal and political priorities of the FederalGovernment. In addition, separating this agencyfrom Federal activities that promote energy pro-duction could enhance the credibility of the pro-gram for those who see a conflict of interest betweensuch activities and the safe planning and develop-ment of a waste management system.

The degree of financial independence of the wastemanagement organization n will be of particular im-portance. NWPA insulates the revenues producedby the waste management fee by establishing a sep-arate Nuclear Waste Fund in the Treasury, limitedto carrying out the purposes of the Act. Althoughthe budget for the program is to be submitted andexpenditure levels authorized on a triennial basis,the use of the Fund is subject to annual appropria-tions. Since annual budget control is not entirelyconsistent with a commitment to steady progresson a long-term schedule, any future deliberationson establishing an independent waste managementagency will have to consider ways of providing suchan agency with greater budgetary independence.Without such independence, there will be a risk thatconsiderations of the annual Federal budget (e. g.,pressures to limit the temporary borrowing fromthe Treasury that may be needed to balance theflow of revenues and expenditures in the WasteFund) could lead to deferral or elimination ofplanned expenditures. This could in turn jeopard-ize steady progress on a program whose schedulehas been fixed by contracts with utilities.

Achieving an acceptable balance between in-dependence and accountability will be one of thecentral challenges in designing such a wastemanagement authority. The more independentthe institution and its funding are, the surer theguarantee that nuclear waste management activi-ties will be carried out on schedule. But such aninstitution raises a crucial and difficult question:how to ensure the congressional oversight and pub-lic accountability that a democratic society de-mands. There may be considerable reluctance to

Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 1 7

establish a single-purpose agency with even greaterindependence than the current institutional struc-ture, for fear that it might be less responsive to theconcerns of Congress, the administration, and thepublic.

The Mission Plan could serve as the principalmechanism for balancing the need for adequatecongressional oversight with the need for in-creased flexibility of operation. Using the Mis-sion Plan for this purpose could be easier and moreeffective if there were a process by which Congresscould approve it. Since this is not now required byNWPA, consideration of mechanisms for such ap-proval might be included in any congressional de-liberations on establishment of an independentwaste management agency.

If there were a mechanism for congressional ap-proval of a Mission Plan, the function of the wastemanagement agency would be that of carrying outa specific program, with specific goals that Con-gress has formally approved, and not that of de-veloping broad waste management policy. Thismight give Congress sufficient ongoing control to

warrant relaxation of normal annual budgetarycontrols, thus increasing confidence that the wastemanagement program will have adequate fundsavailable when needed regardless of other Federalbudget priorities. Once congressional approval isobtained, the agency could be authorized to makeexpenditures from the Nuclear Waste Fund, as pro-vided for in a multiyear budget contained in theMission Plan, without annual authorizations or ap-propriations. To ensure continued congressionalcontrol, revision and reapproval of the Mission Plancould be required at regular intervals (e. g., every4 to 6 years).

The added independence that could be gainedunder this approach might give the waste manage-ment agency the incentive to develop and carry outa highly defensible and widely supported MissionPlan. A regular process of review and reapprovalcould increase public understanding of and supportfor waste management activities. It would also allowCongress to reconfirm its commitment, made inNWPA, that there would be steady progress towardthe permanent disposal of high-level radioactivewaste.

Chapter 2

Radioactive Waste:Its Nature and Management

Contents

Nature of Radioactive Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Nuclear Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Nuclear Fuel Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Amounts of Radioactive Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Hazards of Radioactive Waste.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Institutional Aspects of Waste Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Federal Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Non-Federal Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .International Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TABLES

2121232829

33333536

36

Table No. Page

2-1. Physical Characteristics of LWR Fuel Assemblies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252-2. Current and Projected Inventories of Defense and Commercial

High-Level Radioactive Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28


2-1. Fission Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222-2. Natural Background Radiation varies From State to State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232-3. Toxicity of Spent Fuel, High-Level Waste, and Its Parent Uranium Ore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292-4. Toxicities of PWR Spent Fuel and Its Parent Uranium Ore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302-5. Toxicities of PWR High-Level Waste and Its Parent Uranium Ore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

.-

Chapter 2

Radioactive Waste:Its Nature and Management

Various forms of radioactive waste are producedduring the preparation, use, and management ofreactor fuel for the commercial production of elec-tricity and for defense-related nuclear activities.Radioactive waste is also produced in various in-dustrial and institutional activities, including med-ical research and treatment. The focus of this assess-ment is the management of the highly radioactivewaste produced during the generation of commer-cial nuclear power.

In a nuclear powerplant, heat released whenatomic nuclei in reactor fuel are made to split (fis-sion) is used to produce steam that powers an elec-

tricity-producing generator. This process createsnot only the heat needed for generating electricity,but also radioactive byproducts that are present inthe “spent” (used) fuel discharged from the reactor.The term high-level radioactive waste is used in thisreport to refer to either the high-level waste mate-rial produced if the unused radioactive byproductsare separated from the spent fuel for disposal orthe spent fuel itself if it is discarded directly as waste.This chapter will describe the nature of radioactivewaste; its sources, amounts, and hazards; and thetechnical and institutional aspects of its man-agement.

NATURE OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Nuclear Reactions

Radioactivity

Some atoms, known as radioisotopes, are unsta-ble (radioactive) and undergo a spontaneous decayprocess, emitting radiation until they reach a stableform. Called decay, this stabilizing process takes,depending on the type of atom, from a fraction ofa second to billions of years. The rate of radioactivedecay is measured in half-lives, the time it takesfor half the atoms in a sample to decay to anotherform. After 1 half-life, half the atoms in a sampleare unchanged; after 2 half-lives, one-fourth of theoriginal amount remains unchanged. Thus, afterseveral half-lives only a small fraction of the sam-ple’s original atoms remain unchanged; yet thesample may still be quite radioactive—either be-cause some atoms have not decayed or becausesome atoms have decayed to other radioisotopes.

The intensity of radioactivity in a sample is deter-mined by the number of emissions, or disintegra-tions, per second and usually is measured in curies(1 curie = 37 billion radioactive disintegrations per

second). From this standard, three common meas-urements are derived: the nanocurie ( 1 billionth ofa curie), the microcurie (1 millionth of a curie), andthe megacurie (1 million curies). Elements withshorter half-lives-like thorium-234 at 24.1 days—are more radioactive than those with longer half-lives—like uranium-238 (U238) at 4.5 billion years—because the shorter the half-life, the more atomsin a sample of the element decay and emit radia-tion each second.

Fission

Some radioisotopes are fissile-i.e., they can splitwhen neutrons are added to their nuclei or, in somecircumstances, spontaneously. Only one fissile ele-ment, uranium-235 (U235), exists in nature. Othersare produced artificially when ‘ ‘fertile’ atoms suchas U238 absorb neutrons and subsequently decayto fissile isotopes, like plutonium-239 (Pu239) (seefig. 2-l).

During fission, the nucleus splits into two smallernuclei called fission products, releasing neutrons,radiation, and heat in the process. The released

21


Figure 2-1.- Fission Process

on Neutron

\ \

b,Radioactive ~

\ decay

U-235 (

\


neutrons can cause nearby atoms to split, and,given enough fissionable material, an ongoing chainreaction can begin. Such a chain reaction gener-ates heat, primarily from the fission process itselfand secondarily from the subsequent decay of theradioactive fission products. Uncontrolled, a nu-clear chain reaction could end in an atomic explo-sion. In a nuclear reactor, however, the fissile atoms(U235) are diluted with many non-fissile atoms(U238 and other atoms that absorb neutrons so thatthe chain reaction is maintained but cannot pro-duce an explosion.

Produced in great quantities in a reactor are: 1)transuranic (TRU) isotopes—atoms that absorbenough neutrons to become heavier than uraniumatoms, and 2) fission products—isotopes lighter

\on

\

isotope

than uranium atoms that are formed by the fissionof an atom. Generally, fission products are moreradioactive and have short half-lives, from secondsto decades. TRU isotopes can have half-lives as longas millions of years.

Effects of Radiation

Highly energetic radiation can penetrate humantissue and other matter, triggering molecular andchemical changes that can result in damage or deathto cells, tissue, or even the entire organism. Theextent of the damage depends on the type of radi-ation, the length of exposure, the distance from theradiation source, and the susceptibility of the ex-posed cells. The principal concern about radioactivewaste is that it might be released into the environ-

.

Ch. 2—Radioactive Waste: /ts Nature and Management ● 2 3

ment and be taken into the body through drinkingwater or food supplies, thus placing a source of ra-diation very close to vulnerable tissues.

Radiation exposure is measured in reins, a unitthat indicates the amount of radiation received andthe biological implications of the exposure. In ayear’s time, the average person in the United Statesis exposed to approximately 160 millirems (thou-sandths of a rem) of radiation, two-thirds of whichcomes from natural background sources such asmineral ores, cosmic radiation from outer space,and the radioactive carbon and potassium foundin most living things. Natural background radia-tion from outer space increases with land elevationand is about twice as high for a person living inDenver, Colo., as for a person living at sea level(see fig. 2-2). Slightly less than one-third of thisannual exposure comes from medical irradiation(X-rays).

An acute radiation dose—50 reins or more overa 24-hour period—results in radiation sicknesswithin 1 hour to several weeks. The chance of deathis nearly 100 percent from a dose above 1,000 reins,90 to 100 percent from 600 to 1,000 reins, and 50

percent from 400 reins. With a dose of 200 reinsor less, survival is almost certain. Other conse-quences range from gastrointestinal and circulatorysystem disorders to long-term effects like cancer,birth abnormalities, genetic defects, and poor gen-eral health. Long-term effects also result fromchronic exposure to low-level radiation. In radioac-tive waste disposal, the concern centers on the pos-sibility of such chronic low-level exposures causedby escaped waste, rather than acute doses.

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Several kinds of radioactive waste are generatedduring all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle—from thepreparation of reactor ftlel (front-end of the cycle),through the operation of the reactor, to the stor-age and possible reprocessing of spent reactor fuel(back-end of the cycle). The following activitiescomprise the nuclear fuel cycle for uranium bothas originally envisioned and as now in use in the74 operating commercial nuclear powerplants in theUnited States.

Figure 2-2.—Natural Background Radiation Varies From State to State (millirem per year)

n

SOURCE: A. W. Klement, Jr., Estimates of Ionizing Radiation Doses in the United States, 1%0-20U0, Environmental Protec.tion Agency Publication No. ORP/CDS 72-1, 1972.

24 . Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

Front End of the Fuel Cycle:Preparation of Reactor Fuel

MINING

Uranium ore, the raw material of reactor fuel,is extracted from surface and underground mines,producing low-level radioactive dust and releasingradioactive gas.

MILLING

At mills the uranium ore is crushed and ground,then chemically treated to extract uranium oxidesand produce yellowcake (USOB). The process gen-erates low-level airborne wastes and a large volumeof slightly radioactive mill tailings.

CONVERSION AND ENRICHMENT

Yellowcake is converted to uranium hexafluoridegas (UFG), leaving low-level waste solids. At enrich-ment facilities the concentration of U235 in the gasis increased from the 0.7 percent found naturallyin uranium ore to the 3 to 4 percent needed for fuel

for the reactors in use in the United States. In theprocess, low-level airborne and liquid waste areproduced.

FUEL FABRICATION

The enriched UFG gas is then converted to soliduranium dioxide (UO2), shaped into pencil eraser-size pellets, and loaded into 12-ft long metal fuelrods. The rods are then sealed, arrayed in fuel as-semblies of 50 to 300 rock, and transported to re-actors. Low-level gas, liquid, and solid radioactivewaste remain.

Reactor Operation

The light-water reactor (LWR) is the principalreactor type in commercial use in the UnitedStates. i In the LWR, the fuel assemblies are im-mersed collectively in a coolant (water), where theyform the reactor core. The control rods interspersedamong the fuel rods control the number of nuclearreactions in the reactor fuel. Heat from fission and,to a lesser extent, from the decay of fission prod-ucts is used to heat water to steam. In one type ofLWR, the boiling-water reactor (BWR), the steamis produced directly from the cooling water sur-rounding the reactor core. In the other type, thepressurized-water reactor (PWR), the cooling wateris pressurized to prevent boiling and is used insteadto transmit heat from the core to boil water in aseparate steam generator. In both types the steamcauses a turbine to rotate, generating the electricpower transmitted to consumers. A typical nuclearpowerplant produces about 1 million kilowatts(kW), or 1 gigawatt (GWe), of electricity.

After about 3 years, the buildup of fission prod-ucts and TRU elements in a fuel assembly impedesthe efficiency of the chain reaction. When the con-centration of U235 in the fuel is less than 1 percent,the assembly, considered “spent” fuel, is removedand replaced with fresh fuel. A typical l-GWe

PWR discharges about 60 assemblies, or a total of

‘Seventy-three of the seventy-four commercial powerplants areLWRS. The one high-temperature gas reactor at Fort St. Vrain, Colo.,operates like an LWR but uses helium gas for its coolant. Anothertype of reactor under consideration for future use is the breeder reac-tor, designed to produce more fissile material than it uses by convert-ing nonfissi]e U238 in the fuel into plutonium, which would be extractedthrough reprocessing and recycled as new fuel.

Ch. 2—Radioactive Waste: Its Nature and Management ● 25

about 27 metric tons (tonnes)z of spent fuel, eachyear, while a 1-GW, BWR discharges about 175assemblies, or 31 tonnes, annually.3 Table 2-1shows the characteristics of BWR and PWR fuelassemblies before and after irradiation in a reactor.

Because of the decay of the fission products andTRU elements, spent fuel is extremely hot and ra-dioactive when it is initially discharged from the—— ————.—

‘Note that only the mass of the initial uranium is considered in themeasurement of fuel amounts and not the mass of the rest of theassembly. While this report will use the term ‘‘tonnes’ for simplicity,other terms in common use are MTU (metric tons of uranium),MTHM (metric tons of heavy metal), and MTIHM (metric tons ofinitial heavy metal). A metric ton, or tonne, is equivalent to 1,000kilograms, or about 2,205 pounds.

3N’ational Research Council, Waste Isolation Systems Panel, AStudy of the Isolation S)stem for Geologic Disposal of Radioactive\Vastes (Washington, D. C.: National Academy Press, 1983), pp. 28-29. See chapter note 1 for further discussion of the amounts of spentfuel produced by the generation of 1 GW-year of electricity.

Table 2-1 .—Physical Characteristicsof LWR Fuel Assemblies

BWR PWROverall assembly length (m) . 4.470Cross section (cm) . . . . . . . . . 13,9 x 13.9Fuel pin array . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 x 8Fuel pins/assembly . . . . . . . . 63Nominal volume/

assembly (m3) . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0864Assembly total weight (kg) . . 275.7Uranium/assembly (kg)

Initial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183.3Discharge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176.5

Enrichment (wt% U’3S)Initial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.75Discharge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.69

Plutonium/assemblyat discharge (kg) . . . . . . . . . 1.54

Other TRU elements/assemblyat discharge (kg) . . . . . . . . . 0.10

Fission productslassemblyat discharge (kg) . . . . . . . . . 5.2

Average discharge burnup(MW-d/tonne initialuranium) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,500

Average thermal power(kW/assembly)Discharge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2781 year after discharge . . . . 1.310 years after discharge . . 0.2

Average radioactivity(megacuries)assembly)Discharge. . ., . . . . . . . . . . . 28,31 year after discharge . . . . 0.3510 years after discharge . . 0.06

4.05921.4 X 21.4

17 x 17264

0.186657.9

461.4441.2

3.200.84

4.18

0.43

15.7

33,000

1,0174.70.5

102.01.160.18

SOURCE: Derived from data presented in A. G. Croff and C. W. Alexander, DecayCharacteristics of Once-Through LWR and LMFBR Spent Fuels, High.Level Wastes, and Fue/ Assemb/y Structural Materia/ Wastes. ORNL/TM-7431 (Oak Ridge, Term.: Oak-Rige National Laboratory, ‘1980)

g8-948 O - 85 - 3 : QL 3

reactor. For this reason it is stored in water basinsto provide the cooling and radiation shielding thatit requires. For example, freshly discharged spentfuel from a PWR generates up to about 221 mega-curies of radioactivity and 2.2 megawatts (MW)of thermal heat per tonne.4 BWR fuel is slightlyless hot and radioactive, since it generally has alower “burnup’ —a measure of the amount of thefissile material in the fuel that has been used beforedischarge, and thus of the amount of radioactivewaste products it contains.

The heat output and radioactivity of spent fueldecay rapidly in the first year after discharge, byfactors of 216 and 88, respectively, for PWR fuel.The approximately 10 kW of heat emitted per tonneafter one year equates to that of one-hundred 100-watt light bulbs. The heat and radioactivity decayless rapidly after the first year, by additional fac-tors of 8 and 6, respectively, by the end of 10 yearsafter discharge.

Backend of the Fuel Cycle: Spent FuelManagement and Waste Isolation

At present, many of the activities envisioned totreat and manage commercial spent fuel exist intheory, based on extensive experience with defensespent fuel, but not in practice. Thus, deciding whatto do with commercial spent fuel and the wasteproducts it contains is often referred to as “clos-ing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Thefollowing section provides an overview of the ex-isting and envisioned activities of the back end ofthe fuel cycle.

REPROCESSING AND RECYCLE

Spent fuel contains much material of no discern-ible value, as well as uranium and plutonium, over99 percent of which can be recovered through re-processing and then recycled for reactor fuel. Inthe reprocessing operation, spent fuel rods arechopped into pieces and dissolved. From the solu-tion all but 0.5 percent of the uranium and pluto-nium is extracted. If the recovered uranium wererecycled, it would be converted to uranium hexa-fluoride (UF6) gas for reuse in producing fresh nu-

4A. G. Croff and C. W. Alexander, Decay Characteristics of Once-7’hrough LWR and LMFBR Spent Fuels, High-Level Wastes, andFuel-Assembly Structural Material Wastes, ORNL/T’M-7431 (OakRidge, Term.: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, November 1980).

— —


clear fuel. If the recovered plutonium were re-cycled, it would be converted to plutonium oxide(PuO2) and combined with uranium to make mixedoxide (MOX) fuel.

The leftover solution from reprocessing, highlyradioactive at 10,000 curies per gallon, contains pri-marily fission products and is defined as high-levelwaste. It must, by regulation, be solidified beforedisposal. Any recovered uranium or plutonium thatis not recycled must also be disposed of. Both re-processing and MOX fuel fabrication generate sub-stantial quantities of TRU wastes—materials con-taminated with enough long-lived TRU elementsto require long-term isolation like high-level waste.

Defense spent fuel—from reactors designed toproduce plutonium for weapons and from the pow-erplants of nuclear naval vessels—routinely is re-processed to recover plutonium and unused en-riched uranium. The nuclear fuel cycle wasoriginally envisioned to include such reprocessingfor all commercial spent fuel. However, for eco-nomic and political reasons discussed in chapters3 and 4, no commercial spent fuel is now being re-processed in the United States. Of the three com-mercial reprocessing plants originally planned, onlythe facility at West Valley, N. Y., actually operated(from 1966 to 1972). It closed for modifications andnever reopened. The facility at Morris, Ill., haddesign problems and never opened, and the facili-ty at Barnwell, S. C., has never been completed.Without commercial reprocessing there can be nocommercial recycling of uranium or plutonium.

WASTE MANAGEMENT

Nearly all the highly radioactive byproducts pro-duced thus far by commercial nuclear power gen-eration in the United States are contained in thespent fuel that has been discharged by operatingreactors. The original expectation that all spent fuelwould be reprocessed to recover usable uraniumand plutonium, and that the radioactive byproductswould be separated as high-level waste, has not beenrealized. It now appears possible that at least somespent fuel would be treated as waste and discardeddirectly without reprocessing, which is often re-ferred to as a “once-through” fuel cycle. Thus, theterm high-level radioactive waste is used in this re-port to refer to either the high-level waste from re-processing or the spent fuel itself, if discarded as

waste. Because of the uncertain future of reproc-essing, high-level radioactive waste managementat present can be seen as including: 1) managementof spent fuel until a decision is made about whetherto reprocess it, and 2) final isolation of the fissionproducts and unused TRU elements that are nowin the spent fuel and that may or may not be sepa~rated later.

The high-level radioactive waste managementsystem is a network of facilities for storing spent

Ch. 2—Radioactive Waste: Its Nature and Management ● 2 7

fuel and any high-level waste from reprocessing,facilities for final isolation of whichever materialis ultimately discarded, and transportation linksconnecting those facilities with one another and withany reprocessing and recycling activities that ulti-mately occur. Each of these activities will be de-scribed briefly here and discussed at greater lengthin chapter 3.

Interim Storage. —When the reactors that noware operating or under construction were designed,it was assumed that spent fuel discharged from thereactor would first be stored in water-filled storagebasins at the reactor for about 6 months to dissipatethe thermal heat and allow the decay of some ofthe short-lived fission products. It was expected thatthe spent fuel then would be reprocessed and theresultant high-level liquid waste solidified andshipped to a Federal repository for final isolation.Since no commercial reprocessing is being done,and no final waste repository exists that could allowspent fuel to be discarded directly, practically allspent fuel remains in storage basins at reactor sites.Modifications are being made where possible to in-crease the amount of spent fuel that can be storedin these basins, which originally were designed witha capacity for only 3 to 5 annual discharges of spentfuel. Transshipment (shipping spent fuel from onereactor site for storage in a basin at another site)and new storage technologies now under develop-ment promise additional relief (see ch. 3).

Because of the delays that have already occurredin the availability of both reprocessing and final re-positories, it appears likely that most (more than90 percent) of the spent fuel generated in this cen-tury will still be in temporary storage facilities atthe end of the century—even if reprocessing or di-rect final isolation of spent fuel begins in the1990’s.5 Thus, for the next several decades, wastemanagement will consist primarily of interim spentfuel storage. Any reprocessing that occurs wouldsimply convert some of the stored spent fuel intoseparated uranium and plutonium and waste of var-ious types, all of which would require interim stor-age until final isolation of the waste and recycling(or perhaps direct final isolation) of the plutoniumand uranium.

‘b’. S. Department of Energy, Spent Fuel and Radioactive WasteIn\cntories, Projections, and Characteristics, DOE/RW-0006, Sep-tember 1984, fig. C .2, p, 284, and fig. C .3, p. 285.

Final Isolation.—Final isolation, the last stepin radioactive waste management, is intended tolimit or prevent the release of highly radioactivebyproducts of nuclear fission into the environmentfor the thousands of years it takes for these byprod-ucts to decay to low levels. There is no licensed finalisolation facility for high-level radioactive waste inthe world.

There are two conceptually distinct technologicalapproaches to waste isolation that could be used forfinal isolation: storage and disposal. Briefly, dis-posal is isolation that relies primarily on natural(environmental) and manmade barriers, does notpermit easy human access to the waste after its finalemplacement, and does not require continued hu-man control and maintenance. Storage is isolationthat permits easy access to the waste after emplace-ment and requires continued human control andmaintenance to guarantee isolation. Thus, disposalis always designed to provide final isolation, whilestorage may be intended for either interim or finalisolation. G

Although some have viewed long-term storageas a viable final measure for managing high-levelradioactive waste, 7 Federal Government policysince the 1950’s has been directed primarily towardthe development of disposal facilities for final isola-tion. However, storage will of necessity be the onlyform of waste management until the capacity fordisposal is available and may continue to be a ma-jor part thereafter—either because it is desirableto defer disposal even after facilities are available(e.g., to maintain easy access to spent fuel for pos-sible reprocessing) or simply because an extendedperiod would be required to eliminate the backlogsof waste built up in storage by the time disposaloperations begin.

In the United States, Government efforts are fo-cused on the development of mined, geologic re-

——-—— . .—6Much of the debate about radioactive waste managcmcmt has been

clouded by blurred and shifting distinctions between storage and dis-posal. In particular, storage is often defined as emplacement with theintent to recover the material, while disposal is defined as emplace-ment with no intent to recover, a distinction which is based on a sub-jective criterion— the intention of the person emplacing the waste-

that cannot be directly observed from inspection of the facility receivingthe waste. In contrast, the definitions used in this report are basedon the obser~’able design characteristics of the system under consid-erate ion.

7Sec app, A, p. 206.

28 ● Managing the Nation% Commercial High-Leve/ Radioactive Waste

positories for disposal, although other disposal alter-natives, such as emplacement in the seabed, havebeen and probably will continue to be considered.The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA)commits the Federal Government to begin opera-tion of a geologic repository by the beginning of1998. Until the mid-1990’s, the activities associ-ated with disposal will involve locating and evalu-ating suitable repository sites and developing dis-posal technology (see ch. 3).

Transportation. —Linking the stages of the nu-clear fuel cycle are transportation activities that alsogenerate wastes, primarily from the contaminationof transport containers by the transported materials.Because most commercial spent fuel is now storedat reactor sites, very little transportation of com-mercial spent fuel occurs in this country at this time,although some transshipment does take place.

Amounts of Radioactive Waste

High-Level Waste From Reprocessing

The principal source of high-level waste at pre-sent is the reprocessing of spent fuel from defensenuclear activities. Such waste is stored as liquid,salt cake, and sludge in near-surface tanks or ascalcined solids in underground bins at Federal in-stallations at the Hanford Reservation (Washing-ton), the Savannah River Plant (South Carolina),

and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.A small amount of high-level waste, from reproc-essing about 234 tonnes of commercial spent fuel,is stored at the Nuclear Fuel Services facility inWest Valley, N.Y. Table 2-2 shows the existing andprojected amounts of high-level radioactive waste,in terms of volume, radioactivity, and thermal pow-er (the rate of heat output). Note that if reprocess-ing of spent fuel from commercial power reactorsis undertaken, it could rapidly become the domi-nant source of high-level waste.

Spent Fuel

By the end of 1983, about 10,000 tonnes of spentfuel was in storage in water basins at nuclear powerreactors in the United States. Commercial spentfuel was being generated at a rate of about 1,400tonnes/yr in 1983, and the Department of Energy(DOE) estimates the rate will reach about 2,300tonnes/yr by 2000. This increase would result ina total of about 21,000 tonnes by the end of 1990and 43,000 tonnes by the end of 2000.8 The cur-rently operating reactors can be expected to pro-duce about 55,000 tonnes of spent fuel, or about196,000 fuel assemblies, over their operatinglifetimes. g

*U. S. Department of Energy, op. cit.‘Projections supplied by the U.S. Department of Energy. See app. F.

Table 2.2.-Current and Projected Inventories of Defense and Commercial High. Level Radioactive Waste

End of calendar year 1983 End of calendar year 2000

Volume a Radioactivity Thermal power Volume a Radioactivity Thermal powerMaterial (cubic meters) (megacuries) (kilowatts) (cubic meters) (megacuries) (kilowatts)

High-Level waste:Defense:

Savannah River. . . . . . 111,000Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,000Hanford . . . . . . . . . . . . 203,000Defense total . . . . . . . 324,000

Commercial:West Valley . . . . . . . . . 2,000

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0

Spent fuel:Cumulative . . . . . . . . . . . 4,600

(10,000 tonnes)Annual . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620

(1,400 tonnes)

77665

4741,315

350

12,900

7,400

2,280190

1,3803,850

1040

48,000

29,400

83,00014,000

217,000314,000

—300

19,400(42,800 tonnes)

1,050(2,320 tonnes)

699241430

1,370

23324

35,700

13,700

2,040726

1,2564,022

681,106

131,000

55,300

aspent fuel volumes calculated Using a nominal volume of O.OSM m“ for a BWR assembly and 0.186 m’ for a PWR assembl}. (DOE/NE-0017/2, table 19! P 32)bAssumes a first reprocessing plant starts operation in 1995 at 500 tonnelyr through 2004.

SOURCE U S Department of Energy, Spent Fuel and Radioactive waste /inventories, Projections, and Characteristics, DOEIFIW-0006, Washington, DC., 1984.


The total volume of existing and projected com-mercial spent fuel discharges is shown in table 2-2. Because most of the high-level defense waste isrelatively dilute, and has not been concentrated andsolidified, the current inventory of commercialspent fuel represents only about 1 percent of thevolume of such defense waste. However, the cur-rent inventory of spent fuel already has a consid-erably higher level of radioactivity and heat out-put than the defense waste, and the annualdischarge from the currently operating reactors ex-ceeds the total defense waste inventory in those twomeasures. This is very significant for waste man-agement, since the heat output is a more impor-tant factor than the physical volume of the wastein determining the amount of repository spaceneeded for disposal.

Hazards of Radioactive Waste

Comparison of Nuclear Waste to Uranium

While the original uranium in reactor fuel is itselfa low-level health hazard, many of the radioisotopesproduced by the fission of uranium or the conver-sion of uranium into transuranic elements are moretoxic. First, most of these radioisotopes have shorterhalf-lives than that of uranium. Some of the fissionproducts are so short-lived that about 80 percentare gone by the time the spent fuel is removed fromthe reactor.

10 This means that they undergo more

radiation-producing decays per second than theoriginal ore; hence, their radioactivity per gram ofmaterial is much higher. Second, some of the wasteproducts are more biologically dangerous than theoriginal uranium because of the intensity of radia-tion emitted and because they stay in the body long-er, once ingested, or concentrate in particularlyvulnerable organs. For example, 1 curie of thetransuranic isotope americium-241 (Am241) is es-timated to be about 10 times as hazardous as 1 curieof U*38.‘‘

The hazard posed by radioactive waste is oftendiscussed in terms of an overall measure, or index,of the toxicity of the waste. A commonly used meas-

. —‘“Bernard L. Cohen, “High-Level Radioactive Waste From Light-

Water Reactors, ” Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 49, No. 1, Janu-ary 1977, pp. 1-19.

11 Intemation~ Comission on Radiation Protection, Limits for hl-takes of Racfionuclides by Workers, ICRP-30 (New York: PergamonPress, 1979).

ure of toxicity is the water dilution volume (WDV),defined as the volume of water (usually measuredin cubic meters) that would be required to dilutethe waste to acceptable drinking standards. Figure2-3 shows the WDV for 1 tonne of spent fuel, forthe high-level waste that would result if the spentfuel were reprocessed both 160 days and 15 yearsafter discharge from the reactor, and for the ura-nium ore needed to produce 1 tonne of fuel. ThoseWDVS are calculated using standards based on re-cent data for toxicity of various radioisotopes. Fig-ure 2-2 shows that it would take about 1 millionyears for high-level waste from reprocessing 15-year-old spent fuel to fall below the toxicity of the

121bid.

Figure 2-3.-Toxicity of Spent Fuel$ High-Level Waste,—and its Parent Uranium Ore

I I I I I 1 I I I

Spent fuel

1

~ HLW from 15-year-~ old spent fuel ~

10-’ 1 10’ 10’ 10’ 10’ 10’ 106 10’

Decay time after discharge (years)

SOURCE: Data supplied by Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

—


original ore. The toxicity of the unreprocessed spentfuel would fall below that of the original ore afterabout 3 million years. The figure also shows thatfollowing the decay of most of the fission productsin the first few hundred years, the toxicity of spentfuel would exceed that of the waste from reproc-essing 15-year-old fuel by a factor of from 2 to 5.

Such comparisons of spent fuel and high-levelwaste with each other and with uranium ore interms of a simple toxicity index should be used onlywith great caution, for several important reasons.First, these comparisons may be somewhat mislead-ing since a toxicity index such as the WDV is onlya crude measure of the potential hazard to humans.It will greatly overestimate the actual hazard posedby the waste, which must take into account howlikely it is that the waste will be released into thebiosphere and eventually be ingested by humans.A discussion of the hazard from radioactive wastethat considers the barriers between the waste andhuman beings is contained in chapter 3.

Second, there are substantial uncertainties in theestimates of the risk of cancer per curie of any ra-dioisotope ingested into the body, resulting fromuncertainties about: 1) the fate of the radioisotopein the body (what fraction is taken into the system,where it goes, and how long it stays there), and 2)how much damage is done by the radiation the ra-dioisotope emits.

13 As new data and extrapolationmethods become available, estimates of the toxicityof various radioisotopes change over time. Theseuncertainties about the toxicity of the waste andthe likelihood of additional revisions in toxicity esti-mates in the future14 strongly suggest that wastemanagement regulations and policies be designedto be relatively immune to such changes.

The impact of such changes can be seen by con-sidering the effects of the recently revised estimatespublished by the International Commission on Ra-diation Protection (ICRP), which are reflected in

——.—. .‘sBernard L. Cohen, “Effects of ICRP Publication 30 and the 1980

BEIR Report on Hazard Assessments of High-Level Waste, ” HealthPhysics, vol. 42, No. 2, February 1982, pp. 133-143; and NationalResearch Council, op. cit., app. B. See also Charles E. Land, “Esti-mating Cancer Risks From Low Doses of Ionizing Radiation, Sci-ence, vol. 209, September 12, 1980, pp. 1197-1203.

14A diwussion of the possible need for further revisions of the ICRp-30 estimates of the toxicity of Np2’7 is found in Bernard Cohen, “Ef-fects of Recent Neptunium Studies on High-Level Waste HazardAssessments, ” Health Physics, vol. 44, No. 5, May 1983, pp. 567-569.

figure 2-2. Except for a few recent studies,15 mostpublished analyses use older estimates such as thoseunderlying Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC) standards for protection of the general pub-lic, contained in the Cede of Federal Regulations(CFR).l’ The effect of the recent changes is shownin figures 2-4 and 2-5, which display the toxicitiesof spent fuel and high-level waste from reprocess-ing that spent fuel 160 days after discharge fromthe reactor, calculated using both the ICRP andthe CFR standards. These figures show that the— . . . - —

IsCohen, “Effects of ICRP 3[1; ” National Research Council, op.cit.; A. G. Croff, “Potential Impact of ICRP-30 on the CalculatedRisk From Waste Repositories, Transactions of the American Nu-clear Society, vol. 39 (1981), pp. 74-75.

IG1O CFR 20, app. B, table II.

10”

10’

10’

10’10-’ 10’ 10’ 10’ 104 10’ 10’ 10’

Decay time afler discharge (years)

SOURCE: National Research Council, A Study of the Isoletlorr System for Geo-logic Disposal of Rsdiosct/ve Wastes, 1983.


Figure 2=5.-Toxicities of PWR High-Levei Wasteand its Parent Uranium-Ore

10’0

10’

104

10-’ 1 10’ 10’ 10’ 104 10’ 10’ 10’

Decay time after discharge (years)SOURCE: National Research Council, A Study of the Isolation System for Geo-

logic Disposal of Radioactive Wastes, 19%3.

ICRP estimates decrease the toxicity of both spentfuel and high-level waste for the first few hundredyears, but increase it in the long-run, with a greaterincrease for high-level waste than for spent fuel. Forexample, the amount of time it takes for each todecay to the toxicity of uranium ore is increased—from about 7,000 years to about 3 million years forspent fuel, and from about 400 years to about20,000 years for high-level waste.

Third, comparisons between the toxicity of spentfuel and high-level waste from reprocessing are alsosensitive to the underlying assumptions regardingreprocessing and recycle of the separated plutoniumthat affect the actual radionuclide content of thehigh-level waste. For example, the toxicity of high-level waste is highly dependent on the assumed de-

lay in reprocessing spent fuel after it is dischargedfrom the reactor. The longer the delay, the less thedifference between the toxicity of the resulting high-level waste and the original spent fuel. Delay allows14-year-half-life plutonium-241 (Pu241) in the spentfuel to decay into Am241, which will be separatedinto the high-level waste. Am241 and its decay prod-uct neptunium-237 (Np237) are the principal con-tributors to the long-term toxicity of both spent fueland high-level waste.

This effect can be seen by comparing the twocurves for high-level waste shown in figure 2-3.These figures show that increasing the delay beforereprocessing from 160 days to 15 years increasesthe time required for the toxicity of the high-levelwaste to decrease to that of the original ore fromabout 20,000 years to about 1,000,000 years. Mostpublished comparisons of the toxicity of spent fueland high-level waste assume that reprocessing oc-curs a short time (from 150 days to about 1.5 years)after discharge from the reactor, which was origi-nally expected to be the normal case for operationof commercial reactors with recycle. This tends tomaximize the difference in toxicity between thespent fuel and the resulting high-level waste. How-ever, the delays that have already occurred in theinitiation of large-scale commercial reprocessingmake it unlikely that fuel younger than 15 yearsold would be routinely reprocessed in the UnitedStates for decades after reprocessing began. Thus,the curve for high-level waste from 15-year-oldspent fuel in figure 2-3 represents a more realisticestimate of the toxicity of the high-level waste thatmight actually be produced by reprocessing com-mercial spent fuel in the United States during thiscentury.

Finally, the radionuclide content, and thus thetoxicity, of high-level waste will depend heavily onthe extent to which the plutonium that is separatedfrom the spent fuel during reprocessing is recycledin MOX fuel. The reason that high-level waste is

17Ear1ier repressing done, unaccompanied by early recycle of the

plutonium, would not avoid this effect, since the plutonium-241 inthe separated plutonium would continue to decay into americium-241which would have to be disposed of in high-level waste sooner or later.While rapid reeycle of the plutonium could fission the plutonium-241before it could decay, recycle itself complicates the waste disposal taskin ways that could offset this advantage. This is discussed further inchapter 3.

laNationa] Research Council, Op. Cit., p. 34.


less toxic than the spent fuel from which it is derivedis that reprocessing removes practically all of theplutonium, which not only is highly toxic itself, butalso decays to form other toxic radioisotopes. How-ever, unless that plutonium is recycled and de-stroyed by fission in a reactor, it would eventuallyhave to be disposed of in addition to the high-levelwaste. In other words, reprocessing by itself simplyseparates the plutonium from the fission productsand other TRU elements in the spent fuel, but doesnot eliminate it. The additional step of recyclingthe plutonium would be required to reduce theamount of plutonium that must ultimately be dis-posed of. However, plutonium recycle increases thetoxicity of the resulting high-level waste comparedto that produced from reprocessing fuel contain-ing only uranium, since it increases the amountsof important transuranic elements in the waste. 19

As a result, the net reduction in waste toxicity thatwill result from reprocessing and recycling will beless than that implied by comparisons (e. g., thoseshown in fig. 2-3) which consider only the high-level waste resulting from fuel that contains onlyuranium.

Comparison of Radioactive andOther Toxic Waste

Comparing radioactive waste to other hazard-ous industrial waste provides some perspective onthe problem of radioactive waste management. zo

Hazardous wastes include organic materials (e. g.,chlorinated hydrocarbons) and inorganic chemicalcomponents —almost all of which, like radioactivewaste, are manmade and do not exist in the natu-ral environment—and metals, such as barium andarsenic, which occur naturally, but usually in chem-ically bound forms. Both radioactive and other toxic

241 which is a major contributor to long-term19 For example, Am ,toxicity both directly and through daughter Npz37, would be increasedabout threefold by plutonium recycle in light-water reactors. Sec Na-tional Research Council, op. cit., pp. 289-290. See the analysis ofreprocessing in ch. 3, for further discussion of the effects of reproc-essing time and plutonium recycle on the overall high-le~el waste man-agement problem.

~OFor a detailed analysis of the problems of hazardous waste man-agement, see Technologies and Strategies for Hazardous Waste Con-trol (Washington, DC.: U.S. Congress, OfKce of Technology Assess-ment, OTA-M - 196, March 1983). For a more extensive comparisonbetween nuclear and nonnuclear hazardous wastes, scc James P. Mur-ray, Joseph J. Barrington, and Richard Wilson, ‘‘Risks of Hazard-ous Chcrnica] and Nuclear Waste: A Comparison, Discussion Pa-per E-82- 11, Energy and Environmental Policy Center, HarvardUnitcrsity, November 1982.

wastes can cause cancer, birth defects, and genet-ic mutations, although the causal relationships forsuch effects may be better understood in the caseof radioactive materials 21

Unlike many toxic organic and inorganic com-pounds, radioactive waste cannot readily be detox-ified or destroyed .22 As a result, it must be isolatedfrom the environment until it decays spontaneouslyto low levels of radioactivity. Because radioactivewaste eventually decays, it is unlike some organicand inorganic compounds, which persist indefi-nitely unless some treatment is applied to them, andunlike the toxic metals, ‘which persist forever, al-though they too can be stabilized or immobilizedto render them relatively harmless. This sponta-neous decay, however, produces the radiation thatmakes the material toxic and releases heat. Boththe radiation and the heat complicate the task ofdisposal (see ch. 3).

The amount of high-level radioactive waste gen-erated each year is much less than the amount ofother hazardous wastes. In 1983 about 1,400 tonnesof spent fuel were generated compared to 255 mil-lion to 275 million tonnes annually of other haz-ardous wastes .23 On the other hand, the cost ofdisposing of the small amount of radioactive wasteis much higher than for other hazardous waste, be-cause of the differences in disposal techniques thatmust be used. The current cost estimate for dis-posal of spent fuel or equivalent reprocessed wastein a deep geologic repository is about $125,000 pertonne 24 compared to estimates of up to $240 Per

tonne for shallow landfill disposal of other hazard-ous wastes and up to $791 per tonne for treatmentof such wastes .25 Considering that the generation

— — - —21 Land, Op, cit. j and Thomas H. ,Waugh, 11, ‘‘Chemical carc in o-

gens: How Dangerous Are Low Doses?’ Science, vol. 202, Oct. 6,1978, pp. 37-41.

ZZBY ~mbarding radioactive waste with neutrons, some of the ]ong-livcd, highly toxic transuranic elem~mts can be split, leaving fissionproducts with short half-lives that d~:cay much more rapidly. How-ever, this docs not now appear to be a practical method for reducingthe Iong-ttn-m toxicity of radioacl ive waste. SCC discussion of‘ ‘transmutation’ in ch. 3. See also, ii. G. Croff, J. O. Blomcke, andB. C. Finney, Actinide Partitioning Transmutation Program FinalReport, 1: Otmall Assessment, ORN .-5566 (Oak Ridge, Term.: OakRidge National Laboratory, June 1’180),

2“Of[ice of Technology Assessment, op. cit., p, 3.24u, s, Department of Energ y, Reoort on F i n a n c i ng the Disposal

of Comn)ercial Sptmt Nuclear Fuel an<! Processed High -Ltw’el Radioac -ti~’e W’astc, DOIVS-0020, June 1981;, p. 14.

2JOfficc of Tcchno]og}, Assessment, op. cit., table 34, p. 196.

Ch. Z—Radioactive Waste: Its Nature and Management ● 33

of about $10 million worth of electricity producesonly 1 tonne of spent fuel,26 it is possible to spendsuch a large amount per tonne to dispose safely ofspent fuel, or high-level waste from that spent fuel,without materially affecting the overall cost of nu-clear electricity.

Because radioactive waste is more tightly con-trolled and regulated than other hazardous wastes,the location and characteristics of virtually all radio-—. . —.———

ZG”rhe ~epartment of Energy estimates that generation of about 28trillion kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity by nuclear reactors will pro-duce 144,000 tonnes of spent fuel, or an average of about 194 millionkWh/tonne. DOE, Report on Financing the Disposaf, p. 10. Withan average charge for residential customers of electricity of 54 mills/k~’h in calendar year 1980 (Congressional Budget Office, FinancingRadioacfi\’e Waste Disposal, September 1982, p. xviii), this comesto total revenues of $10,480,000 per tonne of spent fuel generated.

active waste are known, 27 and there is little chanceof illegal or uncontrolled dumping of significantquantities, as sometimes occurs with other toxicwaste, Radioactive materials are also relatively easyto detect in small concentrations using readily avail-able instruments such as the Geiger counter; thus,the potential threat of any escaped waste can bechecked more easily. In contrast, detection of themany more diverse nonradioactive hazardous ma-terials is more difficult; no universal method anal-ogous to a Geiger counter exists to detect easily andeconomically the many potentially toxic chemicalsthat might be released, or that have already beenreleased, by hazardous wastes.

~ls~e DOE spent Fuel and RadjOacril,e Waste In\’entories, for acomplete inventory of radioactive waste in the United States.

—— —INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF WASTE MANAGEMENT

Waste management includes not only the tech-nical activities for treating and isolating nuclearwaste but also a range of institutional activities re-quired to guide and support them .28 These are de-scribed briefly below and are discussed at greaterlength in chapters 7 and 8.

Federal Activities

Policymaking

Policymaking or decisionmaking activities at var-ious administrative levels control the overall struc-ture and goals of the system, the integration of theactivities, and, to a certain extent, the degree towhich the activities are accomplished successfully.Because final isolation of high-level radioactivewaste is a Federal responsibility, policymaking inthis area is principally a Federal activity, althoughthere is much involvement by non-Federal actors.Even waste management activities under privatecontrol, such as interim spent fuel storage, are sub-ject to Federal regulation. The Federal Govern-ment’s authority for commercial radioactive waste

~HA “l(lF(. d(,(ail(.d dC.5cription of the institutional aspects of th(’ Ful-c.ral rad ioact i~’e waste management program is found in information&Lsr /i)r L’ommcrcial Radioactive M’aste Management, U.S. Dcpart-rnt.nt of F;neryy, DOE IF;rI’/401 10-1, JU]} 1982.

management rests with Congress and the executivebranch. Congress establishes general policy throughlegislation and controls program implementationby reviewing, authorizing, and appropriating re-sources. The laws passed by Congress authorizeFederal agencies to carry out their responsibilities,clarify Federal and State roles in making decisionsand implementing programs, and give States legalauthority over certain waste management activi-ties. The President and the executive branch fur-ther develop and implement the waste managementprograms.

Regulation

ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) isresponsible for developing generally applicablestandards that set limits on the allowable releaseof radioactivity from the disposal of radioactivewaste. Proposed numerical standards for high-levelwaste disposal in geologic repositories were pub-lished for comment in December 1982, and finalcriteria are expected to be promulgated in 1985.NRC is responsible for developing regulationsbased on EPA standards for managing high-levelradioactive waste. Final NRC regulations for dis-posal in geologic repositories were issued in 1983.


licensed activities and defense programs. NRC hasalready developed procedures and regulations(based on anticipated EPA standards) that must besatisfied before a mined geologic repository can belicensed. During the various steps of repository de-velopment, NRC may conduct hearings so thatother interested parties may participate in licens-ing activities.

During the development of a repository, NRCwill formally evaluate the suitability of potential sitesat three stages. If the site appears suitable after insitu testing, NRC will issue a construction auth-orization for repository development. If the initialphases of repository construction pass NRC re-quirements, NRC will issue an operating license,and waste emplacement in the repository will com-mence. If the final predictions of repository per-formance after waste emplacement meet NRC re-quirements, NRC will authorize closure of therepository.

Development and Operation of Repositories

DOE is the Federal agency with lead responsi-bility for carrying out the high-level radioactivewaste management policies adopted by Congressand the administration. The principal activity ofDOE and its predecessors (the Atomic EnergyCommission and the Energy Research and Devel-opment Administration) in this area has been re-search directed toward siting and constructing oneor more geologic repositories for waste disposal.Other Federal agencies, in particular the Depart-ment of the Interior, also have some responsibilitiesin developing repositories.

Funding

Until 1983, funds for developing final isolationfacilities came from annual Federal appropriations,with the assumption that the utilities using thosefacilities would ultimately repay the costs when theydelivered waste to a Federal repository. Legislationenacted by Congress at the end of 1982 providesfunds through user fees paid by utilities at the timethe waste is generated.

Coordination and Management

Although DOE is the lead agency for waste man-agement and Federal interagency cooperation onsome waste management activities does exist, there

Ch. Z—Radioactive Waste: Its Nature and Management ● 35

can license uranium milling operations, decommis-sioned facilities, or commercial burial sites for low-level waste within their State boundaries. State of-ficials have had a major impact on repository sitingactivities in the past, and the Nuclear Waste Poli-cy Act of 1982 gives a major formal role to Statesand affected Indian tribes in those activities in thefuture. The role of State and tribal governmentsis discussed in chapter 8.

Public Involvement

Interest groups and the general public partici-pate in waste management activities in many ways,including attendance at public hearings sponsoredby Federal agencies, direct appeal to Members ofCongress and other Federal and State officials, par-ticipation on citizen advisory panels and quasi-over-sight panels, litigation, and submission of writtencomments on proposed activities as part of the Na-tional Environmental Policy Act process. Techni-cal groups conduct independent studies and reviewsand provide advice, either formally as contractorsor informally through independent publications, Al-though there is much controversy over the role ofthe public in the decisionmaking process, somefunds are available to State and local organizations

is no single Federal agency with overall responsi-bility for coordinating and managing the activitiesof all the Federal agencies involved in waste man-agement. Interagency coordination is discussed fur-ther in chapter 7.

Non-Federal Involvement

Intergovernmental Interaction

Among the most important non-Federal actorsin waste management are the governments of theStates, Indian tribes, and localities that may be af-fected by waste management activities. State, local,and Indian tribal governments informally reviewpolicy and programs and express concerns by di-rect appeal to Federal officials, by intervention insite selection processes, and, in the case of States,by passing legislation restricting waste managementactivities. Twenty-six States, in accordance withformal agreements with the Federal Government,


(from the Federal Government) and to intervenergroups (from private sources) to facilitate non-Federal participation in waste management. Pub-lic involvement is discussed further in chapter 8.

International Activities

There are approximately 290 commercial nuclearpowerplants in operation worldwide and another215 plants under construction in 31 countries, in-cluding the United States. *g Five countries haveoperating facilities for reprocessing spent fuel fromLWRs. Major commercial waste managementR&D is being undertaken by the United States,France, West Germany, Great Britain, Sweden,

zgThe~e fiWm~ were v~id at the end of 1982. Znternatiomd Atomic

Energy Agency Bulletin, vol. 25, No. 1, March 1983, p. 38.

Canada, and Japan. 30 In the United States, DOEis primarily responsible for conducting cooperativeR&D efforts with foreign countries. The Depart-ment of State is involved in waste managementactivities that involve U.S. nonproliferation policiesor cooperative activities with other countries.31 TheNuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 includes provi-sions (sec. 223) to promote additional cooperationwith nonnuclear weapon states in the field of spentfuel storage and disposal.

‘“See K. M. Harmon, “Survey c,f Foreign Terminal RadioactiveWaste Storage Programs, ‘‘ in U.S. Department of Energy, Proceed-ings of the 1983 Civilian Radioacti\’e Waste Management Informa-tion Meeting, CONF-831217, February 1984, pp. 199-205.

glen the subject of nonproliferation in general, see office of Tech-nology Assessment, IVucdear Proliferation and Safeguads (New York:Praeger Publishers, 1977). Detailed analysis of the relation betweennuclear nonproliferation and spent ft d management is found in Fred-erick C. Williams and David A. Deese, Nuclear Nonproliferation:The Spent Fuel Problem (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979).

CHAPTER NOTE

The precise amount of spent fuel discharged by a reac-tor each year will depend primarily on two factors: thetotal amount of electricity generated by the reactor thatyear and the burnup of the fuel (measured in megawatt-days per tonne [MWd/t]), which is a measure of theamount of electricity obtained from each tonne of fuel(and thus of the amount of fissile material in the fuelthat is used before the fuel is discharged from the re-actor). The higher the burnup, the more complete theutilization of U*35 and the less the discharge of spentfuel per gigawatt-year (GW-yr) of electricity generated.Since BWRS use lower burnups than PWRS, they dis-charge more spent fuel per GW-yr of generated elec-tricity.

The 1984 DOE spent fuel projections shown in table2-2 assume that spent fuel burnup will increase at anannual rate of 2.5 percent from 1985 to 1996, and willbe 42,000 MWd/t for PWRS and 37,000 MWd/t forBWRS from 1996 on.32 It is possible that burnups willincrease even further in the future, perhaps up to 50,000MWd/t, if the price of uranium, and thus of fresh fuel,goes up. 33 In this case, the amounts Of spent fuel ‘e-

32u s Depa~ment of Energy, Spent Fue~ and Radioactive Waste. .Inventories, p. 11.

S3U S. Depa~ment of Energy, IVuc]ear Proliferation and Civilian

Nuclear Power, vol. 9, June 1980, pp. 24-27.

suiting from the projected levels of generation could bereduced somewhat. However, even though higher burn-ups would reduce the amount of spent fuel, they wouldnot reduce the amount of fission products and transur-anic elements contained in the spent fuel, since theamount of those isotopes created is approximately pro-portional to the amount of electricity generated. Use ofhigher burnups simply means that there will be morefission products and transuranics in each of the smallernumber of fuel assemblies discharged for each gigawatt-year of electricity produced. In other words, the wasteproduced by generation of a given amount of electri-city would be concentrated in a smaller amount of spentfuel if a higher burnup were used. Thus, the total heatoutput from the waste produced in generating a giga-watt-year of electricity, and the total repository spaceneeded for disposal, would be relatively unaffected byincreasing the burnup. However, handling and packag-ing at the repository might be simplified somewhat bythe smaller number of spent fuel assemblies involvedif they were disposed of directly without reprocessing.For this reason, there may be waste management in-centives for increasing burnups beyond the levels thatwould be justified by the increased efficiency of fuel usealone.

Chapter 3

Technology of Waste Management

Contents

Page

Waste Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Mined Geologic Repositories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Other Disposal Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Comparison of Disposal Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Waste Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ..OO. 55Interim Storage Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56Comparison of Interim Storage Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Waste Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Reprocessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Status of Reprocessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Reprocessing for Waste Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Integrated Waste Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73System Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74System Interrelationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

TABLESTable No. Page

3-1. Number of Possible Cancer Cases Due to Ionizing Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463-2. Projected Population Risks From High-Level Waste Disposal: EPA Reference Cases . . . . . 463-3. EPA Proposed Release Limits for Containment Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493-4. Comparison of Capital and Annual Operating Costs of At-Reactor Storage Options . . . . . 603-5. Conventional Site Effects of a Large Industrial Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75


3-I. Emplaced Waste Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413-2. Artist’s Conception of the Surface Support Buildings and Underground Facilities

of a Radioactive Waste Repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453-3. Individual Radiation Dose as a Function of Water Travel Time From a Repository

in Basalt Containing 100,000 Tonnes of Unreprocessed Spent Uranium Fuel. . . . . . . . . . . . 473-4. Individual Radiation Dose as a Function of Water Travel Time From a Repository in

Basalt Containing Reprocessing Waste From 100,000 Tonnes of Spent Uranium Fuel.... 483-5. Water Dilution Volume of PWR Spent Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493-6. Dry Storage Concepts for Spent Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573-7. Decay Heat Power for Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles for a Pressurized Water Reactor . . . 723-8. Spent Fuel Shipments in a Centralized Waste Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 773-9. Spent Fuel Shipments in a Decentralized Waste Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Chapter 3

Technology of Waste Management

WASTE DISPOSAL

Over the last three decades, the Federal Govern-ment has considered disposing of radioactive wastepermanently in geologic formations on land, in icesheets, beneath the ocean floor, and in outer space.Although total containment of radioactive materialin any of these environments may be impassibleto guarantee, or even expect, these disposal envi-ronments are attractive because their remotenessfrom the Earth’s surface minimizes the biologicalimpacts of any potential releases of radioactivity.

Methods of disposal are in various stages of con-ceptual development. Disposal in mined geologicrepositories is the concept most studied, and sub-seabed disposal is the next. In general, past Fed-eral programs for waste disposal have concentratedalmost exclusively on the development of minedgeologic repositories. In 1981 this technology wasformally selected as the focus of the Federal high-level waste management strategy by the U.S. De-partment of Energy (DOE), based on its Final En-vironmental Impact Statement (FEIS) on the Man-agement of Commercially Generated RadioactiveWaste, published in 1980.1 However, very littlework has been done on any of the other conceptsexcept subseabed disposal. The uncertainties asso-ciated with many of the alternative disposal con-cepts reflect either the level of conceptual develop-ment of the technology or the complexity of theenvisioned disposal system. In some cases, uncer-tainties can be resolved through additional researchand development (R&D); in other cases, uncertain-ties may be unresolvable for all practical purposes.

Mined Geologic Repositories

Technology

The disposal of radioactive waste in mined geo-logic repositories at depths from 1,000 to several— . — .

1 U. S. Department of Energy (DOE), Final Environmental ImpactStatement, Management of Commercially Generated RadioactiveWaste, DOWEIS-0046F (Washington, D. C.: October 1980), hereafterreferred to as FEIS.

thousand feet below the Earth’s surface is the finalisolation technology most widely studied and fa-vored by the worldwide scientific community.Three decades of study have revealed no insur-mountable technical obstacles to the developmentof mined geologic repositories, provided suitablesites are found.2

The technology of the mined geologic repositoryis composed of a system of both natural and engi-neered barriers selected to prevent or limit theescape of waste from the repository so that the ra-diation exposure to humans from escaped waste isheld to very low levels. In addition, geologic dis-posal also involves a ‘‘technology of prediction’ ‘—aset of procedures and techniques for predicting theperformance of a repository over the very long timeperiod that the waste remains hazardous. Each ele-ment of the technology of geologic repositories willbe discussed briefly below.

NATURAL BARRIERS: THE SITE

The site of a mined geologic repository is an in-tegral part of the technology of geologic disposalsince it plays a crucial role in isolating the buriedwaste from the biosphere. For this reason, sites forsuch repositories must be selected with great care.

.— . .Z1bid; American physical Society (APS), “Report to the Ameri-

can Physical Society by the Study Group on Nuclear Fuel Cycles andWaste Management, ” Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 50, No. 1,pt. II, January 1978; Interagency Review Group on Nuclear WasteManagement (IRG), Subgroup Repoti on Alternative TechnologyStrategies for the Zsolation of iVuclear Waste, TID-28818 (draft),(Washington, D. C.: October 1978); International Nuclear Fuel Cy-cle Evaluation (INFCE), Waste Management and Disposal: Reportof INFCE Working Group 7, International Atomic Energy Agency(Vienna: 1980); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), DrafiEnvirrmmental Impact Statement on # CFR Part 191, EnvironmentalStandad for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Wastes, EPA 520/1-82-025, December 1982,hereafter referred to as DEZS on 40 CFR 19J; National ResearchCouncil, A Review of the Swedish KBS-IZ Plan for DisposaJ of SpentNuclear Fue~ (Washington, D. C,: National Academy of Sciences,1980); National Research Council, A Study of the Isolation Systemfor Geologic Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (Washington, D. C.: Na-tional Academy Press, 1983); U.S. INuclear Regulatory Commission,Waste Confidence Decision, Federal Register, vol. 49, No. 171, Aug.31, 1984, pp. 34658-34688.

39


The natural features of the site that contributeto isolation are the host rock (which can be selectedto prevent or minimize contact between the wasteand flowing ground water, the principal potentialmechanism for bringing buried waste into contactwith human beings),3 the chemical characteristicsof the site and its environment (which can limit therate at which the waste dissolves in ground waterand is transported to the biosphere), and the timerequired for contaminated ground water to flowfrom the repository to the biosphere (which, alongwith the chemical characteristics of the media sur-rounding the repository, can delay the release ofdissolved waste until many of the hazardous radio-nuclides have decayed). In addition, the locationof the site can be selected to reduce the possibilityof human intrusion (e. g., by avoiding proximityto valuable natural resources) and to provide fordilution of any contaminated ground water by largequantities of surface water before the ground wateris used by human beings.

Until the late 1970’s, the natural features of thegeologic repository site were seen as the principalmeans for providing waste isolation. Initially, theemphasis was on a particular host rock, salt, whichhas features that were felt to provide adequate as-surance that the waste would be isolated from con-tact with flowing ground water.4 Later studies con-cluded that the characteristics of the environmentsurrounding the host rock could provide adequateisolation even if ground water were contaminatedby contact with the waste and that there was noclearly superior host rock for mined repositories.5

Other rocks under consideration include tuff (com-pacted volcanic ash), basalt (coarse-grained solid-ified lava), and granite.

Because the site plays such a central role in geo-logic disposal in mined repositories, the final valida-tion of the concept will depend on construction andoperation of a repository at an actual site. G No sitehas been approved for such a repository anywherein the world, although some reviews have concludedthat it will not be difficult to find suitable sites. 7

3APS, op. cit.‘See discussion of the evolution of the role of the waste form in app.

A.51bid.; IRG, op. cit. ; National Research Council, IsoJation System.61 NFCE, op. cit., p. 119.7APS, op. cit. The National Research Council review of a Swedish

waste disposal plan also concluded that suitable disposal sites couldbe found in Sweden. National Research Council, Review of theSwedish KBS-11 Plan.

It is generally agreed that identification of specificsites for detailed geologic investigation is necessaryto resolve the remaining technical questions aboutgeologic disposal. a

In the United States, the process of finding suit-able sites involves the screening and progressiveelimination of sites in different regions of the coun-try. It is likely that only a small percentage of thesites screened will survive the site selection proc-ess. Because of the high degree of variability amongsites, each potential site must be evaluated individ-ually through surface exploration and by geologi-cal mapping, geophysical (nondestructive) survey-ing, drilling, and in situ testing within candidaterock formations. The technology for identifying and‘‘characterizing’ potential sites is available orunder development. g

The suitability and total waste capacity of eachpotential site must be evaluated on a case-by-casebasis because of the great variability among sites.In some cases, for example, a fault (a fracture inthe Earth’s crust, along which there has been rela-tive displacement of adjacent rock formations) mayreduce the suitability of a particular site; in othercases, the fault could actually provide an additionalnatural barrier.

Because all potentially usable rock types have notbeen evaluated for repository sites, the total num-ber and capacity of potential repository sites in theUnited States is unknown at this time. However,general knowledge about geologic formationsthroughout the United States suggests that at leastseveral suitable repositories could be located, al-though it is probable that suitable sites cannot befound in all States.

ENGINEERED FEATURES

The principal engineered features are the over-all design of the repository, the waste form (e. g.,solidified high-level waste or unprocessed spentfuel), and the waste package, which may includean overpack (e. g., a titanium container) designedto provide containment for up to 1,000 years and

81RG, op. cit.; U.S. Department >f Energy and U.S. GeologicalSurvey (USGS), Earth Science Technizd PJan for Disposal of Radioac-tive Waste in a Mined Repository, Ikaft, DOE/TIC-l 1033 (draft),April 1980, p. 1.

gIbid,; Cyrus Klingsberg and Jamrs Duguid, Status of Technolo-gy for Isoiating High-Level Radioactive,: Wastes in Mined Repositories,DOE/TIC 11’207 (draft) (U.S. Depart nent of Energy: October 1980).

Ch. 3—Technology of Waste Management 47

a packing material (e. g., bentonite) designed to pre- As noted above, until the late 1970’s, it was gen-vent water from reaching the overpack and to limit erally assumed that the natural geologic featuresthe escape of any water that does cometact with the waste (see fig. 3-l).

Figure

into con- of a salt repository alone would provide an adequatedegree of isolation. The solid waste form (required

3-1.—Emplaced Waste Package

/

. . . \

. - . “

Spent Fuel or ~SolidifiedHigh-Level ~ ‘Waste

98-948 0 - 85 - 4 : QL 3

—


by Federal regulation) and waste package were in-tended only to prevent accidental release of wasteduring transportation and handling until retrievalof the waste from the repository was no longer con-templated. They were not seen as playing a crucialrole in ensuring long-term isolation of the wastewithin the repository after it was sealed. 1°

In the mid-1970’s to late 1970’s, recognition ofthe uncertainties associated with the prediction ofthe behavior of the repository and surrounding geol-ogy over a period of many thousands of years ledto a growing interest in a “multiple barrier” ap-proach in which a combination of manmade andnatural barriers would act together to provide con-fidence in long-term isolation, despite uncertain-ties about each barrier separately. The result hasbeen a growing emphasis on the role of the wasteform and the waste package,11 which is reflectedin Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regu-lations for geologic disposal.12

The current reference waste form for solidifiedhigh-level waste from reprocessing is borosilicateglass, which was selected when a solid waste formwas seen as being needed primarily for safe trans-portation and handling. When the waste form tookon an important role in long-term isolation, ques-tions arose about how well borosilicate glass couldperform this more demanding task under the con-ditions anticipated in a repository after closure. Ofparticular concern was the question of the rate atwhich waste might dissolve from the glass intoground water at the high temperatures that couldbe produced by the heat emitted by the waste.13

Several technical reviews have concluded, however,that borosilicate glass could be an adequate wasteform (although perhaps not the best one possible)if the repository were designed so that the temper-ature of the glass remained relatively low (around

‘“See app. A.t Isee, for example, the proWsed Swedish KBS waste disposal sys-

tem in which major reliance is placed on a long-lived waste package,analyzed in National Research Council, Review of the Swedish KBS-11Plan, and in National Research Council, A Review of the SwedishKBS-3 Plan for Final Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (Washington,D. C.: National Academy Press, 1984).

1210 CFR 60.Issee, for examp]e, G. J. M&arthy et al., ‘‘ ImeraCtiOnS Between

Nuclear Waste and Surrounding Rock, ” Nature, vol. 273, May 18,1978, pp. 216-217.

100° C).14 Recent studies have also concluded: 1)that development of a waste form that would re-lease waste into ground water much more slowlythan forms that are currently available could re-duce substantially the expected long-term effects ofgeologic disposal, and 2) that improvements in thewaste form would be much more effective than im-provements in the rest of the waste package inachieving that result. 15 Further discussion of thevalue of continued R&D on alternative waste formsis found in chapter 6.

If reprocessing to recover plutonium and urani-um does not occur, it is assumed currently thatspent fuel would be disposed of directly, so that thewaste form would be the uranium dioxide fuel pel-lets (still in the fuel assemblies) that contain thewaste products. Recent analyses have concludedthat adequate isolation can be achieved in this way,although the fuel pellets would be more soluble thanborosilicate glass.

16 If necessary the spent fuel couldbe dissolved and resolidified in a better wasteform.17 However, a careful systems analysis wouldbe necessary to determine if the increase in workerexposures and accident risks resulting from morecomplex waste-processin{: operations would offsetthe possible decrease in long-term risks from thewaste after disposal. *8

Some have argued that use of sophisticated engi-neered barriers, ‘such as a [ow-volubility waste formor long-lived package, could decrease the relianceon natural barriers to the extent that many moresites would be usable for repositories. 19 (The roleof long-lived waste packages in a conservative re-

— -.—.—lqNation~ ReSearCh Council, lso~ation System, p. 7; U.S. Depart-

ment of Energy, The Evaluation and Review of Alternative WasteForms for Immobilization of Fligh-1.evel Radioactive Wastes, ReportNo. 3 by the Alternative Waste Form Peer Review Panel, DOE/TIC-11472, July 1, 1981.

lsNation~ Research Councd, IsoL~tion System, p. 280; EpA, DE~f$on 40 CFR 191, p. 208.

IGNation~ Research Council, lsc!lation System; INFCE, Op. Cit.;IRG, op. cit.; EPA, DEIS on 40 tZFR 191,

17D0q FEIS, PP. 4.20-4.22.lfJNation~ Research council, ~s(dation System, p. 14.19see, for exmple, Nation~ Res,?arch Council, hdatbn system,

p. 45. However, this and other re[ent studies have concluded thatit is very important to select a site with chemical characteristics thatwill limit the rate at which particularly toxic and long-lived radionu-clides such as Np237 can dissolve into ground water. EPA, DEIS on40 CFR 191, p. 109.

Ch. 3—Technology of Waste Management ● 4 3

pository system design is discussed further in ch.6.) While there is no consensus about the degreeto which engineered barriers might substitute fornatural ones, there is growing agreement that theymay usefully complement natural ones to providea high degree of isolation through a multiple-barriersystem in which each barrier helps compensate forthe uncertainties about the others .20

TECHNOLOGY OF PREDICTION

Development and operation of mined geologicrepositories will require not only location of spe-cific sites and design of engineered facilities appro-priate for those sites but also decisions by the li-censing authority, NRC, that those combinationsof sites and engineered features can be expected toprovide the required degree of waste isolation fora required period of time. In addition to the phys-ical technology, therefore, a ‘‘technology of predic-tion’ is needed to show in a formal licensing processthat a proposed repository is likely to meet estab-lished standards.

The repository development and licensing proc-ess is uncharted territory. The ability of a geologicrepository to isolate radioactive waste for milleniacannot be demonstrated directly in the same sensethat a new aircraft can be demonstrated to performaccording to its design specifications. For this rea-son, there must be heavy reliance on predictionsof the long-term isolation provided by the reposi-tory based on the use of mathematical models thatembody scientific understanding of the behavior ofthe repository and its environment .21 Techniquesfor predicting repository performance are neededas a basis for detailed design of a repository, as wellas for the licensing process .22 Such long-term pre-diction has never been done in a formal regulatoryprocess, and no widely reviewed and generally ac-

. —ZOBoth proposed EPA Criteria for geologic disposal, and final NRC

regulations place emphasis on use of a multiple-barrier approach. Seeproposed EPA standards in the Federal Register, vol. 47, No. 250,Dec. 29, 1982, pp. 58196-58206. Final NRC technical criteria, 10CFR, pt. 60, are found in FederaJ Reg”ster, vol. 48, No. 120, June21, 1983, pp. 28194-28229, and are summarized in app. D.

“ Klingsberg and Duguid, op. cit.;21 IRG, op. cit. ; APS, oP. clt ” ~

National Research Council, Isolation System; EPA, DEIS on 40 CFR191.

22 Thomas H. pigford, “The National Research Council Study ofthe Isolation System for Geologic Disposal of Radioactive Wastes,presented at the meeting of the Materials Research Society, BostonMA, November 1983.

cepted method for predicting repository perform-ance exists. Many analytic procedures to be usedin the licensing process must be developed, includ-ing data collection and validation techniques, meth-ods for verifying and validating scientific models,and the formal procedures for using such modelsto predict repository performance .23 The impor-tance of an explicit program to develop the tech-nology of prediction is discussed in chapter 6.

OVERALL STATE OF TECHNOLOGY

No licensed mined repository for high-level ra-dioactive waste exists in the United States or else-where in the world. The failure to develop and li-cense mined repositories in the United States stemsto a large extent from nontechnical factors such asinadequate and intermittent Federal support andreluctance to address major institutional problems.The main areas of technical disagreement concernnot the ultimate feasibility of developing mined re-positories, but the degree of conservatism in de-sign (e. g., temperature limits and the design re-quirements for engineered barriers) and the paceand scope of the R&D program needed to developa repository safely. *4 Technical reviews have con-cluded that the major remaining technical uncer-tainties about geologic disposal could be sufficientlyresolved in time to allow the first repository to beconstructed and licensed for operation by the late1990’s, if no unforeseen technical or institutionalproblems arise .25

— . — -Zssee Nation~ Research Council, Implementation Of Long-Term

Environment/ Radiation Standards: The Issue of I’erifica[ion (\$rash-ington, D. C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1979), for detailed dis-cussion of steps needed in demonstrating compliance with rritcria

lqFor example, the authors of a USGS report that is cited some-times as raising fundamental questions about the overall concept ofgeologic disposal believe that acceptable geologic repositories can beconstructed. J. D. Bredehoeft et al., “Geologic Disposal of High- I.e\-el Radioactive Wastes—Earth Science Perspectives, Geological Sur-vey Circular 779, U.S. Geological Survey, undated, p. 111. Also, asnoted above, the questions about the suitability of borosil icatc glassas a waste form relate to its performance at very high temperaturesand can be deatt with by keeping the temperature in the repositorylow. The extensive debates about waste management policy duringthe Carter administration dealt not with whether to develop geologicrepositories, but instead with how many sites and geologic media shouldbe examined before selecting a site. IRG, op. cit.

Z5DOE and USGS, Op. cit, , p. 1, concludes that 10 years (from1980) should be needed to resolve the major technical uncertainties.

44 Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT

Disposal in mined geologic repositories will in-volve the following activities (as well as others listedin ch. 2):

Disposal Technology Development and Sit-ing. —DOE’S present R&D efforts are focused onspent fuel transportation and storage; data collec-tion on geohydrologic environments and waste/rockinteractions; the development and evaluation ofwaste forms, canisters, and other engineered bar-riers; the development of equipment and facilitydesigns for waste handling, processing, and dispo-sal; and the development of predictive mathematicalmodels for evaluating the suitability of potential re-pository sites. Information from in situ testing andimpact evaluation activities at potential sites willbe used by DOE to develop full-scale repository de-signs to be submitted to NRC for approval. Ac-cording to current regulatory procedures,26 if a po-tential repository site and design met appropriateNRC requirements, NRC would authorize con-struction. After some or all of the repository andsupporting surface facilities were constructed, NRCwould thoroughly evaluate the suitability of the siteand determine whether to approve emplacementof waste in the repository.

Repository Development and Operation.—Re-pository development would involve excavatingrock from the repository, preparing (canning) thewaste in surface facilities at the repository site,lowering the canisters of waste into the repository,and emplacing the canisters of waste and the sur-rounding overpack material into holes drilled in therock formation (see fig. 3-2). Each repository wouldremain in operation from 10 to 40 years, depend-ing on its size and the rate of waste emplacement.During this operational phase, additional informa-tion on the behavior of the repository would be col-lected and used to refine further the predictions ofthe long-term behavior of the repository. Individ-ual rooms or modules of the repository could bebackfilled or kept open for a certain period of timeto permit further cooling of the waste or to main-tain ready access to the waste.

After the repository is filled, DOE could requestthat its license be amended to permit decommis-

ZfIlo CFR 60, Subparts B and C, published in 46 FR 13971, Feb.25, 1981.

sioning or closure of the facility. NRC would makea decision about the request after considering theplan and the public comments about it in light ofNRC requirements. The tunnels connecting indi-vidual rooms or modules of the repository wouldthen be backfilled and the vertical access shafts tothe repository, permanently sealed. After closure,monitoring could be used to detect unexpected re-leases from the repository.

Safety

The expected efficacy of geologic disposal is notbased on the conclusion that the waste can be con-tained completely until it decays to harmlessness.Instead, it is assumed that some releases may oc-cur and that engineered and natural barriers canlimit the size of such releases to very low levels. Thetwo principal modes of possible release of radioac-tivity from a well-designed and well-sited mined re-pository would be small, concentrated releases fromhuman intrusion (e. g., from digging a well nearor into a repository), which could expose a few in-dividuals to relatively large doses of radiation, orthe gradual release of radioactivity from the repos-itory into ground water (and, ultimately, into drink-ing water or food supplies), exposing a potentiallylarge population to very small doses (compared tobackground radiation) .27 The release of a large frac-tion of the waste in a repository would be extremelyunlikely, and the chance that any individual wouldreceive a very high dose of radiation would besmall. 28

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) has calculated that releases from a geologicrepository containing 100,000 metric tons (tonnes)of spent fuel (the lifetime output of about 100 one-gigawatt [GWe] reactors) could be expected to pro-duce fewer than an average of one fatal cancer every10 years over a 10,000-year period. Table 3-1 showsthat this level of health effects is smaller than thehealth effects that could result from other sourcesof ionizing radiation. For example, it is much lessthan 1 percent of the fatal cancers that would beproduced in the same exposed population fromnormal levels of background radiation .29 The results

Z?EPA, DEIS on 40 CFR 191; N,ttiona.1 Research Council, Isola-tion System.

ZBEpA, DEIS on 40 CFR 191, pp. 107-108.291 bid., p. 43.


Figure 3-2.-Artist’s Conception of the Surface Support Buildings and Underground Facilitiesof a Radioactive Waste Repository

.+.- -------- - -

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.

of EPA’s calculations for various geologic mediaare shown in table 3-2. More recent analysis, whichtakes into account the revised estimates of radio-nuclide toxicity discussed in chapter 2, supportsEPA’s conclusions that the expected effects froma well-designed and well-sited repository would besmall compared to the effects from background ra-diation.30

Figures 3-3 and 3-4 show recent estimates of thepossible performance of a repository in basalt con-taining 100,000 tonnes of spent fuel or equivalenthigh-level waste (solidified in borosilicate glass).Performance is measured in terms of the maximumradiation doses, in millirems per year, that would

JONationa] Research Council, Isolation System, ch. 9.

be received by an individual from water contami-nated by waste that has escaped from the repository.The calculations reflect the recent InternationalCommission on Radiation Protection revisions ofthe estimated toxicity of critical radionuclides thatwere discussed in chapter 2. Both figures show thatthe longer it takes for water to travel from the re-pository to the environment where it can be in-gested by humans, the lower the predicted dose,because of radioactive decay during that time. Theyalso show that the dose from spent fuel is expectedto be higher than that from high-level waste. How-ever, even for spent fuel, the predicted dose fromusing contaminated surface water is at most around10 millirems per year, compared to a normal doseof around 110 millirems per year from normal back-


Table 3-1.—Number of Possible Cancer Cases Due to ionizing Radiation’

Number of cases Number of casesOrigin per yearb per 10,000 yearsb

High-level radioactive waste disposalc . . . . . . . . . . . . up to 0.1 up to 1,000(Proposed EPA standards)

Uranium mill tailingsd:Unprotected* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 30,000’Protected (covered, etc.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.03 300*

Indoor air pollution:Residential exposuree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000 to 20,000 ‘10,000,000 to

200,000,000*Residential weatherization (added cases)e

(Nero estimate) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250t05,000 2,500,000 to50,000,000*

Residential weatherization (added cases)f . . . . . . . . . 10,000 to 20,000 100,OOO,OOO to2oo,~,ooo’

Background radiating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,000 to 4,000 30,000,000 to40,000,000

Cancer deaths (U.S.)h (all causes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430,000 NA

a These num~~ are all calculated on the Same basis using a linear non-threshold dose response ITKKfel. The linear non-thresholdmodel involves a high degree of speculation, and the resulting values have little merit ae absolute indicators of the numbersof bloiogicai effects that may occur. It has been used here to provide a framework within which relalivo risks from variousradiation exposure situations can be compared.

b Assuming constant U.S. population and cuiture—numbers with (*) are extrapolated from annual v~u~’e.C EpA propog~ ru)e 413 CFR part 191 (December 1982) number per 100,IXXI tonne high-levei redloectlve w=te repository.d NRC, October IgSO. “Uranium Miii Licensing Requirements: Finai Ruies,” /%tera/ f?e~lster, 45, No. 194, 135521%5538. Radon

inhalation exposures.e Nero, A, v., “fndoor Radiation Exposures From Z~]Rn and Its Daughters: A View of the Issue, ” Hedfh l?tYSh:S, 45, No. 2 (August

1983), 277-288.f EPA Report EpA 52014.78-013 (revised printing, JulY 1979).9 NASINRC, The Effects on populations of Exposure to LOW Levei of ionizing Radiation, November 1972 1972 BEiR Report.h American Cancer Society, Cancer Facts and Figures—1982, 1~1.

● Does not include heaith effects from water pathways.

SOURCE: High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Subcommittee, Science Advisory Board, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,“Report on the Review of Proposed Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposiil of Spent NuclearFuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes (40 CFR 191),” January 1984, tabie A, pp. 12-13.

Table 3=2.—Projected Population Risks From High= Level Waste Disposal EPA Reference Cases

Projected health effects over 10,000 yearsRepository Routine Drilling number Breccia Volcano;type release Faulting (No hit) (Hit) pipe meteorite TotalGranite . . . . . 10 + 750 + 760Bedded salt .

—o

+160 8 + + 190

Basalt . . . . . . 1,400 : 3,000 2 + 4,400Number = “No hit” means the drili dcms not hit soiid waste but only reposltov water, whiie “hit” indicates the driil does hlt solld waste.+ . Less than 1 pro)acted fatai cancer.— . Not applicable.

SOURCE: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Draft Errv)rorrrnerrtal hnpsct Staterrrerrt for 40 CFR 191: &rvirorrrnerrtal Standards for Management arrd Disposal ofSpent Nuclear Fuel, High-Lewl and Transuranic Radioactive Waste, EPA 52011-824125, December 1982, p. 205.

ground radiation. (Further analysis of the differencebetween high-level waste and spent fuel is foundin the discussion of reprocessing below. ) It shouldbe noted, however, that these figures show that di-rect use of contaminated ground water that has notbeen diluted in a large volume of surface watercould lead to doses to some individuals that are wellabove background levels .31

91 EPA cites Simtiw conclusions. EPA, DEIS on @ CFR 191, P. 106.

The acceptability of such expected effects is avalue judgment, rather than a technical determina-tion, and is the responsibility of the EnvironmentalProtection Agency. EPA has proposed that theamounts of certain critical radionuclides that canbe released from a repository in the first 10,000years after emplacement be limited to specified lev-els that are calculated to produce no more thanabout 1,000 deaths (for a 1OO,OOO-tonne repository)during that period. The proposed limits are shown


Figure 3-3.— Individual Radiation Dose as a Function of Water Travel TimeFrom a Repository in Basalt Containing 100,000 Tonnes of Unreprocessed

Spent Uranium Fuel

E0

.&

102

10’

1

lo-

lo-

lo-

lo-

10

lo-10’ 102 10’ 104 10’ 106 10

Water travel time, year

Assumptions:Dissolution rates = 10- 4/yr for C, Cs, and 1. All other radionuclides

dissolve at a rate determined by their own volubility rather thanthe rate of dissolution of the waste form.

River flow = 1.1 x 101’ m3/yrGroundwater flow = 3.2 x 1 04 mYyr

108

10’

106

10’

104

103

10’

10’

?

SOURCE: Adapted from National Reaearch Council, A Study of the/so/at/on Sys-tem for Geologlc Dk?posal of Radioactive Wastes (VVaehington, DC:National Academy Press, 19S3).


Figure 3-4.— Individual Radiation Dose as a Function of Water Travel TimeFrom a Repository in Basalt Containing Reprocessing Waste From 100,000 Tonnes

of Spent Uranium Fuel

.-=.-E

1

10-1

10-2

10-3

10 10’ 103 104 10’ 10’ IC

II10’

10’

10’

10’

10’

)7

Water travel time, year

Assumptions:Dissolution rates = 10- 4/yr for Cs. All other radionuclides dissolve

at a rate determined by their own volubility rather than the rateof dissolution of the waste form.

River flow = 1.1 x IOf’ mVyrGroundwater flow = 3.2 x 1 04 m3/yr

SOURCE: Adapted from National Research Council, A Study ofttre Isolation Sys-tem for Geologic Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (Washington, DC:National Academy Press, 19S3).

in table 3-3. The NRC performance requirements ceptable levels of radiation exposure to, or healthfor geologic repositories-are summarized in appen- effects in, exposed population; or individuals; anddix D. whether to set performance standards for individ-

It should be noted that there are disagreementsual components of a repository system (such as thewaste package), or only for the system as a whole .32

in the technical community about the philosophicalapproaches reflected in both EPA’s proposed stand-ards and NRC final regulations. The issues in dis-pute include whether to base the safety standardson what is theoretically achievable by a well engi-neered and sited repository, or on an independentlydetermined standard of acceptable risk; whether tostate the standard in the form of limits for theamounts of radionuclides that can be released bya repository over a fixed period, or in terms of ac-

3ZA discussion and critique of the NRC regulations and proposedEPA standards is found in National Research Council, Isolation Sys-tem, ch. 8. Suggestions for revisions of the proposed EPA standardsare found in the ‘‘Report on the Review of Proposed EnvironmentalStandards for the Management ami Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel,High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes (40 CFR191)” bythe High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Subcommittee of theScience Advisory Board of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,January 1984. This group suggested that the release limits be ten timeshigher than proposed by EPA.


Table 3-3.—EPA Proposed Release Limits forContainment Requirements (cumulative

releases to the accessible environmentfor 10,000 years after disposal)

Release limitRadionuclide (curies per 1,000 tonnes)

Americium-241 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Americium-243. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Carbon-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200Cesium-135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,000Cesium-137 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500Neptunium-237 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Plutonium-238 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400Plutonium-239 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Plutonium-240 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Plutonium-242 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Radium-226 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Strontium-90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80Technetium-99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,000Tin-126 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80Any other alpha-emitting

radionuclide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Any other radio nuclide which does

not emit alpha particles. . . . . . 500SOURCE US Environmental Protection Agency.

Figures 3-3 and 3-4 can also provide perspectiveon the point emphasized in chapter 2: that simpletoxicity indices, such as water dilution volumes, area misleading measure of the hazard posed by radio-active waste. Figure 3-5 shows the contributionmade to the toxicity of spent fuel by each of themost significant radionuclides. Comparing that fig-ure with figures 3-3 and 3-4 shows that, with theexception of neptunium-237 (Np237) in the very longterm, none of the radionuclides that are the prin-cipal contributors to the predicted dose from wastein a repository are major contributors to the totaltoxicity of the waste. The major contributors to thetoxicity are in general expected to decay before theycan reach the environment. Some, like stronti-um-90 and cesium-137, have short half-lives so thatthey will decay to negligible levels even within rela-tively short water travel times. Others with longerhalf-lives, like americium and plutonium, are ex-pected to be retarded severely by chemical reac-tions with the surrounding rock so that they willmove much more slowly than the ground water andthus will take a very long time to escape, even ifthe water travel time is not long compared to thehalf-life.

Figure 3-5.—Water Dilution Volume of PWRSpent Fuel

10-’ 1 10’ 102 10’ 10’ 10’ 10’ 10’Decay time after discharge, year

SOURCE: National Research Council, A Study of the Isolation System for Geo-logic Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (Washington, DC: National Acad-emy Press, 19S3),

cost

DOE estimates that the cost of designing, con-structing, operating, and decommissioning a geo-logic repository having a capacity of 70,000 tonnesof spent fuel will range from $5 billion to $7 bil-lion (in 1983 dollars), depending on a range of fac-tors, including the nature of the site and medium.33

Two repositories of this capacity should accommo-date all of the radioactive waste generated over the40-year expected operating lifetime of the nuclear

33u s Department of EnerW, Mission Plan for the Civilian Radi-. .oactive waste Management Program, draft, DOE/RW-0005 (Wash-ington, D. C.: April 1984), vol. II, table 10-6, p. 10-14.

—


powerplants in existence or under construction inthe United States. The actual number required willdepend on a number of factors, including the phys-ical capacity of the sites that are found, the reposi-tory designs that are finally adopted, the size of thenuclear power system that must be served, and therelative amounts of spent fuel and solidified high-level waste that are disposed of.34

Other Disposal Technologies35

Subseabed Disposal

Next to mined geologic repositories, the disposalconcept that has been the focus of the most studyis subseabed disposal. Subseabed disposal involvesthe emplacement of high-level radioactive waste be-neath the ocean floor within the thick (200 to 500feet [ft]) clay sediments that cover large expansesof the relatively deep (3 to 4 miles) midoceanic re-gions. These flat-lying, homogeneous sedimentscould provide sufficient disposal for all the high-level radioactive waste produced worldwide. Be-cause these remote, deep-ocean areas lack signifi-cant levels of mineral and biological resources, thelikelihood of human intrusion is very low. The mid-oceanic regions are among the most stable and pre-dictable geologic environments on Earth. More-over, the ocean itself provides an additionalisolating barrier between the sediment surface andland-based ecosystems. On the other hand, subsea-bed disposal presents added safety risks from oceantransportation accidents. Although waste retrievalwould be possible with existing technology, its costwould probably be prohibitive for all but safetyreasons.

Additional work is needed before the scientificfeasibility of seabed disposal can be determined. Forexample, further research is needed to determinewhether the waste canister and the sediments will

.——.‘~4D0E ~ysis that took such factors into account concluded thata maximum of five or six repositories would be needed for a nuclearpower system that reaches a maximum of 250 GWC of installed gen-erating capacity. DOE, FEZS, table 7.3.10, p. 7.29.

q-he ~onc]usions abut these other disposal technologies are drawnprimarily from three sources in which these alternatives are analyzed:DOE, FEZS, 1980; IRG, op. cit.; and U.S. Department of Energy,Statement of Position of the United States Department of Energy inthe Matter of the Proposed Rulemaking on the Storage and Disposafof Nuclear Waste, DOWNE-0007 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 15, 1980).For brevity, specific references to these sources will be omitted.

adequately contain the wastes, and models to pre-dict the physical and biological transport of radio-nuclides in the ocean must be developed.36

In its relatively small subseabed research pro-gram (funded at $6 million in fiscal year 1982),DOE is studying not only the potential migrationof radioactive material within the oceanic sedimentsand ecosystem, but also transport, emplacement,and isolation systems. Large regions of the oceanhave been screened and many areas explored inmore detail; several prospective sites have been se-lected for in situ testing. Resolving technical ques-tions about the impacts from the internationaldumping of low-level radioactive waste onto theocean floor may be required before the emplace-ment of high-level radioactive waste could be ini-tiated.

With subseabed disposal, the domestic politicaldifficulties associated with siting land-based minedrepositories might be replaced with similar diffi-culties in siting the shipping facilities .37 In addi-tion, significant national and international legalproblems might require resolution before this con-cept could be implemented. The Ocean DumpingAct (Public Law 92-532~ can be interpreted to bansubseabed disposal of high-level waste. At the in-ternational level, the 1972 London Dumping Con-vention prohibits high-level radioactive waste frombeing dumped into the oceans or placed on the sur-face of the seabed. However, since subseabed dis-posal involves emplacing the waste beneath the sedi-ment surface, the legal status of this option relativeto existing international laws and the ongoing Lawof the Sea negotiations is presently ill-defined, andthere is currently no official U.S. position on thematter.38 Implementation of this disposal alterna-— - — —

JGRO~rt Il. Klett, sU6Seabed Disposal Program Annual Report:

Systems, October 1981 Througl September 1982, SAND83-1835(Albuquerque, N. Mex.: Sandia National Laboratories, February1984), p. 8.

37A full discussion of the domestic and international issues in sub-seabed disposal is found in Edward Miles, Kai N. Lee, and ElaineCarlin, Sub-Seabed Disposal of Hi!?h-Level Nuclear Waste: An Assess-ment of PoJicy Issues for the United States (Seattle, Wash.: Univer-sity of Washington Institute for Marine Studies, July 21, 1982).

WK R. Hinga and D. R. Andt.rson, ‘‘The Institutional prOgramfor an International Subseabed Repository, ” in U.S. Department ofEnergy, Proceedings of the 1982 Nationzd Waste Terminal StorageProgram Information Meeting (Washington, D. C.: December 1982),pp. 68-70. See ~SO Seabed Programs Division, The Seabed DisposalProgram: 1983 Status Report, SAND 83-1387 (Albuquerque, N.Mex.: Sandia National Laboratories, October 1983).

Ch. 3—Technology of Waste Management ● 51

tive would probably require an international agree-ment as well as specific U.S. congressional action.

To enhance the level of international coopera-tion in the evaluation of subseabed disposal, an in-ternational seabed working group has been createdwith a membership that currently includes theUnited States, the United Kingdom, France, Can-ada, Japan, the Netherlands, the Federal Republicof Germany, Switzerland, and the Commission ofEuropean Communities. In addition, Italy and Bel-gium have participated as observers in the cooper-ative R&D efforts of this group. This high level ofinternational interest and cooperation indicates thatsubseabed disposal is widely regarded as the mostpromising alternative disposal technology to minedgeologic repositories. In addition to the potentialvalue of subseabed disposal for the United States,it may be useful to maintain a viable seabed R&Dprogram for both low- and high-level radioactivewaste to ensure the safe and equitable use of theseabed by the international community and to pro-vide an alternative for those countries that cannotdispose of radioactive waste on land.

Deep Holes

Deep-hole disposal involves the disposal of waste-filled canisters at the bottom of holes 12 to 15 inchesin diameter, drilled to a depth of 20,000 to 50,000ft, well below the maximum depth of ground watermovement. At these extreme depths, the potentialfor disturbance by natural surface forces or humanintrusion or for transport by ground water to thebiosphere would theoretically be minimized. How-ever, significant uncertainties remain about thecharacter of the hydrogeologic environment andabout waste/rock interactions at these depths. Sim-ply determining the suitability of alternative sitesat such depths is extremely difficult.

This concept requires larger holes and heavierdrilling equipment than are currently available, al-though these technical requirements are probablymanageable by extensions of existing technology.The difficulty of keeping holes of this depth openmay complicate waste emplacement. Moreover, thelogistics of deploying a full-scale, deep-hole systemmay be significant; as many as 2,000 holes may berequired if the commercial spent fuel from existingreactors and those under construction are to be ac-

commodated. This number could conceivably bereduced by a factor of 10 for high-level waste fromreprocessing operations if the heat produced by thewaste did not cause significant problems. Each holewould probably require 3 to 6 years to drill. Onceemplaced, it might be practically impossible to re-trieve the waste and extremely difficult to verify thedegree of isolation obtained.

Rock Melting

Rock melting involves pumping newly generatedhigh-level liquid waste into a conventionally minedcavity at depths of 5,000 to 6,000 ft. The high levelsof heat produced by the waste would theoreticallymelt the surrounding rock within several decades;the resultant resolidification of the rock/waste mix-ture into a presumably insoluble matrix would re-quire many hundreds of years. Rock melting canonly be used for disposing of newly generated high-level waste from the reprocessing of unaged spentfuel. Therefore, any high-level waste generatedfrom reprocessing older spent fuel, as well as thetransuranic waste from reprocessing, will have tobe disposed of in another manner.

Since the rock-melting concept has not been stud-ied to any great extent, it contains numerous andpotentially significant uncertainties about wastehandling and emplacement techniques, about thephysical and chemical interaction of the melted ma-terial with the host rock, and about the potentialmigration of the radioactive material after emplace-ment. Retrieval of the waste is not possible withrock melting, and verification of isolation afteremplacement, even over the short term, may bedifficult. The number of rock-melting disposal sites,of course, would depend on the size of the cavitiesused. For example, a mined cavity 80 ft in diameterwould be capable of containing the high-level liq-uid waste generated by reprocessing 50,000 tonnesof spent fuel. Rock melting could offer substantialcost advantages over the development of mined re-positories because the mining activity for rockmelting is considerably less than that for the de-velopment of mined repositories.

Well Injection

From an operational point of view, a relativelysimple means of permanently isolating liquid high-


level waste from reprocessing would be to pumpit to depths of 500 to 5,000 ft into a well in a suitablehydrogeological environment at or near a reproc-essing plant. Two such injection wells would prob-ably be required for a reprocessing plant with a ca-pacity of 2,000 tonnes/year (yr). Retrieval of wastesinjected into deep wells would be limited, if not en-tirely impractical.

In grout injection, certain suitable rock forma-tions, such as shale, at depths of 300 to 500 ft wouldfirst be hydrofractured by injecting a fluid underhigh pressure down a borehole. A mixture of liq-uid radioactive waste and self-hardening grout, suchas cement, would then be injected into the fracturedrock, leaving the waste in a relatively immobile andessentially irretrievable form. Hydrofracturing hasbeen used at the Oak Ridge National Laboratoryto dispose of 1.8 million gallons of liquid defensewaste at a single well site, and monitoring hasshown no indication of any postinjection migrationof radioactive material away from the grout sheets.Approximately 40 grout injection wells would prob-ably be required at a reprocessing plant having acapacity of 2,000 tonnes/yr.

Well-injection techniques have already been usedto dispose of various types of industrial wastes. Infact, there are approximately 300 industrial waste-disposal wells that have been or are in operationin the United States. However, at this time, thereare only limited field data on the long-term con-tainment of these wastes. In addition, deep-well in-jection of any waste is prohibited in 12 States anddiscouraged in another 7. Nine other States haveregulations controlling its use.

Ice Sheets

The ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica,where ice thickness reaches several thousand feet,could conceivably provide a remote, low-temper-ature environment for containing radioactive waste.The waste could be allowed to melt down throughseveral thousand feet of ice to the bedrock underthe ice, to be suspended in the ice to a depth of afew hundred feet from cables anchored at the icesurface, or to be stored in surface facilities thatwould gradually sink toward the bedrock under theweight of naturally accumulating snow and ice. Inthe first and second cases, refreezing of the water

above the waste as it melts through the ice wouldtheoretically seal the err placement hole. Cases twoand three could theoretically provide a certain de-gree of retrievability for a few hundred years. How-ever, once inside the ice sheet, the waste would mi-grate slowly (over an estimated period of tens tohundreds of thousands of years) with the ice towardthe perimeter of the ice sheet where the ice breaksoff as icebergs.

Although there are apparent advantages to thisdisposal concept, an international group of glaci-ologists recommended in 1974 that the Antarcticice sheet not be used for waste disposal because ofthe many uncertainties about its general nature,evolution, and behavior, as well as the unknownrelationship between ice sheet dynamics and as yetunpredictable climatic changes. The principal un-certainties concern the stability of the ice massesfor very long periods (10,000 years or more) andthe possibility that the waste, once in contact withthe basement rock, would be broken up mechani-cally and escape along unknown pathways. As insubseabed disposal, international negotiations andthe signing of treaties would be necessary beforethis concept could be implemented.

Space

Placing encapsulated radioactive waste into or-bit around the Sun would eliminate the waste ir-retrievably from the Earth itself. According to con-cepts studied by DOE, spent fuel would first bereprocessed and the high-level liquid waste fromreprocessing would be solidified into an acceptablewaste form. After transporting the solidified wasteto the launch site, an upgraded space shuttle wouldcarry the waste into orbit around the Earth. An or-bital transfer vehicle would then be used to carrythe waste from the shuttle to the position of solarorbit between Earth and Venus. (Shooting thewaste directly into the Sun would require too muchfuel to be practical.) After the orbital transfer vehiclehad been recovered, the shuttle would return toEarth for reuse.

Although conceptually attractive and probablytechnically feasible, space disposal is not consideredan immediate and viable disposal option becauseof undeveloped technology, the large number ofspace shuttle launches required (a thousand or more


per year for spent fuel or 4 to 6 dozen per year forhigh-level waste), and the uncertain, yet potentiallyserious, consequences of an accident during launchthat might release significant quantities of radioac-tive waste into the atmosphere. Since space disposalappears to be economically feasible only for selectedlong-lived elements, or perhaps for the total amountof high-level reprocessed waste, reprocessing ofcommercial spent fuel would be required first. Analternative disposal system would then be neededfor the remaining radioactive waste not destinedfor space.

Assuming adequate funding and the resolutionof existing technical problems, this disposal con-cept could possibly be ready for use by the year2000. However, resolution of numerous and po-tentially significant political and international issuesas well as a large number of legal complexities couldlengthen the time needed to implement this disposaloption.

Transmutation

Transmutation is a treatment (not disposal) tech-nique that theoretically could be used to convert(transmute) the long-lived radionuclides in radioac-tive waste (in particular, the transuranic radionu-clides such as Np237) into stable or short-lived radio-isotopes by neutron bombardment in nuclearreactors. The process requires reprocessing spentfuel, with the addition of a step that would sepa-rate (partition) the long-lived radionuclides fromthe liquid high-level waste so that they could be in-corporated into new fuel rods and recycled throughnuclear reactors. Although this process should theo-retically reduce the long-term hazards associatedwith the waste, recent work has indicated that theprocess may result in an increased radiation hazardduring the short term because of the additionalcomplex operations that are involved, along witha very small decrease in long-term hazards .39 Infact, partitioning and transmutation involve suchan increase in operational complexity that the proc-ess can be seen as a new fuel cycle rather than sim-ply as an incremental modification of the reproc-essing fuel cycle. 40

-.~9A, G, Croff J. 0, Blomeke, and B. C. Finney’, Acfinide parti-tioning-Transmu tation Program Final Report. I. OveraIl Assessment,OR NL-5566 (Oak Ridge, Term.: Oak Ridge National Laboratory},June 1980).

401bid.

Since only 5 to 7 percent of the recycled elementsare transmuted while the fuel is in the reactor, nu-merous recycles would be required to transmute allthe long-lived radioisotopes. Although specially de-signed reactors could conceivably increase the rateof the transmutation process, most of these ad-vanced technologies would require 20 to 30 yearsto develop. Transmutation would substantially in-crease both the handling requirements and the vol-ume of secondary wastes generated, thereby morethan doubling the total costs of waste management.In addition, since fission products have to be dis-posed of after transmutation, the need for otherwaste disposal technologies would not be elim-inated.

Comparison of Disposal Alternatives

The general attractiveness of a particular disposaloption as a basis for the Federal waste managementprogram is affected by the following factors: 1) therelative degree of safety it offers, 2) the type of wasteit can accommodate, 3) its provision for retrievingwaste, 4) the potential international complicationsfrom developing or deploying the option, and 5)cost .

Technology Status

Disposal in mined geologic repositories has re-ceived far more attention on a worldwide basis, andhence is far more advanced in development, thanany of the other disposal technologies. As discussedabove, subseabed disposal is also now the focus ofan international research effort, and its scientificand engineering feasibility could conceivably betested by the end of this century. The other tech-nologies have received far less attention, and itwould require considerable effort to develop thesame level of understanding about their advantagesand disadvantages that now exists about mined re-positories and subseabed disposal.

Relative Degree of Safety

It is difficult to compare different waste emplace-ment and disposal options in terms of safety, not

only because some have not been analyzed in muchdetail, but also because such comparisons involvea complicated balancing between differences inlong-term isolation on the one hand and offsetting


differences in near-term operational risks on theother. In general, the more remote the environmentinto which the waste is emplaced (e. g., outer space),the greater the isolation that can be achieved. Atthe same time, remote environments involve in-creased difficulty and risks during emplacement(e.g., the risk of accidental reentry of waste intothe atmosphere in space disposal) and greater dif-ficulty of monitoring the waste to detect unantici-pated problems (and of taking corrective actionssuch as retrieval) if such problems arise.

An additional safety consideration arises in thecase of those disposal alternatives, such as rockmelting, that require that spent fuel be reprocessed.If reprocessing were undertaken specifically to allowuse of such an alternative, the additional operationalrisks and worker exposures resulting from reproc-essing would have to be balanced against any long-term safety advantages afforded by the disposaltechnology.

Type of Waste

Because of significant uncertainties about the fu-ture of commercial reprocessing in this country andthe large quantities of spent fuel expected to be gen-erated by the reactors that now are operating orare under construction, it appears possible that atleast some spent fuel might be discarded directlyas waste. Thus, the ability to accommodate spentfuel as well as high-level waste from reprocessingcould be an important consideration in choosinga disposal system. Only some disposal technolo-gies—e. g., mined repositories, deep holes, subsea-bed, and space—would have that ability, and insome of those cases (in particular, space disposal),technical considerations could make their use forspent fuel impracticable.

Ability to Retrieve Waste

Because of the uncertainties about the degree oflong-term isolation that any disposal system wouldprovide, it maybe desirable to maintain some abil-ity to recover the waste after emplacement if thedevelopment of scientific understanding shows thatthe risks were greater than anticipated at the timeof emplacement. In fact, EPA’s proposed criteriafor high-level waste disposal would require that re-

moval of most of the waste be possible for a rea-sonable period after disposal. 41

Because disposal systems rely heavily on natu-ral barriers to prevent radioactive waste from be-ing released into the environment, these same nat-ural barriers make human access to, and retrievalof, the waste quite difficult after final emplacement.In some cases, retrieval could be practically impos-sible. Thus, for example, the proposed EPA retriev-ability requirements might preclude use of suchtechnologies as deep-hole emplacement and rockmelting.

In addition to such safety considerations, retriev-ability might also be desirable in order to keep theoption of reprocessing spent fuel. The mined geo-logic repository appears to be the only disposal tech-nology that could allow economic retrieval of spentfuel after emplacement, although this may only bepossible before the repository has been backfilledand sealed.

Potential International Complications

Legal and institutional difficulties at the inter-national level could be encountered in any attemptto use space, subseabed, or ice sheet disposal. How-ever, the extent to which these problems could con-strain the development of these disposal alterna-tives is uncertain. The potential for suchcomplications could make some technologies rela-tively unattractive as a choice for the primary focusof the United States’ radioactive waste-manage-ment program.

cost

Preliminary cost estimates by DOE indicate thatmined geologic disposal and subseabed disposalcould be the least expensive options (on the orderof 0.1 C/kilowatt-hour [kWh] of nuclear-generatedelectricity), while deep-hole disposal could cost sev-eral times as much (around 0.3¢/kWh).42 Estimatesof the costs of other options are too incomplete topermit a similar calculation of the unit cost of dis-posal. All such estimates are uncertain at this point,in part because the final safety standards and reg-

41EpA, DEZS on 40 CFR 191, p. 127.WDOE, FEIS, table 6.2.7, p. (I. 192.


ulations for high-level waste disposal have not beenadopted yet, and thus the final performance re-quirements for disposal systems are not certain. Inaddition, the cost of those disposal options that re-quire reprocessing is unknown because it is not clearif the cost of such reprocessing would be offset com-pletely by the sale of the recovered uranium andplutonium or if part or all of the cost would haveto be included as part of the cost of waste disposal.Nonetheless, since these estimated costs (excludingreprocessing costs) are a small fraction (a few per-cent) of the typical current new construction costof generating nuclear electricity with a new facili-ty,43 it appears unlikely that the ultimate disposalcosts would significantly affect the economics of nu-clear power even if they are increased substantiallyover current estimates.

Conclusions

Based on analyses of the above factors, the de-velopment of mi’ned repositories in the continen-tal United States appears to provide the most im-mediately available disposal technology suitable forboth spent fuel and high-level waste from reproc-essing that could be developed by the United States.Despite potential international problems, subseabeddisposal presently provides the most promising al-ternative to the use of mined repositories. If com-mercial reprocessing is ever developed fully, it maybe advantageous to consider other options, such asdeep holes or rock melting, for disposing of thehigh-level waste from reprocessing. However, evenif all spent fuel were reprocessed and the high-levelwaste were disposed of using another disposal alter-——-

4j1bid, , p p . 7 . 5 0 - 7 . 5 1 .

native, there would still be other waste productsgenerated by the reprocessing operation (in par-ticular, large volumes of transuranic-contaminatedwaste) that may have to be disposed of in minedrepositories.

Although the development of mined repositoriescould be deferred until more information about al-ternative disposal technologies is available, it is notclear what benefits would be gained by such defer-ral.44 In fact, there is considerable consensus within

the technical community that the development ofmined repositories should not be deferred, and theNuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) madea commitment in law to operation of d geologic re-pository by 1998 (see ch. 5).

There is disagreement about the desirability ofdeveloping other disposal options as insuranceagainst the remote possibility that mined reposi-tories cannot be developed because of unforeseentechnical or institutional problems. The annualbudgets for the commercial waste management pro-gram have increased gradually from $1.7 millionin fiscal year 1972 to approximately $317 millionin fiscal year 1982. Of this latter amount, approx-imately 97 percent is devoted to the developmentof mined repositories. Subseabed, deep-hole, andspace disposal options may be investigated furtheras technologies to back up or complement the de-velopment of mined repositories, but are not nowplanned for full development. NWPA also providesfor accelerated investigations of such alternative dis-posal technologies.

4+See discussion in issue 1, app. B

WASTE STORAGE

Unlike disposal technologies, storage technologiesare designed to allow easy retrieval of the emplacedmaterial. Thus, they cannot rely as heavily on re-moteness and impenetrable natural barriers to pre-vent accidental releases and human intrusion, butinstead must use engineered features and continuedhuman control. In effect, the price of easy retriev-ability is the need for continued care, maintenance,and monitoring of the storage facility.

As noted in chapter 2, large amounts of new stor-age capacity will be needed at least for the next sev-eral decades simply to hold the spent fuel gener-ated by commercial reactors until adequate disposalor reprocessing capacity becomes available. Stor-age for considerably longer periods may also beused either to maintain access to spent fuel for pos-sible future reprocessing or to allow waste (eitherspent fuel or high-level waste) to cool before emplac-


ing it in a repository for permanent disposal. Somealso view permanent storage as an acceptable way,in itself, to provide final isolation of the waste. (Forfurther discussion, see issue 1 in app. B.) Thus,storage technology may be required to function forperiods ranging from 10 years or less to 100 yearsor more.

Discussions about storage technology are some-times clouded by the use of different terms (e. g.,‘ ‘away-from-reactor’ [AFR] and ‘‘monitored, re-trievable storage’ [MRS]) that have been associ-ated with particular policy debates (see issue 4 inapp. B). For example, the term ‘‘AFR’ came intogeneral use in the debate about whether the Fed-eral Government should provide centralized (thus,away-from-reactor) storage facilities to enable theGovernment to accept spent fuel from utilities dur-ing a relatively short interim period until a geologicrepository would be available, which was assumedto be as quickly as possible. In contrast, the term‘‘MRS” was introduced in the context of a debateabout whether the Federal Government should pro-vide storage facilities designed for spent fuel andhigh-level waste that could provide an alternativeto geologic repositories for an extended period—perhaps 100 years or longer. However, some alsosee an MRS facility as providing a cushion againstrelatively short slippages in the geologic repositoryprogram. In that event, there would be little prac-tical difference between the two concepts.

In general, a system that can store spent fuel sat-isfactorily can also be designed to store high-levelwaste from reprocessing. Therefore, although thediscussion of storage in this section focuses on spentfuel storage, for which there is the greatest imme-diate need, it also pertains to storage of solidifiedhigh-level waste from reprocessing.

Interim Storage Technology

Water-Filled Basins

Practically all the existing commercial spent fuelis currently stored at reactor sites in water-filledbasins that were originally designed to store freshlydischarged spent fuel for a short period (6 months)until it could be reprocessed. Such basins are aneffective way to provide the high level of radiationshielding and thermal cooling needed during suchinitial storage periods.

Photo credit: Department of Energy

Spent fuel storage basin at a commercialnuclear powerplant

Since reactor basins were originally not intendedto provide storage for an accumulating inventoryof spent fuel, their potential capacity was not max-imized. The capacity of those reactor basins, or ofnew independent water basins, may be increasedin two ways: reracking and rod consolidation.

Reracking allows closer spacing of spent fuel ele-ments by replacing the original, inefficient, but rela-tively inexpensive aluminum storage racks that holdthe spent fuel assemblies with more expensive racksmade of other materials. Because reracking in ex-isting basins is by far the least expensive and easiestway to provide additional storage capacity, utili-ties have been doing it as needed since the mid-1970’s. By reracking, utilities can increase the ca-pacity of many reactor basins that were designedoriginally to hold up to 4 to 5 annual spent fuel dis-charges by up to 10 additional annual discharges.DOE assumes that utilities will exploit the poten-tial for reracking to the maximum extent possiblebefore considering other storage options.

Rod consolidation involves disassembling spentfuel elements and packing the individual fuel rodsmore closely together in steel storage canisters. This


technology could allow the capacity of existing stor-age basins to be nearly doubled in some instances(subject to structural limitations on the ability ofthe basin to withstand the additional load) at a costcomparable to reracking. Although large-scale rodconsolidation has not been demonstrated yet, suchdemonstrations are planned for the next few years,If successfully demonstrated, this method could re-duce the need for additional storage facilities tosome extent by the end of the decade, and substan-tially by the end of the century. However, rod con-solidation will probably not be usable at every re-actor because of structural limitations on the totalweight of spent fuel that can be placed in some wa-ter basins. Rod consolidation could also be usedto increase the storage capacity of the dry storagetechnologies discussed next.

Dry Storage

Several concepts for dry storage of spent fuel areunder consideration for new storage facilities (seefig. 3-6). Since dry storage appears to be suited forstorage over long and uncertain periods, it has beenselected over water basins in each major Federalanalysis of extended storage options .45 Most of thefollowing dry storage concepts require sealing spent-

MU s Atomic Enerw Commission, Preliminary Draft Environ-. .mentaf Statement, Retrievable Surface Storage Facility (Richland,Wash.: November 1974); U.S. Department of Energy, The MonitoredRetrievable Storage Concept: A Review of Zts Status and Analysisof Its Impact on the Waste Management System, DOE/NE 0019(Washington, D. C.: December 1981); D. E. Rasmussen, Comparisonof Cask and DryWell Storage Concepts for a Monitored RetrievableStorage/Interim Storage System, PNL-4450 (Richland, Wash.: Bat-telle Memorial Institute, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, December1982.

Figure 3-6.-Dry Storage Concepts for Spent Fuel

yEach drywell would hold a steel canister containing about 0.5

Each cask would contain about 10 tonnes of spent fuel (24 to

tonnes of spent fuel (1 or 2 fuel assemblies depending upon52 assemblies).

the type of reactor).

If licensed, dry storage technologies like these may provide a relatively inexpensive, flexible alternative to water-filled basins for in-

cj8-948 O - 85 - 5 : QL 3


fuel elements in steel canisters prior to em-placement:

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●

●

Air-cooled vault—a large concrete structureusing natural air convection for cooling.Concrete surface silo-a concrete cylinder sit-ting vertically on the ground.Casks—large metal casks (which may be de-signed to be used for transportation as well)sitting vertically in warehouselike sheds.Surface drywell (dry caisson)—a steel- andconcrete-lined hole that will hold one or sev-eral spent fuel elements.Tunnel drywell storage—drywells sunk in thefloor of subterranean tunnels.Tunnel rack storage—movable racks placedin tunnels inside a mountain.

Comparison of Interim StorageTechnologies

Status of Technology Development

Because the water-filled basin is the only stor-age technology now in use in licensed facilities, ithas been considered until recently the only viableoption for new facilities in the next decade. Esti-mates of the time required to design, construct, andlicense an independent basin facility range fromabout 7 years at a licensed reactor site to 9 yearsat a new site.

However, recent studies indicate that some alter-native dry-storage technologies may be availablefor use before 1990.46 A cast iron cask of West Ger-man design and a cask of U.S. design are beingused by DOE and the Tennessee Valley Author-ity (TVA) for tests and a licensed demonstrationexpected to be completed in 1987. It is possible thatsuch cask technology could be licensed on a genericbasis, i.e., approved for use at any licensed reactorsite, thereby reducing the lead time required fora decision by a utility to use the technology. Bothdrywells and surface silos are being tested currentlyby DOE at the Nevada Test Site.

Because of the significant potential advantagesof these technologies in stiety, cost, time, and speed

ME. R. Johnson Ass~iates, Inc., A Preliminary Assessment OfAher-native Dry Storage Methods for the Storage of Commercial Spent Nu-clear Fuel, JAZ-180, DOE/ET/47929-1 (Reston, Va. : November1981).

of implementation, it seems important to determinetheir licensability and actual cost quickly, particu-larly for at-reactor use. NWPA includes measuresto accomplish this. If no major licensing problemsare encountered, cask or drywell facilities could beconstructed at reactor sites in about 4 years .47 Ad-ditional research, development, and demonstrationof dry storage will be required to develop a full-scale system that can reliably receive, package, andemplace waste at the very high annual rates (2,000tonnes/yr) that would be involved in a large, cen-tralized storage facility.

48 There is, however, noapparent technical reason why this cannot be done.

The cask and the surface drywell are currentlyconsidered to be leading candidates for new stor-age capacity both at existing reactor sites49 and atcentralized facilities for interim or extended stor-age.50 A DOE study estimates that a centralizeddry storage facility using either casks or drywellscould be designed, sited, and constructed in about11 years.

51 Other dry-storage technologies, such asthe tunnel-rack system, have received less study todate .52

NRC has adopted regulations for licensing in-dependent spent fuel storage facilities using wet ordry technologies for periods up to 20 years .53 Sincethese regulations were designed for interim stor-age, it is not clear whether additional issues mightbe raised in the case of extended storage (for peri-ods up to 100 years or longer) .54 If extended stor-age facilities were intended to be used for terminalisolation, for example, more sophisticated engi-neered features such as waste packages might berequired to control releases that might occur if in-stitutional control were lost or abandoned. If ex-isting regulations had to be modified for licensingfacilities for extended storage, additional time couldbe required to construct such a facility.

Safety

There appear to be no fundamental questionsabout the technical ability to design, construct, and

471bid.+fJRasmussen, op. cit., p. 6.46.49E. R. Johnson Associates, Inc. , op. cit.sORasmussen, op. cit.JIDOE, The Monitored Retriev;!ble Storage Concept.521bid.5310 CFR, pt. 72.WDOE, Monitored Retrievable Xtorage Concept, p. 2-14


operate interim spent fuel storage facilities to meetapplicable radiation protection standards as longas continuing surveillance and maintenance of thefacilities is provided. Safe storage in water basinshas already been demonstrated, and it appears like-ly that equally safe, perhaps safer, storage can beprovided with dry-storage technologies.55 Whilethere may be disagreements about the safety of par-ticular system designs (e. g., certain methods for ex-panding the capacity of existing storage basins atreactors), these disagreements do not challenge theconclusion that safe storage is technically feasible.

Water basins are simple structures that have beenused successfully for the storage of radioactive ma-terials, including spent fuel, for 30 years. The engi-neering practices and procedures involved in theirdesign and construction are well established. Ex-perience shows that spent fuel can be stored underwater safely without significant deterioration of thefuel elements for periods of at least 20 years andperhaps considerably longer, particularly if the fuelassemblies are sealed in stainless steel canisters tocontain leakage.

Although there has been much less experiencewith dry storage than with water basins, dry tech-nologies may have potential safety advantages.First, unlike water-filled basins, they do not relyon an active cooling system. Furthermore, the heav-ily shielded containers required in most dry tech-nologies would provide a massive physical barrieragainst accidents (e. g., airplane crashes) or sabo-tage and would limit the effects of such an eventto a few fuel elements. However, longer aging(about 5 years) is required before spent fuel canbe placed into dry storage, and the fuel, once en-capsulated, becomes hotter than in a water basin.While there has been relatively little experience withdry storage of spent fuel from light-water reactors(LWRs), NRC regulations for independent interimstorage facilities contemplate licensing dry-storagefacilities.56

“M. S. Plesset, “ACRS (Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards)Comments on Proposed Rulemaking on the Storage and Disposal ofNuclear Waste, ” Letter (Dec. 10, 1980) to John F. Ahern, U.S. Nu-

clear Regulatory Commission. Quoted in DOE, Monitored Retriev-able Storage Concept. See also U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion, Waste Confidence Decision.

5610 CFR, pt. 72.

The conclusion that high-level radioactive wastecan be stored safely is based on the assumption thatthe storage facilities will continue to be controlledand maintained .57 However, extended (orperma-nent) storage raises a safety issue that does not arisewith interim storage: the possibility that institution-al control of the storage facility would be terminatedbefore the waste decays to innocuous levels. Thissituation could result either from the loss of society’sability to care for the facility (through war or socialregression) or, perhaps more likely, from careless-ness or declining concern by later generations, lead-ing to a decision not to continue to bear the costsof maintenance despite the potential long-term con-sequences.

No detailed quantitative analysis yet comparesthe safety of extended storage to that of direct dis-posal as a means of providing final isolation .58 Ex-isting analyses of the safety of storage facilities dealonly with the releases that might occur during aperiod of temporary storage under continuous hu-man control. No analyses of accidents that couldcause releases from a storage facility over a verylong period are comparable in thoroughness to themany studies of the possible ways that wastes couldescape from a mined repository. In particular, thereare no studies of the consequences of premature ter-mination of institutional control, the ‘‘accident’in a storage facility that is most comparable to aphysical breach of containment in a mined re-pository.

Flexibility

Water basins and dry vaults are fixed structureswith physical limits to their storage capacity. Whilethey can be designed to allow modular expansion,such expansion is usually economical only for largeincrements of capacity. In addition, they requirerelatively long lead times for construction and li-censing—about 7 years for a basin or dry vault ata reactor site, compared to as little as 3.5 years fora cask storage facility.

59 contrast, the dry tech-nologies that use separate, freestanding containersfor individual fuel elements (shipping casks, dry-wells, and silos) all allow expansion of capacity in

57 Plesset, op. cit.58A brief qu~itative comparison is found in the discussion of issUe

1 in app. B.‘gE, R. Johnson Associates, Inc. , op. cit., table 7-1, P. 7-3.


very small increments and on relatively short noticeonce the required packaging facilities are available.As a result, they appear better able to meet the un-certain storage requirements that now face utilities.

cost

The total undiscounted costs of constructing andoperating a 1 ,000-tonne storage facility at a reactorsite are estimated to range from $82 million (forcasks using fuel consolidated in the reactor basin)to $260 million (for unconsolidated fuel in a dryvault). GO The comparable undiscounted totals fora centralized dry-storage facility with a 48,000 -tonne capacity range from $2.4 billion (for surfacedrywells and tunnel racks) to $5.3 billion (for tun-nel drywells). 61 A comparison of capital and oper-ating costs for a range of at-reactor spent fuel stor-age options is shown in table 3-4.

The wide range of technical and financial as-sumptions used in the available studies of storagetechnologies precludes any simple comparison ofthe cost per tonne of using each of the storage tech-nologies at different locations. Examination of theavailable DOE studies, however, leads to severalgeneral conclusions:

1. For both at-reactor and away-from-reactoruse, those technologies providing relativelylarge, fixed capacities (water basins or dryvaults) appear to be more expensive per tonneof storage than do the dry technologies thatallow expansion in annual modules (drywell,silos, and casks). 62 The principal reason is thatthe modular dry technologies have a lower ini-tial capital cost, and their remaining costs canbe spread out over time as additional contain-ers are built. Deferring much of the total costsin this way reduces the discounted cost of stor-age and thus makes the expandable technol-ogies even more attractive financially as cap-ital costs increase. It also lowers the financialrisk involved in making a large investment infixed storage capacity when the total amountof storage needed is uncertain.

bO1bid., table &1, p. &a, Amounts are in 1981 dollars.61DoE, The Monjrored Retrievable Storage Concept, table 2-3,

p. 2-20. Amounts are in 1981 dollars.GZE. R. Johnson Associates, Inc., op. cit., p. 2; DOE, FEZS, vol.

2, app. A, table A-8, p. A-1OO.

Table 3-4.—Comparison of Capital and AnnualOperating Costs of At= Reactor Storage Options

($/kilogram of uranium–operating costsin parentheses below capital costs)

Facility capacity (tonnes)Storage option 500 1,000 2,000Cask (5-tonne capacity). . . . .

Vault (fuel canned). . . . . . . . .

Cask (l O-tonne capacity). . . .

BWR reracking (stainlesssteel to beratedstainless steel) . . . . . . . . . .

Pool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Silo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vault (fuel not canned) . . . . .

Drywell. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PWR reracking (stainlesssteel to beratedstainless steel) . . . . . . . . . .

Rod consolidation withinexisting poola . . . . . . . . . . .

PWR reracking (low densityto stainless steel) . . . . . . .

BWR reracking (low densityto berated stainless steel)

BWR reracking (low densityto borate stainless steel) .

PWR reracking (low densityto berated stainless steel)

Double tieringb . . . . . . . . . . . .

118(1.3)100

(1.9)

(0!;

(1;;

(4.9)

(4:$

(2.1)

(0::

(0:;

40

(Oi;

(1%;

(1%;

(Oi;—

109 “--

aNo operating coat data available.bNo cost data, but reracking costs represent lower limits.

SOURCE: Electric l%wer Research Institute, Cost Corn@sons for Orr.slte Spent-

2.

Fuel Options, EPRI NP-33S0, MiIy 19S4, taties 12-1, 12-2.

The least expensive way to provide storageusing casks or drywells appears to be to locatethe storage facility at I-he site of a reactor, re-processing plant, orgcologic repository whereexisting staff and equ~+pment can be used forpackaging and handling spent fuel (or solidi-fiedhigh-level waste) fiwstorage. A major partof the capital cost for a modular dry-storagefacility at an independent site is for the equip-ment and facilities needed for handling andpackaging the spent fuel prior to insertion in


individual storage units. 63 A recent study ofcentralized extended storage using casks anddrywells concluded that substantial savingswould be achieved if the cost of handling fa-cilities (several hundred million dollars) couldbe avoided by locating the storage facility ata repository or reprocessing plant that wouldhave such facilities in any case, rather thanat an independent site .64 Since it may also bepossible to use modular dry storage at reactorswith only relatively minor modifications to ex-isting facilities, decentralized storage at re-actors may also prove to be less expensive thancentralized storage at a stand-alone facility.However, there is as yet no consistent com-parison of centralized v. decentralized stor-age using dry-storage technologies and usingthe same financial assumptions for both cases.

3. Once a spent fuel element has been stored at

6SDOE, The Monitored Retrievable Storage Concept; Rasmussen,op. cit.

64 Rasmussen, Op. Cit.

an interim storage facility, it may be less ex-pensive to leave it there indefinitely than toremove it and transport it elsewhere. For ex-ample, DOE estimates that the annual costof caretaker operations at a 48,000-tonne dry-storage facility would be at most about $2.7million, or about $56/tonne/yr. In contrast,annual retrieval operations would range from$4.1 million to $10.7 million, while transpor-tation to another site would cost at least$15,500/tonne— nearly 300 times the annualcaretaking cost.

66 Thus, an important consid-eration in planning the full-scale operation ofa waste disposal system will be how rapidlyto draw down the backlogs of spent fuel thatwill already have been placed in storage bythe time disposal begins. This point is dis-cussed further below and in chapter 6.

6SDOE, The Monitored Retrievable Storage Concept, table 2-1,p. 2-18.

66]bid. , table 2-4, p. 2-’22.

WASTE TRANSPORTATION

Spent fuel is transported using heavily shieldedcontainers called shipping casks. At present threetypes of casks are used:67

●

●

●

Legal weight truck casks weigh about 23 tonsand hold one pressurized water reactor (PWR)fuel assembly or two boiling water reactor(BWR) fuel assemblies. There are 11 suchcasks in the United States.Overweight truck casks weigh about 35 tonsand hold 3 PWR fuel assemblies or 7 BWRfuel assemblies. They are restricted in move-ment because of their weight. There is onesuch cask under construction.Rail casks weigh from 64 to 90 tons and holdfrom 7 to 10 PWR fuel assemblies or from 18

bTTheSe data are drawn from U.S. Department of Energy, SfJentFuel Storage Fact Book, DOE/NE-0005, April 1980, p. 54. OTA iscurrently conducting a more detailed examination of container testing,safety standards, and risks associated with transportation as part ofits ongoing assessment of Transportation of Hazardous Materials. In-formation systems and regulatory and institutional issues relating tothe safe transport of nuclear waste and other hazardous materials willalso be studied as part of this assessment.

to 24 BWR fuel assemblies. There are six railcasks in the United States.

Solidified high-level waste from reprocessing wouldalso be shipped” in similar heavily shielded casks,although such casks are still in the conceptual de-sign stage.

The combined capacity of the existing truck andrail casks is 28 tonnes. DOE estimates that this ca-pacity would be adequate for shipments through1988, even if all additional storage capacity beyondexisting basins were provided at a centralized stor-age facility, and that it would be possible for theindustry to meet the demand for additional casksafter that time. 68

Future casks may be somewhat different fromthose now in operation. New casks may be able tocarry up to twice as much fuel as current ones ifdesigned to carry only fuel that is at least 5 years

Wbid., p. 39.


old. 69 Such fuel has about one-tenth the output ofheat and radiation as 150-day-old spent fuel, forwhich existing casks were designed. Since it appearsunlikely that spent fuel less than 5 (or even 10) yearsold would be moved for the next few decades, 70there will be strong financial incentives to developand use casks that hold more spent fuel than cur-rent designs. In addition, transportation in the fu-ture may be done in casks that are designed for stor-age, 71 and perhaps for disposal for 72 as ‘en ”

Safety

Standards

Transportation of highly radioactive materials isgoverned by NRC and U.S. Department of Trans-portation (DOT) regulations requiring that ship-ping casks be designed to limit radiation exposureto bystanders during normal operations (10 milli-rems/hour at 6 ft from the cask) and to prevent re-lease of radioactive materials from the cask evenin severe accidents. Casks must be designed to with-stand a sequence of hypothetical tests without re-leasing more than a specified small amount of ra-dioactive material.73 (It should be noted that theability of a cask design to pass these tests is assessedby analytical methods rather than by actual per-formance of the tests on sample casks.) These de-sign criteria, which are intended to encompass arange of very severe accident conditions, includesequential exposure to:

GgIbid., p. 39. See also J. A. Bucholz, A Summary Report on OP-timized Designs for Shipping Casks Containing 2-, 3-, 5-, 7-, or 10-Year-Old PWR Spent Fuel, ORNL/CSD/TM-150 (Oak Ridge Term.:Oak Ridge National Laboratory, April 1983), table 4a, p. 25. Themaximum capacity of an optimal rail cask design for 10-year-old spentfuel is 21 PWR assemblies, compared to existing rail casks holding12 PWR assemblies.

70An~yse5 gener~]y assume that the oldest fuel would be reproc-

essed or disposed of first. DOE analysis suggests that even if reproc-essing began at large scale by 1990, the youngest spent fuel being re-processed in 2020 would still beat least 10 years old. U.S. Departmentof Energy, Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Inventories, Projec-tions, and Characteristics, DOEINE-001 7/2, September 1983, table1.4., p. 20.

TID. E. Rasmussen, op. cit., p. 6.32.TZWestinghouse Electric Corp., En~”neered Waste package Con-

ceptual Design, Defense High-Level Waste (Form 1), CommercialHigh-Level Waste (Form 1), and Spent Fuel (Form 2), Disposal inSalt, AESD-TME-3131 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: September 1982).

7949 CFR 173.398 (c). Transport regulations are 10 CFR 71 and10 CFR 73.

. a 30-ft drop onto a flat, unyielding surface withthe cask oriented to cause the greatest damage;

. a 40-inch drop onto a 6-inch-diameter steel pinmounted on an unyielding surface; and

. 30-minute, all-engulfing thermal environ-ment (fire) radiating at 1,4750 F.

The same requirements have been adopted by theInternational Atomic Energy Agency and are ingeneral use worldwide,

Questions have been raised about the adequacyof these requirements (and of existing casks de-signed to meet them) in view of the conditions thatmight be encountered in realistic accidents. For ex-ample, it is noted that some actual fires are hotterthan 1,475° F and some accidents involve impactsat higher velocities than those involved in the droptest. In this regard, the regulatory test conditionsare engineering criteria that provide a well-definedbasis for designing and analyzing casks. They areintended to create stresses on the cask at least asgreat as those produced by a wide range of extremeaccident conditions that could actually be encoun-tered.74 Thus, while an individual aspect of a spe-cific test (e. g., drop height or temperature) mightbe exceeded in real accidents, other test aspects aremore severe than could he encountered in the realworld. For example, objects in the real world arenot completely unyielding; if struck by a transpor-tation cask, they would absorb some of the energyof the cask. Similarly, actual fires are not likely tosurround all surfaces of a cask completely, as spe-cified in the regulatory test, and a fire that sur-rounds only part of a cask would have to be hotterand/or longer than the regulatory fire to providethe same heat input to the cask.

74 For example, it has been estim ~ted that the regulatory 30-ft drop

onto an unyielding surface would IX more severe than about 99.9 per-cent of all accidents, while the 30- minute fire requirement is longerin duration than 99.8 percent of actual fires involved in rail or truckaccidents. See Edwin L. Wilmot, 7’ransportation Accident Scenariosfor Commercial Spent Fuel, SAND80-2124 (Albuquerque, N. Mex.:Sandia National Laboratories, Fetruary 1981), pp. 47-48. Analysisof the 1982 Caidecott Tunnel fire near San Francisco, in which a gas-oline tanker burned in a highway tunnel, concluded that the fire couldhave produced a heat input into a sj~ipping cask ranging from a min-imum of one-fourth to a maximum of twice the heat input from thestandard regulatory fire conditions. D. W. Larson, R. T. Reese, andE. L. Wilmot, “The Caldecott Tunnel Fire Thermal Environments,Regulatory Considerations and Pmb,ibilities” (Albuquerque, N. Mex.:Sandia National Laboratories, uncated), table 2.


Experiments that have been performed usingshipping casks show how the regulatory tests canbe more severe than actual accident conditions that,at first glance, appear to exceed the requirements.For example, a cask would only reach a speed ofabout 30 miles per hour (mph) in the regulatory30-ft drop test. Yet in an experiment in which atruck carrying a spent fuel cask was driven head-on into a reinforced concrete target at 61 mph, theactual forces experienced by the cask were less thanthose that would result from the drop test.75 In1984, the British Central Electricity GeneratingBoard performed the 30-ft drop test on an actual48-tonne steel spent-fuel shipping cask, with noreported damage to the cask. 76

Similarly, experiments in which spent fuel ship-ping casks were exposed to fires that were hotterand/or longer than the standard fire specified in theregulations showed that the actual environmentsproduced by those fires were comparable to, or lesssevere than, the regulatory test requirements.77 Ad-ditional tests to determine the actual properties ofvarious fire environments are now underway atSandia National Laboratories under DOT spon-sorship. Such tests could be quite valuable in re-solving questions about the relationship betweenexisting regulatory requirements and actual acci-dent conditions.

In 1981 NRC determined that no immediatechanges in current regulations were needed to im-prove safety. At the same time, it initiated a “Mo-dal Study of Transportation Safety” designed to:

. —TsMichael Huerta arlcI Richard H, Yoshimura, A Crash Test of a

Nuclear Spent Fuel Cask and Truck Transport System, .SAND77-0419 (Albuquerque, N. Mex.: Sandia Laboratories, January 1978),p. 16. It should be noted that this test was designed to assess the ac-curacy of analytical techniques for predicting the response of a caskto a collision, rather than to evaluate regulatory standards or caskdesigns.

TbThe Energy Daily, Mar. 8, 1984, p. 4.77 Tes ts involving a so-minute, 1,2000 C torch fire led to cask heating

that was substantially less than would be produced by the regulatoryfire. Manuel G. Vigil, Amado A. Trujillo, and H. Richard Yoshimura,“Measured Thermat Response of Full-Scale Spent Fuel Cask to aTorch Environment, ” Nuclear Technology, vol. 61, June 1983, pp.514-520. Analysis of exposure of a shipping cask in a railcar to a 2-hour petroleum fuel fire concluded that the amount of heat input tothe cask was about equivalent to that resulting from the 30-minuteregulatory test fire. J. E. Hamann et al., ‘‘ Modelling of Pool FireEnvironments Using Experimental Results of a Two-Hour Test ofa Railcar/Cask System, Proceedings of the 6th International Sjrm -posium, Packaging and Transportation of Radioacti\r Materials, Nov.10-14, 1983, pp. 1081-1088.

●

●

●

●

collect data on severe accident conditions andtheir relative frequency;devise package tests that simulate those acci-dent conditions;analyze and/or test packages under severe ac-cident conditions and assess their performance;andusing this information, evaluate further theadequacy of present standards to protectagainst potential high consequence accidentsand develop possible changes to NRC stand-ards, if appropriate. 78

This study is expected to be completed by the endof 1985.

Whtie OTA did not attempt in this study to eval-uate any particular technology designs or regula-tions, its review of the debate about transportationsafety did not reveal any fundamental technicalchallenges to the conclusion that shipping casks canbe designed to prevent significant radioactive re-leases in realistic accident conditions.79 At the sametime, it is clear that the central role of shipping caskintegrity in providing transportation safety placesconsiderable importance on ensuring that great careis taken in the manufacture, testing, use, and main-tenance of casks. A transportation panel of the Na-tional Academy of Sciences’ Committee on Radi-oactive Waste Management concluded that:

. . . the transportation of radioactive materials isnot a major factor in the total hazards associatedwith the nuclear power system. However, this con-

clusion is supportable only if the highest stand-

ards of care are applied in all aspects of waste prep-

aration and transportation. 80— —

T8NRC comment in preface to P. Eqqers, Severe Rail and Truck. .Accidents: Toward a Definition of Bounding En~.ironments for 7’rans-portation Packages, NUREG/CR-3499 (M’ashington, DC.: U.S. Nu-clear Regulatory Commission, October 1983), p. iii.

TgRecent c~tiques of radioactive waste transportation have focused

on the adequacy of existing cask designs and regulatory requirementsand have suggested that suitable casks could be designed. Marvin Res-nikoff, The Next Nucfear Gamble (New York: Council on EconomicPriorities, 1983), pp. 20-21. See also Robert M. Jefferson, ‘ ‘Trans-porting Spent Reactor Fuel: Allegations and Responses, SAND82-2778 (Albuquerque, N. Mex.: Sandia National Laboratories, March1983); and Robert M. Jefferson et al., “Analysis of Recent Councilon Economic Priorities Newsletter’ SAND82- 1250 (Albuquerque, N.Mex.: Sandia National Laboratories, May 1982).

EnReport of the panel on Transportation to the Committee on Ra-dioactive Waste Management, August 1974, cited in letter from JohnC. Frye, Chairman of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Man-agement, to Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Administrator of the U.S.Energy Research and Development Administration, Feb. 12, 1975.


Thus, confidence in the safety of waste transpor-tation will depend on confidence that shipping caskswill in fact be designed, constructed, and operatedaccording to packaging regulations. Past experiencewith lax enforcement of packaging regulations con-cerning low-level waste shipments, 81 and recent crit-icisms of the adequacy of enforcement of regula-tions concerning spent fuel shipping casks, 82 suggestthat enforcement could become an issue of increas-ing concern as shipments of spent fuel increase. Arecent review of the regulatory structure of high-level radioactive waste transportation concludedthat it is inadequate in several respects and recom-mended a careful evaluation of Federal regulationof highway transport of radioactive waste .83

Risk Analyses

Analyses of the risks of transporting spent fuel(or solidified high-level waste) in casks designed toexisting regulatory standards generally suggest thatthe radiological risks to the public from accidentalreleases of radioactive materials during transpor-tation would be very small in comparison to thehealth effects from normal operation of the fuel cy-cle.84 For example, a recent study evaluated thecosts and impacts of shipping 72,000 tonnes of spentfuel (or the wastes from reprocessing that amountof fuel) to five possible repository sites over a 26-year period. This study concludes that for a repos-itory at Hanford, Wash., there would be, at most,78 nonradiological fatalities and 16 long-term can-cer fatalities if the material were all moved by truck,or about 6 nonradiological fatalities and 36 long-term cancers if it were moved by rail.85 In com-parison, EPA’s analysis of waste disposal, discussedearlier in this chapter, concluded that a repository

—..———EIU.S. ~Panment of Transportation (DOT) and U.S. Department

of Energy, Nationai Energy Transportation Study, July 1980, p. 118.8ZResnikoff, op. cit., ch. V.8tNation~ Research Council, %&l and Economic Aspects of Ra-

dioactive Waste Disposal (Washington, D. C.: National AcademyPress, 1984), pp. 123-128. See also Paul F. Rothberg, “Nuclear Ma-terials Transportation: Safety Concerns, Governmental Regulationsand Activities, and Options to Improve Federal Programs, Congres-sional Research Service Report No. 84-45 SPR, Mar. 15, 1984.

IMI_J .S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Environmental h-pact Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Airand Other Modes, NUREG-01 70, vol. 1, December 1977, p. 5-52.

oSEdwin L. Wi]mot et al., A Preliminary Analysis of the COStS andRisk of Transporting Nuclear Waste to Potential Candidate Com-mercial Repository Sites, SAND83-0867 (Albuquerque, N. Mex.: San-dia National Laboratories, June 1983), table 4, p. 12.

containing 100,000 tonnes of spent fuel could cause1,000 or more deaths in a 10,000-year period afterdisposal.

These risk studies also indicate that even a worst-case situation, involving a major breach of a caskas a result of an accident or deliberate sabotage,would not lead to catastrophic effects, but rathermight result in at most 10 to 15 deaths from can-cer in the long term. For example, an NRC studyof the effects of releases from transportation ofradioactive materials in urban areas concluded thatthe maximum consequences of accidental penetra-tion of a spent fuel cask would be one cancer deathin the long term, with no early fatalities.86 A DOEstudy of transportation by truck that examined ac-cident environments much more severe than thosespecified in the regulatory tests (e. g., a collision pro-ducing a large breach in the cask and failure of allof the fuel rods, followed by a 2-hour, 1,850° F fire)concluded that the maximum number of resultingdeaths would be about 10, and that the probabili-ty of an accident of that magnitude would be lessthan 1 in 1 million per year.87

The NRC study of transportation of radioactivematerials in cities also examined the possible effectsof deliberate sabotage involving the use of explosivesto penetrate a shipping cask, to pulverize part ofthe contained material, and to disperse that mate-rial into the environment. Using conservative as-sumptions about the amount of material that couldbe released by sabotage, this study calculated thatsuch an attack on a truck cask loaded with 6-month-old spent fuel in New York City could cause fromtens to hundreds of cancer fatalites, while an at-tack on a rail cask could produce hundreds to thou-sands of cancer fatalities, depending on the precisetime and location of the attack and the weather con-ditions. 88 (While there would be no early deathsfrom radiation, the explosion itself could be ex-pected to cause about 10 deaths.89) However, a

—.. . - . —‘3eSandia Nation~ Laboratories, 7’ransportation of Radionuclides

in Urban Environs: Drafi Environmental Assessment, NUREG/CR-0743, SAND79-0369 (Washington, 11. C.: U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission, July 1980), table 3-11, p. 66.

a?pacific No fiwest Laborato~, An Assessment of the Risk of Trans-porting Spent Nuclear Fuel by Truck, PNL-2588 (Seattle, Wash.:Battelle Memorial Institute Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Novem-ber 1978), fig. 2.1, p. 2-4.

88 Sandia Nation~ Laboratories, op. cit. , table 5-20, P. 131.egIbid., table 5-20, p. 131.


more recent assessment, based on experimentsusing explosives to determine how much materialactually might escape from a cask as a result of sab-otage, concluded that, at most, 14 cancer deathsmight result in the long term, with 4 deaths ex-pected. 90

While the risk of fatalities from releases of radi-oactive material during spent fuel transportationis calculated to be very low, the economic impactsfrom a substantial release could be very high. Theseimpacts are estimated to be roughly comparable fora worst-case accident and deliberate sabotage—from $2 billion to $3 billion for an incident in aCity.91 The major costs of both are almost entirelyattributable to the denial of use of the contaminatedarea while cleanup occurs; once an area has beencontaminated to the level that nonuse is necessary,futher contamination does not appear to increasethe cost.92 By way of comparison, accidents involv-ing shipments of other common hazardous mate-rials (e. g., gasoline, anhydrous ammonia, or chlo-rine) that are less well protected and more likelyto escape if a shipping tank ruptures may be morelikely to cause significant numbers of deaths thanaccidents involving shipments of spent fuel .93 How-ever, the costs of a worst-case accident with radioac-tive waste could be higher because of the cost ofcleaning up the resulting radioactive contamina-tion, a problem that does not occur with most otherhazardous materials .94—. . . . —.—

g’JRObert P. sandoval et al., An Assessment of the Safety of SpentFuel Transportation in Urban Environs, SAND82-2365 (Albuquer-que, N. Mex.: Sandia National Laboratories, June 1983). This anal-ysis was based on experiments with fresh fuel. Similar results, in termsof the estimates of the amount of material that would escape, wereobtained in experiments using spent fuel. E. W. Schmidt et al., FinalReport on Shipping Cask Sabotage Source Tt=rm Investigation, Bat-telle Columbus Laboratories, NUREG/CR-2472 (Washington, D. C.:U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 1982).

91 Sandia National Laboratories, op. cit. The maximum direct eco-nomic impact for an accident is $2 billion (table 3-11, p. 66) whilethe maximum for sabotage is $3 billion (table 5-17, p. 128).

‘* Ibid., p. 126.g3The Probability of an accident leading to one or more deaths is

estimated to be about 2.2 in 100,000 per year for shipment of spentfuel in trucks. See Pacific Northwest Laboratory, op. cit., p. 11-3.No such accident has ever occurred. In comparison, DOT reports anumber of accidents involving one or more deaths associated with theshipment of gasoline and anhydrous ammonia in 1977 alone. DOTand DOE, Nationaf Energy Transportation Stud}., table 6-2, p. 108.

g+ Ibid, This report shows that although there were 1,500 incidentsinvolving the transportation of gasoline, leading to 21 deaths and 47injuries, the total damage came to $6,981,317.

The adequacy of the worst-case accident analy-ses that have been performed to date has been ques-tioned on the grounds that substantial uncertain-ties remain about the severity of ‘ ‘real-world’accidents and about the amount of radioactive ma-terial that might be released .95 On the other side,some argue that the analyses deal adequately withthe uncertainties by using conservative assumptionsthat tend to overestimate the consequences.96

Transportation risk analyses have not been sub-ject to the same degree of independent peer reviewas have studies of the risks of geologic disposal. Sucha review, taking into account the results of the ex-periments and studies that have been performedin the last 5 years, could help resolve some of thedisagreements about transportation safety and theadequacy of the existing regulatory structure.

Conclusions

OTA did not undertake a detailed evaluation ofrisks associated with any stage of waste manage-ment— storage, transportation, or disposal. How-ever, a brief review of the areas of disagreementbetween transportation risk analyses suggests thatmany of the arguments are based on the assump-tion that very young spent fuel (150 days old or less)is being transported— the assumption that was usu-ally made when rapid reprocessing of all spent fuelwas anticipated. Such fuel generates so much heatfrom radioactive decay that loss of the coolant usedto keep the temperature inside the cask to accept-able levels can lead to rapid overheating of the fuel,release of radioactive materials from the solid fuelpellets into the cask cavity, and subsequent escapeof those materials into the environment. It shouldbe noted that the analyses leading to the conclu-sion that the maximum consequences of a worst-case accident would be 10 to 15 cancer deaths takesuch overheating into account. Others, however,

—‘5 Resnikoff, op. cit.WA Feder~ court has reviewed NRC risk analyses and has con-

cluded that they are adequate as a basis for transportation regulations.The City of New York and the State of New York v. The United StatesDepartment of Transportation, Et Al. and Commonwealth EdisonCompany, Et Al., United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-cuit, Docket Nos. 82-6094, 82-6200, decided Aug. 10, 1983. This deci-sion overturned a lower court decision invalidating in part the DOTReg. HM- 164 governing the highway transportation of large quanti-ties of radioactive materials.


argue that much higher temperatures (and thusmuch greater release of radioactivity) could resultif fuel were shipped that has been cooled after dis-charge from the reactor less than the 120 days re-quired by NRC regulations-or if a cask were ex-posed to a fire that is longer and/or hotter than thefire specified in the regulatory test.97

These arguments could be rendered moot, or atleast greatly reduced in force, by the fact that theonly spent fuel likely to be shipped in the foreseeablefuture will be at least 5 years old, and more likelymore than 10 years old.98 As noted above, the heatoutput of 5-year-old fuel is about one-tenth that of150-day-old fuel. As a result, the maximum tem-perature of the fuel resulting from self-heating willbe much lower than is possible with young spentfuel. This has several important implications foranalysis of the risk of transporting spent fuel.

First, the consequences of a breach of a cask orfailure of its seals would be substantially reduced.Shipment of young spent fuel requires a coolant(generally water) to keep the temperature of the fuelat an acceptable level. Existing studies show thatloss of the coolant through a breach in the cask ora failed seal or valve is a principal contributor tototal risk because it leads to rapid overheating ofyoung spent fuel. Because the heat output of olderspent fuel is so much lower, no coolant is requiredin the shipping cask to keep the temperature down.In fact, old spent fuel is now shipped without cool-ant in existing shipping casks,99 and casks designedespecially for transporting older fuel will probablynot use a special coolant.loo As a result, accidentsthat could breach the cask or cause its seals to failwould not lead to a rapid increase of the fuel tem-perature, as would be the case if the coolant escapedfrom a cask carrying 150-day-old fuel.

Because self-heating from radioactive decay ismuch less of a problem with old spent fuel, fire ap-pears to be the only potential mechanism for heatingspent fuel to the high temperatures some have sug-gested could lead to major releases. One study thatargues that very large releases of radioactive ma-

gTRe9nikofl, op. cit., pp. 266-’267.98U. S. DOE, Spent FueJ and Radioactive Waste Inventories, Pro-

jections, and Characteristics, DOWRW-0006, fig. C.2, p. 284, fig.C.3, p. 285.

ggJeflerson et ~., An~ysis of Recent Council on Economic prioritiesNewsletter, p. 19.

IOOBucho]z, op. cit., p. 7.

terials could occur in a worst-case accident basesthis conclusion on the assumption that under cer-tain circumstances the temperature of the fuel mightreach as high as 2,000° F, exceeding the tempera-ture at which the fuel cladding would deteriorate(about 1,688° F). 101 Analyses of currently licensedcasks show that the hypothetical regulatory fire (30minutes at 1,450° F) would lead to an average max-imum fuel temperature of only about 1,000° F in120- to 150-day-old spent fuel.102 An analysis thatconsidered fires more severe than the regulatoryfire concluded that even a 2-hour, 1,850° F firecould produce a maximum temperature of about1,600° Fin 150-day-old spent fuel in a truck cask.103

Furthermore, this analysis indicates that the ma-jor effect of a fire of that length and temperaturewould be to cause a loss of coolant from the cask,which in turn would lead to rapid overheating ofthe fuel. This self-heating, rather than the fire itself,would cause most of the sharp temperature in-crease. 104 This situation in turn implies that a sub-stantially longer and/or hotter fire would be re-quired to produce excessive heating in old spentfuel in a shipping cask, since decay heat from thefuel would play a much less important role. Anal-ysis shows that the regulatory fire would producea maximum temperature of 660° F in 5-year-oldfuel in a rail cask designed for such older fuel. Thisis only 148° F higher than the normal operatingtemperature of 502° F. With 10-year-old fuel, themaximum temperature would be 559° F. *05

These considerations suggest that the risks oftransporting spent fuel could be substantially re-duced if only older fuel were shipped. One studycalculates that the risk from transporting spent fuelby truck in existing shipping casks could be reducedby a factor of about 6 if the fuel were cooled for4 years before shipment. 106 As noted earlier, therecould be strong economic incentives to ship olderfuel in casks that have been optimized for that pur-pose. Designing the casks for fuel that is at least10 years old would provide an additional margin

Iolsee Resnikofl, op. cit., pp. 266.267.102~e Edtin L. w~mont, Transporbatjon Accident Scenm”os, p. 1 ~.lessee pacific Northwest Laborato v, op. cit., pp. G-7—G- 11.IOtThis study c~cu]ates that 10SS of molant with no fire would Iead

to a maximum fuel temperature of 1 360° F (738° C). Addition ofa 2-hour, 1,850° F fire increased that maximum to 1,598° F, an in-crement of 238° F. Pacific Northwest Laboratory, op. cit., app. G.

IOsBucholz, op. cit., table 3, P. 22Ioepacific Northwest Laboratory, op. cit., p. 11-3.

Ch. 3—Technology of Waste Management . 67

of conservatism compared to 5-year-old fuel since,as noted, it would reduce the maximum tempera-ture reached in the regulatory fire by about 100° F.

cost

A truck cask for spent fuel shipment is estimatedto cost about $700,000, while rail casks cost up to$3.9 million.107 The total cost of shipping 1 tonneof spent fuel for a distance of 1,500 miles is esti-

IOTU<S. Depafirnent of Energy, Report on Financing the Disposal

of Commercial Spent Fuel and Processed High-Level RadioactiveWaste, DOEIS-0020, June 1983, table 3-9, p. 18.

mated to be about $21 ,000; the cost of transport-ing the high-level waste from 1 tonne of spent fuelis estimated to be about $3,000.108 Total transpor-tation costs should represent less than 20 percentof the cost of waste management. 109 These costs canbe reduced by using casks designed to ship largerquantities of older spent fuel and by using regionalrepository sites located to reduce transportation dis-tances to the greatest extent possible. 110

IOB1bid., table 3-8, p. 17.IOgIbid,, tables A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, pp. 42-45.110K. D. Kirby et ~., Evaluation of the Regional Repository Con-

cept for Nuclear Waste Disposal, USDOE OffIce of Nuclear WasteIsolation Report ONWI-62 (Columbus, Ohio: 1979), pp. 183-186.

REPROCESSING

Status of Reprocessing

The commercial nuclear power system was en-visioned originally to include reprocessing of allspent fuel and reuse of the recovered uranium andplutonium. However, while reprocessing and re-cycling can reduce the requirements for uraniumore, it will not be attractive commercially until thecost of the recovered material becomes competitivewith the cost of fresh uranium. At present, nuclearreactors are being delayed or canceled, and no neworders are being placed because of uncertaintiesabout the demand for electricity, the cost of re-actors, and other factors. 111 As a result, it appearsthat there may be an excess capacity in the uraniummining industry and uranium enrichment world-wide through the 1990’s,112 a situation that bodesill for the commercial attractiveness of reprocess-ing in the next few decades. At present, there ap-pears to be no private interest in undertaking re-processing in the United States.113 Moreover, thereis growing agreement within the technical commu-nity that large-scale commercial reprocessing willnot be attractive economically except as part of a—

11 Iu.s. ~on~ss, Ofllee of Technology Assessment, NucIear powerin an Age of Uncertainty, February 1984,

1 izcongression~ Budget OffIce, Uranium Enrichment: InvestmentOptions for the Long Term, October 1983. See also “Uranium Short-age Turns to Glut, Science, vol. 225, Aug. 3, 1984, p. 484.

“3’’ Jilted Reprocessor Vents Spleen, ” The Energy Daily, Apr. 16,1984, p. 2.

nuclear power systemand breeder reactors

including breeder reactors, 114

themselves may not becomeeconomically competitive with LWRs for dec-ades. 115

Reprocessing of commercial spent fuel is underway currently in several countries, including Franceand the United Kingdom, which are contemplatingeventual use of breeder reactors. The quickest pathfor initiating the large-scale reprocessing of com-mercial spent fuel in the United States appears tobe the completion of the Allied General NuclearServices (AGNS) facility at Barnwell, S.C. How-ever, the owners of that facility have recently aban-doned the project, and completion and operationof the plant would therefore probably require Fed-eral intervention. 116 At present, the AGNS chem -

ical separation facility, with a design capacity of1,500 tonnes/yr, and the spent fuel receiving andstorage station have been completed. Full-scaleoperation of the plant would require constructionof additional major facilities for conversion of

llqThe 1nternatiOn~ NUCleaT Fuel Cycle Evaluation (I NFCE) con-cluded that recycle of plutonium in LWR’S would be an economical-ly marginal proposition and that most countries now planning to useplutonium are planning to use breeder reactors. INFCE, SummaryVolume (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1980), p. 145.

11 sIn the United States, the experimental Clinch River breeder re-

actor project has been canceled, and European breeder programs areexperiencing increasing delays. See ‘‘ Europe’s Fast Breeders Moveto a Slow Track, ” Science, vol. 218, Dec. 10, 1982, pp. 1094-1097.

“’’’Jilted Reprocessor, ” op. cit.


recovered plutonium into solid plutonium dioxide(Pu02) and solidification and storage of high-levelwaste from reprocessing. A number of regulatoryissues must also be resolved before a reprocessingfacility could be completed and operated. Licens-ing and operation of the AGNS facility or any newreprocessing plant would require a generic proceed-ing dealing with reprocessing and plutonium recycleand a licensing proceeding to resolve site- anddesign-specific issues associated with the particu-lar facility. 117

The AGNS facility could probably be completed,licensed, and operating in about 10 years.118 Esti-mates of the cost for constructing the additional re-quired facilities at AGNS range from $580 millionto $950 million. 119 A new reprocessing facility withthe same annual capacity is estimated to cost from$1 billion to $1.6 billion, assuming a predictableschedule is maintained. 120 Since there is no experi-ence with much of the required technology at com-mercial scale in the United States, and since thereare substantial remaining regulatory uncertainties(e.g., waste solidification criteria), these schedule

and cost estimates should be viewed with caution. 121

Reprocessing for Waste Management

Because it was generally assumed until the mid-1970’s that spent fuel would be reprocessed to re-cover the usable uranium and plutonium, plans forwaste management focused on solidified high-levelwaste from the reprocessing operation. However,the increasing uncertainty about the economic in-centive for reprocessing has focused attention onthe option of direct disposal of spent fuel. In thiscontext, some have suggested that reprocessingmight be desirable as a waste management step,in view of its potential advantages over disposingof unreprocessed spent fuel—for example, 1) re-

.—11 TU.s. Department of Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and civilian

Nuclear Power: Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative SystemsAssessment Program (NASAP), vol. IV, DOE/NC-0001/4, June 1980,p. 184.

llBIbid, p. 184; Internation~ Energy Associates Limited (IEAL),Study of the Potentiid Uses of the Barnwell Nuclear Fud Plant (BNFP),IEAL-141, Mar. 25, 1980, fig. 4-13, p. 145.

] 191EAL, ~p. ~it., p. 137; DOE, Nuclear Proliferation and Civif -

ian Nuclear Power, vol. IV, p. 185.I ZODOE, Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear power, vd.

IV, p. 185.121 IEAL, op. cit. , p. 144.

moving the plutonium and uranium produces amore benign waste product with lower volume, tox-icity, and long-term heat output than spent fuel,and 2) reprocessing allows the use of potentially bet-ter disposal technologies (e. g., less soluble wasteforms or alternative approaches, such as isotopepartition and transmutation).

Despite such potential advantages, major studiesthat have considered reprocessing in the context ofwaste management have concluded that reprocess-ing of commercial spent fuel is not required for safewaste isolation. Mined repositories can be designedfor the safe isolation of either spent fuel or high-level waste from reprocessing, or both. 122 More-over, reprocessing—which generates additional ra-dioactive waste streams and involves operationalrisks of its own—does not appear to offer advan-tages that are sufficient to justify its use for wastemanagement reasons alone. 123 Thus, while large-scale reprocessing of commercial spent fuel wouldhave significant implications for waste manage-ment, those implications would not be a major fac-tor in the decision on whether to undertake suchreprocessing. Instead, the decision to reprocesswould depend on whether the recovery and recycl-ing of unused fissionable material in the spent fuelis more attractive from an economic and energypolicy point of view than using freshly mineduranium. 124

— . . . —1Z21NFCE, Summary Vo]ume, p. z 1; APS, op. cit., p. S 107; Na-

tional Research Council, Zso/atio]t System, p. 1 1; and K. D. Clossand H. Geipel, “Some Preliminary Results of the FRG (Federal Re-public of Germany) Alternative Fuel Cycle Evaluation, ” presentedat the International Meeting on Fllel Reprocessing and Waste Man-agement, Jackson, Wyo., Aug. 25-29, 1984.

1 ZJINFCE, Summary volume, ~~. 2 I: ‘‘Working Group 7 general-ly concluded, taking into account not only health and safety and en-vironmental impacts but also the ~ther assessment factors, that thedifference in the impacts of waste management and disposal amongthe reference fuel cycles does not :onstitute a decisive factor in thechoice among them. Employing technology assumed, the radioactivewastes from any of the fuel cycles studied can be managed and disposedof with a high degree of safety and without undue risk to man or theenvironment. ” APS, op. cit., p. S1 12: “Although influencing detailsof repository design, none of the factors we have identified concern-ing waste management are of dete]”mining importance in the choiceamong fuel cycles. Page S107: “In particular, arguments concerning. . . waste management are not important in deciding between recy-cle and non-recycle fuel cycle optiorls. While the Nation~ ResearchCouncil Waste Isolation System Panel concluded that adequate isola-tion could be provided for spent fuel as well as high-level waste, itdid not address the question of the implications of waste managementconsiderations for the choice of fut 1 cycles.

IZ4Aps, op. cit., p. 5 8 .


The principal reason for this conclusion is thatreprocessing and recycling do not produce a largenet improvement from a waste management pointof view because: 1) the benefits are not large, and2) reprocessing and recycling generate new wastemanagement problems that offset some of the ben-efits. This can be seen by considering some of thecomplications introduced by the two separate stepsof reprocessing and recycling.

Reprocessing Operations and Costs

Reprocessing involves dissolving the spent fuelin acid and separating the fission products andunusable TRU elements from the reusable mate-rial (uranium and plutonium). Dissolving the spentfuel has several waste management benefits evenif the uranium and plutonium are not removed forrecycling. First, it allows the radionuclides to beseparated into several streams for different typesof treatment and disposal. For example, the short-lived, hot fission products (in particular, strontium-90 and cesium-137) could be segregated for sepa-rate disposal so that the long-lived fission productsand transuranics could be disposed of without thecomplications caused by high heat output. Second,the dissolved material can then be resolidified intoa low-volubility waste form, which can reduce therate at which the waste could escape from a repos-itory if it comes into contact with ground water.

A recent National Research Council study of geo-logic disposal shows that it is these effects, ratherthan the removal of plutonium, which give high-lev-el waste from reprocessing an advantage comparedto spent fuel. This can be seen by comparing figures3-3 and 3-4, which show the study’s best estimatesof the expected doses from a basalt repository con-taining high-level waste and spent fuel, respectively.These figures show that, for the ground-water traveltimes greater than the 1,000 years required byNRC regulations, the major difference between thedoses from spent fuel and high-level waste is causedby carbon-14 (C14) and iodine-129 (1129).125 Thesetwo nuclides are released as gases when the spent

.—1zsThe doses resu]ting from the differences in content of plutonium

or uranium, and their decay daughters, like radium-226 (Ra?2G), areat much lower levels because they are expected to dissolve much moreslowly than the the waste form that contains them, and to be retardedstrongly by the material surrounding the repository so that they sub-stantially decay before they escape to the environment.

fuel is dissolved, and can then be concentrated ina relatively few packages in a chemical form thatcan limit the rate at which they dissolve into groundwater to a level far below the rate that is expectedif they are distributed uniformly throughout a largenumber of spent fuel packages. 126

The other advantage that results from dissolv-ing the spent fuel is that it is possible to resolidifythe material in a waste form that is much less solu-ble than the original spent fuel pellets. As notedearlier, several studies have indicated that this couldbe one of the most effective ways to improve re-pository performance significantly. As will be dis-cussed in chapter 6, additional work on insolublewaste forms could be useful. Recent analysis sug-gests that both spent fuel and borosilicate glass maybe unable to meet the current NRC release raterequirement for some radionuclides,127 althoughNRC can modify the requirements for some radio-nuclides on a case-by-case basis. In any case, useof a less soluble waste form for spent fuel wouldnot require removal of the plutonium and uranium,and dissolution and resolidification has been con-sidered by DOE as one method for treating spentfuel for direct disposal in a once-through fuel cy-cle. 128

Dissolving spent fuel, packaging the Ct4 and 1129

separately, and resolidifying the rest of the mate-rial in an insoluble form could thus improve ex-pected repository performance. However, the im-portant question from a waste managementperspective is whether the improvements are suf-ficient to warrant undertaking those relatively com-plex steps, if reprocessing is not otherwise beingdone anyway to recover the plutonium and urani-um. There are several considerations that underliethe judgment cited above that the advantages arenot sufficient:

1. Reprocessing involves increased near-termoperational risks. Reprocessing spent fuelwould increase the amount of handling andprocessing of highly radioactive materialsprior to disposal of the waste, increasing work-er exposures and population exposures dur-ing normal operations and producing addi-

ltbNation~ Research Council, Isolation System, p. 282.!271bid., p. 239.128DoE, FEIS, p. 4.20.


2.

tional possibilities for accidents that couldrelease radioactive material. For example,DOE analysis shows that normal waste man-agement operations for a 250-gigawatts-elec-trical (GWe) once-through cycle could be ex-pected to cause from none to 2 health effectsworldwide, while a comparable reprocessingcycle could cause from 6 to 750 health effectsworldwide, with about 95 percent of those re-sulting from predisposal waste treatment oper-ations. 129 130 This relatively certain increasein near-term operational risks would have tobe weighed against the more uncertain reduc-tion in long-term risks that could result fromreprocessing.

This same consideration also applies to anyof the more sophisticated waste-managementtechniques that reprocessing would allow, suchas use of a highly insoluble waste form, to theextent that they also involve more complexhandling and processing operations. In thisregard, a National Research Council panel re-cently concluded that the choice of solid wasteforms for high-level waste from reprocessingshould take into account the release of radioac-tivity into the environment from all stages ofwaste management, including waste formmanufacture, rather than just the differencesin expected releases after the waste is placedinto a repository.

131 Similarly, as noted, anal-ysis of the possible benefits of separating outthe long-lived, toxic TRU elements and re-cycling them along with uranium and pluton-ium so that they can be destroyed by fissionin reactors has concluded that the increase inoperational risks and complexity involvedwould offset the limited advantages.Reprocessing, or even simply dissolving spentfuel and resolidifying it in another form, pro-duces other waste forms—principally, largevolumes of TR U waste—that must also bemanaged and ultimately disposed of. 132 If re-processing were initiated before a disposal fa-

lzgrbid , pp. 7.39-7.40.l~OThe recent cerrnan fuel cycle study has alSO concluded that a

reprocessing tie] cycle would increase worker and population exposurescompared to direct disposal of spent fuel. Closs and Geipel, op. cit.

lslNation~ Research Council, Zso]ation System, p. 14.l$zsee DOE, FEIS, sec. 4.3.1 for TRU wastes produced by spent

fuel processing options and sec. 4.3.3 for TRU wastes produced byreprocessing.

3.

cility were available, it would change the na-ture of the waste-from spent fuel to high-levelwaste from reprocessing, TRU, low-levelwaste, and, perhaps, unrecycled plutonium—but would not eliminate the need for wastestorage. DOE estimates that the capital costof storage facilities at a reprocessing plantcould amount to around $350 million for 5years’ output of waste and at least $280 mil-lion for storage of separated plutonium, whichwould have to be provided unless the pluton-ium were recycled without delay. 133 In addi-tion, these large quantities of additional wasteforms could significantly increase the costs andrisks of waste transportation. 134 Finally, TRUwastes will require the same sort of long-termisolation as the high-level waste and thus maybe disposed of in the same facility. Dependingon resolution of regulatory issues, such reproc-essing wastes might require more repositoryspace than spent fuel for a given amount ofelectricity generation .135

Reprocessing could increase the costs of wastemanagement if undertaken for that purpose.It is not at all clear that there would ever bea demand for all of the plutonium that couldbe obtained by reprocessing all of the spentfuel from LWR’s, even if a system of breederreactors were operated. 136 In addition, theremay be a financial incentive to discard someplutonium after three or more recycles, in anycase, because of the buildup of undesirable ra-dionuclides. 137 If reprocessing were requiredas a waste management step, then the costs

IS9DOE, FEL$, vol. 2, app. A, tahle A.8.8, p. A. 102. ApS, op.cit., p. 62, notes that the cost of storing separated plutonium for 10years is much greater than the cost of storing spent fuel for the sameperiod.

Is+wilmot et ~., A p~fiminary Analysis, op. cit. see dso T. 1.McSweeney, R. W. Peterson, and R Gupta, “The Costs and Im-pacts of Transporting Nuclear Waste to Candidate Repository Sitesin Proceedings of the 1983 Civilian Radioactive Waste ManagementInformation Meeting (Washington, E. C.: U.S. Department of En-ergy, February 1984), pp. 351-361.

13JDOE, FEIS, p. 7.29, table 7.3.1 ). This analysis takes into ac-

count the effects of plutonium recycle on the heat output of, and thusthe repository space required for, high-level waste.

lseThe MITRE Corp,, An~ysi~ of ~udear waste DiSpOSid ~d

Strategies for Facility Deployment (McLean, Va.: April 1980), a re-port prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment; and BrianG. Chow and Gregory S. Jones, “Nonproliferation and Spent FuelDisposal Policy, ” a report prepared for the Council on EnvironmentalQuality (Marina Del Ray, Calif.: Pan Heuristics, October 1980).

137D0q FEZS, p. 7.30.


of reprocessing that were not offset by sale ofrecovered plutonium and uranium would haveto be added to the waste management costs.

Comparisons of the costs of disposing ofspent fuel and high-level waste show relativelylittle difference between the two approaches,with some studies showing an advantage forhigh-level waste and others an advantage forspent fuel. 138 For example, current DOE esti-mates show that the cost of disposal of spentfuel would be about $122 to $125/kilogram(kg), while the cost of disposing of the reproc-essing waste equivalent would be $115 to $1 19/kg; if the $8/kg cost of solidification of the high-level waste is included, total waste manage-ment costs for high-level waste would slightlyexceed the costs for direct disposal of spentfuel.139 In comparison, the costs of reprocess-ing could be several times as high. For exam-ple, DOE currently uses $390/kg as a referencecost for reprocessing LWR fuel, with a possi-ble range of from $200 to $600/kg. 140 Sincethe range of uncertainty in the cost of reproc-essing is greater than the total estimated costof waste disposal, it is highly unlikely that thevery small difference in disposal cost betweenspent fuel and high-level waste would play asignificant role in a decision about whether toundertake reprocessing.

Even if high-level waste could be disposedof for free, the cost advantage would not byitself offset the cost of reprocessing. Thus, awaste policy requirement for reprocessingspent fuel that would otherwise not be reproc-essed for economic reasons could substantiallyincrease the costs of waste management. (Thiswould be the case even if the only processinginvolved were dissolution of spent fuel and re-solidification in borosilicate glass, withoutseparating the plutonium and uranium-a stepwhich DOE estimates would increase the costof waste management in a once-through cy-cle by about 60 percent. 141)

Issrbid., p. 7. 5(I shows s]igh~y higher costs for reprocessing waste;INFCE, Summary Volume, p. 232, shows about a 10-percent advan-tage for reprocessing waste.

JJg~E, Report Orl Financing the Disposal, op. cit., p. 2.1*OU s. Depa~ment of Energy, Nuclear Ener~ Cost Data Base,

DOE/NE-0044/2 (Washington, D. C.: March 1984), table 2.12, p. 24.1+1 Derived from FEZS, table 4.9.7, p. 4.110.

Since neither EPA nor NRC have concluded thatunprocessed spent fuel would not be an acceptablewaste form, there may be little incentive for incur-ring the additional costs and operational risks ofreprocessing (or other processing) simply to im-prove repository performance beyond a level thatis already judged to be satisfactory. Similar con-siderations also would apply to any more complexand expensive waste processing steps allowed byreprocessing that promise to reduce long-term risksbelow the level presented by direct disposal of spentfuel. Reprocessing could allow use of more com-plex disposal system technologies than those pos-sible with direct disposal of spent fuel. For exam-ple, it could allow separation and separate disposalof the heat-producing, but relatively short-lived, fis-sion products from the cool, but very long-lived,transuranics, or the use of disposal systems suchas space disposal, which are not practical with spentfuel. Similarly, it could allow use of very insolublewaste forms and/or waste forms that are tailoredto the characteristics of the repository host rock.

However, unless these alternative disposal op-tions prove less expensive than simpler systems orare required by law or by regulation for safety rea-sons, they may not be used—even if reprocessingwere undertaken for resource recovery reasons. Forexample, as mentioned earlier, recent analysis hasshown that increased waste management costs, aswell as increased operational risks, would probablypreclude partition and transmutation of long-livedradionuclides in reactors, even if spent fuel werealready being reprocessed routinely.142 Similarly,if a very low-volubility waste form proved to be sig-nificantly more expensive than a more soluble butstill acceptable one (which borosilicate glass mayprove to be), it is not clear that the additional ex-penditures would be made unless there were a reg-ulatory requirement for the more expensive wasteform. The same reasoning, of course, would applyto the choice between spent fuel and reprocessedwaste as a waste form.

Effects of PlutoniumRecycle on Waste Management

So far, we have considered only the waste man-agement benefits and costs associated with chemi-

l+2(_Jroff et al. , Op. cit.


cal processing of spent fuel per se. Some of the po-tential waste management advantages of high-levelwaste compared to spent fuel result from remov-ing the plutonium and recycling it so that it is de-stroyed by fission in nuclear reactors rather thanbeing disposed of. However, like the initial step ofreprocessing, which is required for separating theplutonium in the first place, the additional step ofplutonium recycle generates waste managementproblems that offset the advantages to some extent.

First, recycle of plutonium reduces the differencebetween once-through spent fuel and high-levelwaste. As noted in chapter 2, plutonium recycle in-creases the toxicity and heat output of the resultinghigh-level waste. Thus, as recycle continues, theresulting high-level waste from reprocessing spentmixed-oxide (MOX) fuel containing recycled piu-tonium becomes more and more similar, in tox-icity and heat output, to once-through spent fuelcontaining no recycled plutonium. 143 This effect isincreased by the delay in reprocessing, which, asdiscussed in chapter 2, will also increase the tox-icity and heat output of the resulting high-levelwaste.

The effect of plutonium recycle on the heat out-put of high-level waste can be seen in figure 3-7,which shows the heat output of once-through spentfuel (SF UOZ), high-level waste with no plutoniumrecycle (HLW UO2), and high-level waste with plu-tonium recycle (HLW MOX). The heat output ofHLW MOX is actually higher than once-throughspent fuel for the first 100 years, the period duringwhich the maximum temperature increases in a re-pository are expected.144 This could reduce one ofthe advantages sometimes cited for reprocessing—i.e., its ability to reduce the volume of waste, sincethe unused uranium and plutonium (representingabout 95 percent of the volume of the spent fuel)would be separated for reuse. The actual reductionthat could be achieved will depend on the amountof heat-producing, high-level waste that can beplaced in each canister, which in turn will dependon the temperature limits established for the wastepackage and the repository and on the heat outputof the waste. The nearer the heat output of high-level waste to that of once-through spent fuel, theless the advantage of high-level waste in terms of

143DOE, EMS, p. 7.53.‘441 bid., app. K.

Figure 3=7.—Decay Heat Power for DifferentNuclear Fuel Cycles for a Pressurized Water Reactor

Time aller d scharge, years

SOURCE: Wang, et al., Thermal Impact of Waste Emplacement and Surface Cool-ing Associated With Geologic Disposal of Nuclear Waste, NUREGICR-2910 (Washington, DC: U.S. Nu:lear Regulatory Commission, 19S3).

volume and number of waste canisters. Further-more, any volume reduction that results from re-processing and recycle may not reduce proportion-ately the total amount of repository space neededto dispose of the waste from the generation of agiven amount of nuclear electricity, since it is thetotal amount of heat-producing isotopes in thewaste, rather than the waste’s physical volume, thatis the principal determinant of the total repositoryarea required.

Secondly, considerable centralized control of thenuclear power system may be needed to eliminateall of the plutonium recovered by reprocessing.While recycle destroys plutonium by fission in re-actors, it also produces plutonium from U238, sothat the total amount of plutonium present in a re-processing cycle is greater than that in the once-through cycle.145 Thus, if reprocessing and recy -

‘+slbid., p. 7.30.


cle were undertaken to reduce the amount of plu-tonium that must be disposed of compared to aonce-through cycle, careful planning and manage-ment would be needed to minimize the amount ofplutonium left when the nuclear power system iseventually phased out.

In addition, recycle may have to be continuedfor an extended period to obtain major reductionsof plutonium compared to those from a once-through cycle. For example, DOE calculates thata once-through nuclear power system that reaches250 GWe. in the year 2000 and phases out by 2040would produce about 1,900 tonnes of plutoniumto be disposed of in spent fuel. In comparison, areprocessing cycle for the same generating scenariowould produce about 3,400 tonnes of plutonium,about 1,100 tonnes of which would still be unre-cycled in 2040 even if reprocessing and recyclebegan as early as 1990.146 Clearly, nuclear powergeneration and recycle would have to be continuedconsiderably beyond 2040 to reduce the amount ofunrecycled plutonium to a small fraction of the plu-tonium discarded in the once-through cycle. Sinceit is not clear that economic factors would lead util-ities to manage their systems so as to reprocess allspent fuel and to recycle all of the recovered pluto-nium, some form of Federal intervention (e. g., aregulation requiring that utilities deliver solidified

1461 bid., tab]e 7.3.12, p. 7.31.

high-level waste for disposal, or Federal operationof reprocessing facilities and of reactors for usingthe plutonium), might be needed to minimize theamount of unrecycled plutonium.

Conclusion

Available analysis strongly supports the conclu-sion that reprocessing is best viewed as a possiblemeasure for extending energy resources rather thanas a waste management step. Analysis of the mer-its of reprocessing and recycle from the perspec-tive of energy needs is beyond the scope of thisstudy. However, it is not necessary at this time todecide when and how much spent fuel will be dis-posed of or reprocessed, since that decision will notbe faced until a disposal capability is available. Atthat time, if commercial reprocessing has not com-menced, a decision will have to be made either tomaintain the spent fuel in surface (or near-surface)storage facilities at reactor sites, repository sites,or other independent sites; to store the spent fuelin a geologic repository that could be backfilled ata later date; or to dispose of the spent fuel in minedrepositories. If that decision is to be based primar-ily on the resource value of the spent fuel ratherthan on the capability to dispose of spent fuel orhigh-level waste from reprocessing, the capabilityto dispose of both spent fuel and high-level reproc-essing waste will have to be developed. (For fur-ther discussion of this point, see issue 3 in app. B.)

INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

To manage the annual flow of spent fuel gener-ated by operating nuclear reactors, waste manage-ment will entail the construction and operation overa long period of time of some combination of thetechnologies described above. Most analyses of ra-dioactive waste management to date have concen-trated on individual components—spent fuel stor-age, transportation, or disposal-rather than ontheir integrated operation in a full-scale system. 147

Only in the last several years have the analyticaltools been developed that (if properly combined)— --

141The DOE ~~ls did Use a systems model to analyze the impactsof operation of the total waste management system.

would allow a systematic comparative analysis ofdifferent waste management system designs and op-timization of the entire system. 148 As a result, thereare a number of important questions of system de-sign for which relatively little systematic analysisexists. For this reason, OTA’S analysis of thesequestions has been based on inference from a num-

148ReCent an~ysis of waste transportation system issues concludes

that greater interaction is needed among persons involved in reposi-tory design, transportation system development, and waste genera-tion. Comments of NWTS Transportation Interface Technology PeerReview Panel, in Clinton G. Shirley, IVWTS Transportation Znter-iice Technology Development Priority Report, SAND82-1804 (Albu-querque, N. Mex.: Sandia National Laboratories, July 1983), p. 9-14.

98-948 0 - 85 - 6 : QL 3


—

ber of partial analyses, some performed specificallyfor this assessment.

A more comprehensive analysis of system designmust await development and use of an integratedsystem model that combines the partial models thathave been developed by DOE. In particular, wenote ‘that integration of the capabilities of the ex-isting Integrated Data Base149 (projections, source-terms, and process tradeoff analyses), transporta-tion systems analysis capabilities150 (routing andlogistics), repository systems analysis capabilities151

(design/cost tradeoffs), repository risk analysis152

(radiological impact of repository), and any one ofnumerous health impact models153 would result ina system model capable of performing a variety ofcost/risk/benefit/scheduling studies necessary for ef-ficient planning and operation of the waste man-agement system. The complexity of these modelsand the specialized expertise necessary to imple-ment them will likely require implementation of theintegrated model in pieces at various sites, with re-sults being communicated using computer-compat-ible methods (magnetic tapes). The importance ofdeveloping an integrated system model is discussedfurther in chapter 6.

System Impacts

Health Effects

Waste management may result in small, localizedreleases from accidents during waste handling,transportation, and storage activities prior to dis-posal. However, there appears to be little, if any,chance of massive, uncontrolled releases of radioac-tivity into the environment in a short period of timethat would cause a large number of health effects(in contrast to the possibility, however remote, ofa meltdown in a reactor). Instead, the principal ra-

*’gK. J. Notz, “Radwaste Inventories and Projections: An Over-view, ” USDOE Report ORNL/TM-8322, July 1982.

151JD. S. Joy, B. J. Hud~n, and M. W. Anthony, ‘‘Logistics Char-acterization for Regional Spent Fuel Repositones Concept, ” USDOEReport ONWI-124, August 1980.

lslL. L. C]ark ~d B. M. Cole, ‘‘An Analysis of the Cost of MinedGeologic Repositories in Alternative Media, ” USDOE Report PNL-3949, February 1982,

152D. J. Silviere et al., “A Short Description of the AEGIS Ap-preach, ” USDOE Report PNL-398, September 1980.

IS9M. Mil]s and D. VOgt, “A Summary of Computer Codes forRadiological Assessment, ” USNRC Report NUREG/CR-3209,March 1983.

biological effects during waste management priorto disposal would result from radiation doses to

workers and the public during routine operations. 154

Analyses indicate that after disposal in a geologicrepository, the two principal modes of release wouldbe: 1) small, concentrated releases produced byhuman intrusion (from digging a well either nearor into a repository) that could result in large dosesof radiation to a few individuals; or 2) the gradualrelease of radioactivity from the repository intoground water (and ultimately into drinking wateror food supplies), leading to very small doses (com-pared to background radiation) to a large portionof the population. DOE analysis calculates that nor-mal operation of a waste management system with-out reprocessing could be expected to produce, atmost, two health effects genetic disorders or fatalcancers) over a 70-year period, even if the level ofnuclear power generation increased to 500 GWe by2040.155 The addition of reprocessing increases themaximum expected health effects to 37 on a region-al basis and 1,100 worldwide for the same level ofgeneration.

156 While this is a large number in abso-lute terms, it nonetheless represents only a smallfraction (0.003 percent) of the health effects to theworld population expected to result from naturalsources of radioactivity over the same period. 157 Areview of the risks associated with nuclear power,conducted by the National Academy of Sciences,concludes that the total exposure to future genera-tions from wastes released from a repository shouldnot exceed the doses to the present generation fromnormal operation of the nuclear fuel cycle. 158

Nonradiological Impacts

Even if there are no significant direct health ef-fects from radioactive releases, management ofhigh-level radioactive wastes will have ecological,land-use, manpower, and community adjustmentimpacts. In general, the nonradiological health andenvironmental effects from constructing and oper-ating a geologic repository should be no more severethan those associated with other large construction

IS4C]oss and Geipel, op . Cit.

ISSDOE, FEZS, table 7.4.3, p. 7.40.l~G1bid., table 7.4.4, p. 7.40.‘571 bid., p. 7.39lJ8Nation~ Academy of Sciences, Risks Associated with Nuclear

Power: A Criticai Review of the Literature, Summary and SynthesisChapter (Washington, D. C.: 1979), p. xi.


projects. In particular, the anticipated nonradi-ological impacts arising from the resource and eco-nomic requirements of nuclear waste managementoccur in similar and ongoing activities associatedwith preparation of fresh nuclear fuel and coal min-ing. For example, the largest coal mines dwarfmined geologic repositories as geographically con-centrated sources of nonradiological, ecological, andcommunity impacts.

160 The waste storage and dis-posal system should add, at most, about 20 per-cent of the land area to the land area required forthe mills and reactors they serve. When all of theother facilities such as uranium mines and enrich-ment plants are taken into account, it appears un-likely that high-level radioactive waste managementwould ever require an appreciable fraction of thetotal land area serving the nuclear fuel cycle. 161

Construction and operation of waste storage anddisposal facilities are likely to have effects on nearbycommunities similar to those of mining or indus-trial warehousing. Development of a repositorycould create a noticeable increase in local popula-tion, particularly during the construction phase,that could require careful planning for expandedpublic services and housing. Such “conventional”impacts have been experienced and dealt with dur-ing industrial developments of many kinds; theyare not unique to radioactive waste management. (See table 3-5.) However, the socioeconomic im-pacts of a repository are likely to be very site-specificand difficult to predict on the basis of experiencewith other types of facilities at other sites.

A less tangible and familiar community impactof waste management and disposal would be theeffect of public concerns about the radiologicalhealth and safety risks of waste management oper-ations —concerns that would not exist to such a de-gree about more familiar industrial activities.164

— ———ISgNation~ Research Council, Social and Economic Aspects, p. 93.160 The MITRE Corp., Assessment of the Non-RadioJo~”caJ Zm -

pacts of Mana~”ng Commercially Generated Spent Fuel, April 1981,a report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, pp. 2-22,2-23.

1611 bid., p. 2-8.16zIbid., p. 2-13. See also Roger Kasperson, Anticipating the Socio-

economic Impacts of Nuclear Waste Facilities on Rural Communi-ties, Center for Technology, Environment, and Development, Worces-ter, Mass., Testimony prepared for the Rural Development Subcom-mittee of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, U.S.Senate, Aug. 26, 1980, p. 6.

lbJNation~ Research Council, Social and Economic Aspects, p. 12.1 b+steve H. Murdock, F. Larry Leistritz and R ita R. Harem, ~u -

Table 3-5.—Conventional Site Effects of a LargeIndustrial Facility

1.0 Economic Effects1.1 Change in property value1.2 Change in rental costs1.3 Change in cost of goods and services1.4 Higher property taxes1.5 Change in employment1.6 Change in prevision of jobs1.7 Change in travel costs1.8 Change in market areas and competitive position of

economic activities

2.0 Environmental and Health Effects2,1 Noise2.2 Air pollution2.3 Damage to soil quality2.4 Water drainage damage2.5 Vibration2.6 Congestion and access2.7 Accidents2,8 Aesthetic changes

3.0 Social Change Effects3.1 Social pathologies (alcoholism, drug abuse, mental

illness, divorce, juvenile delinquency)3.2 Crime3.3 Personality adjustment3.4 Affectual relations3.5 Use of community facilities3.6 Intergroup conflict3.7 Quality of public services3.8 Sense of community (includes sense of attachment,

support networks)

4.0 Location Transfer Costs and New Location Effects4.1 Searching4.2 Moving4.3 Capital financing costs4,4 Start-up and operating costs (businesses)4.5 Personality adjustment

5.0 institutional Adaptations5.1 Land-use functions5.2 Development planning5.3 Negotiations with contractors, government agencies5.4 Conflict resolution5.5 Jurisdictional issues5,6 Public service bureaucracies; direct-sewice agencies5.7 Division of responsibilitiesSOURCE: National Research Council, Sodal and Ecorromlc Aspects of Rsdlo-

active Waste Disposal (Washington, DC: National Academy Press,1984).

There might also be important community impactsresulting from the controversy that could surroundthe siting of waste facilities. 165 In any case, evidencesuggests that the public perceives radioactive wastemanagement to be qualitatively different from other

clear Waste: Socioeconomic Dimensions of Long-Term Storage(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), p. 112.

l’3s Kasperson, Anticipating the Socioeconomic Impacts.


superficially similar operations and industries. 166

This has led some analysts to conclude that a sys-tematic effort to identify and understand those im-pacts that cause the greatest public concern mightbe needed to avoid repetition of past conflicts inthe implementation of the Federal waste manage-ment program.

167 A National Research Councilpanel recently concluded that the “special” effectsassociated with the radiological aspects of radioac-tive waste management might be particularly dif-ficult to assess, but could exceed the conventionaleffects of a repository and prove difficult to miti-gate or eliminate. 168

The acceptability of waste management activi-ties to a community may depend not only on theiractual or perceived impacts but also on the benefitsthe community expects to receive from the activi-ties. While studies of the socioeconomic effects ofradioactive waste management facilities have gen-erally focused on the negative impacts, operationof a geologic repository will have some positive im-pacts as well. As with any industrial facility, therepository will bring some jobs to the community.In addition, the first repository—which is likely tobe the first such facility in the world—may well be-come an international research center on radioac-tive waste disposal for a period extending well be-yond the time when the repository ceases activeoperation. This could lead to long-term commu-nity benefits that might to some extent offset themore immediate but short-term impacts of reposi-tory construction. In fact, some communities thatare already familiar with nuclear activities and areinterested in the financial benefits of waste man-agement have indicated willingness to host wastefacilities. 169

166 Roger E. Kasperson et ~.! “Public Opposition to Nuclear En-ergy: Retrospect and Prospect, Science, Technology, and HumanValues 31, spring 1980, pp. 11-23; and J. A. Herbert et al., Non-technical Issues in Waste Management: Ethical, Znsitutional, and Po-liticai Concerns (Seattle, Wash.: Human Affairs Research Centers,Battelle Memorial Institute Pacific Northwest Division, May 1978).

‘c7Gene I. Rod-din, “The Role of Participatory Impact Assessmentin Radioactive Waste Management Program Activities, Institute ofGovernmental Studies (Berkeley, Calif.: 1981), pp. 43-44.

lbBNation~ Research Council, Social and Economic Aspects, p. 101.‘c9’’Nuclear Waste War Cry: ‘Not Here, You Don’t!’, ” U.S. News

& World Report, Aug. 15, 1983, pp. 23-24; “To Keep Their TownAlive, the Residents of Naturita, Colo. Want a Nuclear Dump, ” TheWall Street ~ournal, July 1, 1982, p. 1.

Generally, Federal activities are less attractivefinancially to local communities than those of com-mercial industry because the Federal Governmentdoes not pay local taxes. Because the adverse im-pacts of repository development and operation havethe potential for substantial harm to the host com-munity, provision of resources to reduce, mitigate,and compensate for such impacts may be re-quired. 170 Authority for this response was includedin the NWPA (see chs, 5 and 8).

Transportation

The transportation of high-level radioactive wastewill be the aspect of waste management that affectsthe largest number of States and communities. Theactual risks posed by transportation appear to below, although transportation is the predisposalwaste management step with the potential for themost serious accidental release of radioactive ma-terial. 17t The transportation of high-level radioac-tive waste through a community will place somedemands on State and local governments to main-tain some emergency response capability for ship-ping accidents, whether or not any release of radi-oactive material occurs. The actual number ofcommunities affected in this way will be highly de-pendent on the nature of the waste managementsystem that is developed—whether it is highly cen-tralized, with one large repository or interim stor-age facility operating at any one time, or decen-tralized, with several operating facilities distributedaround the country. The more centralized the sys-tem, the greater the number of communities af-fected by transportation of spent fuel from reactorsto storage or disposal.

A qualitative idea of the different transportationimplications of centralized and decentralized wastemanagement systems can be obtained by compar-ing figures 3-8 and 3-9. These figures show the pro-jected annual shipments to a single western stor-age site and to three regional storage sites in theyear 2004, assuming that 113 reactors are in oper-

ITONation~ Research Council, Social and Economic Aspects, p. 12.

See also S. A. Carries et al., Incentives and the Siting of RadioactiveWaste Facilities, ORNL-5880 (Clak Ridge, Term.: Oak Ridge Na-tional Laboratory, August 1982).

171 D(3E, FEIS, p. 4.98.


Waste Management System

n

/

Projected annual shipments to a western site in 2004, assuming truck shipments from all reactors. (Site selected for demonstration purposesonly. The site shown is only one of several western sites now under consideration for a repository, and is used as a convenient hypotheticalexampie only.) The actual number of annual shipments is likely to be lower because of use of new casks designed for eider spent fuei, whichwill carry more per shipment, and shipment of some fuel using much larger rail casks.

SOURCE: National Research Council, Social and Economic Aspects of Radioactive Waste LXsposal (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1984).

ation at that time and that all shipments are madeby truck.172 The shipments represent about 13,000spent fuel assemblies containing about 3,700 tonnesof fuel. 173 One rough indicator of the difference be-tween the centralized and decentralized systems isthe total shipping distance involved. Assuming for

. — —172These examples are drawn from a more extensive analysis of the

effects of centralized and decentralized systems on transportation inNational Research Council, Social and Economic Aspects, ch. 3. Thesites shown were selected for demonstration purposes only, to showthe effects of regional v. centralized storage or disposal. Only one ofthe sites, in southern Nevada, is now under consideration for a geologicrepository. The two eastern sites are the inoperative reprocessing fa-cilities at Morris, Ill., and Barnwell, S. C., which were considered bythe Carter administration as possible sites for Federal away-from-reac-tor storage facilities, and which were sometimes used as hypotheticalstorage sites for analytical purposes. The Nuclear Waste Policy Actof 1982 forbids the acquisition of these facilities for Federal interimstorage, and the sites have not been, and are not now, under consid-eration for geologic repositories.

17 JIbid., app. A, p. 15 ~ .

simplicity that all shipments were made by truck,the shipping distance in 2004 would be about 9 mil-lion miles for the regional system, compared toabout 33 million miles for the single western site. 174

Both the costs and risks of transportation will in-crease with the total transportation distance. Forexample, a recent analysis showed that the costsand risks (from radiation exposure and nonradio-logical accidents) would be about two to three timesgreater for a repository in the westernmost area nowunder consideration, Hanford, than for a reposi-tory in the easternmost area under consideration,the Gulf Interior region.

175 Other analysis has con-

bid, table A. 18, p. 166, and table A. 14, p. 162.i 75T. I. McSweeney et al. , “The Costs and Impacts of Transport-

ing Nuclear Waste to Candidate Repository Sites, Proceedings ofthe 1983 Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Information Meet-ing (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 1984), pp.357-359.


Figure 3=9.-Spent Fuel Shipments in a Decentralized Waste Management System

Projeoted annual shipments to regional sites In 2004, assuming truck shipments from aii reactors. (Sites selected for demonstration purposesonly. The eastern sites are not under consideration for repositories and are used as convenient hypothetical examples oniy.) The actual numberof annuai shipments is Iikeiy to be lower because of use of new casks designed for eider spent fuei, which will carry more per shipment, andshipment of some fuei using much larger rail casks.

SOURCE: National Research Council, Social and Economic Aspects of Redloactlve Waste Disposal (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 19S4.)

eluded that the costs and risks of waste transporta-tion could be reduced by as much as a factor of 2with an optimally sited system using two or threerepositories compared to a single repository. 176

cost

The aggregate costs of high-level radioactivewaste management will be in the tens of billionsof dollars, the actual amount depending on the scaleof nuclear power generation, the time that disposaloccurs, and the geologic medium used for the re-pository. DOE has estimated that if disposal beganin 2010, the cost of waste management would beup to $18 billion for the currently operating reactorsand up to $68 billion for a 250-GWe system. 177

!TSK. D. Kirby et al., Op. cit.ITTDC)E, FEIS, table 7.62, p. 7.47. Also, the most recent DOE alI~-

ysis concludes that the cost of disposing of 144,000 tonnes of spentfuel or equivalent high-level waste—about the amount expected to

These very large absolute figures are relativelysmall, however, compared to the total capital costof the nuclear power system that would be served.

Since the expenditures for waste management oc-cur substantially later than do the initial capital ex-penditures for the reactor system, discounting totake into account the time value of money reducesthe relative effect of waste management on the over-all cost of generating nuclear electricity. As a re-sult, it appears unlikely that the costs of waste man-agement could ever represent more than a relativelysmall fraction of the total cost of nuclear power gen-eration. DOE, in its analysis of waste managementalternatives for a range of nuclear power futures,

be generated by the reactors now in o xration or under construction-isbetween $18 billion and $20 billion in constant 1982 dollars. U.S.Department of Energy, Report on .rinancing the Disposid, op. cit.,p. 2.


concludes that the costs of waste managementwould add not more than 2 to 10 percent, and mostlikely not more than 3 percent, to the cost of nu-clear electricity.

178 For this reason the fees forradioactive waste disposal are likely to be small incomparison to the effects on the costs of coal-gen-erated electricity resulting from clean air regula-tions. 179

Since these fees would be seen by the utility asan annual cost, instead of an increase in the capi-tal cost of building a nuclear powerplant, it appearsunlikely that waste management costs could signif-icantly affect a utility’s decisions about whether toconstruct a new nuclear reactor. This conclusionis strengthened by the fact that the estimated costof waste disposal is small compared to the total costof fresh fuel, 180 and in fact, may be no greater thanthe range of uncertainty in the estimates of the costof fresh fuel. 181

The greatest potential cost impact of nuclearwaste management policy may not be the directcosts of the management system, but the indirectcosts that would result if problems in developmentor operation of such a system led to shutting downreactors or to a moratorium on operation of newones. For example, the cost of replacement powerfor a l-GWe reactor for 1 year could exceed theestimated cost of storing and disposing of the totalamount of high-level radioactive waste generatedfrom the operation of that reactor during its life-time. 182

Distribution of Impacts

Since waste management is apt to represent onlya small part of the total costs, logistics, and socialimpacts of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, 183 the choiceamong management systems will have little incre-mental effect on the overall impacts of nuclear pow-er generation. However, available studies have con-

] TBIbid,, pp. 7.50-7.51. An~ysis by the Congressional Budget Of-fice supports this conclusion. CBO, Financing Radioactive Waste Dis-posal, September 1982, p. 27.

‘791 bid., p. xvii.IEOA recent DOE ~~ysis shows an example leve]ized fresh fuel cost

of 7.7 mills/kWh, compared to a waste disposal fee of 1 mill/kWh estab-lished by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. U.S. DOE, NuclearEnergy Cost L?ata Base, table 4.2, p. 66.

181 MITRE, IVonradiolo@”cal Impacts, table 2-6, p. 2-20.‘821 bid., pp. 2-21.1831 bid., ch. 2.

sidered only the aggregate impacts of alternativesystems. The distribution of those impacts amongthe private sector, the Federal Government, andregions of the country has not been analyzed rig-orously, even though it underlies the equity judg-ments that are at the heart of the political decision-making process. 184 Usually, the Federal Environ-

mental Impact Statement, the primary tool foridentifying impacts, focuses almost entirely on ag-gregate impacts and not at all on their distribution.While alternative waste management systems maybe little different in their aggregate impacts, theymay differ significantly in their equity implica-tions. 185 For example, a highly centralized systemwith only one repository operating at a time couldsubstantially increase the number of communitiesaffected by waste transportation. Thus, concernsabout equity issues—in particular, the regional dis-tribution of the costs and benefits of waste man-agement— may play a major role in decisions aboutboth spent fuel management and waste disposalpolicies.

Rigorous analysis of the regional impacts of wastemanagement would require development of an in-tegrated waste system model capable of dealing withspecific sites and transportation routes. As notedearlier, although important components that couldbe used in such a model have been developed, theyhave yet to be combined.186

System Interrelationships

High-level radioactive waste management atoperational scale will involve handling highlyradioactive materials in quantities and at annualrates that are unprecedented. For example, from

—lB4Roger E, Kasperson, ‘ ‘Institutional and Social Uncertainties in

the Timely Management of Radioactive Wastes, Center for Tech-nology, Environment, and Development, Clark University, June 30,1980. Testimony prepared for the California Energy Commission forthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission Confidence Rulemaking on theStorage and Disposal of Nuclear Waste.

1 Sfsee Nation~ Research Council, Social and Economic Aspects,ch. 3.

lsGSite-swcific highway and rail routing models have been devel-oped by Oak Ridge National Laboratories. See D. S. Joy et al.,HIGHWAY, A Transportation Routing Model: Program Descrip-tion and User’s Manual, ORNL/TM-8419, December 1982; and D.S. Joy et al., ‘ ‘Predicting Transportation Routes for RadioactiveWastes, ” Waste Management 1981, vol. 1, p. 415. These are usedin Edwin L. Wilmot et al., A Preliminary Analysis. A nonsite-specilicintegrated systems model was developed for use in the U.S. DOE,FEIS, ch. 7.


the beginning of the use of nuclear power to theend of 1980, a total of about 5,000 spent fuel as-semblies were transported from reactor sites. 187

About 10,000 assemblies would have to be trans-ported each year to feed a 3,000 -tonne/yr reposi-tory.

188 Nonetheless, available analyses indicate thatthe flows of radioactive waste produced by existingand projected levels of nuclear power generationshould be manageable, provided that careful plan-ning is done to avoid bottlenecks and minimize thestrains that could result from the rapid increase intransportation and handling when a repository orreprocessing plant begins operation. 189

The annual handling capacity of the elements ofthe waste management system is as important asthe total amount of the waste in determining thebehavior of the system. For example, the buildupof spent fuel in storage is determined by the dif-ference between the rate at which spent fuel is gen-erated by reactors and the rate at which it can bereprocessed or disposed of. If the Barnwell reproc-essing plant were to begin operating at its maxi-mum capacity of 1,500 tonnes/yr in 1995, it wouldtake 20 years to reprocess the amount of spent fuelthat had gone into storage by that time. 190 It wouldtake somewhat more than the capacity of one ad-ditional plant of the same size to handle the 2,200tonnes of spent fuel expected to be generated eachyear by the reactors that will by operating in

1 BTEdWi~ L. wi]mot, Transportation Accident SCenariO& tablexxv, p. 44.

188Based on an average of 3.5 assemblies/tonne of spent fuel, derivedfrom utility projections of spent fuel discharges contained in app. Bof the U.S. Department of Energy, Spent Fuel Storage Requirements,DOE/SR-0007, March 1981.

IWDOE, FEIS; MITRE, Analysis of Nuclear Waste Disposal; Na-

tional Research Council, Social and Economic Aspects.1goDOE, SPnt Fuel and Radioactive Waste Inventories, table 1.2,

p. 30.

1995,191 Similarly, a single waste repository of thecurrent reference loading capacity, 3,000 tonnes/yr,would be sufficient to stop the buildup of spent fuelin storage, but not to reduce the backlogs veryquickly. Thus, it appears likely that up to 90 per-cent of the spent fuel generated in this century willstill be in temporary storage facilities (most of itat the original reactor basins) at the end of the cen-tury, even if the Barnwell reprocessing plant wereput into operation or a repository began direct dis-posal of spent fuel during the 1990’s.192

Increasing the annual handling capacity of thewaste management system is expensive. The capi-tal cost of a 1 ,500 -tonne/yr reprocessing plant isestimated at $2 billion, 193 and a 3,000 -tonne/yr re-pository is estimated to be about $3 billion. 194 Theinitial capital cost of a centralized spent fuel drystorage facility capable of receiving about 1,500tonnes/yr would be about $500 million, while anadditional 500-tonne/year handling module at thesame site would cost about $90 million. 195 Sinceleaving spent fuel once it has been placed in stor-age at the reactor is relatively inexpensive, as notedin the discussion of storage technology, the deci-sions about how fast and when to remove spent fuelfrom storage at reactor basins will have significantcost implications that must be considered in plan-ning for the operation of a full-scale waste man-agement system. (For further discussion, see theanalysis of the Mission Plan in ch. 6.)

‘g’ Ibid.lgzIbid., fig. C.2, p. 284; fig. ~.3, p. 285.193DoE, Nuc]ear Energy Cost Data Base, table 2.13, P. 27 (1983

dollars).fWDOE, Report on Financing the Dispowd, table 3-4, p. 13 ( 1982

dollars).19SD, E. Rasmussen, Compari: on of Cask and Drywell Storage,

op. cit., table A.27, p. A.28 (19[12 dollars).

Chapter 4

History of Waste Management:Setting the Stage

Contents

Page

Development of Federal Waste Management Policy and Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83Early History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......,.....’....”.. ......”....”......s.... 83Recent History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....’...” ...”........”’.... 85

P r o b l e m s f o r W a s t e M a n a g e m e n t P o l i c y . . . . . . . . . * . . . . * * * . . . . . . . . 8 8Key Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ’ . . . . . . . . . . . . .............”.. 88Complicating Factors.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............””. 90

Chapter 4

History of Waste Management:Setting the Stage

When the 97th Congress convened in 1981,almost four decades into the nuclear era, about 160U.S. commercial nuclear plants had been built orapproved for construction, and approximately6,700 metric tons (tonnes) of commercial spent nu-clear fuel containing radioactive waste had alreadybeen generated. Yet the United States still had notdecided how radioactive waste should be dealt withfrom point of generation to point of final isolation.As a result, a host of problems had arisen that bothcomplicated the task of developing a credible andcomprehensive waste management program andcast a cloud of uncertainty over the future of nu-clear power in the United States.

The passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of1982 (NWPA) in the final hours of the 97th Con-gress represented a major watershed in the evolu-tion of radioactive waste management policy in theUnited States. The decisions made in NWPA about

how radioactive waste should be managed wereinfluenced not only by technical and institutionalcapabilities but also by perceptions of those capa-bilities—perceptions formed by the historical ex-perience of waste management. To understand howthese perceptions affected the development of wastemanagement policy and to avoid the pitfalls of thepast in implementing that policy, it is necessary toexamine the history and effects of past radioactivewaste management policies and practices. 1 Thischapter will provide that background. The provi-sions of NWPA will be described and analyzed inchapter 5.

‘This chapter draws on Radioactive Waste Management PolicyMaking, a more detailed analysis of the history of the U.S. waste man-agement program by Daniel Metlay, included as app. A of this re-port. For brevity, references to that appendix are omitted (except fordirect quotations), and only references to other sources are cited inthis chapter.

DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL WASTE MANAGEMENTPOLICY AND PROGRAMS

Early History (1945-75)

Sources of Radioactive Waste

High-level radioactive waste was first producedon a large scale in the wartime effort of the early1940’s to produce plutonium for atomic weapons.Spent fuel from defense reactors was routinely re-processed to recover uranium and plutonium, andliquid high-level waste from reprocessing was storedin storage tanks at Federal facilities-first at Han-ford, Wash., and later at Savannah River, S. C.,and Idaho Falls, Idaho. It was assumed that dis-posal could take place later, possibly at these samesites.

In 1954 the Atomic Energy Act opened the nu-clear power industry to private enterprise, and the

first contract for a commercial reactor was issued2 years later. Unlike defense reactors, commercialreactors were designed primarily to produce elec-tricity. Spent fuel discharged from commercial re-actors was stored in water-filled basins at reactorsites, pending development of a commercial reproc-essing facility.

Climate of Policymaking

Overseeing the burgeoning commercial nuclearindustry was the Atomic Energy Commission(AEC), established by the Atomic Energy Act of1946 to promote as well as regulate the nuclearindustry’s defense and commercial functions.AEC’s five members were appointed by the Presi-dent for 5-year terms. They in turn were overseen

83


by the congressional Joint Committee on AtomicEnergy (JCAE).

During the 1950’s and 1960’s, waste manage-ment received relatively little attention from poli-cymakers. Issues of waste management paled besidethe exciting, pressing challenges of reactor devel-opment and research. In addition, the early regu-lators and developers of nuclear power viewed wastedisposal primarily as a technical problem that couldbe solved when necessary by application of existingtechnology. This belief was buttressed by the 1957report of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),which concluded that high-level radioactive wastecould be disposed of in a variety of ways and sitesin the United States. * Testimony of Federal andcivilian experts in the 1959 oversight hearings byJCAE further endorsed this view. Daniel Metlaydescribes the effect of such technical optimism:

An illusion of certainty was created where, inreality, none existed. Over the years, the sense oftechnological optimism embedded itself in the atti-tudes and thoughts of important agency policymak-ers. It became, in a sense, an official doctrine atAEC. There is no evidence that its validity was everseriously questioned until the mid-1970’s, This op-timism facilitated fragmentation by lulling policy-makers; agency personnel never fully recognizedthat they might create in a sequential, incrementalfashion an elaborate technological structure (civil-ian nuclear power), only to find that the last piecescould not be made to fit. The difficulties of inte-grating the whole were systematically underes-timated.3

As a result of these beliefs and attitudes, commit-ments of budget and personnel to the managementof radioactive wastes were woefully inadequate,forcing key personnel to make stopgap decisions.Moreover, key officials tended to ignore signs thata technical approach was not working and to dis-count the nontechnical factors that impeded pro-gress. Later, when it became apparent that morecomprehensive action was needed to isolate waste,the organizational and technical structures were notprepared to respond rapidly enough. Althoughsome decisions made during this time later provedto be unfortunate, at the time they were made,

‘National Academy of Science/National Research Council, The Dis-posal of Radioactive Waste on Land, 1957.

3App. A, Q. 203.

many appeared at least reasonable and, given theconstraints at work, the most appropriate possible.

Reprocessing and Storage

The country’s first large-scale efforts in wastemanagement were defense-related and involved thereprocessing of spent fuel and the storage of liquidwastes from that reprocessing in carbon steel tanksdesigned to last 50 to 100 years. From 1957 to 1973,however, premature corrosion of the tanks resultedin a series of well-publicized leaks at Hanford andSavannah River. An attempt at Hanford to preventfurther leaks by solidifyng the wastes created a solidthat remains in the tanks today and may be verydifficult, if not impossible, to remove for ultimatedisposal.

In 1963, AEC authorized the construction of thefirst commercial reprocessing plant, the NuclearFuel Services (NFS) facility at West Valley, N.Y.During its 6 years of operation (1966-72), the NFSplant experienced several problems. For one, thelack of enough commercial spent fuel forced the fa-cility to reprocess well below capacity, and to re-process defense fuel that it was not designed to han-dle, causing damage to equipment and other tech-nical problems. In addition, the plant received ad-verse publicity about its offsite leaks of radioactivewaste and about radiation exposure to some of itsworkers.

In 1970, AEC proposed new regulations thatcommitted the Government to develop repositorieson Federal land and required that, for safety, liquidhigh-level waste be solidified within 5 years of itsgeneration and transported to the repository within5 years after solidification. Partly to meet these newregulations, the NFS plant was closed in 1971 formodifications. For financial reasons the plant neverreopened, and the 612,000 gallons of liquid wastesfrom its reprocessing operations remain in storagetanks at the site.

A second commercial reprocessing plant, builtby General Electric at Morris, Ill., never operatedbecause of technical and design problems. A thirdplant, the Allied General nuclear Services (AGNS)facility in Barnwell, S. C., was still under construc-tion in April 1977, when commercial reprocessingwas suspended indefinitely by the Carter admini-stration. Since the operations ceased at West Val-

Ch. 4—History of Waste Management: Setting the Stage 85

ley, no reprocessing of commercial spent fuel hasoccurred in the United States.

Disposal

AEC first addressed the problem of waste dis-posal in 1955 when it asked NAS how to structureresearch to establish a scientific base for the wastemanagement program. Under the assumption thatthe waste to be disposed of would be dissolved atrelatively low concentrations in liquid, NAS statedin its 1957 report that disposal was technologicallyfeasible and that stable salt formations appeared tobe the most promising repository medium. Suchformations would theoretically prevent transport ofliquid and would become self-sealing in the eventof a fracture. The commitment to salt became acornerstone of waste disposal policy for the next 20years.

In the 1960’s, improved reprocessing techniquesreduced the volume and increased the thermal andradiation content of reprocessed wastes. To test theeffect of these new characteristics on salt, 14 spentfuel assemblies and several heaters to raise the tem-perature of the salt were emplaced from 1965 to1967 in the abandoned Carey Salt Mine at Lyons,Kans. The experiment, called Project Salt Vault,was conducted in an atmosphere of goodwill amongFederal, State, and local officials: State and localofficials were consulted about various aspects of theexperiment, public tours of the mine were givenduring the experiment, and the wastes were re-moved at the end of the experiment, as promised.The results of this experiment showed no measur-able evidence of excessive chemical or structuraleffects on the salt, a fact which became important2 years later when the need suddenly arose to finda disposal site quickly.

In 1969, a fire at the Federal weapons compo-nents facility in Rocky Flats, Colo., left a large vol-ume of low-level, plutonium-contaminated trans-uranic waste. Following standard procedures,officials sent the wastes to the National Reactor TestStation in Idaho for storage. Concerned that theirState had become a dumping ground for waste fromColorado, Idaho’s political leaders appealed to AECChairman Glenn Seaborg, who pledged to removethe waste by 1980. That promise, as well as thecommitment to disposal expressed in the AEC reg-

ulations mentioned above, spurred AEC to searchfor a geologic repository site. The Lyons site wasselected because:

●

●

●

some, albeit very little, information had beengathered about the site during Project SaltVault;a favorable reception by the local citizenryseemed likely; andinvestigations needed to prove the acceptabil-ity of the other sites would have delayed re-pository development by 2 years.

AEC announced in 1970 that, pending confirma-tory tests, the Lyons site had been selected for thefirst full-scale repository. Although the degree towhich AEC had consulted with State and local offi-cials before this announcement is in dispute, AEC’Sdecision did not have full endorsement from theseofficials. Moreover, State and local political opposi-tion to the Lyons site was intense, particularly whentechnical problems with the site became apparent.The Government abandoned plans for Lyons 2years later because AEC was unable to convincecritics that the many mining boreholes throughoutthe site could be plugged reliably and because noone could account for the disappearance of a largevolume of water flushed into a nearby mine.

Left without a repository, AEC requested theU.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to search for addi-tional repository sites for defense wastes. It alsoproposed building a series of aboveground struc-tures, called retrievable surface storage facilities(RSSFs), to store commercial high-level wastes fora period of decades while geologic repositories weredeveloped. The environmental impact statementissued by AEC in support of the RSSF conceptdrew intense criticism by the public and by theEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA) becauseof concerns that the RSSFs would become low-budget permanent repository sites, As a result,AEC abandoned the RSSF concept in 1975,

Recent History

Climate of Policymaking

After the mid-1970’s, significant changes oc-curred in waste management. EPA issued its firststandards-those for the preparation of reactor fuel,


for reactor operations, and for reprocessing of spentfuel—and announced its intention to develop stand-ards for the disposal of nuclear waste. The EnergyReorganization Act of 1974 abolished AEC and dis-tributed its developmental functions to the new En-ergy Research and Development Agency (ERDA),later changed to the Department of Energy (DOE),and its regulatory functions to the new NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC). JCAE was dis-banded and its role assumed by a variety of con-gressional committees. These events marked thechange to a formal process of regulating the stor-age and disposal of high-level wastes. Thus, ERDA(later, DOE) would select a disposal site and de-sign a facility to meet regulations promulgated byNRC in accordance with EPA standards.

By the late 1970’s, the problem of waste isolationhad captured the focus of the Federal Government,which began to allocate substantial personnel andfunds to its solution. Although many decisionmak-ers still contended that managing high-level radioac-tive wastes was not technically difficult, they in-creasingly recognized the nontechnical aspects ofthe problem and worked to develop a firmer tech-nical base from which to make decisions.

Disposal

DEFENSE WASTE

The abandonment of the Lyons site left the Gov-ernment without a repository for the nuclear wastesfrom Rocky Flats. To fill that need, ERDA offi-cials in 1974 selected a site near Carlsbad, N. Mex.,for construction of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant(WIPP), a pilot repository for defense transuranicwaste. Initially, State and local officials supportedWIPP because of its potential for boosting the econ-omy of an area hard hit by the decline in the pot-ash industry.

Then in 1977, the Government made the firstof several dramatic changes in the scope and mis-sion of WIPP: it considered the emplacement ofdefense high-level waste at the facility.4 To ensurerepository safety, ERDA also promised the licens-ing of the repository by NRC. Angered by the

‘This discussion of the history of WIPP is drawn from Jackie L.Braitman, Nuclear Waste Disposal: Can Government Cope? (SantaMonica, Calif.: The Rand Corp., December 1983), pp. 116-121.

changes in scope, the New Mexico House of Rep-resentatives came with in three votes of passing aconstitutional amendment banning disposal of out-of-State nuclear waste. ‘Under fire, DOE promisedNew Mexico officials veto rights over WIPP.

Relations were further strained in February 1978when DOE recommenced the emplacement of upto 1,000 commercial spent fuel assemblies at WIPP.Local opposition arose over the increased hazardspromised by the inclusion of spent fuel; over thechange in nature of the repository from pilot to per-manent; and over the perception that New Mexico,which had no commercial reactors, would assume adisproportionate responsibility for the Nation’scommercial nuclear waste. Moreover, critics ac-cused DOE of putting aside technical considera-tions to use WIPP to satisfy laws, passed by Califor-nia and under consideration in other States,requiring that a demonstrated high-level waste dis-posal technology approved by the Federal Govern-ment must exist before additional reactors couldbe constructed.

During 1978 and 1979, Congress rejected theproposals for NRC licensing and State veto powersfor WIPP. These actions weakened the credibilityof DOE, which had promised those provisions toNew Mexico. In 1980 President Carter proposedthat WIPP be terminated but that the site (nowcalled the Los Medanos site) be retained as a candi-date for a future repository. Congress refused toterminate WIPP, reactivating it as an unlicenseddefense facility primarily for disposal of transuranicwaste from Rocky Flats and for defense high-levelwaste research. Site characterization activities atWIPP, including the construction of a large shaftand exploratory tunnels, are now underway.

COMMERCIAL WASTE

For disposal of commercial high-level waste,ERDA developed the National Waste TerminalStorage (NWTS) program in 1975. The programinvolved a multiple-site survey of undergroundgeologic formations in 36 States and was designedto lead to the development of six pilot-scale reposi-tories by the year 2000--the first in salt, the restin other geologic media. This change from preoc-cupation with salt reflected new views about whatconstituted an effective repository. As formally

Ch. 4—History of Waste Management: Setting the Stage ● 8 7

expressed in 1978 in “Circular 779”5 by severalUSGS scientists and also in a study by the Ameri-can Physical Society,6 the effectiveness, or integrity,of a repository could be considered dependent onthe combination of the emplacement medium andits environment, rather than on the emplacementmedium alone. With that view, salt, although stilla strong contender, might not be the only choicefor a geologic repository. Moreover, the staff ofNRC contended that “it would be highly desirableto place major, if not primary, importance on thewaste form itself, its packaging, and the local waste-rock interface. 7

The responses of State officials to DOE’s plansfor the NWTS program varied. Some States ex-cluded ERDA from even exploring potential repos-itory locations. Others were reluctant to welcomeERDA until further studies were completed. Thus,what began as a fresh start in the area of waste man-agement soon got mired down in the reluctance ofState officials even to contemplate a facility on theirsoil.

Because of lower-than-requested funding andpolitical opposition from the States, schedulesslipped repeatedly as the Government was forcedto cut the program drastically. By 1980, active siteevaluation research was being undertaken only inLouisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, Utah, andWashington.

Recent Waste Management Policy

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

Partly to ease the utilities’ growing burden ofspent fuel storage, President Carter announced inhis spent fuel policy in 1977 that title to spent fuelwould be transferred to the Government and thatthe spent fuel would be transported at utilityexpense to a Government-approved away-from-reactor facility for storage until a repository becameavailable. A one-time fee for Government storageand disposal would be charged to the utility. To

— .‘J. D. Bredehoeft, A. W. England, D. B. Stewart, N. J. Trask,

and 1. J. Winograd, ‘ ‘Geologic Disposal of High-Level RadioactiveWastes—Earth Sciences Perspectives, Geological Survey Circular#779, U.S. Geological Survey, 1978.

“’Report to the American Physical Society by the Study Groupon Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Waste Managcmcnt, Reviews of hfocf -ern Physics, vol. 50, No. 1, pt. 11, January 1978.

7App. A, p. 219.

limit the availability of weapons-grade material,President Carter extended the moratorium on re-processing, set in the Ford administration in 1976,by suspending indefinitely the reprocessing of com-mercial spent fuel in the United States. The policyalso offered to provide limited storage and disposalof foreign spent fuel, if necessary to meet nonpro-liferation objectives, and committed substantial re-sources to development of mined geologic reposi-tories.

To help develop his administration’s policy onlong-term nuclear waste management, PresidentCarter established in 1977 the Interagency ReviewGroup (IRG), composed of representatives from14 Government agencies. IRG submitted its reportin 1979, and in 1980 President Carter ratified theunanimous conclusions of IRG, recommending:

1. proceeding with the geologic disposal pro-gram;

2. increasing State and Indian tribe involvementin repository siting;

3. preparing a detailed National Plan for Nucle-ar Waste Management; and

4. developing better participation programs forthe general public and the technical com-munity.

In addition, he required characterization of moresites in a variety of media prior to submission ofa license request to NRC, an issue on which IRGhad been unable to reach a consensus.

To formalize the relationship between DOE andthe States, IRG formulated the concept of ‘consul-tation and concurrence, first proposed by the Na-tional Governors’ Association. Under this concept,a State would be consulted by the Government andgiven the opportunity to concur with each step indeveloping a repository. By not concurring, a Statecould effectively exercise a veto. To advise the Fed-eral Government on key radioactive waste man-agement issues, President Carter created the StatePlanning Council (SPC), a 14-member council ofGovernors, State legislators, an Indian tribal gov-ernment representative, an observer from NRC,and representatives from DOE, the Department ofTransportation, and EPA. SPC recommended thata State’s nonconcurrence be overridden, or pre-empted, by the Federal Government only througha Presidential determination backed by both Housesof Congress.


96TH CONGRESS

Nearly 50 bills concerning waste managementwere introduced in the 96th Congress. The Sen-ate passed a bill which emphasized developmentof long-term, monitored storage facilities that per-mitted the retrieval of the emplaced waste. TheHouse passed a bill that focused on a timetable fordevelopment of mined repositories. However, noacceptable compromise could be reached betweenthe two bills, largely because of disagreements aboutthe power States should be given with respect tositing of defense waste repositories. 8 As a result,the effort to pass comprehensive high-level radioac-tive waste management legislation during the 96thCongress failed.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

In 1981 the Reagan administration declared itssupport for nuclear power and declared an ‘ ‘intentto demonstrate the permanent storage of high-levelradioactive waste as soon as possible. The admin-istration lifted the ban on commercial reprocess-ing, and DOE adopted the assumption that the ref-erence waste form for disposal would be solidifiedhigh-level waste rather than spent fuel. However,DOE efforts to encourage private investment in re-

aBoth Houses agreed that the host State’s objection would be sus-tained with regard to a repository for commercial high-level waste ifeither the House of Representatives or the Senate affirmatively con-curred, but they were unable to agree to a procedure for dealing witha State’s objection to a repository for defense high-level waste.

‘This description of the waste management policy of the Reaganadministration is drawn from the statement of Kenneth Davis, Dep-uty Secretary of Energy, before the Subcommittee on Energy and theEnvironment, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. Houseof Representatives, July 9, 1981.

processing have been unsuccessful. The Reagan ad-ministration also withdrew the Carter administra-tion’s offer to provide Federal storage facilities forspent fuel and left utilities with the primary respon-sibility for storing spent fuel until reprocessing ordisposal facilities are developed.

With regard to repository siting, the Reaganadministration reduced to three the number of sitesthat were to be examined prior to selecting a firstsite for licensing; the Carter administration hadplanned to evaluate four to five sites before makingthe selection. The three sites were expected to bein basalt formations at Hanford, in volcanic tuffat the Nevada Test Sitej and in a salt formationat a site to be determined in 1983. Constructionof exploratory shafts for in situ testing was plannedto begin in 1983. After completion of the shafts in1985, one of the three sites was to be selected forthe development of an unlicensed test and evalua-tion facility for development of waste emplacementtechnology. This facility was planned to be readyto accommodate up to 200 to 300 packages of solid-ified high-level waste by 1989.

The first license application for a full-scale facil-ity was expected to be submitted to NRC by 1987or 1988. Review of the license application wouldbe conducted by NRC in parallel with further de-velopment of the unlicensed test and evaluation fa-cility. The first repository was expected to be con-structed and licensed for operation between 1998and 2001. 1°

IOA siml]ar schedu]e was u]timate]y incorporated in NWPA and isdiscussed at greater length in chs. 5 and 6.

PROBLEMS FOR WASTE MANAGEMENT POLICY

Key Policy Issues

Two major related waste management issuesfaced the 97th Congress when it began to considerradioactive waste legislation in 1981:

1. What to do about final isolation of the highlyradioactive waste produced by nuclear re-

2.

actors, which is contained for the present inthe spent fuel discharged by those reactors.What to do with the growing inventories ofthat spent fuel now stored at the reactors,given the uncertainties about when (or evenwhether) it would prove worthwhile to reproc-ess them, and when final isolation facilitieswould be available.


Final Isolation

The central issue that was to be resolved concern-ing final isolation was how strong a commitmentto make to the development of a waste disposal tech-nology that, unlike storage, would not require con-tinued human control and maintenance to assuresafe isolation.

11 Some argued that a disposal sys-

tem should be developed with all deliberate speed.Others argued that a long period of interim stor-age (many decades) should be planned before de-veloping a disposal system so that more optionscould be made available and uncertainties aboutthe economic value of spent fuel could be resolvedbefore selecting a disposal techology for develop-ment. Still others argued that storage itself is asatisfactory approach to final isolation, so no dis-posal system is needed. Although DOE made a for-mal decision to proceed with the development ofmined geologic repositories, this decision had notyet been endorsed by Congress, and a bill passedby the Senate in the 96th Congress contemplatedextended storage in monitored retrievable storagefacilities as an alternative to rapid development ofa disposal system. OTA’s analysis indicated thatuntil there was a clear resolution of this issue inlaw, continued instability in the direction of thewaste management program was possible. *2

There was considerable disagreement over thedegree to which the future use of nuclear powershould depend on the development of an accept-able program for final waste isolation. Some arguedthat the United States should make no significantnew commitments to nuclear power—and hence tothe generation of more waste—until the safe andfinal isolation of nuclear waste could be demon-strated. Others argued that the technology for safe,final isolation was available and that there was notechnical justification for restricting waste genera-tion. Nonetheless, they argued that a demonstrationof final isolation was needed to allay public concernsthat threatened the continued growth of nuclearpower. From either point of view, it was seen asimportant to resolve the existing uncertainties aboutfinal isolation of radioactive waste.

I )An extensive discussion of this subject is found in issue 1 of app. B.‘ZOTA testimony before the House Committee on Science and Tech-

nology, Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production, Oct. 5,1981.

Even among those Who agreed that developingthe capability to dispose of—rather than store—ra-dioactive waste was necessary to stop the issue frombecoming an encumbrance on the use of nuclearpower, there was substantial disagreement abouthow to demonstrate this capability and about theurgency of doing so. Some believed that the currentbasis of knowledge about mined geologic reposi-tories was adequate to permit an acceptably saferepository to be sited and constructed quickly. Theyargued for rapid development of a repository (andperhaps an earlier unlicensed demonstration facil-ity into which a small amount of waste would beemplaced) to allay what they perceived to beunfounded public concerns about waste disposal.Others believed that more time would be neededto develop sufficient confidence in a repository de-sign and site. They contended that emplacementof waste in a demonstration facility would not byitself allay public concerns and feared that pressuresfor rapid action could lead to a premature commit-ment to an inadequate repository site or design or,at the very least, would lead to actions that wouldjeopardize the credibility of the Federal waste dis-posal program.

Some argued that resolving disagreements aboutthe technical feasibility of waste disposal would not,in itself, be enough to remove disposal as an issueaffecting the use of nuclear power, Demonstratingthe Federal Government’s institutional capacity tocarry out the difficult effort required to build andoperate a safe and reliable waste isolation systemmay be as important as demonstrating the techni-cal capacity to dispose of waste.

Interim Spent Fuel Storage

The fact that neither reprocessing nor a Federalwaste repository was likely to be available for a dec-ade or longer meant that it would be necessary toprovide interim storage for large quantities of spentfuel for at least the rest of the century. This posedtwo key problems for utilities, which led some toseek Federal assistance in providing that storage.First, reactors were running out of storage space,and it was clear that some might have to shut downby the mid-1990’s unless more storage space weremade available—even if existing basins were ex-panded as much as possible and if utilities wereallowed to ship spent fuel to unfilled basins at other


reactors. 13 Some utilities would face serious prob-lems by the late 1980’s if such shipment were notallowed. Because of the relatively long leadtimesneeded for the construction and licensing of newstorage facilities, these utilities needed to knowwithin a few years whether they would have to pro-vide such facilities themselves.

Second, the fact that there was no firm schedulefor either reprocessing or turning spent fuel overto the Federal Government left the utilities com-pletely in the dark about how much additional stor-age capacity they would have to provide, when theywould be able to end their liability for the growinginventories of spent fuel, and how much the totalcost would be for storing and disposing of that fuel.There was increasing opposition to efforts to pro-vide additional storage capacity because of fear thateasy availability of interim storage would reducethe pressures for developing a Federal disposal sys-tem, thus turning interim storage facilities into per-manent waste repositories. This opposition, in turn,had increased utilities’ fears that they might not beable to gain approval for additional storage facili-ties quickly enough to prevent reactor shutdowns.

Concern about the utilities’ capacity to provideadditional interim storage quickly enough to pre-vent reactor shutdowns, especially in the face of theGovernment’s failure to develop disposal facilities,led some to argue that the Federal Governmentshould provide away-from-reactor storage facilitiesto give utilities one sure way to get rid of spent fuelonce their existing basins were full. 14 Others arguedthat the utilities should be responsible for interimstorage, while the Federal Government concen-trated on the disposal program. While the Carteradministration proposed that the Federal Govern-ment acquire an away-from-reactor facility, the96th Congress did not authorize it, and the Reaganadministration focused, instead, on helping the util-ities provide their own additional storage.

Complicating Factors

Linkage to Broader Issues

Resolution of disagreements about commercialwaste management policy has been complicated bylinkages to broader issues: the use of nuclear power,the future of reprocessing, and the disposition ofhigh-level waste from defense activities. OTA’s re-view of the history of waste management showedthat disagreement over these broader issues was amajor reason for the past inability of the FederalGovernment to devise a stable policy for dealingwith commercial wastes, and suggested that suc-cessful adoption and implementation of such a pol-icy would be easier if the policy were neutral re-garding the resolution of these broader issues.

THE USE OF NUCLEAR POWER

In the mid-1970’s, the public began to challengethe wisdom of developing a nuclear power indus-try unconstrained by the status of waste manage-ment. As noted in a memorandum for a JCAE pol-icy session:

. . . the uncertainties concerning the location of therepository are already adversely affecting public ac-ceptance of nuclear power, and it is possible thatthis aspect of the overall nuclear program couldbecome an unnecessarily important negative factorin the Nation’s ability to consider its nuclear optionto power generation. 15

While there is strong disagreement about wheth-er there should be any formal linkage in Federallaw between progress in developing a final isola-tion program and the operation of nuclear reactors,there already is such a linkage in some State lawsand in NRC policy. In 1976 California passed alaw, upheld by the Supreme Court in 1983,16 thatmade the siting of reactors in that State contingentupon Federal Government assurance that the dem-onstrated technology or means for disposal of high-level waste existed. In addition, the Natural Re-

~ssuch shipment between reactor pools is referred to as ‘‘transship-m e n t .

14An extensive discussion of this issue is found in issue 4, zipp. B.

“@p. A, p. 225.I bpacjfic Gas & Electric CO. v. St~~te Ener~ Resources Conserva-

tion and Development Commission, 1 U. S.L. W. 4449 (Apr. 20, 1983).

Ch. 4—History of Waste Management Setting the Stage ● 91

sources Defense Council petitioned NRC to con-duct a rulemaking proceeding to determine if high-Ievel waste could be disposed of without undue riskto the public health and safety and to refrain fromlicensing reactors until such a determination wasmade. In denying the petition, a position upheldin court, NRC stated that it ‘ ‘would not continueto license reactors if it did not have reasonable con-fidence that the wastes can and will in due coursebe disposed of safely. “17 In 1981 NRC announcedits intention to conduct a generic proceeding ‘ ‘toreassess its degree of confidence that radioactivewaste produced by nuclear facilities will be safelydisposed of, determine when any such disposal willbe available, and whether such wastes can be safelystored until they are safely disposed of. As a re-sult of this ‘‘Waste Confidence’ proceeding, NRCconcluded in 1984 that there is reasonable assur-ance: 1 ) that safe disposal of high-level waste andspent fuel in a geologic repository is technically fea-sible, and 2) that one or more mined geologic re-positories would be available in the 2007-2009 timeframe. 18

An analysis of the merits of proposals to limitthe use of nuclear power pending progress on wastedisposal involves questions of energy policy that arebeyond the scope of this OTA study. 19 However,currently operating reactors, which have alreadydischarged more than 10,000 tonnes of spent fuel,would generate around 55,000 tonnes by the endof their operating lives, even if no additional re-actors were licensed for operation. The waste in thisspent fuel must be isolated safely, regardless of thefuture of nuclear power. However, the nuclearwaste problem is only one of a number of difficultiesinhibiting the expanded use of nuclear power,20 andresolution of that problem by itself may not be suf-ficient to sway decisions in favor of new reactororders. 21 Nonetheless, if the other difficulties areresolved, it appears likely that the degree of pro-—— —.. . . . -

‘7t@. A, p. 227.1 au S, Nuc]car ReWlatoV Commission, 10 CFR Parts 50 and 50,

i ‘Wasic Confidence Decision, “ Federal Register, vol. 49, No. 171,Aug. 13, 1984, pp. 34658-34688.

l~This issue was not addressed in the NWpA.zo,~’uc]ear Power in ~ Age of uncertainty (Washington, D. C.: U.S.

Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-E-216, February1984). See also Graham Allison et al., “Governance of Nuclear Power”(Cambridge, Mass.: Energy and Environmental Policy Center, Har-vard University, December 1981).

ZIA1lison et d., op. cit., p. 43.

gress in the final isolation program in the next dec-ade could affect decisions about the future use ofnuclear power, whether or not there is a formallinkage between the two subjects. If a policy canbe adopted, maintained, and implemented steadilyand successfully over an extended period it can beexpected to have a positive effect on attitudes aboutnuclear power. Continued delays and shifts of direc-tion, or discovery of major unforeseen technicalproblems, could have a negative effect on the will-ingness of utilities to invest in new reactors.

REPROCESSING AND THE POTENTIALECONOMIC VALUE OF SPENT FUEL

In OTA’s view, the uncertainty about when, ifever, it will become economical to reprocess spentfuel has unnecessarily complicated Federal decisionsabout interim spent fuel storage and about finalwaste isolation. Some have argued, for example,that because spent fuel is a potentially valuable re-source, the capacity to dispose of spent fuel neednot— and should not—be developed until a cleardecision on reprocessing is made. Extended or per-manent storage has been proposed instead of dis-posal as a means of ensuring that the potential eco-nomic value of spent fuel is indefinitely preserved.However, the development of a disposal capacitywill take more than a decade, and even when it isdeveloped, spent fuel does not have to be disposedof irretrievably. Thus, the major decisions facingthe 97th Congress did not concern the advisabilityof disposing of spent fuel, since the capacity to doso did not yet exist; rather, they concerned whenand at what rate the capacity to dispose of wastewould be made available, and what provisionswould be made for the storage of spent fuel andany reprocessed waste in the meantime.

If the economic value of spent fuel remainsuncertain once a disposal capacity has been devel-oped, the decision can be made at that time whetherto continue storing spent fuel or to dispose of it.As discussed in chapter 3, storage could be accom-plished at a repository site by using the repository’spackaging and handling facilities to receive and pre-pare waste for storage on the surface. Developingthe capacity to dispose of both spent fuel and re-processed waste may, in fact, be the best way toensure that the decision to reprocess or dispose ofspent fuel is based mainly on the resource value

——

92 ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Leve/ Radioactive Waste

of the spent fuel and not on the lack of a capacityto dispose of either spent fuel or high-level reproc-essed waste .22

The question of when it might be desirable todispose of spent fuel irretrievably, therefore, is quitedistinct from the question of when it will be desir-able to have the technical capacity to do so, al-though the two are frequently confused in discus-sions of waste management policy. The onlyirreversible decisions that can be made now arethose related to the availability of technical capac-ity for disposal, since the longer the developmentof disposal facilities is deferred, the longer futurewaste managers will have no choice but to continuestorage.

DEFENSE WASTE POLICY

The defense and commercial high-level radioac-tive waste programs, merged under the Carter ad-ministration, were separated by the Reagan admin-istration. Disagreements about whether the sameprocedures for siting commercial waste repositoriesshould also apply to repositories for defense wasteswere a major reason the legislation dealing withhigh-level radioactive waste did not pass in the 96thCongress.

In this regard, some people argued that no matterwhat is done with military waste, the Federal Gov-ernment had an obligation to get on with the resolu-tion of the commercial waste management prob-lem. They pointed out that the Government had,by law, reserved for itself the responsibility and theauthority to dispose of high-level waste23 and, thusfar, had failed to fulfill its responsibilities. Theyargued that efforts to deal with commercial wastesshould not be impeded by disagreements about pol-icies for managing defense waste, as occurred dur-ing the 96th Congress. They also contended thatseparating the commercial and defense programscould allow more rapid progress in commercialwaste disposal, which would, in turn, make it easierto deal with defense wastes by providing usabletechnology and sites. They noted that there wereno compelling public administration arguments to

ZZThiS is discussed in issue 3, app. B.23 William C. Metz, “Legal Constraints on Repository Siting, ” IVu-

clear Waste: Socioeconomic Dimensions of Long-Term Storage, SteveH. Murdock, F. Larry Leistritz, and Rita R, Harem (eds.) (Boulder,Colo.: Westview Press, 1983).

have a single organization dealing with the twoproblems and cited precedents for separating mili-tary and civilian programs with similar technicalrequirements, such as assigning the civilian spaceprogram to the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration. Moreover, some viewed a differentinstitutional approach to siting repositories for de-fense waste as justified because they believed thebalance of Federal authority should be greater inan activity associated with national defense.

Those who favored handling commercial and de-fense wastes in a unified program cited the simi-larities between their technical and environmentalneeds for long-term isolation. Such an integratedapproach, they argued, would be necessary forgaining public acceptance of a national repositoryprogram and would discourage deferral of progresson disposal of defense wastes or the use of less strin-gent procedures in the defense program. Those whodisagreed cited the fact that, since Federal law al-ready provided that any repository for high-levelwaste, whether defense or commercial, would haveto be licensed by NRC to meet the same environ-mental standards, separation of the programs wouldnot necessarily lead to a less stringent approach withdefense wastes.

Federal Credibility and Mutual Distrust

The most formidable problem that NWPA hadto address was the intense level of mutual distrustamong various concerned parties, a distrust thatthreatened to lock the waste disposal effort in a stateof virtual and continual paralysis. The single mostcritical factor in that distrust was the severe ero-sion of public confidence in the ability of the Fed-eral Government—on the basis of its past record—to create and carry out an effective waste manage-ment program.

24 The utilities and the nuclear in-dustry doubted that the Federal Government wouldever meet a schedule or stick to a policy. Environ-mentalists doubted that the Federal Governmentwould deal adequately with safety concerns. Statesdoubted that the Federal Government would dealopenly and fairly with them.

ZqNationa] Research Council, Soci,d and Economic Aspects of Ra-dioactive Waste Disposal: Considerations for Institutional Manage-ment (Washington, D. C.: National Academy Press, 1984), p. 38.


To the degree that a Federal law alone can doso, NWPA went a long way toward meeting manyof the specific concerns of the various parties andtoward strengthening the credibility of the Federaleffort. Below is a brief discussion of the main rea-sons why the credibility of the Federal program wasso low before the passage of NWPA and of someof the remaining problems of mutual distrust thatcould complicate the effort to implement the Act.

POLICY INSTABILITY

The Federal waste management effort had beenplagued by many major shifts of policy, makingsteady progress difficult and undermining publicconfidence in the effort.25 A major cause of policyinstability had been the failure of the Federal Gov-ernment to consider a broad enough range of view-points, or to address adequately the legitimate tech-nical and nontechnical concerns of major interestgroups. This left some groups with a strong incen-tive to try to thwart or change the policies.

As a result, changes in administration had oftenmeant abrupt changes in waste disposal policy. In1976, for example, President Ford responded toconcerns about the need to demonstrate progressin waste disposal by announcing a 1985 target datefor the first repository, a policy that led to an almostexclusive focus on salt as a disposal medium andon sites that had already been studied or were re-garded as easy to secure. The Carter administra-tion, responding to the resulting concerns that anaccelerated schedule could lead to premature com-mitment to a medium or site, adopted a new poli-cy involving the review of four to five sites in twoto three media and an anticipated repository targetdate of 1997 to 2006. The Reagan administrationabandoned the Carter policy for one of examiningthree sites in two media, the minimum require-ments of NRC, with earlier development of demon-stration facilities. With respect to interim storage,the Carter administration proposed that the Gov-ernment acquire an away-from-reactor facility andoffered to accept spent fuel from utilities for interimstorage prior to disposal. The Reagan administra-

ZsThe State planning Council recommended that ‘‘national plan-ning for radioactive waste management should avoid abrupt changesin direction to prevent further deterioration of program credibility andloss of time. ” State Planning Council on Radioactive Waste Man-agement, Recommendations on National Radioactive Waste Man-agement Policies: Report to the President, 1981, p. 29.

tion rescinded the offer and announced that utili-ties would be responsible for interim storage. Inview of such shifts, some observers questionedwhether any policy could be expected to outlast achange of administration.

FEDERAL CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT A POLICY26

The history of the waste management programraised questions about the institutional ability ofthe Federal Government to implement any wastemanagement policy successfully, even if the pol-icy could be stabilized for an extended period.There were several reasons for this concern.

First, until the mid-1970’s, the waste manage-ment effort was starved for the stable and sufficientresources—both people and money—needed to en-sure a successful waste management effort. Notuntil 1972 did waste management exist as a distinctbureaucratic entity with its own independent budg-et, and not until 1977 did the program receive sub-stantial funding. Increases in the number and ex-pertise of the staff that the waste program neededto meet its responsibilities did not keep pace withincreases in funds. Moreover, history suggested thatthe normal Federal budget process may not assurethe adequate and stable long-term funding neededto enable timely development of final isolation fa-cilities. For example, inadequate funding of theFederal Government’s geologic repository devel-opment program had limited the number of alter-native technologies and sites that were investigated,increasing the likelihood that an acceptable systemwould not be developed in a timely manner andheightening concerns about the technical adequacyof the program.

Second, past problems in the final isolation pro-gram had raised questions about the capabilitiesof the DOE waste management program. Thesequestions will burden its future efforts, even thoughthe problems reflected not the competence of thepeople carrying out the program, but the low pri-ority placed on the effort, the lack of resources, andthe sharp and frequent shifts of policy. Althoughgenerally regarded as technically competent, theDOE program did not appear to have enough peo-

ple with the skills needed to handle the social, po-litical, and institutional issues that concern States,

lbTheSe issues are discussed at greater length in ch. 7.


local communities, and groups outside of DOE orto handle the broad policy and strategic issues. Thefailure to go beyond the strictly technical questionsand address these kinds of issues had underminedmuch of the credibility of the waste managementprogram.

Finally, the development and implementation ofa comprehensive waste management policy willrequire an unprecedented degree of coordinationwithin both the executive branch and Congress. Atpresent, no single Federal agency or congressionalcommittee has the jurisdiction to deal with the widerange of activities required to manage radioactivewaste safely. Six major executive agencies andabout 12 congressional committees have jurisdic-tion over different aspects of waste management.Experience suggests that coordinating the activi-ties of all these Government entities will be diffi-cult. Also, agencies have consistently failed to meetdeadlines to implement policies according to sched-ule, perhaps, in part, because waste disposal is onlyone of the many activities for which they are re-sponsible. For example, NRC’s draft technical reg-ulations for high-level waste, scheduled for issuein 1977, were actually issued in 1981; EPA’s over-all standards for waste disposal, due since 1977,were not even published for discussion until the endof 1982. These delays have raised questions aboutthe ability of the Federal Government to meet along-term schedule requiring the coordinated ac-tions of independent agencies.

PERCEPTIONS OF TRUSTWORTHINESS

Justified or not, States and others had developedstrong doubts that the Federal Government couldbe counted on to keep its word on waste manage-ment matters and that, in general, it could betrusted. One example of the basis for this distrustis the series of policy reversals concerning WIPPdiscussed above.

State Concerns27

To make technical progress in waste disposal, theFederal Government must have access to potentialdisposal sites in order to perform the detailed studyand evaluation needed to determine site suitability.However, several States have sought to prevent

ZTState issues are discussed at greater length in ch. 8.

DOE from conducting initial site investigations,and 18 States have enacted restrictive legislationthat bans high-level radioactive waste managementactivities within their borders without State ap-proval.28 Other States may feel obligated to adoptsimilar restrictions to make certain they do not, bydefault, end up with waste storage or disposal fa-cilities.

In addition to general concerns about Federaltrustworthiness, State opposition to Federal sitingactivities has two main sources:

●

●

The Inherent Costs and Risks Involved inWaste Disposal. –-The presence of anyamount of radioactive waste and the varioussteps involved in storage and disposal pose po-tential radiological risks and have adverse so-cial and economic impacts on States and local-ities. Although these impacts can be controlledor mitigated, there is no assurance that theycan be eliminated, Even if States had no otherconcerns about waste disposal, they wouldprobably be reluctant to take on such costs andimpacts. In its extreme form, the desire notto bear the costs involved in waste disposal canlead to what has been called the “not in mybackyard” or ‘‘anywhere but here’ attitude,which may underlie at least some State op-position.Fear of Unfairness in Siting Decisions.—Many States fear that they could become anational dumping ground for waste—that theywill be forced to take waste generated in otherStates or even from the entire Nation, thusbearing a disproportionate share of the wastedisposal burden. Related to this fear is that ofthe ‘‘foot in the door’ —the concern that if theFederal Government succeeds in siting anywaste management facility, even a small re-search facility, it will try to save money andavoid fighting new siting battles by attemptingto expand that facility, eventually creating arepository at that site. A related State fear is

‘eSarah Daneman, “State Legislation on High-Level Nuclear WasteDisposal (as of 9/15/82 ),” published in The Radioactive Exchange,vol. 1, Nos. 14 and 15, Part II, September/October 14, 1982, pp.15-21. Some laws have banned actit ities involving waste from otherStates; others have required State approval prior to storage or dis-posal of all commercial high-level waste. DOE has so far not challengedthe legality of these restrictions in [ ourt.


that Federal siting decisions will be based tooheavily on considerations other than technicalsafety criteria, such as a desire to site a repos-itory quickly to remove waste disposal as anobstacle to the use of nuclear power or a de-sire to avoid the difficulties of dealing with re-strictive State legislation.

Although restrictive State legislation may notstand up to Federal court challenges, the legalprocesses entailed in such challenges could delaysiting efforts. DOE had been reluctant to contestState restrictions and had sought, instead, to con-duct waste management activities at sites where itwas likely to encounter the fewest obstacles—eitherin time, cost, or political opposition. That approachcan be defended on the grounds that, if it speedsup the process, and if the site eventually selectedis technically sound, then it matters little how thesite is chosen. However, that approach may in-crease resistance to Federal siting activities for tworeasons. First, no site selection process is likely tobe perceived as equitable or technically credible ifit chooses, or appears to choose, sites mainly be-cause they are the easiest to obtain. Second, theapproach feeds State fears that the Federal Gov-ernment will increasingly follow a ‘‘path of leastresistance in seeking repository sites and thusstrongly encourages those States that have not yetadopted restrictive or prohibitive measures to doso. No State wants to be last in the race to makecertain that the path of least resistance does not leadstraight into its borders.

Overall Impacts of History

NWPA is the first Federal law that sets out anexplicit national policy and schedule for the disposalof high-level radioactive waste. It also contains anumber of provisions aimed at overcoming someof the major concerns that have hampered the wastedisposal effort in the past. But a law alone, no mat-ter how well framed, cannot by itself wipe out thelong legacy of problems and false starts and the deepdistrust it has generated among the principal par-ties involved and concerned with waste disposal.

A law alone cannot demonstrate that the Feder-al Government has the capacity to deal fairly withthe States in the selection and development of sites,to take the surest and safest route to waste disposal

instead of the most expedient, or to demonstrateto the satisfaction of the regulatory authorities andthe concerned and affected parties that an adequatewaste disposal technology exists. Nor can a lawalone dispel, however much it may allay, the dis-trust that decades have built up among the variousparties.

That distrust may, indeed, be the single mostcomplicating factor in the effort to develop a wastedisposal system that is acceptable technically, po-litically, and socially. For, if Federal credibility—itscapacity to show the various parties that it can andwill do the job competently, fairly, and on sched-ule—remains the most critical factor in a successfulwaste disposal effort, it is not Federal credibilityalone that is in question. States, environmentalists,and others may, indeed, fear that the Federal Gov-ernment and industry will cut corners just to be ableto say that the problem is solved. But there is thecorrelative concern that not all State forces or en-vironmentalists are acting in good faith: that, what-ever their express concerns with safety or other mat-ters, some environmentalists seek to block and stallwaste disposal efforts solely because they are op-posed to the use of nuclear power, and some in theStates seek only to prevent any and all waste dis-posal activities from occurring within their borders.

In short, some believe that no matter how wellthe Federal Government does its job in carryingout the Act—no matter what pains it takes to re-move any legitimate grounds for opposition—thereare those in the States and elsewhere who will doeverything possible to slow or stop its efforts. What-ever the basis for this belief, it only makes it all themore necessary for the Federal Government to re-move the legitimate grounds for opposition by car-rying out the Act in ways that address the honestconcerns of States and others and that seek to avoidpast mistakes.

The waste management program has improvedsubstantially over time in resources, breadth oforganizational commitment, and technical and in-

stitutional sophistication. It has laid a solid tech-nical groundwork for the development of minedgeologic repositories. Furthermore, resolution of thekey policy issues regarding interim storage and finalisolation through enactment of NWPA should pro-vide stability to waste management policy that has

.


been lacking in the past. Nonetheless, the burden tolerance for failures. Any major failures—real orof past problems will complicate the task of devel- perceived—could have grave consequences for bothoping an effective and acceptable waste disposal sys- the waste management program and the future usetern. Moreover, after more than three decades of of nuclear power.struggling with nuclear waste, there is only a limited

Chapter 5

Policy Analysis: The Nuclear WastePolicy Act of 1982 in Perspective

Contents

Key

The

Page

Comprehensive Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. ... ... .. O..... ..O O O”...””~+o” ”””” ““””.””” 110

Elements of a

—

Chapter 5

Policy Analysis: The Nuclear WastePolicy Act of 1982 in Perspective

.,’

The issues and problems described in the pre-ceding chapter were debated extensively during the96th and 97th Congresses, culminating in finalpassage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982(NWPA) in the closing hours of the 97th Congress.During the course of that debate, OTA presentedthe principal results of its study of commercial high-level radioactive waste management to Congressthrough testimony and release of a summary re-port that dealt with the key issues under debate. 1

As part of its study, OTA analyzed a wide rangeof views from the technical community, Federalagencies, the nuclear industry, the environmentalcommunity, State and local officials, and the lay

‘Office of Technology Assessment, Managing Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste, April 1982.

KEY

The fund

public. OTA then identified the basic elements ofa waste management policy that addressed the mainconcerns of the major affected parties. Thus, whileOTA examined a wide range of issues and optionsas part of its assessment, it focused its testimonyand report on that particular combination of op-tions that appeared capable of securing the credi-bility, stability, and broad support essential to asuccessful waste management effort. This chaptercontains the basic policy conclusions underlyingthat integrated policy, the key elements of that pol-icy, and an analysis of NWPA from the perspec-tive of that policy. Many of the points summarizedin this chapter are discussed at greater length inthe following chapters. Discussions of the principaltechnical issues addressed in NWPA are found inappendix B, and the full text of the Act is includedin appendix C.

ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY

amental finding that OTA presentedto Congress was that, if history were not-to repeatitself, and if the stalemate on nuclear waste werenot to continue, a comprehensive policy was neededthat commanded the support and addressed theconcerns of all major interested parties, made a for-mal Federal commitment to developing several dis-posal facilities according to a firm and conserva-tive schedule, and guaranteed the financial andmanagerial resources required to meet that com-mitment.

By 1980 a widespread concern had developedthat the Federal Government could not or wouldnot manage radioactive waste safely and efficiently.The doubts concerned not so much the technologyof disposal as the institutional capacity of the Fed-eral Government to carry out the difficult and sus-tained effort required to build and operate a dis-posal system that could safely handle large amounts

of waste. The long-term uncertainties and strongdoubts about the Federal Government’s capacityto cope with the nuclear waste problem were themain obstacles to the waste management effort.Only a comprehensive policy that focused on solv-ing the final isolation problem and that addressedinstitutional as well as technical issues appearedlikely to overcome those doubts and uncertainties.

Such a policy, moreover, had to be both accept-able and credible to all concerned parties. For unlessall parties supported a given policy—or at least hada strong stake in seeing it succeed—the policy in-stability of the past was likely to persist, with eachnew administration changing the policy of its pred-ecessor in order to satisfy one interest group oranother. Thus, the more a waste management pol-icy represented a formal agreement—a genuinetreaty that all sides coulddressed their interests and

accept because it ad-concerns and because

99


they believed it could work—the more likely thatpolicy would be to survive changes of administra-tion and to avoid extensive judicial and otherdelays.

OTA concluded that to be credible, a waste man-agement policy had to adopt a conservative ap-proach that carefully identified all the potentialsources of technical and institutional failure, tookthe steps necessary to keep the risk of failure to aminimum, and included contingency plans for deal-ing with any failures that did occur. In addition,because of the high level of distrust of the Federalwaste management program, credibility requireda high degree of explicitness about and commitmentto key policy measures and programs for carryingthem out.

The radioactive waste management policy thatOTA concluded would be both broadly acceptableand credible would contain three main elements,each of which would be aimed at overcoming oneof the three major obstacles to a successful Federalwaste management effort: 1) policy instability; 2)doubts about the institutional capacity of the Fed-eral Government to implement a long-term policy;and 3) perceptions of a lack of Government trust-worthiness.

Element I—Commitment in law to the main goalsof a comprehensive national policy for interimstorage and final disposal of commercial high-levelradioactive waste:A. To develop several final disposal facilities—

mined geologic repositories—on a firm andconservative schedule.

B. To contract with utilities to begin acceptingwaste at a repository on a conservative date,when a repository is likely to be available.

C. To assist the interim storage efforts of utili-ties by supporting licensed demonstrations ofdry storage technologies, and by providing alimited amount of supplemental storage capac-ity as an emergency backup in case of unavoid-able delays in utilities’ efforts to develop theirown storage capacity.

Element II—Credible institutional mechanisms formeeting the policy goals:A. Congressional approval of a binding Mission

Plan,2 developed by the administration, that

B.

c.

spells out the technical and institutional ac-tions and the financial and managerial re-sources required to meet the policy goals.Assured funding through a waste managementfund financed by a mandatory user fee basedon the Mission Plan and paid by utilities atthe time the waste is generated.Assurance of adequate managerial resourcesthrough creation of an independent, single-purpose agency whose sole responsibility is tocarry out the waste management program.

Element III—Credible measures for addressing thespecific concerns of the States and the variouspublics:A.

B.

c.

Development of explicit plans and provisionof assured funds for involvement of the lay andtechnical publics.Development of a regulatory process thatmakes ample allowance for the first-of-a-kindnature of the problem of demonstrating thata disposal system will provide the desired de-gree of isolation for millennia.Provision in law of measures dealing withState and local concerns, such as a form-al rolein repository siting decisions and impact com-pensation.

The technical and institutional elements of thepolicy outlined above are all mutually supportiveand, in several respects, inseparable. For example,unless the policy is carried out by a single-purposeorganization with assured and adequate funding,no comprehensive program that attempts to followa firm schedule over a long period of time is likelyto have much credibility with the general public orwith the utilities. Similarly, it may be possible togain broad support for a single-purpose organiza-tion with independent funding only if effective over-sight mechanisms are assured and if there is sub-stantial agreement in advance, laid out in a MissionPlan, about precisely what the organization is go-ing to do and how it is going to do it.

Because of these interdependencies, several stagesmay be required to implement all of the elementsof the policy. OTA viewed the radioactive wastemanagement problem as a. nettle that, painful asit might be, would have to be grasped in its en-tirety if it were ever to be resolved.

‘In OTA’S 1982 summary report, Manag”ng Commercial High Lev-el Radioactive Waste, the term Management Action Program was

used for this concept. However, sine: NWPA uses the term MissionPlan, this report has adopted that t~~rminology.

Ch. 5—Policy Analysis: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 in Perspective . 101

THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT

The passage of NWPA represented a watershedin the development of Federal waste managementpolicy. This section describes and analyzes the ma-jor provisions of NWPA, using the integrated wastemanagement policy outlined above as a framework,and identifies the key issues that remain to be re-solved.

Element I:Commitment in law to the main goals of a com-prehensive national policy for interim storage andfinal disposal of commercial high-level radioactivewaste.

By including measures to deal with both interimstorage and final isolation, NWPA addresses boththe concerns of utilities facing the near-term needfor additional spent fuel storage and the concernsof those who feel that the highest priority must begiven to the long-term task of a developing finalisolation system for high-level radioactive waste.The embodiment of an explicit high-level radioac-tive waste management policy in law demonstratesthat Congress as well as the administration is com-mitted to the policy, a fact that should help ensurethe policy stability that has been lacking in the past.

OTA’s analysis concluded that comprehensivewaste management legislation should commit theFederal Government to three basic policy goals:

Goal 1: To develop several final disposal facilities—mined geologic repositories—on a firm andconservative schedule.

Permanent Disposal Facilities.—NWPA re-solved the dispute about whether to proceed withlong-term storage or permanent disposal by adopt-ing as its primary focus a requirement that the Fed-eral Government site, construct, and operate fa-cilities for the permanent disposal of high-levelwaste and any spent fuel disposed of as waste.3 Thehistory of strong and successful opposition to pro-posals to develop Federal storage facilities for com-mercial radioactive waste suggests that the devel-opment of permanent disposal facilities is requiredto satisfy public concerns about waste disposal andto serve as the basis for a widely accepted and stable

— —‘An extended discussion of this dispute is found in issue discussion

I of app. B.

waste management policy.does not place a burden

OF 1982

Unlike storage, disposalof continued care and

maintenance on the future, and it is less vulnerableto carelessness or neglect by some future genera-tion. Moreover, a commitment to develop disposalfacilities provides future generations with a greaterrange of choices than would storage alone. Suchfacilities will give waste managers the option of dis-posing of spent fuel or high-level reprocessed waste,or of deferring disposal by placing any such mate-rial delivered to a repository into extended storageat the surface. The development of facilities thatcan handle both reprocessed waste and spent fuelwill also ensure that waste management efforts arenot impeded by debates about reprocessing.

At the same time, NWPA ensures that long-termstorage will be available as an option by requiringthe Department of Energy (DOE) to prepare a de-tailed proposal for construction of one or more mon-itored retrievable storage (MRS) facilities and ananalysis of the need for such facilities to be presentedto Congress for consideration by July 1985. How-ever, it also requires that disposal in a permanentrepository proceed regardless of whether any MRSfacilities are constructed. The question of the roleof MRS facilities in the overall waste managementprogram remains to be resolved, as discussed in thefollowing chapter.

Mined Geologic Repositories. -NWPA does notsimply commit the Federal Government to developpermanent disposal facilities; it also lays out adetailed process for siting and licensing one par-ticular permanent disposal technology-the minedgeologic repository. (This process is outlined in app.E.) The mined geologic repository is the clear choiceas the disposal technology to be developed becauseit is the most thoroughly studied technology andis most widely favored by the international techni-cal community. Both the technology and the re-quired regulations exist or are being developed, andavailable analyses indicate that a licensed geologicrepository could be developed within the next 20years if adequate resources are devoted to the task.The legislated commitment to develop geologic re-positories both demonstrates and promotes policystability, since it involves no change in directionfrom previous programs and policies.


Unlike subseabed disposal (the most promisingalternative disposal technology, disposal in minedgeologic repositories in the continental UnitedStates does not raise the question of the need forinternational agreements for access to disposal sites,In any case, development of mined repositories willnot preclude development of other disposal tech-nologies and a later decision to use one that provedto be sufficiently attractive; in fact, NWPA requiresDOE to accelerate research and development(R&D) of alternative technologies for permanentdisposal. If another technology were chosen later,any geologic repository sites that had been devel-oped by then could still be used for supplementalpurposes, such as disposal of waste forms (e. g.,transuranic-contaminated [TRU] wastes) thatmight be too bulky for disposal using other tech-nologies.

Several Repositories. —NWPA includes manda-tory schedules for siting and licensing two separategeologic repositories, with a site for the second tobe selected within 3 years of the first. There arethree main advantages to developing several repos-itories more or less in parallel instead of develop-ing and filling one repository at a time. First, awaste management system with two repositorieswould be more reliable, since disposal operationscould continue at one even if problems arose thatinterrupted loading or limited the total disposal ca-pacity of the other. Second, if acceptably safe,licensable sites can be found in the East near themajority of existing and projected reactors, the costsand risks of waste transportation—as well as thenumber of communities affected by it—would besubstantially less than those of a system based ona single repository in the West, where most sitesnow under consideration for the first repository arelocated. Recognizing this, NWPA explicitly re-quires transportation impacts and costs to be con-sidered in selection of the site for the second repos-itory. Third, a system with two repositories is moreequitable and could allay the fears of any State thatit might become the Nation’s sole dumping groundfor nuclear waste. Thus, siting two repositories mayencounter less political opposition than an effort todevelop only the single site of a centralized system.

Full realization of these advantages requires thatthe second repository begin operating within a rela-tively short time after the first. While NWPA re-

quires the first repository to begin operating byearly 1998, there is no explicit target date for oper-ation of the second. To ensure that a second re-pository ultimately is developed, NWPA prohibitsemplacement of more than 70,000 tonnes of spentfuel in the first repository until the second beginsoperating. While this limit exceeds the 55,000tonnes expected to be discharged by the reactorsthat are now in operation, it is considerably lessthan the total of about 100,000 tonnes that will beproduced if the reactors now under construction arecompleted, Thus, the limit in NWPA is likely torequire eventual construction of the second repos-itory. However, its operation could be deferred forup to perhaps 20 years after emplacement of wastebegins in the first.

To avoid strong budgetary pressures to continueto expand the first licensed repository and to deferthe financial and political costs of developing a sec-ond one as long as allowed by the Act, the devel-opment of a regional system may require an expli-cit commitment by DOE to begin operating asecond repository within a specified time after thefirst is operational. The time should be short enoughto give credibility to the commitment, but longenough to allow the development of the second re-pository to benefit from the lessons learned in sitingand licensing the first. To give additional credibilityto the commitment, and to assure the availabilityof resources as needed, the actions needed to de-velop and operate the second repository on scheduleshould be included in the Mission Plan (ElementII-A), and the additional costs should be consid-ered in determining the revenues required from thedisposal fee (Element II-B) (Further discussion isfound in the following chapter. )

A Firm and Conservative Schedule.—A centralprovision of NWPA is the requirement that DOEbegin disposal of radioactive waste in the firstgeologic repository no later than January 31, 1998.Prior to passage of the Act, the repository schedulesused by DOE and its predecessors lacked the forceof law, and repeated slippages had called into ques-tion the credibility of Federal assurances that a re-pository would be available within a reasonableperiod.

A major conclusion of OTA’s assessment wasthat such a commitment in law to a firm schedule

Ch. 5—Policy Analysis: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 in Perspective 103

for operation of a geologic repository was centralto a resolution of the radioactive waste problem.It was needed to provide:

1.

2.

3.

Assurance that a permanent disposal systemthat does not place a burden of continued careand maintenance on future generations willbe developed within a reasonable period oftime. Any extended delay in the developmentof disposal facilities would deeply concern boththose who wish to remove the waste problemas a burden on the continued use of nuclearpower, and those who fear that interim stor-age would become a permanent solution bydefault.Clear and fixed goals for an implementationprogram. Long-term planning is difficult inthe absence of well-defined and agreed-uponprogram goals, which had been lacking in thepast.A firm basis for planning interim spent fuelstorage. Without a repository schedule, theutilities’ storage problem would remain open-ended.

For the commitment to a firm schedule to bemost credible, the target date for beginning oper-ation of the first repository should be a conserva-tive date that makes ample allowance for the realitythat the location, design, and licensing of a geologicrepository is a complex endeavor that has neverbeen done before and that, therefore, no one knowsfor certain how long it will take. OTA’S analysissuggests that the most important aspect of secur-ing and sustaining the public’s and utilities’ confi-dence in the waste disposal program is not howquickly a repository can be made available if every-thing goes right the first time, but whether the re-pository will be available according to a firm sched-ule that is widely accepted as feasible and reasonabledespite the remaining technical and institutionaluncertainties about the siting process.4

Whether the January 31, 1998, target date forinitial operation of the first repository can be seenas conservative in this sense depends to a consid-erable extent on the approach to constructing andoperating the repository that is adopted by DOE,as discussed at greater length in the following

4An extended discussion of the repository schedule is found in ch.6, and in issue 2 of app. B.

chapter. DOE analysis shows that the 1998 targetdate is very optimistic if initial operation must awaitconstruction of the packaging facilities of the re-pository. 5 However, if initial operation of the re-pository is achieved by emplacement of a smallamount of waste packaged elsewhere as part ofpackaging and handling tests during the research,development, and demonstration (RD&D) pro-gram, as suggested in chapter 6, the 1998 target

appears to be achievable even if there are delaysin the siting and licensing process. (This assumesthat a suitable site can be found among those nowunder consideration for the first repository; if noneof these is licensable it appears unlikely that the1998 deadline could be met. ) As discussed furtherin chapter 6, an approach to repository develop-ment using an initial demonstration phase of small-scale operation, analogous to low-power operationof a reactor, could minimize the risk of failure tomeet the mandated target date and could, at thesame time, allay concerns that corners might be cutin order to meet the deadline.

Goal 2: Contract with utilities to begin acceptingwaste at a repository on a conservative date,when a repository is likely to be available.

NWPA requires DOE and the owners of spentfuel and/or high-level waste to execute, by June 30,1983, contracts under which DOE will accept anddispose of such material. A standard contract waspromulgated by DOE in April of 1983,6 and con-tracts have been signed as required by law.

NWPA does not require that the contracts specifydelivery dates for the material that is covered, andthe contract form adopted by DOE does not requireDOE to publish a priority ranking for acceptingspent fuel until 1991, or to approve utility deliv-ery schedules until 1992, at the earliest. To giveutilities that must make decisions about interimstorage measures before 1992 a firmer basis forplanning, the Mission Plan required by the Actwould need to include an explicit contractual wasteacceptance schedule and a clear statement of pri-orities for accepting waste.

5U. S. Department of Energy, Mission Plan for the CiviIian Radioac-tive Waste Management Program, DOE/RW-0005 DRAFT, April1984, Pp. 3-A-27— 3-A-43.

‘1 O CFR, Part 961,

.


Because the one geologic repository authorizedby NWPA is the only facility that DOE is nowauthorized to construct where spent fuel or high-level waste could be accepted on a large scale, con-fidence that spent fuel will ultimately leave reactorsites depends largely on confidence in the programfor siting and operating the first repository. Thus,the heart of the waste acceptance plan is a reposi-tory loading schedule— a target schedule for mov-ing waste to geologic repositories. In order to pro-vide a credible basis for contractual commitmentswith utilities and to assure communities near re-actors that reactor sites will not become de factolong-term waste repositories, the certainty of therepository loading schedule is more important thanthe speed. To give greater certainty, the MissionPlan would need to contain a repository schedulethat is a high-confidence prediction of when repos-itories are likely to be operating at a full-scale ratecomparable to the rate of waste generation, despitethe kinds of delays that might be anticipated. Toavoid raising false expectations, this ‘‘best esti-mate’ schedule would need to be clearly distin-guished from more optimistic management goalsthat show the earliest that spent fuel could be de-livered to Federal facilities if all goes well.

OTA’s analysis concludes that if an expandedrepository siting program (discussed in ch. 6) isused, there can be considerable confidence that thefull-scale loading facilities of the two repositoriesrequired by NWPA could be operating no laterthan about 2008 and 2012, respectively, even if dif-ficulties are encountered. This is a conservative esti-mate because it could be met even if all of the sitesinitially evaluated are rejected and a new backupsite must be used for each repository. If such con-tingencies do not arise, the repositories could beavailable earlier. Even if the repositories do notoperate at full scale until 2008 and 2012, they couldstill allow spent fuel to be removed from practicallyall reactor sites within 10 to 15 years after the ex-pected date of reactor decommissioning. Furtherdiscussion of a conservative repository loadingschedule using 2008 and 2012 as targets for con-tractual commitments to full-scale operation of tworepositories is found in chapter 6.

Since unforeseen events could cause slippage inthe repository loading schedule, even if the scheduleincluded allowances for some delays, explicit pro-

visions are needed for what would be done withwaste until it can actually be delivered to a reposi-tory. As discussed below, NWPA provides that theutilities have the primary responsibility to providefor, and pay the costs of, interim storage until thematerial is accepted by DOE for disposal in a re-pository. The Act does not authorize DOE to con-struct any large-scale storage facility that could ac-cept a significant quantity of waste before arepository is available.

A major question to be resolved is whether andhow the waste management program should takeresponsibility for spent fuel storage if a repositoryis delayed beyond the 1998 target date containedin the Act. An extended discussion of this questionis found in chapter 6. To summarize briefly here,the Mission Plan should contain provisions for twopossible cases of delay in the repository program:relatively small and more or less expected delaysin full-scale loading that entail additional interimstorage beyond 1998; and large delays (decades ormore) resulting from the discovery of now-unex-pected problems with geologic disposal that couldcall into question its feasibility. The former possi-bility requires a post-1998 interim storage plan,which discusses who is to be responsible for the stor-age (the individual utilities with the immediate stor-age needs or the waste management programfunded by all the utilities) and where storage is tooccur (at the reactors or in a centralized MRS fa-cility). The latter requires a backup facility plan—aplan for providing alternative storage (MRS) or dis-posal facilities if geologic disposal cannot be imple-mented in a reasonable time. These possible rolesfor MRS facilities also need to be evaluated in detailin the MRS need and feasibility study required byNWPA.

Goal 3: Assist the interim storage efforts of utilitiesby supporting licensed demonstrations ofdry storage technologies, and by providinga limited amount of supplemental storage ca-pacity as an emergency backup in case of un-avoidable delays in utilities’ efforts to de-velop their own storage capacity.

NWPA incorporates these provisions in their en-tirety. 7 Utilities are given primary responsibility for

7An extended discussion of interim storage is found in issue 4 ofapp. B.

Ch. 5—Policy Analysis: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 in Perspective ● 105

providing interim spent fuel storage capacity—in-cluding new storage facilities—until the spent fuelcan be accepted by DOE for delivery to a reposi-tory. DOE is to aid utilities in developing theneeded additional capacity through cooperativelicensed demonstrations of new dry storage tech-nologies. Cooperative agreements have been signedwith three utilities for such demonstrations. DOEis also authorized to conduct dry storage R&D ac-tivities to provide data to assist utilities in licens-ing new storage facilities. In addition, NWPA in-cludes measures to facilitate NRC licensing of newstorage technologies and storage facility expansions.

As a backup to utility efforts, DOE is directedto provide up to 1,900 tonnes of storage capacityon an emergency-only basis to utilities that areunable to provide their own storage capacity in timeto prevent shutting down a reactor. NRC is to de-termine which utilities qualify to use that capac-ity. DOE can provide the storage either at existing

Federal facilities or at reactor sites (using mobilestorage equipment such as casks, or new facilitiesconstructed at the site). The full costs of such stor-age are to be recovered through fees paid by theutilities using the storage.

Utility responsibility for interim storage will allowDOE to focus its attention on the disposal programand to avoid possible confrontations with host Statesand localities about efforts to obtain or constructa Federal interim storage facility. It should also re-duce concerns that the availability of such a facil-ity might undermine incentives for progress in thedisposal program. The Act’s strong Federal initia-tives to promote commercialization of new and flex-ible dry storage technologies are needed to ensuretimely resolution of licensing uncertainties thatmake such technologies a riskier prospect for utili-ties than the less attractive but more certain op-tion of the water basin. Provision of a limitedamount of emergency backup storage capacityshould alleviate utilities’ concerns about vulnera-bility to reactor shutdowns in the event of unavoid-able delays in the provision of additional storagecapacity. In addition, NWPA’S commitment to afirm repository schedule should reduce the resist-ance to utility efforts to provide interim storage thathas been based on concerns that such storage mightbecome permanent by default.

Because of the promise shown by new storagetechniques —rod consolidation (which increases thecapacity of existing reactor basins) and dry tech-nologies such as storage casks—the demand for suchemergency backup capacity could be quite small.While no analysis of the precise amount of emer-gency storage needed is available, it can be notedthat only 1,000 tonnes of storage would allow allof the 27 reactors projected to need new storage ca-pacity by the end of 1989 an additional 2 years toprovide that capacity. 8 DOE currently expects thatthe increased efficiency of at-reactor storage thatis expected to result from demonstrations of rodconsolidation and dry storage technologies shouldbe sufficient to preclude need for any Federal in-terim storage. 9 Thus it now appears that utilitieswill be able to provide the needed additional stor-age capacity in time to prevent disruption of re-actor operation.

Element II:Credible institutional mechanisms for meeting thepolicy goals.

The basic institutional conclusion of OTA’s re-view of the history of the Federal waste manage-ment effort was that substantial changes in the Fed-eral Government’s management approach wouldbe needed to give credibility to the central compo-nent of Element I—the commitment to the devel-opment and operation of a complex technologicalsystem, faced with technical and institutional uncer-tainties, on a firm schedule over a period of dec-ades. NWPA included many of the most impor-tant institutional changes that were included in theintegrated waste management policy identified byOTA, although certain key issues were not ad-dressed at the time the Act was passed. The pro\’ i-sions of NWPA are discussed below in the contextof the three key institutional provisions of the in-tegrated policy.

A: Congressional approval of a binding MissionPlan, developed by the administration, that spellsout the technical and institutional actions and thefinancial and managerial resources required tomeet the policy goals.

8See issue 4, app. B.‘DOE, op. cit., p. 3-D-7.


NWPA requires DOE to submit a detailed Mis-sion Plan to Congress, although no provision ismade for formal congressional approval. The Mis-sion Plan is needed to perform two key functions. 10

First, it must lay out a long-term waste manage-ment program, based on the authority in the Act,that fills in those details of the operation of the high-level waste management system that are not speci-fied in the Act; that is, a repository loading plan,a post-1998 interim storage plan, and a backup fa-cility plan.

Second, it must present an implementation pro-gram that DOE believes will be sufficient for achiev-ing the goals of the waste management plan. Acredible commitment to a long-term plan requiresa credible implementation program for effecting it.To be credible in the face of the history of prob-lems and delays in past Federal waste managementefforts, an implementation program must identifythe major possible sources of technical and institu-tional failure, provide measures that minimize thelikelihood that these failures will occur, and includecontingency plans for dealing with those failuresthat do occur. Such a program will likely involvean expansion of ongoing DOE programs to ensurethat backup sites and technologies are available withminimum delay if problems develop with the prin-cipal candidates.

While a sound technical implementation pro-gram is necessary to the success of the waste man-agement program, it may not by itself be sufficientbecause of the many institutional challenges thatmust also be met in siting and operating waste man-agement facilities. Thus the Mission Plan shouldalso contain an institutional implementation pro-gram showing how the activities of all the involvedFederal agencies will be coordinated; how DOE willcarry out the NWPA’s many requirements for in-teractions with States and Indian tribes; and howDOE will provide for peer review of the technicalprograms and for public involvement (discussedbelow).

This comprehensive waste management plan andimplementation program is needed to build confi-dence that the goals of the Act can and will beachieved, to provide a basis for estimating the re-sources needed to do so, and to pinpoint clear mile-

stones that can be used to hold the responsible agen-cies accountable for timely progress.

OTA’s study concluded that formal approval ofthe Mission Plan is a key issue to be addressed inany future congressional consideration of possiblechanges in the institutional arrangements for thewaste management program, because the MissionPlan could play a central. role in oversight and con-trol of an independent waste management agency(discussed further below). Congressional approvalwould put teeth into the milestones in the Plan andwould demonstrate congressional commitment tothe Plan. Approval of the Plan on a multiyear basiswould also give Congess a way to exert long-termcontrol over the waste management program whileallowing it the independence from the annual budg-et and policymaking process needed to ensuresteady progress.

Without a formal mechanism for approving thePlan, there could be great value to developing aMision Plan that is as broadly supported by the keyinterested parties as possible. Finally, the initialMission Plan should include explicit provisions forfurther revisions of the Plan as required by devel-opments during the implementation of the program.

B: Assured funding through a waste managementfund financed by a mandatory user fee based onthe Mission Plan and paid by utilities at the timethe waste is generated.

Stable, adequate funding is essential if the Fed-eral commitment to a firm schedule is to be met.The traditional annual budget and appropriationsprocess appears inconsistent with such a commit-ment, since it lays great stress on keeping imme-diate costs as low as possible and thus will tend tocut back on the expanded aspects of the implemen-tation program (e. g., development of backup sitesand technologies) that arc vital to building con-fidence that the target date can be met.

Prepaid Fee. —A major institutional provisionof NWPA is creation of a Nuclear Waste Fund fi-nanced by a fee initially set at 1 mill (O. 1 cent) perkilowatt-hour on nuclear-generated electricity .11Shifting the front-end funding of the waste man-agement program directly to utility ratepayers atthe time the waste is generated provides a large and

IOThe Mission plan is discussed in detail in ch. 6. i I Funding is discussed at length in ch. 7.

Ch. 5—Policy Analysis: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 in Perspective . 107

stable source of funds, independent of annual com-petition with other Federal priorities, This shouldallow implementation of the expanded and moreexpensive program needed to give confidence thatsteady progress can be maintained over a periodof decades. This arrangement also puts the totalcosts of waste management on the users of nuclearelectricity rather than on the Federal taxpayer.

NWPA requires the Secretary of Energy to re-view the fee annually and to adjust it as needed toensure that the full costs of the program are recov-ered. This provision allows funding levels to bedetermined by the program needed to meet desiredgoals, rather than having the achievable goalslimited by the availability of funds, as occurred inthe past.

Assured funding requires not only a reliablesource of revenues, but also assurance that the fundswill be made available to the waste managementagency as needed to carry out the program. Thus,any future deliberations concerning the institutionalarrangements for waste management need to con-sider ways of providing greater budgetary inde-pendence than is now the case under the Act, whichcontinues annual appropriation control over theNuclear Waste Fund. Greater independence, withcontinued congressional control, could be obtainedthrough multiyear appropriations based on an ap-proved Mission Plan, rather than through annualappropriations. This is discussed further in chapter7.

C: Assurance of adequate managerial resourcesthrough creation of an independent, single-pur-pose waste management organization whose soleresponsibility would be to carry out the wastemanagement program.

Need for a Single-Purpose Agency .—The assur-ance of adequate management resources is as im-portant as the assurance of adequate funds. For thisreason, NWPA established within DOE a single-purpose Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Man-agement, whose sole task is to implement the pro-visions of the Act. The office, which is separate fromthe other nuclear activities of DOE, is headed bya Presidential appointee who reports to the Secre-tary of Energy. This step should stabilize the wastemanagement organization at a higher policy level,insulate it from competition with other nuclear pol-

icy areas or future Federal reorganizations, and helpprovide the degree of central, integrated planningand management capability needed to meet a long-term Federal commitment on schedule.

NWPA also set in motion a process to ensure thatinstitutional questions are addressed in more detailin the future by requiring DOE to submit to Con-gress a report on alternative institutional ap-proaches for managing the radioactive waste pro-gram, including the option of establishing a privatecorporation. OTA’s analysis of the history of theFederal radioactive waste management programconcludes that the credibility of the central com-ponent of NWPA—a commitment to the develop-ment and operation of a complex technological sys-tem, faced with technical and institutionaluncertainties, on a firm schedule extending overa period of decades—could be enhanced by the es-tablishment of an independent waste managementagency with more funding and management flexi-bility than is usual with a typical Federal program.The creation of such an agency may be the bestway to ensure that other fiscal or political prioritiesof the Federal Government do not adversely affectprogress in the waste management program. 12 Be-cause the program is now funded entirely by feespaid by utilities for disposal services, rather thanby appropriations from general Federal revenues,any additional costs involved in establishing andoperating a new, single-purpose agency would beborne by the users of nuclear power rather thanby the Federal taxpayer.

Establishment of an Effective Oversight Process.—The more independent an institution and itsfunding are, the surer the guarantee that a com-prehensive program will be carried out on schedule.But such an institution raises a crucial and diffi-cult question: how to ensure the congressional over-sight and public accountability that a democraticsociety demands. Achieving an acceptable balancebetween independence and accountability will beone of the central challenges in designing an inde-pendent waste management authority.

As noted earlier, a major conclusion of OTA’Sstudy is that congressional approval of the MissionPlan could play a central role in achieving that bal-

I zThe ~ue~rion5 in~.o]l,ed in establishing an independent agencY are

discussed in ch. 7.


ance. In fact, OTA’s analysis suggests that it maynot be possible to gain broad support for the crea-tion of an independent institution with independentfunding until a generally accepted Mission Plan hasbeen developed. If decisions about an institutionalstructure (including the oversight mechanism) aremade after the Mission Plan has been submitted,the decision about the appropriate degree of inde-pendence for such an institution would be madein light of an explicit agreement about preciselywhat that institution would be expected to do. TheMission Plan can then serve as, a yardstick by whichCongress —and a board of directors or any otherbody, including the public—can oversee the activ-ities and expenditures of the waste managementagency and measure its progress.

Relationship to Defense Waste Programs.-Theseparate program office established by NWPA fo-cusses on civilian radioactive waste management.Programs for dealing with wastes generated byDOE defense-related activities are managed underthe Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs.However, NWPA also requires that the Secretaryof Energy make arrangements to use the reposi-tories developed pursuant to the Act for disposalof defense high-level waste unless the Presidentdetermines, after a study required by the Act, thatseparate repositories for such wastes are needed.The draft report from that study, released in 1984,concludes that placing the defense waste in the com-mercial waste repositories will be the most cost-effective option.

13 Such an arrangement could alsoreduce concerns that separation of the civilian anddefense waste disposal programs could lead to in-definite deferral of progress on disposal of defensewaste. However, if the civilian waste managementprogram must accept defense waste as well, provi-sions may be required to ensure that the agency’sability to keep to the schedule for repositories—and thus to fulfill the commitments made in thecontracts with nuclear utilities—does not dependon the Federal appropriations needed to fund thedefense side of the program. Specifically, the Mis-sion Plan must show how the defense and commer-cial disposal activities will be integrated.

13u. S. Department of Energy, An Evaluation of Commercial./ Re-pository Capacity for the Disposal ofllefense High-Level Waste, DOE/DP-0020 (DRAFT), Juiy 1984.

Element III:Credible measures for addressing the specific con-cerns of the States and the various publics.

Because of the legacy of distrust, explicit meas-ures and guarantees are needed to give confidenceabout the integrity of decisions concerning the sit-ing, construction, and operation of waste disposalfacilities. Concerns about the safety and equity ofFederal waste management activities by affectedStates, localities, and the general public could be-come a source of increasingly effective oppositionto implementation of a waste management programunless specific measures are adopted to deal withthese concerns. Efforts to proceed without dealingwith these concerns may simply provoke greater re-sistance, confrontations, and failures to achieve pro-gram objectives on schedule. Recognition of theseconcerns in the waste management program is 1ike-ly to broaden support for it in the first place, re-duce opposition during implementation, and re-move grounds for complaint.

A: Development of explicit plans and provision ofassured funds for involvement of the lay and tech-nical publics.

Public Involvement. --An effective program ofpublic involvement and information may be essen-tial for developing the broad public support neededfor a waste policy to succeed.14 On this point,NWPA recognizes that “public participation in theplanning and development of repositories is essen-tial in order to promote public confidence in thesafety of disposal. Public involvement may be par-ticularly important in the creation of an independ-ent agency with independent funding, which couldbe regarded as less responsive to public concernsthan the existing institutional structure. Althoughconsiderable opportunity for public involvement inFederal activities is already required by existing lawand administrative procedure, NWPA provides anumber of specific opportunities for public inputto siting considerations, such as public hearings inthe vicinity of potential repository sites, before keydecisions are made. However, public confidencethat an adequate and sustained level of resourceswill be devoted to public involvement during thedevelopment and implementation of a waste man-agement program could be increased if DOE in-

I+pub]ic involvement is discusse 4 further in ch. 8.

Ch. 5—Policy Analysis: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 in Perspective 109

eluded a comprehensive plan for public involvementas part of the Mission Plan.

Peer Review. —Because confidence that a geo-logic repository will perform as desired over aperiod of millenia must ultimately rest on confi-dence in the soundness of the underlying scientificanalysis, extensive peer review of this analysis ateach step can play an important role in assuringthe public that waste will be disposed of safely.While the responsible Federal agencies generallyrecognize the importance of peer review, publicconfidence that it would, in fact, take place couldbe enhanced by including a peer review plan in theMission Plan.

B: Development of a regulatory process that makesample allowance for the first-of-a-kind nature ofthe problem of demonstrating that a disposal sys-tem will provide the desired degree of isolationfor millenia.

Many believe that, with a first-of-a-kind prob-lem such as radioactive waste isolation in general,and the first geologic repository in particular, aneffective regulatory process is perhaps the most vitalelement for assuring the ultimate safety of wastedisposal.

Developing the ‘‘Technology of Prediction. ‘—What must be demonstrated to show that waste canand will be safely disposed of is not just the physi-cal technology of disposal, but the institutional ca-pability of the Federal Government to make a reg-ulatory decision that a repository at a specific sitecan be expected to provide the required degree ofwaste isolation for a required period of time (10,000years in tentative criteria under consideration bythe Environmental Protection Agency). In additionto the physical technology, therefore, a broader‘‘technology of prediction’ is needed to show ina formal licensing process that a proposed reposi-tory is likely to meet established standards.

Since the ability of a geologic repository to isolateradioactive waste for millenia cannot be directlydemonstrated, there must be heavy reliance on pre-dictions of repository performance that are basedon the use of mathematical models embodying sci-entific understanding of the behavior of the repos-

itory and its environment. Since such long-termprediction has never been done in a formal regu-latory process, problems can be expected to arisethe first time it is attempted. In addition, manyanalytic procedures to be used in the licensing proc-ess remain to be developed, including data collec-tion and validation techniques, methods for veri-fying and validating scientific models, and theformal procedures for using such models to predictrepository performance. Inclusion in the MissionPlan of a clear plan for the actions to be taken byboth DOE and NRC for resolving these uncertain-ties about procedures before the first formal licens-ing proceeding begins could avoid unnecessary de-lays at that critical stage of the waste disposalprogram.

Integrity of the Repository Licensing Process.—For many who question the credibility of the Fed-eral waste management program, confidence in thesafety of waste disposal will depend on their confi-dence in the NRC repository licensing process. Sev-eral measures that would be included in a MissionPlan, in order to give it a high probability of suc-cess, would also increase confidence in the integrityof the licensing process. First, use of a conserva-tive schedule for full-scale repository operation, onethat can be met even if the first site submitted forlicensing is rejected by NRC, should reduce con-cerns that pressures to meet the schedule could un-duly influence the first licensing decision. Second,planning to achieve initial repository operation witha small amount of waste packaged during the R&Dprogram, before packaging facilities are built at therepository site, could allow the 1998 deadline to bemet even if NRC requires more than the minimumtime allotted by NWPA for its decision on a con-struction authorization. This would further reducethe pressure on the licensing process. Finally, ahigh-confidence Plan would carry more sites thanthe minimum required by NWPA through two cru-cial steps in the siting process—site characteriza-tion and NRC construction authorization—to en-sure that enough good sites would be available atthe end of each stage to proceed to the next with-out major delay. This should reduce the concernsthat a marginal site might be approved because oflack of any timely alternative. These measures arediscussed in detail in chapter 6.

—


C: Provision in law of measures dealing with Stateand local concerns.

A broadly supported policy will require assur-ances that State and local concerns about safety andequity will be addressed, and written into law, tobe credible. 15 The stronger the guarantees in law,the more willing the States are likely to be to coop-erate with the Federal Government. Some arguethat State opposition is so strong that only Federalpreemption can overcome it. It can also be argued,however, that any eventual attempt to deal withState restrictions will be more likely to succeed ifstrong efforts have been made to meet States’ le-gitimate concerns.

NWPA includes two particularly important typesof provisions addressing State and local concerns.First, it requires DOE to engage in an extensiveprocess of consultation with States and affected In-dian tribes throughout the site selection and devel-opment process. It also gives the State or tribe theright to veto the President’s selection of a reposi-tory site, a veto that can only be overridden by joint

IsState and ]OC~ issues are discussed in ch. 8.

action of both Houses of Congress. Similar provi-sions apply to other waste management facilitiesaddressed by the Act.

Second, NWPA requires DOE to make pay-ments to States, affected Indian tribes, and in somecases local governments to compensate for the socio-economic impacts of development and operationof waste management facilities. Confidence thatthese payments will be forthcoming more than adecade from now is enhanced by the stipulation thatthe necessary funds be provided from the NuclearWaste Fund, rather than from appropriations fromgeneral revenues.

Some elements of a high-confidence Mission Planwould also address some of the substantive concernsof the States about the waste management program.For example, State concerns that the first repositorymay end up being the only one would be addressedby a requirement that a second licensed repositorybegin operation within a relatively short fixed pe-riod after the first. An explicit backup siting planwould also help reduce concerns that a lack of alter-natives could compromise the fairness and integrityof the site selection process, as noted earlier.

CONCLUSION

NWPA contains most, but not all, of the policyelements OTA identified as being central to abroadly supported waste management policy. TheAct resolved the major issues that had dominatedthe radioactive waste debate during several Con-gresses by committing to a schedule for develop-ing geologic repositories, giving utilities the primaryresponsibility for interim storage until a repositoryis available, and clearly defining the role and powersof States and affected Indian tribes in siting wastefacilities. In addition, it contains several key pro-visions that OTA had identified as being of par-ticular importance to implementation of a reposi-tory program: financing through a mandatory feeon nuclear-generated electricity; and provisions forfinancial compensation to States and affected In-dian tribes that host waste management facilities.In OTA view, the provisions of NWPA containsuficient authority for a feasible waste managementprogram based on geologic repositories.

Certain major questions were left to be address-ed later, either in the Mission Plan or in subsequentlegislation dealing with the institutional arrange-ments for managing the radioactive waste program.The principal questions to be addressed in the Mis-sion Plan concern the plan and schedule for repos-itory development and operation, the scope of theimplementation program (especially the siting pro-gram) for meeting that schedule, and the role ofMRS facilities in the waste management program.As noted earlier, OTA’s analysis suggests that abroadly supported policy would include a commit-ment to a conservative repository operation sched-ule that can be met despite the remaining techni-cal and institutional uncertainties, backed up byan implementation program that places greatestemphasis on increasing the confidence that theschedule can be met without compromising safety,rather than on holding down the expected front-end program costs. While NWPA does not require

Ch. 5—Policy Analysis: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 in Perspective ● 111

this approach, it provides sufficient authority forits use in the Mission Plan, and provides a sourceof funding that can be adjusted if needed to coverthe costs of a conservative program.

Other important elements not addressed inNWPA all relate to the concept of an independentwaste management agency with more funding andmanagement flexibility than is usual with a typicalFederal program. These elements are: 1) establish-ment of such an agency; 2) funding through multi-year appropriations from the Nuclear Waste Fund;and 3) a procedure for congressional approval ofthe Mission Plan as the principal mechanism forbalancing the need for adequate congressional con-trol of the agency with the need for increased flex-ibility of operation. As noted earlier, the historyof the Federal waste management program suggeststhat these changes could substantially increase thelikelihood that a Federal commitment to a schedulefor repository operation can be kept. These changesare discussed in more detail in chapter 7.

At the time NWPA was being debated, alterna-tives to the existing institutional structure for wastemanagement had been studied less thoroughly thanthe technical options. It was felt to be unnecessaryand premature to attempt to make major changesbefore a long-term technical program had beenadopted. Instead, Congress chose to correct someof the most obvious institutional problems by estab-

lishing the Office of Civilian Radioactive WasteManagement within DOE. Congress chose to leavethe question of more basic structural changes forconsideration following submission by DOE of astudy of alternative institutional arrangements formanaging the waste program.

OTA’s analysis indicates that development byDOE of a Mission Plan that is widely viewed asachievable and as responsive to the principal con-cerns of the major affected parties is the crucial nextstep, both for stabilizing the waste managementProgram and for establishing the level of confidencethat would be needed before a more flexible andindependent waste management organization couldbe established. If the Mission Plan leaves some af-fected parties strongly dissatisfied with the way thatthe major questions left open by NWPA are re-solved, the risk of future policy shifts such as thosethat have characterized the program in the past willcontinue, and the credibility of long-term commit-ments will suffer. In addition, it is likely that suchdissatisfaction would lead to strong opposition togiving the waste management program any greatermanagerial and financial independence than italready has. The following chapter presents thebasic elements of a Mission Plan that is consistentwith the authority provided by NWPA and that willbe, in OTA’s opinion, feasible and responsive tothe principal concerns of the major affected parties.

Chapter 6

The Mission Plan

Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

An Achievable Initial Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115Basic Elements of the Initial Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 115Major Advantages of the Initial Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

The Waste Management Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117Repository Loading Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117Storage: The Role of the MRS in the Waste Management Plan... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Implementation Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Present Siting Program ..........,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129High-Confidence Siting Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132Waste Management Technology Development Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

A Strategy for Revising the Mission Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Chapter Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151


6-1. Possible Alternatives for Completion of Major Program Phases of First Repository . . . . . . . 1336-2. Risk That Delayer Rejection of Sites in One Stage of Repository Development Will

Delay Progress to the Next Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1346-3. Effects of Canister Life and Waste Form Release Rate on Projected Population Risks

Over 10,000 Years.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145


6-1. Spent Fuel Projections: LWRS Operating and With Construction Permits onDec. 31, 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

6-2. Potentially Acceptable Sites for the First Repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1316-3. Regions Being Considered for the Second Repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Chapter 6

The Mission Plan

INTRODUCTION

With the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Pol-icy Act of 1982 (NWPA), the Federal Governmenthas, for the first time, committed itself in law toa specific date—January 31, 1998—for beginningthe disposal of nuclear waste in a geologic reposi-tory. Meeting that commitment will require theGovernment to surmount many unprecedentedtechnical and institutional challenges in a sustainedeffort over a period of decades. If that commitmentis to be credible-particularly in view of past prob-lems—it must be supported by a Mission Plan thatmakes ample allowance for the technical and insti-tutional uncertainties associated with developmentof the first geologic repository.

In developing the Mission Plan, two points mustbe considered. First, it is important to develop aPlan that will be widely regarded as feasible andachievable, to show that there is at least one work-able approach to manap”ngspent fuel andhigh-leveiwaste using the authority provided by NWPA.OTA believes that this can be done relativelyquickly by using a conservative system design based

on currently available information and analysis.While such a Plan would not be optimal, the cred-ibility of the Federal waste management programis far more dependent on the realism and achieva-bility of the Mission Plan than on its optimality.

Second, it maybe possible to reduce significantlythe radiation exposure to workers and the public,the costs, and the overall complexity of the wastemanagement process by developing a carefully inte-grated waste management system design. However,the analytical basis needed to design an optimizedintegrated system is still under development. Fur-ther research, development, and demonstration(RD&D) on waste container designs for such a sys-tem will also be required.

For these reasons, the Mission Plan would con-tain two elements: 1) an achievable initial Plan thatincludes ample allowances for those uncertainties,and 2) a strategy for revising the initial Plan asappropriate in the light of new data and experience.Each is discussed below.

AN ACHIEVABLE INITIAL PLAN

Basic Elements of the Initial Plain

As part of its analysis, OTA developed an ini-tial Mission Plan that is: 1) consistent with theauthority provided by NWPA, 2) likely to beachievable, and 3) responsive to the principal con-cerns of the major affected parties. While it is some-times referred to hereafter as the OTA Plan, ’ thisapproach represents for the most part an expan-sion, rather than a major redirection, of the ap-proach that the Department of Energy (DOE) hasfollowed in the past and presented in the Draft Mis-sion Plan released in the spring of 1984. The fol-lowing sections summarize the basic elements of the

OTA Plan and compare it with DOE’s Draft Mis-sion Plan in order to highlight key issues.

OTA’S propostxi Mission Plan emphasizes cer-tm”nty and places great weight on the importanceof minimim”ng the risk of major programmatic de-lays or falures. Because of the long history of dif-ficulties in the Federal waste management program,there is limited tolerance for failures. Any majorfailure—real or perceived—could have grave con-sequences for both the waste management programand the future use of nuclear power. Thus, the Plandescribed below is designed to give a high level ofconfidence that it both can and will be achieved.

115


To ensure it can be achieved, the OTA Plan in-cludes a conservative waste management plan thatcan be met despite remaining uncertainties. Be-cause geologic repositories are the only large-scalewaste facilities authorized and required by NWPA,the heart of a waste management plan based on theauthority provided by NWPA is a repository load-ing schedule: a target schedule for moving spentfuel from reactor sites (where practically all of itwill be stored) to Federal geologic repositories.

The crucial decision concerning the repositoryloading schedule is the balance between the degreeof certainty that the schedule can be met, and thepromised speed of the schedule. Developing ageologic repository is a complex endeavor involv-ing many first-of-a-kind technical and institutionalsteps. The faster the promised schedule, the lessmargin there is for delays or problems at any ofthese steps, and the less confident one can be thatthe schedule can be met. To provide utilities andthe communities near reactors with a highly reliableschedule for removing spent fuel from interim stor-age, the OTA Plan emphasizes certainty by usinga repository loading schedule that does not requireeverything to go smoothly the first time.

The OTA Plan also includes an implementationprogram designed to give confidence that the con-servative loading schedule will be met. The crucialchoice to be made in the implementation programconcerns the balance between the certainty that theprogram will achieve the objectives of the wastemanagement plan on schedule, and the initial costsof the program, both financial and political. Thebasic fact that must be faced is that it is impossibleboth to maximize the certainty of achieving the ob-jectives on schedule and to minimize the initial costsat the same time. In designing an implementationprogram, DOE has essentially two choices: 1) apreventive approach that identifies in advance themost serious potential sources of failure and delay,and includes measures to reduce the chance thatthey will occur or cope with them if they do; or 2)a reactive approach that meets the minimum re-quirements and standards of the Act and assumesthat no major failures will occur, or that problemscan be dealt with adequately after they occur. Thefirst approach treats the requirements of the Actas a floor rather than a ceiling on DOE’s efforts.

It will cost more at the start, but over the long runits financial and political costs may be less-perhapsfar less—than those incurred by the other approach.Because it includes measures to anticipate and avoidpotential delays and failures, the preventive ap-proach is also likely to reduce the time required todevelop an operating repository. With this ap-proach, confidence that the Mission Plan will becarried out successfully is based on the anticipa-tion and allowance for potential problems.

To minimize the chance of real or perceived pro-gram failures, the OTA Plan uses a preventive im-plementation strategy. Its central feature is the pur-suit of enough backup components of the isolationsystem (e. g., the waste form and waste container)and candidate repository sites to ensure a high prob-ability that at least one acceptable combination willbe available on the target date, even if somewhatpredictable failures occur. Such use of backups isa standard technique for achieving high reliabilityin technical systems.

Major Advantages of the Initial Plan

Because the Mission Plan outlined below requiresDOE to go beyond the minimum requirements ofNWPA, it may involve higher financial and polit-ical costs than those contemplated in DOE’s DraftMission Plan. These potential costs could be re-garded as unnecessary by those who believe thatgeologic disposal is a relatively straightforward tech-nical enterprise. However, they could also be seenas the price of insurance for a program that can-not afford any major failures or delays. If those whobelieve that geologic disposal will be easy to im-plement are proved right, this approach will pro-duce a broad range of technical options and quali-fied sites before they are required by the conserv-ative waste management plan. If they are wrong,this approach will be more successful at prevent-ing major delays and will be cheaper in the longrun.

While NWPA does not require this approach,it provides sufficient authority for its use and pro-vides a source of funding I hat can be adjusted tocover the costs of such a program.

The Mission Plan presented below offers severalother advantages. First, it can serve as an impor-

tant early step toward demonstration that high-levelradioactive waste can and will be disposed of safely.A Plan with adequate provisions for dealing withthe remaining technical and institutional uncertain-ties can increase the consensus in the technical com-munity that the waste management plan and theimplementation program are feasible and that reg-ulatory standards will be met. Second, by ensur-ing that cost estimates, necessary for any futurerevisions of the waste disposal fee, are based on aprogram that is widely regarded as being achiev-able, the Plan should significantly reduce the uncer-tainty about the ultimate cost of disposal that nowfaces utilities and ratepayers. Third, the high-

Ch. 6—The Mission Plan . 117

confidence approach can contribute to the accept-ability of the Plan, since the measures needed togive confidence that the waste management plancan be met should also address some of the key con-cerns of interested parties such as States and envi-ronmental groups. In particular, basing contractson a conservative repository loading schedule thatmakes allowances for delays can reduce concernsthat safety might be sacrificed for speed, while de-velopment of backup repository sites and technol-ogies can reduce concerns that less-than-satisfactoryoptions might be used for lack of any suitable alter-natives.

THE WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN

While NWPA sets a target date of 1998 for ini-tial operation of the first geologic repository, it doesnot clearly indicate either how fast DOE is to ac-cept waste for disposal after the repository is avail-able or what is to occur if the repository does notbegin operating in 1998. To fill in those crucialdetails, the initial Mission Plan must contain anexplicit waste management plan that includes: 1)a credible repository loading schedule that couldbe met even if there were delays in the repositoryprogram, 2) a plan for interim spent fuel storageafter 1998 (who is responsible and where storageis to be provided) if the repository is delayed, and3) a backup plan for monitored retrievable storage(MRS) or alternative disposal facilities that wouldallow the Federal Government to accept spent fuelor reprocessed waste eventually, even if there aremajor unforeseen difficulties with geologic disposal.


NWPA clearly established the Federal respon-sibility for disposal of high-level waste and spentfuel and adopted a schedule for development of geo-logic repositories for that purpose. Since the Actdefines a repository as a “system . . . for perma-nent deep geologic disposal, and disposal as ‘‘em-placement in a repository, ” the geologic repositoriesrequired by the Act are the only facilities that DOEcan use to discharge the Federal responsibility for

high-level waste disposal. Thus, a conservative ini-tial Mission Plan based on the authority now pro-vided by NWPA would focus on the credibility ofthe repository loading schedule as the basis of thecredibility of the Federal commitment to take pos-session of spent fuel and ultimately remove it fromreactor sites.

The schedule for the first geologic repository isof particular importance, because that repositoryis the only large-scale waste management facilitythat NWPA authorizes DOE to construct. Al-though DOE is required to find a suitable site forthe second repository and submit it to the NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC) for licensing, fur-ther authorization by Congress will be needed forconstruction of that repository. (As discussed below,the Act’s limitation on the amount of spent fuel thatcan be placed in the first repository before the sec-ond begins operation will require eventual construc-tion of the second to accommodate the spent fuelexpected to be generated by the reactors now oper-ating or under construction. ) NWPA also directsDOE to prepare site-specific designs for MRS fa-cilities, but the Act neither authorizes nor requiresDOE to actually site or construct such a facility.

The rate at which spent fuel can be transferredto repositories will be determined primarily by thedates on which the facilities begin operation andby the loading rate of each repository. These arediscussed below.

—


Schedule for Full-ScaleOperation of the First Repository

A major reason for the contractual commitmentto a schedule for accepting waste at a repository,included in the integrated waste management pol-icy described in chapter 5, is to provide a basis forconfidence that spent fuel will ultimately be re-moved from reactor sites to a permanent restingplace, and thus that interim storage will not becomea long-term measure by default. OTA’s study con-cluded that the single most effective measure to fa-cilitate efforts to provide additional interim spentfuel storage is to provide a highly credible scheduleand program for siting and operating geologic re-positories.

To create confidence that interim storage wouldindeed be interim and not permanent, the certaintyof the schedule for repository operation is more im-portant than the speed. Thus the Mission Planwould contain a conservative repository loadingschedule that is a high-confidence prediction ofwhen repositories are likely to be operating despitethe kinds of delays that might be anticipated in afirst-of-a-kid venture. Such a repository loadingschedule must take into account four broad sourcesof uncertainty: 1) the time that will be required forthe technical and institutional steps involved incharacterizing and licensing the first repository site,2) the possibility that NRC will not grant a con-struction authorization or operating license for thefirst site submitted for approval, 3) the possibilitythat the disposal system design might be rejectedby NRC or might require substantial modificationsto meet regulatory requirements, and 4) the possi-bility that the target loading rate of each reposi-tory cannot be achieved in practice. A repositoryloading schedule that would provide for these uncer-tainties would allow ample time for: 1) delays inthe siting and licensing process, including rejectionof the first site submitted to NRC and the licens-ing of a backup; and 2) development, licensing, anddemonstration of two disposal system designs at thefirst repository site, before the full-scale packagingand loading facilities are constructed.

The Plan will also need to include more opti-mistic management goals that show the earliest timethat spent fuel could be delivered to the FederalGovernment, if all goes well. Such goals are needed

as program management tools to prevent the al-lowances for delay in the conservative loadingschedule from being used up by avoidable procras-tination. However, to avoid raising false expecta-tions, such management goals should be clearly dis-tinguished from the conservative “best estimate”schedule used as a basis for contractual commit-ments. Questions about the credibility of the Fed-eral waste management program in the past havestemmed in part from plans and schedules thatcould only be met if no Technical or institutionaldifficulties arose. The credibility of the Mission Planwould be enhanced if cent contractual commitments arebased on a conservative repository loading schedulethat does not assume that everything will go rightthe first time.

MANAGEMENT TARGET SCHEDULE

The repository management target schedule sug-gested here provides for operation of the first re-pository to be accomplished in two phases—a dem-onstration phase and an operational phase. Thesephases are designed to address separately the twodistinct reasons for a repository:

1.

2.

To demonstrate that a suitable disposal tech-nology exists and that NRC will license it.This is needed to allay concerns that there isno solution to the waste disposal problem andcan be accomplished with initial licensed em-placement of waste : n a repository.To dispose of radioac,bive waste at a scale com -parable to the rate at which it is being gener-ated. This is needed to ensure that at somedefinite point waste will actually be removedfrom storage and moved to a permanent rest-ing place. It requires a full-scale operating re-pository system.

The target for initial operation in the demonstra-tion phase is January 31 1998, as required byNWPA. For this phase, a small amount of waste(e.g., several hundred tonnes) would be placed inconservatively designed packages during the genericpackaging and handling R.D&D program requiredby NWPA. Permission would be requested fromNRC to emplace this material in the repository assoon as possible following issuance of a construc-tion authorization, before the repository’s packag-ing facilities are constructed.

Ch. 6—The Mission Plan “ 119

Providing for separate demonstration and oper-ational phases of operation of the first repositoryoffers several advantages:

1.

2.

It increases the likelihood that the 1998deadline for initial repository operation willbe met, Analysis by DOE indicates that the1998 deadline probably cannot be met if oper-ation of the first repository is deferred untilthe full-scale packaging and handling facilitiescan be built. 1 Under the conservative Plan de-scribed in this chapter, initial emplacementof waste in the repository would be accom-plished before the repository’s packaging fa-cilities had been constructed”. This should min-imize the time between the construction au-thorization and the first licensed disposal inthe repository, thus increasing the chances thatthe 1998 deadline can be met even if there aredelays in receiving the first construction au-thorization.It allows an early demonstration of licenseddisposal. What is needed to demonstrate thatradioactive waste can and will be safely dis-posed of is not only the physical technologyof disposal, but also the institutional capac-ity of NRC to make a regulatory decision thata repository at a specific site can be expectedto provide the required degree of waste isola-tion. NRC approval of a licensed phase of low-level operation, as soon as possible after theconstruction authorization is granted, couldprovide an early demonstration of both thephysical and institutional requirements for dis-posal. Licensed low-level operation may alsobe adequate to satisfy the requirement in someState moratorium legislation that no new nu-clear reactors be licensed until a demonstrateddisposal technology has been approved by theFederal Government.2

‘U. S. Department of Energy, Draft Mission Plan for the CivilianRadioactive Waste Management Program, DOE/RW-0005 DRAFT,April 1984, pp. 3-A-36 and 3-A-37 (hereafter Drafi Mission Plan).

2Analysis by the presiding member of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Com-mittee of the California Energy Resources Conservation and Devel-opment Commission concludes that the last step needed for demon-stration is confirmation of the existence of a suitable site. Emilio E.Varanini, 111, ‘ ‘Aspects of Demonstrating Nuclear Waste Disposal,statement presented to the Waste Disposal Technology Symposium,University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz., Feb. 27, 1979. This could beaccomplished by NRC approval of initial disposal at a site.

3, It allows time to optimize the system designfor the operational-phase. Meeting the Jan-u-ary 1998 deadline with an initial phase of low-level operation could also separate the ques-tion of demonstrating the existence of a dis-posal technology from that of full-scale oper-ation. The demonstration phase would use aconservative repository system design (dis-cussed below), based on the principle that thecertainty of obtaining NRC approval with aminimum of technical disputes should takepriority over cost-effectiveness. Deferring theoperational phase would allow more time forDOE to develop, and NRC to approve, a full-scale system design in which broader wastemanagement system considerations such ascost and worker radiation exposures are givenhigher priority. This might allow relaxationof initial conservatism in repository design,if justified by the results of low-level opera-tion and testing, thus reducing the risk thatadoption of a conservative baseline system de-sign in the initial Mission Plan could lead tocosts that later prove to be unnecessary.

This approach may also reduce disposal costs inthe long run compared to DOE’s proposed ap-proach, which involves construction of full-scalepackaging and handling facilities quickly after aconstruction authorization is granted.3 There areseveral sources of possible cost savings. First, thisapproach allows time to develop and license an op-timized system design. As noted earlier, recentstudies suggest that it may be possible to signifi-cantly reduce total waste management system costsand radiation exposures during operation by usinga carefully integrated system design.4 DOE’s cur-

—-——.-—. —‘DOE’s Draft Mission Plan includes two phases of repository oper-

ation but initiates construction of the full-scale facilities at the sametime as the pilot-scale facilities. There is no allowance for a periodof low-level operation before the design of the full-scale facilities islocked in. Instead, the two-phase aproach is used primarily as a wayof meeting the 1998 deadline, rather than allowing time to developand test an optimized system design before commiting to construc-tion of the full-scale system.

‘Raymond E. Hoskins, “Concept for an All-Purpose Transport,Storage and Disposal Cask for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management, ”published in Prcmedings of the 1983 Civilian Radimctive Waste Man-agement Information Meeting, CONF-8312 17, U.S. Department ofEnergy, February 1984, pp. 362-368. See also Westinghouse Elec-tric Corporation, Waste Technology Services Division, PreliminaryCost Analysis ofa Universal Package Concept in the Spent Fuel Man-agement System, WTSD-TME-432, September 1984.


rent plans may not allow time to develop and in-corporate an optimized integrated design in the firstrepository, however, since DOE did not formallyinitiate an effort to develop concepts for an inte-grated system until 1984. To avoid foreclosing pre-maturely the option of using such an integrated sys-tem for the first repository, the DOE managementtarget schedule for construction of the full-scalepackaging and handling facilities for the operationalphase would be determined by the time requiredto develop, test, and license an optimized integratedsystem design. Whether or not this would requirean adjustment of several years in DOE’s currentplanning schedule (for operation of full-scale facil-ities in 2001) is by no means certain. However, thepotential benefits to be obtained could more thanoffset the cost of the additional storage required ifa delay of several years were involved.

Second, it would provide greater certainty thatthe full-scale system could be operated at the tar-get rate required by the repository loading schedule,since the final design would have the benefit of theexperience gained during low-level operation in thedemonstration phase. This would reduce the riskof costly and time-consuming modifications to analready constructed facility unable to operate at thetarget rate.5

Third, it would allow more time to resolve ques-tions about whether and when spent fuel might bereprocessed. This would allow the operational dis-posal system design to be optimized based on bet-ter information about the relative proportions ofspent fuel and high-level waste from reprocessingit would have to handle, and would reduce con-cerns that irreversible decisions about the fate ofspent fuel would be made prematurely.

Fourth, deferring the large costs of full-scale oper-ation can reduce the total discounted cost of dis-posal, thus offsetting to some extent the costs of theadditional interim storage that would be required.

5Whi1e the DOE Draft Mission Plan provides for an initial phaseof repository loading using partial loading facilities, it does not allowtime to test the loading facility design before full-scale facilities areconstructed. Since there is no experience at packaging and handlinghighly radioactive materials at the rates expected during full-scale re-pository operation, constructing the full-scaJe facilities without experi-ence at an intermediate scale increases the risk that repositories willnot be able to achieve their target loading rates in practice.

CONTRACTUAL REPOSITORYLOADING SCHEDULE

The repository loading schedule used for con-tracts with utilities would be based on operationof full-scale loading facilities beginning no later than2008 at the first repository. This date is a crediblebasis for commitments because, unlike the moreoptimistic management schedule, it can be met evenif significant technical and institutional difficultiesare encountered. For example, the first repositorycould be operating by 2008 even if none of the sitesinitially evaluated at depth (’ ‘characterized’proved acceptable and a new site not now underconsideration had to be used. (By contrast, theDOE Draft Mission Plan estimates that the secondrepository could be operating by 2004, even if botha new site and a new geologic medium [granite]were used. ) Spent fuel could be accepted some yearsearlier than the commitment date if the contingen-cies that have been allowed for, such as the needto use a backup site, do not materialize-providedthat the repository program has been managed firmlyenough to prevent the allowances from being usedup by avoidable delays.

The 2008 commitment date for operation of full-scale facilities at the first repository is consistent withsome independent assessments of the likely availa-bility of a repository. NRC has determined in its‘‘waste confidence’ rulemaking that there is rea-sonable assurance that a geologic repository wouldbe available between 2007 and 2009.6 The Tennes-see Valley Authority, in an analysis of its own needsfor additional spent fuel storage, estimates no bet-ter than a 50-50 chance that DOE will be able toaccept spent fuel on a large scale by 2008.7 OTAbelieves that use of the implementation programdescribed below can substantially increase the levelof confidence that a repository would be availableby that time.

Schedule for Operationsof the Second Repository

The Act does not commit to a specific date bywhich the second repository is to come on line, butrather sets a limit of 70,000 tonnes on the amountof spent fuel or equivalent high-level waste that can

‘Federal Register, vol. 48, No. ’39, May 20, 1983, p. 22730.7Hoskins, op. cit.

Ch. 6—The Mission Plan ● 121

be placed into the first repository before the sec-ond begins operation. DOE analysis shows that thesecond repository could open by 2005, at the earli-est, if the first site recommended for that reposi-tory is approved by NRC and there are no sub-stantial delays in the siting process. At most, it couldopen as late as 30 years after the first, since it wouldtake about that long to emplace 70,000 tonnes inthe first repository, according to DOE’s most re-cent repository loading schedule. (It should be notedthat because the reactors that are currently opeating or under construction are expected to dis-charge over 100,000 tonnes of spent fuel duringtheir lifetimes, the 70,000-tonne limit on the firstrepository implies that the second must ultimatelybe built if projected amounts of waste are to be ac-commodated without amendment of NWPA.)

The proposed Mission Plan would commit tooperation of the full-scale facilities of the second re-pository to begin no later than 2012—4 years afterthe commitment date for full-scale facilities of thefirst repository. An explicit commitment to opera-tion of a second repository soon after the first wouldallay concerns that the first repository would be-come the Nation’s sole ‘‘nuclear waste dump’ formany decades, and would provide a backup to thefirst repository to ensure that some disposal oper-ations could take place even if problems developedwith one repository. In addition, if an acceptablesite for a second repository can be found nearer thebulk of the reactors in the East, it will significantlyreduce the costs and impacts of full-scale transpor-tation of high-level radioactive waste from reactorsto disposal. Planning for a short delay betweenoperation of the first and second repositories allowsmore time to identify suitable sites in the East, andtime for experience at operating the first repositorybefore the second starts up.

Target Full-Scale Annual Loading Rate

The target loading rate of each repository is amajor design decision affecting the entire wastemanagement system. It will determine how longeach repository will be in operation, how quicklythe buildup of spent fuel in storage at reactors canbe stopped, and how long it will take to eliminatethe backlogs that are already in storage at the timerepository loading begins. The higher the targetloading rate, the more rapidly the backlogs can be

eliminated. At the same time, increasing the repos-itory loading rate will increase the cost of the pack-aging and handling facilities, the number of trans-portation casks needed to deliver waste to the repos-itory, and the number of shipments needed eachyear.

Three considerations are relevant to choosing adesign maximum loading rate: the projected typesand amounts of waste that must be accepted, thegoal for removing waste from interim storage, andthe desired reserve margin in the loading capac-ity. Each will be discussed briefly.

WASTE PROJECTIONS

A waste management plan must be based onsome assumptions about the amount of spent fuelthat will be generated in the future. The more re-actors that are expected to be operating when therepositories begin operation, the greater the loadingcapacity that will be needed to stop the buildup ofspent fuel in storage. OTA suggests that, as a basecase for the waste management plan, DOE con-sider the spent fuel expected to be generated by thereactors that are now operating or are under con-struction (see fig. 6-1 ). If additional reactors areordered in the future, the Mission Plan can be re-vised as needed. (If the increase over currentlyplanned construction is relatively small, it couldprobably be handled by increasing the design load-ing rate of one or both of the two repositories re-quired by the Act, or by extending the operationalperiod of the repositories. If the increase is large,additional repositories may be required. ) Thiswould provide a conservative basis for estimatingthe fee that will have to be charged to ensure full-cost recovery, as required by NWPA. A fee basedon the expectation of revenues from reactors thathave yet to be ordered could turn out to have beentoo low if those orders do not materialize, a andcould produce insufficient revenues in the earlyyears of the program.

The waste projections must also make assump-tions about the relative amounts of spent fuel andhigh-level waste from reprocessing that would bedelivered for disposal. A conservative assumptionis that all spent fuel would be delivered directly to

8U. S. Department of Energy, Report on Financing the Disposalof Commercial Spent NucIear Fuel and Processed High-Level Radioac-tive Waste, DOE/S-0020 (Washington, D. C., June 1983), p. 30.

— —


Figure 6=1.-Spent Fuei Projections: LWRS Operating and With Construction Parmlts on Dec. 31, 1932

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

YearaAS~~eS b~lns gre re~~ked to the rnexlrnum extent, but no rod consolidation. Consolidation couid significantly increaaa the capacity of the exiSting baairm

SOURCE: Data aupplled by U.S. Uepertment of Energy (aea app. E).

repositories without reprocessing. This would givea high estimate of the number of packages of highlyradioactive waste to be received, packaged, and em-placed in each repository each year, since it is ex-pected that there would be fewer packages of solid-ified high-level waste than of spent fuel for a givenamount of electricity generation. At the same time,a conservative plan would provide capacity to dis-pose of the high-level waste from the West Valleyreprocessing plant and the defense nuclearprograms.

Planning to provide capacity for direct disposalof all spent fuel simply ensures that disposal willbe available as an option according to the plannedschedule, not that spent fuel must be disposed ofaccording to the schedule. Thus, it does not pre-

clude future decisions to defer disposal. In fact, oncethe repository packaging and handling facilitiesneeded to meet the reference loading schedule havebeen constructed, it would be possible to store thepackaged spent fuel on the surface at the reposi-tory if that were desired.

GOAL FOR REMOVING WASTE FROM STORAGE

DOE estimates that by 1998, some 36,000 tonnesof spent fuel will be in storage (practically all of itat reactor sites), and about 2,300 additional tonneswill be discharged each year by the reactors thatare in operation at that time.g While it is possible

‘U.S. Department of Energy, Spent Fuel and Radioactive WasteInventories, Projections, and Charactem”sticsp DOWRW-0006, Sep-tember 1984, table 1.2, p. 30.

Ch. 6–The Mission Plan ● 123

that one repository loading at 3,000 tonnes per yearcould handle the total annual discharge from thereactors that are already operating or under con-struction, it would have little capacity left over tobegin reducing the backlog. A major design ques-tion, then, is how much loading capacity to pro-vide beyond the amount needed to stop the buildupof spent fuel. This decision will depend upon howquickly it is desired to remove waste from interimstorage sites, and, in particular, how quickly toremove spent fuel from reactor sites.

As discussed in chapter 3, once fuel has beenplaced into storage, it may be cheaper to leave itthere for an extended period than to construct theadditional transportation and disposal capacityneeded to allow it to be removed quickly. Further-more, NRC has concluded in its ‘‘waste confi-dence’ rule that spent fuel can be left safely at re-actor sites up to 30 years after expiration of thereactor’s operating license. Nonetheless, the pros-pect of spent fuel remaining in storage at reactorsites for decades after the reactors cease operationmay be objected to by the surrounding communi-ties and may be viewed as a negative factor in deci-sions about siting and construction of new reactors.The repository loading schedule must strike a bal-ance between these considerations.

Allowing 10 to 15 years after reactor shutdownfor spent fuel removal could be advantageous be-cause it would avoid the strains on the transporta-tion and handling systems that would result if a re-actor’s lifetime discharge had to be removed withina few years.

10 In addition, designing and licensing

the transportation cask fleet to handle only fuel thatis at least 10 years old would provide an additionalsafety margin because of the reduction in heat out-put of the fuel.l1 Under the current DOE contract,spent fuel must be at least 5 years old before it canbe delivered to DOE, which means that some spentfuel will remain at reactor sites for at least 5 yearsafter decommissioning.

Operation of full-scale facilities of the first reposi-tory as late as 2008 and the second repository as

IOAli GhOvanlOU et al., Analysis of Nuclear Waste Disposal andStrategies for FaciJity Dep/oymenc, The MITRE Corporation,(McLean, Va., April 1980), p. 6-51.

11A9 discussed in Ch. 3, cask design studies show that increasingthe age of fuel from 5 to 10 years leads to a 1000 F reduction in maxi-mum fuel temperature during a design-basis fire.

late as 2012 would not lead to large amounts ofspent fuel being left at reactor sites for an extendedperiod after decommissioning. Even with thatschedule, two repositories, each loading at 3,000tonnes per year, could dispose of all the spent fuelexpected to be generated by the reactors now oper-ating or under construction by about 2030, andcould ensure that spent fuel is removed from eachreactor site within 10 to 15 years after the reactorceases operation. 12

RESERVE MARGIN

Confidence that the desired annual loading rateswill be achieved in practice can be increased byplanning to construct one more independent proc-essing line than the minimum expected to be re-quired to meet target loading rates. Available stud-ies suggest that a single processing line may becapable of achieving the loading rate of 3,000 tonnesper year now being used in DOE plans.13 How-ever, construction of two lines provides a reservemargin that can, in several ways, increase the con-fidence that that rate will be achieved in practice.

First, the loading rate depends on both the num-ber of packages per year that the processing linecan handle and the amount of waste that can beplaced in each package. Even if one line is able toprocess the required number of packages each year,it is possible that site-specific considerations mightrequire a lower package waste load than antici-pated. Provision of a second packaging line wouldallow the waste load per package to be reduced byhalf without lowering the total loading rate.

Second, the reserve margin provided by a sec-ond packaging line is insurance against the possi-bility that unanticipated operational difficultiesmight force each line to operate at a lower rate thanplanned. The risk that this would occur could bereduced by planning to begin full-scaie operationfollowing construction of the first processing line,and to defer construction of the second until thedesign is confirmed in practice and any neededmodifications are made.

lzData On light-water reactors that are operating and with const~c-tion permits provided by DOE. See app. G for calculations.

l~westinghouse Electric Corporation, Advanced Energy SystemsDivision, En~”neemd Waste Package Conceptual Design Ikfense HighLevel Waste (Form 1) and Spent Fuel (Form 2) Disposal in SaIt,AESD-TMA-3131, September 1982, pp. 422-423.


Third, a second processing line provides backuploading capacity against the possibility of accidentsor other problems that would halt, interrupt, orslow down the operations of the first line, or loadingof the other repository. In fact, if a single line provescapable of handling the target rate of 3,000 tonnesper year, the second line would provide fully redun-dant capacity to handle material intended for theother repository if loading of that repository werehalted for any reason.

Addition of a second processing line is estimatedto cost between $18 million and $60 million, de-pending on the package design .14 In addition to in-creasing confidence that the loading schedule willbe achieved, it could also allow defense high-levelwaste to be loaded in the repository (if a decisionis made to do so) without seriously affecting theloading of commercial waste.

Storage: The Role of the MRSin the Waste Management Plan

Although the major focus of NWPA is the sitingand operation of two permanent geologic reposi-tories, the Act also requires DOE to submit designsfor, and a study of the need for, one or more mon-itored retrievable storage (MRS) facilities. Thisstudy is to be submitted to Congress in mid-1985,to provide a basis for possible deliberations con-cerning whether to authorize siting and construc-tion of such a facility.

Proposals for construction of Federal storage fa-cilities have played a major role in debates aboutwaste management policy since 1974, when theAtomic Energy Commission, following failure ofthe attempt to site a first repository at Lyons,Kansas, suggested Retrievable Surface Storage Fa-cilities (RSSFS) as an interim measure to allow sev-eral decades to develop permanent disposal facili-ties. (See the discussion of storage in ch. 4 and app.A.) Two distinct functions have been proposed forsuch storage facilities:

1. To provide relatively short-term interim stor-age as part of a waste management programpredicated on fairly rapid development andoperation of geologic repositories. This role

~+~bi~., pp. 423 and 434.

2.

was the focus of debate on the Carter admin-istration’s proposal to provide Federal away-from-reactor (AFR) storage facilities in the1980’s, discussed in issue 4 of appendix B.To provide a long-term waste managementoption that would allow more time to be takenin developing geolo!gic repositories or otherdisposal technologies (tie proposed role for theRSSF), or to serve as an alternative to geologicrepositories in the event that such repositoriescannot be developed for a long, and perhapsindefinite, period. The construction of long-term storage facilities as an alternative to rapiddevelopment of geologic repositories is dis-cussed in issue 1 of app. B.

Proposals for construction of MRS facilities haveincluded both functions. 1 t would be valuable forthe Mission Plan to analyze the need for each ofthese principal functions in an integrated wastemanagement system. This would provide a usefulperspective for the plan, required to be includedin the MRS need and feasibility study, for integrat-ing any MRS facilities that are constructed withthe other storage and disposal facilities authorizedby the Act. Such analysis would also be responsiveto NWPA’s requirement that the Mission Plan pro-vide ‘‘an informational basis sufficient for informeddecisions. A brief discussion of each functionfollows.

Post-1998 Interim Storage

While the repository program is the principalfocus of the Mission Plan, it must also address theissue of interim storage after the 1998 deadline forrepository operation. Additional storage capacitywill

●

●

be required after 1993 for three reasons:

Even if the repository begins operating onschedule in 1998, it will take some time toreach a high enough annual loading rate toequal or exceed the rate at which spent fuelis being generated. DOE currently estimatesthat this would not occur until 2003.15

Some slippages in the repository operationschedule are possible if: not likely. Even a con-servative repository development programmight experience some relatively short delaysresulting from foreseeable but unavoidable

15DOE, Draft Mission Plan.


events such as lawsuits, construction accidents,rejection of a repository site, strikes, and badweather. While such events could delay repos-itory loading by years, they would not lead toextended or open-ended delays and would notraise major questions about the eventual avail-ability of geologic repositories.

● Even after the repository is operating at fullscale, there will be a need for buffer storagecapacity in the waste management system toallow reactors to continue operating withoutdisruption even if there are any operationaldifficulties at the repository that would pre-vent it from accepting spent fuel at the desiredrate.

NWPA provides that utilities be responsible foradditional interim storage as needed until DOE canaccept the waste at a repository, and the Act doesnot authorize construction of Federal storage fa-cilities. In accordance with this law, an initial Planbased on the authority in NWPA would providefor interim storage by utilities at reactor sites untila repository or alternative long-term waste manage-ment facility is available.

Providing post-1998 interim storage at reactorsites appears to be quite feasible. 16 NWPA containsmeasures to facilitate utility efforts to provide at-reactor storage until a repository is available, and,as noted earlier, NRC has concluded in its wasteconfidence rulemaking that spent fuel could be safe-ly stored at reactor sites for up to 30 years after ter-mination of the reactor license. Thus, if no furtheraction were taken by Congress to authorize stor-age by the FederaI Government, it appears now thatthe needed storage could and would be providedby the utilities themselves. This shows that the ex-isting authority provided by NWPA is sufficient tocarry out a workable waste management programunless currently unforeseen major problems are en-countered in developing geologic repositories.

Nonetheless, discussions concerning the MissionPlan have raised the issue of whether the FederalGovernment has a responsibility or an obligationto take spent fuel after 1998 if a repository is not

ICDOE ‘‘exwcts the increasecj efficiency of onsite spent fuel stor-age, that is expected to result from successful completion of the fuelrod consolidation and dry storage demonstrations (now underway),to be sufficient to preclude the need for Federat Interim Storage. ”DOE, Dratl Mission Plan, p. 3-D-5.

available as required by NWPA. This involves twointerrelated questions: who should be responsiblefor post-1998 interim storage, and where should itbe done? These need to be discussed separately,although they are often merged in the comparisonof two alternatives: utility responsibility, with stor-age at the reactor sites; or Federal responsibility,with storage at an MRS facility. There is also athird option that bears consideration, since NWPAallows DOE to take title to spent fuel at reactor sites:Federal responsibility for post-1998 storage at thereactor sites.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR POST-1998INTERIM STORAGE

Some feel that NWPA requires utilities to pro-vide interim storage for as long as is necessary un-til a repository is available. Others feel that the Act’s1998 deadline for a repository, and the fact that util-ities are now paying fees for disposal services, ob-ligates the Federal waste program to take respon-sibility for spent fuel beginning in 1998. This isprimarily an equity issue rather than a technicalquestion, since NWPA allows DOE to take title tospent fuel at the reactor sites before it is deliveredto a repository. Thus, title and responsibility couldbe transferred according to any arbitrary schedulethat could be agreed upon. The options range fromcontinuation of utility responsibility until spent fuelis physically delivered to the repository, to havingthe waste management program take responsibilityfor all spent fuel in 1998. OTA’s analysis of an in-tegrated waste management policy concluded thatit may be possible to reach agreement on the prin-ciple that the costs of additional spent fuel storage,beyond the contractual acceptance date (and per-haps title to and liability for the spent fuel), wouldbe transferred from the utility to the waste man-agement program on that date.

It should be noted that under NWPA, the costsof the waste management program are to be recov-ered from users through fees. Thus, any costs foradditional interim storage would be paid for by util-ities rather than the Federal Government, whetherthat storage is provided by the utilities directly orby the Federal waste management program. Thequestion is whether the cost will be paid only bythose utilities that would have to provide additionalstorage if the repository loading schedule is delayed,or by all utilities through the Nuclear Waste Fund.

IZ6 ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

NWPA currently requires that utilities, to the ex-tent possible, provide interim storage until the spentfuel is accepted by the waste management program,and requires that the costs of the limited 1,900-tonne Federal interim storage program be borneby those utilities that use it. While NWPA providesthat any MRS facilities subsequently authorized byCongress would be paid for for the Nuclear WasteFund, it also requires that the MRS proposal beaccompanied by a funding plan that would providethat the costs of constructing and operating suchfacilities be borne by the generators and owners ofthe material to be stored in the facilities.

While the decision about who is responsible forpost-1998 spent fuel storage would affect primari-ly the equity of the distribution of waste manage-ment costs among the utilities themselves, it couldalso affect the total costs to the utilities. This willdepend on the interest rate set by the Secretary ofthe Treasury for borrowing by the Nuclear WasteFund in years when the expenditures exceed therevenues from the waste disposal fee. If that rateis set at the rate for Government securities, ratherthan at competitive market rates that utilities wouldface if they were raising capital themselves, shift-ing the storage costs to the waste management pro-gram could reduce the total costs to the utilities andwould to some extent represent an implicit Federalsubsidy to the waste management program.

LOCATION OF POST-1998 INTERIM STORAGE

If the utilities are responsible for interim stor-age, it appears likely that most of the storage wouldbe located at reactor sites. If the Federal waste man-agement program takes responsibility, the storagecould be done either at centralized MRS facilitieslocated away from the reactor sites, or at the sitesthemselves, using one of the dry storage technol-ogies that will be demonstrated as part of the pro-gram required by NWPA. If combination storage/transportation casks prove feasible and licensable,DOE could simply provide those casks to utilitiesas needed to store spent fuel that cannot be storedin the reactor basin, since DOE has authority underNWPA to provide transportation casks. (DOE hassuggested this option in the Draft Mission Plan.)Once a repository begins operation, title to the spentfuel could also be transferred to DOE at any desiredrate even if the target loading schedule is notachieved, since title can transfer at the reactor site.

If multipurpose casks are not feasible, Congresscould authorize DOE to provide other storage fa-cilities directly at reactor sites, as is already author-ized under the limited Federal interim storage pro-gram in NWPA. This approach maybe desirableunless there are substantial safety and cost benefitsto centralized storage, and it would avoid the po-tential complications of siting and licensing MRSfacilities.

If DOE provided additional storage using multi-purpose casks, the costs would be borne by thewaste management program rather than by the in-dividual utility. If Congress authorizes DOE to con-struct additional storage facilities, either a cen-tralized MRS or at-reactor facilities, a decisioncould be made at that time about whether the costswould be borne by all utilities.

The questions involved in providing a centralizedFederal MRS for post- 1998 interim storage are es-sentially similar to those involved in earlier pro-posals for a Federal AFR storage facility that wereconsidered at the time N WPA was being debated.(These questions are discussed in issue 4 of app.B.) The major difference is that the interim stor-age provisions of NWPA have dealt with a princi-pal argument made for a Federal AFR: the con-cern that utilities would not be able to provideadditional storage capacity quickly enough to pre-vent reactor shutdowns. As noted earlier, it nowappears likely that utilities will be able to providetheir own storage by and after 1998 even if no largeFederal storage facility is provided. While a sys-tematic and detailed comparison of storage optionsmust await completion of the MRS needs and fea-sibility study, available studies suggest some pre-liminary conclusions, which are discussed below.

Available analyses suggest that decentralized at-reactor storage could be economically competitivewith centralized storage, and may even be less ex-pensive under some conditions. 17 The principal rea-son is that the at-reactor approach allows the capi-tal cost of handling facilities to be spread out overtime as small increments are added on a reactor-by-reactor basis as needed. A centralized approach

17A recent ~~ysis of univers~ (ontainer concepts shows that anoptimized at-reactor approach using storage transportation casks couldbe as much as 20 percent less expensive than an optimized approachincluding centralized MRS facilities, Westinghouse, Preliminary CostAnalysis, table 1-3, pp. 1-10 and j -11.


involves a large front-end expenditure for packag-ing and handling facilities that may not be fully uti-lized, and that to some extent would duplicate at-reactor facilities that the utilities would already haveconstructed to meet their pre-1998 interim storageobligations under NWPA.18

In addition, expanding at-reactor storage maybe more reliable than building a centralized stor-age facility for assuring adequate buffer storage inthe event of delays in repository siting or interrup-tions in repository operations. A centralized stor-age facility would itself be subject to many of thesame sorts of ‘expected’ delays that would affecta repository. In addition, a centralized MRS fa-cility, like a repository, would be potentially vul-nerable to operational problems that could adverse-ly affect many reactors simultaneously unlessprovisions have been made for buffer storage at thereactor sites. Furthermore, the history of strong andsuccessful opposition to past efforts to provide Fed-eral storage facilities suggests that a policy of pro-viding MRS facilities might be relatively difficultto sustain over an extended period. Thus, the ef-fort to develop MRS facilities may not providemuch more insurance against such delays thanwould the measures to increase confidence in therepository loading schedule described below.

On the other hand, it is possible that a need couldbe shown for offsite storage before a repository canbe expected to be available. For example, some re-actor sites may be limited in their physical capac-ity for additional storage, although further analy-sis is needed to determine the extent to which thiswould lead to a requirement for offsite storage be-fore repositories are likely to be available. (Therewill be a need for some spent fuel prior to that timefor packaging and handling tests, dry storageRD&D, and low-level operation of the first reposi-tory. This requirement may be sufficient to elimi-nate any physical need for offsite interim storagebeyond the 1,900 tomes of backup offsite storagealready provided for by NWPA. ) It is also possi-ble that there may be overall system benefits, interms of safety and cost, to providing centralizedfacilities for the additional interim storage thatwould be required if all the contingencies providedfor in the conservative repository loading plan cameto pass. However, this remains to be demonstrated.

Iasee chapter note at end of chapter.

To provide Congress with a complete basis forits decision, it would be valuable for the MRS needand feasibility study to include an analysis of anoptimum Federal at-reactor storage option for com-parison with the centralized MRS options. Com-parisons would be made in terms of total wastemanagement system costs, worker and public ra-diation exposures, geographic distribution of wastemanagement impacts, and vulnerability to delaysor disruption of operation of any facilities in thesystem. Consideration of providing Nuclear WasteFund-financed interim storage at reactor sites, asan alternative to centralized MRS facilities, wouldallow a comparison of the relative merits of at-reac-tor and away-from-reactor storage that is not com-plicated by institutional differences in funding andownership arrangements between the two options. 19

It would also be useful for the MRS need studyto analyze the advantages and disadvantages of de-ferring a decision on post-1998 interim storage until1990, when DOE is expected to recommend thefirst site for a repository. This would allow the deci-sion to be made after: 1) evaluation of the resultsof the commercial spent fuel storage RD&D pro-gram required by NWPA, which is expected to becompleted in 1989; 2) development of an integratedsystem model and evaluation of optimized inte-grated system designs; and 3) completion of char-acterization of the first round of candidate reposi-tory sites, at which time the projected schedule forrepository availability would be much better known.If a decision were made to proceed with an MRSfacility at that time, it could still be available byaround 2001, the current target date for operationof full-scale facilities at the repository.

Finally, it would be useful for the MRS studyto contain analysis of the impact of storage op-tions on the rate of progress in the repository pro-gram. As discussed in chapter 4, one of the majorsources of resistance to efforts to provide a Federalstorage facility in the past has been concern thatthe availability of such a facility would lead to defer-ral of the politically and financially costly steps in-volved in siting a geologic repository. In OTA’S—

19DoE comparisons of at-reactor and away-from-reactor storage

to date have assumed that the at-reactor facilities would be financedat private utility borrowing rates, while the centralized facility wouldbe financed at lower Federal borrowing rates and would not be sub-ject to taxation. This biases the results in favor of away-from-reactorfacilities.

— .


view, this is the principal programmatic risk in at-tempting to site and construct a large Federal stor-age facility before a permanent repository site isselected and licensed. The risk arises from: 1) thepossibility that the effort to site and construct a Fed-eral storage facility would divert resources and en-ergy from the repository program; and 2) the factthat, once such a facility is available, it will be easierand less expensive to expand the storage capacityfrom year to year than to proceed rapidly to de-velop a geologic repository. (For further discussionof this point, see issue 1 in app. B.) On the otherhand, some argue that making the Federal Gov-ernment responsible for storing growing inventoriesof spent fuel would put more pressure on the Fed-eral program to find a permanent solution. Becausesuch considerations may be more important in anMRS decision than the relative technical merits ofat-reactor vs. away-from-reactor facilities for inter-im storage, they are worthy of rigorous analysis inthe MRS need study.

Backup Waste Facility Plan

The other possible role of MRS facilities is asa long-term alternative to geologic repositories. Acomprehensive Mission Plan must address the pos-sible need for such an alternative. To date, no in-surmountable technical obstacles to geologic dis-posal have been identified. However, there isalways some possibility that major difficulties couldlead to extended delays or even rejection of the con-cept. Thus, a complete specification of the Federalcommitment to utilities must identify what will bedone if that occurs. The principal question to beaddressed is when to provide long-term alternativesto repositories so that the Federal Government canaccept spent fuel in the event that geologic reposi-tories are delayed for a long time. The answer tothis question will determine the backup waste fa-cility plan.

Generally speaking, only two alternatives will en-sure that the Federal Government can take physi-cal possession of waste or spent fuel from utilitiesif a geologic repository is delayed: 1) MRS facili-ties; or 2) disposal capacity based on some otherdisposal technology, such as subseabed emplacement.NWPA provides for the development of both op-tions: section 141 requires the development of de-signs and construction plans for MRS facilities, and

section 222 requires the accelerated developmentof alternative permanent disposal technologies.

If MRS facilities are provided for post-1998 in-terim storage, they would be available as long-termbackup facilities if there are major problems withthe disposal program. However, if it is decided toprovide interim storage at reactor sites, a time maycome when alternative facilities must be providedto prevent the spent fuel from remaining at the re-actor sites indefinitely. Because the Act does notrequire or authorize construction and operation ofsuch facilities, a comprehensive Mission Plan wouldidentify a time at which DOE would address thequestion of whether to seek such authority fromCongress and would discuss the criteria for mak-ing an affirmative decision.

To avoid the need for additional authority as longas possible, the proposed Mission Plan defers thisdecision until it is clear that there are major tech-nical problems with geologic disposal. Specifically,it provides for the decision to be made after com-pleting NWPA’S mandatory process for siting tworepositories, which will occur when NRC decideson the second site in 1998. This should provide am-ple time to obtain the evidence that might justifya reevaluation of the entire concept of geologic dis-posal. For example, rejection of one or more can-didate sites during characterization, or even NRCdisapproval of the first site submitted for licensing,would not be strong evidence that geologic disposalmight not work, any more than drilling one or twodry holes on an otherwise promising potential oil-field proves that the field does not contain oil. Sincethere is little experience with at-depth characteriza-tion or licensing of a geologic disposal site, and sinceat least some geologists believe that it is impossi-ble to tell on the basis of surface exploration alonewhether a site is suitable for a repository, one canexpect some ‘‘dry holes’ before a site that can belicensed is found. On the other hand, if no suchsite can be found after completion of a conserva-tive siting program designed to site two repositories(see discussion of the siting program below), am-ple grounds might exist for reevaluating the feasi-bility of geologic disposal.

If no proposed repository site has received a con-struction authorization by 1998, authorization toconstruct two MRS facilities (or alternative disposalfacilities, if suitable technology is available) would


be sought. Since DOE estimates that an MRS couldbe sited, licensed, and constructed in about 11 yearsafter authorization, it should be possible to havebackup facilities in operation between 2008 and2012, the commitment dates for operation of thetwo geologic repositories, even if a decision to con-struct such facilities is not made until 1998. Oper-ation of backup storage or disposal facilities witha capacity of 6,000 tonnes per year (DOE’s refer-ence loading rate for two MRS facilities), even ifit came as late as 2012, could still assure that thespent fuel discharged by reactors now operating orunder construction could be removed from the sitesof most reactors (except a few of the oldest ones)within about 15 years after reactor shutdown. (Seeapp. G.)

Deferring a decision on long-term alternativesuntil a full and fair effort has been made to site andlicense the geologic repositories required by NWPAhas

●

several advantages:

It avoids the risk that early availability of long-term storage facilities, or perhaps simply theeffort to provide such facilities, might createpressures to defer difficult repository siting

decisions, as discussed above. While long-termMRS facilities might be constructed earlier,to allow more time for repository siting, it mustbe recognized that such a step may make itmore difficult to precede with selection andevaluation of repository sites at all.

It provides ample time to develop backup tech-nologies, A conservative schedule for backupfacilities allows time to test the feasibility ofalternative disposal technologies and to devel-op MRS designs that are most suitable for useas a long-term alternative to geologic reposi-tories. In this regard, it would be valuable forthe MRS need and feasibility study to discussthe design criteria that would be appropriatefor MRS facilities intended as long-term alter-natives to geologic repositories, in contrast tothose intended for relatively short-term interimor buffer storage, and to identify any RD&Dneeded to develop technologies for very long-term monitored storage. (This is discussed fur-ther in the analysis of the technology devel-opment program, below. )

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM

To be credible as a basis for contractual com-mitments with utilities, the proposed repositoryloading schedule requires not only allowances fordelays, but also an implementation plan that con-tains measures to avoid delays in the first place andto mitigate the impact of difficulties that do occur.

As noted earlier, the key feature in the high-con-fidence implementation program described in thischapter is the use of backup sites and technologies,to give confldence that at least one acceptable com-bination of site and repository design will be avail-able when needed even if some candidates are re-jected. While this program emphasizes certaintyrather than minimized front-end costs, it representsa minimum use of backups, since it involves usingonly one more candidate site and technology at keystages than the minimum required number. It isa major conclusion of OTA analysis that this min -l

im urn backup strategy can substantially increaseconfidence that the waste management plan can andwill be carried out on schedule.

Present Siting Program

The major source of uncertainty in the reposi-tory schedule lies in the process for finding suitablesites and for NRC review and approval of a repos-itory constructed at those sites. Unlike many morefamiliar technologies, the site of a geologic reposi-tory is itself a central component of the technology.The natural barriers produced by the properties ofthe site are expected to provide the ultimate long-term insurance against any significant release of thewaste. Thus, the process of finding sites with theright properties and of convincing NRC that thoseproperties do exist is at the heart of the process ofdeveloping geologic repositories.

.

130 ● Managing the NatIon’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

NWPA prescribes a detailed process for findingand licensing sites for two geologic repositories. Themajor steps are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Development of guidelines for site selection.DOE, with NRC concurrence, issues generalguidelines for recommending sites for reposi-tories. This was accomplished in December1984.Nomination. Following issuance of guidelines,DOE must nominate at least five sites suitablefor detailed evaluation for the first repository.This is anticipated in early 1985. No later thanJuly 1, 1989, DOE must nominate five sitesfor the second repository.Characterization. The crucial step in siteevaluation involves tests performed in tunnelsat the base of a large shaft excavated to theproposed depth of the repository. These testsare intended to determine the suitability of thesite for a repository. Both NWPA and NRCregulations require DOE to characterize threenominated sites for each repository. The firstsites are expected to be named in 1985.Presidential recommendation and congres-sional review. Following characterization, thePresident must recommend to Congress a sitefor the first repository no later than March31, 1987, and a site for the second repositoryno later than March 31, 1990. (DOE has con-cluded that these recommendations cannot bemade until June 1990 and October 1995, re-spectively; see below.) At that time, the hostState or Indian tribe has an opportunity to dis-approve of the recommendation. Such disap-proval prevents further development of the siteunless Congress overrides it by passage of ajoint resolution.‘NRC construction authorization. If the siteis not disapproved, it is submitted to NRCfor review and issuance of a constructionauthorization—i. e., approval to proceed toconstruct a repository at the site. NRC mustact on the DOE application within 3 years,which can be extended by one year at theCommission’s discretion. This is the last stepexplicitly prescribed in detail in NWPA.Construction. After NRC issues a construc-tion authorization, DOE will construct thesurface facilities and some portion of theunderground facilities of the repository.

7. Operating license. NRC regulations prescribethat, following construction, NRC will reviewan application from DOE to begin disposingof waste at the repository, an application thatwill incorporate any new data about the siteobtained during construction. If this licenseis granted, DOE can begin operation.

Imposing this detailed siting process and ambi-tious schedule on the ongoing DOE siting programraised certain concerns that need to be consideredin the siting strategy. First, the 1998 deadline forinitial repository operaticn can most likely be metonly by using sites in areas that were already underinvestigation at the time the Act was passed, al-though full-scale operation of the first repositorycould be achieved by 2008 even if a site not nowunder consideration had to be used (see fig. 6-2).While this was recognized at the time NWPA waspassed, some have questioned whether it is possi-ble to apply the guidelines required by the Act fairlyand effectively if the sites for initial considerationwere already selected before the guidelines were de-veloped. In addition, some are concerned that, be-cause there is a wide variation in the quantity andquality of data available for- the various sites underconsideration, and because the siting guidelineswere delayed nearly two years beyond the deadlinespecified by NWPA, it may not be possible to makea sound technical choice among the available sitesat this time. Some are thus concerned that consid-erations other than technical ones might unduly in-fluence the choices. They argue that DOE shouldpostpone selecting sites far characterization untilmore information on the current sites can be ob-tained, or even until additional sites can be identi-fied and evaluated.

Any major delay of site characterization (e. g.,to allow new sites to be considered) would makeit practically impossible to meet NWPA’S 1998deadline for the first repository. Thus, a MissionPlan based on the requirements of the Act mustassume that the initial selection of sites forcharacterization will be made from among thosenow under consideration. The problem is how toproceed to the characterization stage while mini-mizing the risk that doing so would lead to prema-ture decisions. In fact, there is considerable agree-ment in the technical community that it isimportant to proceed now t~ detailed characteriza-


Figure 6-2.—Potentiaiiy Acceptable Sites for the First Repository

Tuff

Basalt

NOTE: In December 1984, DOE published draft environmental assessments on these sites, indicating that the Hanford, Yucca Mountain, and Deaf Smith sites are thetop three candidates for characterization.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, Draft kfission Plan for the Civilian Radioactive WaSte Management Program, DOEIRW-0005 DRAFT, April 1984.

tion of speeific sites in order to make progress indeveloping geologic disposal.20 If that step is de-ferred because of concerns that there is not enoughdata now to proceed, the siting program might getcaught in a vicious circle: before sites could beselected for at-depth characterization, much moredata about the sites would have to be obtained; yetto get more data about the sites, characterizationis necessary.

ZOFor exmple, he Interagency Review Group concluded that “Acreis an urgent need to obtain access to potential repository sites to beginthe process of site characterization. Laboratory studies and in situ test-ing . . . cannot substitute for thorough examination of actual sites. ”Subgroup Report on Alternative Technology Stratep”es for the Isola-tion of NucJear Waste, TID-28818 (draft), October 1978, p. 78. Sim-ilarly, a DOE/U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) study concluded that“The major impediment to the resolution of technical questions leadingto the establishment of a mined geologic repository for commercialradioactive wastes is the lack of specific sites on which to conduct de-tailed in situ geological research. DOE and USGS, Earth ScienceTechnica/ Plan for Disposal of Radioactive Waste in a Mined Repos-itoV, DOE/TIC-l 1033 (draft), April 1980, p. 1.

The principal risk in choosing sites for charac-terization using currently available data is that ofprematurely discarding a site that in fact has a bet-ter chance of ultimately being licensed by NRCthan one of the sites that is selected. Comparingsites will be a difficult task. Because there is nosingle generally accepted measure of the quality ofa repository site, a judgment that one site is betterthan another must be based on a subjective balanc-ing of many incommensurable factors. Such judg-ments will be particularly difficult before the datafrom in situ characterization are available, sincethe basic questions about site suitability can onlybe answered by at-depth testing. There is no as-surance that the sites that appear most likely to belicensable on the basis of currently available infor-mation would turn out to be those that appear mostfavorable after characterization has been completed.Carrying extra sites through critical stages of thesite evaluation process would reduce the risk of pass-

—- —— —


ing over a good site in favor of a less-favorable oneby deferring the crucial decisions to screen out somesites in favor of others until more data are avail-able. This approach will be discussed further in thefollowing description and analysis of the proposedhigh-confidence siting strategy.

High-Confidence Siting Plan

A high-confidence Mission Plan, using only theauthority now provided by NWPA, would use anexpanded repository siting strategy to provide con-fidence that the two repositories required by NWPAwould be available no later than required by theproposed loading schedule. Evaluation by OTA ofDOE’s analysis of possible sources of delay in therepository program

21 suggests that there is consid-erable confidence that the target dates of 2008 and2012 for full-scale operation of the first and secondrepositories can be met if one more site than theminimum required bylaw is carried through eachstage of the siting process, prior to the actual con-struction of each repository. Thus, four sites ratherthan three would be characterized, and two ratherthan one would be recommended for submissionto NRC for construction authorizations.

Sources of Uncertainty

The effect of this expanded strategy on the levelof confidence in the repository schedule can be seenby considering the two principal sources of uncer-tainty in the siting process:

● the time required to complete each stage of thesiting process; and

● the likelihood of a site being rejected at eachstage.

TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE EACH STAGEOF THE SITING PROCESS

Table 6-1 shows DOE’s estimates of the possi-ble range of times that might be required for eachmajor stage of the siting process. A strategy of car-

rying one more site than the required minimumthrough each stage provides insurance against thepossibility that extended delays at any one site willdelay the entire process. For example, NWPA re-quires that characterization be completed at three

21~q Drafi Mission Plan, pp. B-A-Z?—B-A-M.

sites before one can be recommended for licensing.If only three sites are characterized, then the dateon which one can be recommended will be deter-mined by the rate of progress at the slowest site.If four sites are characterized, one can be recom-mended as soon as the fastest three are completed;extended delays would have to be encountered attwo sites to delay the entire process. Similarly, sub-mitting two sites to NRC for licensing, rather thanone, means that construction could proceed as soonas authorization is granted for either.

Table 6-2 shows how extra sites can reduce therisk that the entire process will be delayed by de-lays at one site. Notice, for example, that even ifthe likelihood of experiencing an extended delayat any one site during characterization is as low as20 percent, there is about a 50 percent risk that atleast one site will experience a delay that would holdup the site recommendation process. Characteriz-ing four sites instead of three can reduce that riskto about 20 percent. In general, the largest im-provement is provided by the first site added be-yond the minimum number needed to proceed tothe next stage. This finding is the basis for OTA’sconclusion that a siting strategy using only onemore than the minimum required number of sitesat key steps can substantially increase confidencethat large delays will be avoided.

LIKELIHOOD OF SITE REJECTION

Analysis performed for OTA indicates that thereis a lack of consensus in the technical communityabout how much information about the ultimatesuitability of a site can be determined at each stageof the site evaluation process-surface testing, insitu characterization, repository construction, andoperation. 22 Some experts feel that a site that ap--

pears suitable on the basis of tests performed fromthe surface will have a high probability of being ac-ceptable as a repository. Others believe that therecould be as much as a 50 Percent chance that sucha site would be rejected on the basis of informa-tion obtained during characterization, and as muchas a 40 percent chance that a site that survived char-acterization would subsequently be rejected on the

22Ghova~ou et ~., op. cit., Ch. 8. Also published in Ghovanlou,

et al., “Selecting a Repository Site, ” Underground Space, vol. 6,1982, fig. 1, p. 244.


Table 6-1.—Possible Alternatives for Completion of Major Program Phases of First Repository

Recommend sites for Select site and NRC licensing Construct and testcharacterization Characterize sites obtain site approval review repositoryAssumotlons and schedule durations:1-A “Secretary recom-

mends three sitesto President byJanuary 1985, Pres-ident approvessites in minimumtime provided byAct (15 months)

1-BNRC requires signifi-

cant changes tositing guidelines,President approvessite in minimumtime provided byAct (21 months)

l-cExtensive modification

required to EAs,President approvessite in minimumtime provided byAct (27 months)

1-DSecretary requires ad-

ditional data tosupport site recom-mendation, Presi-dent requiresadditional reviewperiod allowed byAct (45 months)

2-ARecommendation

based on surfacestudies and ESconstruction data(22 months)

2-BParallel permitting, in-

situ testing (49months)

2-cSequential permitting,

in-situ testing (73months)

2-DSequential permitting,

ES constructiondelays, extensivein-situ testing (133months)

3-APresident recom-

mends site, noState or IndianTribe disapproval(17 months)

3-BPresident recom-

mends site, Stateor Indian Tribedisapproval filed,Congress over-rides (20 months)

3-cAdditional DEIS

review, Presidentrecommends site,State or IndianTribe disapprovalfiled, Congressoverrides (29months)

3-DAdditional DEIS

review, Presidentrecommends site,site disapproved,select new site(43 months)

NRC adopts two-stepconstructionauthorization

4-ANRC review ex-

pedited (24months)

4-BNRC review takes

nominal periodallowed by theAct (36 months)

4-cNRC requires addi-

tional review timeas allowed by theAct (48 months)

4-DNRC requires exten-

sive additional in-formation toSUPPOft CA (60months)

4-ENRC rejects site,

new site selected,approved and CAissued (108months)

Construction undertwo-step con-structionauthorization

5-APhased construction,

Phase One com-plete (53 months),Phase Two com-plete (90 months)

5-BFull scale repository

(70 months)

5-cPhased construction,

exploratory shaftsnot used for con-struction, PhaseOne complete (89months), PhaseTwo complete(126 months)

5-DPhased construction,

exploratory shaftsnot used for con-struction, con-struction delays.Phase One co-m;plete (101months), PhaseTwo complete(138 months)

KEY: EA = environmental assessmentES = exploratov shaftDEIS = Draft Environmental Impact StatementCA = construction authorization

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, Draft Mission Plan for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program, DOE/RW-0005 DRAFT, April 19S4.

basis of information obtained during constructionor operation.

The possibility that disqualifying data would befound after a site is recommended for licensing isof particular importance in view of current DOEsiting plans. According to those plans, the initiallicense application would be based on 8 to 22months of in situ testing (depending on the me-dium), while data from about 7 more years of at-

depth tests, including 4 years of extensive under-ground construction, would be available beforeNRC is expected to act on the application for anoperating license.

23 The shorter the time spent ob-taining data prior to the license application, thegreater the likelihood that any disqualifying prob-lems at a site will not be discovered until after theapplication has been submitted.

ZJDOE, Drafi MiSSOn Plan, p. 3-A-32, and fig. 3-A-5, p. 3-A-38.

134 ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radliactive Waste

Table 6.2.—Risk That Delay or Rejection of Sitesin One Stage of Repository Development Will

Delay Progress to the Next Stage

Number of sites consideredSites needed to at each stageproceed to next stage 2 3 4 5

P = 20%0I % 0.2% .03%

; : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 3%: 10% 30/0 0.7%3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA 49% 18% 6%

P = 50%. . . . . . . . . . 25% 13% 60/0 3%

; : : : : : : : : . . . . . . . . . . 75% 50% 31% 19%3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA 870/o 690/o 50%NOTE: In this tabie, P represents the probability that any individual cite wouid

experience major difficulties in one stage of the siting process, ehher adeiey in competing the proceae or outright diequetification. Since no citehaa aver gone through any of these stagea, P ie a subjective judgment.if N ie the number of aites evaluated in the atege (coiumns) and K ie thenumber of eitee that muat compiete the atege to go to the next (rowe),then the riak of a deiay in the stage is 8impiy the probability that at ieeetN -K+ 1 sites have difficulties. Using the eimpiifying aeaumptiona thataach site hee the eeme probability (P) of experiencing difficuitiea, andthat there ie no interdependence of results among the cites, probabilitytheory showa that the rick is given by the foiiowing atatament:

N

Riak -J=(?K+,) J & ! ‘J(’-PYN-J)

SOURCE: Of fica of Technology Assessment.

Because there is no experience in most of thesteps for developing high-level waste repositories(and since final EPA performance criteria for re-positories have not yet been adopted), this lack ofconsensus cannot be resolved at present and is afactor that must be considered in determining theappropriate approach for investigating sites for re-pository development. The expanded strategy de-scribed above reduces the consequences of rejec-tion of any one site by providing an additional siteas backup at each stage and by increasing the poolof viable sites. For example, if there is a 20 per-cent chance that any one site submitted for a con-struction authorization will be rejected by NRC,then submitting two sites instead of one reduces therisk of not having an approved site from about 20percent to only 4 percent.

Characterizing four sites rather than three alsoprovides insurance against a potentially importantambiguity in the requirements of NWPA. DOEconsiders that it can proceed to recommend a sitefor licensing even if one or more of the three sitesto be characterized is found unsuitable during orafter characterization .24 However, DOE also rec-

241 bicl., p. 3-A-33.

ognizes the possibility that this interpretation of therequirements of NWPA might be found invalid,and that NWPA might be interpreted as requir-ing that before DOE can recommend a site for li-censing, it must have three sites that appear suitablefor a repository after characterization. 25 Table 6-2clearly suggests that this more demanding interpre-tation would make the characterization stage muchmore vulnerable to delays if only three sites arecharacterized initially. For example, even a 20 per-cent probability that an individual site would berejected would lead to a 50 percent risk that char-acterizing three candidate sites would produce fewerthan three that were suitable after characterization.Characterizing four sites would reduce that risk toabout 20 percent. If steps to characterize additionalsites are not taken until this question can be re-solved, which may not occur until DOE recom-mends a site, there is a risk of a delay of 4 or moreyears if the more demanding interpretation wereupheld, and if it were necessary to find and char-acterize a replacement site for one rejected duringthe initial characterization phase.26 In any case, ifthe legal uncertainty is not resolved before the endof the characterization process, and if fewer thanthree good sites are available at that time, therecould be a delay of a year or more for considera-tion of a lawsuit to resolve the question.

Steps to Increase Confidence

The following section discusses the high-confi-dence siting strategy in more detail as it relates toeach of four key areas:

●

●

●

●

relationship of the siting processes for the tworepositories required by NWPA;characterization of candidate sites for each re-pository;recommendation of sites to NRC for construc-tion authorizations; andscreening to identifi new backup sites potentiallysuitable for characterization.

z5Recent discussions between DOE and NRC concluded that theissue remains to be resolved mgaxtling how many sites need to be deter-mined to be suitable afier characterization. The Radioactive Exchange,vol. 3, No. 11, June 30, 1984, p. 1.

Z6DOE, Dr~t Mi~jon pl~, p. B-A-41. The Draft Mission plan

does not indicate an explicit plan for assuring that backup sites wouldbe available.


HAVE TWO FULL, SEPARATE PROGRAMS FORSITING A FIRST, WESTERN, REPOSITORYAND A SECOND, EASTERN, REPOSITORY

The overall goal of the siting program is to pro-vide confidence that two repositories will be oper-ating within a relatively short time of each other.Because the Act requires that transportation costsand impacts be taken into account in siting the sec-ond repository, the siting plan is also designed tomaximize the likelihood that one repository wouldbe located in the East and one in the West.

A clear commitment to a credible plan for sit-ing both repositories may be needed to allay theconcerns of those areas being considered for the firstrepository that they might by default wind up be-ing the nation’s only nuclear waste ‘‘dump’ if fi-nancial and institutional pressures lead to indefi-nite deferral of the second repository. Since mostof the sites under consideration for the first reposi-tory are in the West, a serious effort to site the sec-ond repository in the East, near most of the re-actors, should help deal with concerns of the firstround States about regional equity.

In this approach, the first round of site charac-terization—for the first repository-would containonly western sites. The eastern sites now under con-sideration would not be characterized in the firstround.

For each round of site characterization to focuson one region, as proposed in the high-confidencesiting plan, the first round must use western sites.Six of the nine sites now under consideration arelocated in the West (see fig. 6-2), and one of thetwo westernmost sites (in Nevada and Washing-ton) must be included in the first round in orderto meet NRC requirement that at least one non-salt site be characterized before the first repositorysite can be licensed (all of the other sites are inbedded or dome salt). Considering only the west-ern sites in the first round, as proposed in this strat-egy, ensures that both the primary candidate forNRC licensing and its backup (explained later)would be western. In addition, it may be easier toreach agreement about the suitability of a site lo-cated in a relatively arid region the first time thelicensing process is attempted. The six western sitesnow under consideration represent four distinctgeohydrologic settings and three geologic media

(basalt, tuff, and bedded salt), and thus should pro-vide a sufficiently wide range of choices for charac-terization in the first round.

The second round of site characterization—forthe second repository—would involve only easternsites. Thus, sites characterized for the first, west-ern, repository would not be considered again inthe second round, as now contemplated by DOE.At present, the DOE Draft Mission Plan providesthat one of the sites from the first round of charac-terization be counted among the three that mustbe characterized before the second repository is se-lected, as allowed (but not required) by NWPA.27

DOE plans to characterize only two additional sitesfor the second round, and is currently screeningcrystalline rocks in the East to identify potential can-didate sites (see fig. 6-3). The third site, to be car-ried over from the first round, most likely wouldbe western, although it could be eastern if one ofthe eastern sites now under consideration were char-acterized in the first round.

Because OTA’s high-confidence siting strategyprovides for only western sites in the first round,they would not be used again in the second, east-ern, round. Instead, DOE would evaluate four east-ern sites before selecting the site for the second re-pository (unless the results of the first round ofcharacterization show that three would give suffi-cient confidence that delays could be avoided). Thisapproach would increase the chances that both aprimary site and a backup (discussed below) for asecond repository will be found in the East. It wouldalso reduce the stakes involved in selecting the sitesfor the first round of characterization. If some sitesfrom the first round are also used in the second,as now contemplated by the DOE Draft MissionPlan, sites selected for the first round face somechance of being selected for the second repositoryeven though they are not the first choice for the firstrepository. Of course, there will always be somepossibility that one of the sites from the first roundof characterization would ultimately be needed forthe second repository, but in this expanded sitingplan that would be done only as a last resort, i.e.if a full and fair effort to find a suitable eastern sitefails.

N~E, Dr~t Misson plan, p. 10-4.

— — —.


Figure 6-3.—Regions Being Considered for the Second Repository

\

NortheasternRegion

I I A

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, Draft Mission Plan for the Civilian Radioactwe Waste Management Program, DOEIRW-00C5 DRAFT, April 19S4.

CHARACTERIZE FOUR SITES FOR EACHREPOSITORY INSTEAD OF THE THREE

REQUIRED BY NWPA

Characterizing more than the minimum requirednumber of sites is the principal, and perhaps only,way to reduce substantially the likelihood of ma-jor delays or other complications at the crucial stepof recommending the first site for a repository. Sig-nificant problems at this point could damage thecredibility of the Federal waste management effort.Characterizing one more site than required byNWPA would provide insurance against the pos-sibility of extended delays (see above). Characteriz-ing four sites also gives greater confidence that atleast two suitable ones will be available after char-acterization, allowing a backup to be submitted toNRC more quickly, as discussed below, and avoid-ing the delay of as much as 10 years that could oc-cur if characterization of backups were not starteduntil the principal candidate had been rejected.

The increased confidence that at least two suit-able characterized sites would be available withoutextended delays also would reduce the risk thatCongress might have to consider a State’s objec-tion to the President’s recommendation of the firstsite without having a suitable alternative candidateavailable. In fact, NWPA requires DOE to recom-mend a second site for licensing for a repositorywithin 1 year if the first recommendation is vetoedby the State and the veto is not overridden by Con-gress. This can only be done if a second suitablecharacterized site is availabls from among the firstset of sites that are characterized.

Characterizing additional sites also reduces therisk that proceeding now to site characterizationwould prematurely narrow the available options onthe basis of relatively little information. For exam-ple, characterizing four sites for the first repositoryallows one site to be selected from each of the four


western geohydrologic settings. The decision aboutwhich settings to reject could be deferred until aftera site in each setting had been characterized, so thatthe decision could be based on comparable andmore extensive data from each site. This minimizesthe risk that a site that has a better chance of ul-timately being licensed by NRC might be passedover in favor of a less suitable site because the cur-rently available data gives a misleading picture.

In this approach, the only narrowing of choicesbefore characterization of sites for the first reposi-tory would be selection of one of the two sites underconsideration in the Paradox Basin area and thePalo Duro Basin area, the western settings that eachcontain two sites. Comparing nearby sites in thesame setting should be easier than comparing sitesin substantially different settings. Thus, the firstuse of the siting guidelines would be in the rela-tively limited choice between sites in the same set-ting. The guidelines’ major application would comeat the later stage of selecting sites to recommendto NRC for licensing based on the data from sitecharacterization, which are needed for the full ap-plication of the guidelines in any case.

Characterizing an extra site for each repositorycould increase total expected program costs by upto several percent. The actual amount would de-pend on the geologic medium involved and the ex-tent of at-depth investigation required. This is dis-cussed below.

RECOMMEND TWO SITES TO NRC FORCONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATIONS FOR EACH

REPOSITORY, RATHER THAN JUST THEONE REQUIRED BY NWPA

The conservative contractual commitment dates(2008 and 2012) for operation of full-scale facilitiesat two repositories allow for the possibility that theprimary candidate sites will be rejected by NRCat some point during the licensing process. To givefurther confidence that the commitment dates willbe met, a backup site for each repository would besubmitted for a construction authorization as soonas possible after the primary site for each reposi-tory had been recommended. NRC would be askedto license both alternatives, rather than to choosebetween them.

If only one site per repository is recommendedto NRC for licensing, then the selection of the final

repository site must be made at the recommenda-tion stage on the basis of only the information avail-able after characterization. Recommending twosites per repository for licensing allows the finalselection to be made after NRC’s review of bothsites, including review of the additional data thatwould be obtained from both sites during the 3 ormore years of the licensing process.

The additional cost of submitting a second siteper repository for licensing, assuming that two goodsites are available after characterization, should bevery small compared to the cost of characterizingthe site in the first place. Furthermore, it wouldbe inexpensive insurance against the delays thatcould result if licensing of a second site were notinitiated until after the first was rejected. Even ifneither site were rejected by NRC, this approachmight still reduce the time required for the first re-pository to begin operation by aIlowing construc-tion to begin as soon as either site for that reposi-tory is approved.

If both sites for a repository receive a construc-tion authorization, the one not selected for devel-opment would be held as a backup in case prob-lems are discovered during construction or duringthe first 5 to 10 years of operation of the reposi-tory at the primary site. If the backup site is notneeded by the end of that period, it could be usedfor subsequent repositories beyond the first two.

When combined the first step, this step is de-signed to give confidence that DOE could recom-mend to NRC both a primary western site with awestern backup, and a primary eastern site withan eastern backup. Separating the siting processinto western and eastern rounds also reduces therisk that a good site from the first round that wouldotherwise be needed as a backup in that roundwould instead be needed for the second repository.

If either the primary site or the backup is re-jected, another site would be submitted for a con-struction authorization as soon as possible to ensurethat one backup would be available with minimumdelay. If a suitable characterized site were avail-able, the additional cost of submitting it for licens-ing would be small. If a suitable characterized sitewere not available, a contingency siting plan couldprovide for characterization of an additional siteto be initiated immediately (see discussion of screen-ing program for backup sites below).

—


CONTINUE SITE SCREENING TO IDENTIFY NEWSITES SUITABLE FOR CHARACTERIZATION AS

BACKUPS FOR THE FIRST TWO ROUNDS

The preceding steps are intended to increase con-fidence in the repository schedule by increasing thenumber of sites initially considered at crucial stagesof the siting process. However, there is always somepossibility that even the increased number wouldnot be sufficient and that, eventually, additionalsites would have to be characterized. A high-con-fidence siting strategy would therefore include abackup site-screening program to identify addition-al new sites suitable for characterization for boththe western and eastern repositories.

Characterization of an additional site could be-gin, for example, in the unlikely event that onlyone site survives the initial round of characteriza-tion and would ensure that a backup site for eachrepository can be recommended to NRC for a con-struction authorization. Or an additional site mightbe characterized in case one of the two sites sub-mitted to NRC is rejected and there is no other suit-able characterized site available. Such a step wouldminimize the delay that would result if the sole re-maining site were rejected at some later point inthe licensing process. (In either case, this wouldmean that all but one of the sites initially charac-terized had been rejected at some point in the proc-ess. This would be evidence that the more pessi-mistic view about the difficulty of finding suitablesites is correct, and that having a backup availableis even more important than originally expected. )

This contingency siting plan increases confidencethat the conservative contractual repository loadingschedule can be met even if there are major prob-lems with the first round of site characterization.As noted in the discussion of the repository loadingschedule, it is possible that the first repository couldbe operating by 2008 even if none of the first foursites characterized proved suitable and one of thesites identified through the backup screening pro-gram had to be characterized and used. This con-tingency plan also gives added confidence that eachof the two licensed repositories required by the Actwill be backed up by a second site with a construc-tion authorization, which could be developed intoa full repository if problems are discovered with theoperating repositories during their initial years ofoperation.

The backup site screening process would not re-place the ongoing DOE siting program, whichwould continue as the meii.ns for meeting the sched-ules in NWPA for identifying the first candidatesites for characterization for the first and secondrepositories. DOE’s analysis of the repository de-velopment schedule suggests that a siting programdesigned to make a best effort to meet the 1998deadline for the first repository must proceed to sitecharacterization in the next year or so. Yet it wouldprobably take several years to identify new candi-date sites and to complete the necessary proceduralsteps for characterizing them; for example, DOEdoes not expect to be able to begin characterizingsites for the second repository until 1989. Thus theNWPA repository schedule appears to require thatcharacterization begin with the sites now under con-sideration, in order to determine if they include atleast one that is suitable for a repository.

To give confidence that both a western and aneastern site can ultimately be found, the backupsiting program would search for backups in theWest for the western sites now under considerationfor the first repository site, as well as backups inthe East for the second site. This requires an ex-pansion of the program in the DOE draft MissionPlan, which suggests that sites under considerationfor the second repository be considered as backupsfor the first, if backups are needed.

The backup sites for possible characterization fora repository in the West could be obtained, for ex-ample, by continuing the screening of the Basin andRange province now being conducted by the U.S.Geological Survey (USGS) .28 This USGS effortuses a site screening process, proposed in 1980 bya Federal interagency working group,29 thatsearches for favorable geohydrologic environmentsinstead of focusing initially on particular host rocksor on federally owned land, as in past siting ef-forts. so (Identifying new sites that are not now

28M. S. Bedinger, et d., “Status of Geohydrologic Screening ofthe Basin and Range Province for 1:.elation of High-Level Radioac-tive Waste, ‘‘ in DOE, Proceedings {}f the 1983 Civilian RadioactiveWaste Management Information Meeting, pp. 193-195.

29u. s. Geologic~ Survey, Plan fiw Mentification and GeologicalCharacterization of Sites for Mined Radioactive Waste Repositories,Water-Resources Investigations Open-File Report 80-686 (Reston,Va., May 1980).

30The siting program outlined in the Drafit Mission plan is a con-

tinuation of the two principal approaches to site identification thathave been used in tha past by DOE and its predecessors: 1) search-

Ch. 6—The Mission Plan 139

under consideration for the first repository wouldavoid having to use as backups any of the currentsites that were not judged good enough to be in-cluded among the first four selected for character-ization, and would address the concerns of thosewho feel that siting efforts should not be limited tothe current sites. ) Backups for an eastern reposi-tory could be identified by using this same screen-ing process in the East, or by considering mediain addition to crystalline rocks, which are the focusof current efforts to identify sites for the second re-pository.31

Costs and Benefits of theHigh-Confidence Siting Strategy

The basic issue in selecting a siting strategy isthe balance between the initial cost of the strategyand the degree of confidence that long delays willbe avoided. As noted earlier, OTA’S conclusion thatthere can be considerable confidence in the con-servative repository loading schedule is based onthe assumption that the backup siting strategy de-scribed above would be used.

The crucial near-term siting question is wheth-er to characterize one extra site for the first reposi-tory, in addition to the three required by NWPA.DOE’s current plan to characterize only three sitesis identical to the plan in place before NWPA im-posed the 1998 deadline for initial repository oper-ation. Characterizing one additional site is the prin-cipal significant expansion that could be made toincrease the confidence that a licensed repositorywould be available by 1998. While characterizingan additional site would increase program costs overthe next 4 years or so, it could reduce total pro-gram costs in the long run by reducing or avoidingpotentially costly delays. Thus the decision on howmany sites to characterize raises important ques-tions for the Congressional appropriations process.

ing for favorable locations containing a potentially suitable candidatehost rock, and 2) searching for favorable locations with suitable hostrocks on Federal reservations dedicated to nuclear activities. Of thesix areas now under consideration for the first repository, four withsalt deposits (Texas, Utah, Mississippi, and Louisiana) were identi-fied by the first method, while two (the Hanford Reservation in Wash-ington and the Nevada Test Site) were identified by the second. Can-didate sites for the second repository are being identified by the firstmethod, focusing on crystalline rocks (granite) in the East.

31DOE, Dr~t Mission Plan, pp. 2-%—2-47.

To give Congress a clear understanding of theimplications of decisions about the siting program,especially the decision about how many sites tocharacterize, it would be valuable for the MissionPlan to present the results of a rigorous comparisonof the costs and benefits of alternative siting strat-egies. This should evaluate both a minimum strat-egy that does no more than explicitly required byNWPA and an expanded strategy that includes onemore than the minimum required number of sitesat key stages. This comparison should consider: 1)the increased initial costs of a backup siting strat-egy, 2) the long-term cost savings that can resultif delays can be avoided by such a strategy, and3) the non-quantifiable costs and benefits of thesiting strategy. The remainder of this section dis-cusses some preliminary observations concerningeach area.

INCREASED INITIAL COST

The principal cost impact results from the num-ber of additional sites that would be characterizedunder the expanded siting strategy; the other pro-visions, such as submitting two sites for licensing,should have considerably less impact. The addition-al cost of characterization is difficult to determineat this time for several reasons. First, the actual costof characterizing an additional site is difficult to de-termine from available information. It will dependupon the amount of work that must be done at thesite. At one extreme, it is possible that preliminaryborehole tests could lead to the site being rejectedbefore an exploratory shaft is sunk.32 At the otherextreme, the Draft Mission Plan envisions carry-ing out at each characterized site a considerableamount of engineering and construction that is ac-tually required only for a site that is recommendedfor development and licensing. While this can savesome time in the repository schedule, it adds per-haps hundreds of millions of dollars to the costs in-curred at the sites that are not used,33 without in-

~ZCharacterization Cm include boreholes from the surface as wellas an exploratory shaft. If there is reason to suspect that additionaltests from the surface might disclose factors that would preclude useof the site, those tests could be performed first to determine whetherit is worth incurring the costs and impacts of sinking an exploratoryshaft. If the site were rejected before the shaft was sunk, characteriza-tion activities could be terminated and the site reclaimed, as requiredby section 113(c) of NWPA.

gsThe DOE Drfit Mission plan proposes that characterization ateach site include sinking two large shafts that can subsequently beused for repository constmction (p. 3-A-21), a step which is expected


creasing the certainty of the schedule in the sameway that characterizing an additional site would.To facilitate congressional deliberations on theDOE waste management budget, it would be usefulfor the Mission Plan: 1) to distinguish clearly be-tween characterization costs that are required to de-termine which sites are suitable for recommenda-tion, and those additional costs that are requiredonly for a site which is selected for development;and 2) to compare DOE’s current proposed ap-proach with one in which four sites are character-ized only to the extent necessary for DOE to selectthe most promising two for submission to NRC (asprovided above), with the more expensive detailedwork needed to support a license application to bedone only at those two sites.

The additional cost is also uncertain because itis unclear how many extra sites would ultimatelyhave to be characterized. At the outside, all of thesteps described above could require characteriza-tion of three more sites than the five contemplatedin current DOE plans (one extra site as a backupfor each repository, and an additional eastern siteto replace the one that DOE plans to carry overfrom the first round.) However, just as many ad-ditional sites might be required under a minimalstrategy-if only one site survives the first round,for example, it would be necessary to characterizeat least three new sites for the eastern repository.Thus, characterizing extra sites before they areneeded, rather than after, merely incurs those costsearlier than would otherwise be the case. In addi-tion, it may not be necessary to characterize morethan three for the second repository in any case,if experience with the first round shows that an ad-ditional site is not needed to give the desired level

to save about 3 years in the DOE schedule (p. 3-A-37). The addi-tional cost of a second large shaft is estimated to be about $75 millionto $100 million per site (footnote on p. 10-4). The Drdt Mission Planalso provides for detailed engineering work including limited final wastepackage and repository designs for all characterized sites, includingthose not selected for development (p. 10-2). The additional cost ofpreparing limited final designs for all characterized sites is difiicultto estimate but could amount to $160 million per site or more (table10-1, p. 10-5, and fig. 3-A-5, p. 3-A-38). By comparison, NRC esti-mated in 1981 that $25 million to $30 million was an upper limit forthe “at-depth” portion of site characterization (in soft rock), assum-ing that the test facility included two shafts and up to 1,000 feet oftunnels. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ‘ ‘Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic Repositories: Licensing Pro-cedures,” Federa/Re~”ster, vol. 46, No. 37, Feb. 25, 1981, p. 13973.

of confidence in the schedule for the second re-pository.

REDUCED LONG-TERM COSTS

The major quantifiable benefit of the expandedsiting strategy is that it can reduce the likelihoodof the delays that would result if backup sites aredeveloped only after it is certain that they areneeded. Such delays would require additional in-terim spent fuel storage, for example-for this alonea delay of as much as 5 years, while additional siteswere characterized, could cost between $600 mil-lion and $1.1 billion.34 A rigorous comparison ofthe costs and benefits of alternative siting strate-gies must balance the expected costs of such delaysagainst the expected initial siting costs.

NONQUANTIFIABLE COSTS AND BENEFITS

Perhaps the most important nonquantifiable ben-efit of the expanded siting strategy is that it reducesthe risk that the credibility of the Federal wastemanagement program would be damaged by ma-jor delays at key stages of the siting program, par-ticularly at the crucial early step of recommendingthe first site for a repository. Because of its troubledhistory, the program does not appear to have a largereservoir of goodwill left to cushion it in the eventof major difficulties in the future. From this per-spective, it is important to compare siting strate-gies in terms of the risks they involve if siting turnsout to be difficult, as well as the benefits they yieldif siting proves to be relatively easy.

If the most optimistic view proves to be correct,the conservative siting strategy described in this sec-tion will produce more sites than are needed—which should increase confidence that repositoriescan be made available as needed if a significant ex-pansion of the use of nuclear power is contemplated.Potentially suitable sites can be banked, saved forlater use, and developed as they are needed. If thesites are eventually developed, the initial cost of siteevaluation is not lost, only incurred sooner thanabsolutely necessary. If the more pessimistic viewproves to be correct, the sizing strategy will reducethe likelihood of costly delays and adverse politi-cal impacts that might result if the current siting

3+B~ing Engineering Company Southeast, Inc., Spent Fuel Stor-age System Options: A Comparative Cost Analysis, a report preparedfor the Electric Power Research Institute, 1984, table 2-5, p. 2-13.


process fails to produce enough suitable sites at anykey decision point in the siting process. In addi-tion, by providing for backups at key stages of therepository development process, the conservativesiting strategy would increase the credibility of theprocess by reducing fears that crucial decisionsmight be prejudiced by the absence of any real alter-natives.

It can be argued that expansion of the site evalua-tion process beyond the minimum required byNWPA would increase the political costs involvedin locating radioactive waste repository sites, sinceit would increase the number of States affected byDOE siting activities. On the other hand, it canbe argued that, because it would increase confi-dence that two repositories would in fact be avail-able on schedule, with one in the East and one inthe West, the expanded program would offer ad-vantages to States that do not wish to see their nu-clear reactors become de facto spent fuel repositoriesand to States that would be substantially affectedby waste transportation if there were only one re-pository. Furthermore, keeping the processes forsiting the first and second repositories separate, andnot using sites characterized for one repository forthe other as well, could reduce the concerns of thetargets for the first repository that they would alsobe under consideration for the second, and the con-cerns of the targets for the second repository thatthey may wind up being the first-and perhaps theonly —repository.

Waste Management TechnologyDevelopment Program

The second element of a high-confidence imple-mentation program is a conservative waste mana-

gement technology development program. Thisprogram includes parallel development of both aconservative baseline waste management system de-sign, intended to be widely viewed as workable de-spite the remaining technical uncertainties, and anoptimized system design. The conservative baselinesystem design, to be widely viewed as workable,would be based on currently available data and onthe assumption that current technical and regula-tory uncertainties could be resolved in the direc-tion of increased, rather than reduced, demandson system performance. This approach minimizes

the probability that the design would have to bemodified substantially in the light of unfavorabledevelopments, and thus would build confidence thata conservative loading schedule based on the de-sign could be met even if such developments oc-curred. It also provides a useful basis for a conserv-ative estimate of disposal costs.

As noted earlier, the conservative design wouldbe intended only for implementation during thedemonstration phase of repository operation, whilethe optimized system design would be implementedfor the operational phase. However, the conserva-tive design would be available as a backup if prob-lems are encountered with the alternative. Further-more, the existence of a conservative design thatis widely viewed as workable would reduce the like-lihood that disagreements in the technical commu-nity, about whether a proposed ‘‘optimal’ designis suitable, would be interpreted by the public asdisagreement about whether there is any design thatwill work.

This section will describe in general terms botha conservative baseline design and the relatedRD&D program for each element of the waste man-agement system.

Geologic Repositories

NWPA requires that a conceptual repository de-sign be included in the site characterization planto be prepared for each site proposed for detailedevaluation. In addition, baseline repository designsare needed as a basis for determining the waste dis-posal fee and to provide additional focus for theRD&D program.

DOE and its predecessors have generally usedthe approach of developing reference repository de-signs that appeared most cost effective in light ofthe best information available at the time. As newinformation about site conditions, waste character-istics, repository performance, or regulatory re-quirements became available, the designs weremodified to conform to the new information andto maintain their cost effectiveness. This has some-times led to ongoing technical disagreements aboutwhether the designs would be acceptable, and torepeated changes in the system design. The objectof developing a conservative baseline design is tominimize the technical debates about whether the


system would be able to meet regulatory require-ments, and to provide a basis for a workable dis-posal system that is not likely to require continuedmodification.

One risk of using conservative baseline designsis that they could lead to higher waste disposal coststhan necessary if additional RD&D indicated thattheir conservatism was excessive but it proved in-stitutionally difficult to relax that conservatism once,the designs had been adopted. This risk would bereduced by proving for a demonstration phase oflow-level operation at the first repository before thefull-scale packaging and handling facilities are built.The conservative system design is in fact explicitlyintended for that initial demonstration phase, withdevelopment of an optimized full-scale system de-sign deferred until the principal remaining techni-cal uncertainties have been resolved.

Using a conservative design for the demonstra-tion phase should reduce the likelihood of difficultiesduring the licensing process, and could minimizethe time required to gain NRC approval for ini-tial emplacement of waste in the repository. Untilthe final design is completed, the conservative ref-erence design could be used as a basis for a con-servative estimate of the waste disposal fee, thusreducing the likelihood of insufficient revenues. Itshould be noted, however, that even if a conserva-tive design must ultimately be used, the additionalcosts should not substantially affect the overall eco-nomic competitiveness of nuclear power.35

~~A review of the pape~ presented at a recent international confer-ence on radioactive waste management concluded: “Though (disposal)costs are higher than had been assumed previously, they do not seemlikely to have a serious or decisive impact on the use of nuclear power—and this even in countries with small nuclear programmed. Econom-ics was not and will not be a major driving force for simplifying orreducing conservatism in radioactive waste management systems; elab-orate systems that meet long-term safety and stringent radiation pro-tection requirements can be aflorded, even though they may not alwaysbe justifiable on technical grounds. ” S. Fareeduddin and J. Hirling,“The Radioactive Waste Management Conference, ” ZnternationaiAtomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol. 25, no. 4, December 1983, p.4. For perspective, DOE projects that the price of uranium in the year2000 might range somewhere between $25 and $120 per pound (incurrent 1983 dollars), compared to a price of about $20 per poundin 1984, and that an increase of $10 per pound in the price of uraniumincreases the nuclear fuel cost to utilities by about 0.8 mills (.08 cents)per kilowatt-hour (kWh). U.S. Department of Energy, United StatesMining and Milling Industry: A Comprehensive Review, DOE/S-0028, May 1984, pp. 47 and 60. This range of uncertainty representsa range of about 8 mills/kWh in nuclear fuel cost (measured in 1983dollars), compared to the 1 mill/kWh waste disposal fee establishedby NWPA.

The principal areas for conservatism in reposi-tory designs are reduced thermal loading, retriev-ability, the waste form, and the waste package.

REDUCED THERMAL LOADING

A major source of conservatism in repository de-sign would be in thermal design criteria-allowableheat load per acre and maximum temperatures ofwaste package and rock formation. The decay heatfrom the waste is a major source of uncertaintyabout the long-term behavior of the engineered bar-riers, the repository facility itself, and the hydro-geologic environment in the vicinity of the reposi-tory. One straightforward way to reduce technicaluncertainties about repository performance is tokeep the repository temperatures relatively l0W.36

Available studies suggest that a conservative ini-tial repository design would keep the maximumtemperature of the rock in the repository in the vi-cinity of 100° C. For example, a recent NationalResearch Council review of geologic disposal con-cluded that limiting the rock temperature to 100°C would provide confidence in the suitability of bor-osilicate glass, the reference waste form for reproc-essed waste, until the necessary research is per-formed to show that it would be suitable at highertemperatures.

37 In contrast, current DOE reference

designs have rock temperatures that range from140° C (in unsaturated tuff) to 250° C (in basalt) .38In addition to reducing rechnical disagreementabout the expected performance of the repository,use of conservative thermal criteria may have theadded benefit of reducing the amount of RD&Dthat is needed on waste forms and packages by re-ducing the temperature range for which their per-formance must be assured.

~sFor examp]e, in its comments on DOE’s preliminary draft Mis-sion Plan, NRC obsemed that “DOII can reduce or eliminate uncer-tainties about testing needs by design measures such as limiting ther-mal loading. ” Letter from John G. Davis, Director, Ofice of NuclearMaterials Safety -d Safeguards, U.!]. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion, to Michael J. Lawrence, Acting Director, Oflice of Civilian Ra-dioactive Waste Management, Department of Energy, Feb. 8, 1984,p. 2.

~7A Study of the Isolation System fhr GeoIop”c Disposai of Radioac-tive Wastes, (Washington, D. C.: Na:ional Academy Press, 1983), p.7. Conservative repository designs developed by the Swedish utilitieswould also limit maximum temperaf ures to this range. See, for ex-ample, KBS, Find Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel-KBS-3, (Stock-holm: Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supply Co., May 1983).

S8Nation~ Research Council, op. cit. P. 8.


A lower thermal loading can be achieved in threeways:

1.

2.

3.

Cooling the waste prior to final sealing in therepository. Even with an optimistic repositoryloading schedule, with the full-scale facilitiesof the two repositories beginning operation in1998 and 2005, the initial spent fuel emplacedwould be 25 years old, and fuel as young as10 years old would not be emplaced until after2010.39 Additional cooling could be obtained,if desired, by storing the spent fuel aboveground at the repository site for a longer pe-riod before emplacement, or by keeping therepository rooms open for some period afteremplacement and using active ventilation toremove heat before the rooms are backfilledand sealed.Reducing the amount of waste in each canis-ter. The amount of waste placed in each can-ister affects not only the maximum tempera-ture of the canister after emplacement, butalso the number of canisters that must be han-dled each year to accommodate a target wasteloading rate, an important determinant of sys-tem design and cost. Recent DOE designsassume that the canister loading will be in-creased by disassembling spent fiel assembliesand consolidating the individual rods in thewaste canister, allowing the rods from 6 pres-surized water reactor assemblies, or 18 of thesmaller assemblies from boiling water reac-tors, to be placed in a single canister. Sincethis involves an additional complex operation,a conservative design (for demonstrationphase operations and initial cost estimates)would instead assume no rod consolidation.The RD&D program for developing an opti-mum system design would be intended to pro-vide the data needed to justify larger canisterloads.Reducing the amount of waste per acre of re-pository. Reducing the amount of waste peracre (the emplacement density) will reduce theheat load per acre for waste of any given age,leading to lower temperatures. At the sametime, it would increase the number or size of

wu s Depa~ment of Ener~, Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste. .Inventories, Projections, and Characteristics, DOEIRW-0006, Sep-tember 1984, fig. C.2, p. 284.

repositories required for a given amount ofradioactive material, thus increasing the dis-posal cost. From a technical point of viewi in-creasing the emplacement density is an easyway to relax the thermal conservatism usedin the demonstration phase.

Using conservative thermal criteria for the base-line repository design is consistent with the princi-ple of basing the baseline design to the maximumextent possible on data and analysis that are avail-able now. The National Research Council studyof geologic disposal concluded that current DOEdesign temperatures are much higher than the tem-peratures used in most studies of waste form dis-solution,40 and it suggested using conservative ini-

tial temperature limits, although it also concludedthat research will probably eventually allow use ofhigher temperatures. While conservative thermalcriteria would be used for initial emplacement ofwaste during the demonstration phase, the RD&Dprogram would determine the extent to which thosecriteria could be relaxed for emplacement duringthe operational phase.

RETRIEVABILITY

NRC’s regulations for high-level waste disposalrequire that the repository design keep open the op-tion of waste retrieval throughout the period dur-ing which wastes are being emplaced, and thereafteruntil completion of a repository performance con-firmation program and NRC review of the results.The regulations specify that the design provide forretrieval to be undertaken any time within 50 yearsafter initiation of emplacement, subject to modifica-tion in light of the planned emplacement scheduleand confirmation program .41 In addition, NWPA(sec. 122) also requires that repository designs allowfor retrieval of spent fuel for safety or economic rea-sons, subject to NRC approval.

An important design question affecting the costof disposal is whether to provide for “ready retriev-ability, ” easy access to the waste, by keeping therepository rooms open during the retrievability pe-riod rather than backfilling them soon after wasteemplacement. A period of ready retrievability of-fers two advantages. First, it reduces concerns that

+ONation~ Research Council, op. cit. p. 8.+lFeder~ Register, VO]. 48, No. 120, June 21, 1983, p. 28197.


emplacement of waste in a repository is a practicallyirreversible step. Second, it enables economic re-covery of spent fuel if reprocessing appears desirableafter the fuel has been emplaced.

NRC’s regulations do not require easy access,nor do they preclude backfilling. While there aresome advantages to early backfilling, particularlyin salt, remaining the hot backfill to retrieve thewaste could be quite difficult and expensive .42 Thus,the retrievability requirement may be an additionalfactor favoring conservative thermal design criteria.

Since the design implications of the NRC re-quirement have not yet been thoroughly assessed,a conservative initial design would provide for someperiod of ready retrievability after emplacement,although perhaps not for the full period of reposi-tory operation. DOE has analyzed 25-year readyretrievability and concluded that it is feasible, al-though it is more expensive because it requires re-duced thermal loads per acre.43 However, the ad-ditional cost could be reduced by using ventilationto remove excess heat; furthermore, the conserva-tive thermal loads needed to meet a 100° C designtemperature may enable ready retrievability at rela-tively small additional cost.

In any case, the assumption of some period ofready retrievability should provide a conservativeestimate of the cost of disposal and could increaseconfidence in initial low-level emplacement of wastein the repository. The assumption could be relaxedfor full-scale operation when analysis is availableto show that NRC requirements can be met evenif rooms are backfilled soon after waste emplace-ment, and when it is clear that ready retrievabilityof spent fuel is not needed for economic reasons.

WASTE FORM

DOE reference waste forms are borosilicate glassfor solidified high-level waste and untreated fuel as-semblies for spent fuel. Because EPA analysis con-cludes that either waste form could meet EPA’s pro-

. — . —4ZNatiOn~ ReSearCh council, Op . cit., p. 9.

43The cost impact is greatest for a repository in salt, because, unlikehard rock, salt flows under pressure, making it more difficult to keeptunnels open for an extended period. U.S. Department of Energy,Final Environmental Impact Statement, Management of Commer-cially Generated Radioactive Waste, DOEIEIS-0046F, (Washington,D, C.: October 1980), vol. 2, app. K, pp. K.23-K.25.

posed environmental standards,44 and because theseare the two waste forms that have been studied inmost detail, a conservative baseline system designwould be based on these waste forms. This is con-sistent with the decision to use borosilicate glass asthe waste form for solidifying the liquid commer-cial high-level waste stored at the inoperative Nu-clear Fuel Services reprocessing plant at West Val-ley, NY, and the defense high-level waste storedat the Savannah River plant. The classified wastefrom West Valley, and some of the waste from Sa-vannah River (if it is decided to place defense wastein commercial repositories), could be used in thedemonstration phase of the first repository, alongwith an amount of spent fuel. As noted above, aNational Research Council study concluded thatkeeping the temperature of the borosilicate glassbelow 100° C, as provided in the conservative re-pository design for the demonstration phase, wouldgive confidence in its suitability as a waste formuntil the uncertainties in its performance at highertemperatures can be resolved through additionalresearch .45 The waste form RD&D program woulddetermine whether this conservatism could be re-laxed in the full-scale operational phase.

The RD&D program would provide for devel-opment of backup waste forms for both untreatedspent fuel and high-level waste as a hedge againstunforeseen problems such as regulatory difficulties.In particular, the recent National Research Councilstudy of geologic disposal concludes that neitherwaste form may be able to meet NRC criterionthat the engineered barriers allow no more than onepart in 100,000 of each critical radionuclide to es-cape each year.

46 While this criterion is not abso-lute, and might be adjusted by NRC for individ-ual radionuclides in light of the EPA standard orthe geochemical characteristics of the repository and

4+u.s. EnvirOnment~ Protection Agency, Drafit Environmental ~m-pact Statement for 40 CFR 191: Environmental Standards for Man-agement and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Trans-uranic Radioactive Wastes, EPA 520/1-82-025, (Washington, D. C.:December 1982).

4sNation~ Research Council, op. cit., p. 7. This study concludedttlat “borosilicate glass is the appro~wiate choice for further testingand for use in current repository de:,igns’ but also that ‘‘there areuncertainties about its performance m a repository that need to bebetter understood before glass waste ~ ould be acceptable for emplace-ment in a repository. ” Ibid., p. 78.

4bNation~ Research Council, op. cit., pp. 237-238.


its environs, 47 it is possible that less soluble waste

forms might be necessary for at least some candi-date repository sites. In addition, the National Re-search Council study concluded that significant im-provements in repository performance could beachieved if highly insoluble waste forms could bedeveloped. The study participants recommendeda backup technical program that would: 1) provideinsurance against the contingency that release ratesfrom currently preferred waste forms prove con-siderably higher than now estimated, and 2) de-velop better waste package alternatives that couldbe used in later stages of waste emplacement .48 Thepotential effect of a reduced waste form release rateon the risks from geologic disposal is shown in table6-3.

The RD&D program could examine such wasteforms, as well as processes for treating spent fuel(e.g., by powdering or chemical dissolution) so thatit could be incorporated in such a waste form di-rectly if reprocessing and plutonium separation isnot otherwise undertaken for resource recovery rea-sons. However, later decisions about whether to usean alternative waste form that involves significantlymore complex treatment and handling processesthan the reference waste forms involve (e. g., dis-solution and resolidification of spent fuel) shouldtake into account the increased costs, risks, andoperational exposures that would be entailed .49

4710 cFiIart 60.113(a)(l )(ii)(J3).qBNatiOnal Research council, Op. cit. , pp. 82-83.+gThe Nation~ Research Council review of geologic disposal ob-

served that the operational considerations of producing different wasteforms could be a factor in the choice between waste forms, and con-

Conservatism also suggests that the entire wastemanagement process be kept as simple as possible.

WASTE PACKAGE

A conservative baseline waste package would usethe package design that has received the most studyto date: a metal canister, containing several spentfuel assemblies, which would be emplaced in ver-tical boreholes drilled in the floor of the repositoryrooms. Since the package would be unshielded, itwould require remote handling. Potentially morecost-effective emplacement techniques now underconsideration by DOE, such as insertion into longhorizontal boreholes drilled out from the walls ofthe rooms, would not be used in the baseline de-sign because they have not been studied as thor-oughly as the vertical emplacement concept.

A major aspect of conservatism in the waste pack-age concerns the design lifetime of the package. Pro-posed EPA criteria encourage use of multiple bar-riers to increase confidence about long-termisolation, and NRC final regulations require thatthe waste package provide assurance of containmentof the waste for a period of from 300 to 1000 years,the period during which the heat released by thewaste will have its greatest effect. Some argue thatanalyses using mathematical models to project re-pository performance show that such a packagewould not significantly improve the predicted per-

cluded: ‘‘The analysis of the release of radioactivity to the environ-ment must include the entire waste disposal cycle, beginning withwaste-form manufacture, to achieve overall minimal release objec-tives. National Research Council, op. cit., p. 14

Table 6-3.—Effects of Canister Life and Waste Form Release Rate onProjected Population Risks Over 10,000 Years

Projected health effectsGranite Bedded salt Basalt

Canister life:Reference Case (100 years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 190 —

(500 years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 760 — 4,4001,000 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575 90 3,9005,000 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 40 180Waste form release rate:Reference case (10-41year). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 760 190 4,400High estimate (l O-’/year) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,500 200 18,000Low estimate (lO-a/year) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 50 50— = Not applicable.SOURCE: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Draft .Envirorrnrerrtal Impact Statement on 40 CFR Part 191, Environmental

Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transurarric Radioactive Wastes,EPA 52011-82-025, December 1982.


—

formance. Others, including NRC, argue that itmay be needed to give greater confidence in thepredictions of repository performance.50

A conservative approach would be to provide fora waste package with a design life exceeding theregulatory requirements, and to use that waste formas a fully redundant barrier, rather than as a com-pensation for any defects in the geologic featuresof the site. (The potential effect of increased canis-ter life on the risks from geologic disposal is shownin table 6-3. ) Long life is achieved by using thickcanister walls and/or corrosion-resistant material,such as copper, titanium, or zirconium. For exam-ple, a Swedish-designed copper canister for use ina granite repository has been estimated to have upto a 1-million-year life.51 DOE estimates that a ti-tanium canister would add about $6 per kilogramto the cost of disposal,52 compared to current wastepackage designs using a simple canister of stainlesssteel (for tuff) or carbon steel (for salt or basalt). 53

A conservative baseline system design would in-clude a long-lived package in its plans for the dem-onstration phase and in estimating disposal costs,while the RD&D program to develop an optimizeddesign would determine whether that conservatismcould be relaxed for full-scale operation.

While the conservative baseline design would usethe borehole waste package concept, recent analy-ses have suggested that there may be significant ad-vantages to a waste package design that is signifi-cantly different from the borehole design. Thisalternative design involves a massive (70 to 100tonnes) cast iron or cast steel cask holding up to10 to 20 tonnes of spent fuel, which could also con-ceivably be used for storage and transportation .54Such a cask would provide radiation shielding sothat complicated hot cell operations, shielded trans-port vehicles, and shielded storage vaults would not

5010 CFR pan (jo. 11 S(a)( 1 )(ii)(B). The importance of an effectiveengineered barrier in addition to the waste form itself is discussed in‘ ‘Achieving Performance Objectives for the Engineered Barrier Sys-tern, ” a Staff Report prepared by the Subcommittee on Energy Con-servation and Power of the Committee on Energy and Commerce ofthe U.S. House of Representatives, Committee Print 98-II, Novem-ber 1984.

31 NationA Reseamh Council, A Review of the Swedish KBS-3 planfor Final Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (Washington, D. C.: NationalAcademy Press, 1984), p. 3.

5ZDOE, Repo~ on Financing the Disposal of Spent Fuel, p. 23.33D0E, Draft Mission Plan, p. 3-A-19.S4Westinghouse, En@nee~ Waste Package; Hoskins, oP. cit.

be required.55 The casks would simply be placedin repository rooms, eliminating the need for drill-ing holes for holding the package.

It maybe possible to design such a cask as a uni-versal container for storage, transportation, and dis-posal. If so, it could substantially reduce the com-plexity of the waste management process andreduce worker exposures, since the spent fuel wouldbe handled directly only once—at the time it isplaced in casks at the reactor. This universal con-tainer would also provide great flexibility in the sys-tem, since once spent fuel; has been placed in thecask in which it will ultimately be buried (unlessit is removed for reprocessing), slippages in the re-pository schedule would not cause additional stor-age problems. Even if such a multipurpose outercask cannot be used, the universal container con-cept could be applied to an inner container thatcould be inserted into separate outer containers forstorage, transportation, and disposal.

Because of the potential advantages of this un-proven concept, the RD&D program to develop anoptimized system design would resolve questionsabout its feasibility as quickly as possible, so thatthis concept can be considered as an option for theoperational phase of the first repository, (It is im-portant to resolve the question before full-scalepackaging facilities are des;igned and constructed,because the different waste packages impose dif-ferent requirements on the design of the handlingfacilities and on the repository itself. The opera-tional implications of using a massive disposal caskmay have to be determined during the generic pack-aging and handling test program, required by theAct, before a decision could be made to adopt thatconcept.) Although DOE plans to examine this sys-tem, it is unclear from the Draft Mission Planwhether this system’s feasibility would be deter-mined in time for its use in the full-scale facilitiesof the first repository. As discussed above, the two-phase approach to operation of the first repositoryis designed to allow ample tlme to determine wheth-er this technology is feasible and desirable beforea commitment is made to a final design for the oper-ational-phase system.

Sswestinghouse, L?ngineered Waste package, p. 279.


TECHNOLOGY OF PREDICTION

As discussed in chapter 3, predictions of reposi-tory performance will be based heavily on the useof mathematical models. Use of such predictivetechniques in a formal licensing process may wellbe one of the most difficult aspects of demonstratingdisposal, and validation of those techniques will beof critical importance.

56 Since such long-term pre-

diction has never been done in a formal regulatoryprocess, many unforeseen problems will probablybe encountered the first time it is attempted. A seri-ous effort to anticipate and resolve such problemsbefore the first formal licensing proceeding com-mences could avoid unnecessary delays at that crit-ical stage of the waste disposal program. This couldbe accomplished, for example, if the site charac-terization plan required by section 113(b) of NWPAincluded a preliminary analysis by DOE of the ex-pected performance of the conceptual repository de-sign for that site, based on the data available priorto characterization. If this analysis were explicitlyrelated to NRC and EPA performance require-ments, a broad review process involving NRC,EPA, USGS, and others could begin at that time.This could allow ample time for thorough consid-eration of the issues that might arise. It would alsoprovide a rigorous basis for the characterizationprogram, so that efforts could be focused on resolv-ing the uncertainties that were identified as cen-trally important to the predictions of repository per-formance.

While this approach might not lead to formal res-olution of licensing issues, in the sense that theycould not be reopened later, it is possible that a suf-ficient degree of technical consensus could bereached that some issues would be effectively re-solved. This would permit attention to be focusedon those issues that remained in dispute. If this weredone at each site recommended for characteriza-tion, it should increase the probability that NRC

JGThe NatiOn~ Research Council study of geologic disposal notedthat ‘ ‘There is not yet a validated technique for predicting the per-formance of borosilicate glass—or of any other waste form—in a re-pository . . . Whatever technique the U.S. Department of Energy(DOE) adopts for predicting waste-form and waste-package performa-nce must be carehdly validated before any waste form and waste pack-age can be considered acceptable. National Research Council, Zsola-tion System, pp. 78-79. For a discussion of general issues in thedevelopment and use of predictive models, see OffIce of TechnologyAssessment, Use of Models for Water Resource Management, Plan-ning, and Policy, OTA-O-159, August 1982, ch. 3.

would be able to reach a decision on a site withinthe 4 years’ maximum time allowed in NWPA.

Storage

Available analyses indicate that there aretechnically promising interim storage methods thatcould substantially reduce the overall cost of wastemanagement. These include rod consolidation andstorage casks that could also be used for transpor-tation and perhaps for disposal. Since these meth-ods have not yet been demonstrated and licensed,a conservative system design would not assume thatthese technologies would be available, but wouldinstead assume that all spent fuel would be receivedunconsolidated in casks optimized for shippingonly. However, the RD&D program in the Mis-sion Plan would contain an accelerated effort to ex-amine these possibilities and determine the extentto which they could be incorporated into a laterrevision of the system design. It is important thatthis be resolved as quickly as possible, before finalchoices about interim storage systems are made byindividual utilities (in deciding how to deal withtheir spent fuel until at least 1998) and by Con-gress (in deciding whether to authorize MRS fa-cilities after the MRS proposal is presented in1985). Because these decisions could be stronglyaffected by the availability of a multipurpose caskor other form of universal container, the MissionPlan should clearly show the relationship betweenthe program for evaluating the feasibility of suchcontainers and the timing of the storage decisionsthat would be affected by their availability.

The RD&D program must also address the tech-nology requirements for monitored storage for in-definite periods. The storage technologies that aremost mature today, and that would most likely beselected for an MRS facility if one were to be builtin the 1990’s, are the surface cask and dry-well con-cepts. 57 While these are particularly well suited forproviding easily expandable storage capacity in theface of an uncertain level of demand (as would bethe case for buffer storage to deal with smallschedule slippages), they may not be optimal forproviding large amounts of storage for an extendedperiod in the event of major difficulties in the re-pository program—the principal role for MRS fa-

5TDOE, Draft Mission Plan, p. 3-B-7.


cilities in the backup facility plan described above.In addition, storage facilities designed for a longand perhaps indefinite period of storage may raiselicensing issues that are not faced by facilities in-tended for a limited period of interim storage. Thusthe RD&D program in the Mission Plan would in-clude a program for developing, testing, and per-haps demonstrating appropriate storage technol-ogies so that a reliable long-term system can beprovided with high assurance of success if needed.

Transportation System

A conservative baseline system design would as-sume that transportation during full-scale opera-tion of the repository system would be accomplishedwith casks that are designed for transportation onlyand that are optimized for the repository loadingschedule, taking into account the age of spent fuelor high-level waste at the time it would be trans-ported to a repository. As noted in chapter 3, de-signing the casks for fuel that is at least 10 yearsold would provide an additional margin of conserv-atism by reducing the effects of self-heating in caseof transportation accidents involving a fire. Thereis little question that such casks can be designed,licensed, and constructed in time for the conserv-ative loading plan, although any transportation dur-ing the next decade or so would probably have touse the existing generation of casks. While detaileddesigns remain to be developed, currently availableanalysis should give a solid basis for initial estimatesof cost and capacity.

The transportation section of the Mission Planwould also include a baseline reactor storage un-loading plan, since that will have significant im-plications for transportation. For example, an un-loading plan that provides for large amounts ofstored spent fuel to be removed from a relativelysmall number of reactors each year, rather than forsmaller amounts from a larger number of reactors,may simplify the transportation process and reduceits costs and impacts by allowing the use of dedi-cated unit trains. However, it would also requireallowing larger quantities of spent fuel to build upat each reactor site before the site is unloaded. (Seeapp. G for a discussion of the limitations on therate at which spent fuel can be removed from re-actor sites. ) A conservative initial Mission Planwould assume that interim spent fuel storage would

be unloaded according to the “oldest fuel first”principle included in the reference contract adoptedby DOE. Assuming that all spent fuel is to beshipped by truck would maximize the number ofshipments and the demands on the repository wastereceiving facility as a basis for a conservative esti-mate of system costs and impacts.

One important focus of the transportation RD&Dprogram is to determine whether casks that mightbe used for storage and/or disposal can be designedto be suitable for transportation as well. As notedearlier, this could greatly simplify the overall wastemanagement process. This will require substantialcoordination with the spent fuel storage and repos-itory development programs to ensure that a fullyintegrated optimized system design can be devel-oped in time to be considered for the operationalphase of the first repository.

Packaging and Handling Technology

To ensure that unforeseen bottlenecks do not pre-vent the Federal Government from accepting wasteaccording to the planned schedule, prior experienceat handling, packaging, and emplacing radioactivewaste at operational rates would be valuable. DOEnow estimates that by the time a repository is tobegin operation in January 1998 some 36,000tonnes of spent fuel, representing over 126,000 in-dividual spent fuel assemblies, will have been dis-charged by commercial nuclear reactors.58 To storeor dispose of this spent fuel at a central facility fastenough to stop the further buildup of inventoriesin at-reactor storage in 1998, without even begin-ning to work off the backlogs, would require han-dling about 2,300 tonnes, or about 7,900assemblies, in 1998 alone. If this spent fuel werebeing canned for storage or disposal, it would re-quire filling, sealing, and testing—using remotehandling procedures—up to 5,000 canisters peryear (depending on the final system design).

There is experience with all of the procedures forhandling spent fuel through the step of canning forstorage, but there is no experience at rates ap-proaching those that must be achieved for full-scaleoperation. For example, DOE tests involving em-

SoTheSe are DOE’S most current projections, found in spent Fueland Radioactive Waste Inventories, Projections, and Characteristics,DOE/RW-0006, September 1984, ch. 1.


placement of encapsulated spent fuel in a deepmined facility in granite at the Nevada Test Sitehave used only 11 spent fuel assemblies. Further-more, there is no experience with the proceduresthat might be required for final packaging of ei-ther spent fuel or high-level waste for permanentdisposal, procedures that may be more complexthan those required for canning for temporary stor-age. While there is little doubt that waste can bepackaged and loaded at relatively high rates, thereis less certainty about the rates that could actuallybe achieved by the first facilities designed for thatpurpose.

The provisions of NWPA suggest a conservativeRD&D program that could give a high degree ofassurance that full-scale facilities will operate at theplanned rates and thus minimize the risk that com-mitments to delivery schedules cannot be met. Theprogram would involve three stages prior to full-scale repository operation, allowing developmentof hands-on experience with large amounts of spentfuel and/or high-level waste in a series of steps ex-tending over the next 20 years. The first stagewould take place before the first site is approved,while the next two would take place at the site fol-lowing NRC approval.

GENERIC TESTS

The first stage would involve the generic packag-ing, handling, and emplacement tests required bysection 217(d) of NWPA. Since many of the oper-ational questions apply to large-scale storage as wellas to disposal, it may be very useful to plan for anintegrated storage and disposal operational testingprogram that could provide data useful to MRSdesigns, as well. The program could also includethe 300-tonne dry storage R&D program author-ized in section 218(c). Such a program would de-velop packaging and handling technology thatwould allow the packaged material to be emplacedeither in surface storage or into a repository. Thiswould help ensure that spent fuel or high-level wastecould be accepted at operational rates at a reposi-tory on a target date, even if it were decided to de-fer full-scale loading of the repository itself. Asnoted above, handling and emplacement tests maybe a particularly important part of determining thefeasibility of using very large self-shielded casks fordisposal and would also be useful in developing final

designs for handling such large casks at operationalrates even if the casks are only used for surfacestorage.

An integrated storage and disposal test facilitywould also allow the development and demonstra-tion of the capacity to retrieve waste from a repos-itory at a rate comparable to the emplacementrate— an NRC requirement—and to place it intotemporary surface storage if necessary. This shouldhelp build confidence that initial emplacement ofwaste into a repository is not an irreversible step.

To gain needed operational experience might re-quire a substantial quantity of spent fuel or high-level waste. For example, tests at a scale of 5 percentof both the total capacity and projected annual han-dling rate of DOE’s current reference repositorydesign could require over 1,000 tonnes over the nextdecade. The actual amount that should be usedwould be determined by an analysis of: a) the needfor reliable data and experience concerning oper-ations with highly radioactive materials over a sus-tained period, and b) the need for packaged wasteor spent fuel for use in the second stage of preopera-tional tests, early tests of waste emplacement in arepository during the demonstration phase of re-pository operation.

It may be possible to conduct all of the neededgeneric operational tests using existing governmentfacilities. If not, NWPA authorizes construction ofa test and evaluation facility (TEF) that could allowunlicensed temporary emplacement of up to 100tonnes of spent fuel in a repository-like facility atanticipated repository depths to test and verify han-dling and emplacement procedures.

EARLY REPOSITORY EMPLACEMENT TESTS

The initial stage of the demonstration phasewould involve early emplacement in the repositoryof the material packaged conservatively during thefirst generic packaging and handling tests. Thiswould occur after NRC had granted a construc-tion authorization but before completion of the firstprocess line of the packaging facilities of the repos-itory. Informal discussion with NRC staff indicatesthat this would be possible within the frameworkof the existing regulations for repository licensing;it would be analogous to low-power licensing fora reactor. As noted earlier, emplacement during


this phase would use the conservative disposal sys-tem design. Early emplacement of a small amountof waste under licensed conditions would be a log-ical extension of the activities at a TEF if one wereconstructed at the repository site.

Such tests would offer a number of potential ben-efits. First, it would allow an early test of one ofthe crucial steps in the licensing process: NRC’sability to decide to allow actual “disposal” asdefined by NWPA—permanent emplacement ofwaste in a geologic repository with no foreseeableintent of recovery. Second, because emplacementof even a small amount of waste with NRC approv-al would be disposal, it should satisfy the require-ment in section 302(a)(5) that disposal in a reposi-tory begin by January 31, 1998. NWPA does notspecify the level of operation that must begin bythat time, but it does specify that emplacement bedisposal, which presupposes NRC permission forpermanent emplacement with no intent of recovery.Thus, this approach could allow disposal to beginperhaps several years earlier than 1998, assumingthat the construction authorization for the first re-pository is granted on schedule.

TESTS OF REPOSITORY PACKAGING FACILITIES

A final stage of testing in the demonstrationphase would be operation of the initial process lineof the full-scale packaging facilities. For this stage,one processing line would be constructed and oper-ated for a period of several years in order to dis-cover and correct any design problems before con-structing the rest of the process lines in the facility.While initial emplacement during the demonstra-tion phase will use the conservative baseline design,the optimized system design would be demonstratedin this phase. Thus, the schedule for earliest oper-ation in this phase depends on the time requiredto develop and gain NRC approval of an optimizeddesign. Once the final designs have been modifiedas needed in light of this operational experience andthe rest of the processing lines have been built, theRD&D program would be finished and the fulloperational phase would begin.

Integrated System Model

Evaluation and comparison of alternative wastemanagement system designs with the conservative

baseline design would greatly benefit from devel-opment of an integrated systems model that allowsanalysis of the total costs, risks, worker exposures,and other operational characteristics of waste man-agement system designs from the time spent fuelis discharged from the reactor to the time of finaldisposal. As noted in the discussion of the integratedwaste management system in chapter 3, many ele-ments already exist which could be combined intoan integrated model.

It is important to recognize that an optimum sys-tem design may involve elements that are not op-timum if viewed from a narrower perspective. Forexample, from the point of view of the individualutility, using a multipurpose container for spent fuelmight appear to increase interim storage costs, yetuse of such containers may substantially reduce thetotal system costs. As another example, steps thatcould improve safety in one area could reduce itelsewhere; for example, while treatment of spentfuel to reduce its volubility may improve repositoryperformance in the long run, it would lead to in-creased operational risks and generation of addi-tional waste streams that must be disposed of.

An integrated system model is needed to captureall of these effects, so that decisions can be madeon the basis of a clear understanding of the impli-cations of the options under consideration. Anotherarea in which integrated analysis is needed concernsthe tradeoffs between distance between waste pack-ages when emplaced in the repository, concentra-tion of waste in the waste form and package, useof a corrosion-resistant waste package, and addi-tional cooling prior to disposal.59

Alternative Disposal Technologies

Confidence that a permanent disposal system willultimately be available could also be enhanced bythe development of alternative disposal technolo-gies, Such development is required by section 220of NWPA.

sgNation~Research Council, Isc]ation System, p. 15.

.


A STRATEGY FOR REVISING THE MISSION PLAN

It is to be expected that future analysis and re-search will provide information that may allow re-laxation of some of the convervatisms in the initialMission Plan or significant changes in the systemdesign. The initial Mission Plan should identifythose points in the repository development proc-ess at which it is expected that sufficient new in-formation would be available to warrant reexamina-tion of the Plan. Alternatively, provision could bemade for reassessment of the Mission Plan every3 years, to provide a basis for the triennial budgetand authorization process established by NWPA.Use of the Mission Plan for that purpose is dis-cussed further in chapter 7.

The initial Mission Plan could also specify whatsteps would be taken to review and revise the Plan.Because the choices to be made in the Mission Planhave significant implications for many affected par-ties, public acceptance of and confidence in the Planmight be enhanced by broad involvement of thevarious affected parties in the process of review andrevision. (See discussion of the role of the MissionPlan in public participation in ch. 8.) This couldalso build consensus on the Plan, thereby reduc-ing the likelihood of successful efforts to causechanges that favor one group or another or tothwart the Plan’s implementation.

CHAPTER NOTE

Available analysis shows that there are strong finan-cial incentives for use of cask or drywell storage at re-actor sites—the same modular technologies that wouldalso likely be used for a centralized storage facility de-signed to provide a limited amount of storage for a rela-tively short period. Thus, the main difference betweenat-reactor and centralized storage would be the dif-ference in the cost of the packaging and handling facil-ities required in each case. DOE estimates that a caskstorage facility with an annual receiving rate of about2,000 tonnes would require handling and support facil-ities costing about $410 million. 60

By 2008, the reactors that are now operating or underconstruction are expected to require about 2,300 tonnesper year of additional storage capacity beyond that avail-able in their own basins (see app. E). About 1,500tonnes per year of that amount would be from reactorsthat will have to provide their own storage facilities by1998, so construction of new handling facilities for thatfuel at a centralized site would duplicate costs that havealready been incurred. The remaining 900 or so tonnesper year is from reactors that would not have to pro-

vide additional storage facilities until 1998 or later. Thisrepresents the annual discharge of about 30 1 -Gwe re-actors.

The estimated capital cost of facilities for lifetime caskstorage for two such reactors at the same site is

$7,100,000. 6’ This in turn suggests that the total capi-tal cost for the at-reactor facilities for 900 tonnes peryear would be well under $200 million. Since these costswould be spread out over the 10-year period, the dis-counted cost would be less, compared to the discountedcost of a centralized system in which most of the capitalcosts are incurred at the beginning. While a detailedanalysis will be required to provide an accurate com-parison of at-reactor and away-from-reactor storagecosts (an analysis that would benefit from completionand evaluation of the dry storage RD&D program man-dated by NWPA), this rough estimate indicates thatthere is no strong prima facie reason for concluding thatdry storage using modular systems will benefit fromlarge economies of scale if implemented at centralizedsites.

60D. E, R~mussen, Comparison of Cask and DryWell Storage Con-cepts for a Monitored Retrievable Storage/Interim Storage System,Battelle Memorial Institute Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL-4450,December 1982, table A.29, p. A.30.

ME. R. Jo~son Ass~iates, Inc., A Pndiminary Assessment of Alter-native Dry Storage Methods for the Storage of Commercial Spent Nu-clear Fuel, JAI-180, DOE/ET/47929-l, Reston, Va., November 1981,table 8-2.

Chapter 7

Federal Institutional Issues

Contents

Page

Program Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Organization of the Federal Waste Management Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159Alternative Means of Financing and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Federal Interagency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168


7-1. Reference Program Costs for Waste Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1567-2. Nuclear Waste Fund Projections Under tine DOE Reference Program Schedule . . . . . . . . . 1657-3. Principal Executive Agencies With Waste Management Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

FIGURESFigure No, Page

7-1. Range of Cumulative Estimated Waste Management Program Costs ..............,.. . . 1587-2. Organization Chart of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Chapter 7

Federal Institutional Issues

The historyeffort strongly

of the Federal waste management capacity of the Federal Government to implementsuggests that changes in past insti- a waste management policy successfully: funding

tutional arrangements and procedures may increase for the program, organization and management ofthe credibility of the central component of the Nu- the program, and coordination among the agen-clear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA)-the com- cies that will be involved in waste management.mitment to the development of a complex techno-logical system, despite technical and institutional

This chapter will discuss each of these concerns,the ways in which they have been addressed in

uncertainties, on a firm schedule extending over NWPA, and some of the important questions thata period of decades. As discussed in chapter 4, thereare three particular areas of concern regarding the

remain to be resolved.

PROGRAM FUNDING

The direct and indirect costs of waste manage-ment probably will be a small fraction (several per-cent) of the cost of nuclear-generated electricity. 1

For example, the Congressional Budget Office(CBO) calculated that even if the costs of the wastedisposal program were 160 percent greater thancurrently anticipated, it would add only about 3to 4 percent to consumer electricity bills.2 However,the absolute sums required to develop an operat-ing waste disposal system will be quite large (seetable 7-l). According to Department of Energy(DOE) estimates, about $4 billion of research anddevelopment (R&D) will be required over the next20 years to develop the capability to dispose ofradioactive wastes in mined repositories.3 The totalcost of developing and operating two mined repos-itories, which would be sufficient to accommodateall of the high-level radioactive waste that will begenerated by the reactors now operating or underconstruction, is expected to amount to about $20billion in 1982 dollars.4 Assuming an average of3-percent inflation per year over the entire period

‘The discussion of costs draws heavily on a staff working paper pre-pared for OTA by the Congressional Budget Office: “Financing Nu-clear Waste Disposal, May 1981.

2Congressional Budget Office, Financing Radioactive Waste Dis-posal, September 1982, p. 27.

‘U.S. Department of Energy, Report on Financing the Disposalof Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel and Processed High-Level Radioac-tive Waste, S-0020, June 1983, table A-1, p. 42.

‘Ibid., p. 2.

of repository development and operation, and tak-ing into account some (but not all) sources of costuncertainty, DOE estimates that actual programoutlays could range from $35 billion to $64 billion.5

Thus, the credibility of any Federal commitmentto a long-term waste management program willdepend on confidence that these large sums will beavailable as needed over a period of decades.

NWPA provided for funding of the Federal ra-dioactive waste management program through amandatory f’ee of 1 mill (one-tenth of 1 cent) perkilowatt-hour (kWh) on nuclear-generated electri-city. The revenues from this fee will be placed ina Nuclear Waste Fund in the Treasury of theUnited States, and can be used only for waste man-agement activities specified in NWPA. This restric-tion on the use of the fund will be of particular im-portance during the first few decades of collectionof the fee, when the fund will accumulate large sur-pluses that must be allowed to accrue interest sothat sufficient money will be available in later years.

It has been Federal policy since 1970 that thecosts of commercial radioactive waste disposal beborne by the generators of the waste.6 However,

‘Ibid.6APP. F, pt. 50, title 10, CFR, Nov. 14, 1970, requires that upon

delivery of high-level radioactive waste to a Federal repository, theparty delivering such waste would pay the Federal Government acharge designed to defray all costs of disposal and perpetualsurveillance.

155

— —.


Table 7=1.—Reference Program Costs for Waste Disposal

Program cost Percentage of(in billions of Total program

Cost category 1983 dollars) costTwo 72,000 metric ton capacity repositories:

Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 23—17b

Operating c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0—6.9 26–34Decommissioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 5–4b

Transporting spent nuclear fueld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,3–4.0 15—20Site selection, evaluation, and licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 8–6bTest and evaluation facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 1Technological development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 10—8b

Administration e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8—2.2 12—1 1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.3—20.3 100aTheseCOst$refertO tworepositories bulltln asaltmedlum. The costs of building and opefatlng two hard rock rwos~tofie$

would be roughly2 percent higher.All CBOanalysesaasume the development of salt repositories.b Although the specific program Cost remains the same under different growth patterns, its corresponding :}hare of total PrO-

gram costs will differ,c The total Owrating cost for the two repositories depends on the scheduie of nucieareiactricity 9eneratiOn. Th~! ennual oPeratin9

cost for each repository is $48 million per thousand metric tons of spent fuel received.d Totai Sflipplrlg Costs SISO deperlda on the nuclew.growtfl forecast; the annUai cost per thousand metric ton:; of spent nuclear

fuei shipped is S28 miliion. A no-growth scenario assumes that only 82,000 metric tons wiil be disposed o‘ at a cost of $2.3blilion; the S4.0 biliion projection refers to the three growth forecasts used by CBO.

e Administrative costs inciude aid peyments to State end local governments and to indlan tribes affected by rePs~tOrY develop-ment and fund management coats. Administrative costs continue until the second reposltoW is decommissioned, and thusdepend on the schaduie of nuciear-electricity growth.

f The rmge of total Cost estknates reflects the reposito~ scheduies under the different nuclear~rowth forecasts used by CBO.

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office, Nuclear Waste Dkwosal: Achlevh7g Adequate Financing, August 19E4. Based on costprojections from Department of Energy, Report on Financing the Disposai of Commercial Spent Nuciear Fuel andProcessed High-Levei Radioactive Waste, DOEIS-0020, June 1983.

it had been assumed, before passage of NWPA, thatmost of the costs of developing the disposal systemprior to operation of the first repository would haveto come from Federal appropriations, to be repaidwhen utilities delivered the waste to a Federal fa-cility for storage or disposal. 7 If this repayment ap-proach had been continued, progress in the wastedisposal program for the next decade or two wouldhave been dependent on competition for generalrevenues in the annual Federal budget process andthereby vulnerable to pressures to defer major ex-penditures (e.g., site evaluation activities) when theFederal budget was tight. Moreover, the period ofdependence on Federal appropriations would havebeen uncertain, since offsetting revenues wouldhave been determined by the utilities’ independ-ent decisions about when to deliver waste to theFederal Government.

Under the pay-as-you-go system established byNWPA, the utilities with nuclear reactors providethe front-end funding for the development of re-positories. This method has the potential for assur-ing the availability of an adequate source of reve-

7See, for example, U.S. Department of Energy, ‘‘Preliminary Esti-mates of the Charge for Spent-Fuel Storage and Disposal Services,DOE/ET-0055, July 1978.

nue, so that lack of resources can be eliminated asa limitation on the scope and timing of the tech-nical waste management program.8 This could allayany concerns that budgetary pressures might leadto “corner-cutting” that cou.ld compromise safety.It could also increase greatly the credibility of anywaste management policy commitments of the Fed-eral Government. In fact, OTA’s analysis indicatesthat this funding arrangement may be necessaryfor a credible commitment to a firm schedule fordeveloping and operating waste repositories.

To realize the full potential of a mandatory fee,two requirements must be met. First, there mustbe a means of adjusting the revenues from the feeto ensure that the full costs of the program arerecovered despite inflation and unanticipatedchanges in program scope. Second, the revenuesmust be available for expenditure as needed. Thefirst requirement will be considered in the re-mainder of this section; the second will be analyzedin the discussion of fiscal oversight mechanisms thatfollows.

8Funding limitations have restricte 4 the scope of the Federal siteevaluation program in the past. See app. A, p. 213,

Ch. 7—Federal Institutional Issues 157

DOE has analyzed the revenues expected to begenerated by the l-mill/kWh fee established byNWPA and concluded that those revenues, includ-ing interest earnings when the fund is in surplus,should be just sufficient to cover total program costsfor development and lifetime operation of two re-positories, if there are no significant cost increasesover current estimates other than an average in-flation of 3 percent per year. g However, it shouldbe noted that this conclusion is based on a reposi-tory development program that is little modifiedfrom the program that was in place before the enact-ment of NWPA, which for the first time establishedin law a firm Federal commitment to a specific datefor repository operation. As discussed in chapter6, the repository siting and development programneeded to give high confidence that such a com-mitment can be met despite technical problems islikely to be more extensive and expensive than theprogram planned prior to passage of the Act.

If the mandatory fee is to provide sufficient rev-enues to enable the Federal Government to meetits waste management policy commitments, thenit maybe necessary to adjust the initial l-mill/kWhlevel to cover the program needed to fulfill thosecommitments. (Historically, the program, and thusthe achievable goals, have been determined to aconsiderable extent by the availability of appro-priated funds. ) Since the program expenditures tobe covered by the fee will extend over a period offour or more decades, a plan of activities and theirassociated costs over an extended period will beneeded. The long-term cost analysis required in theMission Plan could be particularly useful as a basisfor determining whether adjustments of the fee areneeded.

Whatever the initial estimates of the long-termcosts of the waste management program, the po-tential for unanticipated cost increases is veryhigh. l0 There are many sources of cost uncertain-ty. 11 First, future inflation maybe incorrectly esti-mated. For example, DOE’s analysis shows thatif average annual inflation is 5 percent instead of

‘U.S. Department of Energy, Report on Financing the Disposal,p. 31.

‘“Ibid., p. 3.11 See u.s. Department of Energy, Report on Financing the Dis-

posal, and Congressional Budget OffIce, Financing Radioactive WasteDisposal, for analyses of sources and implications of cost increases.

the anticipated 3 percent, it would increase aggre-gate program expenditures (in current dollars) byabout $34 billion. 12 Second, current estimates arebased on generic repositories, while the actual site-specific costs are likely to be different. Third, reg-ulatory requirements for the disposal program arenot final. Finally, there may be unanticipated tech-nical problems that lead to increased costs. BothDOE and CBO agree that cost uncertainty is theprincipal source of financial risk to the disposal pro-gram. 13 Figure 7-1 shows a DOE estimate of therange of possible cumulative waste managementcosts.

Because the future costs of waste managementare uncertain, there is a risk that the fee establishedby NWPA may not generate sufficient revenue tocover the actual costs of the program. Providinga mechanism for revising the fee to adjust for costincreases is important, not only if it is desired thatall costs of the waste management program beborne by the generators of the waste, but also ifit is desired to make credible long-term commit-ments for the development and operation of a Fed-eral waste disposal system. If adjustment is diffi-cult or impossible, then the revenues generated bythe fee could, over the course of time, become in-adequate to finance the program. In that event, his-tory suggests that, once again, budgetary pressuresmight lead to program cuts (particularly in thenumber of backup sites and component technolo-gies under parallel development) that could reducethe credibility of the long-term commitments. Atthe same time, if adjustments are too easy, therewill be a risk that incentives for cost control wouldbe weak.

NWPA deals with this by requiring the Secre-tary of Energy to review the adequacy of the feeannually and to propose any changes required toensure that the full costs of the waste managementprogram are recovered. It also provides for con-gressional control over such fee increases by speci-fying that either House can block a proposed in-

12U. S. Department of Energy, Report on Financing tht’ Disposal.p. 31. A recent Congressional Budget Office study concludes that theI mill fee will be inadequate if inflation exceeds 3 percent annually,Congressional Budget Ofice, Nuclear Waste Disposal: Achim’ing Ade-quate Financing, August 1984.

] su s Department of Energy, Report on Financing the Disposal.. .p. 32; and Congressional Budget OffIce, Financing Radioacti\’e WasteDisposal, p. 24.


Figure 7-l.- Range of Cumulative Estimated Waste Management Program Costs(constant 1982 dollars)

30

c I

= A

12 F A10

t

4

t

A

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030Year

SOURCE: U.S. Depeftment of Energy, Rejwtl on Flnanclng the Dkpoeal of Commercle/ Spent Nuc\eer Fuel and Fwceaeed High-Lew/Radloact)w Wade, DOE/Sa20, June 19S3,

crease. However, the Supreme Court’s finding thatsuch one-House veto provisions are unconstitution-al raises questions about the long-term effective-

ness of the provisions for congressional review ofadjustments of the fee. The problem of striking anappropriate balance between cost control and ade-. — — —

I+Immigration and Naturalization Service V. Chadha et ~., 103S. C., p. 2764, No. 80-1832.

quacy of revenues in light of the uncertainties re-sulting from the Supreme Court’s decision will beconsidered below in the discussion of fiscal controlmechanisms for the waste management organiza-tion. 15

IJSee &. U.S. Department of Energy, Report on Financing theDisposal, p. 32; and Congressional Budget Oflice, Financing Radioac-tive Waste Disposal, p. 32.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERALWASTE MANAGEMENT AGENCY

The implementation of the repository develop- primary responsibility. On :he technical side, steadyment program mandated by NWPA entails two progress must be made through a series of R&Dmajor sets of requirements for the organization with milestones to the goal of the operation of one or

Ch. 7—Federal Institutional Issues ● 159

more full-scale disposal facilities. Such progress re-quires the ability to assemble and manage consid-erable financial and human resources over a periodof decades, to ensure that resources remain at anadequate level to continue activities, and to coordi-nate technically diverse and demanding tasks.

The lead agency must also be attentive to non-technical demands, Agency officials must be ableto deal with a variety of non-Federal parties withconflicting viewpoints who have the power to de-lay waste management efforts if they are dissatis-fied. In such a situation, the ability to negotiate andbargain is important, as is the ability to forecastdemands of non-Federal parties and the possibleeffects of such demands on the waste managementprogram.

Radioactive waste management has suffered inthe past from problems in policy and program plan-ning, in the coordination of agency activities, andin responsiveness to the expressed concerns ofgroups affected by waste management, such as util-ities, environmentalists, and State officials (see ch.4). These and other problems have led to sugges-tions that there be changes in the agency with prin-cipal responsibility for radioactive waste manage-ment, currently DOE. The suggested changes fallinto two broad categories: those related to the posi-tion of the waste management program within theFederal Government, and those related to the in-ternal organization of the program.

At the time NWPA was being debated, alterna-tives to the existing institutional structure for wastemanagement had been studied less thoroughly thanthe technical options. It was felt unnecessary andpremature to attempt to make major institutionalchanges at that point before a long-term technicalprogram had been adopted. Instead, Congresschose at that time to correct some of the most ob-vious institutional problems by establishing withinDOE the Office of Civilian Radioactive WasteManagement, with a Director appointed by thePresident and reporting to the Secretary of DOE,and to leave the question of more basic structuralchanges for later consideration. To ensure that in-stitutional questions would be addressed in moredetail in the future, NWPA also requires DOE tosubmit to Congress a report on alternative institu-tional approaches to managing the radioactive waste

program, including the option of establishing a pri-vate corporation. Each of these steps will be dis-cussed further below.

The Office of Civilian RadioactiveWaste Management

Historically, the principal Federal responsibilityfor radioactive waste management has been dis-charged by a program office located within an or-ganization having many broader responsibilitiesconcerning nuclear power—initially the Atomic En-ergy Commission, then the Energy Research andDevelopment Administration, and now DOE.l6 Asa result, the Federal waste management programhas had to compete for money, manpower, and pol-icy-level attention with more popular or urgentareas of nuclear R&D.

Establishment of the waste management programas a single-purpose office that is independent ofother nuclear activities of DOE should stabilize thewaste management organization at an appropriatepolicy level, insulate it from competition with othernuclear policy areas, and make possible the cen-tral integrated planning and management neededfor ensuring implementation of a long-term wastemanagement policy.

17 This should also insulate thewaste management organization from any majorinstitutional uncertainty or delay that could occurif the Federal energy activities were reorganized,as has been proposed by the Reagan adminis-tration.

While NWPA moved the location of the wastemanagement office within DOE, some changeswithin the office itself may be desirable. The Of-fice of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management isbased on the waste management organization inDOE that existed prior to passage of the Act. Theability of that organization to implement a radio-active waste policy has been questioned by someobservers 18 The history of the waste management

115For ~ discussion of (he evo]ution of the waste management orga-

nization, see app. A.1 TSee for example, Nationa Academy of Public Administration,

‘‘Building the Institutional Capacity for Managing Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste, ” May 1982, p. 4.

‘aSee Irvin C. Bupp, “The Management of the National Researchand Development Program, statement prepared for the CaliforniaEnergy Commission, May 30, 1980, p. 4.

. — — — .


program suggests that some changes in internal or-ganizational structure may help build confidencethat the commitment in NWPA to operate a re-pository by 1998 can be met.19 Such changes maybe useful regardless of whether there is any shiftin the organizational location of the waste manage-ment program. The following discussion will brieflyconsider some of the principal types of changes thathave been suggested.

Some observers, particularly some State officials,have questioned DOE’s planning and implemen-tation abilities in nontechnical areas of waste man-agement (e. g., dealing with sociopolitical impacts)that may be as important as the technical areas forsuccessful siting and development of a repository. 20

Though proficient in technical areas, some DOEpersonnel are seen as lacking the nontechnical skillsand sensitivities important for planning for rela-tions between DOE and non-Federal participants .2*Yet NWPA contains many requirements for exten-sive DOE relations with States and the public,While them appears to be growing appreciation atDOE of the importance of nontechnical questionsin implementing a radioactive waste program, nosingle office or manager has been clearly responsi-ble for dealing with them. As a result, even thoughcontractors to DOE have produced many studiesin nontechnical areas, there is no clear mechanismfor transferring the results of their analysis into pol-icy and programs.

22 Implementation of NWPAmight be facilitated if responsibility for dealing withsuch nontechnical aspects of the waste programwere explicitly assigned to a staff group with the

— . . . — —19 For an ~na]ysis of the institutional problems in implementing a

radioactive waste management program, see Jackie L. Burns, ‘‘In-stitutional Issues in the Planning and Implementation of a Programto Dispose of High-Level Radioactive Wastes, Rand Corp., N-1650-DOE, 1981. See also National Academy of Public Administration,op. cit., pp. 40-42.

ZOThis was apparent in many interviews with State offlcids con-

ducted by OTA stafland contractors. This view was also expressed,for example, by the South Carolina Governor’s Task Force on Ad-vanced Nuclear Systems, which concluded that lack of proper atten-tion to, and planning for, socioeconomic and sociopolitical impactshad been a major impediment to implementation of waste manage-ment and disposal systems. ‘‘Review of—’Draft Report of Depart-ment of Energy Task Force for Review of Nuclear Waste Manage-ment, ‘ “ June 1, 1978, p. II-7.

21See pat Choate and John Bowman, ‘‘Radioactive Waste h4an-agement: State Concerns, a report to OTA from the Academy forContemporary Problems, 1981.

22 For a comprehensive &cUssiOn of these and other management

problems, see Burns, op. cit.

expertise needed to deal with them. This may re-quire the addition of staff with the appropriate skillsand experience.23 In response to such concerns, theOffice of Civilian Radioactive Waste Managementhas recently established an outreach division (seefig. 7-2).

Changes may also be needed to strengthenDOE’s ability to plan and coordinate the many ac-tivities that will be involved in developing and de-ploying an operating repository system on sched-ule. As discussed in chapter 5, OTA has concludedthat one of the basic requirements for making acommitment to a firm repository schedule credi-ble is the development of a sound implementationplan, showing precisely how the Federal Govern-ment proposes to meet the schedule. NWPA in-cludes a requirement for development by DOE ofa comprehensive Mission Plan. However, histori-cally the DOE waste program has lacked the strongcentral planning and analysis capacity that wouldbe required to develop an integrated Mission Plan.Instead, it has relied on a relatively small centralstaff to coordinate the activities of field offices andcontractors. 24 That central staff has been dividedalong functional lines (e.g., spent fuel storage andrepository development), with little or no empha-sis placed on analysis of how all the individual func-tions could be integrated into a comprehensivewaste management system.

Passage of NWPA, which mandates both aschedule for repository operation and a wide rangeof technical and nontechnical activities prior tooperation, places an even greater demand on thewaste management organization to ensure thatthose activities are coordinated most effectively ifthe schedule is to be achieved. Unless there is sub-

231 bid., p. 87,Z+fjome have noted that this management structure ~s~ affects

DOE’s ability to deal with nontechnical requirements. For example,the Summary Report of the Second Keystone Conference on PublicParticipation in Radioactive Waste Management Decisionrnakingstated that, “A major barrier to establishing an effective public par-ticipation program at DOE is the lack of overall management capa-bility at headquarters. It is perceived that most of the people at DOEheadquarters are contract officers and not program managers. Con-cern was expressed that no one was paying sufficient attention to theabsence of a strong program management capability at DOE, in com-parison to the disbursement of funds fwerwhelmingly to contractors.‘ ‘Public Participation in Developing National Plans for RadioactiveWaste Management” (Keystone, Colo.: The Keystone Center, (Jc-

tober 1980), p. 15.


Figure 7=2.—Organization Chart of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

—.


—

stantial direct involvement by DOE program staffin the development of the Mission Plan, it may havelittle chance of achieving its potential as a key man-agement tool for coordinating the many activitiesrequired to meet the goals of NWPA. This mayrequire establishment of an adequately staffed andfunded group within the waste management officewith responsibility for integrated systems analysisand mission planning. In response to these con-cerns, the Office of Civilian Radioactive WasteManagement recently established a program inte-gration division.

Implementation of NWPA may also requirestrengthening of the capacity of the DOE centraloffice program staff to manage the field activitiesof the program. Historically, radioactive wastemanagement functions have been handled bygeographically separate organizational units thatoperate different programs and laboratories .25 Be-cause field offices have latitude in program imple-mentation, including relations with States in thecourse of siting activities, coordination is more dif-ficult to maintain. Yet, NWPA’s commitment toa firm schedule for operation of a repository maymake such coordination even more important thanit has been in the past.26

Alternative Means of Financingand Management

In addition to establishing an Office of CivilianRadioactive Waste Management within DOE,NWPA also requires the Secretary of Energy tostudy and report to Congress on alternative ap-proaches to managing the construction and opera-tion of all civilian radioactive waste managementfacilities.27 The study is to consider the feasibility

Zfsee, for example, Roger Kasperson, ‘‘Institutional and Social Un-certainties in the Timely Management of Radioactive Wastes, tes-timony prepared for the California Energy Commission, June 30,1980, pp. 11-16. See also Burns, op. cit.

ZGpresident Kennedy’s commitment to land a man on the Moonby the end of the 1960’s required new organizational modes at theNational Aeronautics and Space Administration. In particular, a muchstronger headquarters team was needed to coordinate the efforts ofseveral research centers that would be involved. See Frank W. Ander-son, Jr., Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 1915-1976 (Washington, D. C.: National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-tration, 1976), p. 31.

Z7T0 conduct this study the Secretary of Energy appointed an advi-sory group formally titled the Advisory Panel on Alternative Meansof Financing and Managing Radioactive Waste Facilities. The firstmeeting was held in January 1984, and the report of the panel wasdelivered to the Secretary at the end of 1984.

of establishing an independent, single-purposewaste management organization, including a pri-vate corporation.

OTA’s analysis of the history of the Federalradioactive waste management program concludesthat the credibility of NWPA’s commitment to thedevelopment of a complex technological system ona firm schedule could be enhanced by the estab-lishment of an independent waste managementagency with more funding and management flexi-bility than is usual with a typical Federal program.This section will discuss some of the arguments forcreating an independent organization and will focuson the problem of providing adequate oversight andcontrol over such an organization.

At present, DOE is responsible for numerouspolicy areas in nuclear energy besides radioactivewaste management and for a host of other energy-related programs. Units in DOE responsible forwaste management have in the past had to com-pete with other units for funding and staff. Giventhe long time span during which development ofthe waste management system will take place, wastemanagement could receive inadequate attention rel-ative to other functions, both from outside policy-makers and from DOE itself, if it continued to betreated simply as one program among the manyfor which DOE is responsible, Moreover, what wasseen by the Interagency Review Group (IRG) asa strength of DOE—its ability to maintain an ap-propriate perspective on waste management in rela-tion to energy production-may, in some senses,be a liability.28 Some groups fear that DOE’s mis-sion as a promoter of energy production could con-flict with the safe planning and development of aradioactive waste management system. A separateradioactive waste management authority could beinsulated from promotion of nuclear power in a waythat DOE would find difficult to match.

Creation of a new organization with a narrow,mission-oriented focus on radioactive waste man-agement would greatly reduce the chance that or-ganizational resources would be diverted to other,competing missions. The attention of outside pol-icymakers to waste management issues might beincreased through the increased visibility such an

z8RePort t. the President by the lnt, ~ragency Rev’iew Group on Nu-

clear Waste Management, TID-29442, March 1979, p. 117.


organization would give to radioactive waste man-agement and by the reduction of internal organiza-tional layers that now exist at DOE. Finally, to out-side parties, change can signal a fresh start and abreak with existing practice.

Establishing a separate organization could leaveopen later options for organizational change-e. g.,the transfer of responsibility for operating storageor disposal facilities to the private sector—to a great-er extent than would occur if responsibility for theFederal waste management program remained witha program unit within DOE. If a corporation werelater created to manage the entire nuclear fuel cy-cle, as proposed by some, an independent agencymight more easily merge with such a corporationthan could a program within DOE. Similarly, cre-ation of an independent radioactive waste manage-ment agency may be most compatible with a laterdecision to create a broader Federal hazardouswaste management authority dealing with both ra-dioactive and nonradioactive toxic wastes in gen-eral. 29

There are many possible models for a separateradioactive waste management authority, includinga federally chartered public corporation, such asthe Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA); an inde-pendent authority with loose ties to DOE, such asthe Bonneville Power Administration; or a newagency in the executive branch. Some analyses ofthe nature of radioactive waste management re-sponsibilities have suggested that a corporate struc-ture may be most desirable for a waste manage-ment organization .30 For example, corporatestructure is most consistent with the self-financingnature of a program funded entirely through userfees, and with the high degree of discretion overannual expenditures from a trust or revolving fundneeded to give confidence that a long-term schedulecan be met. (Since the organization would be self-financed through the waste management fee, anyadditional costs involved in establishing and oper-

——-.——~gEfforts t. site faci] ities for treatment and disposal of toxic wastesencounter many of the same difhculties associated with siting radio-active waste management facilities, and some of the technical prob-lems of providing isolation with an acceptable level of confidence aresimilar. Thus, it could be argued that there would be advantages toa single hazardous waste management agency. Along these lines, theU.S. Geological Sutwey has created a single O!%ce of Hazardous WasteHydrology that deals with both radioactive and nonradioactive wasteissues.

JOSee Muon Willrich and Richard Lester, Radioactive Waste: M~-a.gement and Regulation (New York: The Free Press, 1977).

ating a new, single-purpose agency would be borneby the users of nuclear power rather than by theFederal taxpayer.) A definitive conclusion concern-ing the most suitable organizational form would re-quire a more extensive investigation of the advan-tages and disadvantages of the various possiblemodels than OTA was able to perform,31

A major question to be addressed in the organiza-tional study of alternative structures for the leadwaste management agency is the degree of inde-pendence the agency would be granted in the per-formance of assigned responsibilities, especially indiscretion over annual expenditures. Governmentcorporations, for example, normally have more in-dependence than Federal agencies.32

Greater independence makes organizations moreresistant to political fluctuations and enables greaterflexibility in hiring and firing and in rewardinggood performance and penalizing nonperformance.If the organization has control over use of itsrevenues, uncertainties of the annual appropriationsprocess can be avoided.33

On the other hand, greater independence couldprove detrimental if oversight were insufficient toallow adequate responsiveness to interests and con-cerns of groups outside the organization. In someinstances, insulation from outside political influencehas led managers of government corporations tooveremphasize financial criteria, an action thatcould be fatal to the credibility of a radioactive wastemanagement organization. 34 Thus, a particularly.

31A preliminaV an~ysis Of ot-gartization~ issues is found in An Or-ganizational Analysis of a Nuclear Waste Management System byRandall F. Smith, report prepared for the Oflice of Technology Assess-ment by Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers, BHARC-311 /80/010, March 1980. See also National Academy of Public Adminis-tration, op. cit., pp. 40-42; and Jackie L. Braitman, Nuclear WasteDisposal: Can Government Cope? (Santa Monica, Ca.: The RandGraduate Institute, December 1983).

JzNation~ Academy of Public Administration, ‘‘Report on Gov-

ernment Corporations, vol. 1, August 1981; see also Harold Seid-man, Politics, Position, and Power, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1980), pp. 265-276.

33A ~umey of utilities’ attitudes about the Federal waste manage -

ment program showed a desire that funding for radioactive waste man-agement be independent of problems in the Federal budget and DOEbudget cycles. See “Developing a Federal Policy on Spent NuclearFuel, ” Task 2 Draft Report, prepared for DOE, Assistant Secretaryfor Policy and Evaluation, Office of Coal and Electrical Systems Pol-icy, by Resource Planning Associates, Inc., and International EnergyAssociates Ltd., June 1978.

34 Annmarie Hauck w~sh, The public Business: The politics and

Practices of Government Corporations (Cambridge, Mass.: MITPress, 1978), p. 6.

.

164 ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Leve Radioactive Waste

important question in establishing a more inde-pendent waste management authority will be howto ensure a satisfactory degree of congressionaloversight and public accountability.

Because of concerns about the responsiveness ofpast Federal waste management efforts, there maybe considerable reluctance to establish a lead orga-nization with any greater independence than DOEfor fear that it might be less responsive to the con-cerns of Congress, the administration, and the pub-lic. Achieving an acceptable balance between in-dependence and accountability will therefore be oneof the central challenges in designing an independ-ent waste management authority. The followingdiscussion considers possible means of achievingsuch a balance through the general oversight struc-ture for the waste management agency and throughfiscal control mechanisms.

Oversight Structure

The oversight structure of an independent wastemanagement agency could be similar to that of apublic utility, since the agency would have a mo-nopoly on disposal of commercial waste and utili-ties would be required to use its services. Supervi-sion of the management of the agency could beexercised by a board of directors, appointed by theSecretary of Energy, Congress, or the President,with possible congressional confirmation of appoint-ments. Such a board could include members fromCongress, DOE, and other Federal bodies, as wellas from non-Federal groups such as State and localgovernments, utilities, public service commissions,and environmental organizations. Alternatively,such non-Federal groups could be representedthrough a public advisory commission establishedas part of an oversight structure .35

35The Ju]y I$IT8 Radioactive Waste Management Discussion Groupsponsored by the Keystone Center for Continuing Education recom-mended the creation of a Public Advisory Committee, with membersfrom citizens’ groups, private industry, universities, local and Stategovernments, and Congress, to ensure “effective two-way commu-nication between the federal government and concerned segments ofthe public, thereby improving the federal program and developinga broader understanding of that program outside of the federal gov-ernment. ” Letter to Frank Press andJohn M. Deutch, Sept. 9, 1978,p. 8.

Fiscal Control

Whatever formal oversight structure is chosen,control of the finances of the waste managementagency will be of particular concern. There are twodistinct aspects of fiscal control that should be ad-dressed in an analysis of institutional alternatives:control over the level of the mandatory waste man-agement fee established by NWPA, and controlover the agency’s expenditures from the NuclearWaste Fund.

CONTROL OF REVISIONS OF THE FEE

The discussion of program funding indicated theimportance of providing some mechanism for ad-justing the waste management fee to cover unan-ticipated costs. Because of the importance of thefee adjustment mechanism to the success of thewaste management program, and the uncertaintycreated by the Supreme Court decision concern-ing the one-House veto, which raised questionsabout the provisions in NWPA for congressionalcontrol of revisions of the fee, it would be usefulfor any congressional deliberations on alternativeinstitutional arrangements to consider alternativefee adjustment mechanisms.

Two possibilities are: 1,) complete delegation ofauthority to revise the fee to the head of the wastemanagement agency, with no provisions for con-gressional review; and 2) revision of the fee onlythrough amendment of the l-mill/kWh level estab-lished by the Act. In either case, it may be diffi-cult to strike a balance between the oversight neededto ensure efficient use of the revenues from the feeand the assurance that revenues will be sufficientto cover all of the costs of the program needed toprovide confidence that the commitments in NWPAcan be met.

If the head of the waste management agency weregiven the authority to adjust the fee, and Congress’only means of vetoing such an adjustment werethrough specific legislation, direct congressionalcontrol would be difficult--both because of the in-herent complexity of the legislative process and be-cause such legislation would have to be signed bythe President, who might be inclined to support theaction of the head of an executive branch agency.

Ch. 7—Federal Institutional issues 165

Adjustment of the fee in this case might be too easy,thereby weakening the incentives for efficiency andgood management.

If there were no specific provision dealing withadjustment of the fee, then the l-mill/kWh fee couldonly be changed by amendment of NWPA itself.In this case, adjustment of the fee would be quitedifficult, in part because of the general difficultyof the legislative process and in part because of re-luctance to amend the Act. As noted earlier, if itis too difficult to adjust the fee to cover unexpectedcost increases, the result may simply be that thescope of the waste management program is reducedto match the available revenues. This would even-tually lead to a situation in which progress in re-pository development becomes limited by the avail-ability of resources, which would not be fullycompatible with NWPA’s firm commitment to aschedule for repository operation.

One possible adjustment mechanism that hasbeen suggested is automatic adjustment of the feeaccording to an index of inflation (see table 7-2).36

Another possibility for revising the fee is suggestedby the fact that an independent waste management

JGH. R, 4690, introduced in the second session of the 98th congress,would amend the fee adjustment provisions of NWPA to require auto-matic correction of the fee to keep up with inflation, following NRCapproval of a construction authorization for the first repository. Thisapproach is analyzed by the Congressional Budget Office in NuclearWaste Disposal: Achieving Adequate Financing.

agency would, in effect, be a public utility with amandatory fee on its users. Thus, it might be pos-sible to have an independent body, analogous tothe Postal Rate Commission, review and perhapseven approve proposed fee revisions.

If more direct congressional control were desired,the mechanism of a joint resolution, as providedin NWPA for dealing with a State’s objection toa repository site (see ch. 8), might be used. If a jointresolution were required to veto a proposed fee revi-sion, the degree of congressional control overchanges of the fee would be limited by the abilityof the President to veto the resolution.37 On theother hand, it would reduce the likelihood thatneeded fee increases would be deferred simply be-cause of congressional inaction. If enactment of ajoint resolution were required to approve a pro-posed fee revision, the degree of congressional con-trol would be substantially higher, although it mightincrease the chance that needed revisions would bedeferred .38

STS+ 1650, introduced in the first session of the 98th Congress fOl-Iowing the Supreme Court’s decision on the one-House veto, wouldprovide for congressional veto of agency actions through passage ofa joint resolution, which would have to be signed by the President.

J8H. R. 4690 would alSO allow the Secretary to propose fee changesin addition to the automatic adjustments for inflation, but those changesmust be approved by Congress through passage of a joint resolution.

Table 7-2.—Nuclear Waste Fund Projections Under the DOE Reference Program Schedule (in billions of 1983 dollars)

High Medium Low Nonuclear nuclear nuclear nucleargrowth growth growth growth

Fixed fee of 1 mill per kilowatt-houcTotal program costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.0 20.1 20.3 15.3Totai fee collections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... , . . . . . 16.2 15.4 14.2 10.7Net interestb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 1.3 -2.4 -1.2Final fund balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -0.6 -3.4 -8.5 -5.8Optimal fee for zero final balance (in mills per kilowatt-hour) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.02 1.10 1.19 1.22Fee increased by annual inflatlon ratec:Total program costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.0 20.1 20.3 15.3Total fee collections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.8 34.2 34.3 17.7Net interestb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.1 26.1 31.0 10.5Final fund balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.9 40.2 45.0 12.9Optimal fee for zero final balance (in miils per kiiowatt-hour) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.72NOTES: The long-term inflation and real Interest rate assumptlone are 4.3 percent and 3.5 percent, reapectlvely.a Total fee Collecting include the one-time payments made for spent fuel generated before April 7, 1983, estimated at $2.3 billion (in nominal dollars).b Net intere9t includes earnings on invested fund revenues and payments on borrowed funds.C Thi9 fee de9ign would incre~e the current fee by the annual percent change in the gross national product price deflator, beginning in 19S4. The Optimal fee under

this schedule refers to the rate the fee should have been set at in 19S3 in order to leave a final fund balance of zero.

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office, Nuclear Weate Disposal: Achieving Adequate Financing, August 1984.


CONTROL OF EXPENDITURES FROMTHE NUCLEAR WASTE FUND

Assurance of steady progress in development ofa waste management system requires assurance thatadequate funds will be available as needed. Thisin turn requires not only assurance of sufficientrevenues but also assurance that the revenues willbe made available to the waste management agencyas needed to carry out the program. In this regard,NWPA makes expenditures from the NuclearWaste Fund subject to annual appropriations. Thisprovides a high degree of congressional control overprogram financing, which may be seen as particu-larly desirable if the head of the waste managementagency is given power to revise the fee. On the otherhand, it also raises questions about whether suffi-cient funds will be available each year to carry outa long-term repository development program onschedule. For example, there may be pressures inthe appropriations process to defer large capital ex-penditures in years in which the Federal budget isparticularly tight. This may be inconsistent withthe assurance of predictable annual funding neededto ensure that a firm, long-term schedule can bemet. Thus, there appears to be an inherent con-flict between a stable commitment to a fixedschedule for a complex technical project and a highdegree of external budgetary control.

There is a wide range of alternatives for congres-sional control over the finances of a Federal entity.At one end of the spectrum in terms of independ-ence is TVA, which has direct control over the useof the funds generated by the sale of electricity, al-though its budget is shown as part of the Federalbudget. Congressional influence is exercisedthrough annual oversight of TVA activities, directcontrol of its debt ceiling, and appointment andconfirmation of its board of directors.

An alternative that lies between the financial in-dependence of TVA and annual appropriationscontrol would be to provide for multiyear appro-priations, which might be justified in view of thelong-term nature of the repository developmentprogram and the need for adequate and predicta-ble funds over an extended period of time. NWPAtakes a step in this direction by providing that thebudget for the Nuclear Waste Fund is to be sub-mitted, and the appropriations from the fund areto be authorized, on a triennial basis.

Role of the Mission Plan in Agency Oversight

To exercise fiscal control over the waste man-agement program, the responsible oversight author-ities need justification of proposed revenues gen-erated by the fee and expenditures from the fund.The Mission Plan required by NWPA might beparticularly well suited for this purpose, if it con-tained a detailed, long-term budget for the expend-itures and revenues required to implement the Plan.In fact, the Mission Plan could serve as the princi-pal mechanism for balancing the need for adequatecongressional oversight with the need for increasedflexibility of operation and funding.

DOE analysis shows that the cost of waste dis-posal will mainly be determined by the scope of therepository R&D program, the timing of construc-tion and operation of full-scale disposal facilities,and the design of the repository. Therefore, to en-sure that the fee to be charged to utilities to financethe waste management program covers all of thecosts required to meet the legislated objectives, thefee must be based on a clearly defined plan for de-veloping and operating a repository system. TheMission Plan could provide such a basis for the fee,and for appropriations from the Nuclear WasteFund.

To be most useful as a basis for fiscal control,the Mission Plan would have to be revised period-ically to take into account the fiscal effects of infla-tion, unanticipated difficulties, program changesrequired by new information, or other develop-ments. For example, congressional considerationof a proposed fee revision might be facilitated if theproposal were accompanied by a revised versionof the Mission Plan that clearly justifies the changein the fee in terms of such factors. Congressionalreview of a budget for multiyear authorizations orappropriations could similarly benefit from provi-sion of a revised Mission Plan that gives a detailedanalytical basis for the budget. The amount of timerequired for congressional review of fiscal matterscould be reduced if proposed fee revisions were sub-mitted at the same time as multiyear budgets, andif proposed revenues and expenditures were justi-fied by a single revised Misision Plan document.

NWPA does not require revisions of the MissionPlan after it has been submitted to Congress, nordoes it explicitly link the Mission Plan to the deter-

Ch 7—Federal Institutional Issues ● 167

mination of revisions of the fee or to the triennialbudget authorization and annual appropriationsprocess. However, NWPA does require that theMission Plan contain an estimate of the annual ex-penditures needed to carry out its objectives, andNWPA does not appear to preclude DOE from re-vising the Plan as necessary for use as a justifica-tion for fee changes and appropriations from thefund.

Use of the Mission Plan as a basis for oversightand accountability of an independent waste man-agement agency could be strengthened by creationof a process for congressional approval of the Mis-sion Plan. OTA’s analysis of the history of Fed-eral waste management efforts suggests that it maybe unlikely that broad agreement can be reachedon establishing an independent waste managementagency unless there is explicit agreement about whatthe agency is going to do and how it is going todo it. Congressional approval of a Mission Plan forimplementing the goals enacted in NWPA wouldestablish such an agreement. Thus, the functionof the waste management agency would not be todevelop broad waste management policy, but ratherto carry out a specific program to implement spe-cific goals, a program Congress has formally ap-proved. Once approved, the Mission Plan couldserve as the main yardstick by which Congress—and a board of directors or any other body, includ-ing the public—could oversee the activities andexpenditures of the waste management agency andmeasure Its progress.

A process of extensive public and technical re-view of the draft Mission Plan prior to congressionalapproval could help develop broad national under-standing and agreement on waste management pol-icy. This agreement, combined with explicit con-gressional approval, could enhance the credibilityand stability of the program .39

sgThe State planning Council recommended that ‘‘nationzd plan-ning for radioactive waste management should avoid abrupt changesin direction to prevent further deterioration of program credibility andloss of time. To that end, it also recommended a broad and exten-sive national planning process involving all levels of government andthe general public. Letter from Richard W. Riley, Chairman, StatePlanning Council, to President Carter, Jan. 13, 1981, The processof review of the Mission Plan could also serve as a principal vehiclefor public information efforts and for public involvement in the wastemanagement program. See discussion of public involvement in ch. 8.

There are many possible options for providingsome form of congressional approval of the Mis-sion Plan. These range from direct approvalthrough an explicit joint resolution procedure, suchas that included in the Synfuels Act for congres-sional approval of a national synfuels strategy, toindirect approval through approval of authoriza-tions, appropriations, or fee revisions explicitlybased on the Mission Plan.

In developing procedures for congressional ap-proval of the Mission Plan as part of the oversightmechanism, several considerations should be takeninto account. First, the elements of the Mission Plansubject to congressional review and approval shouldnot be too detailed. For example, it may be appro-priate for Congress to approve a long-term scheduleof activities and associated expenditures and reve-nues derived from a more detailed Plan, rather thanto approve such a Plan in its entirety.

Second, the approval process should allow roomfor revision of the Mission Plan as new informationand developments arise. Provision could be made,for example, for the agency to revise and resubmitthe Mission Plan for approval as needed.

Third, the approval process must give Congresssufficient ongoing control over the actions and ex-penditures of the management agency to warrantthe relaxation of the normal annual budgetary con-trol. One approach would be to require revisionand reapproval of the Mission Plan at regular in-tervals, such as every 4 or 6 years. Between reap-provals, the waste management agency could beauthorized to make expenditures from the NuclearWaste Fund, as provided for in the multiyear budg-et contained in the Mission Plan, without a require-ment for annual appropriations or authorizations.While the agency would also have the power to pro-pose changes to the Mission Plan and budget morefrequently, it might be anticipated that revisionsof the Plan and fee would normally take place onlyat these regular intervals.

Fourth, approval of the initial Mission Plan andrevisions to it should be sufficiently difficult thatthe program and its milestones, once approved, willbe taken very seriously, and arbitrary changes willbe effectively precluded. To avoid the possibilitythat the waste management program would cometo a halt if the Mission Plan and its multiyear budg-


et were not approved, the program could remain under this approach, if congressional approval ofsubject to the annual appropriations process unless a Mission Plan could be obtained, could give theand until such approval had been granted. The waste management agency a strong incentive toadded fiscal independence that would be provided produce a highly defensible, widely supported Plan.

FEDERAL INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

Currently, six major Federal agencies have re-sponsibility for various aspects of the radioactivewaste management effort (table 7-3). For any wastemanagement program to succeed and progress ac-cording to schedule, each agency must do its jobwell and on time. Closely coordinated schedules willbe required for all involved agencies; workingagreements among them will have to be developed;and each agency will have to devote sufficient re-sources, both money and manpower, to its wastemanagement responsibilities. The challenge of co-ordination will be more difficult because waste man-

Table 7-3.—Principal Executive Agencies With WasteManagement Responsibilities

Agency/Responsibility

Department of Energy (DOE). -Responsible for developingradioactive waste isolation technologies and for design-ing, constructing, and operating final isolation facilitiesfor high-level and TRU wastes and spent fuel generatedin national defense and commercial nuclear programs.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).—Responsible fordeveloping generally applicable standards for radioactivematerials. EPA is now developing such standards for geo-logic repositories for radioactive waste.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC}—Responsible for de-veloping and implementing regulations to ensure publichealth and safety for storage and final isolation of high-level radioactive wastes, low-level wastes, and radioac-tive wastes created in the mining of uranium ore. NRC isnow developing regulations for mined geologic reposito-ries that will implement the standards developed by EPA.

Department of Transportation (DOT). -Responsible for de-veloping, issuing, and enforcing safety standards govern-ing certain packaging and shipping containers forradioactive materials, and for the labeling, classification,and marking of all waste packages.

Department of the interior (DOI):U.S. Geological Survey(l/S(3S~-Conducts geologic inves-

tigations in suppori of DOE’s waste disposal programs,collaborates with DOE on earth sciences technical ac-tivities, and will act as consultant to NRC when NRCconsiders DOE applications for disposal facilities.

Bureau of Land Management (BLM~–Serves as custodianof certain Federal landholdings and reviews any pro-Dosals to r)lace waste disoosal facilities on such lands.


agement activities represent only a small part of theresponsibilities of each agency.

Recognizing the need for cooperation by manyFederal agencies to meet mandatory schedulesfor developing repositories, NWPA requires theSecretary of Energy to prepare “Project DecisionSchedules” for each repository specified in the Act.These schedules are to contain deadlines for all Fed-eral agencies that must take action to enable eachrepository to be developed on time. OTA believesthat it would be very useful for the Mission Planto incorporate the Project Decision Schedules foreach repository, so that it would represent an im-plementation plan for the entire Federal Govern-ment, rather than just for DOE. If the initial Mis-sion Plan is submitted before those schedules havebeen completed, it could be revised as appropriateto include them when they are available.

Development of an integrated radioactive wastemanagement Mission Plan that includes both thetechnical and institutional steps required for eachagency to meet the goals of legislation, as suggestedhere, would be an important first step toward en-suring interagency coordination .40 Even after a Planis developed, there will be a need for continuedoversight to monitor progress and resolve any dis-putes among the agencies as the Plan is imple-mented. In addition, action must be taken to en-sure that each agency has the manpower andfinancial resources it will need to fulfill its rolein the Federal waste management program. WhileNWPA provides an assured source of funds forDOE through the waste management fee, the otheragencies, which must also act on time if the sched-

40The State p]anning Council concluded that a national plan ‘‘isvital to improve coordination among :he Federal agencies . . .‘ StatePlanning Council on Radioactive W.~ste Management, Recommen-dations on National Radioactive Waste Management Policies: Re-port to the President, August 1981, p. 28.


ules in the Act are to be met, may be dependenton annual appropriations from general revenues forthe funds they will need to do so.

The overall responsibility for developing an in-teragency plan and overseeing its implementationcould be assumed by one of the following groups:

● the lead waste management agency;● the Executive Office of the President; or● a high-level council.

OPTION 1:The lead waste management agency.

As the lead agency for radioactive waste man-agement, DOE has been responsible for coordinat-ing all Federal nonregulatory aspects of waste man-agement and for working out relationships withregulatory agencies. Most waste management leg-islation considered by Congress has left DOE withinteragency coordination responsibilities. IRG alsochose DOE to coordinate, plan, and implement thenonregulatory aspects of radioactive waste manage-ment. The strongest arguments of IRG in favor ofDOE related to the drawbacks of change: a majorshift of responsibilities to a different organizationcould disrupt ongoing programs, cause delay, andentail significant financial costs. Such a changecould also exacerbate perceptions that Federal ra-dioactive waste management policy lacks stability.

While DOE can be seen as the logical candidatefor overseeing coordination of waste managementactivities by other agencies, there are some limita-tions to such an approach. First, the history of theFederal waste program gives some grounds fordoubt that sufficient interagency coordination willbe achieved in the future if responsibility for coor-dination is left solely to DOE. Although DOE wasgiven lead agency responsibility and an interagencycoordinating committee was established under theCarter administration, no coordinated interagencyschedule was developed .4’ The lack of adequatemeans to set priorities for agencies based on anoverall Federal schedule has resulted in such situ-ations as the adoption by the Nuclear Regulatory

41 IRG recowized that ‘‘a summary of the implementing actionsneeded to be taken by involved agencies would have been helpful,and stated that such a summary ‘‘is being prepared for submissionto the President and will be published subsequently. ” This was neverdone. Interagency Review Group, op. cit., p. 119.

Commission (NRC) of regulations for repositoriesin the absence of EPA standards, which the regu-lations are intended to implement. Similarly, DOEhas had to search for prospective repository sitesfar in advance of determination of the performancestandards such sites would have to meet.

The difficulty results in part because some of thekey actions in developing waste repositories involveregulatory agencies. While DOE was given respon-sibility for coordinating all Federal nonregulatoryaspects of waste management, its powers over reg-ulatory matters were limited to working out effec-tive relationships with regulatory bodies .42 GivingDOE full responsibility for coordinating all Fed-eral agency activities might create a real or per-ceived imbalance between the regulated agency(DOE) and the regulator (NRC), particularly ifDOE has the power to make the final decision onthe deadlines for actions of other agencies, includingNRC. To build trust in the Federal Government’swaste management program, it may be wise toavoid any actions that could create even the appear-ance of compromising the integrity of NRC in thisarea.

This might become particularly important if itwere decided to fund the radioactive waste man-agement activities of those agencies out of the Nu-clear Waste Fund, rather than from general reve-nues. Since the fund is not explicitly limited to DOEactivities, this may be possible, and it can be arguedthat this would help ensure steady progress in thewaste program. In the current climate of cutbacksin Federal expenditures and manpower levels, theremay be budget and staff limitations on the wastemanagement activities of EPA and NRC that couldadversely affect their ability to meet schedules. Forexample, some difficulties can be expected in thefirst attempt to prove in an NRC licensing proceed-ing that a repository will perform according to reg-ulatory standards. Delays during that licensing pro-ceeding might be reduced or avoided by an NRCresearch effort designed to identify and resolve suchdifficulties before the licensing process begins. Suchan effort may be easier to undertake if the neces-sary funds are provided directly from revenues gen-erated by a mandatory waste management fee than

42’ ‘Fact Sheet: The President’s Program on Radioactive Waste Man-agement, ” Office of the White House Press Secretary, Feb. 12, 1980,p. 9.


if they must come from NRC’s regular annual ap-propriations from general revenues.

It can be argued that the incremental increasein the waste management fee that would be re-quired to cover all regulatory activities would beso small that it would not have any impact on theeconomic competitiveness of nuclear power, andthat the cost could be more than offset in the longrun if regulatory delays and problems could therebybe minimized. This approach could be facilitatedif an integrated Mission Plan also contained long-term cost estimates for the activities of other in-volved Federal agencies as well as for DOE. How-ever, if DOE had final authority over which costscould be covered by the Nuclear Waste Fund, sub-stantial questions might be raised about the inde-pendence of the other agencies funded in thatmanner.

On the other hand, if the activities of other agen-cies continue to be funded out of general revenues,it may be impossible for DOE to be effective in en-suring that they have adequate resources to meettheir milestones in the Mission Plan. In either case,then, there are questions about whether DOE canplay a useful role in dealing with the funding aspectsof interagency coordination.

Although the Secretary of Energy is given leadresponsibility for preparing the Project DecisionSchedules, this task is to be done “in cooperationwith all affected agencies. However, the Act doesnot specify how this cooperation is to be accom-plished. In view of the possible limitations of oneagency’s developing an effective plan for actionsrequired of other agencies, particularly of regula-tory agencies, consideration of one of the follow-ing options may be useful in developing the inter-agency Project Decision Schedules, integratingthem into the Mission Plan, seeing that they areproperly followed, and ensuring that funds areavailable as needed.

OPTION 2:Executive Office of the President.

This option would give an existing, high-levelorganization in the Executive Office of the Presi-dent responsibility for interagency coordination.For example, the Office of Science and Technol-ogy Policy (OSTP) was heavily involved in the ac-

tivities of IRG, and some have suggested that theDirector of OSTP (the Presidential Science Adviser)be designated as the senior policymaker and over-all coordinator of Federal activities on radioactivewastes.43 Such an agency may be free of the credi-bility problems that have afflicted DOE and itspredecessors simply became it is a different orga-nization. Its location in the Executive Office of thePresident may enhance its chances of achievingcoordination among the various agencies involvedin waste management and of ensuring that each in-volved Federal agency has the resources it needsfor its waste management activities.44 If it weredecided to fund the activities of the other agenciesout of the Nuclear Waste Fund, this approach tointeragency coordination could provide a more ef-fective way to allow that to be done without rais-ing questions about the in.dependence of the regu-lators from the regulated agency, DOE.

On the other hand, there are general disadvan-tages to giving heavy new responsibilities to anagency in the Executive Office of the President.Agencies in the Executive Office of the Presidenttend to have small staffs, mind, as a result, their ex-isting missions could suffer if waste managementresponsibilities were added. Conversely, existingmissions could have such claims on agency loyaltiesand resources that radioactive waste managementcould be slighted.

43 Keystone Center for Continuing Education, July 1978 Radioac-tive Waste Management Discussion Group, letter to Frank Press andJohn M. Deutch, Sept. 9, 1978.

44A task force established by the State P1anning Counci] to reviewa draft of a national plan for radioac :ive waste management concludedthat direct involvement of the Executive Office of the President wasneeded in preparing the plan and in an interagency management com-mittee. It also emphasized the importance of ‘active involvement bythe Office of Management and Budget to ensure integrated consider-ation of the programs and budgets for all waste management activi-ties and to generate greater agreerr ent in the executive branch con-cerning muhiyear funding levels pre:,ented in the draft plan. “Reportfor the State Planning Council: An Independent Task Force Reviewof the Second Working Draft of the l~ational Plan, undated, includedas an appendix to a letter from Richard Riley, Chairman, State Plan-ning Council, to President Carter, J an. 13, 1981. National Academyof Public Administration, op. cit., also recommends designation of‘‘a top echelon position in the Execu :ive OffIce of the President . . . toserve in the role of an honest brokt r for the radioactive waste man-agement program’ (p. 4).


OPTION 3:A high-level council.48

Several sources have proposedsome type of council structure to

the creation ofhandle various

aspects of waste management, in particular inter-agency coordination and planning.46 While suchan approach probably would not be useful forhandling operational responsibilities in the wasteprogram, a high-level council might be useful fora more limited purpose such as overseeing the de-velopment of an integrated Government-wide Mis-sion Plan that includes the associated Project Deci-sion Schedules and long-term budgets for otheragencies. (These budgets would in turn serve as abasis for financing their activities through the Nu-clear Waste Fund, if that were desired. ) In this ap-proach, the operational responsibility for prepar-ing the detailed contents of the Mission Plan couldbe left to the appropriate agencies, while the councilcould guide the development of the outline, overseethe work of the agencies as they prepare its sub-stance, and review and perhaps approve the finalproduct for submission to Congress.

Because of the wide range of interests affectedby Federal radioactive waste management activi-ties, the credibility of such a council might be en-hanced if its membership included representativesfrom non-Federal groups such as State and localgovernments, utilities, public service commissions,and environmental groups .47 This is commonly

‘5 The term ‘ ‘council’ will be used to refer to any organizationalstructure involving representatives from various agencies or othergroups. Other terms that are frequently used include: committee, com-mission, working group, task group, etc.

4bThe July 1978 Keystone Radioactive Waste Management Dis-cussion Group recommended that the Interagency Review Group becontinued to facilitate interagency coordination. A bill introduced bySenators Percy and Glenn during the 96th Congress (S.742) wouldhave established an interagency committee with duties involving coor-dination among agencies with waste management responsibilities andpreparation of annual Nuclear Waste Management Plans. The StatePlanning Council Task Force on the national plan recommended thatthe development of a national plan for radioactive waste managementbe ‘ ‘aggressively directed by a high-level interagency committee thatmeets on a frequent basis. This was seen as ‘‘necessary to extractand enforce real commitments from the agencies on improved coordi-nation, . essential to correcting a key constitutional weakness ofthe FederaJ program, and not incompatible with maintaining thenecessary degree of independence for regulatory responsibilities, StatePlanning Council on Radioactive Waste Management, op. cit., p. 4,

47A Gener~ Accounting Office report that examined the Federalorganizational structure for waste management recommended legis-lation establishing a Federal and State committee to be responsiblefor developing a national waste management plan. In support of this

done in Presidential or national commissions, suchas the Advisory Commission on IntergovernmentalRelations or the Water Resources Council, that areappointed to investigate an area of broad nationalinterest.

For such a council to play an effective role inoverseeing the waste management planning activ-ities of DOE and the other involved agencies, itwould probably need its own staff, focusing solelyon radioactive waste management. Its effectivenessmight be increased further if it were established for-mally by Executive order. To avoid creation of apermanent governmental entity, a sunset provisioncould require dissolution of the council once aGovernment-wide Mission Plan had been com-pleted. A determination could, however, be madeat that time if the council should be continued insome form to oversee the Federal Government’simplementation of the program and to ensure thateach agency would have both the resources and theincentives to meet its own particular deadlines. (Thelatter objective might be facilitated if the Office ofManagement and Budget were included as a mem-ber of the council.)

Chairmanship by someone within the ExecutiveOffice of the President (e. g., the Vice-President orthe Director of OSTP) could both signal a high lev- ,el of Presidential interest in the resolution of theradioactive waste problem and help preserve thebalance between the implementing and regulatoryagencies. History suggests that such a council canbe an effective focal point for identifying and anal-yzing on a coordinated Government-wide basis,the principal options facing the Nation in a partic-

recommendation, the report stated, ‘ ‘We believe it is \ery unlikelythat making DOE the responsible lead agency to plan and coordinatethe program will establish public confidence and trust. A more di-verse organizational concept made up of Federal and non-Federal rep-resentatives should develop the policy and plan, while DOE main-tains responsibility for implementation. Only through (his broaderinvolvement can there be any chance that the pub] ic can bc con~’incedthat an acceptably safe disposal method exists. General AccountingOffice, ‘ ‘The Nation’s Nuclear Waste—Proposals for Organizationand Siting, EMD-79-77, June 21, 1979, p. 12. Along these lines,the National Governors’ Association (NGA) Subcommittee on Nu-clear Energy once suggested the creation of a National Commissionon Nuclear Waste Management, to include members from State andlocal governments. Statement of GovernorJames B. Edwards, Chair-man of the NGA subcommittee, before the House Comm ittce onScience and Technology, Subcommittee on Fossil and Nuclear EnergyResearch Development and Demonstration, June 20, 1978.

.


ular area of interest48—precisely the task that mustbe accomplished in the development of the radio-active waste Mission Plan. The creation of such a

4BSee the histo~ of the Space Task Group, established by Presi-dent Nixon under the chairmanship of the Vice President. CivilianSpace Poficy and Applications (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress,Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-STI-1 77, June 1982), pp. 96-98. This group conducted the first interagency planning effort withrespect to the civilian space program. It involved participation fromthe general public as well as Federal agency representatives.

council could be seen as a clear signal to the pub-lic that the Federal Government intends to get itsown house in order so as to implement NWPA. Ifsuch a council were charged with overseeing thedevelopment of integrated policies and implemen-tation plans for all radioactive wastes, not just com-mercial high-level waste, it could also help allay con-cerns of those who fear that legislation dealing onlywith commercial high-level waste could lead to de-ferral of action in other areas of waste management.

Chapter 8

Addressing State andPublic Concerns

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ””””””~”” ““00 ”””.”

S t a t e C o n c e r n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . .0

Waste Management Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “.”.”.”Federal Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .’””.,”.”-”.”.”

State Involvement in Waste Management Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .State Role in Policy Development and Program Oversight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .State Role in Facility Siting Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Prevention and Mitigation of Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............~~ ....*Addressing State Concerns About Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Impact Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ ., . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . ., ..”....”

Equity in Siting Waste Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~....”.”.”~. .“”

175

175176176177

177177178

184184186

188

190


8-1. NWPA Decisions, Deadlines, Opportunities to Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Chapter 8

Addressing State and Public Concerns

INTRODUCTION

History suggests that concerns about the safetyand equity of Federal waste management activitieson the part of States, Indian tribes, localities, andthe general public could become a source of increas-ingly effective opposition to implementation of awaste management program unless specific stepsare taken to deal with these concerns. Efforts to pro-ceed without dealing with them may simply pro-voke greater resistance, confrontations, and fail-ure to achieve program objectives on schedule. Onthe other hand, measures that adequately address

these concerns in the waste management programare likely to broaden support for it, reduce opposi-tion during implementation, and remove groundsfor complaint.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA)includes many provisions designed to deal with theconcerns of the States, Indian tribes, and the gen-eral public. This chapter will describe those provi-sions and the background against which they weredeveloped.

STATE CONCERNS

The Federal Government must have access to po-tential disposal sites to evaluate the suitability ofvarious geologic media and of particular sites forradioactive waste disposal. Ultimately, Federalownership of actual disposal sites will be necessary.

Federal attempts to perform siting activities havemet with strong State opposition, however, severelyhindering Federal efforts to find and examine po-tential waste disposal sites across the country. 1 Stateand Federal apprehensions have led to a vicious cir-cle in which the actions of each side, taken in per-ceived self-defense, reinforce the fears of the other.On the Federal side, some parties are concernedthat States will refuse to take waste under any cir-cumstances. On the State side, there is fear thatthe Federal Government will site waste facilities de-spite legitimate State objections.2

‘As of September 1982, approximately 160 State laws, initiatives,and resolutions and 250 local laws pertaining to high-level radioactivewaste had been passed throughout the United States. Steven H. Mur-dock, F. Larry Leistritz, and Rita R. Harem (eds. ) NucJear Waste:Socioeconomic Dimensions of Long Term Storage (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 1983), p. 75.

‘For a discussion of some of the diflkulties encountered in past Fed-eral-State relations, see Roger Kasperson, ‘‘The Dark Side of the Ra-dioactive Waste Problem, ” Progress in Resource Management andEnvironmenta/P/arming, T. O’Riordan and K. Turner (eds. ) (NewYork: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 1980), vol. 2, pp. 135-136. See alsoapp. A.

The manner in which State opposition to Fed-eral radioactive waste management activities is dealtwith, and the ultimate outcome of such opposition,have implications for Federal activities in other pol-icy areas in which there is Federal/State conflict.This is especially true in other activities that con-

centrate costs in smaller areas while spreading ben-efits on a national or interregional scale. Feder-al/State relations in radioactive waste managementpose both an opportunity to establish mutually sat-isfactory and workable precedents and a risk of es-tablishing unwise ones.

State opposition to Federal siting activities ap-

pears to be based primarily on (1) fears regardingthe possible risks and impacts of radioactive wasteand waste management activities and (2) fearsabout possible inequitable distribution of those risksand impacts. These concerns are complicated bydistrust of the Federal Government.3

‘OTA’S analysis of State concerns draws on the results of OTA staffinterviews with State officials in South Carolina, Nevada, New Mex-ico, and Washington, and on interviews with State officials in Michi-gan, New York, Illinois, and Tennessee conducted for OTA by theAcademy for Contemporary Problems, as reported by Pat Choate andJohn Bowman in Radioactive Waste Management: State Concerns,report prepared for the OffIce of Technology Assessment, 1980. Seealso app. A. It should be noted that efforts to find sites for treatmentor disposal of nonnuclear hazardous wastes are beset by similar con-

175

..


Waste Management Impacts

Radiological impacts—dangers to physical healthand safety from exposure to radiation—are the po-tential impacts of greatest concern to States and lo-calities. No matter how remote the possibility, wastemanagement facilities and transportation of wastebring the chance of accidental release of radioactivematerials to the biosphere.

States and localities are also concerned about thenonradiological impacts of waste management ac-tivities—i. e., those impacts that can be expectedto occur even if there is no release of radioactivematerials. Some potential nonradiological impacts,such as demands for increased State emergency re-sponse capabilities, arise because radioactive wastemanagement involves radiological hazards. Othersarise simply because a nuclear waste managementfacility is a large-scale industrial activity. Poten-tial nonradiological impacts include the following:

●

●

●

●

Expenditures for activities related to Feder-al/State relations. Depending on the arrange-ments adopted, States will incur costs in re-viewing Federal siting proposals, particularlyif outside experts are consulted.Increased demands on governmental services.State and local police and fire departments,health departments, and other agencies willhave increased responsibilities to prepare forand cope with possible accidents involvingradioactive waste. States may have to allocateadditional funds for regulatory activities suchas inspection of trucks bearing waste. Roadswill be subjected to added stress from truckshipments.Possible losses in land and property values.Possible losses in tax revenue. Radioactivewaste repositories will be built on land eitheralready owned by the Federal Government oracquired for that purpose. Such lands and fa-cilities will remain federally owned in perpe-tuity. Traditionally, Federal ownership hasmeant that lands and facilities are not taxableby State and local governments.

cerns. See Martin Jaffe, Hazardous Waste Management: Implica-tions for Nuclear Waste Facility Siting, report prepared for the Of-fice of Technology Assessment, American Plaming Association, Apr.18, 1980.

●

●

●

●

Increased demands on potentially scarce nat-ural resources, such as water.Possible loss of the ability to exploit mineraland other resources from lands surroundingrepositories.Nonradioactive water and airpollution result-ing from facility construction and operation.Boomtown effects. Construction and, to a les-ser extent, operation of radioactive waste man-agement facilities may result in an influx ofnew residents and transients to areas in whichsuch facilities are located, possibly strainingexisting physical and social services. Boom-town effects have been severe, for example,in some rural areas of Western States wheremining and energy extraction industries haverecently begun operations. In some cases, theintroduction of a new industry to an unpre-pared locality has led to social disruption, suchas rising rates of alcoholism, divorce, andcrime.

Equity

Beliefs about what is equitable vary widely.While the health and safety aspects of prospectivewaste sites are of primary consideration, the amountof waste present in storage and disposal facilitiesand the distribution of sites are also important fac-tors in States’ views of siting.4 Some States fear thatthey could be forced to host radioactive waste gen-erated by the rest of the Nation and thus bear aninequitable share of the disadvantages of nuclearpower. Such concerns about equity have been im-portant in the debate over onsite storage v. away-from-reactor storage and in evaluations of reposi-tory siting, especially in discussions of numbers andlocations of repositories.

Another equity consideration is the length of timewaste will be in interim storage in a State. SomeStates fear that the impetus for the Federal Gov-ernment to develop permanent repositories wouldbe lessened if such short-term solutions are put into

‘Concern about equity was expressed by many State officials in in-terviews with OTA staff and has been frequently expressed in con-gressional hearings on radioactive waste legislation. See, for exam-ple, statements made by officials from Illinois and South Carolina tothe Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on NuclearRegulation during hearings concerning pending nuclear waste legis-lation on Nov. 9, 1981.

Ch. 8—Addressing State and Public Concerns . 177

place, and that, as a result, interim spent fuel stor-age in those States could become permanent bydefault.5

Federal Credibility

Distrust of the Federal Government, stemmingfrom past instances of what States perceive to below Federal competence and poor responsivenessto States’ needs, forms the background againstwhich States express fears about impacts and equityand from which States measure current Federal ef-forts.6 State opinion of Federal competence has beenlowered by frequent Federal policy changes; delaysin formulating a stable national radioactive waste

‘Officials in both South Carolina and 1llinois were concerned thatproposed Federal interim spent fuel storage in existing facilities in thoseStates could become permanent if there were continued delays in aFederal permanent repository. They also did not want such interimstorage facilities to take a disproportionate share of the national spentfuel storage burden. See FederaJ Facilities for Storing Spent NuclearFuel—Are They Needed? General Accounting Office, June 27, 1979,EMD-79-82, pp. 14-16. See al.w E. William Colglazier, Jr. (cd.), ThePolitics of Nuclear Waste (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), espe-cially the Foreword by Governor Richard W. Riley of South Caro-lina, pp. ix-x.

Wee app. A; and Choate and Bowman, op. cit.

management plan; failure to consult effectively withState officials on site investigations; several con-troversies about the scope of the Waste IsolationPilot Plant, near Carlsbad, N. Mex.; maintenanceand funding of the contaminated Nuclear FuelServices reprocessing plant site at West Valley,N. Y.; and the safety of the proposed site at Lyons,Kans. Problems with leaks and inadequate moni-toring of military and low-level waste have also af-fected State perceptions of Federal management ofcommercial high-level radioactive waste. One Statefear is that considerations other than technical cri-teria bearing on safety will play an unwarrantedrole in Federal siting decisions. Such considerationsmight be, for example, a perceived need for rapidsiting of a repository to remove the waste problemas an obstacle to nuclear power, or a desire to savecosts and time by directing site-selection effortstoward locations with already existing Federal fa-cilities.

NWPA addresses State and Indian tribe concernsthrough measures in three areas: State involvementin waste management decisions, prevention andmitigation of impacts of waste management activ-ities, and equity in siting waste facilities.

STATE INVOLVEMENT IN WASTEMANAGEMENT DECISIONS

Discussions about State involvement in radioac-tive waste management have focused on two areas:

1.

2.

How States should be involved in makingoverall Federal radioactive waste managementpolicy and in reviewing implementation ofpolicy.What powers a State should have in siting de-cisions involving that State, and what limitsshould be placed on those powers.

State Role in Policy Developmentand Program Oversight

States have played a role in the formation of Fed-eral radioactive waste management policies and inthe review of implementation of those policies by

the same means as those used in other policy areas:discussions with agency officials, direct lobbyingof administration and congressional leaders, anduse of the State’s congressional delegation to makeviews known and to influence policy. Organizationsrepresenting State governmental groups, such asthe National Governors’ Association and the Na-tional Conference of State Legislatures, have alsobeen important in advocating State interests.

In addition to these traditional means, Stateswere involved in the development of Federal radio-active waste management policy through a special-purpose organization, the State Planning Council(SPC), created by President Carter by Executiveorder in February 1980 and given an 18-monthmaximum lifespan. SPC, among other duties,made recommendations to the President and the


Secretary of Energy about State involvement in allphases of radioactive waste siting and on more gen-eral matters of policy affecting State and local in-terests, such as composition of the National WasteManagement Plan and the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission’s (NRC) licensing procedures. SPCformally dissolved in August 1981 after issuing afinal report.

Some proposals for future State involvement inradioactive waste management have envisioned therecreation of SPC or the creation of a similar orga-nization; others have focused exclusively on theState role in siting decisions, leaving State involve-ment in policymaking to traditional means.

It can be argued that with the completion of theassigned duties of SPC, there is no longer a needfor a special-purpose organization to supplementexisting ways in which States can contribute to Fed-eral radioactive waste management policy. WithinSPC itself, there was division about whether thecouncil’s life should be extended, and no resolu-tion was passed calling for such an extension.

In favor of reviving SPC or creating a similarorganization, it can be argued that there is a con-tinuing need for a single body to synthesize theviewpoints of different States and of groups withinStates. Radioactive waste management policy couldexperience major changes under different Presiden-tial administrations during the extended period inwhich waste management facilities will be sited andoperated. A special-purpose organization couldprove useful for reviewing and commenting on thedraft radioactive waste Mission Plan to be preparedpursuant to NWPA, for monitoring the waste pro-gram, and for making recommendations when ap-propriate. 7 Another possible avenue for State in-volvement in policy development and programoversight would be State representation on broaderbodies such as a high-level council for overseeingdevelopment of a Federal Government-wide Mis-sion Plan, or an oversight body for an independ-ent waste management agency. (Further discussionof these ideas is found in ch. 7.)

‘The RESOLVE Forum on High-Level Radioactive Waste Man-agement recommended continuation of SPC. See ,k.fanaging the Na-tion High -Le\’eI Radioacti\’e Waste: Ke,v Issues and Recommen-dations (Washington, D. C.: The Conservation Foundation, July1981), pp. 27-28.

NWPA made no special provision for State in-volvement in policy development and programoversight, although it does specify that the draftMission Plan must be submitted to the States andaffected Indian tribes for their comments. However,it may be useful for the administration to considerestablishing some mechanism through Executive or-der, as was done with the SPC, and for congres-sional deliberations on alternative management ap-proaches to consider a State role in oversight of theinstitutional options that are considered.

State Role in Facility Siting Decisions

The question of the appropriate role for Statesand Indian tribes in Federal decisions about sitingradioactive waste management facilities has beenone of the main areas of contention in developmentof Federal radioactive waste management policy,The Carter administration proposed giving Statesa continuing role in radioactive waste managementthrough a process termed consultation and concur-rence. 8 This policy left many specific features ofthe Federal/State relationship undefined, however.Later, proposals setting out the State role moreclearly were introduced in the 96th Congress, andboth the Senate and House passed radioactive wastemanagement bills (S. 2189 and H.R. 8378, respec-tively) in 1980 which specified provisions for Stateinvolvement, although no final bill was adopted atthat time. NWPA, passed in the closing days of the97th Congress, contained detailed provisions forState involvement in siting not only permanent dis-posal facilities, but also facilities for interim spentfuel storage and for certain research and develop-ment (R&D) activities. These are discussed below.

There has been general agreement that a proc-ess of consultation—in which individual States arepromptly and continuously provided informationabout intended siting activities affecting them, Stateviews are solicited, and Federal responses are madeto State concerns—should take place. NWPA pro-vides for such consultation in two general ways,First, it specifies points during the repository sitescreening and licensing process at which the affected

‘For a discussion of the genesis of this concept during the delibera-tions of the Interagency Review Group (IRG), see Ted Greenwood,“Nuclear Waste Management in the United States” in Colglazier,op. cit.

Ch. 8—Addressing State and Public Concerns ● 179

States and Indian tribes must be notified of pro-posed Federal actions, provided with detailed in-

formation, and given a chance to comment (seetable 8-l). Second, it requires the Secretary ofEnergy to seek to enter into binding written agree-ments with States or Indian tribes affected by Fed-eral activities at sites that have been selected fordetailed characterization. These agreements are toinclude a wide range of specified procedures, in-cluding procedures: 1) by which a State or Indian

tribe may study and make recommendations con-cerning the impacts of a proposed repository; 2) bywhich the Department of Energy (DOE) shall assistthe State and local governments near the reposi-tory site in resolving concerns about such offsiteeffects as emergency response requirements, wastetransportation, and monitoring of the repositoryduring operation and after decommissioning; and3) by which the objections of a State or Indian tribecan be resolved through negotiation, arbitration,

Table 8-1.—NWPA Decisions, Deadlines, Opportunities to influence

Decision/event NWPA deadline Opportunity to influenceDraft Mission Plan published by Apr. 6, 1984 Reviewed by State/tribe

DOE Comments available for public inspectionFinal Mission Plan submitted to June 6, 1984, effective 30 days

Congress after submissionFive sites nominated for site After issuance of siting Hearings in vicinity of sites prior to nomination

characterization guidelines (Rl)a and prior to preparation of environmentalJUIV 1, 1989 (R2)a assessments

Environmental assessments for Accompany nominationsfive nominated sites

Three sites recommended for Jan. 1, 1985 (Rl)site characterization July 1, 1989 (R2)

President approves or 2 to 6 months afterdisapproves three sites for recommendationsite characterization

Site characterization plans Prior to sinking exploratory Public hearings(SCPS) prepared by DOE for shafts State/tribal comments on draft SCPS,each site to be characterized SCPS available for comment at hearings

NRC site characterization State/tribal comments on draftAnalysis for each site

Prior to repository site DOE must hold hearings at all sites underrecommendation consideration for repository recommendation

30 days prior to recommendation DOE must notify State/tribeState/tribe may comment to DOE and provide

impact report to be forwarded to thePresident

DOE recommends one site forrepository

DOE prepares environmental Public comment on draft environmental impactimpact assessment statement

President recommends site to Mar. 31, 1967 or 1988 (Rl)Congress Mar. 31, 1990 or 1991 (R2)

Possible State/tribal notice of 60 days later State/tribal action (may include publicdisapproval to Congress participation if no written agreement)

Possible congressional override 90 days laterDOE submits application to NRC 90 days after site designation Application sent to State/tribe

for construction authorization takes effect

NRC issues construction Jan. 1, 1989 (Rl), or 3 to 4 years Intervention in licensingauthorization after receipt of application

(Rl, R2)Repository in operation 1998 (Rl)aRl fefers to the first repository; R2 to the second.

SOURCE: Laura Worby, Citizen’s Nuclear Waste Manual (Washington, D. C.: Nuclear Information and Resources Service, 19S4).

I&) ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

or other mechanisms. Similar mechanisms and pro-cedures are provided by the Act for consultationwith States and affected Indian tribes concerningsiting and operation of Federal interim storage fa-cilities, any monitored retrievable storage facilitiesthat might subsequently be authorized, and test andevaluation facilities.

Perhaps the most controversial question concern-ing the State role in waste facility siting was howmuch formal power, if any, the States should begiven to block Federal actions. ‘I’he alternatives thatwere considered ranged from giving States an ab-solute veto-i. e., the binding legal authority to haltFederal siting activities—to giving the Federal agen-cy responsible for waste management the explicitauthority to preempt State objections. This sectionwill discuss some of the principal arguments forthese two positions, which represent the oppositeends of the spectrum of alternatives, and will de-scribe the provisions for shared powers that wereultimately incorporated in NWPA.

State Veto—the Binding Legal Powerto Halt Federal Siting Activities

Under a State veto approach, Federal agenciescould proceed with activities only in the absenceof State objections. The most important feature ofthis approach is the binding legal power of a Stateto stop the activity in question at any point. Suchactivity could resume only if the State changed itsposition.

As argued by proponents, veto rights representedan equitable and constitutionally justified distribu-tion of power among political units. If errors weremade in the siting, design, construction, or opera-tion of radioactive waste facilities, present andfuture residents of States would have to live withthe consequences. Historically, States have beenaccorded primary responsibility for protecting theircitizens’ property, health, and general welfare. Vetopower was seen by some as a necessary defenseagainst a Federal Government perceived as pre-pared to site radioactive waste facilities regardlessof State objections.

In addition, many advocates of State veto be-lieved that States would act reasonably and that aveto would not be used unless it were essential. Intheir view, a veto would indicate an unreasonable

or unsafe Federal proposal rather than an unrea-sonable State reaction. They expected that sitingwould occur if the Federal Government could pro-vide credible assurances of safety. A situation inwhich all 50 States vetoed sites was not anticipated.Advocates believed that, even if the situation werelikely, the veto approach should be rejected onlyif and when the situation occurred, and not before.

On the other hand, not only Federal officials, butmany State officials as well, feared that if given aveto power, State officials would have no choice butto use it, regardless of the merits of a particular proj-ect.9 They believed the alternative to such use couldbe political disaster because public opposition to aradioactive waste project is likely to be much strong-er and more intense than support for it. Even ifinternal political pressures were not overwhelming,officials might use their veto power out of fear thattheir State would be the only one not to veto a fa-cility. If use of the veto by many States was ex-pected, the Federal Government might select sitesprimarily on political rather than technicalgrounds —one of the very reasons why some Statesdistrust the Federal Government. For these andother reasons, the veto approach was opposed bymany organizations, including SPC.1°

Federal Agency Preemption

Federal agency preemption—whereby a Federalagency could, if necessary, overrule a State and pro-ceed with a siting activity in dispute-is the reverseof State veto. In essence, the extent of involvementand power possessed by States would be determinedby the Federal Government. In its extreme form,States would have little or no chance to influenceFederal activities, and consultation would be min-imal. More commonly, however, proponents of thepreemption approach envisioned much greaterState involvement, including measures of consulta-tion. Even with extensive consultation, however,Federal agency power would remain clearly pre-dominant.

‘For example, statement by Steven Sldar for the National Confer-ence of State Legislatures before the Subcommittee on Energy Regu-lation, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, July 19,1979, p. 8.

Iostate planning Cowci] on Radioactive Waste Management (Spc),Recommendations on National Radimctive Waste Management Pol-icies: Report to the President, August 1981, p. 6.


Several rationales were given for preemption.Preemption was seen by proponents as the appro-priate expression of Federal preeminence in radio-active waste management, given the relationshipof waste management to other areas of Federal con-cern, such as national energy policy, interstatecommerce, foreign policy, national health, and dis-tribution of costs among many States. It also wasseen as consistent with past Federal legislation andpolicy in the general field of atomic energy.

An implicit assumption behind preemption, inmany cases, was that a significant number of Stateswould reject siting of a radioactive waste facility,given the power to do so. In this view, making com-promises with a State would take too long or betoo expensive to permit timely siting of neededwaste management facilities. Examples that sup-port this assumption include the many State lawsrestricting waste management activities and vocif-erous State reactions even to initial site explora-tion. An explicit declaration of Federal power wasperceived by some proponents to be the quickestand, perhaps, only way to remove such present andpotential obstacles to siting activities in time to safe-guard nuclear power.

Opponents noted that preemption had potentialproblems as an approach to State powers in radio-active waste management. Apart from objectionsbased on States’ rights considerations, the abilityof this approach to overcome State objections quick-ly may in fact be limited. States have substantialabilities to translate their objections into delay andexpense for the Federal Government through suchmeans as defense of their legislation in court andintervention in licensing hearings. While the Fed-eral Government legal power to overcome Stateopposition is fairly clear,

11 the amount of time andexpense required to do so is uncertain. Court chal-lenges, for example, could take years to reach judg-moment12 Some feared that unless the avenues for

State intervention were narrowed or the proceduresfor reviewing challenges to State actions were ex-

I I For a genera] discussion of the legal status of state ]aWS affecting

radioactive waste management, see Harold P. Green and L. MarcZen, “Federal-State Conflict in Nuclear Waste Management: TheLegal Bases, ‘‘ in Colglazier, op. cit.; and William C. Metz, ‘‘LegalConstraints to Repository Siting, ” in Murdock et al., op. cit.

‘*Frederic A. Morris, “The Federal Legal Framework for High-Lev-el Nuclear Waste Management” (Seattle: 13attelle Human Affairs Re-search Center, Mar. 31, 1980), BHARC-31 1/80/009, pp. 29-34.

pedited— measures that could have broader impli-cations for Federal/State relations in general—attempts at preemption might make siting proceedmore slowly. Preemption could also create a viciouscircle in which preemption of initial State opposi-tion would generate more intense opposition, whichin turn would have to be preempted. Each turn ofthe circle would make it more difficult to return tomutual trust. Initial use of the preemption approachcould make it difficult to switch to a more cooper-ative approach later.

Shared Powers

Between preemption and veto, a broad spectrumof possible approaches to Federal/State sharing ofpower in radioactive waste management were con-sidered in the debate leading up to passage ofNWPA. This report will use the term shared powersto characterize this middle ground.

Basic features of most proposals for sharedpowers that were considered included: 1) extensiveconsultation between States and the Federal Gov-ernment, often including procedures for resolvingsome types of State objections (e. g., by arbitration);and 2) the formal ability of States to halt some Fed-eral siting activities, under some circumstances, bal-anced by Federal power to override State objec-tions, given certain conditions. Shared powers thusrepresented a compromise between veto and pre-emption, with limitations placed on the powers ofboth sides.

Limitations on State power, especially overrideprovisions, are objected to by some defenders ofStates’ rights because of the perceived chilling ef-fect such limitations might have on a State’s abilityto influence Federal actions and to protect State in-terests. Conversely, even with such limitations,some observers are troubled by the formal abilityof States to halt Federal projects. These disadvan-tages to each side are mitigated by several factors.From the State perspective, limitations on veto pow-er may be acceptable even to strong defenders ofStates’ rights. At the same time, defenders of Fed-eral preeminence may find satisfaction even in aprocess that gives States nonconcurrence powersunder some circumstances.

The Carter administration policy of consultationand concurrence, while intended as a compromisebetween the extremes of preemption and veto, was


vague in its definition of concurrence, particularlyin distinguishing between nonconcurrence—theability of a State to prevent the continuance of Fed-eral siting activities—and State veto. 13 Not surpris-ingly, much of the debate about the State role inradioactive waste management during the 96th and97th Congresses focused on the precise specifica-tion of the balance between Federal and Stateauthority.

In response to those who were concerned aboutgiving States any formal authority to halt Federalactivities, it was noted that adoption of explicit pro-cedures for shared powers would in some ways besimply a formalization of powers States already pos-sessed to delay Federal actions, plus formalizationof procedures for resolving disputes at several levels.It was argued that these formalizations would makethe use of State power more predictable and con-tained. Federal plans, State objections, Federal re-sponses, mediation between parties, and final judg-ments could all be expressed within specified areaswith prescribed procedures and time limitations.Adoption of a formal structure in law might enablethe Federal Government to avoid the slow, gradu-ated appeal procedures likely in various courts ifrestrictive State actions were challenged and de-fended .14

Procedures Established by NWPA

NWPA includes detailed processes for State andIndian tribe involvement in decisions for siting thedifferent types of waste management facilities ad-dressed in the Act. While there are some differencesin the processes dealing with different facilities, in

IJThe Interagency ReVievv Group stated that consultation and con-currence implies ‘ ‘an on-going dialogue participation and the devel-opment of a cooperative relationship between States and all relevantFederal agencies during program planning and the site identificationand characterization programs on a regional basis using the systemsapproach, through the identification of specific sites, the joint deci-sion on a facility, any subsequent licensing process and through theentire period of operation and decommissioning. Under this approachthe State effectively has a continuing ability to participate in activi-ties at all points throughout the course of the activity and, if it deemsappropriate, to prevent the continuance of Federal activities. (Re-port to the President by the Interagenc,v Re\iew Group on NuclearWaste Management, TID-29442, March 1979, Washington, D. C.,p. 95. ) For further discussion of the concept of consultation and con-currence, see Consultation and Concurrence, proceedings of a work-shop held at Eastsound, M ich. on Sept. 23-26, 1979, published bythe OffIce of Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle Memorial Inst itutc,January 1980, ONWI-87.

14SNar, o p . c i t . , p . z.

general they share two features: 1) prior to selec-tion of a final facility site, State and Indian tribeparticipation is limited to extensive consultation;and 2) following site selection15 by the Federal Gov-ernment, the affected State or Indian tribe has theright to lodge a formal objection with Congress,and that objection becomes effective unless over-turned by passage of a joint resolution by bothHouses of Congress. These and several other fea-tures will be discussed briefly next.

State role during site exploration and charac-terization. —NWPA provides for extensive con-sultation with States during the siting steps preced-ing the President’s recommendations to Congressof a site for a repository, but the Act grants theStates no authority to halt Federal activities. Dur-ing the debates on waste management legislation,some had argued that States should have the rightto forbid or halt these initial siting activities, as wellas some other activities, because of the possibilitythat site exploration might lead eventually to a re-pository. Others argued that such restrictions onexploration could mean that sites that were desir-able from a technical viewpoint might be effective-ly withdrawn from consideration, or that the sitesthat were finally chosen might be those that weremost politically acceptable rather than those thatwere most technically suitable. 16 If safety is to bethe primary goal of radioactive waste managementpolicy, it was argued, the ability to gain knowledgeabout different media and sites must be preserved,and therefore the States’ ability to prevent the Fed-eral Government from conducting site explorationactivities should be limited. 17

Procedures by which the Federal Governmentcould override a State’s objection.—The 96th and97th Congresses debated extensively about whatprocedures should be required to override a State’sobjections to a Federal choice of a waste disposalsite. The greater the number of political bodies re-quired to reach agreement to override a State ob-jection, and the greater the amount of action re-quired by them, the more difficult it will be for an

J SIn the case of a Feder~ Interim Storage Facility, the State hasthe right to object only after DOE decides to provide more than 300tonnes of storage capacity at a site.

IbSk]ar, o p . C i t . , p . s.

171 n this regmd, Spc recomnlendcd that States and t ribcs not at’-.bitrarily refuse permission for initial site investigations. SPC, ln[t’r-im Report, Feb. 24, 1981, p. 14.

Ch. 8—Addressing State and Public Concerns 183

override to occur. SPC, for example, recommendedthat for a State’s objection to be voided, a Presiden-tial determination and a concurrent or joint resolu-tion by both Houses of Congress should be re-quired.

Conversely, override can be made easier in var-ious ways. Both the Senate and House bills passedin the 96th Congress had provisions stating that fora State’s objection to stop DOE’s civilian waste sit-ing activities effectively, at least one House of Con-gress must pass a resolution sustaining the State’sobjection. State objections would thus be overrid-den de facto if such a resolution were not passed.

After considering and finally rejecting the ‘‘one-House-sustain” approach, the 97th Congress ulti-mate] y agreed to include in NWPA a procedurerequiring passage of a joint resolution by bothHouses of Congress to override a State’s objectionto a Presidential selection of a repository site. How-ever, the ‘‘two-House-override’ approach may belittle different from the ‘ ‘one-House-sustain’ ap-proach in terms of the relative difficulty of over-turning such an objection. The reason is that theprocedures in NWPA for congressional consider-ation of a State’s objection practically ensure thatboth Houses would ultimately have to vote on aresolution dealing with that objection, as was thecase with the ‘‘one-House-sustain’ provisions pre-viously under consideration. As long as each Housewill eventually have to vote on the question ofwhether to sustain or overturn a State’s objection,all the State has to do to have its position upheldunder either approach is to persuade one Houseto vote its way. is However, if the procedures hadallowed a significant possibility that one Housemight never vote on the question (for example, ifthe resolution could die without being dischargedfrom a committee to which it had been referred),the legislation would have been biased in favor ofcontinuation of the status quo if Congress failed toact— rejection of a proposed site in the case of a

— -1 alf the one-HouSe-SuStain approach is used, a House sympathetic

with the State would vote to pass the resolution to sustain the objec-tion. If the two-House-override approach is used, a House sympatheticwith the State would vote to defeat the resolution to override the Stateobjection. In either approach, the State objection would be overriddenonly if both Houses supported the selection of a site by voting to de-feat a resolution to support the State or to pass a resolution to o\’er-ride the State. If either House does not support the site selection undereither approach, the State’s objection would be sustained.

‘‘two-House-override” approach, or acceptance ofthe site with a ‘‘one-House-sustain’ approach.

Participation by affected States and local gov-ernments.-Affected States are those that could beheavily affected by a radioactive waste managementfacility located in another State: e.g., States thatare connected by above- or below-ground water sys-tems or that serve as a transportation corridor forwaste shipments to another State in which a wastefacility is located. Some proposed giving affectedStates rights similar to those enjoyed by host States.SPC, for example, recommended that affectedStates meeting certain criteria established by DOEin consultation with the Department of Transpor-tation (DOT) have rights equivalent to hostStates.19 However, NWPA gave explicit participa-tion rights only to States that would host a reposi-tory site and to affected Indian tribes. 20

Localities near radioactive waste management fa-cilities will bear a large share of facility-related im-pacts. While there were many proposals that rele-vant local governments be given consultation rights,there were few proposals that they be given any au-thority to block Federal actions, as well. State offi-cials and organizations have generally been opposedto giving local governments such authority. NWPAdoes not provide for participation in siting decisionsby units of local government, and leaves it up toStates to decide how local governments will be in-volved in the consultation process.

A recent National Research Council report con-cluded that the lack of an institutionalized processfor involving local governments in the siting proc-ess represents a significant gap in the frameworkdefined by NWPA, and that the need for linkagebetween local jurisdictions and State governmentsis of potentially critical importance to the wastemanagement program. The report underscored theresponsibility of State governments to address theissue of State-local relations constructively, sinceCongress decided against a Federal prescription forthe institutional relationship between State and local

jgSPC, Interim Report, p. 19.20NwpA defines an ‘‘affected Indian tribe’ as one whose reserva-

tion contains a specified radioactive waste facility or whose federallydefined possessor or usage rights may be substantially and adverselyaflected by the locating of such a facility, (42 USC 10101. )

—


governments.21 On his topic, SPC had recom-

mended that the Federal Government put forwarda clearly structured interagency waste managementprogram plan that provides for effective participa-tion by local governments, as well as by State andtribal governments.22 In addition, it recommendedthat States establish a process that would enablelocal governments to participate in the NRC re-pository licensing process.23

The State role in military waste siting.—Therewas substantial disagreement over whether Statesshould have the same role in military waste disposalas in civilian waste disposal efforts. Some arguedthat because the hazards associated with defenseand commercial waste are similar, their treatmentshould be similar. In addition, some feared that ifcommercial and defense waste were considered sep-arately, defense waste might remain in storage in-definitely rather than be disposed of safely. Othersargued that giving States a role in decisions on the. —

21 N~tion~ Research council, Social and Economic Aspects of Ra-dioactive Waste DisposaJ: Considerations for Institutiomd Manage-ment (Washington, D. C.: National Academy Press, 1984).

ZZSK, Recommendations, p. 12.231 bid., p, 15.

disposal of military waste would jeopardize nationalsecurity and could set a precedent for involvingStates in decisions on siting other facilities neededfor national security purposes, such as militarybases.

One compromise considered was to give Statesthe power to object to military waste facility sitingbut to make override easier than would be the casefor the siting of commercial waste facilities. For ex-ample, S. 2189, considered during the 96th Con-gress, required that a State’s objection to defensewaste siting could be upheld only if both Housesof Congress affirmed the objection. However, the97th Congress agreed in NWPA to apply the sameprocedures to repositories for commercial waste anddefense waste. NWPA also provided that the Sec-retary of Energy use the commercial waste reposi-tories developed under the Act for disposal of de-fense waste, as well, unless the President finds, onthe basis of an evaluation to be completed by Jan-uary 1985, that a separate repository for defensewaste is required. The draft of that evaluation, re-leased in 1984, concludes that disposal of defensewaste in commercial repositories would be the mostcost-effective option.

PREVENTION AND MITIGATIONOF IMPACTS

State concerns may also be addressed directly inthe waste management program by measures deal-ing with the prevention and mitigation of impacts.Such measures could reduce pressures on the par-ticipation process (above) as the principal meansof protecting States’ interests. They could also in-crease State confidence in the competence and in-tegrity of the Federal radioactive waste manage-ment system.

Addressing State ConcernsAbout Safety

It is beyond human ability to ensure that no re-lease of radioactivity will occur over the course ofradioactive waste management operations and dur-

ing the long life of the waste after it is disposed of;indeed, such total containment is not required bythe proposed Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) standards nor final NRC regulations forhigh-level waste repositories. However, it is possi-ble to reduce the chances that serious impacts willoccur and to lower the consequences of impacts ifthey do occur. States seek assurances that siting willnot be based on nontechnical grounds or inadequatecriteria, that the siting process will proceed no fasterthan safety concerns dictate, that waste manage-ment activities will be monitored for safety, and thatemergency response capability exists. The Federalradioactive waste management program could pro-vide such assurances in several ways. Some are ex-plicitly provided by NWPA, while others are withinthe discretion of DOE.


Independent Reviews of Radioactive WasteManagement Plans and Activities

Confidence in the safety of waste managementactivities will be increased by independent reviewsof Federal plans for radioactive waste managementbefore such activities take place. At present, thereare three main levels planned for such review-in-ternal review by DOE, licensing proceedings byNRC, and reviews by individual States of appli-cable parts of the plan. Additional levels of review(e.g., by bodies of independent scientific experts)might increase the confidence of observers that sites,technologies, and management systems will meetnecessary levels of safety and reliability.

NWPA provides States and affected Indian tribeswith funding for such independent technical re-views. The Environmental Evaluation Group inNew Mexico provides a good example of how suchreview might be accomplished. This group, whichis supported by funds from DOE, provides the Stateof New Mexico with independent technical reviewof DOE activities in developing the Waste Isola-tion Pilot Plant near Carlsbad.

As discussed in chapter 3, the first repositorycould well become an international waste disposalresearch center. In that event, opening the reposi-tory to independent scientific investigations couldgive the affected State and locality additional con-fidence that potential problems with the site wouldnot be overlooked.

Availability of Backup Sites

States’ concerns that the Federal Governmentmight continue to develop a less-than-satisfactoryrepository site simply because of the lack of anyalternatives could be addressed by measures de-signed to increase confidence that an adequatenumber of backup sites would be under consider-ation at each stage of the repository developmentprocess, up to and including full-scale operation.Along these lines, NWPA establishes a process forsiting and licensing two separate repositories. Thesite for each is to be selected based on (1) an initialevaluation of five sites that have been nominatedfor consideration on the basis of preliminary dataobtained from surface exploration and drill holes,and (2) a detailed characterization at repositorydepth of three of the nominated sites.

Additional measures that could be provided byDOE in the Mission Plan include a target date foroperation of the second repository soon after theopening of the first, characterization of one moresite than the required three, and submission of abackup site for licensing for each repository. Thesemeasures—which are also needed to increase con-fidence in a firm waste acceptance schedule, as dis-cussed in chapter 6—could increase confidence thatany sites eventually selected for development hadbeen chosen strictly on technical merit,24 and couldalso deal with State concerns about equity in sitingby assuring States that the initial site would notautomatically become the only operational site.

Assistance in Monitoring andEmergency Response

The capabilities of personnel and equipment todetect and respond to accidents are important formaintaining the safety of radioactive waste manage-ment operations. Filling the need for these capa-bilities may be the impact of radioactive waste sitingthat affects the largest number of States and com-munities, depending on waste transportation ar-rangements.

25 Evert State and community throughwhich waste will be transported will need some abil-ity to respond to accidents, or at least to knowwhom to contact if local capability is inadequate.Monitoring and emergency response capabilitiesare also necessary for the safety of waste manage-ment facilities during operation and after closure.The Federal Government will have the primary re-Spomibility for monitoring any emergency responseat Federal facilities, although States will be involvedto some extent.

NWPA provides for assistance to repository hostStates and affected Indian tribes concerning mon-itoring and emergency response for both wastetransportation and repository operation. However,no provision is made for special assistance to non-repository States affected by waste transportation.Thus, such States will have to rely on existing gen-eral provisions for Federal involvement in trans-portation of radioactive materials.

‘+Choate and Bowman, op. cit., pp. 25-26.Zssee Albert M. Church and Roger D. Norton, ‘‘Issues in Emerg-

ency Preparedness for Radiological Transportation Accidents, ’ Nat-ural ResourcesJournal, VOI. 21, No. 4., October 1981, pp. 757-771.


Under legislative authority that existed prior topassage of NWPA, NRC and DOT regulate thetransportation of radioactive waste. However, Stateand local authorities, along with personnel em-ployed by transportation carriers, are usually thefirst to respond to transportation accidents involv-ing all types of hazardous cargo shipments, and theyhave primary responsibility for maintaining pub-lic health and safety in the event of such accidents.This is true for radioactive waste transport, aswell.26 The Federal Government provides assistanceto State efforts in various ways: for example,through radiological assistance teams, trainingcourses for State and local authorities, assistanceto States in preparing emergency response plans,and funding of state enforcement efforts throughthe State Hazardous Materials Enforcement De-velopment Program conducted by DOT. *7

Monitoring— which includes inspection, enforce-ment, and, possibly, escort of waste shipments—and emergency response policies and capabilitiesvary greatly from State to State. 28 Some States havewide-ranging requirements and large offices de-voted to one or both efforts; others have more min-imal requirements and may depend largely or en-tirely on outside assistance. For both emergencyresponse and monitoring, the ability of States tohandle shipments depends, in part, on regulatorydemands. For example, if Federal regulations re-quiring waste to be escorted were to be promul-gated, a heavy burden could be placed on State andlocal police departments.

Some States feel that their programs are adequateto handle foreseeable demands. However, otherStates and localities see some level of Federal assist-ance as necessary. Localities, in particular, oftenlack equipment and expertise to deal with emer-gencies involving radioactive materials, and manyStates express a desire for aid in training person-nel and in procuring special equipment. Opinionsvary on what the extent of Federal assistance shouldbe. SPC recommended that State and, where ap-propriate, tribal governments should have the leadrole in developing emergency response plans and

‘eIbid., p. 765.27S. N. s~omon, State Surveillance of Radioactive Material Trans-

portation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatoy Commission, Office of State Pro-grams, NUREG-1015, February 1984, pp. 35-36.

paFor a detailed review of existing State programs, see ibid.

procedures for dealing with transportation acci-dents. 29 Consideration of additional Federal sup-port to States affected by radioactive waste trans-portation may be appropriate before largequantities of waste begin to be moved to an oper-ating repository. Options include:

1. Additional Federal backup to State and localefforts, such as training programs, provisionof information, or more active support inequipment and personnel.

2. Increased level and scope of Federal fundingof State and local efforts. Financial assistancemay be needed to enable States to cope withthe relatively large number of shipments ofradioactive waste that will occur when a re-pository begins operating. For example, it hasbeen estimated that it would cost about $6 mill-ion over 30 years for the equipment and train-ing needed to bring New Mexico’s emergen-cy response capacity to the level required forthe anticipated shipments of transuranic wasteto the WIPP facility .30

3. Direct provision of monitoring and emergencyresponse services.

Impact Mitigation

Many of the nonradiological impacts likely toarise from the management of radioactive waste arecommon to other large-scale industrial develop-ments and could be significant for the States andcommunities involved, depending on the size of re-positories, the size of the affected communities, andthe proximity of communities to repositories. DOEhas said that potential impacts on communities nearproposed repository sites represent a significantissue in gaining public and local acceptance of sitingactivities. 31

SPC recommended that, because the FederalGovernment has responsibility for developing re-

%PC, Recommendations.~OR. Cummings, H. Bumess, and R. Norton, The proposed Waste

Isolation Pilot Project (WZPP) and Impacts in the State of New Mex-ico: A Socioeconomic A@ysis (Albuquerque, EMD-2-67-1 139, April1981), ch. 7; cited in Church and Norton, op. cit., p. 764.

SIStatement of Kenneth Davis, Deputy Secretary of Energy, beforethe Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, Committee onInterior and Insular Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, July 9,1981. Interior and Insular Affairs Document 97-12.

Ch. 8—Addressing State and Public Concerns . 187

positories, it should accept responsibility for socio-economic impacts arising from such development.32

Measures to mitigate the impacts of repositorysiting activities may be vital in making those activ-ities acceptable to the affected population .33 With-out mitigation measures, a major portion of thecosts of siting would be borne by host States andcommunities. While such concentration of costs iscommon, radioactive waste management may bejudged differently from other industrial activities.One major difference lies in the perceived benefitsbrought by the siting of facilities. Apart from thegeneral national importance of isolating waste safe-ly, the principal specific benefit of commercial ra-dioactive waste management will be the continuedviability of nuclear power—a benefit that may notbe experienced directly by affected areas.

On the positive side, some jobs will be createdand some local businesses will benefit, especiallywith the construction of repositories. There maybe long-term beneficial impacts on the communityif the repository becomes an international scientificresearch center. However, these local benefits maynot by themselves outweigh local concerns aboutthe potential negative impacts of a radioactive wasterepository.

NWPA includes a number of requirements fora range of payments to host States, affected Indiantribes, and, in some cases, units of local govern-ment to mitigate the impacts of development andoperation of the various facilities provided for inthe Act. Drawing these payments from the NuclearWaste Fund, rather than from general revenues,should substantially increase the credibility of Fed-eral assurances that mitigation payments will beforthcoming when needed. A brief discussion ofthree types of impact payments follows .34

32spc, R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , p . 11.

33A more extensive discussion of mitigation measures can ~ found

in chapters 10, 11, and 12 of Murdock et al., op. cit.; see also S. A.Carries et a!., Incentives and the Siting of Radioactive Waste Facili-ties (Oak Ridge, Term.: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL-5880, 1982).

34A more detai]ed description of the mitigation measures containedin NWPA and an evaluation from a State point of view are foundin “The Nuclear Waste Policy Act and Socioeconomic Impact Miti-gation Provisions and Problems, ” by Robert D. Smith of the TexasNuclear Waste Programs OffIce, published in Proceedings of the 1983Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Information Meeting, U.S.Department of Energy, CONF-831217, February 1984, pp. 50-56.

Tax-Equivalent Payments

Because waste disposal will be conducted by theFederal Government, the land, facilities, and oper-ations will not be subject to the State and local tax-ation that normally offsets some of the costs of pri-vate industrial activities. While other Federalfacilities share this drawback, radioactive wastemanagement operations are less attractive. Unlikemany other Federal lands, which are at least po-tentially returnable, waste sites will never be turnedback to lower units of government. To deal withthis, NWPA includes a requirement for paymentsto States and units of local government in whicha repository is located, and to Indian tribes affectedby repository development, of an amount equiva-lent to the revenues that would be collected if therepository could be taxed at the same rate as otherreal property and industrial activities. In the caseof Federal interim storage facilities, general impactassistance payments can be used to compensate forthe loss of taxable property resulting from publicrather than private ownership of the facilities. Noprovision is made for tax-equivalent payments inthe case of monitored retrievable storage facilitiesor test and evaluation facilities.

Compensation Payments

There are many precedents for compensating af-fected units of government monetarily for direct im-pacts caused by private or Federal activities andfor making anticipatory payments in expectationof such impacts.

35 Firms plannin g to conduct oper-ations such as extraction and development of nat-ural gas, coal, oil, shale, and minerals have offeredlump sum payments and other mitigation meas-ures, such as direct funding of services, to offsetboth actual and anticipated impacts. Nuclear util-ities in several countries also offer such measuresto affected communities. In Japan, for example,anticipatory compensation payments are made pri-or to evidence of damage. Localities receive a sub-sidy—portions of which go to improve roads,schools, and other public projects—generated froma tax on utilities for electrical generation. 36 NWPA

35This was done, for example, when the Tennessee Val]ey Author-ity (TVA) and the State of Wyoming signed an agreement that sub-jects TVA to all the laws, regulations, and taxes the State imposeson private mining companies. Nuclear Fuel, Mar. 31, 1980.

wln one case, the amount devoted to such payments was 10 Per-

cent of the cost of plant construction. Hilliard W. Paige, Daniel S.

. .


includes provisions for impact mitigation paymentsto States in which a repository is located and to af-fected Indian tribes. State participation in forecast-ing potential impacts arising from radioactive wastemanagement activities and in negotiating Federalmitigation measures are included in the guaranteesprovided by NWPA.37

The Act also provides for impact payments tounits of local government within which a monitoredretrievable storage facility is located, and to Statesand units of local government hosting a Federal in-terim storage facility. No impact mitigation meas-ures are provided for test and evaluation facilities.

Incentive Measures

Some argue that the benefits provided to States,localities, and Indian tribes asked to host radioac-tive waste facilities should go beyond simple com-pensation for impacts, and should instead be setat a level sufficient to provide positive incentivesto accept the facilities. Measures to encourage com-munities or States to accept waste management ac-tivities include monetary payments, constructionof public facilities, and the tradeoff of siting a wastefacility for a pledge to site a desirable project nearbyor an undesirable project elsewhere.— — . — —

Pipman, and Janice E. Owens, Assessment of Natiomd Systems forObtaining Local Acceptance of Nuclear Waste Management Sitingand Routing Activities, International Energy Associates Limited,IEAL-158, July 1980, “Japan,” pp. 9-10.

STSpC recommend~ that impacts of repository development activ-ities should be independently assessed by State, tribal, and local govern-ments as a basis for Federal impact payments. SPC, Recommenda-tions, p. 11.

Although incentives could lessen opposition tositing, perhaps even making it attractive, they mayalso have drawbacks. A potential disadvantage ofmonetary payments, in particular, is that they mayappear to prejudice a waste siting decision, possiblyincreasing suspicion in some communities that theyare being bribed to accept something that is un-safe. If incentives are offered to make radioactivewaste management activities more acceptable, itmay be necessary to tie them to other measures thataddress health and safety concerns, such as emer-gency response, and to measures that provide as-surances regarding the technical merits of the ra-dioactive waste management program .38 Inaddition, there may be a need for explicit upperlimits on the amount of incentives that could be pro-vided. Otherwise, depending on the latitude thatthe beneficiaries of incentive measures are givento negotiate the amounts received, the cost of suchmeasures could become excessive, placing an un-fair burden on those who must pay for waste man-agement activities.

NWPA makes no provision for incentive meas-ures beyond compensation for impacts. However,there is no limit placed on the level of tax-equivalentand impact payments for States and Indian tribesaffected by repositories, and considerable flexibilityis given to the Secretary of Energy in negotiatinga package of impact compensation.——

tsFor example, in an interview with OTA on Dec. 11, 1980, mem-bers of the New Mexico Governor’s Task Force on Radioactive WasteDisposal indicated that Federal compensation to affected States maybe appropriate, but only after all the questions about radiological healthhave been considered.

EQUITY IN SITING WASTEFACILITIES

Measures to address State concerns about the im- turned with relative ease39 the passage of such lawspacts of waste management facilities will not nec- by a number of States indicates the strength of Stateessarily address their concerns about equity in the -

siting of those facilities. Measures dealing explicitly tgRecent court decisions support the conclusion that state or IOCd

with the question of equity may help increase the laws restricting radioactive waste management from outside the State

acceptability of siting decisions. Though State lawsor locality can be preempted. A Louisa County, Va., ban on the storageof spent fuel from facilities outside the countv’s boundaries was voided

banning out-of-State waste probably could be over- by ~ U.S. District Court judge on Mar. 4, l’983. In issuing that judg-


concerns about equity in the siting of waste man-agement facilities. Nonnuclear States, in particu-lar, feel keenly the intrinsic unfairness of storingor disposing of the waste of nuclear States. NuclearStates, for their part, are understandably sensitiveabout bearing more than their perceived fair shareof costs .40

Concerns about equity have been heightened byproposals for a highly centralized waste manage-ment system, using the minimum number of wastefacilities technically necessary to store or disposeof waste safely. It may be technically possible forone repository or storage facility with a large an-nual loading capacity to handle all of the expecteddisposal or storage needs for decades. This ap-proach might require less initial capital expendi-ture than an approach involving more or less si-multaneous construction of several smaller facilities.Conceivably, only one siting battle would have tobe fought for the disposal or storage system, avoid-ing the additional battles engendered by additionalfacilities.

From an equity standpoint, however, the cen-tralized approach has important drawbacks. Whilethe meaning of fair distribution differs from per-son to person, one factor is generally included inequity perceptions: to the extent possible, benefi-ciaries of actions should bear the accompanyingcosts. There is disagreement, however, about whoare the primary beneficiaries of the activities thathave generated commercial high-level radioactivewaste. Some consider the benefits of nuclear powerto be national in scope because, for example, nu-clear power aids energy independence. Others focuson a smaller class of beneficiaries, the direct con-sumers of electricity generated by nuclear power.Whichever view is taken, use of a minimum num-

ment, the judge cited NWPA as clearly giving the Federal Govern-ment the authority over storage of radioactive material. He also citedthe Federal Government’s exclusive authority over radiation safetyand over interstate commerce. The Radioactive Exchange, vol. 2, Nos.3 and 4, Mar. 22, 1983, p. 20. Furthermore, on May 2, 1983, theSupreme Court decided not to review lower court decisions that de-clared unconstitutional laws of the States of Illinois and Washingtonwhich imposed restrictions on the transportation and storage of radi-oactive materials in those States. This action allowed the lower courtdecisions to stand. The Radioactive Exchange, vol. 2, No. 8, May20, 1983, p. 10.

4oFor example, testimony of former Nevada Governor MikeO’Callaghan before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, Sen-ate Environment and Public Works Committee, Nov. 14, 1979.

ber of large facilities for storage and disposal ofradioactive waste would make it inevitable thatmany of the beneficiaries of nuclear power gener-ation would not bear a proportionate share of theimpacts of waste management.

Thus one advantage of centralized systems—thatit is easier to expand a first facility than to buildanother one—is a distinct disadvantage in an equitysense, since it favors the concentration of the neg-ative impacts of waste management in a very fewareas. Moreover, a system utilizing a single, largestorage or disposal facility will probably necessitatea longer transportation network that affects a great-er number of States than a system with regionalfacilities, if those facilities are located near thesources of waste.

Federal policy that takes into account State con-cerns about equity may be less likely to provokeState opposition. At various times, Federal officialshave noted equity considerations and proposedmeasures to increase equity in siting. For exam-ple, DOE’s environmental impact statement (EIS)on commercial radioactive waste management con-sidered equity as a social issue and, partly in re-sponse to concerns about equity, stated that DOEwould consider the feasibility of regional reposi-tories 41 although no official commitment ‘as

made.

NWPA contains two features that relate to equityin siting. First, it encourages interim spent he] stor-age at reactor sites and strictly limits Federal in-terim storage to 1,900 tonnes, to be used only byutilities that are unable to provide their own stor-age in time. Onsite storage provides assurance thatat least some beneficiaries—in this case, utilities andtheir customers—will bear interim storage costs.It would be difficult for a small number of away-from-reactor facilities, especially if federally owned,to restrict the costs only to the utilities involved.In addition, onsite storage involves less transpor-tation of spent fuel than does away-from-reactorstorage; hence, the number of communities affectedand potentially the number of transportation acci-dents would be reduced.

f IM~agement of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste,Fina/ Environmental Impact Statement, U.S. Department of Energy,DOE/EIS-0046F, October 1980, vol. 1, p. 3.45.


Second, in response to concerns about the ques-tion of regional equity, NWPA requires the devel-opment of two geologic repositories.42 It also spec-ifies that transportation impacts be taken intoaccount in siting the second repository, a stipula-tion that appears to be intended to encourage loca-tion of the second repository closer to the sourcesof waste generation than the sites now under in-vestigation for the first repository .43—

+21R(3, for e=mple, recommended siting repositories on a region-al basis, as far as the technical considerations would permit. IRG,op. cit., pp. 51-52,

4~In suppfi of this provision during the debate on NWPA, Sena-tor SIade Gorton (Wash. ) stated: “In the case of the State of Wash-ington, it is my opinion that it should be asked to do no more thanprovide nuclear disposal capacity adequate to dispose of those wasteswhich are generated within a range of distance in which the transpor-tation risks can be minimized. Other States in other regions of thecountry should be responsible to provide disposal capacity for nucIearwaste generated within similar ranges of those disposal facilities. Weshould not be planning to move high-level nuclear waste across the

While NWPA requires siting and licensing tworepositories, it only authorizes construction of thefirst. The Act does not require operation of the sec-ond until 70,000 tonnes of spent fuel or waste havebeen placed in the first-which could take morethan 20 years. Some State officials have suggestedthat if a regional strategy is adopted, simultane-ous regional repository activities might be neces-sary to assure potential host States that the first re-pository would not be the only repository. Equityconsiderations could thus support a commitmentto a schedule involving operation of the second re-pository within a reasonably short time after thefirst, as provided in the conservative Mission Plandescribed in chapter 6.

continent if we can avoid it. We should not be looking to a State onone side of the continent to provide disposal capacity for waste gener-ated on the other. ” (Congmssiomd Recoti, Dec. 20,1982, p. S15667.)

PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT

Public interest in radioactive waste managementcomes from concerns about its potential hazardsand from its possible linkage to the future of nu-clear power. The checkered history of radioactivewaste management has convinced some membersof the public that the hazards may not be sufficientlyunderstood or fully explained by Government of-ficials. Some feel that the promoters of nucleartechology may not be sufficiently conservative aboutpublic health and safety. Others are concerned thatdelays in implementing permanent waste disposalmay impair the authorization of new nuclear re-actors, thereby jeopardizing the energy security ofthe country and perhaps their own jobs. As withhazardous waste disposal, many citizens living neara candidate site adopt the attitude ‘‘not in my back-yard. ” Through grassroots organizing efforts, somespecial-interest groups attempt to stymie the waste-siting process and demand an end to the produc-tion of mom waste, thereby stopping nuclear power.Nuclear waste and radiation are also associated withmany negative images, such as nuclear weapons,cancer, and birth defects. It is understandable,therefore, that many members of the public havesought greater access to the decisionmaking proc-

ess, in the belief that the Government has not madethe best decisions in the past.

The call for additional avenues for public par-ticipation is usually predicated upon a belief thatpublic acceptability is central to the resolution ofa particular societal problem such as radioactivewaste management. The fundamental objectivesoften quoted for public participation in a Govern-ment program are:44

● To improve the quality of Governrnent deci-sions through the solicitation of broad publicinput and review. Public scrutiny has im-proved some Government programs, such asthe trans-Alaska pipeline. Participation by the“technical’ public through peer review byoutside expert groups is obviously valuable inprogram design and implementation. Becauseconfidence that a geologic repository will per-form as desired over millenia must ultimatelyrest on confidence in the soundness of the

+4see, for exmple, A. Henry Schilling a n d StanJey M. Ne~ey,

“Public Participation in Nuclear Waste Management, ” BattelleHuman Affairs Research Centers, Seattle, Wash., April 1979.


underlying scientific analysis, extensive peerreview of this analysis at each step can playan important role in assuring the public thatradioactive waste will be disposed of safely.General public review is also valuable becausetechnical decisions implicitly involve socialvalues. Public input allows Government offi-cials to discern what the public wants and as-sists them in formulating technically and po-litically acceptable policies. Some of thechronic technical, institutional, and politicalproblems that have occurred in the waste man-agement program in the past might have beeneliminated or alleviated through wider publicscrutiny.

● To enhance the legitimacy of and to build sup-port fora Government program. Once imple-mentation of a program has begun, voluntarycompliance or active cooperation by key in-dividuals, firms, and groups is often essentialfor a program to achieve its goal. If a signifi-cant segment of the public believes its concernsare being ignored, it can stop virtually anyproject by devoting sufficient resources to doso. Making the decision process open to pub-lic inspection and responsive to input from re-sponsible parties can result in greater publicacceptance and understanding of the decision.

● To inform and educate the interested public,so that they can act as they deem appropri-ate. Effective, intelligent, and meaningful pub-lic involvement in Government decisionmak-ing processes often requires adequate informa-tion and education.

45 Members of the publiccan most appropriately decide on their ownhow to be involved in Government decisionsif they are well-informed about the issues in-volved in those decisions.

Thus, the purpose of increased public participa-tion is for the Government to reach wise, just, andfair decisions that can be implemented successfully.The implicit hope of proponents of public partici-pation is for the Government to make better deci-sions in radioactive waste management than it has

~5~RG s~at~, < ‘The IRG’s own experience with public participation

and the recommendations of many citizens appearing before the IRGindicate the urgent need for sustained, effective efforts to inform thepublic and to provide opportunities for discussion between the publicand the Government. ” IRG, op. cit., p. 96.

in the past. Increased public participation, how-ever, does not automatically build public support.4G

Sometimes more information increases fears andconcerns, thereby leading to polarization ratherthan consensus. The desire by some to minimizepublic participation, e.g., in military programs forwaste management, is based on the fear that in-creased visibility will create increased opposition.

Nonetheless, public involvement can pinpointproblems that need further attention by the Gov-ernment as well as accelerate the ripening of anissue in order to initiate the settlement process. Ig-noring the need for public participation may onlypostpone problems that appear later in a program’sdevelopment. While an inadequate technical pro-gram cannot be made acceptable solely by publicparticipation, public scrutiny can highlight dif-ficulties that need the application of more Govern-ment resources. In controversial issues of high pub-lic visibility, such as radioactive waste disposal,Government officials will probably have to accom-modate increased demands for sharing of informa-tion and even some authority.

Considerable opportunity for public involvementin Federal Government activities is already requiredby existing law and administrative procedure. TheAdministrative Procedure Act,47 for example, re-quires notice in the Federal Register and publichearings for various Federal actions, e.g., rulemak-ings. The regulatory agencies must hold formalpublic commenting periods on draft rules, stand-ards, and regulations prior to promulgating finalversions. The National Environmental Policy Act(NEPA) requires the preparation of environmentalimpact statements that entail public participationopportunities in the notice of intent, public hear-ings, and commenting process. In a final EIS, Fed-eral officials are required to respond to public com-ments received on the draft EIS. Regulationspromulgated by the Council on Environmental

—-.—._—.——46A represenbtive of the League of Women Voters observed that

‘‘if increasing the likelihood of project completion is an agency’s solerationale for involving the public, the process will certainly fail to reacheven that single, limited objective . . . If people sense (accurately) thatthey are involved only to be sold a particular decision, the seeds forfailure are well sown. ” Susan Wiltshire, “Public Involvement in Nu-clear Waste Management Decisions, Proceedings of the 1982 Na-tional Waste Terminal Storage Program Information Meeting, U.S.Department of Energy, DOE/NWTS-30, December 1982, pp. 214-216.

475 U. S.C. 551, et seq.

.,


Quality have broadened the opportunities for publicreview and involvement in NEPA implementation.The legislation that established DOE directed it toencourage and provide for public participation inthe development of national energy programs; theDOE Citizen Participation Manual was producedin 1979 as a result. The Office of Management andBudget has required that local communities be in-formed of Federal Government projects that arelikely to affect them. Formal licensing procedures,such as those required by NRC’s procedural reg-ulations for high-level waste repositories, offer op-portunities for public and State participationthrough public hearings in the siting and licensingprocess, The Uranium Mill Tailings RadiationControl Act of 1978 contains provisions for publicparticipation in remedial action programs, as dothe rules promulgated by DOT for selecting alter-nate routes for transport of radioactive waste. Inaddition, the Freedom of Information Act increasesopen public access to a broad range of informationabout Federal activities.

The many available avenues for public partici-pation in Federal programs also include formal andinformal mechanisms not required by law. Theseinclude:

●

●

●

●

●

●

public meetings that incorporate presentationsby Government officals;outside advisory panels and review commit-tees created for various Federal programs;library and information services provided byGovernment agencies;submission of unsolicited comments and ad-vice to program managers;public surveys and questionnaires for identi-fying public concerns and opinions; andcongressional lobbying by various special in-terest groups to put pressure on executivebranch officials.

Federal radioactive waste management programshave, since 1976, provided significant public par-ticipation opportunities in the development of na-tional policies and plans.48 For example, the Carteradministration created the Interagency ReviewGroup (IRG) to produce formal policy recommen-dations for the President in radioactive waste man-agement. According to an IRG staff member:

+sc&e Schi]ling and Nealey, op. cit.

The IRG recognized two reasons why obtaininginput from interest groups and the public was crit-ically important. First, it believed that its policyrecommendations would not be useful or capableof being implemented unless they commandedbroad support. Second, it believed that the legiti-macy of the outcome and willingness of the publicto accept it depended in large measure on the le-gitimacy of the process itself and on giving the pub-lic a chance to participate and be heard. In short,the IRG sought both to accommodate its policiesto external reality and to draw relevant interestgroups into the process in the hope that becauseof their involvement, they would be more likely tosupport the policy outcomes. 49

Public hearings, meetings with interest groups,and solicitation of public comments on draft doc-uments were used by IRG for public involvement.Approximately 15,000 copies of the draft IRG re-port were distributed, and comments were activelysought. Some 3,300 written comments were re-ceived. The review of the public comments led tothe reopening of internal IRG discussions on manyof the difficult policy questions. The revised IRGreport published in March 1979 contained the textof the draft report, the drafting committee’s sum-mary of the public comment on each section of thedraft, and an IRG response to these comments.These responses frequently involved extensions andrevisions of findings contained in the draft report .50President Carter adopted many of the IRG recom-mendations in his policy statement of February 12,1980, and stated that:

. . . it is essential that all aspects of the waste man-agement program be conducted with the fullest pos-sible disclosure to and participation by the publicand the technical community .5]

In addition to public participation in national pol-icy discussions, various segments of the public haveundertaken activities at specific project sites. Theproposed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant has for sev-eral years elicited intense interest, both in supportand opposition, from groups in New Mexico. Otherpotential host States for a repository have had con-tacts and public information meetings with Federal

4gGNenwood, op. cit., p. 22.501 bid., pp. 22-23.51’’Fact Sheet: The President’s Program on Radioactive Waste Man-

agement, ” O~ce of the White House Press Secretary, Feb. 12, 1980,p. 10.

.Ch. 8—Addressing State and Public Concerns ● 793

officials over a period of years. Since attemptingto site a repository in Kansas in the early 1970’s,DOE has increased contacts with State and localofficials and the public at proposed project sites,apparently recognizing that ‘‘a Federal agency dis-regards at its peril the potential power of State andlocal officials whose opinions reflect the consensusof their constituency on matters of health andsafety. ’52

Congress, in passing NWPA, found that “Stateand public participation in the planning and de-velopment of repositories is essential in order to pro-mote public confidence in the safety of disposal of. . . waste and spent fuel. ’53 To accomplish this,

NWPA specifies a detailed process for State involve-ment and for public hearings and review of envi-ronmental analyses prepared by DOE at variousstages of the siting process.

Review of past Federal efforts at public partici-pation in radioactive waste management activities,and of critiques of those efforts by non-Federalobservers, 54 suggests three steps that could increasepublic confidence in DOE’s public involvementprogram:

1. Commit additional resources to public in-volvement.

Because of the importance of public acceptabilityof DOE waste management activities, planning andimplementation of public involvement programs re-quire the same degree of care and attention as tech-

—— ——~ZRichard G. Hewlitt, “Federal Policy for the Disposal of Highly

Radioactive Waste from Commercial Nuclear Power: A HistoricalAnalysis, ” (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Mar.9, 1978).

Stpublic Law 97-425, sec. 11 l(a)(6), 96 Stat. 2207, 42 U.S.C. 10131.“See, for example, “Public Participation in Developing National

Plans for Radioactive Waste Management: Summary Report of theSecond Keystone Conference on Public Participation in RadioactiveWaste Management Decision Making, ” (Keystone, Colo.: KeystoneCenter for Continuing Education, October 1980). The conference con-cluded, “If adequate plans for public participation are not preparedsoon and carefidly executed, Federal-State relationships could beharmed; DOE’s credibility could be reduced further; and progressin implementing (President Carter’s) new radioactive waste programcould become more difiicult. Letter to Stuart Eizenstat from RobertCraig and Ter~ Lash, July 15, 1980, p. 3, appended to the confer-ence report.

nical programs.55 T he need for improvements in

the program for public involvement in repositorydevelopment activities was the subject of many pub-lic comments on DOE’s draft guidelines for repos-itory site selection.

56 while DOE strongly endorsesthe concept of public participation at the State andlocal levels,57 it may be necessary to dedicate ad-ditional resources—in terms of staff, funds, andmanagement attention—to that task.

As noted in chapter 7, questions were raised priorto passage of NWPA about the relative weaknessof the DOE waste program staff in the area of thenontechnical aspects of waste management. The in-creased level of interaction with the States and pub-lic required by the Act will place even greaterdemands on DOE in that area. Thus creation ofan adequately staffed and financed program groupdevoted solely to DOE relations with non-Federalactors, including the general public, as suggestedin chapter 7, could increase confidence that publicinvolvement will receive a level of attention com-mensurate with its importance to the success of theprogram. The newly established outreach divisionwithin the Office of Civilian Radioactive WasteManagement may accomplish this.

Mechanisms for some public participation inFederal radioactive waste programs surely will con-tinue to be provided, if only because of the existinglegal and procedural requirements. However, someoutside groups that have studied the Federal Gov-ernment’s public participation efforts in the areaof radioactive waste management have found thoseefforts wanting in some way, either directly—

55This point is emphasized in a letter from SPC to President car-

ter, which stated: “Public participation in waste management plan-ning and programs is sufficiently important to deserve the same qualityof thought, commitment, and implementation as technical programs.This requires a clear definition of goals and objectives; a detailed framew-ork of operating policies, procedures, and/or regulations; and man-agement cognizance, control, evaluation and impro~’ement. The textof the letter is found in app. E of SPC, Recommendations. See alsoNuclear Waste Management Process Review Forum: FinaJ Report(Palo Alto, Calif,: RESOLVE Center for Environmental Conflict Res-olution, June 1980), pp. 36-37.

5GU S Depa~ment of Energy, Responses to Pub/ic COIIIITWUS on. .

the Proposed General Guidelines for Recommendation of Sites forNuclear Waste Repositories, Draft, May 27, 1983, vol. 1, pp.IV-10—IV-12.

571 bid., p. IV-12.


through explicit criticism—or indirectly—throughdetailed recommendations for change. For exam-ple, the Keystone Center’s conference on publicparticipation in July 1980 concluded that:

Involvement of the public and non-Federal jur-isdictions in making decisions about managementand disposal of radioactive wastes is important forgaining needed improvements in the overall Fed-eral program, enhancing the credibility of Federalagencies’ prugrams (when warranted), and educat-ing the public about those programs and the tech-nology of waste disposal. Current Federal plans forobtaining public participation need substantial im-provements to achieve this objective (emphasisadded) .58

Such criticisms suggest that additional efforts areneeded.

2. Include an explicit public involvement planin the Mission Plan.

DOE agrees with the need for involvement byboth the lay and technical publics in the waste man-agement program.

59 However, it has yet to pub-lish explicit policies or a long-term plan showinghow such involvement is to be carried out and howthe results are to be used in the decision process.60

As noted in chapter 5, the broad distrust of the Fed-eral waste management program that developed asa result of past experiences means that a high de-gree of explicitness about and commitment to pol-icies and programs is needed to rebuild credibil-ity. Thus, confidence that an adequate publicinvolvement program will be carried out could beenhanced by including a detailed public involve-ment plan in the Mission Plan.61 This plan shouldmake clear whose comments will be sought, wherethe interaction will take place, how the commentswill be used, and how decisions will be made. Itshould also include explicit provisions for an ob-

— — .56 Keystone Center, “Public Participation, ” p. iv.SsDepa~ment of Energy, Responses, p. IV-12 and IV-27.@An example of a formal Federal agency policy for public partici-

pation can be found in the Environmental Protection Agency’s poli-cy published in the Federal Reg”ster, vol. 46, No. 12, January 19,1981, pp. 5736-5746.

blThe v~ue of exp]icit, Cletai]ed plans for putdic involvement k iden-

tified in the SPC letter to President Carter, op. cit.; in the Fina/ Re-

port of the RESOLVE forum, pp. 36-37, and in the report of the Key-stone Center, “Public Participation in Developing National Plans, ”p. iv.

jective public information program62 and for a sys-tematic technical peer review process.63 Confidencewould be further increased if this plan were accom-panied by a long-term budget for carrying it out,to ensure that the costs of public involvement areexplicitly included in the estimates of overall pro-gram costs so that adequate resources can be madeavailable from the Nuclear Waste Fund.

3. Use the Mission Plan as a focus for public in-volvement.

A frequent theme of recommendations for pub-lic involvement activities is the development of anational radioactive waste management plan as thefocal point for such activities.64 An attempt wasmade by DOE during the Carter administrationto develop a National Plan for Radioactive WasteManagement. The administration circulated thefourth working draft of the plan to State govern-ments and Congress for comment before produc-ing a revised draft for formal public review. Theintention was to produce a final version after ob-

6ZThe impor~nce of a public information program has been em-

phasized by a representative of the government of the State of Mis-sissippi: “The only means through which this nation is going to ef-fectively solve the problem of radioactive waste disposal is throughthe process of gaining a public confidence that the Federal, State andlocal governments and the public sector are satisfied that the wastedisposal program is credible and is designed to absolutely assure thepublic health and safety and the environmental quality. There is onlyone mechanism by which such a program can be successful. That mech-anism is a comprehensive, completely objective public informationprogram. Testimony of Ronald Forsythe, Mississippi Energy andTransportation Board, before the Subcommittee on Energy and Envi-ronment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, May26, 1983.

sgAddition~ efforts may be needed in the area of peer review. Ad-dressing this subject in a 1983 report, a National Research Councilpanel concluded that DOE “should institute a more deliberate over-all technical review of its program on geologic disposal. This techni-cal review should be done on a continuing and extended basis, withfull technical input representing the technical breadth of the program. . . “ National Research Council, A Study of the Iscdation Systemfor Gecdogic Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (Washington, D. C.: Na-tional Academy Press, 1983), p. 15.

‘For example, the Keystone conference on public participation rec-ommended, “A National Plan for the management of radioactivewastes should be prepared through an extended process involving theknowledgeable and concerned segments of the public, and the appro-priate ofticials of State, tribal, and local governments. ” Keystone Cen-ter, “Public Participation, ” p. iv. Similarly, SPC concluded, “ANational Plan, which would be updated periodically, is vital to im-prove coordination among the Federal agencies, to build and main-tain the Federal/State/tribal partnership, and to involve the public inthe decision making process. ” It recommended that the National Planprocess be carried fomvard. SPC, Recommendations, pp. 28-29.


taining public comments and then to update theplan biennially by repeating the process. It washoped that the preparation of a National Plan mightthen become a useful vehicle for improving coor-dination among Federal agencies, incorporatingcomments from States and Indian tribes, and elic-iting public participation. The Reagan administra-tion received the comments on the draft plan fromthe States and Congress, but it did not proceed withthe development of a document for review by thegeneraI public.

As discussed in chapter 5, NWPA requires DOEto prepare a comprehensive Mission Plan for thewaste management program. Chapter 6 showedthat the choices to be made in the Mission Plan willinvolve many decisions about the waste manage-ment program that will have significant implica-tions for many affected parties—e. g., the utilitiesand their ratepayers, the communities affected bywaste transportation, and so on. For example, thetiming of operation of the second repository couldgreatly influence the number of States affected bywaste transportation, while the planned full-scaleloading capacity of the repository system will de-termine the level of impacts of waste transporta-tion and the length of time that utilities will haveto care for spent fuel stored at reactors. While

NWPA does not explicitly require DOE to providefor broad public involvement in preparation of theMission Plan, such involvement could be a usefulmeans of developing broad support for the Plan bythose affected by the choices made in it, and in factmay be a necessary step for achieving that objec-tive. 65

DOE widely circulated a preliminary draft of theMission Plan for comments, which were used inpreparing the formal draft required by NWPA. Assuggested in chapter 7, a process of extensive pub-lic and technical review of this formal draft, andof any subsequent revisions of the Plan after it hasbeen submitted to Congress as required by the Act,could help develop broad national understandingof and agreement about the high-level waste man-agement program.

bsspc stated that ‘ ‘public participation must be incorporated to pro-duce a ‘true National Plan. “ Letter to President Cafier from Gover-nor Richard Riley, Chairman of the State Planning Council, Jan.13, 1981, p. 2, contained in the appendixes to the SPC Interim Re-

port, Feb. 24, 1981. The Keystone conference on public participa-tion also agreed that public participation in development of a NationalPlan “is needed if the administmtion’s plans am to be widely acceptedand workable. Letter to Stuart Eizenstat from Robert Craig and Ter-ry Lash, July 15, 1980, p. 2, appended to October 1980 report of theconference.

Appendixes

Appendix A-1

Radioactive Waste ManagementPolicymaking*

Acknowledgments

In preparing this paper, the author accumulated anumber of debts that he can only hope to partially repaywith these words of acknowledgment. William Barnardof the Office of Technology Assessment was a constantsource of encouragement and support as this effort, in-itially planned to be of 2 months duration, stretched intomany months. He also carefully read the first draft andoffered helpful criticisms. David Stewart of the U.S.Geological Survey provided much information as wellas useful suggestions for improving the first draft. AlexPerge of the Department of Energy (DOE) also com-mented on the first version of the paper and pointed outsome factual errors. Several unknown reviewers fromDOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)helped improve the accuracy of appendix A-2.

In addition to David Stewart, the author greatly ben-efited from detailed internal decision memoranda ob-tained from the Office of Science and Technology Policyand from NRC. The Off Ice of the Historian at DOEwas extremely helpful in providing decision memoran-da for the period prior to 1975. Sheldon Meyers, Direc-tor of DOE’s Office of Nuclear Waste Management,and his staff also provided assistance. However, theywere unable to find or to produce some key decisionpapers for the post-1975 period. That unfortunatelymade this analysis less complete than it might otherwisehad been.

Marcia Picket did an admirable job in typing thedrafts and the final product.

Despite all these efforts to facilitate the work and toimprove it, errors undoubtedly remain. For this I takefull responsibility.

The Imperative

The philosopher Hans Jonas poses the central ethicalissue of our new technological age as he observes thatthe days have passed when:

The good and evil about which action had to care layclose to the act, either in the praxis itself or in its im-mediate reach, and were not a matter for remote plan-ning . . . Proper conduct had its immediate criteria andalmost immediate consummation. The long run conse-quences beyond were left to chance, fate or providence.Ethics, accordingly, was of the here and now, of occa-sions as they arise between men, of the recurrent, typicalsituations of private and public life. 1

● The material in this appendix was prepared for OTA by Daniel Metlayof the University of Indiana under contract No. 033-2690.0, June 1981.

I Hans Jonas, “Technology and Responsibility: Reflections on the New Taskof Ethics, Social Research 40, spring 1973, pp. 35-36,

Instead, suggests Jonas,[T]his sphere is overshadowed by a growing realm of

collective action where doer, deed, and effect are no longerthe same as they were in the proximate sphere, and whichby the enormity of its [technology’s] powers forces uponethics a new dimension of responsibility never dreamt ofbefore. 2

Advocating a new categorical imperative—’ ‘In yourpresent choices, include the future wholeness of Manamong the objects of your will’ ‘—Jonas recapitulatesa theme which underlay the intent of those managingradioactive waste from the time they were first pro-duced, nearly 2 score years ago.

IntroductionRadioactive waste management is a problem that is

not quite like most others that have come within theGovernment’s purview. There are technical and institu-tional uncertainties associated with this problem; someof them unknown and possibly large; some of those un-certainties are, in principle, unresolvable. The cost oferror may be high, and the time constant of feedbackabout error is great. No jurisdiction is enthusiastic aboutlocating waste management facilities within its confines;yet if all decline, a pressing national need will not bemet, thus opening the way for a repeat of the ‘‘tragedyof the commons.

This paper is about radioactive waste managementproblem-solving. It examines how the Federal Govern-ment responded to an issue of high complexity, poten-tially large risk, and intense political controversy. Eightdimensions of waste management problem-solving areconsidered:

the determination of what constitutes waste;the storage of radioactive waste;the role of the earth sciences in designing waste dis-posal facilities;the development of strategies for searching for dis-posal sites;the use of engineered barriers in the design of wastedisposal facilities;the determination of acceptable levels of risk in dis-posing of radioactive waste;the interaction between the States and the FederalGovernment in the area of waste management; andthe relationship between waste management andthe production of nuclear power.

For each of these elements, two questions are raised:How did a particular aspect come to be recognized aspart of the “problem?” How did the understanding of

‘Ibid., p. 38.

1 9 9


the eight problem elements evolve over time? Once thosequestions have been considered, we ask a third one:How did conceptualizations of the problem and deci-sions taken at one point influence problem-solving dur-ing subsequent periods of time? We shall try to learnthe reasons why policymaking was sometimes quite suc-cessful and why it was sometimes not. By doing thatwe hope to provide insights into designing and imple-menting programs that might be useful guides for thefuture.

Before we can proceed with that analysis, the stagemust be set, a foundation must be laid. For those un-familiar with the details and history of radioactive wastemanagement, four chronologies have been prepared andare included in appendix A-2. The chronologies de-scribe, in turn, events dealing with waste storage, eventsdealing with waste disposal, events dealing with the reg-ulation of radioactive waste, and events affecting orga-nizational structure and responsibility for waste man-agement. In addition, a “time line” has also beenprepared and appended which shows the sequence ofsome of the major events in waste management history.Of more general interest, however, is a discussion ofthe context within which waste management problem-solving occurred. The evolution of waste managementpolicymaking can only be partially understood withoutreference to that context. It is to that second compo-nent of the foundation that we now turn before address-ing the eight specific areas of the problem.

The Context of thePolicymaking Process

Richard Cyert and James March correctly observedthat complexity and uncertainty generate dilemmasabout how to act. According to them, decisionmakersin organizations appear to resolve those dilemmasthrough the use of a particular strategy:

[Policymakers] make decisions by solving a series ofproblems; each problem is solved as it arises; the organiza-tion then waits for another problem to appear. Wheredecisions within the [organization] do not naturally fallinto such a sequence, they are modified to do S0.3

Thus, policymakers give pressing problems priority;what had to be done yesterday draws their first atten-tion today. Problems which can wait, wait.

A high degree of complexity and a substantial amountof uncertainty affect policy makers’ behavior in otherways as well. Decisionmakers tread carefully; theycautiously implement policies that are minimally disrup-tive; they monitor the consequences of their actions andevaluate whether those consequences are satisfactory or

‘Richard Cyert and James March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 3.

unsatisfactory. When faced with outcomes that are notacceptable, they search in the neighborhood of the ex-isting policy to find alternatives. To simplify the com-plexity they confront, policymakers generally ignore fac-tors that appear only marginally related to the core oftheir efforts; sometimes they even ignore factors that aresubstantially related but which are, for any number ofreasons, intractable or elusive.

The evidence is strong that the policymaking processfor the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle followed thepatterns of organizational behavior just described, atleast during the three decades prior to 1975. The AtomicEnergy Commission (AEC), the developer and the reg-ulator of the nuclear power technology, deferred thesearch for long-term solutions to the problem of wastemanagement. When the problem could be finessed, itwas; when it could not be, waste management was dealtwith in ad hoc ways. Such responses are hardly unrea-sonable. Indeed, given the limitations inherent in theexercise of cognitive power by individuals, as well asmore mundane but important constraints such as budgetceilings, they may represent the best strategy available.Nonetheless, those responses may prove ultimately tobe inadequate and insufficient; their employment maylead policymakers into situations from which they can-not easily or gracefully escape.4

What factors facilitated this fragmentation of nuclearpower policy and the subsequent minor emphasis givento waste management? First, attitudes held by the AECCommissioners and operating personnel played a role.The Commissioners never got personally excited aboutthe problems of waste management. In the history ofAEC, there was only one Commissioner, Clarence Lar-son, who took a major interest in waste management,But even he never championed the area’s needs in thesame manner that James Ramney pushed reactor de-velopment or Glenn Seaborg pushed physical research.For most of the Commissioners, waste was unpleasant,unglamorous, and low priority.

Evidence for this proposition comes from interviewswith key participants involved in the decisionmakingprocesses that took place prior to 1975. One person whodealt with the Commissioners every day described theobstacles he encountered:

To get them interested was very difficult. There wasnot a lot of glory in waste. No one wanted to be a cham-pion of waste. Milt Shaw and I went to get the KansasGovernor’s approval [for the Lyons repository] but notone Commissioner would go to do it. No one wanted toget tagged as having waste being his bag . . . One divi-sion or another would develop things about waste man-

4See, Daniel Metlay, Error Correction in Bureaucracy, unpublished Ph. D.dissertation, University of California, 1978, especially chs. 1 and 5 .

App. A-l—Radioactive Waste Management Policymaking . 201

agement within the staff; the Commission tolerated it,but they were really interested in reactors . . . I’d havea hard time finding someone on the Commission whothought he was responsible for waste.5

A program director dealing with waste managementduring this period offered a similar view: “One of theproblems the Commission had for years was that theemphasis was on the development of reactors and to hellwith anything to feed or service reactors. That was be-cause the sexy part of this industry was the damnedreac tor . A former Commissioner summed up how oneof his colleagues treated the issue of waste managementby recalling that ‘‘every time anyone mentioned wasteto X, [he] would make a face, turn up [his] nose, andmove on to another subject.

Nor could the cause of waste management be sus-tained through the skillful use of internal politics by per-sonnel at lower levels. For them to pursue the issue in-tensely hardly made much sense. Grand careers weremade in reactor development where the organization’sresources were committed, not in waste disposal. More-over, waste management also seemed to lack the intellec-tual challenges of reactor research or high energyphysics.

A second influence, more subtle but extremely per-vasive, which led policy makers to place a low priorityon waste management and which reduced their sensitivi-ty to potential errors in their actions was a sense of tech-nological optimism. By technological optimism we meana systematic perception on the part of scientific andtechnical professionals that solutions to problems canbe crafted through the straightforward administrationof readily available technologies. It is, in Leon Lind-berg’s words, ‘‘an overwhelming faith in progress. . . that admits of few limitations to the ability of scien-

tific knowledge to solve problems. Obviously, muchof this optimism is justified by past experience. Scien-tists and engineers have solved a wide range of problemsand have fundamentally altered modern society. How-ever, should this faith be too rigidly held or if it ismisplaced, then serious distortions can arise. In partic-ular, there is a tendency among those gripped by tech-nological optimism to discount substantially aspects ofproblemsolving which are not technological. g This pro-clivity can lead them to misspecify and misconstrue thecharacter of the problem and to adopt policies that proveto be inadequate. The evolution of waste management

‘Confidential interview with author, 1975.cContidential interview with author, 1976.‘Confidential interview with author, 1975.‘Leon Lindberg, “Energy Politics and the Politics of Economic Develop-

ment, 1976, p. 29.‘See, Ida Hoos, “The Credibility Issue, ‘‘ in W. P. Bishop, et al., Essays

on Issues Relevant to the Regulation of Radioactive Waste Management,NUREG-0412, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1978, for a good discus-sion of this point.

policy provides a striking illustration of both the senseof technological optimism and its often accompanyingtendency to discount the nontechnical components ofproblemsolving.

For at least 25 years, the nuclear developers main-tained that radioactive waste management was an easi-ly solved problem; by extension, it was also one thatcould be disaggregated and ignored until a system wasactually required. A plethora of examples document thepolicymakers’ sense of technological optimism. We citejust a few. One manager in the Division of ReactorDevelopment and Technology testified before the JointCommittee on Atomic Energy ~CAE) in 1959:

Although one has to be careful to distinguish betweenaspiration, reality, and speculation, it is my strong feel-ing that the development program has thus far found solu-tions to some of the waste problems and at least indica-tions of solutions to others. 10

Even the most visible failure in waste management his-tory, the Lyons project, was seen as technically feasibleby program personnel. The Oak Ridge engineer incharge of that effort was asked whether the laboratorycould have handled the problems which arose in Kan-sas. He replied, “Of course, it was technologicallypossible. 1 One executive in charge of waste manage-ment development remarked: ‘‘The easiest part of thereactor business is the waste management portion. Ican’t believe that it has ended up as it has. ’12 The Direc-tor of the Division of Waste Management reflected of-ficial attitudes when he told the American Nuclear So-ciety: “We do have today, in the retrievable surfacestorage facility, the answers needed for safe managementof commercial high-level radioactive waste. 13

In sum, one gets a strong impression from readingthe public record and from talking with former AECpersonnel that, if they had just been given enoughmoney and had been left alone, they could and wouldhave solved the “problem” expeditiously and to virtual-ly everyone’s satisfaction.

Interestingly, this position was held despite repeatedtechnical setbacks in a number of efforts to manage thebyproducts of nuclear fission. The storage of militarywastes at Hanford has been plagued with numerousproblems. Tanks expected to hold the liquid waste for50 to 100 years have corroded and leaked after less than25.14 Although the waste stored at the Savannah Riverfacility have not leaked into the environment, plans to

I ou, S, Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, hearings, Industrial

Radioactive Waste Disposa/, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC,: U.S.Government Printing OfYice, 1959), pp. 992-993.

llconfidenti~ interview with author, 1975.‘zIbid.IsSpeech by Frank pittm~ to the American Nuclear Society, NOV. 16, 1972.

Reprinted in Atomic Energy Commission Press Release S-18-72, p. 2.I+see Envjmnmenta] Impact Statement, Waste Management Operation%

Hanford Reservation, Richland, Washington, WASH- 1538, U.S. AtomicEnergy Commission, 1974.

202 ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Leve Radioactive Waste

dispose of the material in the bedrock underlying theplant have not been consummated in part because ofpotential technical difficulties.’s The legacy of theNuclear Fuel Service operation, 640,000 gallons of wastein upper New York State, will cost nearly a half billiondollars to dispose of. The attempt to build a repositoryat Lyons failed in part because it was too hastily con-ceived and designed. Low-level wastes have migratedfrom their burial sites at Maxey Flats, Ky., despiterepeated predictions that such movements werephysically impossible.l6

Moreover, the sense of technological optimism wasmaintained despite the fact that past technological ap-proaches to what must be regarded as a long-term prob-lem have proven to be only temporary stopgaps. Theexperience at Hanford illustrates that point. To copewith the leakage from the corroding tanks, a decisionwas made in 1965 to evaporate completely the waste so-lutions; the resulting salt cake not only would not leak,but also it would seal up any holes in the tank. Yet,many knowledgeable people agree with the NaturalResources Defense Council’s observation that:

Eliminating the excess liquid has to a great extent alsoended [the government’s] ability to remove the waste fromthe tanks since as damp solids the waste can no longerbe pumped hydraulically out of the tanks. Moreover, liq-uids cannot be reintroduced in too many of the tanks toresuspend the waste since to do so would almost certain-ly result in substantial leaks to the ground.17

While the alternative of mining the waste out does ex-ist, that technique is beset with a number of difficulties:a remote control system for mining would have to bedeveloped; efforts would have to be made to reduce air-borne releases; and the material is difficult to deal withphysically: thus, the record suggests that past technicalefforts have at least occasionally complicated matters forthe present and have engendered problems for the fu-ture.

No force foreordained this phenomenon of techno-logical optimism. Rather it was something that appearsto have evolved and to have been institutionalized. In-deed, as early as 1955, AEC had not become overly san-guine. For instance, one individual from the Divisionof Reactor Development and Technology told the firstmeeting of the National Academy of Science’s (NAS)Advisory Committee on Waste Disposal:

To some extent because of our geographically isolatedlocations (such as Hanford), it has been possible to sweep

l~~tematjve tiesses hr Managing Existing Commemial High-LevelRadioactive Wastes, NUREG-0043, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1976, p. 12.

16&, ~pmwmenti N&din the Land D@osal of Radioactive Wastes--+

problem of Centuries, RED-76-54 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress, GeneralAccounting Oillce, 1976).

IJNatur~ Resources Defense Council, ‘‘Memorandum and points ofAuthorities in Support of the NRC Licensing of the ERDA’s High-Level WasteStorage Facilities Under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, ” p. 18.

the problem under the rug, so to speak. But those of uswho are close to it are convinced we must face up to thefact that we are confronted with a real problem . . . Look-ing backward we know of the mistakes that many indus-tries made in assuming that the disposal of waste wassimply a back-door problem that any one could handle. 18

At the same time, his colleague, who 4 years later, wouldbecome so optimistic in testifying before the JCAE,noted: “I certainly hope I can disabuse you of the ideathat we have any solution that will solve the problemsof waste disposal. “19 Yet, if that NAS study began ona note of caution, it ultimately provided the major sup-port for the technological optimism that developed inthe agency. Although the writers of the NAS report werecareful to note the need for further research, they statedcategorically that “the committee is convinced thatradioactive waste can be disposed of safely in a varietyof ways and in a large number of sites in the UnitedStates. “2° Further, they stated that “disposal in salt wasthe most promising method for the near future. ’21 Theconsequences of such judgments were great. As someonewho has been in the waste management program fora number of years put it, “The NAS report did instilla sense of complacency in the minds of the people deal-ing with waste management. Because of it, we felt thata solution would be available whenever we needed it. ’22

The Joint Committee itself also played an importantrole in institutionalizing the sense of technological op-timism. In extensive hearings held in 1959, JCAE heardone expert after another from AEC, from the nationallaboratories, from academia, and from industry testifythat a technological solution to the waste managementproblem was possible.23 Once that technological op-timism received the imprimatur of the Joint Commit-tee7 JCAE promptly dropped the subject and, for allpractical purposes, never returned to it for another 16years.

The cumulative impact of the way the NAS reportwas interpreted and the Joint Committee hearings wasto legitimize a certain perspective. An illusion of cer-tainty was created where, in reality, it did not exist.Over the years, the sense of technological optimismembedded itself in the attitudes and thoughts of impor-tant agency policymakers. It became, in a sense, an of-ficial doctrine at AEC. There is no evidence that itsvalidity was ever seriously questioned until themi&1970’s. This optimism facilitated fragmentation bylulling policymakers; agency personnel never fullyrecognized that they might create in a sequential, in-

1~NatiOnaJ Academy of Science~National Research Council, The Disposalof Radioactive Waste on Land, 1957, pp. 16-17.

1gIbid., p. 34.‘“Ibid., p. 3.‘ ] Ibid., p. 6.zzconfidenti~ interview with author, 1974.

Wbid.

App. A-l—Radioactive Waste Management Policymaking ● 203

cremental fashion an elaborate technological structure,civilian nuclear power, only to find that the last piecescould not be made to fit. The difficulties of integratingthe whole were systematically underestimated.

Furthermore, it seems likely that this sense of tech-nological optimism influenced the manner in which deci-sionmakers conceptualized the issue of waste manage-ment. In particular, the lack of attention given to thenontechnical dimensions of policy prior to the mid-1970’s may have resulted from a belief that the prob-lem was so readily technically solvable. In such a case,it is understandable that AEC managers came to viewthe technology as virtually self-implementing. Onlywithin the last 6 or 7 years has the recognition grownthat the nontechnical or institutional aspects of wastemanagement need to be addressed as thoroughly andintensively as the technical ones.24

Thus, during the formative years of waste manage-ment policymaking, 1945 to 1975, the issue was nevergiven a very high priority by the AEC leadership. Wastewas unglamorous; the management of it was not a press-ing problem and could therefore be postponed; such apostponement hardly seemed ill-advised at the timebecause a firm belief prevailed in the nuclear powercommunity that once a need arose, the problem wouldyield to some readily envisioned, self-implementingtechnical solution.

The consequences of this state of affairs were twofold.First, budgetary commitments for waste management,the program’s staff of life, were minuscule, particularlywhen compared to funds expended for reactor develop-ment. (See fig. A-1 and also table A-1 which detail theallocations for waste management up to the presenttime. ) Those low budgets severely constrained prob-lemsolving as personnel were forced to make do. Sec-ond, the years of relative neglect made it harder to res-pond to rapidly growing external concerns about theadequacy of the waste management program. The or-ganizational and technical infrastructure had not beenwell established prior to the mid- 1970’s. As a result,AEC and its successors found themselves in a constantstruggle to catch up. When the program appeared tofalter, its credibility was challenged. That, in turn,created a situation in which efforts to find solutions wereundermined.

In describing the context of policymaking we refrainfrom critically judging the choices made, even thoughin retrospect some of those decisions proved to be un-fortunate. We do so—and suggest that others do so aswell—because, at the time the choices were made, they

W3ee for in~tace, W, p. Bishop, ct al, , Proposed Goals for Radioactive

Waste Management, NUREC-0300, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1978, and proceedings of Conference on PubIic Policy Issues in Nuclear WasteManagement, 1976.

Figure A-1 .—Expenditure for Reactor DevelopmentCompared With Expenditures for Waste Management

1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976

Fisca l year

appeared at least reasonable and, perhaps, given theconstraints at work, the most appropriate possible.Thus, while one can properly be concerned about thelack of progress in waste management, one ought notto denigrate those—at all levels—who worked this prob-lem in the past.

Having established the context of policymaking thatprevailed up until 1975, we must note that it haschanged dramatically over the last half decade. WhereasAEC did not even have a separate organizational struc-ture with its own budget responsible for waste manage-ment prior to 1972, now DOE has an Office of NuclearWaste Management headed by the Deputy AssistantSecretary. Funding for commercial waste managementis now over 100 times greater than it was a decade ago.During the Carter administration top officials at DOEmaintained that, aside from the strategic petroleumreserve, waste management had captured highest priori-ty. And while decisionmakers over the last 5 years stillstrongly believe that managing radioactive waste is not


Table A= I.—Waste Management Costs(dollars in thousands)

Fiscal year Commercial Defense

1960 and prior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1976 and TQ.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$ 125,772

1,7043,7506,215

10,26316,63267,087

123,236179,753207,192256,343317,473— —

8,5738,9408,972

11,7029,492

14,95317,72521,02026,42127,52632,01744,65344,57054,99883,521

141,203162,969234,362296,899313,864336,628392,000

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,189,648 $2,418,776

a difficult technical problem, their current optimism hasnot led them to discount the other dimensions of policyand, perhaps more significantly, appears to be foundedon a firmer technical base.

As the reader digests the next sections dealing withthe substance of problem-solving, he should keep inmind what the context of decisionmaking was and howthat context influenced the action taken.

Defining Radioactive Waste

Radioactive waste comes in a variety of forms; theyinclude uranium mill tailings, low-level waste derivedfrom industrial, institutional, power generating, andmilitary sources, and waste derived from the decon-tamination and decommissioning of nuclear facilities.While all those forms create some health hazard andtherefore must be managed with care, this paper shallconcentrate almost exclusively on two other types: high-level and transuranic contaminated waste.

During the early years of the nuclear endeavor, priorto 1970, only low- and high-level waste were distin-guished; the former variety had to be kept strictlyisolated and contained while the latter could be placedinto the environment under conditions of lower con-straint. More precisely, AEC in 1957 defined high-levelwaste to refer to material which “emitted radiation sostrong as to materially reduce the time a person can be

near the radiating body. “251n practice,that meant thatare lease of two or more roentgens per hour arbitrarilyqualified material to declassified as high-level waste.Ten years later, that definition was refined to meanmaterial “which, by virtue of its radio-nuclear concen-tration, half life, and biological significance, requiresperpetual isolation from the biosphere.”26

Some material, such as the byproducts of reprocess-ing military fuel and the postfission products of com-mercial power reactors, clearly falls under theseradiological definitions of high-level waste. Classifyingother material, however, is somewhat more complicated.For instance, material contaminated with transuranicelements, transuranic waste, initially was interred, alongwith low-level waste, in shallow land burial sites. In thelate 1960’s, AEC decided to halt that practice and seg-regate its own transuranic waste for ultimate transferto and disposal in a geologic repository. In 1974, theagency proposed that commercial waste possessingtransuranic activity of greater than 10 nanocuries pergram be treated the same as commission-generatedtransuranic material .27 Although that regulation wasnever adopted and thus no formal definition of transu-ranic waste is available, there seems to be a fair amountof agreement that transuranic waste, however ultimatelydefined, will eventually be disposed of in a mannersimilar to that of high-level waste. The NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC) is currently carryingout a study to determine whether other radionuclides,hitherto treated as low-level wastes, should, like trans-uranic waste, become subject to more stringent manage-ment controls.28

The very idea of waste connotes something that is val-ueless. The military high-level waste conforms as readilyto this ordinary language meaning of the term as it doesto the radiological definition. The material that emergesfrom a reprocessing plant at the Hanford or SavannahRiver facilities is economically worthless. The situation,however, with regard to the postfission products of nu-clear reactors is somewhat more complex and conten-tious.

From the earliest days of AEC reactor developmentprogram, the operating assumption was that commer-cial spent fuel would be reprocessed and its residualuranium and plutonium recycled as fuel. As the Direc-tor of Reactor Development wrote Commissioner Libbyin 1957, employing this technological alternative would

25’’ Hand1ing and Disposal of Radioactive Waste, ” AEC 180/6, June 14,1957, p. 10,

ZbMinutes of Atomic Ener~ Commission Meeting 2373, June 3, 1969, p. 13.‘7See, Management of Commercial High Level and Transuranium-

Contaminated Radioactive Waste, Drafi EIS, WASH-1539, U.S. AtomicEnergy Commission, Washington, D. C., 1974, pp. 2.4-1—2.4-17.

les~, A Classjticatkm System for Radbactive Waste Disposal— What wasteGoes Where? NUREG-0456 , U .S . Nuc lear Regu la tory Commiss ion ,Washington, D. C., 1978.

App. A-7—Radioactive Waste Management Policymaking . 205

‘ ‘increase utilization of uranium resources and lowerfuel costs. “29 (It would also provide the not incon-siderable benefit of facilitating the sale of U.S. reactorsabroad. ) High-level waste then became whatever wasleft after reprocessing and recycle. Indeed, the first for-mal definition adopted by AEC in 1970 held that com-mercial high-level wastes were ‘‘those aqueous wastesresulting from the operation of the first cycle solvent ex-traction system, or equivalent and the concentratedwastes from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent,in a facility for reprocessing irradiated reactor fuels. ’30

Given the view that reprocessing would be economi-cally advantageous, that definition seemed quite con-sistent with the ordinary language connotations of theterm waste. Within the next 5 years, however, the logicbehind AEC’S 1970 definition of high-level waste cameunder challenge. For the ordinary language connota-tions of waste as something valueless did not seem toapply to reprocessed commercial material alone.

The definitional dilemmas arose because earlier as-sumptions about the costs of reprocessing no longerseemed to hold. The first reprocessing plant, operatedby Nuclear Fuel Services, initially charged a fee thatwas substantially lower than what the next generationof facilities would have to impose. 31 The increase wasbelieved to be so great that arguments were advancedsuggesting that reprocessing might not be economical-ly advantageous at all. Robert Fri, Deputy Adminis-trator of the Energy Research and Development Ad-ministration (ERDA), informed President Ford that forthe United States, “the economics of the [reprocessing]technology are uncertain, and even if favorable, wouldproduce only about a 2-percent reduction in the cost ofgenerating [nuclear] electricity”32 (emphasis added).Thus, the plutonium and uranium components, towhich value had been attributed, might not, after all,be valuable.

The economics of reprocessing were a major elementconsidered in the plutonium recycle rulemaking hear-ings Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed Ox-ide Fuel (GESMO) conducted by NRC. The Commis-sion’s staff, somewhat more cautious than Fri, predicteda discounted benefit of $3.2 billion over a quarter cen-tury for a reprocessing/recycle option compared to the‘‘throw-away’ fuel cycle.33 This is an 8 percent fuel cost

—“’’Plutonium Recycle Program at Hanford, ” AEC-960, Mar. 14, 1957, p. 1.

‘“APP F, 10 Code of Federal Regulatkms, pt 50.Slsee, for example, Ftia] Generic Envii-onmenta] Statement on the Use d

Recycled Plutonium in -Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light Water CooIed Reactors(GESMO), NUREG-0002, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1976,pp. xi-19—xi-23.

sZMemorandum to the President from Robert Fri, Sept. 7, 1976, p. 19.33GESM0, Op. cit p. ES-16. See afso Spurgeon Keeny, Jr., et al., Nuclear.,

Power Issues and Choices (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977), p. 323.

advantage, but less than a 1 percent advantage in totalelectrical costs. Obviously, substantial uncertainties areassociated with those predictions. But what is signifi-cant is that the logic for defining high-level radioactivecommercial waste was seriously and officially under-mined; unreprocessed spent fuel rods could now satisfyboth the ordinary language and radiological definitionsof waste.

The GESMO analysis is notable in an ironic senseas well. Whereas the definition of waste was initially abyproduct of an intuitive commitment to reprocessingand recycling, now reprocessing and recycling were be-ing advocated, in large degree, on the basis of wastemanagement considerations: 40 percent of the economicadvantage of that fuel-cycle option derived from sav-ings in the costs of waste storage and disposal .34Moreover, arguments were made within NRC to con-tinue to push recycle aggressively in terms of the wastemanagement implications of failing to do s0.35)

The shifting definition of commercial high-level wastehad some pragmatic consequences. When, in 1970,AEC tied the definition to a particular fuel cycle, theyset off a critical sequence of events. For once thepresumption is made that spent fuel contained valuablecomponents, there are strong economic incentives to ex-tract those components as rapidly as possible. At thesame time, safety considerations dictate that largevolumes of the residual material should not accumulate.The combination of those two factors led AEC, at thesame time it released its definition, to promulgate aregulation requiring that high-level commercial wastebe transferred to the Government within 10 years fromthe time irradiated fuel rods were removed from thereactor 36 When AEC acted, this requirement did notappear to pose difficulties as a repository at Lyons,Kans., was being developed. When that effort was ter-minated, however, the strong need arose to have analternative available to receive the waste from reprocess-ing plants. In particular, the decision to construct aretrievable surface storage facility (RSSF) can be directlytraced to the need to satisfy that regulatory exigency .37

As spent fuel emerged more clearly as a possible cat-egory of high-level waste, policymakers had to reorientsome of their programs. NRC, for instance, was in themidst of the ‘‘S-3’ hearings on the environmental ef-fects of reprocessing and waste management. The defini-tional changes forced new analyses to be performed andadded to the regulators’ uncertainty about whether theiractions would be sustained in court. In addition, defer-ral of reprocessing increased pressure on utilities to find

34GESM0, Op. cit., p. 11-78.

““PU Recycle Issue, ” SECY-75-37, Feb. 19, 1975, p. 8.36see app, F, 10 CFR 50.3 7’’ Management of Commercial High Level Radioactive Wastes, ”

SECY-2371, Mar. 17, 1972, p. 13.


space to store spent fuel assemblies. Over three timesas much room would be required. 38 The Carter ad-ministration’s decision to request authority to constructan away-from-reactor facility was a response to thatperceived problem.

But the major significant consequence of the shift wasthe injection of a novel issue into the waste managementdebate: could spent fuel be disposed of as safely and ef-ficiently as waste from a reprocessing plant? TheGESMO analysis answered that question affwmativelyand concluded that there is “no clear preference for anyspecific fuel-cycle option based on radioactive wastemanagement considerations. ’39 But others, particularlyadvocates from the nuclear industry and some geolo-gists, were not as persuaded. They argued that dif-ferences in volume, heat generation, amount of long-lived toxic radionuclides, and homogeneity of chemicalcomposition all worked to increase the ease and lowerthe risk of disposing reprocessed waste. This controversyraged intensely for a time. There appears to be anemerging, although not complete, technical consensuswithin this country that “considerations of the manage-ment of [high-level waste] do not put significant con-straints upon choices among various fuel cycles. ’40 Thatview has recently been supported in the report of theInternational Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation studygroup .41

Storing Radioactive Waste

Early records of waste management policymakingblur the conceptual difference between storing anddisposing of radioactive waste. Over the years seeminglymore precise conceptual distinctions emerged eventhough semantic confusion persists. Nevertheless, somedefinitional ambiguity still remains. The purpose of thissection is to clarify the meaning of the two terms, toshow how thinking about storage has evolved, and tospecify some remaining policy dilemmas dealing withwaste storage. We shall then consider the issues sur-rounding radioactive waste disposal in the next threesections.

The connotations associated with the terms storageand disposal can be misleading. Storage is usually linkedto temporariness, disposal with permanence. Phrasessuch as ‘‘interim’ are connected to the former termwhile “ultimate’ and “final’ are associated with thelatter. It is quite possible for the same technological

‘91 bid., p. iv-H6.‘L. Charles Hehel, et al., Report to the American Physical .%eiety by the

Study Group on Nuclear Fuel CycIes and Waste Management (APS Report),Report of Modern Physics 50, January 1978, p. 5107.

else Intemat~n~ Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, IAEA, Vienna, Austria,1980. ‘

system to be viewed by some individuals as an interimmeasure while others see it as providing a final restingspot for waste. Thus, the designation of a systemdepends mainly on what can be done with it sometimein the future, a fate that cannot be forecast at the startwith complete certainty. A more conceptually clear wayto distinguish storage from disposal is based on thedegree of effort that must be exerted to gain access toand active control over the waste material. At the ex-tremes, spent fuel management at the reactor would bean example of storage while extraterrestrial shipmentor transmutation would be instances of disposal. In be-tween, all other technical approaches must be viewedas possessing some mixture of storage and disposalcharacteristics. For instance, NRC’s draft requirementthat a geologic repository be designed to facilitate theretrieval of the waste for 50 years after emplacementoperations cease transforms geologic ‘‘disposal” into anelaborate method of storage. 42 For simplicity sake, weshall call those approaches which require at least asmuch effort to gain access to and control over the wasteas burial in geologic formations without provisions forretrievability ‘‘disposal options. Those approaches re-quiring less exertion will be termed “storage options. ”This shorthand should not encourage the reader to for-get that a continuous range exists between the end-points of “storage” and “disposal.”

This country’s first large-scale excursion into wastemanagement centered on developing storage systems.The vast tank farms at the Hanford Reservation, as wenoted above, were established to hold the liquid wasteproduced in conjunction with the nuclear weapons pro-gram. The functions of the system were ambiguous atthe time they were created and, to some extent, remainso today. There is some evidence to suggest that thoseinvolved at Hanford, particularly during the pre-1970period, viewed the tanks, or some relatively minormodification of them, as a perfectly viable final ap-proach to managing the wastes. 43 Indeed, the view isadvanced in some early documents that the tanks wouldmaintain their integrity for hundreds of years, just thelength of time needed for the two biggest “problemisotopes, strontium and cesium, to decay .44 Certain-ly, this view of perpetual tank storage was the one whichprevailed in the design of the commercial waste manage-ment system used at the Nuclear Fuel Service’s (NFS)reprocessing plant .45

4ZFe&ra] Register, Mar. 5, 1981.4$For exmp]es of the ambiguity, compare Atomic Ene~ Commission 180/5,

“Disposal of Radioactive Wastes, ” Mar. 30, 1956 with Atomic Energy Com-mission 180/6.

*4See, “Hanford’s Highly Radioactive Waste Management Program, ” AEC180/30, Apr. 5, 1968, pp. 6-7.

45~e U.S. Conps, Joint Committ= on Atomic Energy, hearings, chem~af

Repmeessing Plant, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, 1963).

App. A-l–Radioactive Waste Management Policymaking ● 207

By 1956, however, another position began to gaincurrency within AEC. Those who took that new tackargued that tank storage was not the ‘‘ultimate solu-tion” to the waste management problem . . . if onlybecause it was too expensive over the long run.46 In-stead, they advocated a robust research program to finda technical option that could be employed to managenewly created waste material. Thus, rather than beinga final measure, tank storage would simply serve as aninterim approach pending the discovery of somethingbetter.

There were a number of AEC staff and policymakerswho saw the storage system serving a third function:a reservoir containing materials of economic impor-tance. Efforts were initiated to extract from the wastesoup radionuclides that were commercially valuable.Strontium and cesium would be employed as heatsources; cesium would be used in a project to irradiatefoods; the heavy metals would be destined for industrialapplications. 47 In his way, some of the costs of the wastemanagement program might be offset. There was suf-ficient enthusiasm for this approach in the late 1960’sthat one firm reached an agreement with AEC to builda fission product extraction plant at Hanford. But beforeconstruction began the economics of the endeavorturned sour and the company canceled its plans. Never-theless, the idea of fission product recovery of commer-cially valuable material would not die easily. As late as1975, JCAE was pushing the concept.48 Even today,some people still hope to see some commercial ventureto utilize fission products.

The next major initiative in the waste managementprogram was the effort to develop a disposal facility atLyons, Kans. A combination of technical weaknessesand a lack of attention to the institutional aspects of theproject contributed to its early and painful demise.AEC, thus, found itself in early 1972 without arepository and without a fallback plan to find anothersite for one in the near term.

AEC response was to propose constructing a seriesof aboveground engineered structures—mausolea—which would be used to store solidified, reprocessedwaste from the commercial sector. 49 The explicit ra-tionale for this undertaking presented to AEC was:so

If the problems of gaining public acceptance of the con-cepts of storage [sic] in geological formations cannot beovercome in the near future, an available option is re-trievable storage in carefully engineered man-made struc-tures and acceptance of the idea that man must main-

*bAtomic Ener~ cornrnjg.qjon 180/5, op, Cit., p. 5.+ 7 M e m o r a n d u m , Fr~k pittman t o J a m e s R a m e y , F e b . 25. 1965>

pp. 7-8.tsThls matter arose during hearings on the Atomic Ener~ COmmis5i0n’s

fiscal year 1976 budget.49See WASH-1539.M’ High Level Waste M a n a g e m e n t , SECY-2271, Jan. 25, 1972, p. 3.

tain close control over the waste so stored at least untilgeologic storage [sic] becomes acceptable or until develop-ment of new technology opens up new approaches notnow practical.

Storage in RSSF would be used as an interim approachpending a more hospitable political environment.

Unfortunately, AEC took other actions over the next2 years which, at the very least, sent a set of mixedsignals to those interested in waste management policy.Perhaps because fiscal year 1975 was a tight budgetyear, AEC had to severely cut back its expendituresdevoted to advancing its capabilities for geologicaldisposal or for discovering new alternative technologies.That circumstance left the impression in the minds ofsome concerned individuals that the RSSF’S functioncould very well evolve into one of final dispositionrather than the interim one which AEC asserted. Thatwas precisely the critique of the RSSF leveled by theEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA):

A major concern in employing the RSSF conceptis the possibility that economic factors could laterdictate utilization of the facility as a permanentrepository, contrary to the stated intent to make theRSSF interim in nature . . . [I]t is important that[environmental factors] never be allowed to becomesecondary to economic factors in the decision mak-ing process. Vigorous and timely pursuit of ultimatedisposal techniques would assist in negating sucha possibility . . . However, the draft statement doesnot contain an adequate description of a programto develop such a disposal system nor does it reflecteither the priority given to programs by the AECnor an indication of the resources required .51

More than any other single criticism, the one advancedby EPA and supported by other commentators providethe coup de grace for the RSSF concept. In this instance,it was clear that it was unacceptable to proceed with astorage system unless there were unambiguous assur-ances that the system would not degenerate into a finaldisposing spot for the waste.

Since the cancellation of the RSSF, Federal activityhas concentrated on the development of disposal tech-nologies, particularly mined geologic repositories. Anumber of generic studies have been undertaken andexploration of specific sites commenced. But because ofthe. program’s relatively late start and its slow progressand because of possible lengthy delays in the start ofcommercial reprocessing, concerns arose as early as1975 that a number of operating reactors would run outof room to store their discharged spent fuel onsite.52

Should that occur and if there were no alternative loca-tions to place the material, then the reactor would be

SIEPA reswnse to WASH-1 539, NO V. 15, 1974, p. 2.5ZL WR Spnt Fuel Disposition Capabilities, 1975-1984, ERDA-25, Energy

Research and Development Administration, 1975.

— —


forced to shut down. Between 1975 and 1977, the privatesector floated proposals to construct large-scale facilitiesto hold excess spent fuel from utilities. Yet, for a varie-ty of reasons, many unclear to this day, those proposalsnever reached fruition.

It was in this context that the newly elected Carteradministration announced its spent fuel policy in Oc-tober 1977.53 Under it, title to the spent fuel would betransferred to the U.S. Government. The fuel wouldbe transported to a Government-approved away-from-reactor site at the utility’s expense. A one-time fee wouldbe paid by the utility that would cover the Government’scosts of storage and disposal. In addition, the ad-ministration expressed a willingness to accept limitedamounts of foreign spent fuel for storage and disposalif such an action contributed to the achievement of thecountry’s nonproliferation goals. At the time this policywas first articulated, many of its modalities and logisticswere unsettled. The administration, for instance, didnot necessarily propose to construct a new storage facili-ty on its own. It was prepared to contract with the pri-vate sector for storage services.

Thus, the away-from-reactor storage proposal was in-itially designed to serve four different functions. Itprevented the shutdown of reactors pending repositorydevelopment; it would provide time for the geologic dis-posal program to mature; it would provide some foreigncountries at least a limited incentive to forego fuelreprocessing thereby reducing the spread of nucleararms; it would provide a means of conserving poten-tially valuable material since the plutonium anduranium in the spent fuel would be accessible shouldreprocessing ever be permitted and become economical-ly viable. Later on, the away-from-reactor program wasalso advocated by those who saw a fifth function: theaway-from-reactor, by relieving some of the pressureson the nuclear industry, would reduce the likelihood thatthe industry might use its large political clout to forcea premature decision on a geologic disposal plan. Final-ly, the administration carefully distinguished its policyfrom the RSSF project. Not only did it announce thatdisposal remained a high priority, but it committedsubstantial resources toward that end. It should benoted, however, that those actions did not deter criticswho maintained that an away-from-reactor would alsoend up as the final resting place for the stored wasteeither because of the short-term economics or becauseDOE would lose its incentive to develop repositories.

The administration’s initiative to involve the publicsector in the provisions of storage facilities placed theissue of waste management on Congress’ legislativeagenda after a hiatus of nearly 5 years. A plethora of

~$DOE Information Bulletin, R-77-017, Oct. 18, 1977.

bills were introduced dealing with a wide range of wastemanagement issues. In July 1980, the Senate passed S.2189, which, in many respects, marked an abruptchange from the policies that had evolved over the lastdecade.

In particular, the bill blurred the conceptual distinc-tion between storage and disposal. The bill defined “dis-posal’ ‘ to include the:

. . . long-term isolation of material, including long-term monitored storage which permits retrieval of thematerial stored .54

Moreover, it provided for the construction of a “dis-posal” facility that would:

. . . permit continuous monitoring, management, andmaintenance of the spent fuel and high level radioactivewaste for the foreseeable future, allow for the readyretrieval of any spent fuel and high level radioactive wastefor further processing or disposal by an alternativemethod, and safely contain such high level radioactivewaste and spent fuel so long as may be necessary, bymeans of maintenance, including, but not limited to, re-placement of such a facility .55

That section had the effect of radically redefining theidea of disposal. Although geologic means could still bepursued, indeed the bill called for that program’s ac-celeration and a demonstration repository, minedfacilities were no longer to be seen as the dominanttechnique of disposal. The Federal Government’s obli-gations in that regard could be met by the construction,monitoring, and continuous replacement of a set ofmausolea. In fact, the bill sanctioned a return to anRSSF-like approach.

Senate bill S. 2189 viewed the function of storage asessentially twofold: a means of preserving options to pro-tect the resource value of the spent fuel and a methodof postponing, perhaps forever, commitment to a tech-nique of more secure disposal. It was that last visionthat elicited the most hostile response. Critics main-tained that the bill, by diluting the commitment to dis-posal, would permit an inequitable transfer of risk fromthis generation to generations in the future. The Houseof Representatives passed a bill more responsive to thoseconcerns. And despite last-minute, strenuous efforts tocompromise the two versions, no mutually acceptablelegislation could be hammered out. The 96th Congressadjourned with the issue of storage still unresolved. Thenew Reagan administration abandoned the away-from-reactor storage proposal, believing that the private sec-

1

tor ought to tend to the storage of spent reactor fuel.

S+ fjenate Bill 2189, sec.531 bid., sec. 402 (b).

201 (3).


Utilizing Knowledge of the EarthSciences in Developing a Waste

Management Program

Since the late 1950’s, when the policy was informal-ly adopted of disposing of at least the high-level wastefrom the commercial sector, the front running technicalstrategy has been emplacement in repositories minedby conventional methods. At a very early stage, earthscientists and mining engineers were involved in con-ceptually crafting the AEC waste management program.Those same professionals have intermittantly providedguidance to AEC and its successor agencies over the lastquarter century. In this section, we shall explore howthe basic scientific and technological knowledge influ-enced the design of the waste management program.We shall in particular note how, as the program evolved,earth science became a more central element of the ef-fort and how relatively simple—but elegant—earthscience conceptions were displaced by more complexones.

The first major involvement of earth scientists to con-sider the issue of waste disposal began in February 1955.Then AEC contracted with NAS to provide advice onhow to structure the research that could establish thescientific basis of a waste management program. NASappointed an eight-man committee of prominent geol-ogists, hydrologists, and geophysicists. The group metseveral times and convened a major conference on thequestion at Princeton University during September1955. Two years later, the committee issued its firstreport, one which we noted above was extremely influ-ential in orienting waste management policy for twodecades. 56

The problem the committee addressed was, in manyrepects, unprecedented: how to design a mechanism forisolating highly toxic radionuclides from the biospherefor long, possibly geologic, periods of time. At the timeits deliberations began, the group took as a given thefact that the waste materials would be dissolved, at rel-atively low concentrations, in some liquid. This con-straint strongly affected the way the committee pro-ceeded to puzzle through the problem. In particular,several alternatives were quickly discarded, The use ofgranite and other crystalline rock quarries was dis-counted because of the near impossibility of sealing thefacility against leaks. The use of permeable noncrystal-line rocks such as sandstone and limestone by themselveswas precluded for similar reasons. The uncertainties ofsealing nonpermeable materials such as clay and shalesseemed too formidable. Other options, such as injec-tion of the waste into deeply lying porous media inter-

SONAS/NRC, 1957, op cit.

stratified with impermeable beds, were deemed to befeasible in principle but so plagued with significant prob-lems that they were impractical in the short run.57

One technique did, however, strike the committee asrather promising. It involved the use of salt, eitherbedded or domed, cavities: “Abandoned salt mines orcavities especially mined to hold waste are, in essence,long-enduring tanks. “58 What made salt the appropri-ate and in some sense the elegant solution were two fac-tors. First, water will not pass through a relatively stablesalt formation to carry away the waste. Second, shouldany fractures arise in the salt, they would soon be self-sealing because of the plastic flow properties of thematerial at typical repository depths. The NAS com-mittee believed it had found an autonomous mechanism,based on immutable physical principles, for ensuringthat the toxic waste would be reliably isolated forthousands of years.

It is essential to understand the premises behind thecommittee’s espousal of salt. The committee’s positionwas founded on the assumption which the group explic-itly recognized required substantiation, that thematerial’s chemical and physical properties would notbe radically altered when the salt was exposed to theheat and radiation generated by the waste. If that as-sumption held, then all that was necessary was to finda suitable salt formation, dig a hole, backfill it with salt,and walk away.

During the next 4 years, small-scale research projectswere initiated to test the validity of the committee’sassumption. Those investigations were ‘‘encouraging,but there remained a variety of difficulties which, in thewords of one report, were ‘‘unique to liquid waste dis-posal. “59 Cavity alterations and radiolytic reactions wereobserved. And while the technical operatives expressedoptimism that those obstacles would be overcome, itbecame evident that the salt concept had not beenvalidated.

As the 1960’s began, substantial alterations in fuelreprocessing technology were being made, the most im-portant of which involved a twentyfold reduction in thevolume of liquid waste. That breakthrough, while sub-stantially increasing the waste’s heat and radiation den-sity, facilitated transforming the material into a solidform. That prospect, in turn, redirected AEC’S fledg-ing research program. AEC contractors, urged on bythe NAS committee, set out to examine the effect of drypackaged radioactive wastes on salt. Therein lie theorigins of the first major in situ experiments—called

371 bid., pp. 81-103.‘81 bid., p. 5.$9R. L . Bradshaw a n d W . C . McClain (eds. ), %ojee( Sah Vau/t: A

Demonstration of the Disposal of High-Activity Solidified Wastes inUnderground Sah Mines, ORNL-4555, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, OakRidge, Term., 1971, p. 1.


Project Salt Vault—undertaken to obtain the dataneeded to design a waste repository.

To say that AEC vigorously pursued these efforts tovalidate the salt assumptions would vastly overstate thecase. Funds to support Project Salt Vault had to be“bootlegged” from other efforts by researchers at theOak Ridge National Laboratory. With some difficultythey put together enough resources to carry out studiesin the Carey Salt Mine at Lyons, Kans., between 1965and 1967. Fourteen irradiated fuel assemblies takenfrom AEC’s Experimental Test Reactor were used tosimulate solidified waste. The assemblies were placedin a ring-like arrangement in the floor of the mine. Fur-thermore, electrical heaters were installed to raise thetemperature of a large quantity of salt in the centralpillar in order to obtain information on its in situ struc-tural response to heat. In spite of the rather high radia-tion doses to the salt and in spite of the high thermalloading, no measurable radiolytic or excessive structuraleffects in the salt were observed. While hardly a defini-tive or exhaustive test, the results of Project Salt Vaultat the time did lead many in AEC to believe that thesalt assumptions were largely valid. GO

Although the AEC leadership had little enthusiasmfor this experimental effort when it was first proposedor even as it was being conducted, nearly 3 years afterit was concluded the undertaking took on special signi-ficance. For in 1970, AEC decided to move ahead anddevelop a full-scale facility at the Carey Salt Mine.61

AEC’S managers relied heavily on the Salt Vault datato support their new initiative. Indeed, the environmen-tal impact statement assessing the proposed Lyonsrepository contains no geophysical information gatheredat the site after the conclusion of Salt Vault. 62

The Kansas project was ultimately canceled becausewater from a nearby solution mining operation couldnot be easily accounted for and because it was hard topersuade critics that the roughly 20 oil and gas boreholescould be reliably plugged. The abandonment of theCarey Mine site, however, did not undermine AEC’sfaith in the salt assumptions. In fact, as we detail lateron in this essay, the Commission quickly moved to iden-tify other sites that might be suitable for a repository.63

Nevertheless, it committed the preponderance of re-sources to searching for locations where the emplace-ment media would be salt. This almost single-mindedpreoccupation with a single geologic formation is wellreflected in the comprehensive “Technical Alternatives

CoSee for instance, memorandum, George Kavanagh to commissioners,“Background Information on Long Term High-Activity Waste Management, ”Sept. 8, 1967, p. 2.

61{ CSo]id R~ioactive Waste3: Salt Mine Storage, ” AEC 180/81, Apr. 23,

1970.elRad&ctjw Wrote Repjtqy, Lyons, Kansas, U.S. Atomic Energy COIn-

mission, Washington, D. C., 1971.c~’ ‘High-~ve] Waste Management, SECY-2333, Feb. 24, 1972, p. 4.

Document” which contains essentially no informationon “nonsalt” repository options. 64

Up until this time those earth science specialists work-ing in and for AEC, as well as those associated with theNAS’S advisory committee, were a relatively closedgroup. They all accepted the salt assumptions and feltcomfortable with a waste management policy that waspredicated on them. Over a period of nearly 20 years,that perspective has two important consequences for theorientation of AEC’s research program. First, compar-atively little effort was devoted to considering how thegeologic environment outside of the salt formation mightcontribute to isolating the waste. Second, there was con-siderable reluctance to investigate other emplacementmedia as a possible alternative to salt.

By the mid-1970’s, because of the abandonment ofthe Lyons site and because of the growing controversyover nuclear power, waste management policy becamesalient to a wider range of individuals, members of thegeneral public and technical specialists alike. Many ofthe new participants were unable to accept the prevail-ing salt assumptions. At first, the criticism of theGovernment’s waste policies came from citizen groupsgenerally opposed to nuclear power. The salt assump-tions were rejected in those criticisms as concerns wereraised about brine migration, decrepitation, the problemof breccia pipes, and the corrosiveness of salt solutions,concerns which had all been considered and largely dis-counted by the Commission. Later on, however, moresubtle challenges were advanced. These did not rejectthe salt assumptions but held them to be problematicand therefore urged that different technologicalstrategies be explored.

Perhaps the earliest influential instance of the latterbrand of skepticism was the report of the AmericanPhysical Society (APS) study group on nuclear fuelcycles and waste management. 66 The APS study groupdid not explicitly reject the salt assumptions. On severaloccasions the report’s authors stated that there was nobasis for believing that a salt repository could not bedeveloped. 67 Yet, the conceptual thrust of the APS studywas strikingly different from that which had dominatedsince the mid-1950’s. Instead of accepting the elegantsolution of a relatively isolated, autonomously self-correcting salt formation, the group stood back andfocused on the larger hydrogeologic environment.

That environment was, in their view, the critical ele-ment in designing a waste disposal facility. While thebehavior of the emplacement media per se was impor-

c+A/remat&S ~r Manitging Wastes From Reactor and Post-Fission @era-

tions in the LWR Fuel Cyck, ERDA-76-43, Energy Research and Develop-ment Administration, Washington, D. C., 1976, pp. 24.49-24.80.

G~’’So]id R~ioactive Wastes: Long-Term Storage in Centrid Kansas SdtMine, ” AEC 180/87, June 12, 1970, p. 5.

‘American Physicaf So&ty, 1976.cT&x American Physical Society, p. S139, for ex-p]e.


tant, it need not be determinative. For if sufficiently longhydrological flow paths were available and if sorptivematerial were present along those paths, then the re-quirements that the emplacement media be self-sealingand impermeable might well be superfluous.

Based on our analysis of hydrogeologic transport weexpect that the conditions that would provide for satisfac-tory geologic isolation of radioactive waste—i. e., a suit-able groundwater environment—are present in a suffi-cient number of places that several acceptable sites in dififerent geologic media can be located without difficultyin the immediate future.68 [Emphasis in original. ]

Thus, the APS report recommended that a broader pro-gram of geologic research and development be insti-tuted. 69

That position, on the surface, appears inconsistentwith the group’s unwillingness to reject the salt assump-tions. After all, if those assumptions held, then substan-tially greater attention to geohydrology and groundwater modeling would itself be superfluous. The elegantsolution had not been overthrown.

What made the APS report internally consistent wasthe introduction of ‘anthropogenic concerns. ’70 Evenif the formation compensated for natural disruptions,salt, particularly domes, by its very nature was attrac-tive to those looking for oil, gas, potash, or even astorage site. Future generations searching out thoseresources might inadvertently disrupt the repository andbring on “possibly serious consequences” unless the en-vironment outside the emplacement media also con-tributed to the isolation of the waste. But if one con-siders the environment of the salt, there is no reasonwhy the environment should not be considered for othermedia. In the group’s view such a course would onlybe “prudent” —hence their conclusions and recommen-dations.

While the APS study did not explicitly reject the saltassumptions, another report published shortly thereaftercame quite close to doing so—at least in the context ofprevailing premises about repository operation. Sincethe early 1950’s, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)had been supporting AEC and its successor agencies intheir waste management research. In the mid-1970’s theUSGS involvement had begun to intensify. The twoagencies’ interaction was not entirely without conflict,which centered on the nuclear organization’s commit-ment to salt. For a period of time, USGS personnel triedto reach an accommodation on that issue with thosemanaging the waste program. Those USGS scientists,however, eventually came to believe that their concernsabout salt-some of which reflected the views of nuclearopponents—were not being given proper considera-tion. 71

6aIbid., p. S138.6gIbid., p. S7.‘“Ibid., p. S139.TIConfidenti~ interviews with author, 1980.

In a rare action by traditionally cautious bureaucrats,the USGS scientists publicly expressed their concernsin Circular 779: ‘‘Geologic Disposal of High-Level Ra-dioactive Wastes—Earth Science Perspectives. “72 Thebulk of the work engendered little controversy; the mid-dle section, however, raised some disturbing—althoughnot entirely novel—questions and in doing so conferreda legitimacy to those technical concerns about dispos-ing of waste in salt which heretofore had been lacking.The USGS argument asserted that if relatively hotwaste—say 5 to 10 years old—is introduced into a saltrepository the potential exists for the repository to loseits integrity. That circumstance would arise because thethermal pulse would aggravate “the mechanical disturb-ances initiated by mining the repository and the chem-ical disturbances caused by the introduction of mate-rial-not in chemical equilibrium with the rock mass. ’73

Should the repository fail, the salt would not itself retardthe migration of the nuclides. Thus, USGS arrived atprecisely the same conclusion, although by a differentand—from a policy perspective—substantively signifi-cant route, as did the APS study group.

It would be misleading to infer from this discussionthat AEC and its successors were unbending in theircommitment to salt. Beginning in 1973 and acceleratingin the next few years, AEC and its successor agenciessponsored research in other media. 74 In 1976, ERDAannounced a program to examine a variety of emplace-ment media to find acceptable repository sites and thatthe third facility might be constructed in some mediaother than salt.75 Yet, if policy makers at AEC andERDA were prepared to open the door for geologicdiversity, they saw little reason to abandon the saltassumptions. However, as more and more technicallycompetent groups” and individuals inside and outside theGovernment questioned the salt orthodoxy, it becameclear that this fundamental earth science controversy hadto be resolved. The forum for that resolution came tobe the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear WasteManagement (IRG) established by President Carter inApril 1978.

A working subcommittee of IRG, chaired by the Of-fice of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), wasassigned the task of crafting a paper synthesizing thestatus of knowledge about waste isolation using geologicrepositories. 76 Representatives from DOE and USGStook an active role in the preparation of the report. The

T~The Cjrcu]ar was written by J. D, Bredehoeft, A. W. England, D. B.

Stewart, N. J. Trask, and 1. J. Winograd.73Circular 779, pp. 4-5.7V3ECY-2271, p. 3.T~znformarjon From E R D A , ‘ ‘ E R D A S t u d i e s G e o l o g i c F o r m a t i o n

Throughout Nation for Data on Potential Sites for Commercial Nuclear WasteDisposal, ” No. 76-355, Dec. 2, 1976.

TbSu&mup Report on Alternative Technology Strategies for the Isolationof NucJear Waste, app. A, TID-28818 (draft), Interagency Review Group onNuclear Waste Management, Washington, D. C., October 1978.

—


study underwent four major revisions over the courseof slightly over 6 months. It was reviewed both by aspecially appointed advisory committee and by hundredsof individuals from the earth science community .77

The section dealing with salt repositories in the OSTPpaper represented something of a compromise betweenthe views of DOE and USGS; in tone and thrust it wasquite akin to the APS study. In essence, the OSTP docu-ment questioned, but did not overturn, the salt assump-tions. At the same time, it reiterated the concerns of APSand USGS about the importance of viewing the wasteisolation mechanism as an entire system of waste form,package, repository structure, and hydrogeologic envi-ronment.

The evolution of earth science perspectives from theearly 1950’s to the late 1970’s was striking and pro-found. While no one dismissed out of hand the conceptof a mined repository, the elegant solution of salt cameto be questioned—and for some—rejected. In its place

has come a more complex view of what needs to be doneto ensure that waste will be reliably isolated for geologicperiods of time. In the three sections that follow—siteselection strategy, waste packages, and regulatory phi-losophy—we shall be recapitulating some of the themesraised here. For those aspects of the waste managementproblem came critically to depend on the status of geo-logic science and technology.

Developing a SearchStrategy For Sites

Siting strategies fall along a conceptual continuum.A process by which sites are randomly examined untilan acceptable one is found demarcates one extreme. Theother end point corresponds to a strategy in which allpossible sites are comprehensively compared along avariety of dimensions prior to selecting one. In thepragmatic world of seeking a location for a repository,neither extreme is appropriate. The former approachfails to take advantage of existing knowledge to eliminatea priori sites that are unsatisfactory. The latter approachis too demanding of knowledge, time, and resources.In between the two extremes, a range of “mixed”strategies do exist, and they can be distinguished interms of how proximate they are to either end point ofthe continuum. Indeed, the history of site selection strat-egies is a chronicle of movement away from the morerandom end toward the more comprehensive one.

AEC’s initial site selection strategy can be inferredfrom the process which at least tentatively selected theCarey Mine in Lyons, Kans., as the location of thecountry’s first repository. As the reader will recall, per-

771 bid., Preface.

sonnel from Oak Ridge National Laboratory used thatabandoned mine for experiments designed to determinethe thermal and radiation effects of high-level waste onsalt. They were led to that particular type of geologicformation by the strong endorsement given salt 6 yearsearlier by NAS.

Those involved in this Project Salt Vault recall thattheir efforts enjoyed the support of the local citizenry. 78Four factors contributed to this climate of acceptance:1) the experiment was designed from the beginning tobe reversible—once it was over all the waste was com-pletely removed; 2) consultations were held with localgroups before the project began; 3) efforts were madeby Oak Ridge staff personnel to conduct the studies infull view of the Kansas population; and 4) once the re-search started, regular tours were conducted in whichthe general public could visit the mine.

Project Salt Vault might have become an isolatedfootnote in the saga of nuclear policymaking had nottwo circumstances intervened. The first was a fire whichoccurred in 1969 at an AEC weapon’s components fa-cility in Rocky Flats, Colo. The accident gave rise toa large volume of low-level, plutonium contaminateddebris. Following its standard operating procedures, themanagers of Rocky Flats forwarded the waste to the Na-tional Reactor Test Station in Idaho for storage. Thataction outraged Idaho’s political leadership who saw noreason why their State should become the dumpingground for waste created in Colorado. They acted andultimately extracted a commitment from Chairman Sea-borg that all of the waste would be removed by the endof the 1970’s. 79 That pledge necessitated the construc-tion of a disposal facility. The second circumstance,which will be discussed below, was the emerging regu-latory policy on commercial waste management. Thatevolving policy also provided a basis for AEC to gobeyond the early experimental efforts at the Kansas saltmine and to develop a repository.

Thus, confronted with the need for a repository,AEC’S siting strategy was relatively straightforward.Because of the prevailing geologic assumptions heldwithin AEC and among its contractors, host formationsother than bedded salt were not even considered. Thisleft about 500,000 mi2 of land overlying bedded saltwithin the continental United States. That area was fur-ther reduced because only salt deposits 200 ft thick andlying within 2,000 ft of the surface were deemed “tobe the most desirable for the first waste repository. “8°The largest area meeting these criteria lay in centralKansas; there were two smaller areas in Michigan andone in west central New York.

zaco~fidenti~ interviews with author, 1975.zgLetter from Seaborg to Senators Church and Jordan, June 9, 1970.SoAtomic Energy Commission 190/81, Op. cit. , p. 10.


In the technical analysis provided AEC, none of thealternative sites had a clear-cut advantage in terms oftheir geologic characteristics although the New Yorklocation was in an area of lower tectonic stability. TheMichigan site was burdened by the fact that part of itunderlay metropolitan Detroit. But finally, AEC de-cided on the Kansas site and in particular the experi-mental mine in Lyons because:

1. There had been detailed information gathered onthe area as part of Project Salt Vault.

2. There was a sense of confidence in receiving a “fa-vorable reception on the part of local and state of-ficials and private citizens. ”

3. There was a recognition that necessary investiga-tions to prove out the acceptability of the other siteswould result in considerable delay ‘‘estimated onthe order of two years. “81

The choice of the Lyons location turned out to be un-fortunate. The site developers encountered several ma-jor technical problems and, as we shall point out below,substantial political controversy as well. Less than 2years after its selection, the location was abandoned byAEC .82

How AEC’s successors crafted a strategy for site selec-tion in the next iteration of activity is not nearly asstraightforward. What is undisputed is this chain ofevents. The aftermath of the Lyons endeavor hadcreated an environment that was not conducive to fur-ther site exploration. As a result, early in 1972, USGSwas asked by the AEC headquarters staff and person-nel from Oak Ridge to summarize the available geologicand hydrologic knowledge of selected rock types, par-ticularly salt, in other parts of the country and to assesstheir suitability for a waste repository. The USGS studyidentified approximately a dozen regions where candi-date sites might be found. That fall, the choice was madeto concentrate further exploration in the Permian basinin eastern New Mexico. The choice seems to have beenmade because the other regions featured salt domes andanticlines (Guld and Paradox basin) rather than beddedsalt, because they were in areas of heavy population(Salina basin), or because the salt was too far under-ground (Williston basin) .83

Four candidate sites were examined in more detailand out of that investigation came the decision in favorof a site located 30 miles east of Carlsbad. Additionaldrilling and geophysical exploration, however, indicatedthat that location was unsatisfactory. Eight additionalareas were studied and their consistency with eight cri-teria was measured. From that process emerged the site

‘Ji Atomic EnerW Commission 180/87, op. cit., pp. 4, 16.

‘zBriefing Summary, “Program Review—High Level Waste Management, ”Feb. 2, 1972.

B9Waste Isolation Pdot Plant, Draft Environmental Zmpact Statement (Wzpp-DELS), DOE/EIS-O026-D, Department of Energy, April 1979, pp. 2-4—2-6.

for what is currently designated the Waste Isolation PilotPlant (WIPP), a facility now being considered as a re-pository for waste from the defense program .84

The official history of the WIPP site selection strategyleaves the reader with the impression of an entirely sci-entific and rational process driven simply by the force

“ 85 To a large degree, that is like-

of disinterested analysls.ly the case. However, that history contains at least oneminor point of contention and one significant omission.The first has to do with who made the decision to focuson the Permian basin. According to the official version,“USGS and [Oak Ridge] selected Eastern New Mexi-co as the area in the United States best satisfying theirsite-selection guidelines. 86 This was presumably at ameeting in Carlsbad in November 1972. USGS person-nel who attended that meeting, however, maintain thatthe decision to select the Carlsbad area for further ex-ploration was made 2 months previously by AEC head-quarters staff and Oak Ridge personnel. The Novembermeeting with USGS simply ratified the initial choice. 87

But the omission could render the point of conten-tion moot. Even before the technical problem whichultimately doomed the Lyons project arose, AEC of-ficials had met with representatives from New Mexico.As a memorandum detailing that contact reports:88

Their interest in obtaining a Federal waste disposalfacility came from a worsening of the competitive posi-tion of the U.S. potash industry . . . as highly automatedCanadian mines in rich potash seams began to come intoproduction. This translated into a loss of jobs and a blowto the Eddy County/Lea County economy. Preliminarydiscussions with potash interests, the Carlsbad Chamberof Commerce and the State Department of Developmentindicated that there was a potential for a favorable politicalatmosphere. 89

The Interagency Review Group (IRG) went on to say,however, that “there is a risk that as a result of apply-ing nontechnical criteria first, organizational and po-litical commitments might develop to such a degree thatinsufficient weight might be given to technical data de-veloped later on. ’90

It is fair to say that opponents of the Lyons and WIPPsites— as well as some relatively disinterested observ-ers—believed that technical criteria had been subordi-nated to political and bureaucratic ones. This impres-sion was fostered, in part, by the fact that AEC and itssuccessor agencies made substantial public commit-

s+Th~ annoUnced plans for WIPP have changed repeatedly. While currenti~

being considered for only the disposal of defense transuranic waste, at othertimes the disposal of defense high level waste and the possible disposal of 1,000commercial fuel rods have been proposed.

85W[PP Ers, O p . Ci[., pp. 2 - 3 — 2 -’ 2 .

96WIPP ELS, op. cit., p. 2 - 6 .‘JTConfidentid interview with author, 1980.Ssowen Gourmley to Dorner Schueler, “Change m Exploration From Kan-

sas to New Mexico, Feb. 1, 1979.89su@-ouP Report, op. cit., p. 8]

‘“Ibid.


ments to the projects and had no alternative sites avail-able as backups. Under those circumstances it was hardto convince the skeptical that the sites would be evalu-ated in an objective fashion.

The siting strategy adopted up to this point, then, wascloser to the random ad hoc extreme of the continuumthan to the completely comprehensive end. That choicewas not entirely voluntary. The preoccupation with saltreflected a limited geophysical perspective and knowl-edge base. Time constraints, such as those imposed bythe Rocky Flats fire, the emerging regulatory changes,and the political need to show some progress in geologicdisposal, ruled out a more deliberate strategy. Finally,resources were scarce; this also foreclosed a more elab-orate strategy.

In truth, neither AEC policymakers nor relevant out-siders were particularly satisfied with that state of af-fairs. The Lyons experience had clearly indicated thepitfalls of a narrow approach to finding sites. As a result,by the mid-1970’s, AEC and later its successor, had be-gun to create the conditions that would allow for theadoption of a more comprehensive site selection strate-gy. Time pressures were dampened, at least temporari-ly, by the RSSF and the delays encountered with re-processing. The Ford administration was persuaded thatmajor funding increases in the program were required.The earth sciences knowledge base broadened as newresearch was undertaken.

This restructuring of circumstances was accompaniedby a policy decision to expand considerably the approachto site selection.91 There was to be a comprehensive re-view of underground formations throughout the UnitedStates. Thirty-six States in all were to be surveyed.Fieldwork, including core drilling, was slated to takeplace in at least 13 States and perhaps as many as 19,More significantly, the search, for the first time, wasnot to be confined to bedded salt; instead, other hostrocks, such as domed salt, basalt, shale, granite, andother crystalline formations were considered. Lowerthan requested fundings and political objections fromGovernors and Senators, however, forced a retrench-ment in the initial plans. While the expanded programwas termed ‘‘too ambitious and not well designed forFederal/State and local government interaction, ”92

nevertheless, as a result of this broadened policy,fieldwork was and is still being undertaken in Texas,Louisiana, Mississippi, Washington, and Nevada insearch of a location for the first commercial wasterepository.

This expansion of the site selection strategy yieldedsome important dividends. It introduced some redun-

gll~~matjon F~m ERDA, op. cit., DCC. 2, 1976.91 RePrr on Tak Fome hr Review of Nuclear Waste Management,

DOE/ER-0004 (draft), Department of Energy, Washington, D. C., February1978, p. 12.

dancy and backup into a program sorely lacking thesecharacteristics. It increased the public credibility of theprogram. It deflated concerns that a single locality hadbeen selected as the site for the Nation’s nuclear waste.

Yet, those returns should not lead one to overestimatethe degree to which the new strategy differed from itspredecessor. In particular, salt was still viewed as theleading, and perhaps preferred, candidate for host rock.This predisposition, based partly on the greater depthof engineering information and partly on organizationaltradition, was reflected in the new program’s assertionthat the first two repositories would likely be carved insalt. In a more fundamental sense the new strategy wasakin to the old in that both mandated a choice and com-mitment to build a repository once a satisfactory sitewas found and qualified. To use an analogy, both strat-egies adopted a decisionmaking principle similar to thatused by most house sellers: as soon as an offer exceedsthe threshold of “acceptability,” it is taken.

Like the order in which technical and nontechnicalcriteria are applied to screen sites, this decisionmakingrule need not be unsound. But if, as we shall see, thereis great uncertainty and strong disagreement about whatconstitutes the threshold of acceptability, such a deci-sionmaking principle can be quite risky both scientifical-ly and politically.

There was, in fact, increasing awareness withinDOE—as well as among outsiders—of the riskiness in-herent in this principle of choice. By the time the Carteradministration had taken office and had completed itsfirst assessment of the waste management program, theawareness had grown to the point where alternative se-lection rules were being publicly discussed. The reportof the Deutch Task Force observed that ‘‘two basicallydifferent philosophical approaches were possible. 93 Thefirst involved comparing the best salt design with thebest design in another media. On that basis, the pre-ferred media would be chosen; then several sites in thatmedia would be considered and, presumably, the bestone selected for the repository. The second approach,in essence, was the continuation of the status quo. Thefirst satisfactory salt site would be selected and developedin a technically cautious fashion. The Deutch TaskForce concluded that “the first approach [is] unneces-sarily conservative’ and it favored the second .94

Although DOE did reconfirm its decision principle,the Deutch Report initiated a process whereby the sen-sibility of the philosophy was assessed. The forum forthis further review was IRG. IRG assigned OSTP theresponsibility of analyzing alternative technologicalstrategies for the isolation of nuclear waste in additionto the technical report on the status of geologic knowl-

931bid.

“1bid., p. 13.


edge. OSTP began by conceptualizing six strategies inwhich the first disposal mechanism was a geologic re-pository. (A seventh postponed the choice of option.)The six alternatives differed in the degree to which therewould be intercomparisons prior to site selection. Themost restrictive alternative was that of evaluating thesuitability of sites on a case-by-case basis—e. g., thestatus quo. The broadest alternative called for compar-ison of several sites in several different geological en-vironments. This broad range, it should be noted, wasdictated by the technical finding, discussed above, thatno particular geologic emplacement medium enjoyed apreferred position.

As the analysis got under way, the OSTP group soonconcluded that the strategies which required inter-comparisons possessed certain advantages over thecase-by-case approach. 95 Intercomparison of sites wouldlikely increase public confidence, would stand a betterchance of satisfying the National Environmental PolicyAct and meeting regulatory requirements, and, allthings being equal, would improve odds of obtaininga technical success. The case-by-case approach, in con-trast, held the advantage of reducing the time it mighttake to develop an operating facility. That approachwould also lessen logistical difficulties that might arisein transporting waste from storage, and entail lowernear-term costs.

However, after the first draft of this analysis was cir-culated within IRG and after informal discussions be-tween staff members of DOE and OSTP, agreement wasreached to remove the case-by-case strategy from fur-ther consideration. Without any fanfare, then, and forreasons which are still something of a mystery, DOEabandoned its traditional decision principle for reposi-tory siting, one which it had reaffirmed only 4 monthspreviously.

The sole remaining issue with respect to siting strat-egy was how many sites in what geologic environmentswould be used in the comparison. DOE argued for twoor three while most of the rest of the IRG agencies calledfor four or five. The relatively small difference in num-ber disguised a large difference in substance. For thequestion was whether the waste management require-ments could be satisfied by the existing program orwhether an expanded effort of geologic investigationswould be required prior to the selection of the firstrepository site. This conflict was ultimately resolved bythe President in favor of the more redundant strategy.96

NRC, in 1981, developed its own procedures that man-dated some degree of intercomparison before a site ispresented for regulatory review and licensing.97 In par-

s~confidenti~ intcrv& with author, 1978.g$see announcement of waste management policy by President Carter, Feb.

12, 1980.gTFe&ra] Reg~ter 46, Feb. 25, 1981, p. 13979.

ticular, NRC required that three sites in at least twodifferent media be evaluated before a permission willbe given to begin repository construction.

Developing a Waste Package

High-level waste streams from a reprocessing plantand, to a lesser extent, spent reactor fuel can be trans-formed into different waste forms prior to their disposal.The potential variety of form is wide, ranging from es-sentially untransformed materials to waste forms careful-ly designed to be compatible, and perhaps in thermoe-quilibrium, with repository rock. In addition, the wasteform itself may be surrounded by other material to pro-tect it further after emplacement in, for example, ageologic repository. The waste form and accompany-ing material surrounding the waste are termed a wastepackage.

The state of the art of materials science determinesthe range of feasible alternatives of waste form andpackaging. But there are several issues that must be ad-dressed before the final choice is made. To what degreeis there confidence that the geology of a repository willperform its job reliably to reduce demands on the wasteform? What economic costs are justified to obtain cer-tain levels of reduction in the long-term risk? What im-provements are needed in the waste handling and trans-portation process itself? How are long-term advantagesand disadvantages balanced against short-term ones? Inthis section, we shall analyze how those issues were ad-dressed, implicitly and explicitly, as the idea of an ‘ ‘ac-ceptable’ waste form evolved.

As early as 1957, the AEC staff reported that workwas under way to ‘‘concentrate and flx the radioactivewaste material . . . in a stable, solid medium so thatmigration of the radioactivity into the environment iseliminated or reduced to safe limits. ’98 Among the ap-proaches investigated were conversion to oxide byheating (calcinating), self-sintering with natural earthmaterials, and fixation of the waste in synthetic feld-spars, clays, ceramics, and glasses. Nine years later,research on waste forms had advanced to the pointwhere the NAS Radioactive Waste Committee could ob-serve that it was “favorably impressed with the wholesolidification program’ and that it was ‘‘especiallyhopeful about glass or ceramic products, because theymay be safe from serious leaching and, thus from releaseof hazardous radionuclides, for periods of centuries. ’99

Despite the promise of waste from research, wastemanagement practices proceeded along a largely inde-

g’JAtOmiC Energy Cotrltni.ssim 180/6, op. cit., p. 28.

‘National Academy of Sciences/National Research CounciI, Report to theDivision of Reactor Development and Technology, U.S. Atomic Energy Com-mission, 1966, p. 28.


pendent track throughout this period. An examinationof decisionmaking prior to 1970 at the major centers ofwaste storage/disposal—West Valley, Savannah River,Hanford, and Idaho—illustrates that point.

The promise of a waste form that would contributeto safety was ignored most blatantly at the NFS reproc-essing plant at West Valley, N.Y. There to the extentthat storage of liquid waste in tanks would become themeans of disposal—and that appeared to be the mostlikely outcome at the time—the waste form became theneutralized stream from the extraction process. Implicit-ly, NFS, AEC, and the State of New York made thejudgment that the economic and health costs and thetechnological uncertainties involved with more sophis-ticated waste forms overwhelmed any short-term advan-tages of waste processing. Obviously, such an assess-ment had as its premise the view that perpetual institu-tional control of the waste provided as much protectionfor the public health and safety as other options suchas geologic storage. 100 The historical record is unam-biguous that NFS, prior to 1970, did not devote anysignificant effort to designing or developing the alter-native waste forms that might be necessary should thestrategy of perpetual institutional care be abandoned.

In many respects, the consideration of waste form atSavannah River was also superficial because of the pre-sumed mode of disposal. Beginning in the late 1950’s,proposals were advanced to inject the facility’s wasteinto the dense, crystalline bedrock underlying the site.AEC production division staff believed that three geo-logical barriers would provide independent obstacles tothe movement of the mobile waste in slurry form: thecrystalline bedrock itself; the saprolite clay overlying therock; and the aquifer overlying the clay. Alternativewaste forms and disposal options were almost totallyignored. 101 This position was taken largely because theproduction division staff and that of its Savannah Rivercontractor, the Du Pent Corp., believed that:

Cost estimates indicate the solidification and off-siteshipment of the waste . . . would be an order of mag-nitude greater than placing the waste in bedrock cav-erns. Furthermore, the hazards involved in processingand shipping this large volume of highly radioactive ma-terial might be avoided.102

The geology of the Hanford site did not permit ascheme analogous to bedroek disposal. Therefore, otherdisposal options were considered. This led, in turn, toa somewhat more intensive examination of waste forms.The production division staf and the personnel of Han-ford’s contractors, Atlantic Richfield Corp., were pre-disposed to a disposal technique premised on near sur-

l~see the &Cu99iOn in Chemical Repressing plants.IOIGenerd Accounting OfrICe, Observations Concerning the Management

of High Level Radioactive Waste Material, Washington, D. C., 1968, p. 27.‘“2’’NAS Review of SR Bedrock Caverns Concept, ” SECY-148, Ju1y 28,

1970, p. 2.

face burial of waste in engineered structures. Such anoption could easily and inexpensively accommodate thelarge volumes of waste as well as the fact that a substan-tial fraction of the liquid waste had been reduced to saltcake to prevent loss of material in case of a leak. Usingthe near surface burial technique also meant that a wasteform only had to be developed for the residual liquor.That could be expediently converted to an aluminosili-cate material-a sort of “cement.” Those involved inthe Hanford operations did recognize, however, that thenear-surface disposal option might not provide the long-term safety margins deemed acceptable. Thus, the pos-sibility of solidifying the waste—perhaps using the spraycalcinator developed at Richland—prefatory to onsiteor offsite geologic disposal was acknowledged. 103 Yet,as in the case of Savannah River, concern was expressedthat under such an alternative ‘‘costs would be in-creased. 104

The only instance where waste management planningand waste form research merged was at the NationalReactor Test Station in Idaho. Two factors accountedfor this exception. First, geologic and hydrologic con-ditions militated against final disposal at the site. Sec-ond, because only relatively small volumes of waste wereinvolved, it was possible to use stainless steel tanks fromthe start to store the liquid waste. This, in turn, allowedthe operators to avoid neutralizing the waste with largequantities of base. These two differences created at oncea need, an incentive, and a favorable technological cir-cumstance for developing a more elaborate waste form.By the end of the 1960’s, the Waste Calcining Facilitywas converting 400,000 gal of waste per year into a gran-ular solid. 105 The solid could be stabilized by heatingto 900° C. But even so, it possessed a high leach ratefor both strontium and cesium,lO6 This waste form, how-ever, would facilitate material handling and transpor-tation at a relatively small economic cost and healthhazard. Yet, the form itself, like its more primitivecousins at Savannah River and Hanford, would onlycontribute marginally to the long-term containment ofthe waste.

As the 1970’s began, then, policymaking on wasteform was almost totally subordinated to the moregeneral question of disposal option. Because each of thefour waste centers took different stances on the basicissue, it was not surprising that they held divergent viewson the secondary one. This pluralism of approach, whileperhaps justifiable in a strict technical sense, did lendan ad hoc air to policymaking that made the programsusceptible to public criticism. To forestall this and to

lo~plm for the M~a&ment of AEC Radioactive Waste, WASH-1202, U.S.

Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C., 1972, pp. 13-16,1O+Aton~ic EnerW Commission 180/30, op. cit., p. 6.io~p]~ for the Management, op. cit., p. 20.1OsA]ternatives for Managing Wastes, op. cit., pp. 6.16-6.21.


impose some order on at least a portion of the wasteproduction sites— the new commercial reprocessingplants to be constructed —AEC moved to promulgateappendix F to 10 CFR 50.107 AEC resolution of thedisposal issue for the private sector led, virtuallyautomatically, to greater closure on the waste formquestion. 108

As noted above, appendix F, the first formal regula-tory policy statement for commercial high-level wastedisposal, committed the Federal Government to buildand operate a geologic repository. Implicit in that com-mitment was the judgment that such a technical meanswas the soundest option in terms of the long-rangepublic health and safety. Such a judgment, although notbased on any extensive risk analysis, foreclosed theperpetual care alternative used by NFS. It also cast ashadow over the bedrock approach and to a lesser ex-tent Hanford’s near surface burial scheme. 109

Appendix F also resolved, again sometimes implicit-ly, some corollary issues. There would only be a fewrepositories built—one would serve the industry’s needsup to 2000. Thus, waste would have to be transportedto the central repository over long distances from thecommercial reprocessing plants which were in variousstages of operation and construction. Because transpor-tation of millions of gallons of highly radioactive liquidwaste was deemed too hazardous, waste solidificationwould have to take place at the reprocessing facility. 110

AEC still had to fill in some critical details: Whenwould conversion to a solid waste form occur? Whatwould be the chemical composition of that solid wasteform? Initially, the AEC staff suggested that both thoseissues be finessed, postponed until some other time. Onepaper AEC considered called only for conversion priorto the ‘‘retirement of the reprocessing facility fromoperational status, and only for ‘‘an AEC-approvedsolid form. 111 Commissioner Ramey instigated changeswhich ultimately led to the requirement that the liquidwaste be converted within 5 years after their produc-tion. 112 Comments from the nuclear industry aboutthe ambiguity surrounding the term “AEC-approved’prompted a clarification which specified that the solidhad to be dry as well as chemically, thermally, andradiolytically stable. That clarification hardly defined

107’ ’Siting of Commercial Reprocessing Plants and Related Waste Manage-ment Facilities, AEC 180/47, Oct. 9, 1968.

‘“’’’ Siting of Commercial Fuel Reprocessing Plants and Related WasteManagement Facilities, ” SECY-160, July 31, 1970.

‘ 09’’ Siting of Commercial Fuel Reprocessing Plants and Related WasteManagement Facilities, ” AEC 180/88, June 17, 1970, p. 29.

I IOApp. F required that the liquid waste be converted to a solid form within5 years after reprocessing and the solid transported to a Federal repository nolater than 5 years thereafter. The timing was somewhat arbitrary but representeda balance between waiting for the waste to cool and avoiding large build-upsof liquid waste.

I I I Atomic Energy Commission 180/47, op. cit., p. 5.11zMemorandum, Thompson to the other Commissioners, June 22, 1970,

p, 3.

the solid form unambiguously. Yet, when ChairmanSeaborg asked whether more detailed volubility require-ments might be included, the Director of Regulationresponded:

A major advantage of the salt disposal concept is thatthe material has been dry for millions of years, therebyeliminating the importance of volubility considerations.Furthermore, the small but finite volubility of even themost insoluble waste solids developed to date did notprovide any additional protection over that provided bythe integrity of the salt formation. 113

Many have applauded the adoption of appendix F asa sound public policy decision. It limited the numberof disposal sites and foreclosed the obsolete and hazard-ous option of disposing liquid waste. But it is criticalto recognize the limitations of the appendix’s scope. Itwould never affect the operations at Savannah River orat Hanford, and it did not affect the waste which hadheretofore been produced at West Valley. At those sitesthe same waste management plans, which discountedthe potential virtues of waste form, could be imple-mented. Even for new commercial reprocessing plants,waste form was not viewed as something to pursue foranything other than short-term advantages.

The comments of the Director of Regulation suggestthe view of many AEC staff members at the time—theissue of waste form had largely been resolved by appen-dix F. After all, the Idaho facility had been producingcalcined waste for nearly a decade; General Electric hadadopted this same process for its proposed reprocessingplant at Morris, Ill. This view seemed so entrenchedthat, when Milton Shaw, the author of appendix F, se-verely cut back funds for waste form research at Han-ford to save money for the breeder development pro-gram, strong objections from the head of AEC’s Opera-tional Safety Division were ignored,

This presumed closure on the waste form issue lastedonly a few years. Commissioner Larson, an underwaterexplorer who had seen glass siting undecomposed on theseabed, began to argue that developing ‘ ‘an essentiallyinsoluble solid form for our radioactive high-levelwaste . . . should be one of the highest priority effortsin our waste management program. Those argu-ments resonated as it became increasingly clear that theunstated assumption of appendix F, early establishmentof a repository, would not be fulfilled. In fact, by 1974,AEC’S waste management policy was premised on ex-tended surface storage in the RSSF. The shift in policydirection had to be coupled, AEC’S Waste ManagementDirector asserted, with a shift in policy regarding wasteform:

The probability of failure of the RSSF is proportionalto the time in storage, and protection against the conse-

1l~MinuteS of Commission Meeting 2429, Aug. 8, 1970, pp. 10-11.114 Memorandum, Larson to the other Commissioners, June 26, 1972.


—

quence of escape during extended surface storage wouldbe enhanced by modifying the waste to a form havinga lower probability of dispersal to air (by decreasing thesurface to volume ratio) or to water (by decreasing leach-ability). The probability of dispersion can be decreasedby having the waste in a massive low-leachable glass (orceramic) form while it is in surface storage. 115

It was recognized that a change in position on the wasteform question could have unsettling effects on theemerging reprocessing industry. Thus, the waste man-agement staff recommended that a centralized glassmak-ing plant be built at the RSSF site by AEC. 116

Significantly, in neither the public nor internal rec-ord is there any consideration of the desirability of theglass waste form in terms of long-range, hundreds of years,safety. Nevertheless, the demise of the RSSF and theproposed Calcine Conversion Facility and a return toan emphasis on geologic disposal did not mark the endof the glass waste form. Only 5 years after it was dis-missed by the Director of Regulation, it came to figureprominently in the center of the “Baranowski bull’ s-eye’ which graphically depicted the multiple barrierdesign or repositories. Waste form, presumably glass,was seen, for the first time, as something more than amodality for moving waste; it had become a means ofsignificantly improving repository performance. 117

Once waste form was certified as an important poten-tial contributor to long-term safety, it took little timebefore the choice of glass came under attack. By 1976,borosilicate glass was already being criticized for hav-ing too high of a leach rate and for being too subjectto devitrification. 118 Within the materials science com-munity, the debate over waste form raged furiously andeventually ignited into controversy over an NAS reporton the subject. 119 Behind the technical substance of thatdebate, however, is a more fundamental policy ques-tion: to what degree should waste form and packagingbe elevated from the potential contributor to long-termsafety to a fully redundant element of a waste manage-ment system?

Currently, the staff of DOE maintains that borosili-cate glass, while perhaps not the ultimate waste form,is good enough. They believe that other forms wouldbe costly and time-consuming and potentially more haz-ardous to develop. Those disadvantages would not beoutweighed by large gains in long-term system reliabilitybecause the geology of a repository can be depended on.The staff of NRC argues that “it would be highly de-

‘ls’’Pros and Cons of Alternative Roles of Government and IndustryReconverting High-Level Waste to Glass, ” SECY-74-673, May 28, 1974, p. 1.

I lcIbid,, pp. I-2; see alSO WASH-1539, pp. 2.5-31—2.5-34.I ITNO record can & found pefiaining to the origins of this elevation of waste

form.I InThis criticism wa9 first raised in 1976 and was incorporated into the

American Physical Society study, op. cit., pp. S128-S132.“’See Luther Carter, “Academy Squabbles Over Radwaste Rep-t,” Science

205, Ju]y 20, 1979, pp. 287-289.

sirable to place major, if not primary, importance onthe waste form itself, its packaging, and the local waste-rock interface. This would leave the geology as a fullyredundant additional barrier. 120 The regulators’ posi-tion clearly derives from a more skeptical view of thepotential for predicting the behavior of repositorysystems and geologic formations far into the future. Oneindicator of the intensity of the NRC position is the factthat in its proposed technical criteria for regulatinggeologic disposal of high-level radioactive waste only onespecific standard is set forth: the performance criteriafor the waste package.121

Determining Acceptable Safety Levelsfor a Geologic Repository

In the previous two sections, the discussion has fo-cused on strategies for finding ‘‘acceptable’ sites for arepository and on the desiderata for an ‘ ‘acceptable’waste form package. We have not considered the proc-ess through which acceptable levels of safety are deter-mined and precisely what those levels are. This sectionwill consider how the process of determining what is ac-ceptably safe has evolved over the last 12 years. How-ever, because the process has not yet reached closure,no statement can be made about its outcome. Instead,this section will also explore the implications of develop-ing sites and waste packages absent a final determina-tion of acceptability.

Judgments about acceptability, it must be recognized,are fundamentally matters of preference. Scientific andtechnical findings can inform those judgments by clari-fying what the levels of safety associated with particularsystem design or repository siting decisions are likelyto be. Even if those findings should be consensually ac-cepted as being empirically accurate (no small task initsel~, it still remains for the individual or society as awhole to determine, based on a set of values, whetherthose levels of safety are satisfactory or not. 122 In thefinal analysis, then, judgments about acceptability can-not be validated or invalidated; they have the same sta-tus as questions of taste.

Prior to 1975, no formal process had been set intoplace to resolve explicitly the issue of acceptable levelsof safety. To be sure, an AEC licensing board duringthe 1960’s did grant construction and operating permitsto the NFS reprocessing plant at West Valley, N.Y. 123

Implicit in those authorizations was the judgment that

IZOLetter, Jack Martin to Sheldon Meyers, June 11, 1979.tZIFeder~ Register, March 1981.lzzsee Re~fi to the Presi&nt, Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste

Management, TID-29442, Washington, D. C., March 1979, p. 42.’23A provisional construction permit-CSF-l-was granted Nuclear Fuel

Service on Apr. 30, 1963.

App. A-l—Radioactive Waste Management Policymaking 219

the storage of liquid waste in tanks for an indefiniteperiod of time posed an acceptable burden to society.But, pragmatically, the drive to introduce commercialreprocessing totally dominated considerations of the ap-propriate level of acceptability for managing the wastegenerated by the facility.

The repository proposed for Lyons, Kans., in 1970provided another instance where a judgment had to berendered about the site and repository design’s accept-ability. Because AEC ultimately chose to abandon thoseplans, no definitive assessment of acceptability was evermade. Nevertheless, the environmental impact state-ment for the project documents well the logic of howsuch decisions were made at the time. 124

Two features of that logic are particularly striking.First, the process for determining the acceptability ofa site and repository design was illustrated. Views aboutwhat constituted an acceptable social burden were ad-mitted from only a narrowly based segment of the poli-cy. In particular, the value judgment offered by theNAS’S Committee on Radioactive Waste Managementthat ‘‘the use of bedded salt for the disposal of radioac-tive waste is satisfactory” was endorsed and accepted. 125

The views of elected officials in Kansas that the specificproject was too risky were discounted. 126 This situationis somewhat ironic because, only 4 years previously,AEC ignored the value judgment of a majority of theNAS Committee that the Savannah River bedrock proj-ect was unacceptably hazardous and proceeded with siteexploration,

127 second, because no a priori standardsfor site suitability were ever explicitly enunciated, eventhis narrowly based judgment of acceptability could notbe held accountable. Selection of a site in the absenceof explicit standards for acceptability raised concern insome quarters that AEC would be able to shoot an ar-row at a wall, to draw the target around where the ar-row landed, and then to pronounce itself an expertmarksman.

With the withdrawal of the Lyons EIS in 1972, andwith AEC falling back to a strategy of long-term sur-face storage, a hiatus of activity emerged and, as aresult, an opportunity arose to adjust the process bywhich matters of acceptability might be resolved. Noevidence is available which suggests that such an effortwas undertaken. The prevailing view within the AECduring that 1972-75 period appears to be that, wheneverthe time came to develop a repository, judgments aboutacceptability of a site and a design would be rendered

]Z+Lyons’ Environment~ Impact Statement, pp. 8-13.iZ3Nation~ Academy of Sciences/Nation~ Research Council, Disposal o f

Solid Radioactive Wastes in Bedded Salt Lkposits, 1970, p. 1.llcsee Lyon9’ Environment~ Impact Statement, pp. 55-5105.IZTNation~ A c a d e my o f S c i e n c e s / N a t i o n a l R e s e a r c h Council, 1966,

pp. 7’3-75.

in much that same relatively closed and informal fashionas they had been in the past.

Starting in 1974, however, the process for determin-ing acceptability in waste management began to under-go two fundamental alterations. First, EPA, after yearsof bureaucratic in-fighting, established a firm toeholdin the domain of radiation protection standards. EPAissued standards for the front-end of the nuclear fuel cy-cle, for reactor operations, and for reprocessing of spentnuclear fuel. 128 In addition, the agency announced itintended to develop standards for the disposal of nuclearwaste. Such criteria would, for the first time, imposeexplicit constraints on repository developments.

The second change was the passage of the Energy Re-organization Act of 1974. That law, which took effectin January 1975, abolished AEC and established in itsplace ERDA and NRC. The motive behind the legisla-tion’s approval was to remove a potential-many be-lieved actual-organizational conflict of interest by sep-arating the development of nuclear power from itsregulation. Not surprisingly, then, both the House andSenate bills contained language authorizing NRC tolicense any “facility used primarily for the receipt andstorage [sic] of high-level radioactive wastes. 129 Thenotion of an independent review of a repository projectwas one of those proverbial ideas whose time had come.A review of the legislative history of the Energy Reor-ganization Act finds no record of opposition to thisprovision—one which represented a major policy shift.

The entry of EPA and the establishment of independ-ent review authority for NRC marked the transitionfrom an informal process of determining acceptabilityto a formal process of regulation. First ERDA and thenDOE would have to choose a site and design a disposalfacility that would meet the regulations that NRC pro-mulgated to ensure that EPA’s standards would be sat-isfied. What was and still is indeterminate was how theregulatory role would evolve and mature.

Conceivably, there are a spectrum of approachesunder which the regulators might interact withrepository developers. At one extreme, the regulatorsadopt a relatively passive posture. The developers pro-ceed with their efforts absent any regulatory guidanceunder the implicit assumption that any facility con-structed would ultimately have to be accepted by theregulators. Under this approach, regulation wouldultimately degenerate into a posteriori approval. At theother extreme, the regulators would establish criteriaand standards independently of the developers and com-pel those responsible for repository siting and design to

~zns~e, En Vironmen(af Analysis of the Uranium Fuel cycle, E~A-520/9- 73-

003, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D. C., 1973; and 40 Codeof Federal Regulations 190,

IZgEnerU Reorganization Act of 1976, sec. 202(3).


conform. The developers could proceed only withgeneric studies until final regulations were promulgated.Mixed approaches might also be adopted. For exam-ple, regulation and development could emerge as in-teractive, iterative, and somewhat informal activities.The developers provide information to the regulatorsabout what is technically possible. Moreover, thedevelopers disregard technical possibilities that seemunlikely to be viewed positively by the regulators. Atthe same time, the developers pursue designs that allowkey parameters to be modified within a range that islikely to include the regulatory standard. Thus, theregulators and the developers work together through thesite selection process and up to the time licensingcommences.

Settling on a regulatory approach is no easy matter.The first alternative, while the least time-consuming,is almost certainly legally tainted; moreover, politicalopposition to it would be vocal and intense. The polarextreme, however, is just as problematic. EPA has stillto issue its standards, even in draft form. Without thosestandards, NRC job of issuing detailed regulationsbecomes more complicated. In short, if the developerswere simply to wait for the regulators to act, substan-tial unfortunate delays would well result. What is cleartoday, that neither extreme approach is viable, wassensed back in 1975. Some mixed approach had to betaken. How that course was charted and its implicationsare the subjects to which we now turn.

All mixed approaches, by definition, entail interac-tion between the regulators and the developers. Whatdistinguishes one such approach from another, however,is which of the two sides provides the driving force thatshapes their relationship and how strong that thrust is.When NRC was first created, it possessed neither theinstitutional knowledge nor the resources to deal withERDA on an equal basis. As a result, NRC’s regulatoryefforts were initially designed to track ERDA’s devel-opmental plans. As those plans shifted, however, NRCfound itself in the position of having to recast its ownpriorities. For instance, NRC first concentrated on de-veloping procedures and techniques for regulating thechoice of site and designing of repositories in beddedsalt. When a domed salt facility became a leading con-tender, NRC found that it could not develop new reg-ulatory tools in time to meet the deadlines thenenvisioned.

As NRC matured as an institution, the balance be-tween the regulators and the developers (now DOE),shifted, resulting in changes in the character of theprevailing mixed approach. The publication of NRC’spolicy statement on licensing procedures for geologicrepositories marks one stage in that evolution. 130 The

tSOFedera] Register 43, NOV. 17, 1978, pp. 53869-53872.

proposed policy called for informal regulatory reviewof the developers’ site selection decision. The NRC staffmight provide comments and advice but the Commis-sion itself would not make any formal findings or takeany formal action. The developers would be at libertyto proceed as they chose in the face of that guidance.The first formal DOE-NRC interaction would occurprior to the sinking of the repository shaft. NRC couldeither authorize repository construction if certain find-ings were made, or it could delay authorization untiladditional data was obtained from sinking the shaft.Unresolved safety issues might be deferred until con-struction was completed if it was felt that furtherresearch was likely to yield favorable solutions. A sec-ond formal licensing review would occur prior to thereceipt of radioactive material at the repository. NRCconcurrence would also be required at the time of closureand decommissioning.

Implicit in those proposed procedures was a visionof the relationship between regulator and developer. Inparticular, the NRC staff believed that it was essentialfor the regulators to intervene formally in the processbefore substantial organizational and resource commit-ments to the site had been made by DOE. Absent suchearly involvement, the regulators faced a risk of beingswept along by the developers’ momentum. Herein,then, lay NRC’s first major effort to assert the initiativein its relations with DOE.

Yet, almost as soon as the proposed policy statementhad been issued, the NRC waste management staff, nowunder new leadership, began to question the policy’slogical foundations.

131 In particular, the staff came tobelieve that any formal authorization prior to the sink-ing of the shaft, or even after it for that matter, wouldhave to be made on the basis of incomplete and inade-quate data. For emerging scientific opinion, articulatedby the USGS, NAS, and the President’s InteragencyReview Group, suggested that “exploration and testingat depth should be performed to determine whether thesurrounding geology will retard waste migration. 132Thus, NRC proposed to require such investigations pri-or to issuing a permit for constructing a repository.

This shift increased the risk of premature commit-ment and the concomitant pressures such a commitmentmight generate. Recognizing that NRC might lose theinitiative in dealing with DOE, the revised proceduralregulations adopted new strategy: ‘‘To guard againstDOE’s making a premature and preemptive commit-ment to a particular site in a particular medium . . . this[revised] approach provides for characterization of anumber of sites at different locations and in different

t~jFederal Register 44, Dec. 6, 1979, pp. 70408-70421.‘321 bid., p. 70410.


media 133 Thus, a multiple-site strategy not onlY

emerges as the one seemingly most consistent with therealities of geologic understanding, but it is also an ef-fective means of asserting regulatory control over theactions of the developers.

The evolving shift in the force driving the relation-ship between the regulator and the developer can alsobe observed in the proposed technical criteria issued byNRC in 1981.134 Three examples stand out as being par-ticularly striking in this regard. The first is the require-ment that the waste package contain radionuclides com-pletely for 1,000 years. The second is the extensivediscussion given to the problem of human intrusion. Thethird is the clear signal that alternative waste forms andpackages be investigated. None of these requirementsappear to be at all arbitrary or constitute an abuse ofregulatory discretion. Yet each could also reasonablybe interpreted as a technical maneuver designed to forceDOE to retrofit its program to conform with the regu-lator’s desires. Certainly part of DOE’s negative reac-tion to the 1,OOO-year waste form requirement could beviewed in this light. Moreover, NRC strong concernabout the issue of human intrusion has to be understoodin the context of the controversy over the Waste Isola-tion Pilot Plant site. In that instance, DOE appearedready to proceed despite the presence of amounts ofpotash in the area that might prompt exploration andexploitation in the future. Finally, the dictum aboutalternative waste forms and packages must be read inthe light of the criticism NRC has made about the ade-quacy of the DOE program.

The developmental program has continued to expandeven as the relationship between NRC and DOEevolved. And not unexpectedly some costs have beenpaid because of this. Perhaps the most significant onehas occurred in the realm of site selection. Absent for-mal regulatory guidance, DOE has had to develop itsown selection criteria. Although they have made aserious effort to accomplish that task responsibly, 135 itdoes seem clear that resource and organizational com-mitments have been made to sites that might not con-form to NRC’s selection criteria or satisfy NRC’s pro-cedural requirements for choosing sites for characteriza-

< tion. In the view of some observers the process for select-ing the sites is flawed and further work on them merelyundermines public confidence in the program. 136

‘s3’(Proposed New 10 CFR Part 60—Disposal of High Level RadioactiveWastes in Geologic Repositories—Procedural Aspects, ” SECY-79-580, Oct.22, 1979, p. 6,

IS~Federa] Register, March ~981.

l$~see, NWTS criteria for the Disposal of Nuclear Wastes: Site Qualifica-tion Criteria, ONWI-33(2) (Columbus, Ohio: Battelle, 1980).

l~bsee some of the critical comments on the siting choice and the Depart-

ment of Energy’s response to them in Final WIPP EIS, DOE/EIS-0026, 1980.

The Relationship Between the FederalGovernment and the States in Nuclear

Waste Management

The Federal Government and several States can pos-sess overlapping jurisdictions and share powers. In thefield of nuclear waste management, the Federal Govern-ment through NRC has entered into agreements witha number of States whereby the latter entities regulatethe activities of low-level waste burial grounds.137 Cur-rent law specifies that the States take over this respon-sibility fully through the formation of regional com-pacts. 138 In the domain of high-level waste disposal,

however, Federal law, at least at this time, * does notauthorize and probably precludes the sharing of powerand authority. Nevertheless, successful implementationof a high-level disposal plan requires that the States beintimately involved. For behind a formal lack of Statepower lies a plethora of informal powers that must beaccommodated. The accommodation is necessary be-cause the States firmly believe that they must protectthe unique interests of those residing within their juris-diction.

In this section, we shall examine how Federal officialsresponsible for waste management began by discount-ing the informal authority of the States, believing thatit would not be exercised, and ended up conceding tothe States formal powers that legally could not be rend-ered.

AEC’S involvement with the States dates back to theearliest days of the waste management program. At thattime, AEC worked closely with local health officials andsanitary engineers in the design of facilities to store wastefrom the military program. By 1956, AEC was consult-ing with State and interstate public health and waterpollution control agencies and was involving State gov-ernments in the evaluation of geological and hydrolog-ical problems associated with disposal of liquid and solidwaste. Moreover, a continuing dialog was reported tobe taking place on the waste management issue throughsuch mechanisms as AEC’S Advisory Committee ofState Officials and the Council of State Governments.One analysis for AEC observed that this Federal/Stateinteraction had been quite positive and recommendedthat it be continued and strengthened. Yet, the analysisconcluded, that relationship could prosper only if it“rested on information derived from sound research anddevelopment programs integrated with knowledge and

ljTTh e A~eement States authority is found in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,

as amended, sec. 274.lj’JSee Low Leve] Waste Management Policy Act of 1980, which passed Con-

gress on Dec. 13, 1980.

● Prior to passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.

—


appreciation of the experiences of . . . communities inresolving their . . . environmental problems. 139

Over the next decade and a half, the character of theFederal/State relationship did not significantly change.Then, as noted above, in 1969, a fire broke out at AEC’Smilitary facility at Rocky Flats, Colo. Considerablequantities of plutonium-contaminated debris were pro-duced. The material was shipped to the waste storagegrounds at the National Reactor Test Station (NRTS)in Idaho. Concerned about NRTS’S role as a “dump-ing ground, ” Idaho Senator Frank Church requesteda multiagency investigation of the facility’s operationsand environmental impacts.140 Although the subsequentreport clearly indicated that AEC’S practices in Idahofully protected the health and safety of the State’spopulation, l41 Church, backed by Governor Cecil An-drus, pressed for a commitment from AEC to removethe wastes and dispose of them elsewhere. 142

AEC recognized that such an action was consistentwith its evolving waste management policy. Even beforethe Rocky Flats fire, AEC had moved toward an ap-proach for commercially generated waste that centeredon the use of Government-owned repositories. It wascertainly feasible to use those planned facilitiesto dispose of the transuranic contaminated waste storedat Idaho. Thus, AEC Chairman Seaborg agreed to hon-or Church’s request and promised to begin removingthe waste by 1980.143 That commitment marked the firsttime a State had substantively affected the direction ofAEC policy. The States’ role had clearly expanded be-yond providing technical collaboration.

It is ironic that AEC’S sensitivity to—or at least apragmatic recognition of—the concerns of the States inthe case of Idaho directly influenced its decision toundertake the Lyons project, an endeavor which sincehas come to be viewed as so lacking both in sensitivityand pragmatism with regard to the State of Kansas. 144

Earlier in this paper the technical issues that cast ashadow over the project’s viability were noted. It is im-portant to recognize that as the exploration and char-acterization of the site progressed, the political atmos-phere was quite turbulent as well.

In the decision memorandum the Commissioners ap-proved authorizing the Lyons project, explicit directionswere given to the staff to ‘‘consult with State offi-cials. 145 The written historical record is unclear aboutthe scope of those consultations. Nonetheless, it is like-ly that members of the Kansas Geological Survey and

1~sAtornic Ene~ Cornrni.ssim 180/5, op. cit., p. 14.l*oLetter, Church to Seaborg, Sept . 13, 1969.

i~l~tter, Bureau of Radiological Health to Church, February 1970.l+~Letter, Church to Seaborg, Apr. 30, 1970.l~~~tter, Seaborg to Church, June 9, 1970.1*+For ~ Cxmple of such a view, see H. Peter Metzger, The Atomic

Establishment (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), pp. 154-160.1+$Atomic Ener~ Commission 180/87, op. cit., p. 6.

probably the staff of the Governor’s office and of locallegislators were briefed. What we do know is that nounambiguous commitments of political support for theproject by the State emerged from those consultations.AEC had not “lined up its ducks” at the time of thepublic announcement on June 17, 1970, that Lyons hadbeen tentatively selected as the first repository site, 146

AEC’S politically exposed position made it more vul-nerable to first the skepticism and then the criticism ofU.S. Congressman Joseph Skubitz, who represented aKansas district which did not include Lyons. Skubitzbegan by asking a straightforward question: why hadthe Kansas salt fields been selected rather than a sitein the Salina basin that would have been closer to theoperating and planned reprocessing plants in New York,Illinois, and South Carolina? The agency responded bysaying the Kansas site possessed ‘‘geologic characteris-tics . . . generally more favorable than those of the saltin the Salina basin. ” AEC furthermore justified the longtransport routes to Kansas by postulating a reprocess-ing plant in California; that hypothetical plant wouldthen make Lyons a centrally located spot.147

AEC’S answer to Skubitz was misleading in that itemphasized the technical bases for the choice and vir-tually ignored the nontechnical factors. 146 The site selec-tion process, as we noted above, was less than system-atic; the analysis supporting the choice of Lyons tookup less than eight pages. Yet, even the analysis con-cluded that Lyons enjoyed, at best, only a marginal tech-nical advantage over other potential sites. If anything,the Kansas salt mine was chosen because of local ac-ceptance of the experimental Project Salt Vault andbecause AEC did not want to wait for—nor did it havethe resources to fund—an investigation of other loca-tions. 149 All this is not to say that AEC’S choice waswrong; simply it was less than candid in dealing withone Representative from Kansas.

AEC also had difficulty in answering specific technicalquestions raised by Skubitz with the obvious help ofKansas Geological Survey’s new director, WilliamHambleton. Concerns were raised about the thermal ef-fects of the geological system, about the problem of brineinclusion, about the available techniques for boreholeplugging, about possible mechanisms for retrieving thewaste if necessary, and about the potential for radia-tion damage to the salt. Many of these same concernswere held by AEC and NAS, But because AEC had onlyskimpily funded waste management research anddevelopment, very few definitive studies could be citedto bolster the agency’s claim that the site was sound.

I*Atomic Ener~ Commiss ion Press Release, N-102, June 17, 1970.1* TLetter, Emlwine to Skubitz, June 11, 1970.l+OAtomic Enerw Commission 180/87, op. cit. , pp. 4, 16.l+gAtomic EnerW Commission 180/81, oP. cit., pp. 4-6.


Instead, AEC pointed to work under way to resolvemany of those issues and, in essence, sought to hold thedebate in abeyance until the research reached fruition.Skubitz, however, strongly argued that it was inappro-priate to select a site, even tentatively, absent thosetechnical findings. For him, AEC’s decision to proceedwith work at Lyons was both a premature commitmentand an act of faith, a faith he did not share.

In the months after the project was publicly an-nounced Skubitz was in the forefront of the attack.Other Kansas officials seemed to adopt a wait-and-seeattitude. That was not to last for long. Spurred on byAEC’s seeming lack of candor, disturbed by the agen-cy’s underdeveloped technical program, and irritatedby what they saw as AEC’s patronizing and arrogantmanner, other local officials soon joined the fray. Bythe beginning of 1971, Governor Robert Docking hadbecome a firm opponent of the Lyons project, and beganto question AEC’sw motives and good faith. 150 Eventual-ly, in August 1971, both of Kansas’ Senators, RobertDole and James Pearson, sponsored an amendment toAEC’s authorizing legislation prohibiting buying of landor burying waste materials at Lyons until such time asan independent advisory council, appointed by the Pres-ident, reported to Congress that the establishment ofa repository and burial of high-level waste could be car-ried out safely.151 Thus, AEC’s inability to satisfy thenot altogether capricious concerns of State officialsresulted in their losing considerable autonomy in im-plementing a major policy decision in waste manage-ment.

The Lyons experience had a profound effect on AECand its successor agencies. While the RSSF was beingplanned, AEC engaged in intensive consultations withState officials from Nevada, Idaho, and Washington.And although State concerns were not completely re-solved, intense confrontations never broke out as theydid over the Kansas project.

By the time the RSSF was canceled and as ERDAreinvigorated efforts aimed at finding new sites for ageologic repository, nuclear energy policymakers clearlyrecognized that States had to become more intimatelyinvolved in waste management decisionmaking. Thus,in November 1976, ERDA’s Administrator, RobertSeamans, wrote to State governors and legislators to in-form them of the agency’s plans to expand the site ex-ploration program. The letter offered to work closelywith the States and to keep the Governors informed ofhow the efforts were progressing. Most significantly,Seamans committed himself to terminating a projectwithin a State ‘‘if the State raises issues . . . connected

with [technical] criteria and their application that arenot resolved through mutually accepted procedures. 152

The States, in effect, were being offered at least thepotential of a veto over the construction of a waste facili-ty within their jurisdiction.

The response of State officials was mixed. Some, suchas those representing South Carolina, Kansas,Michigan, and Wisconsin, wrote to Seamans and ex-plicitly disinvited ERDA from even exploring potentialrepository locations. Others, such as those representingNew York, Missouri, and Colorado, were reluctant towelcome ERDA until further studies, such as the Ge-neric Environmental Impact Statement on Waste Man-agement, were completed. Finally, still others, such asthose representing Oklahoma, Missouri, Mississippi,and Louisiana, did agree to work with ERDA to developground rules which might permit site exploration to pro-ceed. No State, however, evinced much enthusiasm andone by one States soon were dropped from considera-tion. Thus, what began as a new initiative, a fresh startin the area of waste management, soon got mired downin the reluctance of State officials even to contemplatea facility on their soil. 153

The expanded exploration program was directed atfinding sites for disposing of commercially generatedwaste. A parallel effort to construct a repository in NewMexico for military waste had, as we noted above, beenin progress since 1973. State officials and local influen-tial had initially welcomed the possibility of utilizinga site near Los Medanos for a Waste Isolation Pilot Plant(WIPP). 154 By 1978, surface-level site characterizationwas well under way. And a correspondingly mature in-stitutional relationship had evolved between the Federaland State Governments. The New Mexico Governorestablished a Radioactive Waste Consultation TaskForce, an Environmental Evaluation Group, and an Ad-visory Committee on WIPP. Those groups carried outindependent evaluations and assessed the technical va-lidity of the characterization program and provided ad-vice to the Governor. DOE funded a substantial frac-tion of that State effort.

Cooperation between the two levels of governmentwas further facilitated by an informal agreement thatprovided the State of New Mexico with the right of con-currence on the construction of any facility proposed forthe long-term permanent disposal of nuclear waste. TheState interpreted that right to include the opportunitynot to concur and on a number of occasions Federal of-ficials acquiesced in that interpretation, Another factorwhich cemented the Federal/State partnership was thecommitment from the Carter administration in 1978

150see Letter, D~kingS m Skubitz, Feb. 20, 1970, for first hints of Dock-

ing’s growing opposition.151see Provl$o inserted in AEC Authorizing Legislation for fiscd year 1972

for item 72-3-b, the proposed Lyons repository, op. cit.

I~2Letter, Seamans to State officials, NO V. 26, 1976, P. 3.l~9Re~rt of Task Force, op. cit., p. 12.,mGourmley, op. c i t . , PP. 3-5.


that WIPP would be licensed by NRC.155 Such an in-dependent formal review process would help satisfy NewMexican concerns that the facility was indeed “safe.”

By all accounts, then, as the 1970’s drew to a close,DOE and New Mexican officials had established fun-damentally strong working relations that were able tosurvive such occasional shocks as periodic shifts in theproclaimed functions WIPP would fulfill and disagree-ments over the adequacy of the draft WIPP impact state-ment. 156 In December 1979, however, Congress passedthe Department of Energy National Security and Mili-tary Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Actof 1980. That law was reluctantly approved by Presi-dent Carter, who at the time of the signing expressedstrong disagreement with the legislation’s provisions af-fecting WIPP. In particular, the bill undermined thebasis on which New Mexico’s cooperation rested: it pro-hibited DOE from granting the State a veto over theconstruction of the facility and prevented its licensingby NRC.157 Once again, DOE found its relations witha key State strained almost to the breaking point.

DOE’s relationship with the States had developed inan ad hoc fashion over the last half of the 1970’s. Byearly 1978, it became clear to many policy makers thatthat interaction had to be formalized and institutional-ized. DOE began intensive consultations with the lead-ership of the National Governor’s Association (NGA).NGA adopted a resolution in August 1978 which as-serted that DOE had to “obtain State concurrence priorto final site determination. “158 At precisely the sametime, President Carter’s Interagency Review Group onNuclear Waste Management (IRG) was formulating theconcept of ‘consultation and concurrence. Under thatapproach, the ‘‘State would be in agreement with eachstep in the [repository development] process before thenext activity’ would begin. 159 The IRG formulation wasambiguous, perhaps purposely so. Six months later,IRG recast and clarified the concept. In particular, adistinction was made between consultation and concur-rence and a State veto. The former, it was held, im-plied a continuing dialog between the States and theFederal Government; the latter suggested an actiontaken only at one discrete point in time. ’GO To many,IRG’s distinction was without a difference: the obverseof concurrence was nonconcurrence, which was prag-matically equivalent to a State veto. Nevertheless, thisformulation of consultation and concurrence made ex-plicit a policy that had been informally pursued forseveral years; it also proffered more power to the Statesthan they were, up to that time, legally entitled to.

The formalization by the executive branch of thispolicy raised two questions, neither of which has beendefinitively answered. The first question focused on thewisdom of granting the States the ability to delay or defera critically needed national effort. Indeed, PresidentCarter seemed to retreat from the recommendations ofIRG when he emphasized the “consultation” phase andreemphasized the “concurrence” phase in his wastemanagement policy statement.l 161 Moreover, severalMembers of Congress expressed concern that DOE hadgone too far in trying to satisfy the States’ demands,thereby creating a dangerous precedent for the future. 162

Even some State executives indicated that they did notwelcome the power not to concur. To have such author-ity, in their view, would virtually compel them to use it.

Yet, those who opposed endowing the States with sub-stantive controlling influence over repository siting wereprobably in the minority. For the majority the real is-sue—and the second question raised by DOE’s poli-cy—was how would the modalities of the process bedesigned. In particular, what steps could the FederalGovernment take if it disagreed with a State’s noncon-currence? President Carter created by Executive ordera State Planning Council (SPC) composed of Governors,legislators, and representatives of Indian tribes, to pro-vide advice on issues such as that. 163 SPC resolved that,in case of disagreement between DOE and a host State,the latter could only be overridden by an explicitPresidential determination supported by both Housesof Congress.

164 When Congress itself took Up the issuein late 1980, both Houses agreed on an override mech-anism for commercial high-level waste disposal: the hostState would only be sustained if either the House or theSenate affirmatively concurred with the State’s posi-tion.165 Congress, however, could not agree on the rightof a State to object to a facility designed to dispose ofdefense high-level waste. In fact, the disagreement waslargely responsible for Congress’ inability, at that time,to pass a bill dealing with high-level waste.

Linking Reactor Operation With theDevelopment of Techniques for

Radioactive Waste Disposal

. . . the general problem of radioactive waste need notretard the future development of the nuclear energy in-dustry with full protection of the public health andsafety. 166

lssconfidenti~ inteWiews with author, 1978.

“ sIbid,, 1980.tsTDepartment of EnerW Nation~ Security and Military Applications of

Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1980, Sec. 213, 93 Stat. 1259.ls8Nuc]ear herW Policy Position, op. cit., adopted Au~st 1978.13gRe~rt ~0 the president, TID-28817 (draft), Interagency Review Group

on Nuclear Waste Management, Washington, D. C., p. 52.lsOReport to the President, find report, op. cit., pp. 88-96.

islpresident~ Statement on Nuclear Waste Management Policy, Feb. 12,

1980.Iszsee, for instmce, ]etter, Dingell to O’Leary, Apr. 21, 1978.lb~Executive Order No. 12192, Feb. 12, 1980.Is+state p]aning Council Resolution No. 4-10.

lc~see, S.’2 189, sec. 908, 96th Cong. , for example.lbbzndustr~] Radioactive Waste Disposal, op. cit., p. 3.


That statement gives expression to a particular logic.It holds that as long as a solution to radioactive wastedisposal is clearly envisioned, there is no need to pre-vent the commercial nuclear industry from developingand maturing. Another logic can also be constructed.This one holds the generation of nuclear waste, partic-ularly by the commercial nuclear industry, ought to belinked to a resolution of the problem of waste disposal.Which logic prevails depends strongly on the outcomeof activities in the legal and political arenas. In this sec-tion, one will examine how those outcomes have madethe linkage logic more salient although not dominant.

Throughout the period when AEC existed, Congressand the President implicitly sanctioned the developmentof a nuclear power industry unconstrained by the statusof the waste management program. For a dozen years,1959-71, one can find fewer than 25 pages of testimonyabout any aspect of radioactive waste managementamongst the many thousands of pages reporting on hear-ings held by the JCAE on commercial nuclear power. 167

Two reports addressed to the President on civiliannuclear power mentioned the unresolved waste disposalquestion, but there is no evidence that President Ken-nedy, President Johnson, or their staffs saw in thatunsettled issue any reason for concern. 168 Moreover,during that 1959-75 period, the nuclear industry con-tracted for all but six of the reactors ordered in thiscountry.

169 Such a large financial commitment ensuredthat the industry’s political clout would be used to op-pose any action linking reactor deployment with pro-gress in waste disposal.

AEC behaved in a fashion consistent with the incen-tives and signals provided by its political environment.The agency’s policymakers and operating personnelrarely even entertained the idea that, as the wastemanagement program lagged behind reactor develop-ment and deployment, the latter effort should be sloweduntil the former effort reached fruition. When they didconsider the issue of linkage, it was always quicklydismissed. For example, a 1965 memorandum to Com-missioner Ramey reaffirmed the validity of the conclu-sions adopted by the JCAE without offering any fur-ther analysis or rationale. 170

By the early 1970’s, however, AEC recognized thatits political environment had changed somewhat. Amemorandum prepared for an AEC policy session notedthat “the uncertainties concerning location of the

lh7See footnote 8 in NRDC v. Nuclear Regulator), Commission, 547 F. 2d633 (1976) (Hereinafter NRI)C v. NRC).

Iwsee for example, Cjvjljan Nuclear Power—A Report tO the president,1962, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, DC., 1962. The briefsection on waste management appears on pp. 54, 55.

lbgThe Nuc]ear In&8tV.1974, WASH-11 74-74, U.S. Atomic Energy Com-mk.sion, Washington, D. C., 1975, pp. 8-13.

I Topittman to Ramey, OP. cit., p. 1.

repository are already adversely affecting public accept-ance of nuclear power, and it is possible that this aspectof the overall nuclear program could become an unnec-essarily important negative factor in the Nation’s abili-ty to consider its nuclear option to power generation. 171At about the same time, the agency also recognized thatthe National Environmental Policy Act required theconsideration of the environmental effects of theuranium fuel cycle, including waste management, in re-actor licensing hearings.

172 A year later, a staff analysis

of waste management policies noted that any majorchanges in AEC programs ‘‘might be used by nuclearopponents as an indication that nuclear waste cannotbe handled safely for the long term and that nuclearpower should be halted. 173 But if perceptions of anddemands from the political environment had begun tochange, agency behavior did not. For example, AECstaff argued that the S-3 table, which quantified the en-vironmental effects of the fuel cycle, need not even beconsidered because, ‘‘if factored into individual cost-benefit analyses, [it] would be sufficiently small as notto dect significantly the resultant conclusion. 174 Whenit came time to prepare the first programmatic environ-mental impact statement on commercial waste manage-ment, AEC did not analyze the option of shutting offreactors pending progress in the waste disposal program;to have addressed that option would have been in itsview too time-consuming. 175

The tenor of the political environment, however,shifted dramatically in 1976. In June, the State ofCalifornia passed a bill which conditioned siting of re-actors within the State on a finding that ‘ ‘the UnitedStates through its authorized agency has proved thatthere exists a demonstrated technology or means for thedisposal of high-level nuclear waste. “176 When such afinding could not be made, a de facto moratorium onnew nuclear reactors began in the State.177 Although thelaw was overturned as an unwarranted intrusion in anarea preempted by the Federal Government, 178 the factthat a powerful actor—the State of California—hadfirmly rejected the logic of JCAE was not lost. *

In a separate action, scarcely a month after the Cali-fornia Legislature had acted, the Court of Appeals for

iT1sECY-ZzT 1, op. cit., p. 2.!Tz~edera] Register 37, NO V. 15, 1972, pp. 24191-24193.

17s’’Policies for Management of Commercial High-Level RadioactiveWaste, ” SECY.74-222, Nov. 16, 1973, p. A18.

‘74Federal Register, 1972, p. 24192.ITs~uclear Fuel Cyc]e, ERDA-33, Ener~ Research and Development Ad-

ministration, 1975, p. 47.ITsC~ifomia public Resources Code 255 24.2, West SUPP. 1977.l?TC~ifomia EnerW Resoumes Conservation and llevelopment Commission,

In the Matter of Implementation oflVuclear Reprocessing and Waste Disposa~Statutes, No. 76-NL-1, 76-NL-3, Jan. 25, 1978, p. 5 .

ITaPacjtjc ~ga] Foundation, et al. v. State Energy Resources conservation

and Development Commission, reported in CCH, Nuclear RegulationsReports, pp. 16, 621-16, 628.

● The law was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in 1983.


the District of Columbia invalidated the rule which wassupported by the S-3 table. 179 Powerplant certificationwas abruptly halted and remained so for 2 months.More significantly, by holding that AEC had failed todevelop the technical analysis for the rule adequately,the court became the first Federal institution to demandthat a reasoned response and analysis of the consequen-ces of waste disposal techniques be provided before ad-ditional reactors could be brought on-line: “Once aseries of reactors is operating, it is too late to considerwhether the wastes they generate should have been pro-duced, no matter how costly and impractical reprocess-ing and waste disposal turn out to be; all that remainare engineering details to make the best of the situationwhich has been created. 160 In effect, the court’s opin-ion, while not mandating either logic, did reinforce thearguments of those seeking an explicit linkage betweenreactor operation and demonstrable techniques for wastedisposal.

In November 1976, the environmental litigatinggroup, the Natural Resources Defense Council(NRDC), petitioned NRC to conduct a rulemaking pro-ceeding ‘‘to determine whether radioactive wastesgenerated in nuclear power reactors can subsequentlybe disposed of without undue risk to the public healthand safety and to refrain from acting finally to grantpending or future requests for operating licenses untilsuch time as this definitive finding of safety can be andis made. 181 By this petition, NRC was being asked toreconsider the logic that had guided Federal regulatoryand developmental programs for 17 years. NRC deniedthe petition the following June. In the explanation ofits denial, the Commission maintained that it was notobligated, under the Atomic Energy Act, to make thedetermination requested by NRDC. 182 That claim waslater sustained in court.183

But in denying the petition, NRC did not reject thelogic of linkage. It did state that “it would not continueto license reactors if it did not have reasonable confi-dence that the waste can and will in due course be dis-posed of safely. “184 That statement advanced two criti-cal policy innovations and was made at the insistenceof the Chief of the Waste Management Branch over theobjections of the Executive Legal Director. The first in-novation was the distinction between “can and will. ”That distinction marked a departure from the postureof technological optimism. Second, the Commission’sexplanation for its confidence was based on and tied to

179fvR~ V. N R C , op. cit.

1oO1bid., p. 637.t~lpetition is Pfited in Federal Register 42, J~. 13, 1977, p. 2730.189’ NRDC p e t i t i o n f o r Rulemaking o n W a s t e M a n a g e m e n t ,

SECY-77-48B, June 1, 1977.tUNR~ v. NRC and United States ofAmerica, reported in CCH, Nuclear

Regulation Reports, pp. 16537-16544.w SECY.77.48B, a t t a c h m e n t 1, p. 14.

the general direction taken by both NRC and ERDAprograms at that time. “The clear implication is thatif the direction of the present program[s] should changesignificantly, NRC as a matter of sound policy may nolonger be in a position to continue licensing reactors. 185

The California laws, judicial review of the S-3 table,and the NRC response to the NRDC petition all leftprofound and depressing impressions on those defend-ing the logic of the Joint Committee. Mustering theirforces, those opposing linkage did prevail in the intenseand bitter bureaucratic infighting over the Carter ad-ministration’s proposals for reforming reactor licensingprocedures. Advocates of including a specific linkageprovision found their views rejected by the Presidenthimself. The opponents of linkage were also heartenedby the Deutch Report’s recommendation to dispose of1,000 spent fuel rods at the WIPP, a recommendationmany believe was prompted by a desire to satisfy Cali-fornia’s law.186 Moreover, the President’s InteragencyReview Group managed to avoid the question of linkagein preparing its analysis.

187 Yet despite these events,forces within the Government still pressed for a com-mitment to nuclear power which was dependent on pro-gress in waste disposal. For example, one such advocate,J. Gustave Speth, formerly a lawyer for NRDC and lat-er a member and then Chairman of the Council on En-vironmental Quality (CEQ, announced, to the surpriseand shock of many colleagues, that CEQ favored “anational decision which would make the expanded useof nuclear power contingent on a clear and convincingshowing, after consideration of both technical and in-stitutional factors, that nuclear power’s deadlybyproducts can be safely contained for geologicperiods. ’188

Additional pressures to establish an explicit linkagebetween reactor licensing and the resolution of the wastemanagement question began to mount in May 1979,when the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruledin the case of Minnesota v. NRC. 189 The plantiffschallenged NRC’s licensing decision in two cases inwhich utilities sought to expand their onsite capacity forstoring spent fuel. The plaintiffs argued that, absent aproven waste management system, the environmentaleffects of continued at-reactor storage for an indefiniteperiod of time into the future had to be considered.Moreover, they argued that unless the analysis demon-strated an acceptable level of environmental impact, theadditional storage space could not be constructed. Whilethe NRC Licensing Appeal Board accepted the logic of

q3ECy.77-48B, op. cit., p. 2.la~onfidenti~ interviews with author, 1978; also see Task Force RcPort,

op. cit., pp. 16-17.lsJRe~~ t. the President, final report, op. cit., pp. 5-8.jsaQuot~ in the New Y o r k Times, %pt. 30, 1977, p. 12.

18*&fjnnesota V. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 602 F. 2d 412 (1979).

App. A-l—Radioactive Waste Management Policymaking “ 227

the plaintiffs’ contentions, it held that the Commission,in its denial of the NRDC petition, had resolved the is-sue by stating that it had reasonable confidence that safemethods of permanent disposal would be available whenneeded. 190 The court, however, felt that such a pivotalstatement had to have a firmer analytical foundationthan the Commission had thus far provided. The court,therefore, remanded the case to the agency for furtherconsideration in ‘‘the interest of sound administra-tion. 191 In October, NRC announced its intention toconduct a generic processing ‘‘to reassess its degree ofconfidence that radioactive waste produced by nuclearfacilities will be safely disposed of, determine when anysuch disposal will be available, and whether such wastescan be safely stored until they are safely disposed of. ’192

That proceeding, to which there are over 40 parties, isexpected to conclude in 1983.

Coping With Interdependence

As the reader is undoubtedly aware, the eight ele-ments of waste management policymaking just pre-sented are not independent of each other. Rather, eventstranspiring in one sphere affect and constrain laterevents in all spheres. In this penultimate section, firstintroduced is a conceptual framework for understandingthose interactions; it then is employed to explicate theintricacies of waste management policymaking.

At the outset of this paper, developing the nuclearpower energy system was a rather complex task ladenwith uncertainties. Also noted were those characteristicsof complexity and uncertainty that led policy makers toassign a low organizational priority to the issue of wastemanagement up until 1975. Now there is a need to ex-plore further some of the implications of complexity; thistime the complexity of the waste management domainitself.

Although there is some disagreement about the con-cept’s meaning among those who use it, the level of com-plexity will be associated with the number and richnessof the interdependencies that join the components orelements of a policy domain. A policy domain will becomplex if it possesses a large number of interdependen-cies among its elements and if it is structured in a fashionthat prevents breaking it down into relatively self-con-tained systems capable of being treated independentlyof each other. In engineering phraseology, complexityis what distinguishes tightly coupled from looselycoupled systems. In cybernetic terms, complexity resultsfrom the presence of numerous feedback channels. Com-

190~ NRC 51.

191&ffflnesota V, Nuclear Regulatory Gmmission, 418.lQ2FederaJ Register 44, Oct. 25, 1979, pp. 61372-6~3~5.

plexity is what forces econometric modelers to abandona system of recursive equations and shift to a systemof equations that capture a series of reciprocal relations.While no convenient metric exists which scales complex-ity, a persuasive case can be made that the nuclear wastemanagement policy domain is relatively complex. In fig-ure A-2, the major interdependencies among the do-main’s elements are sketched out.

Most of those relationships can be inferred from theanalysis of the eight elements of policymaking. Thechoice of waste form is dependent on whether spent fuelrods or high-level reprocessed byproducts are consideredto be waste. But the choice is also determined by howadequate the scientific/technological knowledge base isdeemed to be. For instance, those who are skeptical ofour current ability to engage in accurate long-term pre-dictions of geologic behavior would choose more sophis-ticated forms than those who had more confidence.Moreover, regulatory standards, such as the proposedtechnical criteria recently suggested by NRC, have anobvious influence on the waste form selected. In a sim-ilar manner the choice of siting strategy will depend onthe adequacy of the knowledge base; the greater the un-certainty, the more redundant the strategy is likely tobe. But the siting strategy will also be strongly affectedby the requirements of the National Environmental Pol-icy Act as well as specific mandates of NRC such as itslicensing regulations.

The capability to develop a system for disposing ofradioactive waste will be a function of the siting strategy,the choice of waste form, the adequacy of the scienti-fichechnological knowledge base, and the thoughtfulnessand sophistication of the implementation program. Thatlatter component subsumes, among other things, logis-tical and budgetary planning, manpower training, de-signing responses to large changes of scale in operation,and post-decommissioning monitoring. Capability willbe influenced as well by the regulatory standards setforth by NRC and EPA; the stricter the standards, theless likely, ceteris paribus, will be the existence of suffi-cient capability to meet them.

But in an important way, those regulatory standardsare also affected by capability. If the regulators, for in-stance, do not believe that a requirement for zero releasefor 10,000 years is within the current or near-term pro-jected capability, they will be reluctant to impose it. Thestandards will be influenced by elements in the regula-tors’ political environment such as courts, Congress, andby the outcomes of battles among competing interestgroups as well.

Like beauty, however, capability is often in the mindof the beholder. Those perceptions will not be independ-ent of some ‘‘objective’ assessment of the developmentact but they will be influenced-perhaps strongly—by

228 “ Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

De finitionwaste

of

Figure A-2.—Waste Management Policymaking

Siting strategy .

---=4Perception of

I t w e l I - I f ~

scientific/technological 7knowledge base

c ~ ~ ~ ~a - s % $ ~ ~ ~ ~ e w ‘Linkage issues

other factors as well. For instance, the historical ex-perience of waste management will affect an individual’ssense of current capability. Totally exogenous considera-tions such as political philosophy, value orientation, orlifestyle may also play a role in evoking perceptions ofcapability.

This distinction between capability and perceptionsof it is not a trivial one: for it is the latter factor, notthe former one, which directly influences other elementsin the policymaking schema. In particular, the activitiesof interest groups are premised on their particular viewsabout capability. Members of the general public will ac-cept or reject proposed projects based on their beliefsabout capability. Moreover, Federal/State relationshipswill develop in ways determined by perceptions of ca-pability; the less favorable the perceptions, the greaterthe effort subordination jurisdictions will make to havea strong say in waste management decisionmaking. Fi-nally, those perceptions will affect how salient thelinkage issue is likely to be; unfavorable beliefs increasesensitivity to the claim that waste is being producedwithout any demonstrated means at hand to dispose ofit.

KeyDirect relationshipReciprocal relationshipFeedback ioop

These interactions among elements of the waste man-agement policy domain dynamically play themselves outover time. Thus, the definition of waste accepted at timeT affects the choice of waste form at time T + 1. Insimilar fashion, the degree of public acceptance for aparticular project or policy at one point in time influ-ences the character of the political environment at somelater point. Finally, the reciprocal relationship betweenchoice of waste form and the adequacy of the knowledgebase and between regulatory standards and capabilitycan also be understood in terms of a time-lagged inter-dependence.

The dynamism, critically conditioned by the complex-ity of the domain, engenders important consequencesas policymaking unfolds, Any given element comes todepend in a nonsimple manner on prior states of a rangeof other elements. Not only need policy makers concernthemselves about managing a set of direct relationships,but they also must address a set of indirect ones as well.In less formal terms, the dynamism and complexity ofpolicymaking quickly locks the elements of the domaintogether. Past decisions and performance come to in-fluence and constrain present choices in important

App. A-l—Radioactive Waste Management Policymaking 229

respects. Four examples can illustrate how this processhas occurred.

Example One

Adequacy of knowledge -Capability+ Perceivedcapability-Acceptance

So long as all the major actors in waste managementpolicymaking subscribed to the salt assumptions, con-sensus prevailed as to the general adequacy of the sci-entific/technological knowledge base. The clear implica-tion of that consensus was that isolating waste was aquite solvable problem. Certainly that was the thrustof the earliest NAS study. Those not directly involvedhad no basis for questioning that claim and, thus, overallperceptions of capability were positive. Interest groupsand the general public, to the extent they even thoughtabout the issue of waste, were quiescent.

As the consensus began to dissolve in the mid-1970’s,questions were raised about capability—with some ar-guments being advanced that isolation, in principle, wasimpossible. Within the larger community, perceptionsabout capability grew more skeptical. As those percep-tions became more widespread, they provided the basisfor opposition among interest groups and members ofthe public.

In short, actions taken early on in the history of wastemanagement severely constrained the options availablein later years. As the premises which underlay actionshifted, the nuclear developers found themselves lockedin, unable to respond to changing circumstances withoutundergoing considerable organizational trauma.

Example Two

Adequacy of knowledge+ Capacity+ Regulatorystandards Waste form

The erosion of the consensus about salt, undermin-ing faith in the elegant solution, had additional conse-quences beyond activating interest groups and membersof the general public. Personnel at both EPA and NRCbegan to ponder what their response should be. At bothorganizations, skepticism replaced confidence in the ac-curacy of predictions of geologic behavior over longperiods of time. The simple and straightforward as-sumptions held in the past were seen to be inadequate.

Although EPA’s position cannot be ascertained, sincethe agency has not promulgated its draft standards andcriteria, NRC response has been strikingly clear.Those regulators have mandated that the waste formand package become fully capable of isolating the wasteindependently of the repository and surrounding envi-ronment. In other words, given the inadequacy ofknowledge and the resulting predictive uncertainties

prudence requires that the repository geology not be thesole barrier preventing release of the waste. The wasteform and package must maintain its integrity for over1,000 years. After that, the waste must not escape be-yond the engineered portion of the repository at a rateof greater than 10-5 per year.

Example Three

Perception-Federal/State relationships-Politicalenvironment Implementation

In the early 1970’s, when AEC embarked on the Ly-ons project, the view was widely held among leaders ofthe Kansas Geological Survey that insufficient knowl-edge about repository design had been gathered. Themen from Kansas pointed to what they felt were primi-tive heat-flow models as well as gaps in understandingwaste-rock interactions and rock mechanics. These con-cerns about the technical viability of the effort provideda basis for opposition on the part of U.S. RepresentativeSkubitz and Governor Docking.

Those officials unleashed a barrage of criticism onAEC, and despite the agency’s best effort, those pro-tests—asserting that State interests were beingignored —never diminished. Within a year, the contro-versy had escalated. Kansas Senators Dole and Pear-son were persuaded to introduce an amendment to anAEC authorization bill. The rider required that an ex-pert advisory committee be appointed to certify that theLyons site was sound and the repository design was re-liable. Absent such certification, the Commission couldnot proceed. Had the effort gone ahead, the agencywould have lost its autonomy over the project’s imple-mentation.

Example Four

Experience with storage-Perception- Federal/Staterelationships- Political environment- Implementation

Historically, it has been the case that people’s judg-ments about the degree of capability have, rightly orwrongly, been strongly influenced by the record estab-lished in storing waste from the military program. Im-ages of leaking tanks at Hanford and the orphaned wasteat West Valley subvert claims of competence for dis-posal. As the images became more widespread and asthe waste issue became more salient, State officials beganto seek Federal guarantees that would ensure that anyproject within a State would be predicated on a highlevel of scientific and technical expertise.

Without those assurances, States were reluctant evento permit repository site investigation, let alone actualsite selection. As more and more States espoused thatposition, a new-era “tragedy of the commons’ loomed.

230 ‘ Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Leve/ Radioactive Waste

The National Governors’ Association, in response, ad-vanced the idea of consultation and concurrence andsoon found it accepted by the Carter administration.Formal agreements were to be negotiated between theStates and DOE which would govern the implementa-tion of further repository development activity.

The complexity and dynamic nature of the wastemanagement policy domain—characteristics we havetried to lay out conceptually and with help of the fourexamples just presented—are not merely intellectualabstractions. Rather, the existence of those two featureshas some significant real world implications.

First, if our arguments are valid, the past is indeedprologue; the slate can never be wiped clean. Actionstaken in the past continue to reverberate within the do-main of waste management policymaking. To be sure,the impact of those actions—unless reinforced by latersimilar ones—becomes attenuated as they recede intime. But the impact never disappears completely.Thus, present day policymakers find themselves saddledwith a not-entirely-welcome legacy. Although they mayassert that the “time has come to put Lyons behind us, ’they are indulging themselves if they believe that caneasily happen. Past problems will reside in the con-sciousness of many players.

The most salient consequence of this pertains to theproblem of credibility. Even the most objective andscientifically responsible and competent DOE programmanagers will find that they will be judged not only ontheir own merits but on their predecessors’ as well. Theclaim that ‘‘things will now be done right’ will oftenappear hollow in the face of a string of past failures andincomplete successes. Altering that perspective will notbe a trivial undertaking.

A second implication of the complexity and dynamismof the waste management policy domain follows fromthe first. At this point in time, 35 years into the nuclearage, there is only limited room for new failures in deal-ing with those toxic materials. Certainly, the currentprogram is substantially improved in terms of resources,broader organizational commitment, and sophisticationcompared to the one in place as recently as 5 or 6 yearsago. A sense prevails that progress-albeit slow progressin some people’s view—is being made. Yet, the opti-mism is fragile. There simply is not much “slack” pres-ent. Should a glaring error arise, there will be little orno residuum of good will to buffer the program fromprofound shocks.

Conclusions

On the basis of the discussion in the preceding 10 sec-tions, a range of conclusions can be drawn about howwaste management policymaking has evolved over time.

For ease of presentation, the findings will be categorizedas follows: conclusions about the policymaking process;conclusions about the technical basis for policymaking;conclusions about problem-solving strategies; and con-clusions about the institutional dimension of policymak-ing.

The Policymaking Process

Up until approximately 1975, waste management andparticularly waste disposal efforts were fragrnented fromand subordinate to other aspects of nuclear develop-ment. That state of affairs was an expectable organiza-tional response to uncertainty and complexity. Wastemanagement and disposal was funded at low levels; theproblem had low bureaucratic visibility; research anddevelopment directed toward disposal was quite rudi-mentary.

Waste management policies have shifted frequentlyover the years. Initial plans to construct a repository atLyons, Kans., had to be abandoned in 1972. AEC thenpursued a policy of extended surface storage until 1975.Those efforts were replaced by a program emphasizingdisposal in salt formations. More recently, the programhas looked at an expanded range of potential candidatesites in a variety of geologic media.

Major waste management policies were made on anincremental and ad hoc basis. The waste managementprogram has lacked a unified guiding philosophy thatcould lend coherence to decisionmaking. Policymakinghas tended to be reactive rather than proactive. It hasoften had a short-term rather than a long-term orienta-tion.

Difficulties encountered in one sphere of wastemanagement have often created problems in otherspheres. Developing a waste disposal system requiresthe fine tuning of a number of interdependent compo-nents. When difficulties arose in one sector, they car-ried over into other parts of the system. As a result,problem-solving was retarded in a wider number ofareas.

Waste management policymaking retains little slackto buffer against additional setbacks. Many of those in-volved in the waste management policy domain hold theview that the program has been relatively unsuccessful.Those negative images have damaged the program’scredibility. In many quarters, no residuum of good willexists to mitigate the shock of some new policy failure.

Technical Issues

Although uncertainties over some technical questionspersist, no one has suggested that waste disposal in geo-logic formations is, h principJe, not possible. Manytechnical issues remain unresolved. Disagreements re-


main about the significance of those issues and corre-sponding policy consequences. Nevertheless, throughoutthe history of waste management problem-solving, nocredible argument has emerged which undermines thefeasibility of geologic disposal.

After an initial overwhelming emphasis on disposalin salt formations, attention has increasingly been givento candidate sites in other media. For many years, AEC,heavily influenced by NAS, was committed almost ex-clusively to finding a site in salt. Not until themid- 1970’s did ERDA expand the range of potentialhost formations. DOE has broadened even further in-vestigations and research into sites other than salt.

Although more is known about engineering a reposi-tory in salt, no particular host geologic formation en-joys a preferred status as a potential disposal site.Geologic knowledge has evolved since the early 1950’swhen salt was recommended as the preferred disposalmedia. A technical consensus has emerged which holdsthat the repository and its hydrogeologic environmentmust be analyzed in tandem to ensure the isolation ofthe waste. Once that environment has been factored intodisposal design, most geologists believe that suitable sitescan be found which utilize a wide variety of host rockformations.

Waste forms and packages have evolved from beingmere conveniences to becoming fully redundant com-ponents of a disposal system. The attention paid to wasteform early on was mainly directed at increasing the easeof transportation of the material from a reprocessingplant to the repository. Later, ERDA advocated otherwaste forms that would increase the middle term isola-tion capability of a disposal system. In 1981, NRCissued a proposed regulation that elevates waste formand packaging into a major component whose perform-ance strongly affects the very-long-term isolation capa-bility of the system.

Strategic Issues

Until 1978, the strategy for seeking disposal locationsfocused on a single site at a time; no site intercom-parisons were to be made prior to site selection. Per-sonnel at AEC and ERDA adopted this strategy of singlesite investigation in part because they had to operateon tight budgets. They also saw no reasons why com-paring sites offered any safety advantage. Current NRCprocedural regulations, however, require some site in-tercomparison prior to the issuance of a repository con-struction permit.

A single site strategy can be politically risky. Thenuclear developers must operate in a political atmos-phere characterized by suspicion and skepticism. No jur-isdiction is enthusiastic over the prospect of being a hostfor a repository. If only one site is under active consid-

eration at a time and no alternative exists, that suspi-cion and skepticism becomes reinforced and local op-position intensifies.

Nontechnical considerations have played an impor-tant initial role in selecting sites to date. It is largely im-material whether technical or nontechnical factors areconsidered first in choosing a potential repository siteso long as both can exert an unbiased influence in theprocess. Tentative site selection in Kansas and in NewMexico relied heavily at the start on nontechnical fac-tors. Concerns were raised in each case that technicalconsiderations were not given their appropriate weight.

Institutional Issues

The definition of waste, whether it includes spent helas well as high-level reprocessed waste, has importantimplications for decisions about storage and disposal.Historically, the waste management program had pre-sumed that reprocessed waste would be disposed of. Asthat assumption came under challenge and was under-mined, adjustments— some of which were major—hadto be made in the program. The current waste manage-ment program seeks to avoid those difficulties in thefuture by designing facilities that will accommodateeither reprocessed waste or spent fuel rods.

Repository development has been complicated by theabsence of regulatory standards. The nuclear developershave proceeded over the years to design repositories andinvestigate potential sites without much regulatory guid-ance. This has had two consequences: first, emergingregulations have forced the developmental program tomake time-consuming and costly adjustments. Second,the developmental program encountered public suspi-cion and skepticism because its internal standards andcriteria were unaccountable.

Policies predicated on extended storage have enjoyedacceptance only when coupled with strong commitmentsto and implementation of a credible program of disposal.The Federal Government has advocated long-termwaste storage on at least four different occasions. Eachtime public criticism has been intense. Only when theplans for storage were linked to a well-funded disposalprogram did the opposition become somewhat attenu-ated.

Federal/State relationships have evolved with theStates being given a more active role in waste disposalpolicymaking. Initially the State role was one oftechnical collaboration. State concern over repositorysiting decisions coupled with their informal powers todelay Federal effort augmented that role. Current policywith regard to commercial waste disposal envisions amajor State contribution in siting choices.

Pressures to establish a formal linkage between fur-ther generation of commercial waste and progress to-


ward solution of the disposal problem have grown over In this paper, the major themes and issues in thethe years. Prior to 1975, there were very few who ad- history of waste management policymaking have beenvocated that linkage. Thereafter, however, a number detailed. By understanding the successes and failuresof States adopted laws conditioning further growth in that marked that history, people might in the futurenuclear generating capacity on a resolution of the waste avoid policies that are error-prone. Therein lies the po-issue. NRC is currently holding hearings to determine tential contribution of this research.its stance on the question.

Appendix

Major EventsA-2

inWaste Management History—1944-81

PART I

Development of Long-Term (Interim) Storage

THE HANFORD EXPERIENCE

Reference: I-Al—December 1944

Construction of the first storage tanks for high-levelliquid radioactive waste is completed at the HanfordReservation. The material that is put into those tankscame from reprocessing reactor fuel irradiated to pro-duce the plutonium, some of which ultimately was usedin the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki, Japan. The single-walled tanks were constructed out of carbon steel thatwas less durable, but more readily available and less ex-pensive than stainless steel. The life expectancy of thetanks was estimated to be between 50 and 100 years.The use of carbon steel tanks required that the acidicliquid waste streams be made alkaline.

Reference: I-AZ—January 1952

Operations begin at the Redox reprocessing plant.This new chemical process for extracting plutoniumfrom irradiated reactor fuel rods produces a significantlysmaller volume of waste than did the original bismuthphosphate. Because of the greater concentration of fis-sion products in the waste stream, however, the liquidwaste from the first-cycle extraction system is self-boilingand must be stored in tanks with appurtenances for boil-ing waste. These tanks are still constructed of single-walled carbon steel and the waste is made alkaline priorto storage.

Reference: I-A3—January 1956

Operations begin at the large capacity Purex reproc-essing plant. This new chemical process for extractingplutonium further reduces the volume of waste pro-duced. The waste are still self-boiling and are stored insimilarly designed single-walled carbon steel tanks.

Reference: I-A4—July 1958

The first leak of 55,000 gallons (gal) was detected ina tank containing nonboiling waste constructed in 1944.The leak was remedied and did not endanger the publicas far as could be determined.

Reference: I-A5—March 1965

In order to reduce the number of new tanks to han-dle the waste from new production and to replace someold tanks, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) andthe operators at Hanford embark on an in-tank solidi-fication program. The purpose of this program is toreduce the liquid to a salt cake that would remain inthe tanks even if cracks developed. The first waste tobe solidified were those in the Y-tank farm and werenonboiling waste.

Reference: I-A6—June 1967

Because of their higher heat content, self-boiling wastecould not be solidified in their tanks. To immobilize

233

234 ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial H/gh-Level Radioactive Waste

—

those wastes, AEC and the Hanford operators beginwaste fractionation. In this process, the long-lived, highheat generating fission products, cesium and strontium,are removed and the remainder of the waste is allowedto decay until it can be evaporated in tanks to a salt cakeand sludge.

Reference: I-A7—February 1971

First double-shell waste storage tanks available for useat Hanford. The new tanks consist of a freestanding car-bon steel tank inside a steel-lined reinforced concretevault; a tank within a tank. This design provides sec-ondary containment of the waste. Any leakage from theprimary tank would be detected and corrective actionstaken before any radioactive material comes in contactwith the surrounding soil. The primary tank is also heattreated after fabrication (stress relieved) to prevent stresscorrosion cracking believed to be the cause of previoustank leaks.

Reference: I-A8—May 1973

The largest leak occurs in the 106-T tank constructedin 1947. Over 100,000 gal of waste is released becausethe operators failed to monitor the liquid levels in areceiving tank during transfer from one tank to another.The leak was remedied and did not endanger the publicas far as could be determined.

Reference: I-A9—November 1973

The waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility beginsoperation. This facility takes the separated cesium andstrontium and packages the isotopes in a form that al-lows for their ultimate disposal. Until that time, thepackages are stored in an engineered facility and cooledby circulating water.

THE SAVANNAH RIVER EXPERIENCE

Reference: I-Bl—November 1954

High-level liquid waste is first generated at the Savan-nah River Plant as part of the military production pro-gram. The waste results from reprocessing irradiatedreactor fuel using a modified Purex process. The self-boiling waste is made alkaline and stored first in single-walled carbon steel tanks. Later on, double-walled car-bon steel tanks are constructed and used at SavannahRiver.

Reference: I-B2—October 1957

The first tank leak is detected at Savannah River butnone of the material is released into the environment.

Reference: I-B3—March 1960

AEC and the operators of the Savannah River Plantbegin an in-tank solidification program which, like theone at Hanford, reduces the waste to a dry salt cake andsludge.

THE IDAHO EXPERIENCE

Reference: I-Cl—February 1953

Reprocessing of irradiated fuel from AEC’S experi-mental reactor program and the Navy’s nuclear fleetbegins at what is now the Idaho National EngineeringLaboratory. The waste streams are not neutralized butare instead stored in stainless steel tanks.

Reference: I-C2—December 1963

The acidic waste are solidified by means of a fluid-ized bed waste calcinator facility for the first time. Theliquid waste is sprayed into a bed of calcine which isagitated by a flow of hot air and heated to the calciningtemperature. The product is converted to granular solidswhich are pneumatically transported to storage facilities.

Reference: I-C3—May 1970

A fire at an AEC-owned weapons fabrication facilitylocated at Rocky Flats, Colo., leaves considerable solidwaste contaminated with transuranic material. The fa-cility ships the waste for storage to the Idaho facility,Idaho’s Governor and Senators protest the transfer andreceive a pledge from AEC Chairman Seaborg that thewaste will be removed by the end of the decade.

Reference: I-C4—October 1976

Construction begins on a new waste calcining facil-ity to convert liquid high-level waste to a granular solid.The new facility will replace the older calcining facil-ity, which was designed as a demonstration unit, andit will provide many operational improvements.

NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICESREPROCESSING OPERATION

Reference: 1-Dl—May 1963

After years of effort to encourage commercial ven-tures in fuel reprocessing AEC approves a constructionpermit for the Nuclear Fuel Services Corp. (NFS) tobuild such a facility in West Valley, N. Y,, NFS adoptsthe Savannah River model of liquid waste storage intanks. New York $tate Atomic Development Authority

—

App. A-2—Major Events in Waste Management History-1944-81 “ 235

agrees to be responsible for safeguarding the waste andfor maintaining the tanks in perpetuity. NFS pays intotrust fund for the care of the waste.

Reference: I-D2—April 1966

NFS receives an operating permit and commencesfuel reprocessing.

Reference: I-D3—March 1972

NFS ceases operation and closes down for remodel-ing and expansion. During its nearly 6 years of oper-ating, the company reprocessed 160 metric tons of fuelfrom the commercial nuclear power industry and 480metric tons of fuel from the military production reac-tors at Hanford. A total volume of 640,000 gal ofuranium processing waste are stored in mild steel tanksand 12,000 gal of acid thorium waste are stored in stain-less steel tanks.

Reference: I-D4—April 1976

The Getty Oil Co., current owners of the NFS facil-ity, announces their withdrawal from the reprocessingbusiness and request that New York State, in accord-ance with its 1963 agreement, take over responsibilityfor the liquid waste stored in tanks.

Reference: I-D5—July 1979

The Energy and Water Development AppropriationBill for 1980 directs the Department of Energy (DOE),using funding provided to it for commercial wastemanagement, to provide necessary technical support tostudy and recommend a nuclear waste solidification pro-gram at West Valley, N. Y., and to assist the State ofNew York as appropriate in developing such a program.Based on this direction, DOE initiates studies and an-nounces its intent to prepare an environmental impactstatement (EIS) on alternatives for solidification of thehigh-level liquid waste in storage at the NFS site.

THE RETRIEVABLE SURFACES T O R A G E F A C I L I T Y

Reference: I-El—June 1972

AEC announces plans to construct an engineered re-trievable surface storage facility (RSSF) to hold com-mercially generated high-level waste until the time whena geological repository is available for waste disposal.

This initiative is prompted by the failure of the Lyonsrepository project. The RSSF would be essentially de-signed as mausolea and would be sited at large AECor Federal sites in the sparsely populated portions of theWestern United States.

Reference: I-E2—September 1974

AEC issues an EIS in support of the RSSF. The EISdraws critical comments from a wide range of groupsand individuals including some Western Governors andthe Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Reference: I-E3—April 1975

The Energy Research and Development Administra-tion’s (ERDA) Administrator Seamans, in one of hisfirst official acts, withdraws the RSSF impact statementand requests that the proposed congressional authoriza-tion for the RSSF be deleted.

SPENT FUEL POLICY

Reference: I-Fl—April 1977

President Carter announces that, in pursuit of non-proliferation objectives, his administration would seekthe deferral of commercial reprocessing and associatedrecycle of plutonium. Under this policy, spent fuelwould become the waste form of the future.

Reference: I-F2—October 1977

DOE, with Presidential approvaI, announces a spentfuel policy which has three major components. First,the administration will construct a large away-from-reactor facility to store any spent fuel that utilities wishto transfer to the Government. The Government wouldthen take title to the fuel and have responsibility for ituntil it is permanently disposed of. Second, at the timeof transfer, the utilities would pay a one-time chargefor the Government’s services. The charge would fullypay for storage as well as disposal costs. Third, theUnited States would accept for storage and disposal lim-ited amounts of foreign spent fuel if such an action wouldcontribute to this country’s nonproliferation objectives.

Reference: I-F3—March 1981

The new Reagan administration declines to continueefforts to construct an away-from-reactor storage facility.


PART II

Development of Disposal Options

GENERIC STUDIES ANDINVESTIGATIONS

Reference: II-Al—August 1957

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Commit-tee, providing advice to AEC, reports on the possibilityof disposing radioactive waste in geological formations.The Committee is convinced that “radioactive wastecan be disposed of safely in a variety of ways and at alarge number of sites in the United States. ” The Com-mittee also maintains that ‘‘disposal in salt is the mostpromising method for the near future. ” Furthermore,the Committee notes that “disposal could be greatlysimplified if the waste would be gotten into solid formof relatively insoluble character. Significantly, theCommittee observes that “the necessary geologic inves-tigation of any proposed site must be completed and thedecision as to safe disposal means established beforeauthorization for reactor construction is given. Unfor-tunately, such an investigation might take several yearsand cause embarrassing delays in the issuing of permitsfor construction. This situation can only be handled bystarting investigations now of a large number of poten-tial future sites as well as the complementary laboratoryinvestigations of disposal methods.

Reference: 11-A2—February 1959

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE)holds hearings on Industrial Radioactive Waste Dis-posal. Scores of witnesses from Government, industry,the national laboratories, and academia testify and pre-sent scientific papers on the manifold aspects of radioac-tive waste storage and disposal. The hearings led AECand JCAE to conclude that: 1) radioactive waste man-agement practices have not resulted in any harmful ef-fects on the public, its environment, or its resources;and 2) the general problem of radioactive waste neednot retard the future development of the nuclear energyindustry with full protection of the public health andsafety.

Reference: 11-A3—November 1962

In a report to President Kennedy on civilian nuclearpower, AEC maintains that the waste managementproblem is “technically soluble” and that “aside fromthe central reactor development program proper, noother phase of the entire program is more importantthan that of waste disposal. ”

Reference: 11-A4—March 1971

JCAE returns to the subject of waste managementand conducts extensive hearings on the proposed repos-itory in Lyons, Kans. Following those hearings, theCommittee reports out an authorization bill providingfunds for the facility. The implementation of the proj-ect is conditioned upon a finding by an advisory com-mittee, appointed by the President, that ‘‘the establish-ment and burial of high-level waste can be carried outsafely.

Reference: 11-A5—January 1972

AEC publishes the first version of its plan for manag-ing waste generated as part of the defense program. Theplan details AEC intentions for short- and long-termstorage of liquid high-level, low-level, solid, and gaseouswaste.

Reference: 11-A6—May 1974

AEC publishes its first technical analysis of potentialalternative methods for long-term management of high-level radioactive waste. The document is based on re-ports written for AEC by the Battelle Pacific NorthwestLaboratory. Neither the Battelle report nor the AECsummary reaches any conclusion about a preferred dis-posal option.

Reference: 11-A7—November 1975

JCAE holds its first oversight hearings specifically onthe waste management question since 1959. The Com-mittee hears reports from the program managers ofERDA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),and EPA.

Reference: 11-A8—May 1976

ERDA releases the so-called Technical AlternativesDocument (TAD) which describes the technologiesavailable for managing radioactive waste from com-mercial nuclear power. TAD updates and expands theanalyses reported by Battelle 2 years previously. Likeits predecessor, TAD makes no evaluation of the com-peting technologies nor does it reach any policy-relevantconclusions. Work on TAD was undertaken in responseto a request from JCAE. The document was also re-quired to provide technical support for the preparationof a Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Com-mercial Radioactive Waste Management (GEIS).

App. A-2—Major Events in Waste Management History-1944-81 ● 237

Reference: 11-A9—October 1976

ERDA publishes a proposed Table of Contents forits GEIS and requests public comment.

Reference: 11-AIO—April 1979

After undertaking one major version of the document,DOE publishes a draft version of its GEIS. The impactstatement is intended to support a programmatic deci-sion to concentrate, in the near term, on mined geo-logical repositories as a means for waste disposal.

Reference: II-All—October 1980

DOE publishes final version of the GEIS.

Reference: 11-A12—July 1977

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) releases Cir-cular 770, “Geologic Disposal of High-Level Radio-active Wastes—Earth Sciences Perspectives. ” Althoughexpressing confidence that ‘‘acceptable geologic reposi-tories can be constructed, ” the circular’s authors didconclude that ‘‘the earth-science problems associatedwith disposal of radioactive waste are not simple, norare they completely understood. ” The circular noted‘‘many weaknesses in geologic knowledge’ particular-ly with respect to disposal of waste in salt.

Reference: 11-A13—January 1978

The American Physical Society (APS) released itsstudy on the nuclear fuel cycle and waste management.The APS group affirms that ‘ ‘effective long-term isola-tion for spent fuel high-level or transuranic waste canbe achieved by geologic emplacement. ” Moreover, thegroup concludes that ‘‘many waste repository sites withsatisfactory hydrogeology can be identified in the con-tinental United States in a variety of geologic forma-tions. Bedded salt . . . can be a satisfactory medium fora repository, but certain other rock types, notablygranite and possibly shale, could offer even greater long-term advantages.


DOE completes a major internal review of its wastemanagement programs. The reviewers urge expansionof the Department’s technical efforts in the area ofgeologic disposal, maintain that reprocessing is not re-quired for the safe disposal of commercial spent fuel,recognize that a repository for commercial waste maynot be ready by 1985, and reaffirm the principle thatthe responsibility for ultimate disposal of radioactivewaste must rest with the Federal Government.


President Carter establishes an Interagency ReviewGroup on Nuclear Waste Management (IRG) com-posed of representatives from 14 governmental units.The group is instructed to formulate recommendationsfor an administration policy with respect to long-termmanagement of nuclear waste and supporting programsto implement this policy.

Reference: 11-A16—October 1978

The draft IRG report to the President is released forpublic comment along with a Subgroup Report on Alter-native Strategies for the Isolation of Nuclear Waste. Thedraft Presidential report drew heavily on the analysisof the Subgroup report and its appendix which assessedthe status of knowledge with regard to geological dis-posal. In the draft Presidential report, all 14 agenciesagree that: the waste disposal program should proceedon the assumption that the first disposal facilities forhigh-level waste will be in mined repositories; sitecharacterization work in a variety of geological en-vironments should be accelerated; funding should be in-creased for near-term technical alternatives to geologicdisposal; initial placement of waste in a repository shouldbe done on a technically conservative basis and shouldpermit retrievability; and opportunities should be pur-sued, if available, to site a licensed intermediate-scalefacility in which as many as 1,000 spent fuel rods orwaste canisters would be emplaced with the possibilitybut not necessarily the expectation of their removal. Theagencies disagreed about the strategy to be employedin choosing sites to be submitted for licensing and onthe future of the proposed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant(WIPP).


President Carter announces his administration’s com-prehensive waste management policy. He ratifies all theunanimous IRG recommendations. He resolves the twocontroversial issues of site selection strategy and WIPP.He decides to adopt a siting approach in which four tofive sites in a variety of environments are characterizedextensively before a license application for one of themis submitted to NRC. The President also decides torecommend to Congress the termination of the WIPPproject.

INVESTIGATIONS IN SALT

Reference: 11-Bl—November 1965

Following over 3 years of preparation, the first can-ister of Experimental Test Reactor (ETR) irradiated fuelis emplaced in the abandoned Carey salt mine in Lyons,

23 ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Levei Radioactive Waste

Kans. This initiates the main phase of Project SaltVault. The project is designed to determine the ther-mal and radiation effects of high-level waste on salt andto demonstrate waste handling techniques. The projectis carried out by personnel from the Oak Ridge NationalLaboratory.

Reference: 11-B2—June 1967

The last canister of ETR fuel is removed from theabandoned salt mine, thereby ending the experimentalphase of Project Salt Vault.

R e f e r e n c e : 1 1 - B 3 — M a y 1 9 6 6

NAS reviews AEC’S waste management programonce again. It reaffirms its 9-year-old view that “saltbeds as permanent storage sites for high-level radioac-tive solids has promise of being successful and satisfac-tory. ” The Committee also strongly supports efforts tosolidify high-level waste.


AEC announces that a site in the salt deposits nearLyons, Kans., had been “tentatively selected” for thecountry’s first repository. The choice is contingent onconfirmatory tests being carried out.

Reference: 11-B5—July 1970

Political opposition to the repository begins to developin Kansas with Congressman Joseph Skubitz and Gov-ernor Robert Docking taking the lead. They are sup-ported in their opposition by the new head of the Kan-sas Geological Survey, William Hambleton.

Reference: 11-B6—November 1970

The NAS Radioactive Waste Management Commit-tee issues a report on the suitability of the Lyons site.The Committee deems the site “satisfactory” but with-holds final judgment pending the completion of addi-tional studies. That additional research would focus onunderstanding the uniformity of the salt beds, develop-ing techniques for plugging nearby oil and gas wells andboreholes, refining methods of backfilling to preventsubsidence in the salt, and understanding the thermaland mechanical properties of key geologic structures.

Reference: II-B7—September 1971

The AEC program manager for the Lyons repositoryreturns to Washington from a trip to Kansas persuadedthat newly discovered technical difficulties severelythreaten the project’s future. The difficulties involve thediscovery of numerous, previously unknown, oil and gas

wells and boreholes. These might not be successfullyplugged. In addition, water used to solution mine saltin a neighboring mine had ‘‘disappeared. This eventseemed to suggest that the geological integrity of the pro-posed site might be inadequate.

Reference: 11-B8—February 1972

AEC abandons plans for a repository at Lyons citingtechnical uncertainties and problems in political andpublic acceptance.

Reference: 11-B9—May 1974

After searching by USGS for over 2 years for a newpotential repository site in bedded salt, ERDA decidesto begin site characterization at a location outside ofCarlsbad, N. Mex. The agency intends this to be aWIPP which would be used to dispose of transuraniccontaminated waste, most of which is stored at Idaho,and up to 1,000 canisters of high-level defense waste.

Reference: 11-BIO—February 1978

An internal agency review of DOE’s waste manage-ment program recommends that the pilot plant’s mis-sion be expanded to include disposal of up to 1,000 com-mercial spent fuel assemblies and that it be licensed byNRC.

Reference: 11-Bll—October 1978

DOE issues a draft EIS in support of the WIPP proj-ect.

Reference: 11-B12—February 1980

President Carter attempts to terminate the WIPPproject.


Congress overrules the President on the WIPP termi-nation.

Reference: II-B14—September 1980

DOE issues the final EIS for WIPP.

INVESTIGATION OF THE BEDROCKFORMATIONS AT SAVANNAH RIVER

Reference: II-Cl—June 1958

The Du Pent Co., the operator of the Savannah RiverProject under contract to AEC, suggests that the pos-sibility of disposing of the partially crystallized high-levelwaste in the bedrock underneath the facility be studied.


Reference: 11-C2—May 1966

After nearly 6 years of intermittent review of the bed-rock proposal, a majority of the NAS Radioactive WasteManagement Committee calls the project “dangerousand not worth sinking the exploratory shaft. A minori-ty calls for continuation of experiments and sinking theexploratory shaft, a view which AEC adopts severalmonths later.

Reference: 11-C3—October 1970

AEC announces that work would proceed on selec-tion of the bedrock site and on the design of the shaftand exploratory tunnels.

Reference: 11-C4—September 1972

The NAS Committee issues a report in which it nowconcludes that there was a reasonable prospect that thewaste could be safely contained in bedrock vaults.

Reference: 11-C5—November 1972

AEC decides to abandon the bedrock project, citingtechnical uncertainties and political opposition of SouthCarolina Senator HcNings.

EXPANSION OF THE PROGRAM FORGEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL

Reference: 11-Dl—February 1972

AEC contracts with USGS to undertake a study ofpossible sites in salt formations that might be suitable

for a repository. The USGS investigation is expandedseveral years later to include sites in formations otherthan salt.

Reference: 11-D2—October 1975

ERDA policymakers decide to embark on a multiple-site strategy which would lead to the development of sev-eral repositories by 2000. The first two of those wouldbe in salt formations; the others might be in other geo-logical media. Letters are sent to 36 State Governorsinforming them of these plans and asking their coopera-tion in site exploration activities.

Reference: 11-D3—October 1976

Because reactions from many State executives werequite negative and because permission to explore wasoften denied, the multisite program is forced to retrench.It also suffers budget cuts in the Office of Managementand Budget. Site investigations do commence in Texas,Louisiana, Mississippi, Washington, and Nevada.


PART III

Development of High-Level Waste Regulations

NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICESREPROCESSING OPERATION

Reference: III-Al—May 1963

After years of effort to encourage commercial ven-tures in fuel reprocessing, AEC approves a construc-tion permit for NFS to build such a facility in WestValley, N.Y. NFS adopts the Savannah River modelof liquid waste storage in tanks. New York State AtomicDevelopment Authority agrees to be responsible for safe-guarding the waste and for maintaining the tanks in per-petuity. NFS pays into a trust fund for the care of thewaste.

Reference: 111-A2—April 1966

NFS receives an operating permit and commencesfuel reprocessing.


NFS ceases operation and closes down for remodel-ing and expansion. During its nearly 6 years of opera-tion, the company reprocessed 160 metric tons of fuelfrom the commercial nuclear power industry and 480metric tons of fuel from the military production reac-tors at Hanford. A total volume of 640,000 gal ofuranium processing waste are stored in mild steel tanksand 12,000 gal of acid thorium waste are stored in stain-less steel tanks.

Reference: 111-A4—April 1976

The Getty Oil Co., current owners of the NFS facil-ity, announce their withdrawal from the reprocessingbusiness and request that New York State, in accordancewith its 1963 agreement, take over responsibility for theliquid waste stored in tanks.

GENERAL ELECTRICREPROCESSING OPERATION

Reference: 111-Bl—December 1967

AEC grants a construction permit to the GeneralElectric Corp. to construct a commercial reprocessingfacility at Morris, Ill. The plans for the facility call forthe conversion of cooled liquid high-level waste into asolid form using a calcination process. In 1974, the com-pany decides not to seek an operating permit becauseof the design flaws in the plant’s maintenance systems.

ADOPTION OF APPENDIX F

Reference III-Cl—August 1970

After over a year of consideration, AEC adopts ap-pendix F to its regulations (10 CFR 50). The impetusbehind the adoption comes from Milton Shaw’s Reac-tor Development and Technology Division. Commis-sioner Ramey is a strong supporter of the regulation.Both the Production Division and the Division of In-dustrial Participation express reservations. Commis-sioner Thompson dissents on the final vote. AppendixF requires that the reprocessed high-level liquid wastebe converted to a suitable solid form within 5 years aftertheir production, that the solidified waste be transferredto a repository within 5 years after conversion, and thatthe repository be operated by the Federal Governmentand located on Federal land.

ALLIED GENERAL NUCLEAR SERVICESREPROCESSING OPERATION

Reference: 111-Dl—December 1970

AEC grants a construction permit to the Allied Gen-eral Nuclear Services Corp. to construct a commercialreprocessing facility at Barnwell, S.C. The Barnwellfacility never receives an operating license and ismothballed pending a decision to resume commercialreprocessing.

D E V E L O P M E N T O F U R A N I U MFUEL CYCLE RULE

Reference: III-El—November 1972

AEC announces that it will hold hearings on the en-vironmental impact of the uranium fuel cycle. The pur-pose of the hearings would be to help formulate a rulethat would quantify the annualized impacts arising fromthe operation of a 1,000-MW reactor. Those impactswould then be considered as part of the required Na-tional Environmental Policy Act analysis undertakenwhen reactors are licensed.

Reference: 111-E2—April 1974

AEC issues its rule on the environmental effects ofthe uranium fuel cycle. The purpose of the hearingswould be to help formulate a rule that would quantifythe annualized impacts arising from the operation of a1,OOO-MW reactor. Those impacts are quantified and

App. A-2—Major Events in Waste Management History-1944-81 241

presented in the S-3 Table. Almost immediately there-after, several environmental and public interest groupschallenge the rule in court.

Reference: 111-E3—July 1976

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-bia overturns the S-3 rule in National Research DefenseCouncil (NRDC) v. NRC. The court holds that AEC’Sconsideration of the environmental effects of fuelreprocessing and waste management was not adequatelysupported by the formal record. Reactor licensing isbrought to a halt.

Reference: 111-E4—October 1976

After 3 months of intensive effort, NRC publishes asupplement to AEC analysis of the environmental ef-fects of the uranium fuel cycle. The supplement pro-vides a more complete and thorough consideration ofthe effects of reprocessing and waste management. Atthe same time, NRC publishes a proposed interim ruleand modifications of the S-3 Table. The interim ruleis adopted in March 1977. Preparations are made tohold hearings which will lead to the adoption of a finalrule. Reactor licensing is resumed.

Reference: 111-E5—April 1978

The Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appealsin NRDC v. NRC. The Supreme Court holds that theAppeals Court incorrectly imposed more extensive par-ticipatory requirements on AEC than were required bythe Administrative Procedures Act. The Supreme Courttakes no position on the substantive issue of the ade-quacy of the S-3 Table.

Reference: 111-E6—August 1979

NRC adopts a final version of Table S-3 with Com-missioners Bradford and Gilinsky dissenting. The Com-mission recognizes that some explanatory material isnecessary to interpret the long-term, cumulative effectsof the fuel cycle. NRC also accepts the need to put thehealth effects in some more easily understood context.Work begins to formulate that explanatory material.

DEVELOPMENT OF PLUTONIUMRECYCLE RULE

Reference: 111-Fl—August 1974

AEC publishes a draft EIS on mixed oxide fuel,Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed OxideFuels (GESMO), and a proposed rule to specify the con-ditions under which commercial reprocessing and therecycling of plutonium might be permitted.

Reference: 111-F2—December 1977

NRC announces that, in response to President Car-ter’s request, commercial reprocessing and plutoniumrecycling will be deferred indefinitely; it is terminatingits GESMO hearings. As a result, commercial nuclearwaste takes on the form of spent fuel rather thansolidified reprocessing waste.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRANSURANICWASTE RULE

Reference: 111-Gl—September 1974

AEC announces a proposed rule which would requirethat all material contaminated with transuranic elementsat a concentration of greater than 10 nanocuries pergram be disposed of at a Federal repository. The Com-mission uses the RSSF EIS as a vehicle for supportingthe rule.

Reference: 111-G2—April 1975

ERDA withdraws the RSSF impact statement. Thewithdrawal leaves the rule in limbo.

Reference: 111-G3—September 1979

NRC releases a study on waste classification specify-ing five types of waste: Class A—waste destined for arepository; Class B—waste which must be adminis-tratively controlled after disposal at intermediate depths;Class C—waste which can be buried at intermediatedepth without administrative control; Class D—wastewhich can be disposed of by shallow land burial cou-pled with administrative control; Class E—waste whichcan be disposed of by shallow land burial without ad-ministrative control.

PASSAGE OF ENERGYR E O R G A N I Z A T I O N A C T

Reference: III-Hi—October 1974

Congress passes the Energy Reorganization Act of1974 abolishing AEC and creating a developmentalagency, ERDA and an independent regulatory commis-sion, NRC. The act gives NRC licensing and relatedregulatory authority over ERDA, now DOE, facilities‘‘used primarily for the receipt and storage of high-levelradioactive waste.

D E V E L O P M E N T O F “ C O N F I D E N C EJ’R U L E M A K I N G

Reference: III-Ii—June 1976

The State of California passes three laws specifyingthe conditions under which nuclear reactors could be

242 • Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

sited within the State. One law prohibits reactor sitinguntil a finding has been made that “a demonstratedtechnology or means of permanent, terminal disposalof high-level nuclear waste exists and has been approvedby the United States through its authorized agency. ”

Reference: 111-12—December 1976

NRC receives a petition from NRDC which requeststhat the Commission conduct a “rulemaking proceedingto determine whether radioactive waste can be gener-ated in nuclear power reactors and subsequently dis-posed of without undue risk to the public health andsafety and that the Commission refrain from acting togrant pending or future requests for operating licensesuntil such time as this definitive finding of safety canbe and is made. ”

Reference: 111-13—June 1977

NRC denies the NRDC petition. The Commissionconcludes that it ‘‘would not continue to license reac-tors if it did not have reasonable confidence that thewaste can and will in due course be disposed of safely.The accumulating evidence continues to support NRC’simplicit finding of reasonable assurance that methodsof safe permanent disposal of high-level waste can beavailable when they are needed. Given this, and the factthat at present safe storage methods are . . . availableand highly likely to remain so until a safe disposal systemcan be demonstrated, the Commission sees in the wastedisposal question no reason to cease licensing reactors. ”

Reference: 111-14—May 1979

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rules in a caseinvolving expansion of spent fuel storage capacity at thePrairie Island, Minn., reactor that NRC should recon-sider its statement of confidence issued in response tothe NRDC petition. Such reconsideration would be “inthe interest of sound administration’ given develop-ments in the S-3 case and other recent events such asan IRG report.

Reference: 111-15—October 1979

NRC initiates a rtdemaking proceeding on the storageand disposal of nuclear waste. The proceeding is in-tended to provide NRC an opportunity to reassess itsdegree of confidence that radioactive waste producedby licensed nuclear facilities will be safely disposed ofoffsite, to determine when any such disposal or offsitestorage will be available, and if disposal or offsite storagewill not be available until after the expiration of the li-censes of certain nuclear facilities, to determine whetherthe waste generated by those facilities can be safelystored onsite until such disposal is available.

DEVELOPMENT OF WASTEMANAGEMENT GOALS

Reference: 111-Jl—June 1978

NRC publishes for comment a task force report onProposed Goals for Radioactive Waste Management.The report and accompanying Essays on Issues ReZe-vant to the Regulation of Radioactive Waste Manage-ment had been completed 18 months earlier but hadbeen held by NRC.

DEVELOPMENT OF SPENT FUELSTORAGE REGULATIONS

Reference: 111-Kl—October 1978

NRC reveals a proposed new regulation that specifiesprocedures and requirements for issuance of licenses tostore spent fuel in an independent spent fuel storage in-stallation. The proposed regulation contains require-ments for the siting, general design criteria, and cer-tain operational aspects of such an activity.

D E V E L O P M E N T O F H I G H - L E V E LC O M M E R C I A L W A S T E R E G U L A T I O N S

Reference: 111-Ll—November 1978

NRC publishes for comment a Proposed GeneralStatement for Policy outlining procedures for licensinggeologic high-level radioactive waste repositories to beconstructed by DOE.

Reference: 111-L2—December 1979

NRC withdraws its Proposed General Statement ofPolicy and substitutes proposed licensing procedures fora high-level repository. The procedures mandate a sitecharacterization review, specify that several, three tofive, sites in different geological environments must becharacterized at depth, and indicate that approval mustbe obtained prior to repository operation and upon itsdecommissioning.

Reference: 111-L3—May 1980

NRC publishes an advanced notice of proposed rule-making setting forth its current views about the technicalcriteria which should govern the licensing of a reposi-tory. The proposed rule addresses these issues: the useof multiple barriers, the process of model validation, thetreatment of geologic uncertainties, and the problem ofhuman intrusion. One performance objective proposedis that waste packages be designed so that ‘‘there isreasonable assurance that radionuclides will be con-tained for at least the first 1,000 years after decommis-sioning and for as long thereafter as reasonably achiev-


able given expected processes and events as well as Reference: 111-L5—March 1981various water flow conditions including full or partial

NRC formally proposed the technical regulations forsaturation of the underground facility.a high-level waste repository.

Reference: 111-L4—February 1981

NRC adopts final procedural regulations for licens-ing a high-level waste repository.

PART W

Federal Waste Management

Reference: IV-A1—1955-70

The responsibility for radioactive waste managementwas highly fragmented. The organizations within AECwith major involvement included:

Division of Production.— Responsible for programsfor high-level waste management and long-term storageof radioactive waste from AEC chemical processingoperations located at Hanford, Savannah River, andIdaho-after 1936. Most of the work and policy develop-ment is delegated to the contractors operating those fa-cilities.

Division of Operational Safety .—Responsible fordeveloping radiation protection standards and for ap-praising and evaluating the performance of AEC, fieldoffices in the protection of health, safety, and property.

Division of Reactor Development and Technology.—Responsible for planning and technical direction ofresearch and development on processes for the treatmentand storage of high-level radioactive waste resulting orexpected to result from chemical reprocessing operationsin connection with the nuclear power industry. Muchof its work in waste management is undertaken by OakRidge National Laboratory, the Pacific Northwest Lab-oratory, and other national laboratories.

Division of Materials Licensing.—Under the Direc-tor of Regulation: Responsible for licensing facilities forreprocessing irradiated source and special nuclear ma-terials and therefore concerned with the adequacy ofwaste management activities at those facilities. Alsoresponsible for low-level waste disposal activities.

It should be noted that most of these divisions under-went several metamorphoses during this 15-year period.Their names changed; their programs grew in size andwere assigned to varying subunits.

Reference: IV-Bl—May 1970

Division of Waste and Scrap Management formed asa staff division. It took over some responsibilities fromthe Division of Operational Safety, the Production Divi-

Structure and Responsibilities

sion, the Division of Operational Safety, and the Divi-sion of Reactor Development and Technology but hadno independent budget. Thus, it had policy, planning,and appraisal functions but was not a strong technicaldivision.

Reference: IV-Cl—June 1971

Division of Waste Management and Transportationcreated. It has its own budget and took over policymak-ing for management of waste from the commercial nu-clear industry.

Reference: IV-Dl—January 1975

AEC is abolished; ERDA and NRC are establishedin its place. The Division of Production, OperationalSafety, and Waste Management and Transportation be-come part of ERDA. A waste management branch isestablished as part of the Office of Nuclear MaterialSafety and Safeguards at NRC.

Reference: IV-El—June 1975

ERDA reorganizes its waste management program.The Division of Waste Management and Transporta-tion is abolished and its programs transferred to two newdivisions. Commercial and military waste programs arebrought under the umbrella of the Division of NuclearFuel Cycle and Production. All program planning, near-terrn research, development, demonstration, and opera-tion of facilities for treatment, storage, and disposal ofcommercial radioactive waste, and the establishmentand operation of Federal repositories for the ultimatedisposal of all radioactive waste become the responsi-bility of an Assistant Director for Reactor Products andInventory Management. A Division of EnvironmentalControl Technology takes over responsibility for very,long-term waste management research. The Divisionof Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Production later becomesknown as the Division of Waste Management, Produc-tion, and Reprocessing.


Reference: IV-Fl—January 1976

ERDA contracts with Oak Ridge National Labora-tory to create an OfEce of Waste Isolation (OWI). OWIwas responsible for managing the research and develop-ment aspects of the National Waste Terminal StorageProgram.

Reference: IV-Gl—March 1977

NRC expands its waste management organization.An Assistant Director for Waste Management positionis created. The Assistant Director is in charge of twobranches, one dealing with high-level and transuranicwaste, the other dealing with low-level waste.

Reference: IV-Hi—October 1977

DOE comes into existence. Policymaking takes placelargely in the Office of the Director of Energy Research.Operations are carried out in the OffIce of NuclearWaste Management. That OffIce contains three majordivisions: Waste Isolation, Waste Products, and Trans-

portation and Fuel Storage. The Office initially reportsto the Director of Nuclear Programs. Later on, ONWMreports to the Assistant Secretary for Energy Tech-nology. The change is designed to give the Office ofNuclear Waste Management more public visibility andsignificance.

Reference: IV-Ii—October 1978

The contract with OWI expires and is not renewedat the request of Union Carbide, the operator of OakRidge National Laboratory. Battelle Memorial Instituteis selected to take over the management of the NationalTerminal Waste Storage Program. Battelle creates theOffice of Nuclear Waste Isolation to carry out this task.

Reference: IV-Jl—January 1979

NRC further expands its waste management opera-tions, creating a Division of Nuclear Waste Man-agement.

Table A-2.–Time Line–Parts I-IV, 1944-81

Year Part I Part II Part Ill Part IV1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Al1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A21953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C1,C21954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-11955. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-31957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-21958 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-41959. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —1860. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-31961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —1962. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1963. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C2,DI1964. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A51966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D21967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A61968. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1969. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C31971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A71972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D3,E11973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A8,A91974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E21975. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E31976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C4,D41977. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F1,F21978. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1979. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D51980. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F3

———.——

Alc lA2

——

A3——

B1B3,C262

——

B4,B5,B6,C3A4,B7A5,B8,C4,C5,D1

—A6,B9A7,D2A8,A9,D3A12A13,A14,A15,A16, B1O,B1 1AlOAl 1,A17,B12,B13,B14

—Al

——

A261

——

C1,D1—

A3,E1—

E2,F1,G1,H1G2A4,E3,E4,11 ,12F2,13E5,J1,K1,L1E6,G3,14,15L3L4.L5

————

AlAlAlAlAlAlAlAlAlAlAlAlAlAlAlA1,B1c l

———

D1,E1F2G1,H1l-lJ1

——

Appendix B

Waste Management System IssuesResolved in the Nuclear Waste

Policy Act of 1982

Introduction

This appendix discusses the major waste managementsystem issues that were debated in the 97th Congressand addressed in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982(NWPA). Questions concerning development and oper-ation of the waste management system authorized byNWPA are discussed in chapter 6.

When the 97th Congress began its debate of radioac-tive waste management legislation, no firm agreementhad been reached on whether final isolation of radioac-tive waste would be accomplished through storage ordisposal, where and when to develop final isolation fa-cilities, or how to store the waste before final isolation.

Several factors complicated congressional decision-making about storage and disposal. First, the unavail-ability of disposal and reprocessing had created the needfor greater and longer term spent fuel storage capacitythan originally envisioned. Because of the delays in de-veloping both reprocessing and disposal facilities, it ap-peared likely that most of the spent fuel generated inthis century would still be in interim storage facilitiesat the end of the century—even if direct disposal of spentfuel were to begin on the earliest possible schedule esti-mated by the Department of Energy (DOE). Further-more, the possibility that reprocessing might becomeeconomical sometime in the future raised questionsabout whether to plan for storage of spent fuel as a po-tential resource or disposal of spent fuel as a waste—orboth.

Thus, for the next several decades, waste manage-ment would consist almost entirely of spent fuel stor-age, and any reprocessing that occurred would simplyconvert some of the stored spent fuel into stored wastesof various types (solidified high-level waste, transuranicwaste) and, perhaps, unrecycled plutonium. Moreover,it appeared that even after the capacity for disposal wereavailable, storage might continue to be a major part ofwaste management—either because disposal would bedeferred after disposal facilities were available (e. g., tomaintain access to spent fuel for possible reprocessingor to reduce the heat output of the waste before disposal)or simply because it would take a long time to elimi-nate the backlogs of spent fuel built up in storage bythe time disposal began.

The following policy issues address:

1.

2.3.

4.

the overall Federal strategy for developing a finalisolation system for high-level radioactive waste;the schedule for developing final isolation facilities;whether the final isolation system should acceptonly high-level waste, spent fuel, or both; andthe Government’s role in interim spent fuel stor-age until final repositories are available.

These issue discussions were written prior to the pas-sage of NWPA, and were the basis for OTA’S summaryreport published in April 1982 during the debate on theAct and for extensive OTA testimony and staff analy-ses provided to Congress during that debate. These issuediscussions are presented in the present tense, as theywere originally written, to give a clear picture of howthe issues and possible options were viewed during thedebate that occurred before final passage of the act. Eachissue discussion is followed by a brief description of theresolution contained in the NWPA.

ISSUE 1:What approach should be used for develop-

ing facilities for final isolation of high-levelradioactive waste?

Prior to passage of the NWPA, existing laws and reg-ulations gave DOE the authority and responsibility todevelop a final isolation system for high-level radioac-tive waste. While there was broad agreement that theFederal Government should proceed to develop such asystem, there was less agreement about the kind of isola-tion needed and the pace of the program for develop-ing isolation facilities.

In particular, there was disagreement about whetherfinal isolation should be accomplished through disposal,which does not depend on continued human mainte-nance and monitoring to provide isolation, or throughstorage, which does. Existing law did not specify whichapproach to final isolation would satisfy the obligationsof the Federal Government and did not even clearly dis-tinguish between the terms ‘‘storage’ and “disposal.No generally accepted approach for the final isolation

I See app. note.

245

—

246 . Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Leve/ Radioactive Waste

program had yet emerged from the congressional de-bates or from the administration’s review of waste man-agement policy. The history of the waste managementprogram made it clear that resolution of this issue inlaw would be needed to avoid continued shifts of direc-tion in the waste management program.

OPTION: 1. Develop a disposal system of mined geo-logic repositories.

2. Defer developing geologic disposal and doresearch on many disposal technologiesbefore selecting one for full-scale devel-opment.

3. Develop a permanent storage system.

The Debate

The three options differ in the degree of commitmentto the development of a disposal system. Option 1 im-mediately commits to developing the disposal technol-ogy that is best understood—the mined geologic repos-itory. Option 2 assumes that a disposal system must bedeveloped sooner or later, but defers that action for anextended period—say, 50 years or more. Option 3, incontrast to the others, favors developing a permanentstorage system instead of a disposal system, based onthe assumption that such storage would be an accepta-ble method for final isolation.

Since there is no alternative to continued storage ofspent fuel (or reprocessed waste) until a disposal sys-tem is available, the options also entail different em-phases on the development of Federal storage facilities.Option 1 is compatible with the provision of little, if any,Federal spent fuel storage capacity (see issue 4), sincethe option emphasizes prompt development of geologicrepositories to which utilities could deliver their spentfuel. With option 2, the immediate focus of the wastemanagement program would probably be developmentof centralized Federal facilities for extended storage ofspent fuel and high-level waste; meanwhile, research anddevelopment (R&D) activities could be conducted ona number of disposal technologies until a decision weremade to select one and develop it full-scale.

In option 3, like option 2, the immediate focus wouldbe on development of appropriate storage technology,location of suitable sites, and construction of facilities.In fact, since a permanent storage program may involveuse of facilities designed to be replaced periodically, per-haps every 50 to 100 years, there may be little if anydifference between the storage facilities developed underoptions 2 and 3. The following discussion briefly sum-marizes the principal arguments cited in favor of eachoption and compares the options in terms of a rangeof criteria.

OPTION 1:Develop a geologic disposal system.

Some supporters of this option feel that an accept-able disposal technology, not necessarily the best possi-ble one, is needed to complete the nuclear fuel cycle andthat there is enough agreement about the potential ofthe mined geologic repository to justify its developmentas the first-generation nuclear waste disposal system. Acommitment to developing a disposal system of minedgeologic repositories—the most well-defined and exten-sively studied disposal concept—is justified by the factthat geologic disposal has survived many intensive re-views without identification of any insurmountable sci-entific or technical barriers to its safe implementation.Moreover, development of geologic disposal providescontinuity with Federal waste management policy of thelast several decades and is consistent with the Environ-mental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) proposed generalregulatory criteria, which preclude reliance on institu-tional control of a repository for longer than several hun-dred years.

Perhaps the principal argument in its favor is that itwould avoid deferring an ultimate solution of the wasteproblem to future generations.z Because disposal, unlikestorage, does not require perpetual human control toassure continued safe isolation, it avoids burdeningfuture generations with a problem they did not create,Moreover, a disposal system provides better assurancethat long-term safety will not be compromised by theloss or abandonment of adequate institutional controlof the repositories before the emplaced waste has de-cayed to innocuous levels. Such concerns prompt somepeople to view development of a disposal system as anecessary step for removing the waste problem as a hin-drance to future use of nuclear power.

OPTION 2:Defer development of geologic disposal and do re-

search on many disposal technologies before selectingone for full-scale development.

Those who agree that disposal will ultimately be re-quired for final isolation of high-level waste disagreeabout how quickly a commercial-scale disposal systemshould be developed. This disagreement results fromconcerns about existing uncertainties associated withvarious disposal technologies and from not knowingwhen and if spent fuel will ever be reprocessed. Becausethe future role of reprocessing is unclear, it is also uncer-

21nteragency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management (IRG), Reportto the President, TIO-29442, March 1979, p. 37; see also U.S. Atomic EnergyCommission, Preliminary Drafi Environmental Statement: Retrievable Sur-face Storage Faciiity-Commercia/ High-Level Radioactive Wastes (Richland,Wash.: Nov. 8, 1974).

—

App. B—Waste Management System Issues Resolved in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 “ 247

tain when there would be any solidified high-level wastefor disposal and when or if it would be economical todispose of spent fuel directly as waste. This considera-tion leads some to conclude that there is ample time toexplore a number of disposal alternatives before select-ing one for development.

Completion of R&D on a number of disposal tech-nologies would allow disposal techniques to be selectedwhen required. Supporters of this approach argue thatsince there appear to be no compelling health and safetyreasons for rapid disposal of high-level radioactive waste,and since safe and relatively inexpensive extended stor-age facilities can be developed, there is simply no ur-gency to choose a specific disposal technology immedi-ately. In addition, extended storage prior to disposalwould simplify the task of disposal by allowing the wasteto cool longer and would allow easy retrieval of spentfuel in case reprocessing is begun in that period. Thus,an extended period of storage would avoid any irrevers-ible actions while uncertainties about disposal technol-ogies and the economic value of spent fuel are resolved.

The concept of extended storage was embodied in theRetrievable Surface Storage Facility (RSSF) that wasproposed by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1974but was subsequently dropped in favor of an aggressivepursuit of the development of mined repositories. In-terest in development of facilities for extended, and per-haps permanent, storage was renewed in 1979 by a pro-posal to use existing tunnels at the Nevada Test Site forthis purpose3 and was subsequently embodied in a bill(S. 2189) approved by the Senate in 1980 that wouldhave provided for the construction of Monitored Re-trievable Storage (MRS) facilities.

OPTION 3:Develop a permanent storage system.

Several principal arguments are made in favor of per-manent storage over disposal for final isolation. First,permanent storage avoids the uncertainties about thelong-term performance of geologic barriers that havebeen the center of the debate about geologic disposal.Second, since suitable storage facilities could probablybe available earlier and at less cost than disposal facili-ties, they could provide an earlier demonstration of long-term isolation than would be possible with geologic re-positories.

Third, since isolation in a storage facility does not de-pend on the properties of the facility site, suitable stor-age sites closer to the sources of waste generation couldbe found more easily and quickly than sites for geologicdisposal facilities. Finally, storage provides ready re-

3Phillip Hammond, “Nuclear Wastes and Public Acceptance, ” AmericanScientist, vol. 67, No. 2, March-April 1979, pp. 146-150.

trieval of spent fuel for later reprocessing or for finalisolation using a better technology, if one is developedlater. It thus preserves options for future generations.

Comparison of Options

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY

The principal objective of waste management is isola-tion of radioactive waste from the biosphere so that itposes no significant threat to human health and life. Sev-eral safety-related factors affect the choice between thethree options under consideration.

All options could involve extended storage before dis-posal because they either defer availability of a disposalsystem for many decades (options 2 and 3) or might con-tinue storage even after disposal facilities are available(option 1). Thus, the decision addressed in this issueis not when to dispose of waste irretrievably, but whento make available the capacity to do so. However, inorder to highlight the differences between the options,this discussion of safety questions assumes that underoption 1, disposal would begin as soon as a geologic re-pository becomes available.

Both the Interagency Review Group (IRG) reportand DOE’s environmental impact statement on high-level radioactive waste explicitly considered the safetybenefits of early disposal in mined geologic repositories(Option 1) compared with those of extended storage (upto 40 years) to allow development and possible use ofalternative disposal technologies (option 2). The reportsconcluded that there are no compelling reasons of pub-lic health and safety for rapid disposal of high-level ra-dioactive waste, since safe interim storage for such peri-ods could be accomplished. +

On the other hand, they also concluded that minedrepositories offered the most immediate and sure choicefor development of an adequately safe disposal systemand that there were no clear safety advantages to waitingfor development of a better system, so long as a techni-cally conservative repository development process wereused.5 In addition, EPA’s proposed general criteria forradioactive waste disposal implicitly rule out storage asa permanent solution by excluding reliance on long-terminstitutional control as a means of assuring isolation. G

Finally, the IRG agreed that a disposal system shouldbe developed:

‘IRG, Subgroup Report on Alternative Technology Strategies for the isola-tion of Nuclear Waste, TID-28818, October 1978, p. 53; U.S. Departmentof Energy (DOE), Final Environmental Impact Statement on Management ofCommerciaJJy Generated Radioactive Waste (FJHS) vol. 1, DOE/EIS-0046F,October 1980, p. 131.

5DOE, op. cit,, pp. 7.39-7,4 I; IRG, Report to the President, ch, 2.

W .S. Environmental Protection Agency, Drdt Environmental Impact State-ment for 40 CFR J91: Environmental Standards for Management and Dis-posal of Spent NucJear Fuel, High -LeveJ and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes,December 1982, p. 123.

-248 ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

The responsibility for establishing a waste manage-ment program shall not be deferred to future genera-tions. Moreover, the system should not depend uponthe long-term stability or operation of social or govern-mental institutions for the security of waste isolationafter disposal. ’As noted in chapter 3, the possible ways that radioac-

tive waste might escape from a geologic repository overperiods of a million years or longer have been consid-ered in great detail by many analysts. In developing re-lease standards for geologic disposal, EPA evaluated awide range of possible release mechanisms, includinginadvertent human intrusion, and concluded that a geo-logic repository could produce health effects over a10,000-year period that are small compared with the ef-fects of background radiation. The expected health ef-fects would also be within the range of effects that couldbe caused by exposure to the bodies of uranium oreneeded to produce the amount of fuel that would be con-tained in the repository.

No analysis comparable in time horizon or range ofaccident conditions now exists of the safety of storageas a substitute for, rather than simply as a prelude to,disposal as a means of permanent waste isolation (op-tion 3). Potential risks of storage over a 10,000-yearperiod would have to be analyzed in order to allow aconsistent comparison with geologic disposal in termsof the proposed EPA standards.

Perhaps the basic question in comparing the safetyof permanent storage with geologic disposal is whetherthe uncertainties about the reliability of the barrier pro-vided by continued institutional control and mainte-nance are greater or less over such a long time periodthan those related to the performance of the geologicbarriers they are intended to replace. Some qualitativeinsight can be gained by comparing the risks from a per-manent storage facility with those from a geologic re-pository under two possible scenarios for institutionalcontrol: 1) the technical capacity and the societal willto maintain such control continue for the required periodof isolation, and 2) the capacity or the will is lost at somepoint during that period.

1. Institutional Control Is Maintained. —Permanentstorage may provide greater assurance than could geo-logic disposal that radioactive waste will not escape intothe biosphere as long as the storage facility is kept underadequate control by today’s standards and as long asrepairs and replacements are made, as needed, to en-sure continued isolation. Moreover, waste leaked froma storage facility could be easier to detect and clean upthan waste leaked from a geologic repository. It shouldbe noted that published calculations of the long-termhealth effects of geologic disposal, such as those per-

71RG, Report to the President, p. 16.

formed by EPA, generally assume that the releases fromthe repository are undetected and therefore that no ef-forts are made to mitigate them or to prohibit the useof contaminated water and food.

In either case, as long as society can and will contin-ue to monitor a waste repository so that leaks can bedetected, such leaks will not impose an involuntaryhealth risk on future generations. They would have thechoice of accepting the risks or bearing the financial andsocial costs of mitigating the effects of the leaks. Whilepermanent storage instead of disposal could reduce thecost of cleanup and mitigation measures in the unlikelyevent of significant unanticipated releases from a repos-itory these potential savings would have to be balanced

against the certain higher financial costs, as well as ra-diation exposures to workers involved in maintaininga storage facility and in providing replacement facilities,as needed, for millennia.

2. Institutional Control Is Lost or Abandoned.—Ifthere is significant concern that adequate institutionalcontrol will be terminated prematurely, geologic disposalmay appear to be the safest final isolation alternative.In that event, the risk from a permanent storage repos-itory would probably be greater than from a geologicrepository since the former would more likely be locatedat or near the Earth’s surface and would be designedto provide long-term isolation only with continued hu-man care. In contrast, a geologic disposal facility wouldbe several thousand feet deep at a site carefully selectedto minimize the likelihood of significant releases—on theassumption that institutional control would not be usedto provide the desired degree of isolation.

Adequate institutional control could cease either be-cause of loss of social ability to care for the waste(through war or social regression) or because of care-lessness or neglect. It can be argued that if somethingserious enough to cause society to lose its ability to carefor radioactive materials occurs, then the possibility oflow-level leakage from a waste repository may be oneof the less important problems that society faces. Onthe other hand, it can be argued that the acceptabilityof the risks imposed on future generations should be in-dependent of any consideration of unrelated risks theymay be facing.

It can also be argued that the Government can be ex-pected to act responsibly as long as it has the technicalcapacity to do so and that, in any case, this generationcannot take responsibility for the decisions of future gen-erations. On the other hand, stored nuclear waste mightbe mishandled in the future in the same way that sometoxic chemicals have been mishandled in the past, pos-ing a risk not only to the generation responsible, butalso to the generations that follow it. In some cases, theimmediate risk to the generation responsible or to its

App. B—Waste Management System Issues Resolved in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 249

immediate descendants might be relatively low, sincethe waste canisters should provide a barrier to releasefor perhaps a century or longer (depending on thedesign).

The risk would be imposed on later generations whenthe facility and the waste packages have deterioratedsubstantially and the waste has had time to leach intowater and be transported to drinking water or food—aprocess that could take centuries. Thus, reliance on con-tinued institutional control as the principal means of pro-tecting future generations requires confidence that eachsuccessive generation will have the same ability to man-age waste and will maintain our degree of concern andresponsibility for the safety of the generations that comeafter them. In contrast, permanent disposal in facilitiesthat do not require continued care and maintenance isnot vulnerable to the possibility that today’s standardsfor protection of health and safety of future generationswill not be maintained.

Permanent storage involves one additional safety con-sideration if spent fuel rather than reprocessed wastewere to be stored—the possibility of theft to recover theplutonium in the spent fuel for use in nuclear weapons.As long as the storage facilities are under control, thisrisk is low, particularly with spent fuel that is less than100 years old and therefore too highly radioactive tohandle easily. Older spent fuel could be a more attrac-tive target for theft—a serious concern in case institu-tional control of the facility were lost. While spent fuelthat had been disposed of in a geologic repository couldalso theoretically be recovered for use in nuclear weap-ons, this clearly would entail a much more difficult andtime-consuming process than recovery from a surfacestorage facility.

STATUS OF TECHNOLOGY AND LICENSING’

Technical reviews have concluded that suitable sitesfor a geologic repository could be found, and a reposi-tory could be developed, licensed, and operating by theend of the century (perhaps earlier), provided adequateand stable resources were devoted to the task. The stepsrequired in the National Environmental Policy Act(NEPA) for a DOE decision to develop a geologic dis-posal system have been completed, and the technicalbasis for the decision has been published in the requiredenvironmental impact statement. g

The remaining uncertainties about geologic disposalcan only be reduced by proceeding to locate, charac-terize, and develop candidate repository sites, a proc-ess now being carried out by DOE. Moreover, the Nu-clear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued final

———. ——‘See ch. 3 for a more extended discussion of the status of storage and dis-

posal technology,‘DOE, FELS.

regulations for procedures to be used in licensing ageologic repository and for technical requirements forsuch a repository. EPA has developed tentative perform-ance criteria for geologic repositories, and issued themfor comment. It appears likely that the entire regula-tory structure for licensing geologic repositories couldbe in place within several years.

Little technical doubt appears to remain that storagefacilities suitable for extended periods can be designedand operated to meet current radiation protection stand-ards as long as institutional control is maintained. Oneof the new dry storage technologies would probably beused for this purpose. 10

NRC has issued regulations (10 CFR 72) for facili-ties designed for interim spent fuel storage for periodsof up to 20 years, renewable at the discretion of NRC.Analysis by DOE suggests that a facility to meet theseregulations could be designed, constructed, and licensedin about 10 years. However, it is not certain that theseregulations would apply without modification to a fa-cility explicitly designed for extended storage, as con-templated in option 2.

This regulatory uncertainty is even greater for a per-manent storage facility (option 3). If the 10,000-year re-lease criteria now under development by EPA for geo-logic repositories would also apply to a permanentstorage facility, additional design requirements (e. g.,a more complex and long-lasting waste package design)might be needed to protect against loss of institutionalcontrol during that period. It might also be necessaryfor NRC to develop a special set of technical regula-tions for permanent or extended storage facilities an-alagous to those proposed for geologic repositories.

COST

A detailed comparison of the costs of the three op-tions must await both clarification of the regulatory re-quirements for storage and disposal facilities and devel-opment and analysis of alternative system designs thatare comparable in total capacity and annual handlingrates. Available studies indicate, however, that for sev-eral reasons it will be less expensive to develop storagefacilities than disposal facilities.

First, the less stringent technical requirements forstorage sites should reduce the initial costs of system de-velopment. Determining the suitability of potential sitesfor geologic repositories requires extensive and expen-sive tests at the proposed repository depth—estimatedto cost more than $100 million per site. Such testing isnot required for siting surface storage facilities. In ad-dition, it may be necessary to incur these high costs at

IIJD, E, Rasmussen, Comparison of Cask and Drywell Storage Concepts fora Monitored Retrievable Storage/Interim Storage System, Battelle MemorialInstitute, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL-4450, December 1982.

2&I . Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

a number of sites in order to find one that survives theentire evaluation process.

Second, the construction costs would probably belower for a storage facility located at or near the Earth’ssurface than for a geologic repository mined at a depthof several thousand feet. The initial capital costs of ageologic repository are likely to exceed $3 billion ,ll com-pared with initial capital costs of perhaps $500 millionfor a long-term surface dry storage facility using casksor drywells. 12 Even if mined tunnels (as proposed in onedesign) were used for storage, such a facility should in-volve less mining than a geologic repository for a givenamount of waste because the continued ventilation inan open storage facility would allow more waste to beemplaced in a given area while maintaining tempera-tures at acceptable levels.

In addition, the acceptable temperatures might behigher in a storage facility than in a geologic repository.With a storage system there is less concern about thelong-term effects of heat on the characteristics of the site,and any adverse effects on the facility or the waste can-isters could be repaired. Higher acceptable temperaturescould further reduce the comparative cost of a storagefacility.

It is difficult to compare long-term costs because stor-age involves a perpetual stream of payment for main-tenance, repair, and replacement of facilities, whilegeologic disposal involves, at most, the continued costof monitoring once the facility has been filled and sealed.Disposal thus concentrates costs nearest the time thewaste is generated, while storage spreads the costs outover many generations. Therefore, the costs of perma-nent storage over the entire period of monitoring andmaintenance could exceed the costs of disposal, whichcan be fairly well defined and bounded because they arelimited to a relatively short period of time.13

If storage were intended only for an extended period(say 50 to 100 years) prior to development of a disposalsystem (option 2), then the costs of storage would bean addition to, not a substitute for, the costs of the pro-spective disposal system. However, extended storagemight reduce the direct costs of disposal somewhat be-cause the cooling of the waste over that period couldallow greater loading of waste in a geologic repository.(It should be noted that if the intention is to increasethe long-term safety of the repository or the predicta-bility of its long-term performance by cooling the wastebefore it is emplaced in the repository, thereby lower-ing repository temperature, it may not be possible to

f I DOE, RePfl on Fin~cing the Disposal of Commemial Spt?rIt Nucfear Fu~

and Processed High-LeveI Radioactive Waste, DOEIS-0020, June 1983, table3.4, p. 13.

iZRa~mu~~en, op. cit., tables A.27 and A.28, PP. A.28-A.29.

I$DOE, The Monitored Retrievable Storage Concept, DOE/NE-0019, De-

cember 1981, p. 2-35.

increase significantly the amount of waste emplacedwithout losing this advantage. )

Any discussion of long-term costs must take accountof discounting, a procedure that gives more weight toearly expenditures than to later ones in order to reflectthe time value of money. Discounting is used to calcu-late the present value of a future expenditure by deter-mining what amount of money would have to be in-vested in the present at the assumed discount rate (orinterest rate) to yield an amount equal to the future ex-penditure by the time that expenditure is incurred. Forexample, since $1 invested at 10 percent would yield$1. 10a year from now, the present value of an expend-iture of $1.10 a year from now, using a 10 percent dis-count rate, is $1. At a 3 percent annual discount rate,$1 spent 100 years from now would have a discountedpresent value of 5 cents.

The discounted total cost of permanent storage couldbe less than the total cost of disposal, since the dis-counted cost would be determined primarily by the costsof construction and maintenance of the initial storagefacilities, which should be less than the same costs fordisposal facilities. The cost of replacing storage facilities,which might be necessary after the first 100 years or so,would have little effect on the discounted total cost. Forthe same reason, the discounted cost of interim storagefollowed by disposal (option 2) could be less than thecost of early disposal, simply because deferral of disposalcosts reduces the contribution of disposal to the presentvalue of total waste management costs. 14

There is no consensus about whether it is appropri-ate to use discounting when considering costs and ben-efits that affect many generations, because discountingstrongly favors present benefits over future costs. Toavoid shifting the costs of maintaining a storage systemto future generations, the present generation would haveto collect the discounted present value of those costs nowand invest them at a rate of return sufficient to earn thediscount rate assumed in calculating the present value,over and above the rate needed to keep pace with infla-tion. No analysis has been done of possible financialmechanisms that could be used to assure that the costsof perpetual care of radioactive waste would be borneprimarily by the generation that created the waste.

FLEXIBILITY

All three options for final isolation offer some flexi-bility for taking advantage of more desirable alterna-tives in the future or for maintaining access to radioac-tive waste; even option 1 allows the choice to continue

‘+ Ibid.l~see, for exampk, Robert E. Goodin, “Uncertainty as an Excuse for Cheat-

ing our Children: The Case of Nuclear Wastes, Policy Sciences, 10, 1978,pp. 25-43.

App. B—Waste Management System Issues Resolved in the Nuc/ear Waste Policy Act of 1982 ● 251

storage even after disposal facilities are available. Thus,a decision to develop a disposal system is not the sameas a decision to dispose of anything irretrievably on anyparticular schedule in the future; indeed, it is difficultto imagine how a decision could be made that wouldeffectively force future decisionmakers to dispose ofwaste irretrievably on any fixed schedule if it appearedunsafe or unwise at that future time to do so.

The capacity for surface storage could be providedat mined repository sites for a relatively small incremen-tal cost, since a mined repository would have a wastereceiving and packaging facility that could packagewaste for emplacement either in a surface storage sys-tem or in the repository.

16 In fact, a mined repository

may require surface storage capacity to handle surgesin deliveries to the repository, to continue receivingwaste if loading of the repository were temporarilyhalted, or to allow the repository to be unloaded ex-peditiously if that became necessary. Thus, the highercost of developing a system of mined repositories wouldprovide the technical capacity and the sites for both stor-age and disposal.

From this perspective, the difference between option1, on the one hand, and options 2 and 3, on the other,is not whether Federal facilities for long-term storagewould ever be built, but where they would be built—atsites that are suitable for untended disposal or at sitesthat are only suitable for monitored and maintainedstorage.

Option 3, and the initial phase of option 2, would pro-vide the option only of storage. A later decision that adisposal system was needed would entail the expendi-ture of additional billions of dollars by future genera-tions to find and develop suitable disposal sites and toconstruct additional handling and packaging facilitiesat those sites. Thus, a decision to store waste for an ex-tended period would be more reversible if the storagewere done at a mined repository site than at a site suit-able only for storage, since the capacity for disposalwould be immediately available onsite (if the repositorywere already built and money were available) and thecosts of moving the waste from storage into the disposalfacility would be minimal. In addition, the extendedstorage period at the repository site could be used to con-tinue analysis of the suitability of the site for permanentgeologic disposal, thus providing a larger body of dataon which to base a decision about irretrievable disposal.

A decision to develop long-term, easily expandableFederal storage facilities instead of or before disposalfacilities would probably create strong budgetary pres-sures to continue to expand the storage capacity and todefer raising and spending the additional funds needed

16Ra~mu~sen, Op. cit., pp. 1.5-1 6“

to develop a disposal system. Availability of Federal stor-age facilities would remove a major source of pressurefor developing a disposal system by providing an effec-tive solution to the waste problem for utilities. In addi-tion, expansion of storage facilities using modular drystorage technologies would be easier and cheaper thandeveloping a disposal system. These advantages leadsome to conclude that the decision in option 2 to defercommitment to development of disposal facilities couldbe, by default, a decision to store waste permanently.

If approval of permanent storage for final isolation(option 3) satisfied State laws linking continued licens-ing of reactors to the existence of an approved final isola-tion method, it might imply that no other system needbe developed as a precondition for continued genera-tion of waste. Moreover, if permanent storage were ap-proved, it might be difficult to justify charging nuclearutilities and their ratepayers any more than is requiredto cover the costs of a Federal storage system. In thatevent, a waste management trust fund financed by di-rect fees on the users of nuclear electricity would be ade-quate only to assure continued maintenance and re-placement of storage facilities as needed. The longer theperiod of storage, the more difficult it could be to raisethe additional billions of dollars needed for disposal fromfuture utility ratepayers or Federal taxpayers who didnot contribute to the generation of the waste or to deci-sions about how waste would be managed.

Thus, development of a stand-alone storage system,required for options 2 and 3, may be less reversible thandevelopment of a geologic disposal system, which pro-vides a relatively easy choice between continued stor-age or disposal. In fact, there maybe little practical dif-ference in reversibility between options 2 and 3, eventhough the storage facilities required in option 2 are onlyintended to be used as an interim step prior to finaldisposal.

PUBLIC ACCEPTABILITY

There appears to be little disagreement that devel-oping a disposal system that meets appropriate safetystandards would satisfy public concerns about the obli-gation to protect the health and safety of this and futuregenerations. However, there is disagreement aboutwhether it is necesszuy to develop a disposal system now,or whether development of a Federal storage systemwould be sufficient to allow the continued generationof waste. The history of strong and successful opposi-tion to Federal efforts to develop storage facilities (firstthe retrievable surface storage facilities, later an away-from-reactor facility) demonstrates that some feel strong-ly that storage is not an acceptable alternative to dispo-sal. Moreover, they fear that the availability of Federal


storage facilities might lead to continued deferral of de-velopment of disposal technology. 17

Supporters of options 2 or 3 argue that storage forthe foreseeable future might be more acceptable becauseit avoids the technical uncertainties in geologic disposalthat result from reliance on predictions of very long-termperformance of natural and manmade barriers. Theyare concerned that an exclusive focus on developmentof a geologic disposal system would make the demon-stration of a satisfactory solution of the waste problemdependent on resolution of many complex technical de-bates about the performance of a geologic repository,a process that may take decades. They contend that anadequately safe storage system could be demonstratedmore quickly and with greater confidence.

On the other hand, a shift in focus from disposal backto storage could create the impression that the FederalGovernment has serious doubts that technical uncertain-ties can be dealt with at all—an impression that couldheighten, rather than reduce, public concerns about thewaste problem.

Some argue that storage simply changes the natureof the uncertainties about safety from technical (associ-ated with performance of geologic and manmade bar-riers) to social (associated with the dependability of con-tinued institutional control). No hard evidence suggeststhat the public would be significantly less concernedabout social uncertainties than about technical ones.From this perspective, demonstrating that waste can besafely stored as long as institutional control is maintainedwould simply not address the unavoidable long-term in-stitutional uncertainties of final waste isolation.

The history of resistance to any deferral of the devel-opment of a disposal system suggests that if the FederalGovernment decided to construct a storage system (aseither an interim or a permanent measure), concernsabout the lack of progress on disposal could in the futurebecome a major encumbrance on the use of nuclearpower; for example, if there were efforts to expand thenuclear power system substantially before a disposal sys-tem were developed.

EASE OF SITING FACILITIES

Storage facilities may be technically easier to site thangeologic repositories. Since the storage site would notbe the major barrier to release of the contents of the fa-cility, the technical requirements of the site would beless stringent, and the long-term performance of the sitewould not have to be demonstrated in the licensing proc-ess. (This advantage might be offset considerably in thecase of permanent storage [option 3] if assurance of con-

I TDOE, The Monitored Retrievable Storage Concept, p. 2-37.

tinued institutional control for a period of millenniamust be demonstrated in the licensing process. )

It should be noted that various storage technologiesmay differ significantly in ease of siting. A preliminaryscreening by DOE indicates that about 20 percent ofthe area of the United States would be favorable for sur-face storage facilities (e.g., surface drywells), while onlyabout 2 percent of the United States would be favorablefor tunnel facilities (e. g., the tunnel rack system).la

The less demanding siting requirements for surfaceor near-surface storage compared to geologic disposalmay not translate directly into substantially greater easeand speed in siting facilities. An underlying not-in-my-backyard sentiment may be a major obstacle to siting,regardless of the type of facility being sited. 19 Althoughthe greater number of potential storage sites shouldmake it easier to find some States willing to accept astorage facility, site selection on that basis may limit theflexibility to locate facilities near the site of waste gen-eration— one of the potential advantages of storage fa-cilities compared with geologic repositories.

In practice, the relative flexibility of siting for stor-age facilities may increase their vulnerability to not-in-my-backyard sentiments precisely because the techni-cal reasons for choosing any particular site would bemuch less strong than would be the case with a geologicrepository. State and local resistance to a waste facilitymay be stronger if there is no compelling safety-relatedreason why it could not be located somewhere else justas easily. In addition, if a storage facility were proposedas a way to deal with delays in a disposal program re-sulting from political resistance to siting a geologic re-pository, it might not be unreasonable to expect thesame sort of resistance to siting the storage facility.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

It maybe more difficult for the Federal Governmentto adopt and implement a commitment to the more ex-pensive and complicated goal of developing a disposalsystem than to the less expensive and more incrementaloption of constructing storage facilities. The normalFederal policymaking and budgeting process tends tofavor incremental actions for the most pressing prob-lems, to defer decisions about issues that seem to re-quire no immediate action to avoid serious conse-quences, and to avoid irreversible actions whereverpossible—particularly when there is substantial uncer-tainty about the outcome of those actions.

‘ sIbid., p. 3-17.19A DOE study Ccmc]uded that the mitigating measures needed to deal with

State and local concerns would be very similar, if not identical, for either geologicrepositories or long-term storage facilities. DOE, The Monitored RetrievableStorage Concept, p. 2-38.


For several reasons, this Federal decisionmaking proc-ess appears to be more compatible with the implemen-tation of options 2 and 3 than with option 1. For in-stance, development of a Federal storage system woulddeal with what some see as the most pressing waste man-agement problem—the utilities’ need for some way toend their open-ended liability for growing inventoriesof spent fuel—while allowing the problems of siting geo-logic disposal facilities to be deferred. In addition, theannual Federal budget process may tend to favor stor-age over disposal, since it will be less expensive in theshort run to construct a new storage facility or expandan existing one than to build a disposal facility.

The near-term cost advantage of storage would be in-creased by use of the dry storage technologies, nowunder development, that allow easy incremental expan-sion of storage capacity. While the continuing costs ofmaintaining storage facilities may make the total bud-get outlays for storage much greater than for disposalin the long run,

20 the near term cost advantages couldtend to dominate decisions.

Substantial changes in the institutional approach towaste management may be needed to give high credi-bility to a commitment to option 1 (see ch. 7), whereasno such changes would be necessary for options 2 or 3.The very flexibility and high degree of annual oversightand control normal in Federal programs opens the pos-sibility that an option 1 policy would be changed in thefuture and storage facilities built as a way to buy timeif problems arose in the disposal program or if the Fed-eral budget were particularly tight when large appro-priations for construction of a full-scale geologic repos-itory were required.

The Resolution

In adopting the NWPA, Congress in effect chose op-tion 1 by making an explicit commitment to develop-ment of mined geologic repositories, thus embodyingin law the policy that had earlier been adopted by DOE.With regard to long-term storage of spent fuel or high-level waste, the Act recognizes that such storage is a po-tentially useful waste management option and requiresDOE to submit an analysis of the need for MRS facili-ties and site-specific designs for the first such facility.However, the Act requires that disposal in geologic re-positories should proceed regardless of whether an MRSfacility is built. Development of a plan for long-termstorage facilities would thus provide a backup option incase serious problems arise in the geologic repositoryprogram.

The remaining issues in this chapter discuss primar-ily those decisions that logically followed the selection

tO1bid. , table 2-5, p. 2-25.

of option 1 of issue 1. The question of the role of MRSfacilities in the waste management program is consid-ered at greater length in the discussion of the radioac-tive waste Mission Plan in chapter 6.

ISSUE 2:What kind of schedule should be adopted for de-

veloping mined repositories?

One principal obstacle to development of a widely ac-cepted waste disposal policy has been disagreementabout the appropriate pace for developing geologic re-positories. People who believe that the current base ofknowledge will permit an acceptably safe system to bedeveloped and implemented fairly quickly recommendrapid action to allay public concerns about waste dis-posal. Others believe that pressures for hasty actioncould lead to premature commitment to a repository sitethat is inadequate or, at the very least, to actions thatwould jeopardize the credibility of the Federal waste dis-posal program.

OPTION: 1. Accelerated schedule.2. Conservative schedule.

The Debate

OPTION 1:Accelerated schedule.

An accelerated schedule for developing a repositorywould involve evaluating the minimum number of pos-sible sites (three) and geologic media (two) —requiredby NRC for selecting the candidate site for the firstgeologic disposal repository-so that submission of alicense application for a repository would not be delayedwhile a broader range of alternatives was examined.Proponents of the accelerated schedule believe that ageologic disposal repository can be developed rapidlywith little risk of failure and that any further delay wouldbe interpreted by the general public as a lack of Feder-al commitment to complete the task and, perhaps, evenas evidence that the job cannot be done at all. If suc-cessful, this approach could lead to a licensed reposi-tory in the late 1990’s.

An accelerated schedule carries several potential risks.First, such a schedule could raise fears that safety mightbe compromised, in turn leading to continued effortsto delay or change the schedule yet again, as well as tocriticisms of the program that could increase the doubtsof the general public. Second, accelerating the scheduleof development of a technology and licensing processfor which there is no previous experience increases therisk of real or perceived failures to find or license sites.


Such failures could reduce public confidence in the Fed-eral waste management program.

A basic problem in establishing a schedule for devel-opment of a geologic repository is the first-of-a-kindnature of the process in terms of both the technical andinstitutional steps involved. Concerning this point, anofficial of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) stated:

The types of information needed for site characteriza-tion and performance evaluation for licensing are fairlywell understood by the interested agencies; however,the time required to perform the tests to obtain this in-formation is uncertain . . . The site characterizationphases will be a learn-as-we-go procedure in which wecannot accurately predict schedules, To complicate thescheduling, sociopolitical aspects of State and public par-ticipation can also impose unplanned delays in obtain-ing technical information. z’

Adoption of an accelerated schedule in the face of un-certainties about siting poses three major risks. First,it may lead to premature selection of candidate sites onthe basis of inadequate data, which could increase thechances that the first site recommended to NRC wouldnot be approved. Considering the great political impor-tance attached to the first repository, the negative ef-fects on public confidence of rejection of the first sitecould be severe, especially if the selection were accom-panied by considerable optimism about the ease of de-veloping a repository. Second, slippages in the schedule,more likely to occur in an accelerated schedule, couldweaken the credibility of the entire schedule, particu-larly if they occurred in the early stages of the process.

Third, to the extent that the feasibility of an acceler-ated schedule is questioned by the technical communityand the involved agencies, the responsibility for real orperceived failures resulting from the schedule will beshifted to some extent from the involved executivebranch agencies to Congress. This shift could reducethe extent to which the agencies could be held account-able for progress. Agency accountability will be greaterif the agencies themselves develop and certify the feasi-bility of the schedule they are to meet.

OPTION 2:A conservative schedule.

Advocates of a more conservative schedule for repos-itory development —one that allows for unforeseen de-lays and provides ample time to review more sites andmedia and to resolve the remaining technical uncertain-ties—argue that a conservative approach is needed tobuild public confidence that the job is being done safelyand that no corners are being cut in haste. (This ap-proach is typified by the IRG recommendation of a cau-

21 Te~timony ~fjmes F. Devine, Assistant Director of Engineering Geology

of the USGS, before the Committees on Energy and Natural Resources andon Environment and Public Works, of the U.S. Senate, Oct. 6, 1981.

tious repository development process involving reviewof four to five sites in two to three geologic media beforeselecting a site for development. )

A conservative schedule poses risks of its own. In thefirst place, it maybe no more capable of gaining broadpublic support than an accelerated schedule. While aconservative schedule deals with the concerns of thosewho fear that haste could compromise safety, it may notbe responsive to concerns of those who believe that arapid demonstration by the Federal Government of boththe will and the technical capacity to dispose of radioac-tive waste is needed. In fact, strong dissatisfaction withthe schedule implied by the Carter administration poli-cy, which envisioned a repository perhaps not availableuntil 2007, was a major reason for congressional effortsto accelerate the schedule and for the decision by theReagan administration to speed up the process by exami-ning only three sites in two media, the minimum re-quired by NRC, before selecting a site for development.

Such a distant target date could generate a relaxedattitude towards the program schedule by those respon-sible for implementing it and may increase the risk ofplanning being minimal, of milestones being missedwith few apparent consequences, and of the goal con-tinuing to recede into the future.

Moreover, the further away the target date for a re-pository, the more strongly the utilities could argue thatthe Federal Government has a responsibility to takesome earlier action to relieve them of the storage prob-lem created by the slow Federal approach to repositorydevelopment. If this action involved construction of anew Federal storage facility, such a facility would prob-ably use one of the easily expandable dry storage tech-nologies, such as the surface drywell, thus further re-ducing pressures for development of a repository andcreating a relatively easy and economical way to con-tinue to defer the costs of the disposal system.

Selection of the pace for repository development re-quires balancing the concerns that too fast a pace wouldnot be consistent with safety against the concerns thattoo leisurely a pace would not allay public fears aboutwaste disposal in a timely manner and would not ade-quately address utilities’ concerns about an open-endedliability for storing growing inventories of spent fuel.

Agreement about an appropriate schedule maybe fa-cilitated by shifting the focus of the argument from thespeed of the. schedule to its certainty and commitment.Analysis performed by OTA suggests that what is mostimportant in securing and sustaining public confidence,and in providing utilities with a solution to their spentfuel storage problem, is not how quickly a repositorycan be made available, but whether it will be availableaccording to a firm schedule, backed by a firm Federalcommitment, and accepted widely (by utilities, environ-mentalists, and all other interested parties) as feasible


and reasonable in view of the remaining technical andinstitutional uncertainties about siting.

A firm Federal commitment to accept waste at a re-pository on a fixed but relatively cautious date wouldrepresent a strengthening of Federal determination andcould provide the most complete and credible solutionto the waste disposal problem for both the public andthe nuclear utilities. Such commitment to a date mightgreatly ease the utilities’ job of providing interim stor-age until that date by removing one of the major sourcesof objection to expanded at-reactor storage: the concernthat such storage would become de facto final isolation.

A major concern with this approach is that the credi-bility of any future Federal schedules may be very lowbecause schedules for the availability of a geologic re-pository have slipped drastically from 1985, as estimatedin 1976, to 2006—at the latest—according to 1982 DOEestimates. 22 The problem is compounded by the signif-icant institutional and technical uncertainties affectingprogress in waste disposal.

A credible commitment to a firm date would requireboth a realistic target date and a conservative technicalprogram for meeting it. The target date must strike abalance between speed and certainty. On the one hand,locating sites as early as possible would limit the buildupof spent fuel in interim storage facilities. On the otherhand, too optimistic a date runs the risk of failure, whichcould have significant political impacts and could createdifficulties for utilities that have made storage plansbased on that date. To the extent that utilities need afirm schedule for their own planning, the reliability ofthe schedule may be more important than the speed.

A conservative target date for operation of the firstrepository would allow ample time for a second candi-date site to be identified and carried through the licens-ing process independently of the first-thus increasingthe confidence that a firm commitment to the target datecould be met even if the first site were rejected by NRC.Such a possibility must be considered because of the lackof technical consensus about the likelihood of a site thatappears acceptable after characterization ultimately re-ceiving an operating license. If the first site proves tobe acceptable to NRC, a repository could be availableearlier than promised.

Recent DOE analysis concludes that a site in a me-dium (granite) not now under consideration for the firstrepository could be licensed by early 1999.29 This sug-gests that a full-scale repository could be in operationby 2008 even if none of the sites under consideration

ZZDOE Natlon~ plan for Siting High-Level Radioactive Waste Repositories

and Environmental Assessment—Public Dr&t, DOE/NWTS-4, February 1982,p. 112.

Zj~E &flssion P],wI for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management pro-

gram, DOE RW-0005 Draft, April 1984, vol. I, p. 3-A-44.

at the time NWPA was being debated proved accept-able, provided that a backup siting program is pursued.

An acceleration and expansion of ongoing DOE activ-ities may be needed to give high confidence that a com-mitment to a firm schedule—even a conservative one—can be kept in spite of technical and institutional uncer-tainties. In particular, the technical program would re-quire enough backups to each component of the disposaltechnology and to each site to ensure that at least oneacceptable combination would be available by the tar-get date, even though more or less predictable difficultiesand failures occur. 24

There is now no technical consensus about the likeli-hood that any particular site that appears suitable forlicensing at the end of site characterization will, in fact,survive the entire licensing process. For this reason,commitment to a schedule for the activities involved inidentifying a first candidate repository site and takingit through the licensing process is not equivalent to acommitment to a schedule for availability of a licensedrepository site.

The relevant agencies could meet every deadline ina schedule for the first candidate site and still wind upat the end of the licensing process with a rejection fromNRC and thus no operating repository. While anothersite could be submitted if the first were rejected, the re-pository availability date would slip significantly, a factwhich the public might well perceive as a major failurein the waste management program.

The most straightforward way to reduce the risk oflicensing rejection is to provide the time and resourcesnecessary to carry more sites than necessary through thesite characterization process and into the licensing proc-ess so that backups are immediately available if the firstsite considered cannot be licensed. This redundant ap-proach might increase the initial costs of developing therepository system. However, it appears certain thatmore than one site will eventually be needed anyway,so the effect on total management costs in the long runmay be less significant.

Commitment to a fixed schedule will thus be moreexpensive, if the probability of failures is minimized,than commitment to a more flexible target date becauseof the greater redundancy needed to assure success onschedule. A detailed analysis of the additional cost wouldrequire development of a more detailed program planthan has been available to date.

In any case, the additional cost should have no sig-nificant effect on the economic competitiveness of nu-clear power. For example, a program that was 160 per-cent more expensive than DOE’s proposed programwould add only about O. 1 cent per kilowatt-hour to the

t+Redu~danCy is a standard design procedure in the development of highly

reliable systems, and is routinely used in the U. S, space program.

—


disposal of spent fuel. A spent fuel disposal package andthe equipment and facilities for packaging and emplac-ing spent fuel in a repository would not be developed,and sites with geochemical conditions suited for spentfuel disposal would not be sought. Second, provisionswould probably have to be made for extended and in-definite storage of spent fuel because of the uncertaintyabout when reprocessing would be economical. This isquite compatible with a decision to provide a disposalsystem on a fixed schedule (issue 1). Once disposal siteswere licensed, construction of full-scale disposal facili-ties could be deferred, if desired, and extended storagefacilities could be constructed at the sites instead.

This option allows continued access to the unuseduranium and plutonium in spent fuel and greater flexi-bility in the choice of a disposal systetn. Geologic dis-posal of reprocessed waste, and not spent fuel, permitstailoring the waste form to the characteristics of a par-ticular repository and would allow separation and sep-arate disposal of the heat-producing, but relatively short-Iived fission products from the cool, but very long-livedtransuranic elements in the waste. This option mightalso allow use of disposal systems such as space disposalthat are not practical with spent fuel.

On the other hand, it now appears possible, if notlikely, that even if the demand for electricity increasessharply enough to warrant large-scale use of breederreactors, only part of the spent fuel expected to be gen-erated by light-water reactors might have to be reproc-essed to provide enough plutonium to start up the breed-ers. If breeder reactors are not used, there may be littlecommercial incentive to recycle uranium and plutoniumfor use in light-water reactors. Even if some recyclingoccurs, there could be an economic incentive to disposeof spent fuel containing plutonium that had been re-cycled several times previously.

Furthermore, a requirement that only reprocessedwaste be disposed of could increase the cost of waste dis-posal by requiring reprocessing of spent fuel in somecases in which the cost of reprocessing could not be off-set by sale of the recovered uranium and plutonium.Since this situation would probably require expenditureof billions of dollars for construction and operation offederally owned reprocessing plants, and since existingand proposed regulations would allow direct disposalof spent fuel without reprocessing, it seems likely thatthe choice would be made to continue to store spent fuelwhile developing the capacity to dispose of it directly.Thus, a decision not to provide the capability to dis-pose of spent fuel may lead to additional disposal costsin the future, either for uneconomic reprocessing ofsome spent fuel or for additional storage of that spentfuel while the capacity to dispose of it is developed,

App. B—Waste Management System Issues Resolved in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 ● 257

OPTION 2:Design the disposal system assuming that no spent

fuel will be reprocessed.

Developing the disposal system for spent fuel alonewould involve planning for the use of disposal capacityas soon as it is available. The policy of the Carter admin-istration appeared in many respects to be similar to thisoption, Reprocessing was deferred, work on waste formswas limited to the military program, and most studiesof disposal policy published by the administrationshowed spent fuel being directly disposed of as rapidlyas repositories could be made operational; however, thepolicy’s stated purpose was to develop a disposal sys-tem that did not preclude future decisions to reprocess.

Developing the capacity to dispose of spent fuel di-rectly would enable an earlier large-scale demonstrationof waste disposal than would occur if the disposal sys-tem were designed only for reprocessed waste. Signifi-cant quantities of spent fuel could be disposed of as soonas a repository was available. A demonstration of dis-posal at commercial scale—which could involve em-placement of perhaps a thousand tonnes of spent fuelor more over a period of years—could answer questionsabout ability to license and operate a full-scale disposalsystem more completely than could a small-scale unli-censed technical demonstration .28 1t would also permitobservation of repository performance under a signifi-cant heat load for an extended period.

One cost of the demonstration would be loss of thepotential resource value of the spent fuel used. How-ever, since existing reactors and those with construc-tion permits alone would generate over 100,000 tonnesof spent fuel during their lifetimes, disposal of even10,000 tonnes would represent less than 10 percent ofthe total and would lead to only a small increase in totaluranium requirements if recycling and an expansion ofnuclear power ultimately occurred. 29 The benefit of anearly, tangible demonstration of commercial-scale wastedisposal could offset the lost resource potential.

There are several disadvantages to designing reposi-tories for spent fuel only. First, since practically all mil-itary high-level waste is reprocessed waste, designinga commercial system to manage only spent fuel wouldlimit the range of options for dealing with militarywastes. Second, the burden of developing the capacity

— — — — —ZS~Ong these ]ine~, one nuclear indust~ group recommended that some spent

fuel should be placed in terminal waste disposal repositories for near-term dem-onstration purposes, although they did not recommend that spent fuel be rou-tinely disposed of in repositories, “Spent Fuel and Nuclear Waste, ’ a state-ment by the Atomic Industrial Forum’s Study Group on Waste Management,Oct. 18, 1978.

Zgone study has concIuded that a policy of disposing of spent fuel when it

is 20 years old would not significantly limit the ability to develop breeder re-actors. Brian G, Chow and Gregory S. Jones, Nonproliferation and Spent FuelDisposa/ Policy, a report prepared for the Council on Environmental Quality(Marina Del Rey, Cafif.: Pan Heuristics, October 1980).

to dispose of reprocessed waste may shift to the futureif it turns out to be more economic to reprocess spentfuel than to dispose of it directly. Modifying the initialspent fuel disposal system design later to handle reproc-essed waste could increase disposal costs.

OPTION 3:Design the disposal system to accommodate both

spent fuel and reprocessed waste.

The major advantage of this option is that it givesfuture decisionmakers the greatest range of choices andleaves open the option to reprocess spent fuel. This neu-trality aboul reprocessing may be seen as a disadvan-tage by those who favor or oppose reprocessing for rea-sons not related to waste management. As discussedabove, it is not clear that either option 1 or 2 can domore than inconvenience future decisionmakers, whocan always use extended storage if reprocessing or di-rect disposal of spent fuel do not appear advisable.

As noted in chapter 3, recent major studies of the sub-ject have concluded that mined repositories could be de-signed for both spent fuel and reprocessed waste with-out compromising safety. Of course, a system designedto handle both forms may be somewhat more expen-sive over the short term than a system optimized for oneor the other, although no data are available to supportan estimate of the additional cost. However, such a sys-tem may be less expensive in the long run since it avoidsthe possible costs of extended storage and system rede-sign necessary for conversion from a single-waste formsystem to a multiwaste-form system.

The Resolution

The NWPA provides that geologic repositories shallbe capable of receiving either spent fuel or reprocessedhigh-level waste.

ISSUE 4:What responsibility should the Federal Govern-

ment assume for interim spent fuel storage before apermanent repository is available?

The delays in availability of both reprocessing anda Federal waste repository have presented utilities withtwo related problems. First, the existing spent fuel stor-age basins at reactors are filling up. Even if the capac-ity of existing basins is expanded by reracking to themaximum extent possible, and if utilities are allowedto transship fuel from reactors whose basins are filledto unfilled basins at other reactors, some face the riskof forced reactor shutdowns by the 1990’s unless addi-tional storage space is made available on a timely basis .30

SODOE, spent Fud Storage Requirements, DOE/RL-83- 1, January 1983,

table 4, p, 17.

258 “ Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Levei Radioactive Waste

Many utilities have expressed concern about whetherthey would be able to provide the needed additional stor-age capacity quickly enough to prevent reactorshutdowns.

Second, even if utilities were certain that they couldprovide additional storage when needed, the uncertaintyabout when spent fuel could be shipped to a reprocess-ing plant or a Federal waste repository leaves the utili-ties with an open-ended liability for growing inventoriesof spent fuel and no clear basis for planning their long-term storage needs. There is an important linkage be-tween this long-term problem and the near-term prob-lem of providing additional storage quickly enough toprevent reactor shutdowns. As noted in chapter 4, therehas been growing opposition to efforts to provide addi-tional spent fuel storage capacity because of fear thatavailability of interim storage would reduce pressuresfor developing long-term solutions, thus turning interimstorage facilities into de facto permanent waste reposi-tories.

The effectiveness of a storage policy in preventingreactor shutdowns may be the greatest determinant ofits potential economic impact. As noted in chapter 3,the cost of replacement power for a l-GWe reactor for1 year could exceed the total discounted cost of perman-ent storage in a new water basin for all the spent fuelthe reactor would generate during its operating lifetime.The ability to ensure timely availability of additionalinterim storage capacity is therefore a primary criterionfor evaluating interim storage options. However, be-cause the uncertainties about the long-term fate of spentfuel may constitute a serious obstacle to gaining the nec-essary approvals for interim storage facilities, it may bedifficult to resolve the near-term storage problem in atimely manner without at the same time addressing thelong-term question.

At present, it appears unlikely that the developmentof large-scale commercial reprocessing could provide avery timely or predictable way to ease the spent fuel stor-age problem at reactors. The private sector appears tohave no interest in constructing and operating reproc-essing facilities now, since reprocessing may not becomeeconomical until sometime in the next decade, at theearliest.

Even if the Allied General Nuclear Services (AGNS)reprocessing plant at Barnwell, S. C., began reprocess-ing operations at its projected full capacity of 1,500tonnes per year in the early 1990’s, it would at mostbe able to handle only the expected overflow of spentfuel from existing basins. It could not handle the totalannual discharges from reactors expected to be in oper-ation at that time. It would take one such plant over25 years to eliminate the backlog of spent fuel that wouldhave accumulated in reactor basins by that time. Be-

cause of the high cost of such plants and the very uncer-tain market for the uranium and plutonium recoveredfrom spent fuel, it appears unlikely that the plants willbe constructed on a reliable schedule by either the pri-vate sector or the Federal Government.

While a Federal waste repository would provide util-ities with a way to get rid of spent fuel, a licensed, full-scale geologic repository could probably not be avail-able before the late 1990’s, leaving a need for additionalspent fuel storage capacity for the interim period. DOEestimates that by 1998 over 60 reactors will need stor-age capacity beyond that available in their existingpools. s~ The interim period could be considerably ex-tended if a very conservative schedule for availabilityof a repository were adopted (issue 2). Thus, the choiceof a Federal interim spent fuel storage policy may de-pend significantly on the final isolation policy that isselected.

The Carter administration raised the possibility of adirect Federal role in interim spent fuel storage whenit advocated that the Federal Government acquire anaway-from-reactor (AFR) storage facility and offer toaccept commercial spent fuel for storage until perma-nent disposal facilities were available. The 96th Con-gress did not authorize acquisition of an AFR facility,and the Reagan administration concentrated its effortsinstead on helping the utilities provide their own stor-age capacity. The question of the appropriate Federalrole in interim spent fuel storage was debated again inthe 97th Congress. The following discussion evaluatesthe principal options considered in that debate, in lightof the proposed options for providing a final isolationsystem considered in the preceding issues.

As background for this discussion, it is useful to un-derstand the relationship between the two distinct stor-age issues considered in the 97th Congress: 1) the“AFR” issue, i.e., the question of the Federal role ininterim spent fuel storage, and 2) the “MRS’ issue,i.e., the question of whether the Federal Governmentshould construct MRS facilities designed to store spentfuel and high-level waste for a long and perhaps indefi-nite period.

The distinction between these two concepts is notclear. An MRS has generally been thought of as beinglocated away from reactor sites, and thus could be con-sidered an AFR. Similarly, any storage facility, evenif intended only for interim storage, as contemplatedfor AFRs, would be monitored and retrievable, and thuscould be considered an MRS. Furthermore, it is possi-ble that the same type of storage technology—metalcasks or drywells—would be used in either case. 32

~llbid., table C-3, pp. 73-76.WSee Ra~mu93en, op. cit., which evaluates casks and d~wclls for both in-

terim storage and monitored retrievable storage.

App. B—Waste Management System Issues Resolved in the Nuc/ear Waste Policy Act of 1982 . 259

Finally, there is some overlap in intended function inthat proponents of a Federal AFR argued that it wouldprovide some flexibility in the event of slippages of thegeologic repository schedule—one of the arguments fora Federal MRS facility.

The principal difference is that the AFR debate hastended to focus on the question of providing additionalstorage capacity until a geologic repository is available,with emphasis on the near-term problem of providingsuch storage in time to prevent reactor shutdowns. Incontrast, the MRS debate has focused on the longer-terrn questions of whether to provide Federal storagefacilities either as an alternative to rapid developmentof geologic repositories (considered in issue 1) or as abackup in case of slippage in the repository program(discussed in the chapter 6). Since a full-scale MRS fa-cility could probably not be designed, sited, licensed,and constructed before 1994 or 1995,33 such a facilitywould not address the immediate problems of the utili-ties which will exhaust the capacity of their reactorbasins before then—the more immediate focus of theAFR debate.

The following discussion will concentrate on the in-terim storage questions raised in the AFR debate, whilethe question of the role of MRS facilities as a backupin case of slippages in the repository program is dis-cussed in chapter 6.

OPTION: 1. No Federal role in interim storage; com-plete responsibility of private industry.

2. Federal assistance to private storage ef-forts by reducing legal obstacles; speedingthe iicensingprocess; and accelerating re-search, development, and demonstrationof new storage technologies.

3. Federzdprovision ofa limited amount ofstorage capacity for emergency use only.

4. FederaJ storage capacity as an alternativeto construction of new storage facilities byutilities.

The Debate

OPTION 1:No Federal role in interim storage; complete re-

sponsibility of private industry.

In 1982, DOE analysis of utility-provided datashowed that conventional reracking could meet all util-ity storage needs until 1986 or 1987 if transshipmentwere aUowed.34 The need for additional storage could

“Ibid., p. 6.2.~~~E, s~nt Fuel Storage Requirements, DOE/RL-82- 1, June 1982. An

update of that analysis in 1983 reached the same conclusion, although it iden-tified one reactor that might need 13 tonnes of additional storage in 1984—DOE, Spent Fuel Storage Requirements, 1983, op. cit.

be deferred several more years if reactors did not main-tain full core reserve—the amount of space needed todischarge the entire reactor core—although this wouldinvolve some risk of extended shutdown if the core hadto be removed for maintenance or repairs. Moreover,it appears that new water basins or other new storagetechnologies could be constructed at reactors by 1988,perhaps sooner, if begun in 1981 or 1982 (when the AFRissue was being debated) .35

Thus, it appears theoretically possible that even withno Federal action, no reactor would have to shut downfor lack of spent fuel storage capacity. There are, how-ever, two important cautions in this conclusion. First,although several of the new storage technologies, espe-cially casks, have the potential for faster implementa-tion than conventional water basins, they will not berealistic alternatives for most utilities facing immediatestorage decisions until their technical feasibility and theirability to be licensed have been demonstrated.

Second, it is not known whether the private sectorwill receive timely permission for constructing and oper-ating any new spent fuel storage facilities, or even forreracking or transshipment. The primary potentialsources of delays are complications in the licensing proc-ess and State and local laws and regulations that limitthe quantity of fuel that can be stored at a reactor. Pre-viously, such factors have not adversely affected reactoroperations, although there appears to be considerableconcern among utilities that this could be a serious prob-lem in the future, particularly with new technologies forwhich there is no licensing experience. This concernunderlies the utilities’ desire for a Federal AFR facil-ity, since many believe that the Federal Governmentwill be better able to provide additional storage capac-ity in the face of opposition than utilities could.

One drawback is the concern that interim storagemight become de facto permanent storage because ofthe uncertain status of spent fuel. Thus, adoption of avery conservative or open-ended schedule for availabilityof a Federal waste repository may make it more diffi-cult for utilities to provide additional interim storage ca-pacity on their own than would a program that includeda fixed schedule for a repository.

OPTION 2:Federal assistance to private storage efforts by re-

ducing legal obstacles; speeding the licensing proc-ess; and accelerating research, development, and dem-onstration of new storage technologies.

Several Federal actions could help utilities provideadequate spent fuel storage capacity in time to prevent

35)3. R. Johnson AssWiates, Inc. , A Preliminary Assessment of AlternativeDry Storage Methods for the Storage of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel, JAI-180 (DOE/ET/47929-l), November 1981, table 7-1, p. 7-3.


reactor shutdowns. One would be Federal support ofan accelerated program for rapidly developing new drystorage technologies and demonstrating their ability tobe licensed for use at reactor sites. Many utilities mayprefer to stick with proven technology-water basinswith conventional reracking—for providing new stor-age capacity, even though the likelihood that at leastsome of the new technologies will prove acceptable ap-pears high. However, one large utility, the TennesseeValley Authority (TVA), is already planning to dem-onstrate some of the new technologies-rod compactionand dry storage—in the next few years before it com-mits to the construction of new interim storage facilities.

The availability of these technologies for general useby utilities might be significantly accelerated by an ag-gressive Federal research, development, and demonstra-tion program to resolve remaining technical and eco-nomic questions and to share some of the costs oflicensed demonstrations.

Approval of interim storage capacity might be has-tened by an explicit statement of congressional intentabout interim storage in existing or new storage facili-ties. Such a statement might speed the resolution ofquestions of Federal preeminence over State and localrestrictions on spent fuel storage.

Adoption of a firm, credible schedule for the availa-bility of a final isolation facility could reduce both theopposition to utilities’ efforts to provide their own in-terim storage facilities and the financial risks created bythe uncertainty about how long such facilities would beneeded. Potential problems might be further lessenedby a favorable resolution of NRC’s ongoing generic con-fidence proceeding about the timely ultimate disposalof spent fuel and about the safety of continued storageuntil disposal is available. The proceeding was initiatedprecisely because of objections to provision of indefiniteinterim storage.36

OPTION 3:Federal provision of a limited amount of storage

capacity for emergency use only.Although it is possible that utilities will be able to pro-

vide all their own interim storage capacity, it is not cer-tain that all would be able to do so before their existingstorage capacity is exhausted. Thus an argument canbe made for providing some Federal storage capacityas a last-resort backup to prevent unavoidable reactorshutdowns while utilities construct their own new stor-

$cIn AuWst 1984, NRC issued a final rule embodying the resuhs of the waste

confidence proceeding, in which it stated that ‘‘there is reasonable assurancethat one or more mined geologic repositories for commercial high-level radio-active waste and spent fuel will be available by the years 2007-2009, and thatin any case, spent fuel could safety be stored at either reactor sites or offsitefor up to 30 years after the expiration of the reactor’s operating license. Fed-eral Register, vol. 49, No. 171, Aug. 31, 1984, p. 34659-34660.

age capacity. The need for such capacity depends onthe importance attached to avoiding the risk of shut-downs and the associated economic costs of providingreplacement power.

The amount of Federal storage needed as a last re-sort backup to utilities’ storage programs could be muchsmaller than would be needed if Federal storage wereintended to handle all spent fuel storage in excess of thecapacity of existing basins. The major source of demandfor emergency capacity would probably occur in the late1980’s and early 1990’s as a result of possible delays inbringing new storage facilities online. Only 1,000 tonnesof storage, approximately the lifetime capacity neededfor a l-GWe reactor, would be required to give everyone of the 24 reactors projected to need new storage ca-pacity before 1990 an additional 2 years to provide thatcapacity themselves. 37

However, if Federal storage were used as a substi-tute for additional utility storage, rather than a backupin case of delays in utilities’ efforts, about 5,000 tonnesof Federal storage would be needed to handle the needsof those same 24 reactors until 1998, the target date foroperation of a geologic repository established byNWPA.38 Of course, provision of limited Federal stor-age capacity for emergency use only would not deal withthe utilities’ long-term problem of liability for growinginventories of spent fuel, and thus might be more com-patible with a fixed schedule for a Federal waste repos-itory, which would solve that problem, than with a flex-ible or indefinite schedule.

A clear decision to provide Federal storage facilitiesfor use only in emergency cases would demonstrate toutilities that they must immediately begin planning toprovide their own facilities. Any possibility that the Fed-eral Government might later provide an alternative toconstruction of new facilities by utilities could encouragethem to defer action and could also discourage privateefforts to develop new storage technologies.

To prevent Federal emergency storage capacity fromdampening utility efforts to provide storage, several ac-tions could be taken. First, utilities could be requiredto show that they have made their best effort to providetheir own storage. Second, existence of State or localprohibitions on increased storage could be disallowedas a justification for use of the Federal storage option,thereby facing the affected communities with the choiceof shutting down a reactor or allowing increased storage.

Several options for providing Federal storage capac-ity may be available in the next decade. The mostreadily available appears to be use of modular dry stor-age (casks or drywells) at existing Federal facilities on

~~E, spent Fuel Storage Requirements, 1983, table C-1, p. 65.381 bjd., table C-3, pp. 73-76.

App. B–Waste Management System Issues Resolved in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 261

Federal reservations. Availability of space in Federal fa-cilities could enable deferral of acquisition of other fa-cilities for several years, allowing questions about theavailability of new storage technologies for utility useto be resolved and permitting a more accurate estimateof the needs for Federal storage. While these facilitieswould probably not be licensed, they could be availablequickly.

Federal acquisition of existing private facilities withstorage basins has also been considered .39

OPTION 4:Federal storage capacity as an alternative to con-

struction of new storage facilities by utilities.

An offer to accept spent fuel at a Federal AFR facili-ty would be an effective alternative for reducing the utili-ties’ open-ended liability for spent fuel if the availabil-ity of final isolation facilities remains uncertain. How-ever, several objections have been made to providingsuch a facility for this purpose. Some argue that the Gov-ernment should not subsidize nuclear power by remov-ing the burden of uncertainty about interim storage fromthe generators and users of nuclear electricity, whichis a commercial responsibility. In addition, some ob-ject that a Federal AFR facility could take the pressureoff Government and industry to decide whether andwhen to develop disposal capacity.

In support of this option, it can be argued that sincethe Federal Government has the responsibility to pro-vide for permanent isolation of high-level radioactivewaste and is itself directly responsible for the delays anduncertainties about providing this service, it has an obli-gation to the users of nuclear power to share the bur-den of spent fuel storage created by its own inaction.

Provision of an open-ended Federal interim storagecapacity is the storage option most compatible with con-tinued flexibility about the date of availability of a per-manent repository. However, the amount of spent fuelmoved to Federal interim facilities could increase rapidlyif the availability of final isolation sites is deferred muchbeyond the turn of the century. Thus, providing Fed-eral spent fuel storage capacity as an alternative to con-structing new facilities by utilities may lead to an in-creasing amount of spent fuel being stored at AFRinterim sites, since it appears that utilities, left to theirown devices, may have an economic incentive to pro-vide additional capacity at reactor sites, if possible .40There would be several effects of this action.. - — — - —

3Whese include the General Electric facility at Morris, Ill., which is alreadystoring some commercial spent fuel, and the AGNS facility at Barnwell, S. C.,which has an unused storage basin that could be reracked to provide 1,750tonnes of capacity. DOE, Spent Fuel Storage Fact Book, DOE/NE-0005, Aprif1980, table 4, p. 24.

*OA~ noted in ~h, 3, the new modular dry storage technologies may be less

expensive to implement at reactor sites, which already have handling facilities,than at a centralized site which would require new facilities.

SAFETY

NRC has concluded that spent fuel can be safelystored either at reactor sites or at AFRs.41 The addi-tional handling and transportation involved in AFRstorage could lead to some increase in worker and pub-lic radiation exposure compared to onsite storage.

TRANSPORTATION

DOE estimates that by 1998, over 7,000 tonnes ofspent fuel will require storage outside the basins of thereactors in which they were produced .42 Interim stor-age of that spent fuel at sites other than those at whichthey were generated will increase the total amount ofhandling and transportation of spent fuel, and could in-crease the total number of communities affected by ra-dioactive waste management activities.

Movement of significant amounts of spent fuel to in-terim storage facilities away from the site of generationmay occur before a repository is available even if theFederal Government plays no role in interim storage,because transshipment is more economically attractivethan is construction of new facilities. In fact, DOE esti-mates that about 2,100 tonnes of the storage needed by1998 could be met in this way.43 (This amount couldbe reduced if rod consolidation—not considered inDOE’s estimates of the maximum capacity of existingbasins—proves to be usable at many reactors.)

However, provision of Federal AFR storage as an al-ternative to utility efforts once existing basins are fullcould more than triple the amount of spent fuel movedto interim storage before 1998.44 In addition to increas-ing transportation impacts, use of a Federal AFR facil-ity for this purpose could increase the likelihood of con-frontations between the Federal Government andaffected States or localities over transportation issues.

COST

Various DOE analyses of the costs of storage haveconcluded that federally owned facilities would be lesscostly to utilities than would privately owned facilities.To some extent, this is a result of the economies of scaleinvolved in a large Federal AFR facility, an advantagethat may be offset by transportation costs or the avail-ability of less-expensive dry storage technologies for at-reactor use. To a significant extent, it is simply the re-sult of the economics of Federal ownership. For exam-ple, DOE analyses indicate that the cost of privatelyowned facilities could be up to 100 percent higher than

“U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Firsaf Generic Environmental im-pact Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power ReactorFuel, August 1979, NUREG-0575, vol. 1, p. S-3.

4ZDOE S%n[ Fue~ Storage Rquimments, 1983, table 3, p. 16.+jIbid. ‘Derived from table 3.

*+ Ibid.

—


identical federally owned facilities because of the lowercost of capital for the Federal Government and becauseof the Government’s immunity to Federal, State, andlocal taxes.45

There has been no systematic comparison of the costsof at-reactor and AFR interim storage that includes thecost of transportation, that considers use of the newmodular dry storage technologies both at reactors andat independent AFR facilities, and that uses a consist-ent set of financial assumptions for ail facilities, regard-less of ownership. However, available studies suggestthat at-reactor storage using modular dry storage tech-nologies could be less expensive than AFR storage, evenwithout considering the additional cost of transporta-tion to an AFR facility.46

Nonetheless, any conclusions about the relative costsof at-reactor and AFR storage must remain tentativeuntil a fully consistent comparison of at-reactor andAFR options is made. Since the modular dry storagetechnologies may have significant cost advantages com-pared with water basins, whether used at reactors oraway from reactors, accelerated development and li-censed demonstrations of those technologies could bevery useful for determining their actual costs more pre-cisely.

EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS

There may be significant differences among spent fuelstorage systems in the distribution of their impactsamong the private sector, the Federal Government, andvarious regions of the country. For example, with anat-reactor storage system, the health and safety risks andsocial impacts of storage are distributed among com-munities that have presumably benefited directly fromthe electricity generated by the spent fuel. These samecommunities would have to bear the costs of reactorshutdowns if additional storage space were not provided.

With an AFR system, the risks and impacts of stor-age are localized to those few communities in the vicinityof the AFR facility, which may or may not have bene-fited from the electricity generated by the spent fuel.Many additional communities would be affected by in-creased spent fuel transportation to the AFR facility.As a result of such distributional effects, provision bythe Federal Government of a significant amount of AFRstorage capacity as an alternative to utility provision of

+~~E ~~no]W for CommemjaJ Radioactive Waste Management,

DOE/ET~O028, May 1979, vol. 3, p. 5.7.55.*6E R Johnmn A~~iates op. cit. , estimated that the cost Of at-reaCtOr 9t0r-

. . ,age using surface drywells could be as low as $117 per kilogram of spent fuel.DOE, The Monitored Retrievable Storage Concept, p. 2-6, concluded that stor-age in a centralized privately financed 10,000-tonne drywell facility could costfrom $100 to $170 per kilogram, with $160 per kilogram as the estimated feebased on the set of assumptions judged most likely to be accepted. Transporta-tion from the reactor to an AFR could add around $16 per kilogram to thisamount (table 2-4, p. 2-22). See also chapter note 1 in ch. 6.

new storage facilities raises more equity considerationsthan do the options for Federal involvement which haveless direct effect on the location of storage. As noted inchapter 4, such considerations have played an impor-tant role in debates about radioactive waste manage-ment issues.

ASSURANCE OF STORAGE CAPACITY

Reliance of utilities on the Federal Government forprovision of a significant portion of their interim stor-age needs could increase the vulnerability of the stor-age system to failures. Analysis by DOE shows that by1998, over 60 of the currently operating reactors couldbe relying on a Federal AFR facility for storage.47 Inthis situation, any licensing delays, failures in acquir-ing additional AFR capacity, shutdowns of an AFR fa-cility because of accidents or sabotage, or serious trans-portation problems could make many reactors vulner-able to potential shutdowns simultaneously. In contrast,a storage system in which utilities provide lifetime in-terim storage onsite, which would be encouraged by lim-iting Federal storage to backup use only, would com-pletely insulate the utility and its ratepayers from anybottlenecks or failures elsewhere in the spent fuel stor-age and waste management system.

The Resolution

The NWPA incorporated a combination of options2 and 3. Utilities are given the primary responsibilityfor providing the additional spent fuel storage neededuntil a Federal repository is available. To assist utili-ties in this effort, the Act provides for an acceleratedprogram for licensed demonstrations of new storagetechnologies and encourages generic licensing of suchtechnologies when possible. At the same time, the Actprovides for a limited amount (1 ,900 tonnes) of last-re-sort Federal storage in existing Federal facilities, withNRC to make the determination about which utilitiesare entitled to use that storage. Federal acquisition ofexisting private facilities for spent fuel storage was notauthorized.

Appendix Note

The original Atomic Energy Act made no referenceto either radioactive waste or to waste disposal. The firstformal regulations on the subject were promulgated bythe Atomic Energy Commission in 1970 (Appendix Fto Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regula-tions). These regulations required liquid high-level wasteproduced by reprocessing of spent fuel to be solidified

47~E, Swnt Fuel stora~ Requirements, 1983, table C-3, pp. 73 -74.


and delivered to a Federal repository within 10 yearsof reprocessing, at which time the industry would paya fee calculated to cover the costs of ‘disposal and per-petual surveillance. While the regulations distinguishbetween temporary storage, which can take place on pri-vately owned property, and disposal, which can takeplace only on federally owned and controlled land, thereis no clear definition of either term, and the referenceto perpetual surveillance suggests that “disposal” couldbe interpreted to mean permanent storage.

It should be noted, however, that the Atomic EnergyCommission, in proposing the Retrievable Surface Stor-age Facility, did distinguish between storage and dis-posal in terms of the continued human control andmaintenance that is required for storage but not for per-manent disposal.48

The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (Public Law93-438), which split the functions of the Atomic EnergyCommission between the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion and the Energy Research and Development Admin-istration (ERDA), gave the new NRC the licensing andregulatory authority over ERDA facilities used primarilyfor the receipt and storage of high-level radioactivewastes resulting from activities licensed under the act[Sec. 202(3)] and over Retrievable Surface Storage Fa-cilities and other facilities authorized explicitly for subse-quent long-term storage of high-level radioactive wastegenerated by ERDA, which are not used for or part ofresearch and development activities [Sec. 202(4)]. Thesesections, which form the basis for NRC licensing au-thority, make no references to disposal facilities and donot define storage.

40U,S, Atomic Ener~ Commission, op. cit., pp. 1.2-11,12; and p. 2.3-21.

NRC has interpreted storage to include disposal,which it takes to mean emplacement of waste with nointention to retrieve. However, this definition is silenton the acceptability of a requirement for continued in-stitutional control, since emplacement with no intentionto retrieve could be effected in a storage facility thatnonetheless required control to ensure safety. NRC hasso far applied the term disposal only to geologic disposalfacilities and has developed regulations only for such fa-cilities.

Finally, the Department of Energy Organization Act(Public Law 95-91, August 1977,91 Stat. 565) explicitlygave the new DOE responsibilities for “the establish-ment of temporary and permanent facilities for storage,management, and ultimate disposal of nuclear wastes’[Title 42, Ch. 84, Sec. 7133. (8)(C)], and “establish-ment of programs for the treatment, management, stor-age, and disposal of nuclear wastes” [Sec. 7133 (8)(E)].However, once again no definitions were given for stor-age and disposal, and the statement in (8)(C) can beread as allowing for permanent storage facilities. In ad-dition, section 7133 (8)(F) gives DOE authority to estab-lish fees or user charges only for nuclear waste treat-ment or storage facilities and makes no mention ofdisposal facilities, thus perpetuating the confusion be-tween the two concepts.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (Public Law97-425) clarified the distinction by defining disposal asemplacement of waste in a repository with no foreseeableintent of recovery, and also defining a repository as asystem for permanent deep geologic disposal. Since deepgeologic repositories are designed not to rely on long-term institutional control and maintenance, this defi-nition implicitly incorporates the idea that disposal doesnot require such continued care.

Appendix C

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of .1982

PUBLIC LAW 97-425—JAN;

Public Law 97-42597th Congress

7, 1983

To provide for the development of repositories for the disposal of high-level radioac- Jan. 7, 1983tive waste and spent nuclear fuel, to establish a program of research, develo ment,and demonstration regarding the disposal of high-level radioactive waste an spent [H.R. 3809]

nuclear fuel, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repmsentatiues of the Nuclear ~mti

United States ofAmerica in Cong.mss assembl~

SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the “NuclearAct of 1982”.

:;13:Y Act of

42 USC 10101

Waste Policy ‘o*’

E: isec. 3.sec. 4.sec. 5.

E: !:Sec. 8.sec. 9.

TABLE OF CONTENTSShort title and table of contents.Definitions.Separability.Territories andOcean disposal.

~ i o n s .

Limitation on spending authority.Protection of classified national security information.Applicability.Applicability,

TITLE I–DISPOSAL AND STORAGE OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACI’IVE WASTEjSPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND LOW-LEVEL RADIOACX’IVE WASTE

Sec. 101. State and affected Indian tribe participation in development of proposedrepositories for defense waste.

sua’rrTLE A—RmwarroRIEs POB DISPOSAL OF H:GH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WMTE AND

sec. 111.sec. 112.sec. 113.sec. 114.sec. 115.Sec. 116.sec. 1170Sec. 118.sec. 119.sec. 120.sec. 121.sec. 122.sec. 123.sec. 124.sec. 125.

sec. 131.Sec. 132.sec. 133.sec. 134.sec. 135.Sec. 136.sec. 137.

SPEHT NUCLEAR FUEL

Findinga and purposes.Recommendation of candidate sites for site characterization.Site characterization.Site approval and construction authorization.Review of repository si~ selection.Participation of States.Consultation with States and Indian tribea.Participation of Indian tribea.Judicial review of agency actions.Expedited authorizations.(Mtain standards and criteria.Disposal of spent nuclear fuel.Title to material.Consideration of effect of acquisition of water rights.Termination of certain provisiona.

suaTrrLE B-INTERIM SmxtAGE PROGRAM

Findings and purposes.Available capacity for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel.Interim atireactor storage.

Licensing of f~ility expansions and transshipmenta.Storage of spent nuclear fuel.Interim Storage Fund.‘Mnqmtation.

264

App. C—The Nuclear Waste Po/icy Act of 1962 265

96 STAT. 2202 PUBLIC LAW 97-425—JAN. 7, 1983

$UBTITLB

Sec. 141. Monitored retrievable storage.

Sec. 151. Financial arrangements for site closure.TITLE II–RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION REGARDING

DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEARFUEL

sec. 211.

Sec. 213.Sec. 214.Sec. 215.Sec. 216.Sec. 217.Sec. 218.Sec. 219.sec. 220.

sec. 221.sec. 222.

sec. 223.

Purpose.Applicability.Identification of sites.Siting research and related activities.Test and evaluation facility siting review and reports.Federal agency actions.Research and development on disposal of high-level radioactive waste.

Payments to States and ti Indian tribes.

Judicial review.

tive waste.Technical assistance to non-nuclear weapon states in the field of ment

fuel storage and disposal.TITLE III-OTHER PROVISIONS RELATING TO RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Sec. 301. Mission lan.%Sec. 302. Nuclear aste Fund.

Sec. 303. Alternate means of financing.Sec. 304. office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.Sec. 305. Location of test and evaluation facility.Sec. 306. Nuclear Regulatory Commission training authorization.

DEFINITIONS

42 USC 10101. SEC. 2. For purposes of this Act:

Environmental Protection Agency.

(A) within whose reservation boundaries a monitoredretrievable storage facility, test and evaluation facility, or arepository for high-level radioactive waste or spent fuel isproposed to be located;

(B) whose federally defined possessor or usage rights toother lands outside of the reservation’s boundaries arisingout of congressionally ratified treaties may be substantiallyand adversely affcted by the locating of such a facility:Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior finds, upon thepetition of the aropriate governmental offlcia.ls of the

/ ?tribe, that such e ects are both substantial and adverse tothe tribe;

(3) The term “atomic energy defense activity” means anyactivity of the Secreta

7performed in whole or in part in

carrying out any of the fo lowing functions:(A) naval reacto~odevelopment;(B) we?po~ actlvltles including defense inertial confine-

ment fusnon;(0 verification and control technology;(D) defense nuclear materials production;(E) defense nuclear waste and materials by-products man-

agement;

—


PUBLIC LAW 97-425-JAN. 7, 1983 96 STAT. 2203

(F) defense nuclear materials security and safeguards andsecurity investigations; and

(G) defense research and development.(4) The term “candidate site” means an area within a geo-

logic and hydrologics tern, that is recommended by the Secre-rtary undersection 112 for site characterization, approved by the

President under section 112 for site characterization, or under-going site characterization under section 113.

(5) The term “civilian nuclear activity” means any atomicactivity other than an atomic energy defense activity.

(6) the term “civilian nuclear power reactor” means a civil-ian nuclear powerplant required to be licensed under section103 or 104 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2133,2134(M).

(7) The term Commussuib“~m e a n s t h e N u c l e a r R e g u l a t o r yc o

(8) The term “Department” means the Department of Energy.(9) The term “disposal” means the emplacement in a reposi-

high-Ievel radioactive waste,forseeable

nt nuclear fuel, or other& % if~ t i v e m a t e r i a l w i tforesseable~le intent of recov-ery, whether or not such emplacement permits the recovery ofsuch Waste

( 1 0 ) T h e ~primary container that holdsh-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, or other radi~

active mate- and any overpacks that are emplaced at arepository.

(11) The term “engineered barriers” means manmade Compnents of a disposal system designed to prevent the release ofradionuclides into the geologic medium involved. Such termincludes the high-level radioactive waste form, high-level radioactive waste canisters, and other materials placed over andaround such canisters.

(12) The term h-level radioactive waste” means—(A) the higly radioactive material resulting from the

reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste

derived from such liquid waste that contains fission proj-J -ucts in sufficent concentrations; and

(B) other highly radioactive material that the Commis-sion, consistent with existing law, determines by rule

requires permanent isolation.(13)The term “Federal agency” means any Executive agency,

as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code.(14) The term “Governor” means the chief executive officer of

a State.(15) The term “Indian tribe” means any Indian tribe, band,

nation, or other organY

ized group or community of Indians recog-nized as el’ “ble or the seMces provided to Indians b the

diSecretary o the Interior because of their status as In ians,including an Alaska Native village, as defined in section 3(c) of

5the Alaska ative Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1602(c)).(16) The term “low-level radioactive waste” means radioactive

material that—(A) is not high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel,

transuranic waste, or by-product material as defined in

App. C—The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 .267

96 STAT. 2204 PUBLIC LAW 97-425-JAN. 7, 1983

Post, p. 2262.

section 11e(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.2014(e)(2)); and

(B) the Commission, consistent with existing law, classi-fies as low-level radioactive waste.

(17) The term “Office” means the Office of Civilian Radioac-tive Waste Management established in section 305.

(18) The term ‘ repository” means any system licensed by theCommission that is intended toebe used for,. or may be used for,the permaanent

‘ waste and spent nucleardesigned to permit the recovery, for a limited period duringinitial operation, of an materials placed in such system. Suchterm includes boths ace and subsurface areas at which high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel handling activi-ties are conducted.

(19) The term “resrvation” means—(A) any Indian reservation or dependent Indian com-

munity referred to in clause (a) or (b) of section 1151 of title18, United States Code; or

(B) any land selected by an Alaska Native village orYregional corporation under the provisions of the A Alaska

Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq).(20) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Energy.(21) The term “site characterization” means—

(A) siting research activities with respect to a test andevaluation facility at a candidate site; and

(B) activities, whether in the laboratory or in the field,undertaken to establish the geologic condition and theranges of the parameters of a candidate site relevant to thelocation of a repository, including borings , surface excava-

Ytions, excavations of exploratory shafts, Limmited subsurfacelateral excavations and borings, and in situ testing neededto evaluate the suitability of a candidate site for the loca-tion of a repository, but not including preliminary boringsand geophysical testing needed to assess whether site char-acterization should be undertaken.

(22) The term “siting research” means activities, includingborings, surface excavations, shaft excavations, subsurface lat-eral excavations and borings, and in situ testing, to determinethe suitability of a site for a test and evaluation facility.

(23) The term “spent nuclear fuel” means fuel that has beenwithdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, theconstituent elementa of which have not been separated byreprocessing.

(24) The term “state” means each of the several States, theDistrict of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, theVirgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern MarianaIslands, the Trust Territo of the Pacific Islands, and any otherterritory or ficepossession oft e United States.

(25) Teh term “story e“ means retention of high-level radioac-tive waste, spent nuclear fuel, or transuranic waste with theintent to recover such waste or fuel for subsequent use, process-ing, or disposal.

(26) The term “Storage Fund” means the Interim StorageFund established in section 137(c).

(2’7) The term “test and evaluation facility” means an atidepth, prototypic, underground cavity with subsurface lateral


PUBLIC LAW 97-425–JAN. 7, 1983 96 STAT. 2205

excavations extending from a central shaft that is used forresearch and development purposes, including the developmentof data and experience for the safe handling and disposal ofsolidified high-level radioactive waste, transuranic waste, orspent nuclear fuel.

(28) The term “unit of general local government” means anyborough, city, county, parish, town, township, village, or othergeneral purpose political subdivision of a State.“-(29)-The term "Waste Fund” means the Nuclear Waste Fundestablished in section 302(c). Post, p. 2257.

SEPARABILITY

SEC. 3. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such 42 usc 10102.provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remain-der of this Act, or the application of such provision to persons orcircumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shallnot be affected thereby.

TERRITORIES AND POSSESSIONS

SEC. 4. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to repeal, modify, or 42 USC 10103.amend the provisions of section 605 of the Act of March 12, 1980 (48USC. 1491).

OCEAN DISPOSAL

SEC. 5. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect the Marine 42 USC 10104.Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C. 1401 etseq.).

LIMITATION ON SPENDING AUTHORITY

SEC. 6. The authority under this Act to incur indebtedness, or 42 USC 10105.enter into contracts, obligating amounts to be expended by theFederal Government shall be effective for any fiscal year only tosuch extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance byappropriation Acts.

PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

SEC. 7. Nothing in this Act shall require the release or disclosure 42 USC 10106.to any person or to the Commission of any classified nationalsecurity information.

APPLICABILITY

SEC. 8. (a) ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE Activities.-Subject to the 42 USC~ 101OT.iprovisions of subsection (c), the provisions of this Act shal not apply

fwith respect to any atomic energy defense activity or to any faci ityused in connection with any such activity .

d(b) EVALUATION BY PRESIDENT .-(1)Not later than 2 years afterthe date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall evaluatethe use of disposal capacity at one or more repositories to bedeveloped under subtitle A of title I for the disposal of high-level post P. 2207.

radioactive waste resulting from atomic energy defense activities.Such evaluation shall take into consideration factors relating to cost

App. C—The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1962 ● 269

96 STAT. 2206 PUBLIC LAW 97-425–JAN. 7, 1983

post, p. 2207.

Post, p. 2257.

42 USC 10108.

42 USC 10121.

efficiency, health and safety, regulation, transportation, publicacceptability, and national security.

(’2) Unless the President finds, after conducting the evaluationrequired in paragraph (l), that the development of a repository forthe disposal of high-level radioactive waste resulting from atomicenergy defense activities only is required, taking into account all ofthe factors described in such subsection, the Secretary shall proceedpromptly with arrangement for the use of one or more of therepositories to be developed under subtitle A of title I for thedisposal of such waste. Such arrangements shall include the alloca-tion of costs of developing, constructing, and operating this reposi-tory or repositories. The costs resulting from permanent disposal ofhigh-level radioactive waste from atomic energy defense activitiesshall be paid by the Federal Government, into the special accountestablished under section 302.

(3) Any repository for the disposal of high-level radioactive wasteresulting from atomic energy defense activities only shall (A) besubject to licensing under section 202 of the Energy ReorganizationAct of 1973 (42 U.S.C. 5842); and (B) comply withal requirements ofthe Commission for the siting, development, construction, and oper-ation of a repository.

(c) APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN REPOSITORIES . —The provisions ofthis Act shall apply with respect to any repository not used exclu-sively for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste or spentnuclear fuel resulting from atomic energy defense activities,research and development activities of the Secretary, or both.

APPLICABILITY

SEC. 9. TRANSPORTATION.—Nothing in this Act shall be construedto affect Federal, State, or local laws pertaining to the transporta-tion of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste.

TITLE I–DISPOSAL AND STORAGE OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIO-ACTIVE WASTE, SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, AND LOW-LEVELRADIOACTIVE WASTE

STATE AND AFFECTED INDIAN TRIBE PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENTOF PROPOSED REPOSITORIES FOR DEFENSE WASTE

S E C. 101. (a) N O T I F I C A T I O N T O S T A T E S A N D A FFECTED IN D I A N

TRIBEs.—Notwithstanding theF

revisions of section 8, upon anydecision by the Secretary or the resident to develop a repository forthe disposal of high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuelresulting exclusively from atomic energy defense activities, researchand development activities of the Secretary, or both, and beforeproceeding with any site-specific investigations with respect to suchrepository, the Secretary shall notify the Governor and legislatureof the State in which such repository is proposed to be located, or thegoverning body of the affected Indian tribe on whose reservationsuch repository is proposed to be located, as the case may be, of suchdecision.

(b) PARTICIPATION OF STATES AND AFFECTED INDIAN TRIBES. -FOl-lowing the receipt of any notification under subsection (a), the Stateor Indian tribe involved shall be entitled, with respect to the pro-posed repository involved, to rights of participation and consultationidentical to those provided in sections 115 through 118, except that



an financial assistance authorized to be provided to such State oraffected Indian tribe under section 116(c) or 118(b) shall be madefrom amounts appropriated to the Secretary for purposes of carryingout this section.

SUBTITLE A—REPOSITORIES for DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVELRADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

FINDINGS AND PURPOSES

SEC. 111. (a) Findings.-The Congress finds that— 42 USC 10131.(1) radioactive waste creates potential risks and requires safe

and environmental acceptable methods of die ;(2) a national problem has been created by the accumulation

of(A) spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors; and (B) radioac-tive waste from (i) reprocess of spent nuclear fuel; (ii) activi-ties related to medical research, diagnosis, and treatment; and(iii) other sources;

(3) Federal efforts during the past 30 years to devise a perma-nent solution to the problems of civilian radioactive wastedisposal have not been adequate;

(4) while the Federal Government has the responsibilityoto

fuel ‘ “= i fm~h*v~l# ! / ’%l ;~p r o v i d e f o r t h e p e r m a n t d i s p o s a lwaste and such spent nuclearorder to protect the public health and safety and t e environ-ment, the costs of such disposal should be the responsibility ofthe generators and owners of such waste and spent fuel;

(5) the generators and owners of high-level radioactive wasteand spent nuclear fuel have the primary responsibility to pro-vide or, and the responsibility to pay the costs of, the interimstorage of such waste and spent fuel until such waste and spentfuel is accepted by the secretary of Energy in accordance withthe provisions of this act;

(6) State and public participation in the planning and development of repositories is essential in order to promote publicconfidence in the safety of disposal of such waste and spent fuel;and

(7) high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel havebecome mjor subjects of public concern, and approriate pre-cautions must be taken to ensure that such waste an spent fueldo not adversely affect the public health and safety and theenvironment for this or future generations.

(b) Purposes.-The purposes of this subtitle are-(1) to establish a schedule for the siting, construction, and

operation of repositories that will provide a reasonable assur-ance that the public and the environment will be adequatelyprotected from the hazards posed by high-level radioactivewaste and such spent nuclear fuel as may be disposed of in arepository;

(2) to establish the Federal responsibility, and a definiteFederal policy, for the disposal of such waste and spent fuel;

(3) to define the relationship between the Federal Govern-ment and the State government with respect to the disposal ofsuch waste and spent fuel; and

(4) to establish a Nuclear Waste Fund, composed of paymentsmade by the generators and owners of such waste an spentfuel, that will ensure that the costs of carrying out activities



relating to the disposal of such waste and spent fuel will beborne by the persons responsible for generating such waste andspent fuel.

RECOMMENDATION OF CANDIDATE SITES FOR SITE CHARACTERIZATION

42 USC 10132. SEC. 112. (a) Guidelines.-Not later than 180 days afterr the dateof the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, following consultationwith the Council on Environmental Quality , the Administrator ofthe Environmental Protection Agency, the Director of the Geologi-cal Survey, and interested Governors, and the concurrence of theCommission shall issue general guidelines for the recommendationof sites for repositories. Such

be Guidelines shall specify detailed geo-

logic considerations that shall primary criteria for the selectionof sites in various geologic media. Such guidelines shall specifyfactors that qualifiy or disqualify any site from development as arepository, including factors pertaining to the location of valuablenatural resources, hydrology, geophysics, seismic activity, andatomic energy defense activities, proximity to water supplies, prox-imity to populations, the effect u n the rights of users of water, and

Wproximity to components of the National Park System, the Nationalildlife Refuge System, the National Wild and Scenic Rivers

System, the National Wilderness Preservation System, or NationalForest Lands. Such Guidelines shall take into consideration theproximity to sites were high-level radioactive waste and spentnuclear Fuel is generated or temporarily stored and the transporta-tion and safety factors involved in moving such waste to a reposi-tory. Such guidelines shall specify population factors that will dis-

qualify any site from development as a repository if any surfacefacility of such repository would be located (1) in a highly populated

area; or (2) adjacent to an area 1 mile by 1 mile having a populationof not less than 1,000 individuals. Such guidelines also shall requirethe Secretary to consider the cost and impact of transporting to therepository site the solidified high-level radioactive waste and spentfuel to be disposed of in the repository and the advantages ofregional distribution in the siting of repositories. Such guidelinesshall require the Secretary to consider the various geologic media inwhich sites for repositories may be located an , to the extent

practicable, to recommend sites in different geologic media. TheSecretary shall use guidelines established under this subsection in

considering candidate sites for recommendation under subsection(b). The Secretary may revise such guidelines from time to time,consistent with the provisions of this subsection.

(b) R=MMENDATION BY SBCRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT.-(1)(A)Following the issuance of guidelines under subsection (a) and consul-tation with the Governors of aihcted States, the Secretary shallnominate at least 5 sites that he determines suitable for site charac-terization for selection of the first repository sit.&.

Recommend a(B) Su-uent to such nomination, the Secretary shall recom-tion date. mend to the President 3 of the nominated sites not later thanJanua 1, 1985 for characterization as candidate sites.

(C) %t later than July 1, 1989, the Secretary shall nominate 5sites, which shall include at least 3 additional sites not nominatedunder subparagraph (A), and recommend by such date to the Presi-dent from such 5 nominated sites 3 candidate sites the Secretarydetermines suitable for site characterization for selection of thesecond repository. The Secretary may not nominate any site previ-


PUBLIC LAW 97-425—JAN. 7, 1983 96 STAT. 2209

ously nominated under subparagraph (A), that was not recom-mended as a candidate site under subparagraph (B).

(D) Such recommendations under subparagraphs (B) and (C) shallbe consistent with the provisions of section 305.

(E) Each nomination of a site under this subsection shall accompamed by an environmental assessment, which shall include adetailed statement of the basis for such recommendation and of theprobable impacts of the site characterization activities planned forsuch site, and a discussion of alternative activities relating to sitecharacterization that may be undertaken to avoid such impacts.Such environmental assessment shall include—

(i) an evaluation by the Secretary as to whether such site issuitable for site characterization under the guidelines estab-lished under subsection (a);

(ii) an evaluation by the Secretary as to whether such site issuitable for development as a repository under each such guide-line that does not reuire site characterization as a prerequisitefor application of suc guideline;

)(iii an evaluation by the Secretary of the effects of the sitecharacterization activities at such site on the public health andsafety and the environment;

(iv) a reasonable comparative evaluation by the Secretary ofsuch site with other sites and locations that have been consid-ered;

(v) a descrip ignd of the decision process by which such site wasrecommend

(vi) an assessment of the regional and local impacts of locat-ing the proposed repos itory at such site.

(F)(i) The issuance o any environmental assessment under thisparagraph shall be considered to be a final agency action subject tojudicial review in accordance with the provisions of chapter 7 of title5, United States Code, and section 119. Such judicial review shall belimited to the sufficiency of such environmental assessment withrespect to the items described in clauses (i) through (vi) of subpara-gra h (E).

(t) Each environmental assessment prepared under this para-graph shall be made available to the public.

(H) Before nominatin a site, the Secretary shall notify the Gover-#inor and legislature oft e State in which such site is located, or the

governing body of the affected Indian tribe where such site islocated, as the case may be, of such nomination and the basis forsuch nomination.

(2 Before nominating any site the Secretary shall hold publichearings in the vicinity of such site to inform the residents of thearea in which such site is located of the proposed nomination of suchsite and to receive their comments. At such hearings, the Secretaryshall also solicit and receive an recommendations of such residents

rwith respect to issues that shou d be addressed in the environmentalassessment described in paragraph (1) and the site characterizationplan described in section l13(b)(l).

(3) In evaluating the sites nominated under this section prior toany decision to recommend a site as a candidate site, the Secretaryshall use available geophysical, geologic, geochemical and hydrolo-

“c, and other information and shall not conduct any preliminaryrings or excavations at a site unless (i) such preliminary boring or

excavation activities were in progress upon the date of enactment ofthis Act or (ii) the Secretary certifies that such available informa-

Post, p. 2262.Environmentalassessment.

Judicial review.

5 USC 701 et seq

Publicavailability.

Hearings.

App. C—The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 . 273


tion from other sources, in the absence of preliminary borings orexcavations, will not be adequate to satisfy applicable requirementsof this Act or any other law: Provided, That preliminary borings orexpectations under this section shall not exceed a diameter of 6

.(c) PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW OF RECOMMENDED CANDIDATE SITES.-(1)

The President shall review each candidate site recommendationDecision made by the Secretary under subsection (b). Not later than 60 daystransmittal or after the submission by the Secretary of a recommendation of anotification. candidate site, the President, in his discretion, may either approve

or disapprove such candidate site, and shall transmit any suchdecision to the Secretary and to either the Governor and legislatureof the State in which such candidate site is located, or the governingbody of the affected Indian tribe where such candidate site islocated, as the case may be. If, during such 60-day period, thePresident fails to approve or disapprove such candidate site, or failsto invoke his authority under par aph (2) to delay his decision,such candidate site shall be considered to be approved, and theSecretary shall notif such Governor and legislature, or governing

Irbody of the affcted ndian tribe, of the approval of such candidatesite by reason of the inaction of the President.

(2) The President ma delay for not more than 6 months hisidecision under paragrap (1) to approve or disapprove a candidate

site, upon determining that the information provided with therecommendation of the Secretary is insufficient to permit a decisionwithin the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (l). The Presidentmay invoke his authority under this paragraph by submitting writ-ten notice to the Congress, within such 60day period, of his intent toinvoke such authority. If the President invokes such authority, butfails to approve or disapprove the candidate site involved by the endof such 6-month period, such candidate site shall be considered to beapproved, and the Secretary shall notify such Governor and legisla-

iture, or governing body of the affected Indian tribe, of the approvalof such candidate site by reason of the inaction of the President.

(d). Conrtinuation OF CANDIDATE SITE ~REENING.—After therequmed recommendation of candidate sites under subsection (b),the Secretary

xmay continue, as he determines necessary, to identify

and study ot er sites to determine their suitability for recommenda-tion for site characterization, in accordance with the proceduresdescribed in this section.

(e) PRELIMINARY Activities~.—Except as otherwise provided in thissection, each activity of the President or the Secretary under thissection shall be considered to be a preliminary decisionmakingactivity. No such activity shall require the preparation of an envi-ronmental impact statement under section 102(2)(C) of the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332(2XC)), or to requirean environmental review under subparagraph (E) or (F) of section1022) of such Act.

(f) TIMELY Sit CHARACTERI zation-Nothing in this section maybe construed as prohibiting the Secretary from continuing ongoingor presently planned site characterization at any site on Depart-ment of Energy land for which the location of the principal boreholehas been approved b the Secretary by August 1, 1982, except that

1’(1) the environment assessment described in subsection (b)(l) shallbe prepared and made available to the ublic before proceeding to

&sink shafts at any such site; and (2) the cretary shall not continuesite characterization at any such site unless such site is among the



candidate sites recommended b the Secretary under the first sen-tence of subsection (b) for site c Chacterization and approved by thePresident under subsection (c); and (3) the Secretary shall conduct Hearings.public hearings under l13(b)(2) and comply with requirements undersection 117 of this Act within one year of the date of enactment.

SITE CHARACTERIZATION

SEC. 113. (a) IN general—The Secretary shall carry out, in 42 UX 10133.accordance with the provisions of this section, appropriate sitecharacterization activities beginning with the candidate sites thathave been a ● proved under section 112 and are located in variousgeologic m The Secretary shall consider fully the commentsreceived under subsection (M(2) and section l12(b)(2) and shall, to themaximum extent practicable and in consultation with the Governorof the State involved or the governing body of the affected Indiantribe involved, conduct site characterization activities in a mannerthat minimizes any significant adverse environmental impacts iden-tified in such comments or in the environmental assessment submibted under subsection (b)(l).

(b) COMMISSION AND STATES.-(1) Before proceeding to sink shafts ti,at any candidate site, the Secretary shall submit for such candidate site to the Commission and to either the Governor and legislature ofthe State in which such candidate site is located, or the governingbody of the affected Indian tribe on whose reservation such candi-date site is located, as the case may be, for their review andcomment—

(A) a general plan for site characterization activities to beconducted at such candidate site, which plan shall include

a description of such candidate sib;(M) a descriptlon of such site characterization a~ititi=,

incluchng the following the extant of planned excavations,plans for any onsite testing with radioactive or nonradioac-tive material, plans for an investigation activities thatma affect the capability o such candidate site to isolatehigh-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, andplans to control any adverse, safety-related impacts fromsuch site characterization activities;

(iii) Plans for the decontamination and decommissioningof such candidate site, and for the mitigation of any significant adverse environmental impacts caused by site charac-terization activities if it is determined unsuitable for appli-cation for a construction authorization for a repository;

(iv) criteria to be used to determine the suitability of suchcandidate site for the location of a repository, developedpursuant to section 112(a); and

(v) any other information required by the Commission;(B) a descricription of the possible form or packaging for the

high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel to be em-placed in such repository ,

sa description, to the extent practica-

ble, of the relationship between such waste form or packagingand the geologic medium of such site, and a description of theactivities being conducted by the Secretary with respect to suchpossible waste form or packaging or such relationship; and

(C) a conceptual repository design that takes into accountlikely site-specific requirement.

App. C—The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 275


Report.

Public (2) Before preceding to sink shafts at any candidate site, theavailability;hearings. Secretary shall (A) make available to the public the site character-

ization plan described in paragraph (l); and 03) hold public hearingsin the vicinity of such candidate site to inform the residents of thearea in which such candidate site is located of such plan, and toreceive their comments.

(3)0 During the conduct of site characterization activities at Candidate site, the Secretary shall report not less than once every 6months to the Commission and to either the Governor and legisla-ture of the State in which such candidate site is located, or thegoverning body of the affected Indian tribe where such candidatesite is located, as the case may be, on the nature and extent of suchactivities and the information developed from such activities.

(c) Restrictions The Secretary may conduct at any candidatesite only such site characterization activities as the Secretary con-siders necessary to provide the data required for evaluation of thesuitability of such candidate site for an application to be submittedto the Commission for a construction authorization for a repositoryat such candidate site, and for compliance with the National Envi-ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.).

(2) In conducting site characterization activities—(A) the secretary may not use any radioactive material at a

candidate site unless the Commission concurs that such use isnecessary to provide data for the preparation of the requiredenvironmental reports and an application for a constructionauthorization for a repository at such candidate site; and

(B) if any radioactive material is used at a candidate site(-i) the Secretary shall use the minimum quantity neces-

sary to determine the suitability of such candidate site for arepository, but in no event more than the curie equivalentof 10 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel; and

(ii) such radioactive material shall be fully retrievable.Notification of (3) If siti ckarachter~tion activities are terminated at a candidatesite terrninatlon” site for any reason, the Secretary shall (A) notify the Congress, the

Governors and legislatures of all States in which candidate sites arelocated, and the governing bodies of all fiiwted Indian tribes wherecandidate sites are located, of such termination and the reasons forsuch termination; and (B) remove any high-level radioactive waste,spent nuclear fuel, or other radioactive materials at or in suchcandidate site as promptly as practicable.

(4) If a site is determined to be unsuitable for application for aconstruction authorization for a repository, the Secretary shall takereasonable and necessary steps to reclaim the site and to mitigateany significant adverse environmental impacts caused by site char-acterization activities.

(d) PRELIMINARY ACTIVITIES.—Each activity of the Secretary underthis section that is in compliance with the provisions of subsection(c) shall be considered a preliminary decisionmaking activity. Nosuch activity shall require the preparation of an environmentalimpact statement under section 102(2)(C) of the National Environ-mental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)), or to require anyenvironmental review under subparagraph (E) or (F) of section102(2) of such Act.

276 Managing the Nation’s Commercial H/gh-Leve/ Radioactive Waste


SITE APPROVAL AND CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION

SEC. 114. (a) HEARINGS AND PRESIDENTIAL RECOMMENDATION .-(1) 42~ 10134.The Secretary shall hold public hearings in the vicinity of each siteunder consideration for recommendation to the President under thisparagraph as a site for the development of a repository, for the

rpurposes of informing the residents of the area in which such site is

ocated of such consideration and receiving their comments regard-ing the possible recommendation of such site. If, upon completion of such hearings and completion of site characterization activities atnot less than 3 candidate sites for the first proposed repository, orfrom all of the characterized sites for the development of subsequentrepositories, under section 113, the Secretary decides to recommendapproval of such site to the President, the Secretary shall notify theGovernor and legislature of the State in which such site is located,or the governing body of the affected Indian tribe where such site islocated, as the case may be, of such decision. No sooner than theexpiration of the 30day

rriod following such notification, the

Secretary shall submit to t e President a recommendation that thePresident approve such site for the development of a repository. Anysuch recommendation by the Secretary shall be based on the recordof information developed by the Secretary under section 113 andthis section, including the information described in subparagraph(A) through subparagraph (G). In making site recommendations andapprovals subsequent to the first site recommendation, the Secre-tary and the President, respectively, shall also consider the need forregional distribution of repositories and the need to minimize, to theextent practicable, the impacts and cost of transy r t i n ? ‘ ~n t ‘ u e l

and sohdified high-level radioactive waste. Toget er with any rec- public . .ommendation of a site under this paragraph, the Secretary shall avallablllt Y.make available to the public, and submit to the President, a compre-hensive statement of the basis of such recommendation, includingthe following:

(A) a description of the proposed repository, including prelimi-nary engineering specifications for the facility;

(B) a description of the waste form or packaging proposed foruse at such repository, and an explanation of the relationshipbetween such waste form or packaging and the geologic mediumof such site;

(C) a discussion of data, obtained in site characterizationactivities, relating to the safety of such site;

(D) a final environmental impact statement prepared pursu-ant to subsection (f) and the National Environmental Policy Actof 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), including an analysis of theconsideration given by the Secretary to not less than 3 candi-date sites for the first proposed respositor or to all of the

Lcharacterized sites for the development of su equent repositor-ies, with respect to which site characterization is completedunder section 113, together with comments made concerningsuch environmental impact statement by the Secretary of theInterior, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Adminis-trator, and the Commission, except that any such environmen-tal impact statement concerning the first repository to be devel-oped under this Act shall not be required to consider the needfor a repository or the alternatives to geologic disposal;

(E) preliminary comments of the Commission concerning theextent to which the atdepth site characterization analysis and



Deadlines,extensions.

the waste form proposal for such site seem to be sufficient forinclusion in any application to be submitted by the Secretary

Efor licensing of suc site as a repository ;(F) the views and comments of the Governor and legislature of

any State, or the governing body of any affected Indian tribe, asdetermined by the Secretary, together with the response of theSecretary to such-views;

(G) such other reformation as the Secretary considers appro-priate; and

(H) any impact report submitted under section 116(cM2XB) bythe State in which such site is located, or under sectionl18(bX3)(B) by the affected Indian tribe where such site islocated, as the case maybe.

Submittal toCongress.

(2)(A) Not later than March 31, 1987, the President shall submit tothe Congress a recommendation of one site from the three sitesinitially characterized that the President considers qualified forapplication for a construction authorization for a repository. Notlater than March 31, 1990, the President shall submit to the Con-gress a recommendation of a second site from any sites alreadycharacterized that the President considers qualified for a construc-tion authorization for a second repository . The President shallsubmit with such recommendation a copy o the report for such siteprepared by the Secretary under paragraph (l). After submission ofthe second such recommendation, the President may submit to theCongress recommendations for other sites, in accorance with theprovisions of this subtitle.

(B) ‘I’he President ma extend the deadlines described in subpara-igraph (A) by not more t an 12 months if, before March 31, 1986, for

the first site, and March 31, 1989, for the second site, (i) thePresident determines that such extension is necessary; and (ii)transmits to the Congress a report setting forth the reasons for suchextension.

Submittal (3) If approval of any such site recommendation does not takeCongress. effect as a result of a disapproval by the Governor or legislature of a

State under section 116 or the governing body of an affected Indianhtribe under section 118, the President s all submit to the Congress,

not later than ear after the disapproval of such recommendation,a recommendation of another site for the first or subsequentreposito .

(4)(A) %e President may not recommend the approval of any siteunder this subsection unless the Secreta has recommended to thePresident under paragraph (1) approval o such site and has submit-ted to the President a report for such site as required under suchparagraph.

(B) NO recommendation of a site by the President under thissubsection shall require the preparation of an environmental impactstatement under section 102(2XC) of the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)), or to r quire any environ-mental review under subparagraph (E) or (F) o section 102(2) ofsuch Act.

(b) SUBMISSION OF APPLICATION.—If the President recommends tothe Congress a site for a repository under subsection (a) and the sitedesignation is permitted to take effect under section 115, the Secretary shall submit to the Commission an application for a construc-tion authorization for a repository at such site not later than 90 daysafter the date on which the recommendation of the site designationis effective under such section and shall provide to the Governor and

—



legislature of the State in which such site is located, or the govern-ing body of the affected Indian tribe where such site is located, asthe case may be, a copy of such application.

(c) Status report ON APPLICATION.-NOt later than r

the date on which an application for a construction authorization issubmitted under subsection (b), and annually thereafter until thedate on which such authorization is granted, the Commission shallsubmit a report to the Congress describin the proceedings under-taken through the date of such report wit regard to such applica-tion, including a description of—

(1) any major unresolved safet issues, and the explanation ofthe Secretary

Tdwith respect to esign and operation plans for

resolving Suc issues;(2) any matters of contention regarding such application; and(3) my Commission actgions regarding the granting or denial

of such authorization.

cation for a construction authorization for all or part of a repository ~PPliatiO~in accordance with the laws applicable to such applications, exceptthat the Commission shall issue a final decision approving or disap-proving the issuance of a construction authorization not laterthan—

(1) Jan 1, 1989, for the first such application, and Janu-ary 1, 1992, or the second such application; or

(2) the expiration of 3 years after the date of the submission ofsuch application, except that the Commission may extend suchdeadline b not more than 12 months if, not less than 30 days

h ibefore suc deadline, the Commission complies with the report-ing requirements established in subsection (eX2);

whichever occurs later. The Commission decision approving the firstsuch aplication shall prohibit the emacement in the first reposi-tory o a quantity of spent fuel contairun in excess of 70,000 metric

ttons of heavy metal or a quantity of soli “fied high-level radioactivewaste resulting from the reprocessing of such a quantity of spentfuel until such time as a second repository is in operation. In theevent that a monitored retrievable storage facility, approved pursu-ant to subtitle C of this Act, shall be located, or is planned to belocated, within 50 miles of the first repository, then the Commissiondecision approving the first such application shall prohibit the

fem placement of a quantity of spent uel containing m excess of70,k0 metric tons of heavy metal or a quantity of solidified high-level radioactive waste resulting fmm the reprocessing of spent fuelin both the repository and monitored retrievable storage facilityuntil such time as a second repository is in operation.

(e) ~oJ- Project decision schedule(l) The Secretary shall re ea~and u~te, as approprmte, in coo ration with all affected

3Fed’

agencx~ a project decision sched e that portrays the optimum wayto attain the operation of the repoeito involved, within the time

Yperiods specified in this subtitle. Suc schedule shall include adescription of objectives and a sequence of deadlines for all Federalagencms required to take action, including an identification of theactivities in which a delay in the start, or completion, of suchactivities will cause a delay in beginning repository operation.

(2) Any Federal agency that determines that it cannot comply ~~tisubrnittalwith any deadline in the project decision schedule, or fails to so ~~w~~ry ‘dcomply, shall submit to the Secretary and to the Congress a writtenreport explaining the reason for its failure or expected failure to

App. C—The Nuclear Waste Po/icy Act of 1982 279


Report response,filing withCongress.

42 USC! 4321 etseq.

42 USC 5841.

meet such deadline, the reason why such agency could not reach anagreement with the Secretary, the estimated time for completion ofthe activity or activities involved, the associated effect on its otherdeadlines in the project decision schedule, and any recommenda-tions it may have or actions it intends to take regarding anyimprovements in its operation or organization, or changes to itsstatutory directives or authority, so that it will be able to mitigatethe delay involved. The Secretar , within 30 days after receiving

hany such report, shall file with t e Congress his response to such1’report, including the reasons why the Secretary cou d not amend

the reject decision schedule to accommodate the Federal agencyfinvo veal.

(f)l ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT . —Any recommendationmade b the Secretary under this section shall be considered a

fmajor ederal action significantly affcting the uality of theihuman environment for urposes of the National nvironmental

Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.~.C. 4321 et seq.). A final environmentalimpact statement prepared by the Secretary under such Act shallaccompany any recommendation to the President to approve a sitefor a repository. With respect to the re uirements imposed by the

8National Environmental Policy Act of 1 69 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.),compliance with the procedures and requirements of this Act shallbe deemed adequate consideration of the need for a repository, thetime of the initial availability of a repository, and all alternatives tothe isolation of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuelin a repository. For purposes of complying with the requirements ofthe National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 1321 etseq.) and this section, the Secretary shall consider as alternate sitesfor the first repository to be developed under this subtitle 3 candi-date sites with respect to which (1) site characterization has beencompleted under section 113; and (2) the Secretary has made aprehminary determination, that such sites are suitable for development as repositories consistent with the guidelines promulgatedunder section 112(a). The Secretary shall consider as alternative

itories at least three of the remaining sitesby January 1, 1985, and by July 1,

1989, ursuant to section 112 ) and approved by the President for{site c aracterization pursuant to section 112(c) for which (1) site

characterization has been completed under section 113; and (2) theSecretary has made a preliminary determination that such sites aresuitable for development as repositories consistent with the guide-lines promulgated under section l12(a). Any environmental impactstatement repared in connection with a repository proposed to beconstrueJ by the Secretary under this subtitle shall, to the extentpracticable, be adopted by the Commission in connection with theissuance by the Commission of a construction authorization andlicense for such repository. To the extent such statement is adoptedby the Commission, such adoption shall be deemed to also satisfy theresponsibilities of the Comm~ion under the National Environmen-tal Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and no furtherconsideration shall be required, except that nothing in this subsec-tion shall affect any independent responsibilities of the Commissionto protect the public health and safety under the Atomic Energy Actof 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.). Nothing in this Act shall be con-strued to amend or otherwise detract from the licensing require-ments of the Nucler Regulatory Commission as established in title 11of the Enera Reorganization Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-438). In

- “ .— - - ——- —— - - ---, . . . .

280 c Managing the Nation’s Commercia/ High-Level Radioactive Waste


any such statement pre red with resr F

to the first repository tobe constructed under t is subtitle, t e need for a m itory or

rnongeologic alternatives to the site of such repository 6 all not beconsidered.

REVIEW OF REPOSITORY SITE SELECTION

SEC. 115. (a) hmwmoN.-For purposes of this section, the term AZ uw 10135.“resolution of repository siting approval” means a joint resolution ofthe Congress, the matter after the resolvin clause of which is as

tfollows: “That there hereb is approved t e site at . . . . . . . . . . for a

3re iitory, with respect to w ich a notice of disapproval was submit-

by . . . . . . . . . . on . . . . . . . . . . . . . The first blank space m such resolutionshall be filled with the name of the geographic location of theproposed site of the re~ito

Tto which such resolution pertains; the

second blank s ce m sucr

resolution shall be filled with thedesignation of t e State Governor and le@slature or Indian tribegoverning body submitting the notice of dmapproval to which suchresolution pertains; and the last blank space in such resolution shallbe filled with the date of such submission.

(b) STATE OR INDIAN ‘htIBE PETITIONS. —The designation of a site assuitable for application for a construction authorization for a reposi-tory shall be effective at the end of the 60da period beginning on

1the date that the President recommends suc site to the Con essrunder section 114, unless the Governor and legislature of the tate

in which such site is located, or the governing body of an Indiantribe on whose reservation such site is located, as the case may be,has submitted to the Congress a notice of disapproval under section116 or 118. If any such notice of disa proval has been submitted, the Notice ofdesignation of such site shall not L eff~tive except as provided $~~~;~~a~under subsection (c).

(c) wNCRESslOIUAL REVIEW OF pETITIONS.— If any notice of disap-Cmgreaa.

proval of a reposito~ site designation has been submitted to theCongress under Section 116 or 118 after a recommendation forapproval of such site is made by the President under section 114,such site shall be disapproved unless, during the first period of 90calendar days of continuous session of the Congress after the date ofthe receipt by the Con@ess of such notice of disap roval, the

YCongress passes a resolution of reposito siting ap rova in accord-T $ance with this subsection approving suc site, an such resolution

thereafter becomes law.(d) PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO THE SENATE.-(1) The provisions of

this subsection are enacted by the Con —r(A) as an exercise of the rulema in~power of the Senate, and

as such they are deemed a part of the rules of the Senate, butapplicable only with respect to the procedure to be followedin the Senate in the case of resolutions of repository sitingapproval, and such provisions supersede other rules of theSenate only to the extent that they are inconsistent with suchother rules; and

(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of theSenate to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure ofthe Senate) at any time, in the same manner and to the sameextent as in the case of any other rule of the Senate.

(2)(A) Not later than the first day of session following the day on ~~~~k~on ofwhich any notice of disapproval of a repository site selection issubmitted to the Congress under section 116 or 118, a resolution of



repository siting approval shall be introduced (by request) in theSenate by the chairman of the committee to which such notice ofdisapproval is referred, or by a Member or Members of the Senatedesignated by such chairman.

Committee (B Upon introduction, a resolution of repository siting approvalrecommenda-tions. shall be referred to the appropriate committee or committees of the

Senate by the President of the Senate, and all such resolutions withrespect to the same repository site shall be referred to the samecommittee or committees. Upon the expiration of 60 calendar daysof continuous session after the introduction of the first resolution ofrepository siting approval with respect to any site, each committeeto which such resolution was referred shall make its recommenda-tions to the Senate.

Discharge of (3) If anycommittee to which is referred a resolution of sitingcommittee. approval introduced under paragraph (2)(A), or, in the absence ofsuch a resolution, any other resolution of siting approval introducedwith respect to the site involved, has not reported such resolution atthe end of 60 days of continuous session of Congress after introduc-tion of such resolution, such committee shall be deemed to bedischarged from further consideration of such resolution, and suchresolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the Senate.

(4)(A) When each committee to which a resolution of siting ap

proval has been referred has reported, or has been deemed to bedischarged from further consideration of, a resolution described inparagraph (3), it shall at an time thereafter be in order (even

ithough a previous motion to the same effbct has been disagreed to)for an Member of the Senate to move to proceed to the considera-

ftion o such resolution. Such motion shall be highly privileged andshall not be debatable. Such motion shall not be subject to amend-ment, to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to theconsideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote bywhich such motion is to or disagreed to shall not be in order.If a motion tn p to the consideration of such resolution is_ @ such resolution shall remain the unfinished business ofthe Senate until disposed of.

(B) Debate on a resolution of siting approval, and on all debatablemotions and appeals in connection with such resolution, shall belimited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equallybetween Members favoring and Members opposing such resolution.A motion further to limit debate shall be in order and shall not bedebatable. Such motion shall not be subject to amendment, to amotion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration ofother business, and a motion to recommit such resolution shall notbe in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which such resolu-tion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order.

(C) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on aresolution of siting approval, and a single uorum till at the

Jconclusion of such debate if requested in acco ance with the rulesof the Senate, the vote on final approval of such resolution shalloccur.

(D) Appeals fmm the decisions of the Chair relating to the applica-tion of the rules of the Senate to the procedure relating to aresolution of siting approval shall be decided without debate.

(5) If the Senate receives from the House a resolution of repositorysiting approval with respect to any site, then the following proce-dure shall apply:

Appeals.



(A) The resolution of the House with respect to such site shallnot be referred to a committee.

(B) With respect to the resolution of the Senate with respectto such site—

(i) the procedure with respect to that or other resolutionsof the Senate with respect to such site shall be the same asif no resolution from the House with respect to such sitehad been received; but

(ii) on any vote on final passage of a resolution of the[Senate with respect to suc site, a resolution from the

House with respect to such site where the text is identicalshall be automatically substituted for the resolution of theSenate.

(e) PROCEDURES APPLICABLE ~ THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES .—(1) The provisions of this section are enacted by the Congress—

(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House ofRepresentatives, and as such the are deemed a part of the

frules of the House, but ap Iicab e only with resR t to theprocedure to be followed in t e House in the case o resolutionsof repository siting approval, and such provisions supersedeother rules of the House onl to the extent that they are

rinconsistent with such other ru es; and(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of the

House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure ofthe House) at any time, in the same manner and to the sameextent as in the case of any other rule of the House.

(2) Resolutions of reposito3

siting a proval shall u n introduc-tion, be immediately referr 8 Eby the peaker of the ouse to theappropriate committee or committees of the House. Any such resolu-tion received from the Senate shall be held at the Speaker’s table.

(3) Upon the expiration of 60 days of continuous session after the ~i::::~ofintroduction of the first resolution of repository siting approval withrespect to an site, each committee to which such resolution was

rreferred shal be discharged from further consideration of suchresolution, and such resolution shall be referred to the appropriatecalendar, unless such resolution or an identical resolution waspreviousl reported by each committee to which it was referred.

(4) It skl be in order for the Speaker to recognize a Member Resolution,favoring a resolution to call up a resolution of repository siting ~~~s$~&/~ on

approval after it has been on the appropriate calendar for 5 legisla-tive da .

zWhen an such resolution is called up, the House shall

proc dto its imm iate consideration and the Speaker shall recog-nize the Member calling up such resolution and a Member opposedto such resolution for 2 hours of debate in the House, to be equallydivided and controlled by such Members. When such time hasexpired, the previous question shall be considered as ordered on theresolution to adoption without in@=vening motion. No amendmentto any such resolution shall be in order, nor shall it be in order tomove to reconsider the vote by which such resolution is agreed to ordisagreed to.

(5) If the House receives from the Senate a resolution of repositorysiting ap roval with respect to any site, then the following proce-

Ydure shal apply:(A) The resolution of the Senate with respect to such site shall

not be referred to a committee.su~~)s~~ resped to the resolution of the House with respect to



42 USC 10136.

“Potentiallyacceptable site.”

Notice ofdisapproval,submittal toCongress.

(i) the procedure with respect to that or other resolutionsof the House with respect to such site shall be the same as ifno resolution from the Senate with respect to such site hadbeen received; but

(ii) on any vote on final assage of a resolution of theHouse with respect to suci site, a resolution from theSenate with respect to such site where the text is identicalshall be automatically substituted for the resolution of theHouse.

(f) COMPUTATION OF DAYS.— For purposes of this section—(1) continuity of session of Congress is broken only by an

adjournment sine die; and(2) the days on which either House is not in session because Of

an ad ournment of more than 3 days to a day certain aredexclu ed in the computation of the 90day period referred to in

subsection (c) and the 60day period referred to in subsections (d)and (e).

@ INFOmT1oN PROVIDED TO ~NGRESS.-1n considering anynotice of disapproval submitted to the Congress under section 116 or118, the Congress may obtain any comments of the (%mmission withrespect to such notice of disap roval. The provision of such com-

Jments by the Commission sh 1 not be construed as binding theCommission with respect to any licensing or authorization actionconcerning the repository involved.

PARTICIPATION OF STATES

SEC. 116. (a) NOTIFICATION OF STATES AND AFFECTED TRIBEs.—TheSecretary shall identify the States with one or more potentiallyacceptable sites for a repository within 90 da s after the date of

ienactment of this Act. Within 90 days of suc identification, theSecretary shall notify the Governor, the State legislature, and thetribal council of any aff~ted Indian tribe in any State of thepotentially acceptable sites within such State. For the purposes ofthis title, the term “potentially acceptable site” means any site atwhich, after geologic studies and field mapping but before detailedgeologic data gathering, the Department undertakes preliminarydrillin and eophysical testing for the definition of site location.

$(b) #TATE ANTICIPATION IN REPOSITORY S ITING DECISIONS .-(1)Unless othemvke

Yrovided b State law, the Governor or legislature

iof each State shal have aut ority to submit a notice of disapprovalto the (kmgress under paragraph (2). In any case in which State lawprovides for submission of any such notice of disapproval by anyother person or entit ,

1any reference in this subtitle to the Governor

or legdature of suc State shall be considered to refer instead tosuch other person or entity.

(2) Upon the submission by the President to the Congress of arecommendation of a site for a repository, the Governor or legisla-ture of the State in which such site is located may disapprove thesite designation and submit to the Cangress a notice of disapproval.Such Governor or legislature may submit such a notice of disapproval to the Congress not later than the 60 days after the date thatthe President recommends such site to the Congress under section114. A notice of disapproval shall be considered to be submitted to theCongress on the date of the transmittal of such notice of disapproval

Pto the S er of the House and the President pro tempore of theSenate. uch notice of disapproval shall be accompanied by a state

284 ● Manag/ng the Nation’s Commercial High-Levei Radioactive Waste


ment of reasons explaining why such Governor or legislature disapproved the recommended repomtory site invalved.

(3) The authority of the hvernor or legislature of each Stateunder this subsection shall not be applicable with respect to any sitelocated on a reservation.

(c) IMANCIAL ASSISTANCE.-(1)(A) The Secretary shall make [email protected] to each State notified under subjection (a) for the purpose ofparticipating in activities required by sections 116 and 117 or au-thorized by written agreement entered into pursuant to subsection117(c). Any salary or travel expense that would ordinarily be in-curred by such State, or by any Iitical subdivision of such State,

rma not be considered eligible or funding under this paragraph.&) The Secretary shall make grants to each State in which a

candidate sita for a repository is a proved under section 112(c). Such8grants maybe made to each such tab only for purposes of enabling

such Stata-(i) to review activities taken under this subtitle with respect

to such site for pur

of determining any potential economic,social, public heal and safety, and environmental impacta ofsuch repository on the State and its residents;

(ii) to develop a request for impact assistance under para-graph (2k

(W b e-e in any monitoring, testing, or evaluation activi-ties with respect to site characterization programs with regardto such site;

(iv) to provide information to its residents regarding anzactivities of such State, the Secretary, or the Commission wit

respect to such site; and(v) ~ Wu@t information from, and make comments ad

recommendations to, the Secretary regarding any activitiestaken under this subtitle with respect to such site.

(C) An salary or travel expense that would ordinarily be incurred8by such tate, or by any political subdivision of such State, may not

be considered eligible for funding under this paragraph.(2)(A) The Secretary shall provide financial and technical assist- ~;;;:u~t~~~

~~”~~&sZ~[~%~%ZZ~oYhma;t~h&t;Z%~l~t “of a repository. Such assistance shall be designed to mitigate theimpact on such State of the development of such repository. Suchassistance to such State shall commence within 6 months followingthe granting by the Commission of a construction authorization forsuch repository and following the initiation of construction activitiesat such site.

(B) Any State desiring assistance under this paragraph shall ~~POOtiprepare and submit to the Secretary a report on any economic,social, public health and safety, and environmental impacts that arelikely as a result of the development of a repository at a site in suchState. Such report shall be submitted to the Secretary following thecompletion of site characterization activities at such site and beforethe recommendation of such site to the President by the Secretaryfor application for a construction authorization for a repository. Assoon as practicable following the granting of a construction authori-zation for such repository, the Secretary shall seek to enter into abinding agreement with the State involved settin forth the amount

Lof assistance to be provided to such State under t “s paragraph andthe procedures to be followed in providing such assistance.


96 STAT. 2222 PUBLIC LAW 97-425—JAN. 7,.1983

(3) The Secretary shall also grant to each State and unit of eneralJlocal government in which a site for a repository is approv under

section 112(c) an amount each fiscal year equal to the amount suchState and unit of general local government, respectively, wouldreceive were they authorized to tax site characterization activities atsuch site, and the development and operation of such repository, assuch State and unit of eneral local government tax the other real

dproperty and indust activities occurring within such State andunit of general local overnment. Such granta shall continue until

%such time as all suc activities, development, and operation areterminated at such site.

Grants, (4)(A) A State may not receive anlimitations. ?Wtmder

paragraph (1) aftertheexp~ration of the 1- ear period o owmg—

L(!) the ate on w ch the Secretary notifies the Governor ~dlegudature of the State revolved of the termination of sitecharacterization activities at the candidate site involved in suchstate;

(ii) the date on which the site in such State is disapprovedunder section 115; or

(M) the date on which the ~ti”Ion disapproves an applica-tion for a construction authorization for a repository at suchsite;

whichever occurs fix unless there is another candidate site in theState ap roved under section 112(c) with respect to which the

Jactions escribed in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) have not been taken.(B) A State may not receive any fiwther assistance under para-

gra h (2) with respect to a site if repository construction activities atRsuc site are terminated by the Secretary or if such activities are

pe~Funding ‘nt1ye70hdb$ay mu@”(C) At the en of the year permd beginning on the eff&ctive datelimitations. of any license to receive and possess for a repository in a State, no

Federal fhnds shall be made available to such State under para-graph (1) or (2), except for-

(i) such funds as maybe necessmy to support State activitiesrelated to any other repository located in, or proposed to belocated in, such State, and for which a license to receive and_ has not been in effect for more than 1 year; and

(II) such funds as maybe n~ to support State activitiespursuant to

Yments or contracts for impact assistance en-

tered into, un er paragraph (2), by such State with the Secre-~ d u r i such Z-year period.

(5) -c~ RSStice authorized in this su=ion sh~ ~made out of amounts held in the Nuclear Waste Fund established in

Post, p. 2257. section 302.(d) ADD~oNfi y-cAmON AND ~NSULTAITON.-whWlever the

Secretary IS reqwred under any revision of this Act to notify orFconsult with the governing body o an afhcted Indian tribe where a

site is located, the Secretary shall also noti& or consult with, as thecase may be, the Governor of the State in which such reservation islocated.

CONSULTATION WITH STATES AND AFFECTED INDIAN TRIBES

42 USC! 10137. SEC. 117. (a) PROVISION OF INFORMATION .-(1) The Secretary, theCommission, and other agencies involved in the construction, o r-ation, or re lation of any as

r Yrof a repository in a State s all

provide to t e Governor and egislature of such State, and to the

2% c Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive w(3Stt)


$overning body of any tiected Indian tribe, timely and completereformation regarding determinations or plans made with respect tothe site characterization siting, development, design, licensing, con-struction, operation, regulation, or decommissioning of such reposi-to .7( ) Upon written request for such information b the Governor or ~:~r~;tionlegislature of such State, or by the governing dy of any affectedIndian tribe, as the case may be, the Secretary shall provide a ‘Wwn=owritten response to such r uest within 30 da s of the receipt of

3 fsuch request. Such responses all provide the in ormation requestedor, in the alternative, the reasons why the information cannot be soprovided. If the Secretary fds to so respond within such 30 days,the Governor or legislature of such State, or the governing body ofan? affected Indian tribe, as the case may be, ma transmit a formal

iwritten objection to such failure to respond to t e President. If thePresident or Secretary f~ to respond to such written requestwithin 30 days of the receipt by the President of such formal writtenobjection, the Secretary shall immediately sus nd all activities in

rsuch State authorized by this subtitle, and s all not renew suchactivities until the Governor or legislature of such State, or thegoverning body of any affected Indian tribe, as the case may be, hasreceived the written response to such written request required bythis subsection.

(b) CONSULTATION AND COOpEMTION. —In performing any study ofan area within a State for the purpose of determining the suitabilityof such area for a repository pursuant to section 112(c), and insubsequently developing and loadin any repository within such

iState, the Secretary shall consult an cooperate with the Governorand legislature of such State and the overning bod of an affected

t [6Indian tribe in an effort to resolve t e concerns o such tate andany affected Indian tribe regarding the ublic health and safet ,

f Tenvironmental, and economic impacts o any such repository. ncarrying out his duties under this subtitle, the Secretary shall takesuch concerns into account to the maximum extent feasible and asspecified in written agreements entered into under subsection (c).

(c) w mTEN kmxmawr.-Not later than 60 days after (1) theapproval of a site for site characterization for such a repositoryunder section 112(c), or (2) the written request of the State or Indiantribe in any affected State notified under section l16(a) to theSecretary, whichever, first occurs, the Secretary shall seek to enterinto a binding written agreement, and shall begin negotiations, withsuch State aned, where appropriate, to enter into a se arate binding

d_ment wth the governing body of my df Indian tribe,setting forth (but not limited to) the procedures under which therec@rements of subsections (a) and (b), and the provisions of suchwmttenments=

ment, shall be carried out. Any such written agree-not affect the authority of the Commission under exist-

ing law. Each such written agreement shall, to the maximum extentfeasible, be completed not later than 6 months after such notifica-tion. If such written agreement is not completed within such period, &~otithe Secretary shall report to the Congress in writing within 30 dayson the status of negotiations to develop such agreement and thereasons why such agreement has not been completed. Prior to wPofi, reviewsubmission of such report to the Congress, the Secretary shall and COrnrne”~”transmit such m rt to the Governor of such State or the governingbody of such xacted Indian tribe, as the case may be, for theirreview and comments. Such comments shall be included in such

App. C—The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 “ 287


Review andmodification.

Report.

Transportationof radioactivewaste and spentnuclear fuel,statenotification.Monitoring andbating.

report prior to submission to the Congress. Such written agreementshall specify procedures—

(1) by which such State or governing body of an affectedIndian tribe, as the case may be, may study, determine, com-ment on, and make recommendations with regard to the possi-ble public health and safety, environmental, social, and eco-nomic impacts of any such repository;

(2) by which the Secretary shal consider and respond tocomments and recommendations made by such State or govern-ing body of an affected Indian tribe, including the period inwhich the Secretary shall so respond;

(3) by which the and such State or governing bodyof an affixted Indian tribe may review or modify the agreementperiodically;

(4) by which such State or governing body of an affctedIndian tribe is to submit an impact report and request forimpact assistance under section 116(c) or section l18(b), as thecase may be;

(5) by which the Secretary shall assist such State, and theunits of general local government in the vicinity of the reposi-tory site, in resolving the offsite concerns of such State andunits of general local government, including, but not limited to,questions of State liability arising from accidents, necessaryroad upgrading and access to the site, ongoing emergency pre-paredness and emergency response, monitoring of transporta-tion of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuelthrough such State, conduct of baseline health studies of inhabi-tants in neighboring communities near the repository site andreasonable periodic monitoring thereafter, and monitoring ofthe repository site upon any decommissioning and decontamina-tion;

(6) b which the Secretary shall consult and cooperate with1such tate on a regular, ongoing basis and provide for an

orderly process and timely schedule for State review and evalu-ation, includin identification in the agreement of ke events,

fmilestones, an decision points in the activities of the retaryat the potential repository site;

(7) by which the Secretary shall notify such State prior to thetransportation of an high-level radioactive waste and spent

inuclear fuel into suc State for disposal at the repository site;(8) by which such State may conduct reasonable independent

monitoring and testing of activities on the repository site,except that such monitoring and testing shall not unreasonablyinterfere with or delay onsite activities;

(9) for sharing, in accordance with applicable law, of alltechnical and licensing information, the utilization of availableexpertise, the facilitating of permit procedures, joint projectreview, and the formulation of joint surveillance and monitor-@g arrangements to carry out applicable Federal and Statelaws;

(10) for public notification of the procedures specified underthe preceding paragraphs; and

B11) for resolving o jections of a State and affti Indiantribes at any stage of the planning, siting, developmen~ con-struction, operation, or closure of such a facility within suchState through negotiation, arbitration, or other appropriate

.

.

2&3 ● Manag\ng the Nation’s Commercial H/gh-Leve/ Radioactive w&M8


PARTICIPATION OF INDIAN ~

S=. 118. (a) P A R T I C I P A T I O N O F km ‘1’knms N wPosIToltY y.:::alha kxmoNs.-Upon the submission by the President to theCongrem of a recommendation of a site for a repositcq located on &~mittil dthe reservation of an afkted kdh $rh?, ~e qovemmg body of 42 @?%138.such Indian tribe may disathe.(lmqem3 a notice,of CA?R:%R%!%%3;U:’%

:ti2.-ti%8e&ti&nE:ti%:pcA%:2=mends -~ & & .Gngrees under section 114. A notice of

edisa nmdemd to be submitted to the Cothe of the tmuumu r“M of such notice of disapprov to ti’i~-r of the Ho= and the President pro tern re of the Senate.

ZSuch notice ~ ~ppmval shall be accompani by a statement ofmamns why the governing body of such Indian tribe

remended reposito site involved.AN- Aas18rANcZ-(1) TheLtary shall make grants Gran~.

to each afhcted tribe notified under section l16(a) for the urpose of~OriZd byparticipating in activities required by section 117 or au

written nt entered mtosalary or= rll$dwll

-t .to section l17(c). Anexpense that wo d O y be incurred by SUCi

tribe, may not be considered eligible for tiding under this para-gra h.

(&A) The Secrek& shall make grants to each afhcted Indiantribe where a can “ te site fw a m “tory is approved undersection 1lMc). Such granta may be e to each such Indian tribe

of enabling such Indian tribe-~~seun~~ this subtitle with respect

rmmng any potential economic,

asmstance under para-gmph (2k

(M) ti engage in any monitoringrkfjri or evaluation activi-t$suwih*dM#pect b ate charade rograms with regard

.(iv) ~ pr&vide information to the residents of its reservation

~ activities of such Indian tribe, the Secretary, orw -on ~th respect to such site; and

(v) @ qua Lnfonnation km, and -e Commen@ ~drecommendations to, the Secretary mgardmg any activitiestaken under this subtitle with res

Pto such site.

(B) The amountpoftiundindiy rovid to any afkcted Indian tribeunder this paragra L

‘--LnO&%%g%%*l%:of the costs incurred by such khan tnactivities described in clauses (i) thmS** srdlnanl

O(V). of subor travel expense that “,R%R!&i(:;

Indmn tribe may not be considered eligible for funding underthis

(9x&?Eph”&wre@ry shall provide financial and technical assistian= to any affbctd Indian tribe requesting such assistance andwhere there is a site with respect to which the Commission hasauthorized constmctz“on of a repository. Such “asmstance shall bedesigned to mitigate the impact on such Indian tribe of the develoment of such repository. Such “ dasmtance to such hdian tribe S 1commence within 6 months following the granting by the Comm&



Reportsubmittal.

Granta,limitation.

Funding.

sion of a construction authorization for such repository and follow-ing the initiation of construction activities at such site.

(B) Any affected Indian tribe. desiring assistance under this para-graph shall prepare and submit to the Secretary a report on anyeconomic, social, public health and safety, and environmentalimpacts that are likely as a result of the development of a repositoryat a site on the reservation of such Indian tribe. Such report shall besubmitted to the Secretary following the completion of site charac-terization activities at such site and before the recommendation ofsuch site to the President by the Secretary for application for aconstruction authorization for a repository. As soon as practicablefollowing the granting of a construction authorization for suchrepository, the Secretary shall seek to enter into a binding agree-ment with the Indian tribe involved setting forth the amount ofassistance to be provided to such Indian tribe under this paragraphand the procedures to be followed in providing such assistance.

(4) The Secretary shall grmt to each affected Indian tribe where asite for a repository is approved under section 112(c) an amount eachfisal year equal to the amount such Indian tribe would receive wereit authorized to tax site characterization activities at such site, andthe development and operation of such repository, as such Indiantribe taxes the other commercial activities occurring on such reser-vation. Such grants shall continue until such time as all suchactivities, development, and operation are terminated at such site.

(5) An affcted Indian tribe may not receive any grant underparagraph (1) after the expiration of the l-year period following—

(i) the date on which the Secretary notifies such Indian tribeof the termination of site characterization activities at thecandidate site involved on the reservation of such Indian tribe;

(ii) the date on which such site is disapproved under section115; or

(iii) the date on which the Commission disapproves an applica-tion for a construction authorization for a repository at suchsite;

whichever occurs first, unless there is another candidate site on thereservation of such Indian tribe that is approved under section112(c) and with respect to which the actions described in clauses (i),(ii), and (iii) have not been taken.

(B) An affected Indian tribe may not receive any further assist-ance under paragraph (2) with respect to a site if repository con-struction activities at such site are terminated by the Secretary or ifsuch activities are permanently e~”oined by any court.

(C) At the end of the 2-year period beginning on the effective dateof any license to receive and possess for a repository at a site on thereservation of an affcted Indian tribe, no Federal funds shall bemade available under paragraph (1) or (2) to such Indian tribe,except for—

(i) such funds as maybe necessary to support activities of suchIndian tribe related to any other repository where a license toreceive and possess has not been in effect for more than 1 year;and

(ii) such funds as may be necessary to support activities ofsuch Indian tribe pursuant to agreements or contracts forimpact assistance entered into, under paragraph (2), by suchIndian tribe with the Secretary during such 2-year period.

.

2~ . Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive waste


(6) Financial assistance autho- in this subsection shall bemade out of amounts held in the Nuclear Waste Fund established insection 302. Post, p. 2257.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTIONS

SEC. 119. (a) JURISDI~ON OF UNITED STA- COURTS OF APPEAIS.— 42 USC 10139.(1) Exce t for review in the Supreme Court of the United States, the

8United tates courts of appeals shall have original and exclusivejurisdiction over any civil action—

(A) for review of an final decision or action of the Secretary,the President, or the &remission under this subtitle;

(B) alleging the failure of the Secreta , the President, or theCommission to make any decision, or Ze any action, requiredunder this subtitle;

(C) challengiY

the constitutional of any decision made, or‘%action taken, un er any provision of t is subtitle;

(D) for review of any environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) with respect to an action under

rthis subtitle, or as required under section 135(c)( ), or alleging afailure to prepare such statement with respect to any suchaction;

(E) for review of any environmental assessment preparedunder section 1120(1) or 135(c)(2); or

(F) for review of any research and development activity undertitle II. Post, p. 2245.

(2) The venue of any roceeding under this section shall be in the[judicial circuit in whic the petitioner involved resides or has its

b@cipal office, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the

trict of Columbia.($) DEADLINE NR COMMENCING ACTION.-A civil action for judici~

renew described under subsection (a)(l) may be brought not laterthan the 180th day after the date of the decision or action or failureto act involved, as the case may be, except that if a party shows thathe did not know of the decision or action complained of (or of theftilure to act), and that a reasonable

rrson acting under the

circumstances would not have known, suc party may brin a civilfaction not later than the ~80th da after the date suc party

7ra umed actual or constructure know edge of such decision, action,

or ailure to act.EXPED_ AUTHORKZA’MONS

SEC. 120. (a) ISSUANCE OF AUTHORIZATION S.-(1) To the extent that 42 u~ 1014O.the taking of any action related to the site characterization of a si~or the construction or initial operation of a repository under thissubtitle requires a certificate, right-of-way,

Frmit, lease, or other

authorization fkom a Federal agency or o leer, such agency orofficer shall issue or grant any such authorization at the earlieatpracticable date, to the extent

rrmitted by the applicable provi-

sions of law administered by suc agency or offker. All actions of aFederal agency or oflker with respect to consideration of a~plica-tions or requests for the issuance or grant of any such authorizationshall be expedited, and any such application or request shall takeprecedence over any similar applications or requests not related tosuch repositories.

App. C—The Nuc/ear Waste Policy Act of 1982 .291


(Z) The Provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to any certifi-cate, right-of-way, permit, lease, or other authorization issued orgranted by, or requested from, the Commission.

(b) TERMS OF kYIHORIZATIONS.-AnY authorization issued orgranted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include such terms andconditions as may be required by law, and may include terms andconditions permitted by law.

CERTAIN STANDARDS AND CRITERIA

42 USC 10141. SEC. 121. (a) ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY STANDARDS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, theAdministrator, pursuant to authority under other provisions of law,shall, by rule, promulgate generally applicable standards for protec-tion of the general environment from offsite releases from radioac-tive material in repositories

(b) WMMISSION REQUIREMENTS AND ~“~lXA) Not laterthan January 1, 1984, the Commission, pursuant to authority underother provisions of law, shall, by rule, promul ate technical require

kments and criteria that it will ap 1 , under t e Atomic EnerZ{ T

Actof 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) an t e Ene

YReorganization ct of

1974 (42 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.), in approving or isapproving—(i) applications for authorization to construct repositories;(ii) applications for licenses to receive and possess spent

nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in such reposi-tories; and

(iii) applications for authorization for closure and decommis-sioning of such repositories.

(B) Such criteria shall provide for the use of a system of multiplebarriers in the design of the re sitory and shall include such

Yrestrictions on the retrievability o the solidified high-level radioac-tive waste and spent fuel emplaced in the repository as the Commis-sion deems appropriate.

(C) Such r uirementa and criteria shall not be inconsistent with7any comparab e standards promulgated by the Administrator under

subsection (a).(2) For purposes of this Act, nothing in this section shall be

construed to prohibit the Commission from promulgating require-ments and criteria under

rragraph (1) before the Administrator

promulgates standards un er subsection (a). If the Administratorpromulgates standards under subsection (a) after requirements andcriteria are promulgated by the Commission under paragraph (l),such requirements and criteria shall be revised by the timmission ifnecessary to comply with paragraph (lXC).

(c) ENvlRONMEN’rAL IMPACT ~ATEMEXW. —The promulgation ofstandards or criteria in accordance with the provisions of thissection shall not

7uire the pre aration of an environmental

8impact statement un er section 10 2)(C) of the National Environ-mental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)), or to require anyenvironmental review under subparagraph (E) or (F) of section102(2) of such Act.

DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

42 USC 10142. Sw. 122. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, anyrepository constructed on a site approved under this subtitle shall bedesigned and constructed to permit the retrieval of any spent



nuclear fuel placed in such repository, during an appropriate period ofoperation of the facility, for any reason pertaining to the publichealth and safety, or the environment, or for the purpose of permit-ting the recovery of the economically valuable contents of suchspent fuel. The Secretary shall specify the appropriate period ofretrievability with respect to any repository at the time of design ofsuch repository, and such aspect of such repository shall be subjectto approval or disapproval by the Commission as part of the con-struction authorization process under subsections (b) through (d) ofsection 114.

TITLE ‘m MATERIAL

SEC. 123. Delivery, and acceptance by the &mWary, of any high- 42 USC 10143.level radioactive waste or s nt nuclear fhel for a repository

rconstructed under this subti e shall constitute a transfer to theSecretary of title to such waste or spent fuel.

CONSIDERATfON OF EFFECT OF ACQUISITION OF WATER RIGHTS

SEC. 124. The Secretary shall give fbll consideration to whether w usc 10144.the development, construction, and operation of a repository mayrequire any purchase or other acquisition of water righta that willhave a significant adverse effiwt on the present or fbture development of the area in which such repository is located. The Secretaryshall mitigate any such adverse efkta to the maximum extentpracticable.

TERMINATION OF CERTAIN PROVISION8

SEC. 125. ~ions 119 and 120 shall cease to have effect at such 42 USC 10145.time as a repository developed under this subtitle is licensed toreceive and possess high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclearfuel.

SUBTITLE &kERIIU %’ORAGE ~OCRAM

FINDINGS AND PURPOSES

SEC. 131. (a) IWmws.-The Congress finds that– 42 USC 10151.(1) the PWWNM O~ing ~d operating civilian nuclear power

reactors have the prunary responsibility for providing interimstorage of spent nuclear fuel fmm such reacto~ by maximizing,to the extent practical, the efhctive use of existing storagefacilities at the site of each civilian nuclear power reactor, andby adding new onsite storage capacity in a timely mannerwhere practical;

(2) the Federal Government has the responsibility to encour-age and expedite the efkctive use of existing storage facilitiesand the addition of needed new storage capacity at the site ofeach civilian nuclear power reactor; and

(3) the Federal Government has the responsibility to provide,in accordance with the provisions of this subtitle, not more than1,900 metric tons of capacity for interim stprage of spentnuclear fuel for civilian nuclear power reactors that cannotreasonably provide adequate storage capacity at the sites of such



reactors when needed to assure the continued, orderly operationof such reactors.

Purposes.-The purposes of this subtitle are-(1) to provide for the utilization of available spent nuclear fuel

pools at the site of each civilian nuclear power reactor to theextent practical and the addition of new spent nuclear fuelstorage capacity where practical at the site of such reactor; and

(2) to provide, in accordance with the provisions of this subti-tle, for the establishment of a federally owned and operatedsystem for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel at one ormore failities owned by the Federal Government with not morethan 1,900 metric tons of capacity to prevent disruptions in theorderly operation of any civilian nuclear power reactor thatcannot reasonably provide adequate spent nuclear fuel storagecapacity at the site of such reactor when needed.

AVAILABLE CAPACITY FOR INTERIM STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

42 USC 10152. SEC. 132. The SecreY

, the Commission, and other authorizedFederal officials shall eac take such actions as such official consid-ers necessary to encourage and expedite the effective use of availa-ble storage, and necessary additional storage, at the site of eachcivilian nuclear power reactor consistent with—

(1) the protection of the public health and safety, and theenvironment;

(2) economic ~nsiderations;(3) continued o ration of such reactor;

r(4) any applica le provisions of law; and(5) the mews of the population surrounding such reactor.

INTERIM AT REACTOR STORAGE

Licensing SEC. 133. The Commission shall, by rule, establish procedures forprocedures. the licensing of any technology approved by the Commission under42 USC 10153. section 219(a) for use at the site of any civilian nuclear power

reactor. The establishment of such procedures shall not preclude thelicensing, under any applicable rocedures or rules of the Commis-

Ysion in effect prior to such estab ishment, of any technology for thestorage of civilian spent nuclear fuel at the site of any civiliannuclear power reactor.

LICENSING OF FACILITY EXPANSIONS AND TRANSSHIPMENT

42 USC 10154. SEC. 134. (a) ORAL &GuMm+rr.-In any Commission hearing undersection 189 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2239) on ana plication for a license, or for an amendment to an existing license,f~ed after the date of the enactment of this A% to expand the spentnuclear fiel stor e capacit at the site of a civilian nuclear power

Yreactor, through t e use of L“ hdensity fuel storage racks, fuel rodcompaction, the transshipment of spent nuclear fuel to anothercivilian nuclear power reactor within the same utility system, theconstruction of additional spent nuclear fuel pool capacity or drystorage capacity, or by other means, the Commission shall, at therequest of any party, provide an op rtunity for oral argument withrespect to any matter which the G remission determines to be incontroversy among the parties. The oral argument shall be precededby such discovery procedures as the rules of the Commission shall

294l Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste


such party proposes to rely that are known at such time to suchparty. Only facts and data in the form of sworn testimony or writtensubmission may be relied upon by the parties during oral argument.Of the materials that may be submitted by the parties during oralargument, the Commission shall only consider those facts and datathat are submitted in the form of sworn testimony or writtensubmission.

(b) ADJUDICATORY HEARINg.-(l) At the conclusion of any oralargument under subsection (a), the Commission shall designate anydisputed question of fact, together with any remaining questions oflaw, for resolution in an adjudicatory hearing only if it determinesthat—

(A) there is a genuine and substantial dispute of fact whichcan only be resolved with sufficient accuracy by the introduc-tion of evidence in an adjudicatory hearing; and

(B) the decision of the Commission is likely to depend in wholeor in part on the resolution of such dispute.

—(A) shall designate in writing the specific facts that are in

genuine and substantial dispute, the reason why the decision ofthe agency is likely to depend on the resolution of such facts,and the reason why an adjudicatory hearing is likely to resolvethe dispute; and

(B) shall no! consider—(d an issue relating to the design, construction, or oper-

!ation o any civilian nuclear power reactor already licensedto operate at such site, or any civilian nuclear power reac-tor for which a construction permit has been granted atsuch site, unless the Commission determines that any suchissue substantially afhcts the design, constr@ion, or oper-ation of the facility or activity for which such licenseapplication, authorization, or amendment is being consid-ered; or

(ii) my siting or design issue fully considered and decidedby the Commission in connection with the issuance of aconstruction permit or operating license for a civilian nu-clear power reactor at such site, unless (I) such issue resultsfrom any revision of siting or design criteria b the Com-mission following such decision; and (II) the & remissiondetermines that such issue substantially affecta the design,construction, or operation of the facility or activity forwhich such license application, authorization, or amend-ment is being considered.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2)(B) shall apply only with respectto licenses, authorizations, or amendments to hcenses or authoriza-tions, applied for under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.2011 et seq.) before December 31,2005.

(4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to the firstapplication for a license or license amendment received by theCommission to expand onsite spent fuel stor e capacity by the useof a new technol~ m m ~ i o n

Ynot reviously approved or use at any nuclearpowerplant by the .



(c) Judicial REVIEW:-~NO COUrt shall hold unlawful or set ~ide adeaslon of the Comrnmnon in any proceeding described in subsec-tion (a) because of a failure by the Ummission to use a particularprocedure pursuant to this section unless—

(1) an objection to the procedure used was presented to theCommission in a timely fashion or there are extraordinarycircumstances that excuse the failure to present a timely objec-tion; and

(2) the COUrt fin~ that such failure has precluded a fairconsideration and informed resolution of a significant issue ofthe proceeding taken as a whole.

STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

Ante, p. 2205. SEC. 135. (a) STORAGE CAPACITY.-(1) Subject to section 8, the42 USC! 10155. Secretary shall provide, in accordance with paragraph (5), not more

than 1,900 metric tons of capacity for the storage of spent nuclearfuel from civilian nuclear power reactors. Such storage capacityshall be provided through any one or more of the following methods,used in any combination determined by the Secretary to beappropriate:

(A) use of available capacity at one or more facilities owned bythe Federal Government on the date of the enactment of thisAct, including the modification and expansion of any suchfacilities, if the Commission determines that such use willadequatel protect the public health and safety, except that

isuch uses all not—(i) render such facilities subject to licensing under the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) or theEnergy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.);

‘r(ii) except as provided in subsection (c) require the prepa-ration of an environmental impact statement under section102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969(42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)), such facility is already being used, orhas previously been used, for such storage or for any simi-lar purpose.

(B) acquisition of an modular or mobile spent nuclear fuelTstorage equipment, inc uding spent nuclear fuel storage casks,

and provision of such equipment, to any person eneratin orF fholding title to spent nuclear fuel, at the site o any civi ian

nuclear power reactor operated by such person or at any siteowned by the Federal Government on the date of enactment ofthis Act;

(C) construction of storage capacity at any site of a civiliannuclear power reactor.

(2) Storage ca city authorized by paragra h (1) shall not beP “ ~whichthere isaprovided at any ederal or non-Federal site wnt

candidate site for a reP “ T ”

The restriction in the precedingsentence shall only app ~ untl such time as the Secretary decidesthat such candidate site M no lower a candidate site under consider-ation for development as a repomtory.

(3) In select”% c r e

methods of roviding storage capacity under para-gra h (l), the

2Ytary shal comider the timehness of the avail-

ab” ity of each such method and shall seek to minimize the transpor-tation of spent nuclear fuel, the public health and safety impacts,and the costa of providing such storage capacity.

~ ● Managing the Nation’s commercial High-Level Radioactive waste


(4) In providin storage capacity through any method described infparagraph (l), t e Secretary shall comply with any ap licable re

dquirementi for licensing or authorization of such meth , except asprovided in ragraph (l)(A)(i).

(5) me Gtary shall ensure that storage capacity is madeavailable under paragra h (1) when needed, as determined on thebasis of the sto e n

T& specifkl in contracts entered into under

section IW(a), an shall accept upon request any spent nuclear fuelas covered under such contracts.

(6) For p~ of ~Ph (lXA)$ the t=m “fa~litY” m=~ “F’’ility””an building or structure.

&) ComaAem.-(U Subject to the capacity limitation establishedin subsections (a) (1) and (d), the Secretary shall offer to enter into,and may enter into, contracta under section 136(a) with any persongenerating or owning spent nuclear fuel for purposes of providingstorage capacity for such spent fuel under this section only if thec oremission determines that—

(A) adequate StO7

capacity to ensure the continued orderloperation of the ci ian nuclear power reactor at which sucispent nuclear fuel is generated pot reasonably be rovidedby the person own’atthesitiofmy%e?$~~~%{~h~=ka~~c!~~~by such person, and such capacit cannot be made availa le in a

%timely manner through any met od described in subparagraph(B); and

(B) such person is diligently pursuin licensed alternatives tofthe use of Federal sto e capacity or the storage of spent

%nuclear fiel expected to generated by such person in thefuture, incMing—

(i) eqlon of storage facilities at the site of any civiliannuclear power reactor operated by such person;

(ii) construction of new or ackhtional storage facilities atthe site of any civilian nuclear power reactor operated bysuch person;

(iii) acqu$ition of modular or mobile s nt nuclear fuelYstorage eqtupment, includin spent nuc ear fuel storage

1!casks, for use at the site o any civilian nuclear powerreactor operated by such person; and

(iv) tr~eshipment to another civilian nuclear power reac-tor owned b such person.

i(2) In making the etermmation described in paragraph (lXA), theCommission shall ensure maintenance of a fill core reserve storagecapability at the site of the civilian nuclear power reactor involvedunless the Commission determines that maintenance of such capa-bility is not neessary for the continued orderly operation of suchreactor.

(3) The Commission shall complete the determinations required in

1’aragraph (1) with respect to any request for stir e capacity not

%ater than 6 months after receipt of such request by e Commission.(c) ENVIRON MENTAL REVIEW:-(1) me provision of 300 or more

metric tons of storage capmnty at any one Federal site undersubsection (aXIXA) shall be considered to be a mqjor Federal actionrequiring reparation of an environmental impact statement under

!!section 10 (2XC) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969(42 U.S.C. 43W2XC)).

(2XA) The Secretary shall prepare, and make available to the fiblicpublic, an environmental assessment of the probable impacts of any av~abflity”



provision of less than 300 metric tons of storage capacity at any oneFederal site under subsection that requires the modificationor expansion of any facility at the site, and a discussion of altema-

Environmental tive activities that may be undertaken to avoid such impacts. Suchassessment. environmental assessment shall include-

(i) an estimate of the amount of storage capacity to be madeavailable at such site;

(ii) an evaluation as to whether the facilities to be used atsuch site are suitable for the provision of such storage capacity;

(iii) a description of activitms planned by the Secretary withrespect to the modification or expansion of the facilities to beused at such site;

(iv) an evaluation of the effixts of the provision of suchstorage capacity at such site on the public health and safety,and the environment;

(v) a reasonable comparative evaluation of current informa-tion with respect to such site and facilities and other sites andfacilities available for the provision of such storage capacity;

(vi) a description of any other sites and facilities that havebeen considered by the Secretary for the provision of suchstorage capacity; and

(vii) an assessment of the regional and local impacts of provid-ing such storage capacity at such site, including the impacts ontransportation.

Judicial review. (B) The issuance of any environmental assessment under thisparagraph shall be considered to be a final agency action subject tojudicial review in accordance with the provisions of chapter 7 of title

5 USC 701 et seq. 5, United States Code. Such judicial review shall be limited to thesufficiency of such assessment with respect to the items described inclauses (i) through (vii) of subparagraph (A).

(3) Judicial review of any environmental impact statement orenvironmental assessment prepared pursuant to this subsectionshall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 119.

(d) REVIEW ● OF SITESOAND ~A~oPARTICIPATION.-(l) In carryingout the provmons of th~ subtitle wth regard to any interim storageof spent fuel from civilian nuclear power reactors which the Secre-tary is authorized by section 135 to provide, the Secretary shall, assoon as practicable, noti&, in writing, the Governor and the Statelegislature of any State and the Tribal Council of an afhctedIndian tribe in such State in which is located a Jtenti ly accept-

Fable site or facility for such interim storage o spent fuel of hisintention to investigate that site or f~ility.

Investigation. (2) DUrin the COUrSe of investigation of such site or facility, the[Secretary s all keep the Governor, State legislature, and af&ted

Tribal Council currently informed of the progress of the work, andresulta of the investigation. At the time of selection by the Secretaryof an site or existing facility, but prior to undertaking any site-

?speci IC work or alterations, the Secretary shall romptly notl& thedGovernor, the legislature, and any M&ted Tri Council in writing

of such selection, and subject to the provisions of paragraph (6) ofthis subsection, shall romptly enter into negotiations wnth such

LState and affected Tri Council to establish a cooperative qpw+ment under which such State and Council shall have the right topartici

rte ina

trecess of consultation and cooperation, based on

public ealth an safety and environmental concerns, in all stagesof the planning, development, modification, expansion, operation,and closure of storage capacity at a site or facility within such State

2@ ● Managing the NatIon’s Commercial High-Leve/ Radioactive Waste


for the interim storage of spent fuel from civilian nuclear powerreactors. Public partici tion in the negotiation of such an agree-ment shall be providz for and encouraged by the Secretary, theState, and the affected Tribal Council. The Secretary, in cooperationwith the States and Indian tribes, shall develop and publish mini-mum guidelines for public participation in such negotiations, butthe adequacy of such guidelines or and failure to comply with suchguidelines shaIl not be a basis for judicial review.

(3) The cooperative agreement shall include, but need not belimited to, the sharing in accordance with applicable law of alltechnical and licensing information, the utilization of availableexpertise, the facilitating of permitting procedures, “oint project

dreview, and the formulation of joint surveillance an monitoringarrangements to carry out applicable Federal and State laws. Thecooperative agreement also shall include a detailed plan or scheduleof milestones, decision points and opportunities for State or eligibleTribal Council review and objection. Such cooperative agreementshall provide rocedures for negotiating and resolving objections of

fthe State an affected Tribal Council in any stage of planning,development, modification, expansion, operation, or closure of stor-age capacity at a site or facility within such State. The terms of anycooperative agreement shall not affect the authority of the NuclearRegulato Commission under existing law.

%(4 Fort e purpose of this subsection, “process of consultation andcooperation” means a methodology by which the Secretary (A) keepsthe State and eligible Tribal Council fully and currently informedabout the aspects of the reject related to any potential impact on

/ ’the public health and sa ety and environment; (B) solicits, receives,and evaluates concerns and objections of such State and Council

Lwith re ard to such aspects of t e project on an on oing basis; andL t(C) wor diligently and cooperatively to resolve, t rough arbitra-

tion or other a propriate mechanisms, such concerns and objections.F !The process o consultation and coo ration shall not inc ude the

grant of a right to any State or “bal Council to exercise anabsolute veto of any aspect of the planning, development, modifica-tion, expansion, or operation of the project.

(5) The Secretary and the State and affected Tribal tiuncil shallseek to conclude the agreement required b paragraph (2) as soon aspracticable, but not later than 180 days folowin the date of notifi-cation of the selection under paragraph (2). & e Secretary shallperiodically report to the Congress thereafter on the status of theagreemenb approved under paragra h (3). Any report to the Con-

/ ’gress on the status of negotiations o such agreement by the Secre-tary shall be accom

Yied by comments solicited by the Secretary

from the State and e igible Tribal Council.(6)(A) Upon deciding to provide an aggregate of 300 or more metric

tons of storage capacity under subsection (a)(l) at any one site, theSecretary shall notify the Governor and legislature of the Statewhere such site is located, or the governing body of the Indian tribein whose reservation such site is located, as the case may be, of suchdecision. During the 60day period following receipt of notificationby the Secretary of his decision to provide an aggregate of 300 ormore metric tons of storage capacity at any one site, the Governor orlegislature of the State in which such site is located, or the govern-ing body of the affected Indian tribe where such site is located, asthe case may be, may disapprove the provision of 300 or more metrictons of storage capacity at the site involved and submit to the

Guidelines.

Cooperativeagreement.

“Process ofconsultation andcooperation. ”

Report toCongress.



Notice ofdisapproval,submittal tQCongresa.

Ante, p. 2217.

“Resolution.”

“Affected TribalCouncil.”

Congress a notice of such disapproval. A notice of disapproval shallbe considered to be submitted to the Congress on the date of thetransmittal of such notice of disapproval to the Speaker of theHouse and the President pro tempore of the Senate. Such notice ofdisapproval shall be accompanied by a statement of reasons explain-ing why the provision of such storage capacity at such site wasdisapproved by such Governor or legislature or the governing bodyof such Indian tribe.

(B) Unless otherwise provided by State law, the Governor orlegislature of each State shall have authority to submit a notice ofdisapproval to the Congress under subparagraph (A). In any case inwhich State law provides for submission of any such notice ofdisapproval by any other person or entity, any reference in thissubtitle to the Governor or legislature of such State shall be consid-ered to refer instead to such other person or entity.

(C) The authority of the Governor and legislature of each Stateunder this paragraph shall not be applicable with respect to any sitelocated on a reservation.

(D) If any notice of disapproval is submitted to the Congress undersubparagraph (A), the proposed provision of 300 or more metric tonsof storage capacity at the site involved shall be disapproved unless,during the first period of 90 calendar days of continuous session ofthe Congress following the date of the receipt by the Congress ofsuch notice of disapproval, the Congress passes a resolution approv-ing such proposed provision of storage capacity in accordance withthe procedures established in this paragraph and subsections (d)through (f) of section 115 and such resolution thereafter becomeslaw. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “resolution” means ajoint resolution uf either House of the Congress, the matter after theresolving clause of which is as follows: “That there hereby is approved the provision of 300 or more metric tons of spent nuclear fuelstorage capacity at the site located at_ with respectto which a notice of was aproval was submitted by

. The first blank space in such resolution shall&n filled with the geographic location of the site involved; the secondblank space in such resolution shall be filled with the designation ofthe State Governor and legislature or affected Indian tribe govern-ing body submitting the notice of disapproval involved; and the lastblank space in such resolution shall be filled with the date ofsubmission of such notice of disapproval.

(E) For purposes of the consideration of any resolution describedin subparagraph (D), each reference in subsections (d) and (e) ofsection 115 to a resolution of repository siting approval shall beconsidered to refer to the resolution described in such subparagraph.

(7) AS used in this section, the term “affected Tribal Council”means the governing body of any Indian tribe within whose reserva-tion boundaries there is located a potentially acceptable site forinterim storage capacity of spent nuclear fuel from civilian nuclearpower reactors, or within whose boundaries a site for such capacityis selected by the Secretary, or whose federally defined possessor orusage rights to other lands outside of the reservation’s boundariesarising out of congressionally ratified treaties, as determined by theSecretary of the Interior pursuant to a petition filed with him by theappropriate governmental officials of such tribe, may be substan-tially and adversely affected by the establishment of any suchstorage capacity.

~ . Manag/ng the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste


@ LIMITATIONS. —Any spent nuclear fuel stored under this sectionshall be removed from the storage site or facility involved as soon aspracticable, but in any event not later than 3 years following thedate on which a re

rItory or monitored retrievable storage fxility

developed under t is Act is available for disposal of such spentnuclear fiel.

(f) -~.—’hehe %ret=y shall annually repare and submit tothe Congress a report on any plans of the &retary for ~rovidingstor~ capacity under this section. Such report shall include adesmption of thes

rific manner of providing such storage selected

by the Secretary, i any. The Secretary shall prepare and submit thefirst such report not later than 1 year after the date of the enact-ment of this Act.

(g) CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING ADEQUACY OF AVAILABLE STORAGECApAcrrY.-Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment ofthis A% the Commission ursuant to section 553 of the Administra-tive Procedures Am dpropose, by rule, procedures and criteriafor making the determination required by subsection (b) that aperson owning and operating a civilian nuclear power reactorcannot reasonably provide adequate spent nuclear fuel stor e ca-

3pacity at the cimlian nuclear power reactor site when n ed toensure the continued orderly operation of such reactor. Such criteria shall ensure the maintenance of a full core reserve storagecapability at the site of such reactor unless the Commission deter-mmes that maintenance of such capability is not necessary for thecontinued orderl operation of such reactor. Such criteria shall

tidenti~ the feasi ility of reasonably providing such adequate spentnuclear fhel storage capacity, taking mto account economic, techni-cal, r

Ylatory, and public health and safety factors, through the use

of hig density fuel storage racks, fuel rod compaction, transshipment of spent nuclear fuel to another civilian nuclear

rwer reactor

within the same utility system, construction of ad itional spentnuclear fuel

r1 capacity, or such other technologies as may be

ap roved by t e ~mmission.&) APFZJCXTIOIW.- Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

nothing in this Act shall be construed to encourage, authorize, orrequire the private or Federal use, purchase, lease, or other acquisi-tion of any storage facility located away from the site of any civiliannuclear power reactor and not owned by the Federal Government onthe date of the enactment of this Act.

(i) ~RDINN1’10~ WITH kSEARCH AND D EVELOPMENT PROGRAM.—

To the extent avadable, and consistent with the provisions of thissection, the Secretary shall provide spent nuclear fuel for the re-search and development program authorized in section 217 fromspent nuclear fuel received b the Secreta for storage under this

r %section. Such spent nuclear uel shall not subject to the provi-sions of subsection (e).

INTERIM STORAGE FUND

‘=” 13’” (a)tiN-w”+l)Durin PhefFfid ‘O1lOwingthedakof the enactment of th~ Act, but not ater t an January 1, 1990, theSecretary is authorized to enter into contracts with rsons who

rgenerate or own spent nuclear fuel resulting from civi ian nuclearactivities for the storage of such spent nuclear fuel in any storagecapacity provided under this subtitle: Fmuided, howeuer, That theSecretary shall not enter into contracts for spent nuclear fuel in

5 USC 553.

42 USC 10156.

App. C—The Nuc/ear Waste Po/icy Act of 1982 . 301


Study; report toC0ngre8s.

Publication inFederalRegister.

Fees.

amounta in excess of the available storage capacity specified insection 135(a). Those contracts shall provide that the Federal Gov-ernment will (1) take title at the civilian nuclear power reactor site,to such amounts of spent nuclear fuel from the civilian nuclearpower reactor as the timmission determines cannot be storedonsite, (2) transport the spent nuclear fuel to a federally owned andoperated interim awa -from-reactor storage facility, and (3) store

Jsuch fuel in the fac” ity pending further processing, storage, ordisposal. Each such contract shall (A) provide for payment to theSecretary of fees determined in accordance with the provisions ofthis section; and (B) speci& the amount of storage capacity to beprovided for the person involved.

(2) The Secretary shall undertake a study and, not later than 180days after the date of the enactment of this Act, submit to theCongress a report, establishing payment charges that shall be calcu-lated on an annual basis, commencing on or before January 1, 1984.Such payment c

3es and the calculation thereof shall be pub

lished in the Fede -r, and shall become effective not leesthan 30 da after publication. Each pa ent charge published in

2the Feder Register under this rparagrap shall remain effective fora period of 12 months from the effective date as the charge for thecost of the interim storage of any spent nuclear fuel. The report ofthe Secretary shall specify the method and manner of collection(including the rates and manner of payment) and any legislativerecommendations determined by the Secretary to be appropriate.nI~~oF~ for tirage ●rider this subtitle shall be established on a

wnwmnatory barns. The fees to be paid by each person enteringinto a contract with the Secretary under this subsection shall bebased upon an estimate of the pro rata coste of storage and relatedactivities under this subtitle with respect to such person, includingthe acquisition, construction, operation, and maintenance of anyfa~]it&~eu.e~this subtitle.

Tshall establish in writing criteria setting forth

the terms and con “tions under which such storage services shall bemade available.

(5) Except aq provided in section 137, nothing in this or any otherAct requires the Secretary, in carrying out the responsibilities ofthis section, to obtain a license or permit to possess or own spentnuclear fuel.

(b) LIMITATION.-NO spent nuclear fhel generated or owned by anydepartment of the United States referred to in section 101 or 102 oftitle 5, United States me, may be stored b the Secretary in any

Tstorage capacity provided under this subtit e unless such departiment transfers to the Secretary, for deposit in the Interim StorageFund, amounts uivalent to the f- that would be paid to the

\Secretary under t e contracts referred to in this section if suchspent nuclear fuel were generated by any other person;

(c) ESTABLISHMENT or INTERXM STORAGE ~xuD.-T’here hereb isJestablished in the Treasury of the United States a separate fun , to

beme~~ as the Interim Storage Fund. The Storage Fund shall

(1)21 receipts, proceeds, and recoveries realized by the Sem+tary under subsections (a), (b), and (e), which shall be depositedin the Storage Fund immediate upon their realization;

t*@~~mydappropriations made y the Congress to the Storage.*



(3) any unexr

nded balances available on the date of theenactment of t is Act for functions or activities necessary orincident to the interim storage of civilian spent nuclear fuel,which shall automatically be transferred to the Storage Fundon such date.

(d) U SE OF STORAGE FU N D. —The Secretary may make expendi-tures from the Storage Fund, subject to subsection (e), for anypurpose necessa or appropriate to the conduct of the functions andactivities of theLretary, or the provision or anticipated provisionof services, under this subtitle, including—

(1) the identification, development, licensing, construction,operation, decommissioning, and postdecommissioning mainte-nance and monitoring of any interim storage facility providedunder this subtitle;

(2) the administrative cost of the interim storage program;(3) the costs associated with acquisition, design, modification,

replacement, operation, and construction of facilities at an in-~3~m storage site, consistent with the restrictions in section.

(~) the coat of~ransportation ofs nt nuclear fuel; andd(5) lmP@ asm$tance as clescri in subsection (e).

(e) IMPACX ASSISTANCE.-(D Beginning the first f=al year whichcommences after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Seer*tary shall make annual impact assistance payments to a State orappropriate unit of local government, or both, in order to mitigatesocial or economic impacts occasioned by the establishment andsubsequent o ration of an interim storage capacity within the

Y [jurisdicationa boundaries o such government or overnments andauthorized under this subtitle: tivicleci, howeuer, !hat such impactassistance payments shall not exceed (A) ten per centum of the costsincurred in paragraphs (1) and (2), or (B) $15 per kilogram of spentfuel, whichever is less;

(2) Payments made available to States and units of local govern-ment pursuant to this section shall be—

(A) allocated in a fair ~d3

uitable manner with a priority tothose States or units of loc government suffering the mostsevere impacts; and

(B) utilized by States or units of local governments only for (i)planning, (ii) construction and maintenance of public services,(iii) provision of public services related to the providing of suchinterim stir e authorized under this title, and (iv) compensa-

Ttion for loss o taxable property equivalent to that if the storagehad been provided under private ownership.

(3) Such payments shall be subject to such terms and conditions asthe Secretary determines necessary to ensure that the purposes ofthis subsection shall be achieved. The Secretary shall issue such

lations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of thiss=ion.

(4) Payments under this subsection shall be made available solelyfrom the fees determined under subsection (a).

(5) The Secretary is authorized to consult with States and apprmpriate units of local government in advance of c~mmencement ofestablishment of storage ca

Ycity authorized under this subtitle in

an effort to determine the evel of the payment such governmentwould be eli “ble to receive pursuant to this subsection.

(6) k us$in this subsection, the term “unit of local government”means a county, parish, township, municipality, and shall include a

Payments.

Regulation.

“Unit of localgovernment.”



borough existing in the State of Alaska on the date of the enactmentof this subsection, and any other unit of government below the Statelevel which is a unit of general government as determined by theSecretary.

Report to (0 ADMINISTRATION OF STORAGE FuND.—(1) The Secretary of theCongress. Treasury shall hold the Storage Fund and, after consultation with

the Secretary, annually report to the Congress on the financialcondition and operations of the Storage Fund during the precedingfwal ear.

Budget (2) fie Secretary shall submit the budget of the Storage Fund tosubmittal. the OffIce of Management and Budget triennially along with the

budget of the Department of Energy submitted at such time inAnte, p. 907. accordance with chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code. The

budget of the Storage Fund shall consist of estimates made by theSecreta of expenditures from the Storage Fund and other relevant

3financi matters for the succeeding 3 f-l years, and shall beincluded in the Budget of the Umted States Government. TheSecretary may make expenditures from the Stor e Fund, sub”ect to

Y iap~ropriations which shall remain available unt” expended. ppropnations shall be subject to triennial authorization.

(3) If the Secreta~ determines that the Storage Fund contains atany time amounts m excess of current needs, the Secretary mayrequest the Secretary of the Treasury to invest such amounts, orany portion of such amounts as the Secretary determines to beappropriate, in obligations of the United States—

(A) having maturities determined b the Secretary of theJTreasury to be appropriate to the ne s of the Storage Fund;

and(B) bearing interest at rates determined to be ap ropriate by

ithe Secretary of the Treasury, taking into consi eration thecurrent aver e market yield on outstanding marketable obliga-

Vtions of the nited States with remaining periods to maturitycomparable to the maturities of such investments, except thatthe interest rate on such investments shall not exceed theaverage interest rate applicable to existing borrowings.

(4) Receipts, proceeds, and recoveries realized by the Secretaryunder this section, and expenditures of amounts from the StorageFund, shall be exempt from annual apportionment under the provi-

Ante, p. 927. sions of subchapter II of chapter 15 of title 31, United States Code.(5) If at any time the moneys available in the Storage Fund are

insufficient to enable the Secretary to discharge his responsibilitiesunder this subtitle, the Secretary shall issue to the Secretary of theTreasu~ obligations in such forms and denominations, bearing suchmaturitws, and subject to such terms and conditions as may beagreed to by the Secretary and the Secretary of the Treasu . The

7total of such obligations shall not exceed amounts provi ed inappropriation Acts. Redemption of such obl” ations shall be made b

%the Secretary from moneys available in t e Storage Fund. Suciobligations shall bear interest at a rate determined by the Secretaryof the Treasury, which shall be not less than a rate determined bytaking into consideration the average market ield on outstanding

{marketable obligations of the United States o comparable maturi-ties during the month preceding the issuance of the obligationsunder this paragraph. The Secretary of the Treasu

Lshall purchase

any issued obligations, and for such purpose the retary of theTreasuV is authorized to use as a public debt transaction theproceeds from the sale of any securities issued under chapter 31 of

~ ● Manag]ng the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste


title 31, United States Code, and the purposes for which securities A~~e P. 93’7.may be issued under such Act are extended to include any purchaseof such obl” tions. The Secretary of the Treasury may at any time

rsell any oft e obl” ations acquired by him under this aragraph. All1% rredemptions, pure ases, and sales by the Secretary o the Treasury

of obligations under this paragraph shall be treated as public debttransactions of the United States.

(6) Anjapprop+tiom made available to the Storage Fund for any Intereet

FUT described m subsection (d) shall be repaid into the general IXW’nti.un of the Treasury, together with interest from the date of avail-

~b#i~o~&e&pp~ riations until the date of repayment. SuchI

ron the cumulative amount of a~ ropriations

Eavailable to the tor e Fund, less the average und~ ursed cash%balance in the Storage nd account during the fwal year involved.

The rate of such interest shall be determined by the Secretary of theTreasury taking into consideration the average market yield duringthe month precedin each f-l year on outstanding marketableobligations of the #“ smted tates of comparable maturity. Interest ~ferral.

!k3Sllry, b taymenta maybe deferred with the approval of the Secretary of the

u any interest payments so deferred shall themselvesbear interest.

SBC. 137. (a) T RANSPORTATION .-(1) Transportation of spent AZ UX 10MT.nuclear fuel under section 136(a) shall be subject to licensing andregulation by the Commission and b the Secretary of Transporta-

{tion as provided for transportation o commercial spent nuclear fuelunder existing law.

(2) me secrem, in rovidin for the transposition of spentIfnuclear fuel under this et, shal utilize by contract private indus-

try to the fullest extent possible in each aspect of such transporta-tion. The Secretary shall use direct Federal seMces for such trans-portation only upon a determination of the Secretary of Transporta-tion, in consultation with the Secretary, that private industry isunable or unwilling to provide such transportation services at rea-sonable cost.

SUBTITLE C — MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE

MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE

SEC. 141. (a) FINDINGa.-~e bngress findS that— 42 USC 10161.(1) lon -term storage of high-level radioactive waste or spent

fnuclear uel in monitored retrievable storage facilities is anoption for providing safe and reliable management of suchwaste or spent fuel;

(2) ~h~ executive branch and the ~Y

should pI’OCeed asexpechtlously as possible to consider fu ly a proposal for con-struction of one or more monitored retrievable storage facilitiesto provide such lon -term stor e;

(3) the Federal (% 3vernment as the responsibility to ensurethat site-specific designs for such facilities are available asprovided in this section;

(40 the generators and owners of the high-level radioactivewaste and spent nuclear fuel to be stored in such facilities havethe responmbility to ay the costs of the long-term storage of

Fsuch waste ands nt uel; and(5) disposal of P@h-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear

fuel in a repository developed under this Act should proceed



regardless of any construction of a monitored retrievable stm=-e facility pursuant to this section.

(b)?kJBMISSION OF PROPOSAL BY sECR~ARY.-(l) On or before June1, 1985, the Secretary shall complete a detailed study of the need forand feasibility of, and shall submit to the Congress a proposal for,the construction of one or more monitored retrievable storage facili-ties for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Eachsuch facility shall be designed—

(A) to accommodate spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioac-tive waste resulting from civilian nuclear activities;

(B) to permit continuous monitoring, management, and main-tenance of suchs nt fuel and waste for the foreseeable future;

F(C) to provide or the ready retrieval of such spent fuel andwaste for further processing or disposal; and

(D) to safely store such spent fuel and waste as long as maybenecessa~ by maintaining such facility through a propriatemeans, including any

?{uired replacement of suc

(2) Such pro~~ shall inclu e-facility.

(A) the estabhshment of a Federal program for the siting,development, construction, and operation of facilities capable ofsafely storin h~h-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear

!fuel, which acihties are to be licensed by the Commission;(B) a plan for the funding of the construction and operation of

such facilities, which plan shall provide that the costs of suchactivities shall be borne by the generators and owners of thehigh-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel to be storedin such facilities;

(C) site-specific designs, specifications, and cost estimates suf-ficient to (i) solicit bids for the construction of the first suchfacilit ; (ii) support con

1’ rssional authorization of the construc-

tion o such facility; an (iii) enable com letion and operation ofFsuch facility as soon as practicable ollowing congressional

authorization of such facility; and(D) a plan for integrating facilities constructed pursuant to

this section with other storage and disposal facilities authorizedin this Act.

Consultations. (3) 1n formulating such proposal, the Secretary shall consult withthe Commission and the Administrator, and shall submit theircomments on such proposal to the Congress at the time such pro-posal is submitted.

(4) The proposal shall include, for the first such facility, at least 3alternative sites and at least 5 alternative combinations of suchproposed sites and facility designs consistent with the criteria ofparagraph (b)(l). The Secreta

%shall recommend the combination

among the alternatives that t e Secretary deems referable. TheJenvironmental assessment under subsection (c) ah 1 include a full

analysis of the relative advantages and disadvantages of all 5 suchalternative combinations of proposed sites and proposed facilitydesigns.

(c) E NVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS .-(1) Preparation andsubmission to the Congress of the reposal required in this sectionshall not require the re

1Prration o an environmental impact state-

ment under section 1 2( XC) of the National Environmental PolicyEnvironmental Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)). The Secretary shall prepare, inassessment. accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary implementing

such Act, an environmental assessment with respect to such pro-posal. Such environmental assessment shall be based upon available

3~ ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste


informationf

regarding alternative technologies for the storage ofs pent nuclear uel and high-level radioactive waste. The Secretaryrs all submit such environmental assessment to the Congress at the

time such proposal is submitted.(2) If the Congress by law, after review of the reposal submitted

rby the Secretary under subsection (b), specifica ly authorizes con-struction of a monitored retrievable storage facility, the re uire-

8ments of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 .S.C.4321 et seq.) shall apply with respect to construction of such facility,except that an environmental impact statement pre ared withres

rf’ {to such acility shall not be r uired to consider t e need for

asuc facility or any alternative to the esign criteria for such facilityset forth in subsection (b)(l).

(d) LICENSING.— Any facility authorized pursuant to this sectionshall be subject to licensing under section 202(3) of the EnergyReorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5842(3)). In reviewing theapplication filed by the Secretary for licensing of the first suchfacility, the Commission may not consider the need for such facilityor any alternative to the design criteria for such facility set forth insubsection (b)(l).

(e) CLARIFICATION.—Nothing in this section limits the considera-tion of alternative facility designs consistent with the criteria of

1’aragraph (b)(l) in an environmental impact statement, or in any

[icensing procedure o the Commission, with resr

to any moni-tored, retrievable facility authorized pursuant tot is section.

(f) IMPACT ASSISTANCE .-(1) Upon receipt by the Secretary ofcongressional authorization to construct a facility described in sub-section (b), the Secretary shall commence making annual impact aidpayments to appropriate units of general local government in orderto mitigate any social or economic im acts resulting from the

fconstruction and subsequent operation o any such facility withinthe jurisdictional boundaries of any such unit.

(2) Payments made available to units of general local governmentunder this subsection shall be—

(A) allocated in a fair and equitable manner, with priority

&“ven to units of general local government determined by the

reta~ to be most severely affected; and(B) utdized by units of $eneral local overnment only for

fplanning, construction, mahenance, an provision of publicservices related to the sitin of such facility.

%(3) Such payments shall be su ject to such terms and conditions asthe Secretary determines are necessary to ensure achievement ofthe urposes of this subsection. The Secretary shall issue such

Ere fations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of thissu ection.

(4) Such paP

ents shall be made available entirely from fundsheld in the uclear Waste Fund established in section 302(c) andshall be available only to the extent provided in advance in appr~priation Acts.

(5) The SeCre~ may consult with appropriate units of generallocal government m advance of commencement of construction ofany such facility in an effort to determine the level of paymentseach such unit is el” “ble to receive under this subsection.

R(g) LIMITATION .– o monitored retrievable storage facilit devel-Joped pursuant to this section may be constructed in any tate in

which there is located any site approved for site characterizationunder section 112. The restriction m the preceding sentence shall

Submittal toCongress.

Payments.

Regulations.

Consultations.

Ante, p. 2208.



, p p . 2 2 1 7 ,2220, 2222, 2225.

42 USC 10171.

only apply until such time as the Secretary decides that suchcandidate site is no longer a candidate site under consideration fordevelopment as a repository. Such restriction shall continue to applyto any site selected for construction as a repository.

(h) Participation of STATES AND I NDIAN facilityauthorued pursuant to this section shall be subject to the provisionsof sections 115, l16(a), l16(b), l16(d), 117, and 118. For purposes ofcarrying out the provisions of this subsection, any reference insections 115 through 118 to a repository shall be considered to referto a monitored retrievable storage facility.

D-LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

FINANCIAL ARIMNGEMENTS FOR U3W-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE SITE

SE C. 151. (a) FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS .-(1) The Commissionshall establish by rule, regulation, or order, after public notice, andin accordance with section 181 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42U.S.C. 2231), such standards and instructions as the Commissionmay deem necessary or desirable to ensure in the case of eachlicense for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste that an ade-quate bond, surety, or other financial arrangement (as determinedby the Commission) will be provided by a licensee to permit comple-tion of all requirements established by the Commission for thedecontamination, decommissioning, site closure, and reclamation ofsites, structures, and equipment used in conjunction with such low-level radioactive waste. Such financial arrangements shall be provialed and approved by the Commission, or, in the case of siteswithin the boundaries of any agreement State under section 274 ofthe Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2021), by the appropriateState or State entity, prior to issuance of licenses for low-levelradioactive waste disposal or, in the case of licenses in effkxt on thedate of the enactment of this Act, prior to termination of suchlicenses.

(2) If the Commission determines that any long-term maintenanceor monitoring, or both, will be necewary at a site described inparagraph (l), the Commission shall ensure before termination ofthe license involved that the licensee has made available suchbonding, surety, or other financial arrangements as may be neces-sary to ensure that any necessary long-term maintenance or moni-toring needed for such site will be carried out by the person havingtitle and custody for such site following license termination.

(b) TXTLE AND CUSTODY .-(1) The Secretary shall have authority toassume title and custody of low-level radioactive waste and the landon which such waste is disposed of, upon request of the owner ofsuch waste and land and following termination of the license issuedby the Commission for such disposal, if the Commission determinesthat—

(A) the requirements of the Commission for site Clmure,decommwslonmg, and decontamination have been met by thelicensee involved and that such licensee is in compliance withthe provisions of subsection (a);

(B) such title and custody will be transferred to the Secretarywithout cost to the Federal Government; and

~ ● Managing the Nation’s @mmerc/al H/gh-Level Radioactive Waste


(C) Federal ownership and management of such site is neces-sary or desirable in order to protect the public health andsafe , and the environment.

(2) If t?e Secretary assumes title and custody of any such wasteand land under this subsection, the Secretary shall maintain suchwaste and land in a manner that will protect the public health andsafety and the environment.

(c) $PBcIAL SrTES.-If the low-level radioactive waste involved isthe result of a licensed activity to recover zirconium, hafnium, andrare earths fkom source material, the Secretary, upon request of theowner of the site involved, shall assume title and custody of suchwaste and the land on which it is disposed when such site has beendecontammated and stabilized in accordance with the requirementsestablished by the (hnmission and when such owner has madead Uate financial?

arrangements approved by the Commission forthe ong-term maintenance and monitoring of such site.

TITLE 11-RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRA-TION REGARDING DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

PURPOsE

SW. 211. It is the purpoae of this title- 42 USC 10191.,(V to pro~de direction to the Secretary with respect to the

‘iPofmoh-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel;

( ) toauthom the Secretary, pursuant to this title-(A) to rovide for the construction, operation, and mainte-

!nance o a dee geologic test and evaluation facili ; andt x(B) to prow e for a focused and integrated hig -level

radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel reaearch and development ~rograrn, including the develo ment of a testand evaluation facility w carry out researc{ and provide anintegrated demonstration of the technology for deep g-logic diqmal of high-level radioactive waste, and the devel-opment of the facilities to demonstrate dry storage of spentnuclear fhel; and

(3) to provide for an improved coo rative role between theFederal Government and States, xected Indian tribes, andunits of general local government in the siting of a test andevaluation facility.

APPLICABILITY

SEC. 212. The provisions of this title are subject to section 8 and A~@ P. 2205.shall not apply to facilities that are used for the disposal of high- 42 USC 10192.level radioactwe waste, low-level radioactive waste, transuranicwaste, or spent nuclear fuel resulting from atomic energy defenseactivities.

IDENTIFICATION OF 51TES

SEC. 213. (a) Guidelines.-N0t later than 6 months after the date 42 u~ 10193.of the enactment of this Act and notwithstanding the failure ofother agencies to promulgate standards ursuant to a plicable law,the Secretary, in consultation with the & {remission, t e Director ofthe Geological Survey, the Administrator, the Council on Environ-



mental Quality, and such other Federal agencies as the Secretaryconsiders a propriate, is authorized to issue, ~ursuant to section 553

Jof title 5, nited States Code, general guidehnes for the selection ofa site for a test and evaluation facility. Under such guidelines theSecretary shall specify factors that qualify or disqualif a site for

zdevelopment as a test and evaluation facility, inclu ing factorspertaining to the location of valuable natural resources, hydrog-physics, seismic activity, and atomic energy defense activities, prox-imity to water supplies, proximity to populations, the effect uponthe rights of users of water, and proximit to components of the

d?National Park System, the National Wil ife Refuge S tern, the#National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, the National ilderness

Preservation System, or National Forest Lands. Such guidelinesshall require the Secretary to consider the various geol “c media in

Twhich the site for a test and evaluation facility may be ocated and,to the extent practicable, to identify sites in different eologic

!media. The Secretary shall use guidelines established un er thissubsection in considering and selecting sites under this title.

(b) SITE IDBNTIFICAmON BY THE SBCXUWARY.-(1) Not later than 1year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and followingpromulgation of guidelines under subsection (a), the Secretary isauthorized to ident~ 3 or more sites, at least 2 of which shall be indifferent eologic media in the continental United States, and at

fleast 1 0 which shall be in media other than salt. Subject toCommission requirements, the Secretary shall “ve preference to

3sites for the test and evaluation facility in m ia possessing geo-chemical characteristics that retard aqueous transport of radionu-elides. In order to provide a greater possible protection of publichealth and safety as operating experience is gamed at the test andevaluation facility, and with the exception of the primary areasunder review by the Secretary on the date of the enactment of thisAct for the location of a test and evaluation facility or repository, allsites identified under this subsection shall be more than 15 statutemiles from towns having a population of greater than 1,000 personsas determined by the most recent census unless such sitea containhigh-level radioactive waste rior to identfilcation under this title.

Environmental [Each identification of a sites all be su ported by an environmentalassessment. rassessment, which shall include a detai ed statement of the basis for

such identification and of the probable impacts of the siting researchactivities planned for such site, and a discussion of alternativeactivities relating to siting research that may be undertaken toavoid such impacts. Such environmental assessment shall include—

(A) an evaluation by the Secretary as to whether such site issuitable for siting research under the guidelines establishedunder subsection (a);

(B) an evaluation by the Secreta of the effects of the sitingTresearch activities at such site on t e public health and safety

and the environment;(0 a reasonable comparative evaluation by the Secretary of

such site with other sites and locations that have beenconsidered;

(D) a description of the decision process by which such sitewas recommended; and

(E) an assessment of the regional and local impacts of locatingthe proposed test and evaluation facility at such site.

(2) When the Secretary identifies a site, the Secretary shall assoon as possible notify the Governor of the State in which such site



is located, or the governing bod7 of the affected Indian tribe wheredsuch site is located, of such i entification and the basis of such

identification. Additional sites for the location of the test and evalu-ation facility authorized in section 302(d) may be identified aftersuch 1 year period, following the same procedure as if such sites hadbeen identified within such period.

SITING RESEARCH AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

SEC. 214. (a) IN General-Not later than 30 months after the 42 Usc 10194.date on which the Secretary completes the identification of sitesunder section 213, the Secretary is authorized to complete sufficientevaluation of 3 sites to select a site for expanded siting researchactivities and for other activities under section 218. The Secretary isauthorized to conduct such preconstruction activities relative tosuch site selection for the test and evaluation facility as he deemsappropriate. Additional sites for the location of the test and evalua-tion facility authorized in section 302(d) maybe evaluated after such30-month period, following the same procedures as if such sites wereto be evaluated within such period.

(b) Public M EETINGS AND E NVIRONMENTAL Assesment.-Notlater than 6 months after the date on which the Secretary completesthe identification of sites under section 213, and before beginningsiting research activities, the Secretary shall hold at least 1 publicmeeting in the vicinity of each site to inform the residents of thearea of the activities to be conducted at such site and to receive theirviews.

(c) RESTRICTIONS .—Except as rovided in section 218 with respect1’to a test and evaluation faciity, in conducting siting research

activities pursuant to subsection (a)-(1) the Secretary shall use the minimum quantity of high-

level radioactive waste or other radioactive materials, if any,necessary to achieve the test or research objectives;

(2) the Secretary shall ensure that any radioactive materialused or placed on a site shall be fully retrievable; and

(3) upon termination of siting research activities at a site forany reason, the Secretary shall remove any radioactive materialat or in the site as promptly as practicable.

(d) TITLE TO MATERIAL. The secretiT

may take title, in thename of the Federal Government, to t e high-level radioactivewaste, spent nuclear fuel, or other radioactive material emplaced ina test and evaluation facility. If the Secretary takes title to any suchmaterial, the Secreta

3shall enter into the appropriate financial

arrangements describe in subsection (a) or (b) of section 302 for thedisposal of such material.

TEST AND EVALUATION FACILITY SITING REVIEW AND REPORTS

SEC. 215. (a) Consultation and Cooperation the Governor of a 42 UX 10195.State, or the governing body of an affected Indian tribe, notified of asite identification under section 213 shall have the right to partici-pate in a process of consultation and cooperation as soon as the siteinvolved has been identified pursuant to such section and through-

Jsection, the term “process of consultation an cooperation” means amethodolow— cooperation.”

(1) b~”which the Secretary—

— —.



(A) keeps the Governor or governing body involved fullyand currently informed about any potential economic orpublic health and safety impacts in all stages of the siting,development, construction, and operation of a test andevaluation facility;

(B) solicits, receives, and evaluates concerns and objec-d’tions of such Governor or governing body with regar to

such test and evaluation facility on an ongoing basis; and(C) works diligently and cooperatively to resolve such

concerns and objections; andk(2) bY which the tate or affected Indian tribe involved can

exercise reasonable independent monitoring and testing ofonsite activities related to all stages of the siting, development,construction and o ration of the test and evaluation facility,

Pexcept that any suc monitoring and testing shall not unreason-ably interfere with onsite activities.

(b) WRITTEN AGREEMENTS.-The secretary shall enter into writtenagreements with the Governor of the State in which an identifiedsite is located or with the governing body of any affkcted Indiantribe where an identified site is located in order to expedite theconsultation and cooperation process. Any such written agreementshall specify—

(1) procedures by which such Governor or governing body maystudy, determine, comment on, and make recommendationswith regard to the possible health, safety, and economic impactsof the test and evaluation facility;

(2) procedures by which the Secretary shall consider andrespond to commenta and recommendations made by such Gov-ernor or governing body, including the period in which theSecretary shall sores nd;

P(3) the documents t e Department is to submit to such Gover-nor or overning body, the timing for such submissions, thetiming or such Governor or governing body to identify publichealth and safety concerns and the process to be followed to tryto eliminate those concerns;

(4) procedures by which the Secretary and either such Gover-nor or governing body may review or modify the agreementperiodically; and

(5) procedures for public notification of the procedures speci-fied under subparagraphs (A) through (D).

(C) LIMITATION.—Except as specifically provided in this section,nothing in this title is intended to grant any State or affected Indiantribe any authority with respect to the siting, development, orloading of the test and evaluation facility.

FEDERAL AGENCY ACtiONS

42 USC 10196. SE C. 216. (a) COOPERATION AND ordination.-&k?ra1 agenciesshall assist the Secretary by coo rating and coordinating with the

rSecretary in the preparation o any necessary reports under thistitle and the mission plan under section 301.

(b) ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW.-(1) No action of the Secretary orany other Federal agency required by this title or section 301 withrespect to a test and evaluation facility to be taken prior to theinitiation of onsite construction of a test and evaluation facilityshall require the preparation of an environmental impact statementunder section I02(2)(C) of the Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42


PUBLIC LAW 97-425–JAN. 7, 1983 96

U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)), or to require the preparation of environmentalreports, except as otherwise specifically provided for in this title.

(2) The Secretary and the heads of all other Federal agenciesshall, to the maximum extent possible, avoid duplication of efforts inthe preparation of reports under the National Environmental PolicyAct of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.).

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ON DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVELRADIOACTIVE WASTE

SEC. 217. (a) Purpose E.-Not later than 64 months after the date ofthe enactment of this Act, the Secretary is authorized to, to theextent practicable, begin at a site evaluated under section 214, aspart of and as an extension of siting research activities of such siteunder such section, the mining and construction of a test andevaluation facility. Prior b the mining and construction of suchfacility, the Secretary shall pre pare an environmental assessment.The purpose of such facility shal be-

(1) to supplement and focus the repository site characteriza-tion process;

(2) to provide the conditions under which known technologicalcomponents can be integrated to demonstrate a functioningrepository-like system;

(3) to provide a means of identifying, evaluating, and resolv-ing potential repository licensing issues that could not beresolved during the siting research program conducted undersection 212;

(4).@ validate, under actual conditions, the scientific modelsused m the design of a repository;

(5) to refine the design and engineering of repository compo-nents and systems and to confirm the predicted behavior of suchcomponents and systems;

(6) to supplement the siting data, the generic and specificgeological characteristics developed under section 214 relatingto isolating disposal materials in the physical environment of arepository;

(7) to evaluate the design concepts for packaging, handling,and emplacement of high-level radioactive waste and spentnuclear fuel at the design rate; and

(8) to establish operating capability without exposing workersto excessive radiation.

(b) Design.-The Secretary shall design each test and evaluationfacility—

(1) to be capable of receiving not more than 100 full-sizedcanisters of solidified high-level radioactive waste (which canis-ters shall not exceed an aggregate weight of 100 metric tons),except that spent nuclear fuel may be used instead of suchwaste if such waste cannot be obtained under reasonable condi-tions;

(2) to permit full retrieval of solidified high-level radioactivewaste, or other radioactive material used by the Secretary fortesting, upon completion of the technology demonstration activi-ties; and

(3) based upon the principle that the high-level radioactivewaste, spent nuclear fuel, or other radioactive material involvedshall be isolated from the biosphere in such a way that the

STAT. 2249

42 WC 10197.

Environmentalassessment.

App. C—The /VUC/8i3f Waste Policy Act of 19B2 ● 313


Testing.

initial isolation is provided by engineered barriers fiumtioningas a system with the geologic environment.

(c) @E~moNofil) Not later than 88 months after the date of theenactment of ths Act, the Secretary shall begin an in situ testingprogram at the test and evaluation facilit in accordance with the

{mission plan developed under section 301, or urposes of—i(A) conducting in situ testa of bore ole ~~” , gml~c

%media fracture sealing, and room closure to establis the tech-niques and performance for isolation of high-level radioactivewaste, spent nuclear fuel, or other radioactive materials fromthe biosphere;

(B) conducti3

in situ tests with radioactive sources andmaterials to ev uate and improve reliable models for radionu-clide migration, absorption, and containment within the engi-neered barriers and geologic media involved, if the Secretaryfinds there is reasonable assurance that such radioactivesources and materials will not threaten the use of such site as arepository;

(C) conducting in situ tests to evaluate and improve modelsfbrti~und water or brine flow through fkactured geologic

●

(D) &mdu “9

in situ tests under conditions re resenting the\real time and t e accelerated time behavior oft e engineered

barriers with@ the g@ogic environment involved;(E) condu~W in situ testa to evaluate the efkcta of heat tmcl

pressure on the geolT

“c media involti on the hydrology of thesurrounding ~ an on the integrity of the dis

r1 packages;

(F) ~ndu~ in situ te@s under both norm and abnormalrepository comhtions to establish safe design limiti for disposalpackages and to determine the effects of the gross release ofradionuclidea into surrounm and the effects of various credi-ble failure mod- inclu “ —

9(i) seismic evenb - to the coupling of aquifersthrough the test and evaluation fiwility;

(ii) thermal ;um~ significantly greater than the maxi-Jmum calcula

(iii) human intrusion creating a direct pathway to thebiosphere; and

(G) ~nducting such other sarch and development activitiesas the Secreta considem appro riate, includin such activities

T #’ fnecessary to o tain the use o high-level ra ioactive waste,spent nuclear fhel, or other radioactive materials (such as anyhighly radioactive material from the Three Mile Island nuclearpowerplant or from the West Vane Demonstration Project) fortest and evaluation p~ iifsuc other activities are reason-ably necessary to support the repository program and if there isreasonable assurance that the radioactive sources involved willnot threaten the use of such site as a m

%i~ubion shall be(?) Tht? in situ testing authorized in tdemgned to ensure that the suitability of the site involved forlicensing by the Commission as a repository will not be adverselyaffected.

(d) USE OF EXISTING DEPARTMENT FAcmrrms.-I)uring the con-ducting of siting research activities under section 214 and for suchperiod thereafter as the Secretary considers appropriate, the Secre-tary shall use Department facilities owned by the Federal Govern-ment on the date of the enactment of this Act for the conducting of



generically applicable tests regarding packaging, handling, and em-placement technology for solidified high-level radioactive waste andspent nuclear fuel from civilian nuclear activities.

(e) ENGINEERED Barriers.-The system of engineered barriers andselected geology used in a test and evaluation facility shall have adesign life at least as long as that which the commission requires byregulations issued under this Act, or under the Atomic Energy Actof 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), for repositories.

(f) ROLE OF COMMISSION .-(1)(A) Not later than 1 year after thedate of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Commissionshall reach a written understanding establishing the procedures forreview, consultation, and coordination in the lanning, construction,

fand operation of the test and evaluation faci ity under this section.Such understanding shall establish a schedule, consistent with thedeadlines set forth in this subtitle, for submission by the Secretaryof, and review by the Commission of and necessary action on—

(i) the mission plan prepared under section 301; and(ii) such reports and other information as the Commission

may reasonably require to evaluate any health and safetyimpacts of the test and evaluation facility.

(B) Such understanding shall also establish the conditions underwhich the Commission may have access to the test and evaluationfacility for the purpose of assessing any public health and safetyconcerns that it may have. No shafts may be excavated for the testand evaluation until the Secretary and the Commission enter intosuch understanding.

(2) Subject to section 305, the test and evaluation facility, and thefacilities authorized in section 217, shall be constructed and o cr-ated as Rresearch, development, and demonstration facilities, ands allnot be subject to licensing under section 202 of the Energy Reorgani-zation Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5842).

(3)(A) The Commission shall carry out a continuing anal sis of theJactivities undertaken under this sedion to evaluate the a equacy of

the consideration of public health and safet issues.#(B) The Commission shall report to the resident, the Secretary,

and the Congress as the Commission considers appropriate withrespect to the conduct of activities under this section.

(g) ENVIRONM~AL RE V I E W. —The Secretary shall prepare anenvironmental impact statement under section 102(2)(C) of the Na-tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)) priorto conducting tests with radioactive materials at the test and evalua-tion facility. Such environmental impact statement shall incorpo-rate, to the extent practicable, the environmental assessment pre-pared under section 217(a). Nothing in this subsection may beconstrued to limit siting research activities conducted under section214. This subsection shall apply only to activities performed exclu-sively for a test and evaluation facility.

(h) LIMITATIONS .--(1) If the teat and evaluation facility is notlocated at the site of a repository, the Secretary shall obtain theconcurrence of the commission with respect to the decontaminationand decommissioning of such facility .

f(2) If the test and evaluation faci ity is not located at a candidatesite or repository site, the Secretary shall conduct only the portionof the in situ testing program requred in subsection (c) determined]ytithe Secretary to be useful in carrying out the purposes of this

.

.



Termination. (3) The operation of the test and evaluation facility shall termi-nati not later than—

(A) 5 years after the date on which the initial repositorybegins operation; or

(B) at such time as the Secretary determines that the contin-ued operation of a test and evaluation facility is not necessaryfor research, development, and demonstration purposes;

whichever occurs sooner.(4) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subsection, as

soon as practicable following any determination by the Secretary,with the concurrence of the Commission, that the test and evalua-tion facility is unsuitable for continued operation, the Secretaryshall take such actions as are n to remove from such site

“any radioactive material placed on such site as a result of testingand evaluation activities conducted under this section. Such require-ment may be waived if the Secretary, with the concurrence of theCommission, finds that short-term testing and evaluation activitiesusing radioactive material will not endanger the public health andsafety.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ON SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

42 USC 10198. SE C. 218. (a) D E M O N-TION AND C OOPERATIVE P R O G R A M S - T h eSecretary shall establish a demonstration program, in cooperationwith the private sector, for the dry storage of spent nuclear fuel atcivilian nuclear power reactor sites, with the objective of establish-ing one or more technologies that the Commission may, by rule,approve for use at the sites of civilian nuclear power reactorswithout, to the maximum extent practicable, the need for additionalsitespecific approvals by the Commission. Not later than 1 yearafter the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall selectat least 1, but not more than 3, sites evaluated under section 214 atsuch power reactors. In selecting such site or sites, the Secretaryshall give preference to civilian nuclear power reactors that willsoon have a sho

Ye of interim storage capacity for spent nuclear

fuel. Subject to reac ing agreement as provided in subsection (b), theSecretary shall undertake activities to assist such power reactorswith demonstration projects at such sites, which may use one of thefollowing types of alternate storage technologies: spent nuclear fuelstorage casks, caissons, or silos. The Secretary shall also undertake acooperative program with civilian nuclear power reactors to encour-age the development of the technology for spent nuclear fuel rodconsolidation in existing power reactor water stor e basins.

(b) coOPERATIVE A G R E E M E N T S. -TO c a rY

%out t e programs described in subsection (a), the Secreta shal enter into a cooperativeagreement with each utility involv3 ’that specifies, at a minimum,that—

(1) such utilit shall select the alternate storage technique toibe used, make t e land and spent nuclear fuel available for the

dry storage demonstration, submit and provide site-specific doc-umentation for a license ap lication to the timmission, obtain

fa license relating to the faci ity involved, construct such facility,operate such facilit after licensing, pay the costs required to

fconstruct such faci ity, and ay all costs?

associated with theoperation and maintenance o such facility;

(2) the Secretary shall provide, on a cost-sharing basis,consultative and technical assistance, including design support

316 ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radloactlve Waste


and generic licensing documentation, to assist such utility inobtaining the construction authorization and appropriate li-cense from the Commission; and

(3) the SeCre~ shall provide generic research and development of alternative spent nuclear fuel storage techniques toenhance utility-provided, atireactor storage capabilities, if au-thorized in any other provision of this Act or in any otherprovision of law.

(c) DRY STORAG= RmmAIUX AND DEVELO Pram.-(l) The consulta-tive and technical assistance referred to in subsection (M(2) mainclude, but shall not be limited to, the establishment of a researczand development program for the d storage of not more than 300

7metric tons of spent nuclear fuel at acilities owned by the FederalGovernment on the date of the enactment of this Act. The purpose

“ T“of such p shall be to collect necessary data to assist theutilities mvo ved’m the licensing recess.

$(2) TO the extent available, an consistent with the provisions ofsection 135, the Secretary shall provide spent nuclear. fuel for theresearch and development ?

!%rt{:zz;?o::z::!:i::from spent nuclear fuel recavsection 135. Such spent nuclear fuel shall not be subject to theprovisions of section 135(0).

(d) FUnlN~.-~e total contribution from the Secretary fromFederal finds and the use of Federal facilities or seMces shall notexceed 25 percent of the total costs of the demonstration programauthorized in subsection (a), as estimated by the Secretary. Allremaining costs of such pr

ram shall be paid by the utilities

involved or shall be provid by the Secretary from the InterimStor e Fund established in section 136.

%(e) E~mON ~ SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE pROGRAM.-Th0spent nuclear fuel sto

Ye program authorized in section 135 shall

not be construed to aut orize the use of research development ordemonstration ftilitiea owned by the Department unless—

(1) a period of 30 calendar days (not including any day in ~~&~O~alwhich either House of Congress is not in session because of ~O~~it~a~oumment of more than 3 calendar days to a da certain) has

r/!0after the Secretary has transmitted to the remittee on

ience and Technology of the House of Representatives and theCommittee on Ene~ and Natural Resources of the Senate awritten report contamin~ a full and complete statement con-cerning (A) the facility revolved; (B) any necessary modifica-tions; (C) the cost thereof; and (D) the impact on the authorizedresearch and development p

Tam; or

(2) each such committee, be ore the expiration of such period,has transmitted to the Secretary a written notice to the effectthat such committee has no objection to the proposed use ofsuch facility.

PAYMENTS TO STATES AND INDIAN TRIBES

SEC. 219. (a) PAYwnms.—Subject to subsection (b), the &cretary 42 USC 10199.shall make payments to each State or affected Indian tribe that hasentered into an agreement pursuant to section 215. The Secretaryshall pay an amount equal to 100 percent of the expenses incurredby such State or Indian tribe in engaging in any monitoring, testing,evaluation, or other consultation and cooperation activity undersection 215 with respect to any site. The amount paid by the

,



Secretary under this paragraph shall not exceed $3,000,000 per yearfrom the date on which the site involved was identified to the dateon which the decontamination and decommission of the facility iscomplete pursuant to section 217(h). Any such payment may only bemade to a State in which a potential site for a test and evaluationfacility has been identified under section 213, or to an affectedIndian tribe where the potential site has been identified under suchsection.

(b) LIMITATION .—The Secretary shall make any payment to aState under subsection (a) only if such State agrees to provide, toeach unit of general local government within the jurisdictionalboundaries of which the potential site or effectively selected siteinvolved is located, at least one tenth of the payments made by theSecretary to such State under such subsection. A State or affectedIndian tribe receiving any payment under subsection (a) shall other-wise have discretion to use such payment for whatever purpose itdeems necessary, including the State or tribal activities pursuant toagreements entered into in accordance with section 215. Annualpayments shall be prorated on a 365 day basis to the specified dates.

Report toCongress.42 USC 10200.

42 USC 10201.

Ante, p. 222’7.42 USC 10202.

42 USC 10203.

Joint notice,

Fublication inederal

Register.

STUDY OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS FOR MONITOREDRETRIEVABLE STORAGE PROPOSAL

SEC. 220. Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactmentof this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Congress a reportdescribing the research and development activities the Secretaryconsiders necessary to develop the proposal required in section141(b) with respect to a monitored retrievable storage facility.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

SW. 221. Judicial review of research and development activitiesunder this title shall be in accordance with the provisions of section119.

SE C. 222. RESEARCH ON ALTERNATIVES FOR THE PERMANENTDISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOActIVE WASTE. —The Secretary shallcontinue and accelerate a program of research, development, andinvestigation of alternative means and technologies for the perma-nent disposal of high-level radioactive waste from civilian nuclearactivities and Federal research and development activities exceptthat funding shall be made from amounts appropriated to theSecreta for purposes of carrying out this section. Such program

7shall inc ude examination of various waste disposal options.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IN THEFIELD OF SPENT FUEL STORAGE AND DISPOSAL

SEC. 223. (a) It shall be the policy of the United States to cooperatewith and provide technical assistance to non-nuclear weapon statesin the field of spent fuel storage and dis sal.

r(b)(l) Within 90 da s of enactment o this Act, the Secretary andthe Commission shal publish a joint notice in the Federal Registerstating that the United States is prepared to cooperate with andprovide technical assistance to non-nuclear weapon states in thefields of at-reactor spent fuel storage; away-from-reactor spent fuelstorage; monitored, retrievable spent fuel storage; geologic disposalof spent fuel; and the health, safety, and environmental regulation

318 c Managing the Nation’s Commercial H/gh-Leve/ Radioactive Waste


of such activities. The notice shall summarize the resources that canbe made available for international cooperation and assistance inthese fields through existing programs of the Department and theCommission, including the availability of: (i) data from past orongoin research and development projects; (ii) consultations with

kexpert partment or Commission personnel or contractors; and (iii)liaison with private business entities and organizations working inthese fields.

(2) The joint notice described in the preceding subparagraph shallbe updated and reissued annually for 5 succeeding years.

(c) Folloting ublication of the annual “oint notice referred to inR !paragraph (2), t e Secretary of State shal inform the governments

of non-nuclear weapon states and, as feasible, the organizationsoperating nuclear powerplants in such states, that the United Statesis prepared to cooperate with and rovide technical assistance to

fnon-nuclear weapon states in the lelds of spent fuel storage anddisposal, as set forth in the joint notice. The Secretary of State shallalso solicit expressions of interest from non-nuclear weapon stategovernments and non-nuclear weapon state nuclear power reactoroperators concerni

3their participation in expanded United States

cooperation and tec nical assistance programs in these fields. TheSecretary of State shall transmit any such expressions of interest tothe De artment and the Commission.

(d) *ith his budget presentation materials for the Departmentand the Commission for f~al years 1984 through 1989, the Presi-dent shall include fundin requesta for an expanded program ofcooperation and technicJ assistance with non-nuclear weaponstates in the fields of spent fuel stnrage and disposal as appropriate

%in 1. ht of expressions of interest in such cooperation and assistanceon t e part of non-nuclear weapon state governments and non-nuclear weapon state nuclear power reactor o raters.

r(e) For the purposes of this subsection, t e term “non-nuclearweapon state” shall have the same meaning as that set forth inarticle IX of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-ons (21 U.S.C. 438).

(f) Nothing in this subsection shall authorize the Department or& Commission to take any action not authorized under existing

.

TITLE III-OTHER PROVISI~~SF&LATING TO RADIOACTIVE

MISSION PLAN

SEC 301. (a) CONTENTS OF MISSION PmN.-The Secretary shallprepare a comprehensive re

rrt, to be known as the mission plan,

which shall provide an in ormational basis sufficient to permitinformed deasions to be made in carrying out the repository pregram and the research, development, and demonstration programsrequired under this Act. The mission plan shall include-

(1) an ident~fication ● of the primary scientific, engineering,and techmcal mformatlon, including any necessary demonstra-tion of engineering or systems integration, with respect to thesiting and construction of a test and evaluation facility andrepositories;

(2) an identification of any information described in para-graph (1) that is not available because of any unresolved scien-

Joint notice,reissuance.

Expressions ofinterest.

“Non-nuclearweapon state.”

42 USC 10221.

App. C—The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 ● 319P


Ante, p. 2208.

tifi~, engineering, or technical questions, or undemonstra@denP

eering or systems integration, a schedule including spe-Ci IC

v“or milestones for the research, development, and tech-

nology emonstration program required under this Act and anyadditional activities to be undertaken to provide such informat-ion, a schedule for the activities necessary to achieve importantprogrammatic milestones, and an estimate of the costs requiredto carry out such research, development, and demonstrationprograms;

(3) an evaluation of financial, political, legal, or institutionalproblems that may impede the implementation of this Act, theplans of the Secretary to resolve such problems, and recommen-dations for any necessary legislation to resolve such problems;

(4) any comments of the Secretary with respect to the purposeand program of the test and evaluation facility;

(5) a discussion of the significant results of research anddevelopment programs conducted and the implications for eachof the different geologic media under consideration for thesiting of repositories, and, on the basis of such information, acomparison of the advantages and disadvantages associatedwith the use of such media for repository sites;

(6) the gui#el@es issued under section l12(a);(?) ~odescrlptlon of known Sites at which site characterization

actnntms should be undertaken, a description of such sitingcharacterization activities, including the extent of planned exca-vations, plans for onsite testing with radioactive or nonradioac-tive material, plans for any investigations activities which mayaffect the capability of any such site to isolate high-level radio-active waste or spent nuclear fuel, plans to control any adverse,safety-related impacts from such site characterization activities,and plans for the decontamination and decommissioning of suchsite if it is determined unsuitable for licensing as a repository;

(8) an identification of the process for solidifying high-levelradioactive waste or packaging spent nuclear fuel, including asummary and analysis of the data to support the selection of thesolidification process and packaging techniques, an analysis ofthe requirements for the number of solidification packagingfacilities needed, a description of the state of the art for thematerials proposed to be used in packaging such waste or spentfuel and the availability of such materials including impacts onstrategic supplies and any requirements for new or reactivatedfacilities to produce any such materials needed, and a description of a plan, and the schedule for implementing such plan, foran aggressive research and development program to providewhen needed a high-integrity disposal package at a reasonableprice;

(9) an estimate of (A) the total reposito capacit r uired to7 r7safely accommodate the dis sal of all igh-leve ra ioactive

rwaste and spent nuclear fue expected to be generated throughDecember 31, 2020, in the event that no commercial reprocess-ing of spent nuclear fuel occurs, as well as the repositorycapacity that will be required if such reprocessing does occur;(B) the number and type of repositories required to beconstructed to provide such disposal capacity; (C) a schedule forthe construction of such repositories; and (D) an estimate of theperiod during which each repository listed in such schedule will

.-

3~ ● Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Rad/oact/ve Waste


be accepting high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuelfor disposal;

(10) an estimate, on an annual basis, of the costs required (A)to construct and operate the repositories anticipated to beneeded under paragraph (9) based on each of the assumptionsreferred to in such aragraph; (B) to construct and operate a

ftest and evaluation acility, or any other facilities, other thanrepositories described in subparagraph (A), determined to befi=d~; and (C) to ~ out any other activities under t~

(l’l) an identification of the possible adverse economic andother impacts to the State or Indian tribe involved that mayarise from the development of a test and evaluation facility or

itory at a site.(b)m&&SMON OF MISSION PLAN.+) Not later than 15 months

after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shallsubmit a draft mission plan to the States, the afhcted Indian tribes,the Commission, and other Government agencies as the Secretarydeems appropriate for their commenti.

(2) In preparing any commenta on the mission plan, such agenciesshall speci& with pr@sion any objections that the may have. U n

{ Gsubmission of the mission plan to such agencies, t e Secretarys 1publish a notice in the Federal

?ter of the submission of the

mission plan and of its availability or public inspection, and, uponreceipt of any comments of such agencies respecting the missionplan, the Secretary shall publish a notice in the Federal Register ofthe receipt of commenta and of the availability of the commenta for

Ppublic ins “on. If the Secretary does not revise the mission planto meet o jections specii%d in such comments, the Secretary shallpublish in the Federal Register a detailed statement for not sorevis”

%the mission plan.

(3) e Secretary, after reviewing any other comments made bysuch agencies and revising the mission plan to the extent that theSecreta may consider to be appropriate, shall submit the mission

7plan tot eap ropriatecommittees of the Congress not later than 17\months aRer t e date of the enactment of this Act. The mission plan

shall be used by the Secretary at the end of the first period of 30calendar days (not including any day on which either House ofCongms is not in session because of adjournment of more than 3calendar days to a day certain) following receipt of the mission planby the (hgress.

NU~R WASTE FUND

SEC 302. (a) Co-crs.-(l) In the performan ce of his functionsunder this Act, the Secretary is authorized to enter into contractswith any person who generates or holds title to high-level radioac-tive waste, ors nt nuclear fuel, of domestic origin for the accept-

%ance of title, su uent transportation, and disposal of such wasteor spent fuel. Suc contracts shall provide for payment to theSecretary of f- pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3) suficient too-t expenditures described in subsection (d).

(2) For electricity generated b a civilian nuclear wer reactorL rand sold on or after the date 90 ys after the date o enactment of

this Act, the f= under paragraph (1) shall be equal to 1.0 mil perkilowatt+hour.

Publication inFederalRe “ ter.rPu lic

inspection andagencycomments.

Plan submittalto congressionalcommittees.

42 USC 10222.

Fees.



Fees.

Ante, p. 2229,

Collection andpaymentprocedures.Review.

Transmittal toCongress.

42 USC! 6421.

Disposalservices, termsand conditions.

License renewalor issuance.

(3) For spent nuclear fuel, or solidified high-level radioactivewaste derived from spent nuclear fuel, which fuel was. used togenerate electricity in a civilian nuclear power reactor-prior to theapplication of the fee under paragraph (2) to such reactor, theSecretary shall, not later than 90 days after the date of enactment ofthis Act, establish a 1 time fee per kilogram of heavy metal in spentnuclear fuel, or in solidified high-level radioactive waste. Such feeshall be in an amount equivalent to an average charge of 1.0 mil perkilowatt-hour for electricity generated by such spent nuclear fuel, orsuch solidified high-level waste derived therefrom, to be collectedfrom any person delivering such spent nuclear fuel or high-levelwaste, pursuant to section 123, to the Federal Government. Such feeshall be paid to the Treasury of the United States and shall bedeposited in the separate fund established by subsection (c) 126(b). Inpaying such a fee, the person delivering spent fuel, or solidifiedhigh-level radioactive wastes derived therefrom, to the Federal Gov-ernment shall have no further financial obligation to the FederalGovernment for the long-term storage and permanent disposal ofsuch spent fuel, or the solidified high-level radioactive waste derivedtherefrom.

(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act,the Secretary shall establish procedures for the collection and pay-ment of the f- established by paragraph (2) and paragraph (3). TheSecretary shall annually review the amount of the fees establishedby paragraphs (2) and (3) above to evaluate whether collection of thefee will provide sufficient revenues to offset the costs as defined insubsection (d) herein. In the event the Secretary determines thateither insufficient or excess revenues are being collected, in order torecover the costs incurred by the Federal Government that arespecified in subsection (d), the Secretary shall propose an adjust-ment to the fee to insure full cost recovery. The Secretary shallimmediately transmit this proposal for such an adjustment to Con-gress. The adjusted fee proposed by the Secretary shall be effectiveafter a period of 90 days of continuous session have elapsedfollowing the rcei t of such transmittal unless during such 90-day period either # ouse of Congress adopts a resolution disapprov-ing the Secretary’s proposed adjustment” in accordance with theprocedures set forth for congressional review of an energy actionunder section 551 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.

(s) Contracts entered into under this section shall provide that—(A) following commencement of operation of a repository, the

Secretary shall take title to the high-level radioactive waste orspent nuclear fuel involved as expeditiously as practicable uponthe request of the generator or owner of such waste or spentfuel; and

(B) in return for the payment of fees established by thissection, the Secretary, beginning not later than January 31,1998, will dispose of the high-level radioactive waste or spentnuclear fuel involved as provided in this subtitle.

(6) The Secreta7

shall establish in writing criteria setting forththe terms and con itions under which such disposal services shall bemade available.

shall not issue or renew a license to any person to use a utilizationor production facility under the authority of section 103 or 104 of theAtomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134) unless—

322 . Manag/ng the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive w8St8


(i) such person has entered into a contract with the Secretaryunder this section; or

(ii) the Secretary affirms in writing that such person isactively and in ood ftith negotiating with the Secretary for acontract under &s“ section.

(B) The Commission,. as it deems necessary or appropriate, mayrequire as a preconchtlon to the issuance or renewal of a licenseunder section 103 or 104 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.2133, 2134) that the a plicant for such license shall have entered

Einto an agreement wit the Secretary for the dispoaal of high-levelradioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel that may result from theuse of such license.

.(2) Except as provided in paragraph (l), no spent nuclear fuel or

%h-level radioactive waste generated or owned by any person

(ot er than a de rtment of the United States referred to in sectionP101 or 102 of tit e 5, United States Code) ma be disposed of by the

iSecretary in any repository constructed un er this Act unless thegenerator or owner of such spent fiel or waste has entered into acontract with the Secretary under this section by not later than—

(A) June 30, 1933; or(B) the date on which such generator or owner commences

%eneration of, or takes title to, such spent fuel or waste;

whic ever occurs later.(3) me ~hk and duties of a party to a contract entered into

under this section may be assignable with transfer of title to thespent nucleear fuel or lugh-level radioactive waste involved.

(4) No9

h-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel generated ~~~l~/i:Oor owned y any de~ment of the United States refe~ to in ~Wti ~~ Swntsection 101 or 102 of title 5, Umted States Code, may ~ d~posed of ~UCl~~~ fU~l.by the Secretary m any repomtory constructed under tlus ~ttii~n~~gsuch department transfers to the Secretary, for de

rNuclear Waste Fund, amounts equivalent to the fees t at would bepaid to the Secretary under the contracts referred to in this sectiond such waste or spent fiel were n~~~lbi an other Pewn.

(c) E STABLISHMENT OF N UCLEAR v .—Aere hereb isJestablished in the Treasu of the United States a separate fun , to

8be known as the Nuclear aste Fund. The Waste Fund shall consistof—

(1) all recei , proceeds,L

and recoveries realized by the Secre-tary under su ions (a), (b), and (e), which shall be depositedin the Waste Fund immediately upon their realization;

(2) any appropriations made by the Congress to the WasteFund; and

(3) any unexE

nded balances available on the date of theenactment of t “ Act for functions or activities necessary orincident to the disposal of civilian hi h-level radioactive waste

tor civilian spent nuclear fuel, whic shall automatically betransferred to the Waste Fund on such date.

(d) USE OF WASTB FUND.-Th(? secretary may make expendituresfrom the Waste Fund, sub”ect to subsection (e), onl for purposes of

/radioactive waste disposa activities under titles r and II, includ- j:~:? PP. 2~~Jing—

(1) the identification, develo ment, licensing, construction,ioperation, decommissioning, an poatdecomrnissioning mainte-

nance and monitoring of any repository, monitored, retrievablestorage facility or test and evaluation facility constructed underthis Act;


96 STAT. 2260 PUBLIC LAW 97-425–JAN. 7, 1983

Ante, p. 2220,2225, !253.

Report toCongrees.

Budgetsubmittal.

Ante, p. 907.

Ante, p. 927.

(2) the conducting of nongenetic research, development, anddemonstration activities under this Act;

(3) the administrative cost of the radioactive waste disposalprogram;

(4) any costs that may be incurred by the Secretary in connec-tion with the transportation, treating, or packaging of spentnuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste to be disposed of ina repository, to be stored in a monitored, retrievable storage siteor to be used in a test and evaluation facility;

(5) the costs associated with acquisition, design, modification,replacement, operation, and construction of facilities at arepository site, a monitored, retrievable storage site or a testand evaluation facility site and necessary or incident to suchrepository, monitored, retrievable storage facility or test andevaluation facility; and

(6) the provision of assistance to States, units of general localgovernment, and Indian tribes under sections 116, 118, and 219.

No amount maybe expended by the Secretary under this subtitle forthe construction or expansion of an facility unless such construc-

ttion or expansion is expressly aut orized by this or subsequentlegislation. The Secretary hereby is authorized to construct onerepository and one test and evaluation facility.

(e) ADMINISTRATION OF W ASTE FuND.-(1) The Secretary of theTreasury shall hold the Waste Fund and, after consultation with theSecretary, annually report to the Congress on the financial condi-tion and operations of the Waste Fund during the preceding fiscalyear.

(2) The Secretary shall submit the budget of the Waste Fund tothe Offlce of Management and Budget triennially along with thebudget of the Department of Energy submitted at such time inaccordance with chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code. Thebudget of the Waste Fund shall consist of the estimates made by theSecretary of expenditures from the Waste Fund and other relevantfinancial matters for the succeeding 3 fiscal years, and shall beincluded in the Budget of the United States Government. TheSecretary may make expenditures from the Waste Fund, subject toappropriations which shall remain available until expended. Appro-priations shall be subject to triennial authorization.

(3) If the Secretary determines that the Waste Fund contains atany time amounts in excess of current needs, the Secretary mayrequest the Secretary of the Treasury to invest such amounts, orany portion of such amounts as the Secretary determines to beappropriate, in obligations of the United States—

(A) having maturities determined by the Secretary of theTreasury to be appropriate to the needs of the Waste Fund; and

(B) bearing interest at rates determined to be appropriate bythe Secretary of the Treasury, taking into consideration thecurrent average market yield on outstanding marketable obliga-tions of the United States with remaining periods to maturitycomparable to the maturities of such investments, except thatthe interest rate on such investments shall not exceed theaverage interest rate applicable to existing borrowings.

(4) Receipts, proceeds, and recoveries realized by the Secretaryunder this section, and expenditures of amounts from the WasteFund, shall be exempt from annual apportionment under the provi-sions of subchapter II of chapter 15 of title 31, United States Code.



(5) If at any time the moneys available in the Waste Fund areinsufficient to enable the Secretary to discharge his responsibilitiesunder this subtitle, the Secretary shall issue to the Secretary of theTreasu~ obligations in such forms and denominations, bearing suchmaturitms, and subject to such terms and conditions as may be_ tO by the Secretary and the Secretary of the Treasu . The

Ttotal of such obligations shall not exceed amounta provi ed inappropriation Acts. Redemption of such obligations shall be made bthe Secretary from moneys available in the Waste Fund. Suciobl” ations shall bear interest at a rate determined by the Secretary

%oft e Treasury, which shall be not less than a rate determined bytaking into consideration the average market “eld on outstanding

Pmarketable obligations of the United States o comparable maturi-ties during the month preceding the issuance of the obligationsunder this paragraph. The Secretary of the Treasu shall purchaseany issued obligations, and for such pu

rthe %ecretary of the

Treasury is authorized to use as a pu lic debt transaction theproceeds from the sale of any securities issued under chapter 31 oftitle 31, United States Code, and the purposes for which securities A~ti, P. 93’7.may be issued under such Act are extended to include any purchaseof such obl” tions. The Secretary of the Treasury may at any time

rsell any oft e obl” tions acquired by him under this ragraph. AllLredemptions, fpurc P, and sales by the Secretary o the Treasury

of obligations under this paragraph shall be treated as public debttransactions of the United States.

(6) Any appropriations made available to the Waste Fund for any 1n~~t

FUYdescribed in subsection (d) shall be repaid into the general ~Ymen~.

un of the Treasury, together with interest from the date of avail-ability of the app~ riations until the date of repayment. Suchinterest shall be 1

%’on the cumulative amount of ap ropriations

available to the taste Fund, less the average undis ursed cashbalance in the Waste Fund account during the f-l year involved.The rate of such interest shall be determined by the Secretary of theTreasury taking into consideration the average market yield duringthe month pmcedi

reach fti year on outstanding marketable

obligations of the nited States of comparable maturity. Interest Wferral.

Fayments maybe deferred with the approval of the Secretary of thereasury, but any interest payments so deferred shall themselves

bear interest.ALTERNATIVE MEAN5 OF FINANCING

SEC. 303. The Secretary shall undertake a study with respect to ~:uj& ~0223alternative approaches to managing the construction and operationof all civilian radioactive waste management facilities, including thefeasibility of establishin a rivate coconducti

a% LmkwxiYz::Yiz:k:;:r&k:such study, t e

of the m of Management and Budget, the Chairman of theCommission, and such other Federal agency representatives as maybeuap ropriate. Such study shall be completed, and a m rt contain- &~@~=~

J re results of such study shall be submitted to t e Congress,within 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACMVE WASTE MANAGEMENT

Sw. $04. (a) EBTmHsHMmrr.-There hereby is established within 42 LJSC KYZ4.the Department of Energy an Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste



Report toCongress

42 USC 10225.

Ante, p. 2206.

Ante, p. 2217.

Regulations orguidance.42 USC 10226.

Management. The OffIce shall be headed by a Director, who shall beappointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent ofthe Senate, and who shall be compensated at the rate payable forlevel IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5,United States Code.

(b) FUNCTIONS OF D I R EctO R. —The Director of the OffIce shall beresponsible for carrying out the functions of the Secretary underthis Act, subject to the general supervision of the Secretary. TheDirector of the Office shall be directly res risible to the Secretary.

(c) ANNUAL REPORT TO iNGRESS. r—The irector of the Office shallannually prepare and submit to the Congress a comprehensivereport on the activities and expenditures of the Office.

(d) ANNUAL AUDIT BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL.-The comptrollerGeneral of the United States shall annually make an audit of theOffIce, in accordance with such regulations as the ComptrollerGeneral may prescribe. The Comptroller General shall have accessto such books, records, accounts, and other materials of the Office asthe Comptroller General determines to be necessary for the prepara-tion of such audit. The Corn troller General shall submit to thefCongress a report on the resu s of each audit conducted under thissection.

LOCATION OF TEST AND EVALUATION FACILITY

SEC. 305. (a) REPORT TO CoNGREss.-Not later than 1 ear after thedate of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary sha 1 transmit tothe Congress a report setting forth whether the Secretary plans tolocate the test and evaluation facility at the site of a repository.

(b) PR N E D U R E S .-(1) If the test and evaluation facility is to belocated at any candidate site or repository site (A) site selection anddevelopment of such facility shall be conducted in accordance withthe procedures and requirements established in title i with respectto the site selection and development of repositories; and (B) theSecretary may not commence construction of any surface facility forsuch test and evaluation facility prior to issuance by the Commis-sion of a construction authorization for a repository at the siteinvolved.

(2) No test and evaluation facility may be converted into a reposi-tory unless site selection and development of such facility wasconducted in accordance with the procedures and requirementsestablished in title I with respect to the site selection and development of repositories.

(3) The Secretary may not commence construction of a test andevaluation facility at a candidate site or site recommended as thelocation for a repository prior to the date on which the designationof such site is effective under section 115.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TRAINING AUTHORIZATION

S E C. 306. N UCLEAR R EGULATORY C OMMISSION T RAINING A U T H O R I-zATIoN.-The Nuclear Regulatory commission is authorized anddirected to promulgate regulations, or other appropriate Commis-

:sion regulatory guidance, for the training an qualifications ofcivilian nuclear powerplant operators, supervisors, technicians andother appropriate operating personnel. Such regulations or guidanceshall establish simulator training requirements for applicants forcivilian nuclear powerplant operator licenses and for operator re-



qualification programs; requirements governing NRC administra-tion of requalification examinations; requirements for operatingtests at civilian nuclear powerplant simulators, and instructionalrequirements for civilian nuclear powerplant licensee personneltraining programs.shall be promulgated b the Commission within the 12-month period

{following enactment o this Act, and the Commission within the 12-month period following enactment of this Act shall submit a reportto Congress setting forth the actions the Commission has taken withrespect to fulfilling its obligations under this section.

Approved January 7, 1983.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY-H.R. 3809:

HOUSE REPORT No. 97-491 t.1 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs) and pt. 2I(Comm. on rmed Services).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 128 (1982):Sept.30, Nov. 29,30, Dec. 2, considered and passed House.Dec. 20, considered and passed Senate, amended; House agreed to Senate

amendments.WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1983):

Jan. 7, Presidential statement.

,.

Appendix D

Performance Requirements for a GeologicRepository as Specified in Nuclear Regulatory

Commission Regulation 10 CFR Part 60

Paragraph Performance requirement60. 113(a)(l) Engineered Barrier System—Contain-

ment of the high-level waste within thewaste package must be substantiallycomplete during the period when radia-tion and thermal conditions in the engi-neered barrier system are dominated byfission products decay. Such periodwould be between 300 and 1,000 yearsas determined by the NRC for individ-ual cases according to factors specifiedin 60. 113(b).

Any subsequent release of radionu-clides shall be a gradual process of smallfractional releases to the geologic settingover long periods of time. For disposalin the saturated zone, both partial andcomplete filling with ground water ofavailable void spaces in the undergroundfacility shall be appropriately consideredand analyzed among the anticipatedprocesses and events in designing the en-gineered barrier system.

The release rate for any radionuclideshall not exceed 10-5 per year of its in-ventory calculated to be present 1,000years after emplacement [60.113(a)(l)(B)].This requirement does not apply to anyradionuclide which is released at a rateless than 0.1 percent of the calculatedtotal release rate limit. The calculatedtotal release rate limit shall be taken tobe one part in 100,000 per year of theinventory of radioactive waste originallyemplaced in the underground facilitythat remains after 1,000 years of radioac-tive decay. Other fractional release limitsmay be specified by NRC for individualcases [60. 113(b)].

60. 113(a)(2) Geologic Setting—The repository shallbe located so that pre-waste-emplace-ment ground water travel time from thedisturbed zone to the accessible environ-ment shall be at least 1,000 years, orother travel time approved or specifiedby the Commission [60.l13(b)].

Paragraph Performance requirement60. 113(b) On a case-by-case basis NRC may de-

termine the required waste package con-tainment period, subsequent radioactivenuchde release rates, or pre-waste-em-placement ground water travel time, tak-ing into account the overall system per-formance objective and factors such asthe following:—generally applicable EPA standards

for radioactivity;—age and nature of waste as well as de-

sign of the underground facility, par-ticularly with respect to the time whenthe thermal pulse is dominated by thedecay heat of fission products;

—geochemical characteristics of the hostrock, surrounding strata, and groundwater; and

—particular sources of uncertainty inpredicting the repository perform-ance.

60.131 General design criteria for the geologicrepository operations area.

60. 131(a) Radiological Protection—The geologicrepository operation area shall be de-signed to maintain radiation doses, lev-els, and concentrations of radioactivematerial in air-restrictedl areas withinthe limits specified in part 202 of thischapter.

60. 131(b) Structures, Systems, and ComponentsImportant to Safety—The repositorysystem must include the following pro-tective features:—protection against anticipated natural

phenomena and environmental con-ditions,

—protection against dynamic effects ofequipment failure and similar events,

1A restricted area is any area, access to which is controlled for purposes ofprotection of individuals from exposure to radiation.

210 CFR 20 establishes standards for protection against radiation hazardsfrom licensed activities. Standards are established to protect both the workersand the general public.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.

3 2 7


Paragraph Performance requirement—protection against fires and ex-

plosions,—emergency capability,—utility services under normal and ac-

cident conditions,—periodic inspection testing and main-

tenance,

Paragraph Performance requirement—control against critical conditions

under normal and accidental con-ditions,

—instrumentation and control systems,—compliance with mining regulations,—safe shaft conveyances for radioactive

waste handling.

,

Appendix E

Procedure for Establishing a Repositoryfor Commercial Nuclear Waste

Governing lawProcedural step or regulation


Site Selection:● Secretary of DOE issues NWPA—sec.

guidelines. 1 12(a)

● State or affected Indian tribe NWPA—sees.may submit notice of disap- 115(b), 116(b),proval of site to Congress 118(a)within 60 days.

● Secretary of DOE nominates NWPA—sec.at least five sites 1 1 0 ,for characterization, accompa- (E)nied by environmentalassessment.

● Secretary of DOE recommends NWPA—sec.to the President three 1 1 0of at least five sites for sitecharacterization.

● President approves or disap- NWPA—sec.proves recommended sites 1 12(C)(1)for site characterization.

● President may delay decision NWPA—sec.for 6 months. 1 12(C)(2)

● Secretary of DOE submits site NWPA—sec.characterization plan. 113(b)(l)

● NRC prepares site charac- 10 CFRterization analysis. 60.1 l(d),(e),(f)

● DOE submits semiannual pro- NWP.4—sec.gress reports to Congress and 113(b)(3)NRC during site characteri- 10 CFRzation activities. 60.1 l(g)

● Secretary of DOE submits rec- NWPA—sec.ommendation of a site for de- 1 14(a),(f)velopment of a repository toPresident, accompanied bysupporting documentation andan Environmental ImpactStatement.

● President may submit request NWPA—sec.to Congress to delay recom- 1 1 0mendation of a site for a re-pository.

● President submits recommen- NWPA—sec.dation to Congress for the site 1 1 0to be developed as a re-pository.

Congress may override disap- NWPA—sec.proval notice within 90 days of 115(c)continuous session.

● If first site recommended is NWPA—sec.not approved, President must 1 14(a)(3)submit another recommenda-tion within 1 year after disap-proval.

Construction Authorization and License:● Following site designation and NWPA—sees.

within 90 days after approval l14(b), 115by Congress, the Secretary ofDOE submits an applicationfor construction authorizationto NRC.

● NRC submits annual progress NWPA—sec.reports to Congress on status 1 14(C)of application.

● NRC may adopt Environ- NWPA—sec.mental Impact Statement 114(f)of DOE to fulfill its obligationto prepare same.

● NRC may approve or dis- NWPA—sec.approve issuance of con- 114(d)struction authorization.

● NRC must issue final decision NWPA—sec.on application within 3 years 114(d)after application is submitted.Decision may be delayed up toone additional year.

Consultation and Cooperation by States,Affected Indian Tribes, and Public: States or affected Indian tribes NWPA sees.

must be notified and public l o ;hearings held prior to site 112(b)(2)nomination,

329


-.


—● The Secretary of DOE must NWPA—sec.

seek to enter into binding 1 17(C)written agreement with Stateor affected Indian tribe regard-ing procedures for consultationand cooperation.

● President or Secretary of DOE NWPA—sec.must submit notice to State 1 12(C)or affected Indian tribe regard-ing decisions on sites recom-mended by DOE for charac-terization.

● Secretary of DOE must submit NWPA—sec.copies of site characterization 113(b)plan to States or affected In-dian tribe for their review andcomment.

Secretary of DOE must submit NWPA—sec.semiannual reports on site 113(b)(3)characterization activities toState or affected Indian tribe.

● DOE must notify State or af- NWPA—sec.fected Indian tribe if site 1 13(C)(3)characterization activities areterminated.

● The Secretary of DOE must NWPA—sec.conduct public hearings 1 14(a)(l)at each site under considera-tion prior to recommending asite for a repository.


● State or affected Indian tribe NWPA—sees.may submit notice of dis- 116(b), 118(a)approval of site to Congress.

● Site is disapproved unless NWPA—sec . —

Congress passes a joint 115(C)resolution of repository sitingapproval within 90 days ofcontinuous session.

● State or affected Indian tribe NWPA—sec.must be provided with a 114(b)copy of the application forconstruction authorization.

Scheduling:● Secretary of DOE must NWPA—sec.

prepare project decision 1 14(e)(l)schedule.

● Agencies that cannot comply NWPA—sec.with schedule must so notify 1 14(e)(2)Secretary of DOE and Con-gress.

Funding:● All costs paid out of Nuclear NWPA—sees.

Waste Fund. 116(c)(5),18(b)(6);302(d\

● Cost for disposal of defense NWPA—sees.high-level waste will be paid 8(b)(2),into Nuclear Waste Fund by 302(b)(4)Federal Government.

SOURCE U.S Depanment of Energy,

● Secretary of DOE must notify NWPA—sec.State or affected Indian 1 14(a)(l)tribe prior to recommending asite for a repository.

.

.

Appendix F

Spent Fuel Projections

Each table provides the following information for each year out to the projected end of life for all plants involved:● the projected annual spent fuel discharges;● the projected cumulative spent fuel inventories; and● the projected annual and cumulative requirements for additional storage capacity outside of the reactor basin,

based on the “maximum at-reactor capacity” case. (See U.S. Department of Energy, Spent Fuel StorageRequirements, DOE-RL-83-1. These data are based on inventories and projections as of Sept. 30, 1982.)

All results are given both in number of assemblies and in metric tons of uranium. The inventories as of Dec.31, 1982, are given in the first line of table F-1. (No such inventories exist for the light-water-reactors that arenot currently operating. )

The cumulative inventories given in tables F-1 and F-2 do not include spent fuel that is currently stored at theWest Valley and GE-Morris facilities. A breakdown of this fuel is as follows:

West Valley

MTU AssembliesBoiling-water reactor . . . . . 75.1 515

P r e s s u r i z e d - w a t e r r e a c t o r . 9 3 . 4 235— .

Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168.5 750

Aggregate to ta l s :

GE-MorrisMTU Assemblies141.6 753177.3 459— .318.9 1,212

487.4 1,962

The cumulative inventories also do not include any corrections for possible future shipments of spent fuel to orfrom nonreactor destinations, because there are no accurate projections of such shipments. Any such shipmentswould reduce requirements for additional spent fuel storage at reactor sites.

The assumed storage capacity of existing basins does not reflect potential technical measures that can increasethe pool capacity, including burnup credit reracking and rod consolidation.

331

.-


Table F= I.—Spent Fuel Storage Projections: Total Currently Operating Light-Water Reactors

Annual Cumulative Annual storagea Cumulative storagedischarge inventory requirements requirements

Year Tonnes Assemblies Tonnes Assemblies Tonnes Assemblies Tonnes Assemblies1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3011984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4271985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3911986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3801987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,5561968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4871989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3161990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,6111991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4151992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3591993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,5751994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4011995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3711996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,6181997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3681998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3361999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,7172000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3972001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3022002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,6322003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3712004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4552005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,5642006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,6512007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,6792008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,2452009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,1522010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W62011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9582012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7522013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5672014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7142015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5062016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6142017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5612018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2702019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1892020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2142022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1682023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0

—4,5954,9034,8044,6935,6165,1204,5825,6644,9904,6995,7104,8374,8395,8144,7454,7546,0104,6644,6745,8174,7355,2285,5416,2335,7838,2783,4863,1953,5922,4752,3422,6401,9072,2642,239

690761326

xo

8,5079,808

11,23412,62414,00415,56017,04718,36319,98420,39022,74924,32425,72627,09728,71530,10331,43933,15634,55335,85637,48938,85940,31541,88043,53145,20947,45448,60749,51250,74151,22351,78952,50453,01153,62454,18854,45454,64354,77354,96755,15555,155

31,26035,85540,75845,34650,25555,87160,99165,57371,43776,42781,12686,83691,67396,512

102,326107,071111,825117,835122,699127,373133,190137,925143,153148,694154,927160,710168,988172,492175,669179,261181,736184,078166,718188,625190,889193,128193,318194,579194,905195,408195,794195,794

00

13

:174201297520408596676641766

1,050941

1,0511,4611,2031,1911.5481;2731,2601,4981,1911,2621,104

8066386413974365722823552621818757

13600

00

280

227402675947

2,0721,4612,1202,5032,2042,5673,7453,0623,8285,2324,1404,2825,5864,5234,4435,3974,0884,5673,5792,6762,3322,2071,4541,7012,313

9501,3541,121

497201133326

00

00

1313

112286487784

1,3041,7122,3082,9843,6254,3915,4416,3837,4348,916

10,11811,30812,85714,13015,39116,38918,08019,34220,44621,31221,88922,53122,92723,16323,93624,21824,57224,85325,01525,10225,16025,29625,296

00

2828

255657

1,3322,2794,3515,8127,932

10,43512,63915,20618,95122,01325,84131,07335,21339,49545,08149,60454,04759,44463,53268,09971,67874,35476,68678,89380,34782,04864,36185,31186,64787,78688,28388,48468,61788,94366,94388.94325;296 ,

.

.

%torage requirad outside of existing reactor basins.

—

App. F—Spent Fuel Projections . 333

Table F-2.—Spent Fuel Storage Projections: Totai Light-Water Reactors With Construction Permits

Annual Cumulative Annual storagea Cumulative storagedischarge inventory requirements requirements

Year Tonnes Assemblies Tonnes Assemblies Tonnes Assemblies Tonnes Assemblies1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2027 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2028 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2029 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

00

193515831936

1,2651,2561,6271,5171,4781,5081,5111,5491,5221,5251,6081,5021,5191,4781,5941,5811,4791,5691,4811,6081,4661,5041,6091,5011,5481,6381,4601,6631,2201,3671,5401,3081,3101,0171,2071,6381,2881,027

788669577104

0

00

7081,8093,0323,3654,2664,0665,4195,1774,8875,2694,9785,2565,1395,1695,3934,9205,3324,7655,4645,4734,7735,3954,9175,3845,0405,1445,3984,9165,3886,1194,9966,2183,7884,5195,1463,9884,0703,3203,5916,3334,0253,2992,5842,0142,225

1930

00

193708

1,5392,4753,7404,9966,6238,1409,618

11,12612,63714,18615,70817,23318,84120,34321,86223,34024,93426,51527,99429,56331,04436,25234,13835,64237,25138,75240,30042,13843,61845,28146,50147,86649,40850,71652,02653,04354,25055,88857,17658,20358,99159,66060,23760,34160,341

0

7 :2,5175,5498,914

13,18017,24622,66527,84232,72937,99842,97648,23253,37158,54063,93368,85374,16578,95064,41489,88794,660

100,055104,972110,356115,396120,540125,938130,854136,242142,361147,357153,575157,363161,682167,028171,016175,086178,406181,997188,330192,355195,654196,236200,252202,477202,670202,670

0000000

460

744664

151253348343485501620

: :933952

1,1591,1411,3391,2791,3451,4061,3681,3761,3661,1731,3011,1731,3111,2851,0961,079

991997961871

1,027766669577104

0

0000000

252

31:252150498827

1,3991,2141,9441,6692,6152,2143,2073,4723,2644,1043,8984,5394,4264,7094,7894,6264,9544,5753,9534,4013,6394,3974,2233,5163,5503,2623,1093,4262,7053,2992,5842,0142,225

1930

0000000

4646

120166230381635982

1,3251,8102,3112,9313,5154,3825,3166,2687,4278,5689,907

11,18512,53013,93615,30316,67918,04619,21820,51921,69123,00224,28625,38426,46327,45428,45129,41230,28331,31032,09832,76733,34433.44833:448

o000000

252252570822972

1,4702,2973,6964,9106,8548,723

11,33813,55216,75920,23123,49527,59931,49736,03640,46245,17149,96054,58659,54064,11568,06872,46976,10880,50564,72888,24491,79495,05698,165

101,591104,296107,595110,179112,193114,418114,611114,611

%torage requirecfoutside of existing reactor basins.

Repository or MRS LoadingAppendix G

CapacityRequired To Remove Spent Fuel From

Reactor Sites Within 10 and 15 YearsAfter Reactor Decommissioning

Practically all of the spent fuel discharged by the endof this century is likely to still be in storage at that time,most likely storage basins at the sites of the reactors thatproduced it. The possibility of further delays in the avail-ability of reprocessing or disposal facilities has led to con-cern that existing reactor sites might become de factolong-term repositories. This appendix is an effort to esti-mate how long spent fuel might have to remain at reac-tor sites if geologic repositories (or alternative Federalwaste management facilities) do not become availableuntil the high-confidence dates discussed in chapter 6—2008 and 2012 for the two geologic repositories, or aslate as 2012 for both of two monitored retrievable stor-age (MRS) facilities. For purposes of comparison, theNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has deter-mined that spent fuel can be stored at reactor sites‘‘safely and without significant environmental impacts”for at least 30 years after the reactor ceases operational

There are two key determinants of the time spent fuelwould have to remain at reactor sites: 1) the maximumrate at which spent fuel can be unloaded from storageat reactor sites; and 2) the maximum rate at which itcan be loaded at Federal waste management facilties.This analysis assumes that a loading rate of 3,000 tonnesper year (tonnes/yr) can be achieved for either a geologicrepository or an MRS facility. Consequently, the fea-sible loading schedule is primarily determined by thedates on which such facilities become available. Thecurves bounding area “C” in table G-1 show the totalcumulative loading capacity that will be available if two3,000-tonnes/yr repositories or MRS facilities beginoperating in 2008 and 2012, or if both begin operating(upper bound) in 2012 (lower bound).

The other crucial assumption in these calculations isthe rate at which spent fuel can be removed from reac-tor sites. A precise analysis of achievable reactor un-loading scenarios would require a detailed evaluationof the conditions at each reactor, an analysis that wasbeyond the scope of this study. To estimate a reasona-

‘U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ‘‘10 CFR Parts 50 and 51: WasteConfidence Decision, ” Federd Re&”ster, vol. 49, No. 171 (Aug. 31, 1984),p. 34660.

334

ble upper bound of the time it would take to unload re-actor sites, OTA made the following assumptions:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Only legaf weight truck casks are used. This is aconservative assumption, since many reactors havea railroad spur that would allow the use of rail caskswith a much larger capacity than truck casks.No rod consolidation is done at the reactor siteprior to shipment. This also adds conservatism, be-cause consolidation (which may prove to be an eco-nomically attractive means of providing additionalstorage capacity) could increase the amount ofspent fuel in each cask and thus reduce the num-ber of shipments needed to remove a given amountof fuel from the reactor site.The truck casks are designed for fuel that is at least10 years old. Existing casks are designed for veryhot spent fuel; casks designed for fuel that is at least10 years old could hold about twice as much spentfuel as current designs (see ch. 3). Thus a legalweight truck cask opimized for unconsolidated old-er spent fuel could hold two pressurized-water re-actor (PWR) assemblies (about 0.9 tonne), or per-haps four boiling water reactor (BWR) assemblies(about 0.75 tonne). Existing casks, by comparison,hold only one PWR assembly or two BWR assem-blies.

This assumption does not add conservatism, butit appears to be quite reasonable in view of the eco-nomic incentives to increase cask capacity wherepossible.Ail spent fuel must be loaded into transportationcasks using the existing handling facilities the re-actor site. This is also a conservative consumption,since some technologies for additional on-site stor-age would allow the stored fuel to be shipped with-out first returning to the reactor’s water basin forloading into transportation casks. If such technol-ogies are used, the result would be a higher totalrate at which fuel can be removed from the site.

Using these assumptions, an unloading rate of 100to 150 tonnes/yr appears technically feasible at most re-actors. A recent study of spent fuel transportation op-tions for several Tennessee Valley Authority reactors

App. G—Repository or MRS Loading Capacity Required To Remove Spent Fuel From Reactor Sites ● 335

150

4 0

Figure G“I.—Spent Fuel Loading Scenarios

.

30

20

10

0I2000

Key:

=

=

Capacity needed to accommodate all spent fuelwithin 15 years of decommissioning

Capacity needed to accommodate all spent fuelwithin 10 years of decommissioning

Capacity available under OTA Mission Plan, with tworepositories or MRS facilities both starting in 2008(high range) or in 2008 and 2012 (low range) /

v I 1 1 1 1 1 1

2ooi - 2oio - 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045

Year

— .2050

Assumptions:1. Projections are for reactors operating or under construction on June 31, 19S4. Reactor discharge data and estimated dates of decommissioning supplied by U.S.

Department of Energy.2. Shared basins we aasumed to be unloaded after the last reactor using the basin is decommissioned.3. For 4 reactors raaching end-of-life before 1998, decommissioning is assumed to occur in 1998.4. Repositories or MRS facilities achieve a loading rate of 3,000 tonnes per year in 4 years, beginning with 375 tonnes the first year, 750 tonnes the second, and 1,500

tonnes the third.5. Repository or MRS capacity assumed to be 70,000 tonnes each.SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.


(including both BWRS and PWRS) indicates that about16 hours, or two 8-hour work shifts, would be requiredto load one truck cask using the existing reactor facil-ities. 2 If only one truck cask were loaded at a time (insome cases, twp or three could be loaded at once with-out a proportionate increase in time), and each heldabout 0.75 tonnes (BWR assemblies), it would take 200shipments each year to achieve a 150-tonnes/yr unload-ing rate. While this could not be accomplished usingonly one shift per day, it appears possible with double-shifting. Since a rate of 100 tonnes/yr would require 133shipments (or 266 8-hour shifts), that rate might be ac-complished with only one shift per day.

Regulations limiting the annual radiation exposureof workers might become a constraint for such largenumbers of shipments per year, even if the technicalability exists. If so, this would have to be taken into ac-count in determining the desired unloading rate forthose reactors where this problem was encountered. Theamount of worker exposure may also depend on whetherall spent fuel has to be returned to the reactor’s storagebasin for loading into transportation casks. Thus, itcould be an additional reason why the choice of tech-nologies for out-of-basin storage would significantly af-fect the achievable reactor site unloading rate, as dis-cussed below.

The curves bounding areas “A” and “B” in figureG-1 show the cumulative amounts of spent fuel thatwould have to be shipped from reactors to enable allfuel to be removed from each reactor site within 10 years(area “B”) or 15 years (area “A”) after the currentlyprojected dates of decommissioning of the reactors,using two assumed unloading rates for each reactor {100tonnes/yr and 150 tonnes/yr) to define the upper andlower bounds. Where two or more reactors share stor-age facilities, shipment is assumed to begin when thelast reactor using the facilities is decommissioned. Thelower the achievable unloading rate, the soonerr off-site loading capacity will be required to allow spentfuel to be removed from reactor sites within a speci-fied period.

Area “B” shows that if a 150-tonne/yr average un-loading rate can be achieved for each reactor (lowerbound), it is not necessary to start removing spent fuelfrom reactor sites until 2007 in order to complete theprocess for each reactor within 10 years of expected de-commissioning (with the exception of the four reactorsreaching end-of-life before 1998). If the maximumachievable unloading rate is 100 tonnes/yr (upperbound), it would be necessary to start shipments in 2001in order to remove spent fuel from all sites within 10

‘Boeing Nuclear Power Systems, Inc., Spent Fued Shipping Cask Design andTransport Study, D275-50002 (prepared for TVA under contract No.TV51222A), March 1981, pp. 54-61.

years of decommissioning. To unload sites within 15years of decommissioning (area “A”), shipments neednot begin until 2006 (at 100 tonnes/yr) or even 2012 (at150 tonnes/yr).

If a first repository or MRS facility begins loadingat the rate of 3,000 tonnes/yr in 2008 (“C” upperbound), by the end of 2009 it will have exceeded thecumulative loading capacity needed to remove spent fuelfrom reactors within 10 years of decommissioning if theunloading rate is 150 tonnes/yr (’‘B’ lower bound), orwithin 15 years regardless of unloading rate (“A’ ‘). Ifthe second repository is available by 2012, their com-bined cumulative loading capacity by 2019 would ex-ceed the amount needed for the most extreme case—un-loading all reactors within only 10 years of decom-missioning, at an average rate of only 100 tonnes/yr ateach reactor (’‘B” upper bound).

Even if the two 3,000-tonne/yr facilities did not beginloading until 2012 (“C” lower bound), they could stillaccept the spent fuel from practically all reactor siteswithin 15 years of decommissioning at an average 150-tonne/yr unloading rate per reactor (“A” lower bound).If reactor sites could only unload at 100 tonnes/yr, bythe end of 2015 the two facilities would exceed the cumu-lative loading capacity required to remove spent fuelfrom reactors within 15 years of decommissioning (“A”upper bound), although some reactors that would haveto begin unloading before that date to meet this goal.Two facilities that begin loading in 2012 would not allowall reactors to be unloaded within 10 years of decom-missioning, although their combined capacity wouldcatch up with demand by 2020 or 2025, even in the mostextreme case (’‘B’ lower and upper bounds, respective-ly). Some spent fuel would have to remain in storageat a few reactor sites for 15 or 20 years.

These calculations are intended only as an approxi-mate assessment of the implications of the high-confi-dence repository loading schedule in chapter 6: geologicrepositories available in 2008 and 2012, or two alterna-tive waste management facilities available in 2012 in theevent of unexpected problems with geologic disposal.This analysis suggests that the postulated repositoryschedule would allow spent fuel to be removed frompractically all reactor sites within 10 to 15 years of ex-pected decommissioning, and the postulated backup fa-cility schedule would allow removal within about 15years for most reactors. In either case, it appears pos-sible to remove spent fuel from reactors sites wellwithin the 30-year period during which NRC has de-termined that spent fuel could safely be stored at thesites after the reactors are decommissioned.

This analysis also indicates that the choice of tech-nologies for out-of-basin storage may have importantimplications for the achievable annual unloading rate.

.

—

App. G—Repository or MRS Loading Capacity Required To Remove Spent Fuel From Reactor Sites ● 337

With some technologies, such as the drywell, fuel as-semblies stored outside the basin would have to be re-turned to the basin to be loaded into shipping casks.As a result, the handling facilities at the basin could be-come a major bottleneck. With other technologies, suchas the horizontal concrete cask concept being demon-strated by Carolina Power and Light in cooperation withthe Department of Energy, stored fuel could be moveddirectly from the storage module into a transportationcask. If combination storage/transportation or ‘ ‘univer-sal’ casks prove feasible, the fuel would be stored inthe cask that is ultimately used for transportation, sothat no transfer from a storage facility to the transpor-tation cask is required. In such cases, the potential bot-tleneck of existing handling facilities could be avoided.

In addition, such technologies could reduce the workerexposures involved in unloading the stored spent fuel,thus avoiding another potential constraint on unloadingrates.

Because these individual storage decisions could con-strain the long-term reactor unloading plan, it is im-portant that the analysis of an optimized system design(discussed inch. 6) be completed quickly, before utili-ties have made irreversible storage decisions. It is alsoimportant to complete and evaluate the demonstrationsof at-reactor dry storage technologies to determine thefeasibility of those concepts that would allow spent fuelto be transported from the site without first returningto the reactor basin.

—

Appendix H -

Glossary, Acronyms, and Abbreviations

actinides: elements with atomic numbers beween 89and 103 inclusive; all actinide isotopes are radioactive

activation: the process of making non-radioactive ma-terial radioactive by bombardment with neutrons,protons, or other nuclear particles

activity (radioactivity): the rate at which radioactivematerial emits radiation, given in terms of the num-ber of nuclear disintegrations occurring in a unit oftime; the common unit of radioactivity is the curie(Ci)

AEC: Atomic Energy Commission; most of its functionshave been assumed by DOE and NRC

AFR: away-from-reactor storageAGNS: Allied-General Nuclear Services, Inc.ALARA: as low as reasonably achievable; the princi-

ple that specifies that all radiation doses are to bemaintained as far below prescribed standards as isreasonably achievable. This is a requirement for allNuclear Regulatory Commission licensees

alpha particle: a positively charged particle emitted bycertain radioactive material, made up of two neutronsand two protons; it is identical to the nucleus of ahelium atom, An alpha particle cannot penetrateclothing or the outer layer of human skin

aquifer: a water-bearing layer of permeable rock or soilat-reactor: refers to storage in the originally designed

basin or to another storage facility added later; usu-ally the latter definition pertains

atomic number: the number of protons within theatomic nucleus of each chemical element

background radiation (natural): nuclear radiation dueto the natural environment and to naturally occur-ring radioactivity within the body

banking (of sites): setting aside public lands for possi-ble future use

basalt: a fine-grained igneous rock, usually formed bylava flows

beta particle: a negatively charged particle emitted inthe radioactive decay of certain nuclides; a free elec-tron; it has a short range in air and low ability topenetrate other materials

biosphere: the part of the earth in which life exists, in-cluding the lithosphere, hydrosphere, andatmosphere

BLM: Bureau of Land Management, DOIburnup: a measure of reactor fuel consumption ex-

pressed as the percentage of fuel atoms that haveundergone fission, or the amount of energy producedper unit weight of fuel

BWR: boiling water reactor

byproducts: 1) any radioactive material (except specialnuclear material) yielded in, or made radioactive by,exposure to the radiation incident to the productionor utilization of special nuclear material, i.e., fissionproducts and/or activation products; 2) the tailingsor wastes produced by the extraction or concentrationof uranium or thorium from any ore processed pri-marily for its source material content. This secondcategory has been added by the Uranium Mill Tail-ings Act of 1978.

canister: a container for radioactive solid waste formscask: a container that provides shielding during trans-

portation of canisters of radioactive materialsCFR: Code of Federal Regulationscladding: the outer jacket of nuclear fuel elements which

contains and supports the fuel material, protects thefuel from interaction with the coolant, and preventsthe release of fission products into the coolant; com-mercial power reactors use a zirconium alloy for clad-ding, while special purpose reactors frequently usealuminum

Climax Spent Fuel Test Facility: this facility is at the1,400-ft depth in the Climax Stock granite formationon the Nevada Test Site. Eleven encapsulated com-mercial spent fuel assemblies and 26 auxiliary elec-tric heaters have been emplaced in three parallelshafts to simulate repository conditions. The test willdetermine the generic behavior of granite under theinfluence of heat and radiation

co-located: refers to location of facilities at a commonsite, thereby minimizing transportation needs

consolidation (compaction): reduction in the spacingof racks that hold spent fuel in a water storage basinso that the basin can hold more fuel and still remainsubcritical

contamination: the deposition of radioactive materialon a surface

criterion: a standard rule or test on which a judgmentor decision may be based

critical mass: the minimum mass of fissionable mate-rial that, with appropriate geometrical arrangementand material composition, will sustain fission

criticality: state of being critical; a self-sustaining neu-tron chain reaction in which the number of neutronslost by absorption or leakage just equals the numberproduced by the fission process

curie: the unit of radioactivity, abbreviated Ci. Onecurie equals 3.700 x 10]0 nuclear transformationsper second

daughter product: nuclides resulting from the radioac-

SOURCE: Adapted from U.S. Department of Energy, Information Base for Commercial Radioactive Waste Management, DOE/ET/401 10-1, July 1982.

338

App. H—Glossary, Acronyms, and Abbreviations . 339

tive decay of other nuclides. A daughter product maybe either stable or radioactive

decommissioning: the process of removing a facilityfrom operation; its contents may be entombed,decontaminated and dismantled, or converted toanother use

decontamination: the removal of unwanted material(especially radioactive material) from the surface orfrom within another material

deep-well injection: pumping waste-containing slur-ries or liquids into subterranean voids or porousstrata

defense waste: radioactive waste due to research anddevelopment on weapons, the operations of naval re-actors, the production of weapons materials, or thereprocessing of defense nuclear fuel

DEIS: Draft Environmental Impact Statementdeuterium: a natural isotope of hydrogen with one

neutron and one proton in its nucleus (atomic weight= 2)

disposal: operations designed to provide finalisolation—with no provision for easy recovery of theemplaced waste—by relying on a combination ofmanmade and natural barriers rather than on con-tinuous human control and maintenance to ensurethe isolation of the waste; NWPA specifies emplace-ment in mined geologic repositories. While disposalsites and facilities must be designed to provide dis-posal, as just defined, they may also be used for stor-age or other activities prior to disposal

DOE: U.S. Department of EnergyDOI: U.S. Department of the Interiordome, salt: a diapiric or piercement structure with a

central, nearly circular salt plug, generally one to twokilometers in diameter, that has risen through the en-closing sediments from a deep mother bed of salt

DOT: U.S. Department of TransportationEA: Environmental AssessmentEIS: Environmental Impact Statementemplacement medium: the material (e. g., granite or

salt) in which a repository is built and into which thewaste will be placed

enriched uranium: uranium in which the percentageof the fissionable isotope U -235 has been increasedabove the 0.7 percent normally found in naturaluranium

EPA: U.S. Environmental Protection AgencyERDA: U.S. Energy Research and Development

Administration, now DOEFederal repository: see repositoryFEIS: Final Environmental Impact StatementFEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agencyfertile atoms: nonfissile isotopes, notably uranium-238,

which after absorbing a neutron will subsequentlydecay to fissile isotopes like plutonium-239

FGEIS: Final Generic Environmental ImpactStatement

final isolation: placement of radioactive material in afinal resting place so that removal to another site isneither necessary nor expected for as long as it takesfor the material to decay to a prescribed low level ofradioactivity. Synonymous with permanent isolationand terminal isolation

fissile material: one of several actinides which undergofission when a thermal neutron is captured

fission (nuclear): the splitting of a heavy nucleus intotwo or more radioactive nuclei, accompanied by therelease of a large amount of energy and generally oneor more neutrons. Fission is usually initiated by neu-trons, but it can also occur spontaneously

fission products: a general term for the complex mix-ture of nuclides produced as a result of nuclear fis-sion. Most, but not all nuclides in the mixture areradioactive and decay, forming additional (daughter)products, with the result that the complex mixtureof fission products so formed contains about 200 dif-ferent isotopes of over 35 elements

fissionable material: any material fissionable byneutrons, such as certain isotopes of uranium andplutonium

fuel (nuclear reactor): fissionable material used as asource of power when placed in a critical arrange-ment in a nuclear reactor

fuel assembly: a grouping of fuel rods which is not takenapart during the charging and discharging of a reac-tor core

fuel cycle: the uranium fuel cycle to support the opera-tion of light ,water reactors involves a number ofstages, including: mining, milling, conversion (U308

to UFG), enrichment, fuel fabrication, nuclear reactoroperation, fuel reprocessing, waste management, andtransportation between stages

fuel element: a tube, rod or other form into which fuelmaterial is fabricated for use in a reactor

fuel reprocessing plant: a chemical plant where irra-diated fuel elements are processed to separate fissionproducts from uranium and plutonium

f%el residue waste: solid wastes consisting of the resi-due (fuel element hardware and chopped claddingmaterial) after the bulk of fuel core material, includ-ing most of the actinides and fission products, hasbeen dissolved in nitric acid in a chop and leach proc-ess. It is contaminated with low levels of actinidesand fission products and contains nearly all the acti-vation products formed in the hardware and clad-ding material

full-core reserve: space reserved in the reactor basinto accommodate all of the fuel contained in thereactor

full cost recovery: includes charges to the user that

.


compensate the government for budgetary spending,for capital and operating costs, for return on investedcapital, and for costs to cover unusual hazards, e.g.,insurance premiums, premium pay for hazardouswork, workmen’s compensation

FY: fiscal yeargamma rays: short-wavelength electromagnetic radia-

tion emitted in the radioactive decay of certain nu-elides. Gamma rays are highly penetrating

GEIS: Generic Environmental Impact Statementgeologic disposal: disposal in a repository constructed

in a geologic formationGESMO: Generic Environmental Statement on the Use

of Recycle Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in LightWater Cooled Reactors, NUREG-0002

granite: a generally light-colored, coarse-grained igne-ous rock with substantial amounts of quartz and feld-spars rich in sodium and potassium

groundwater: water that exists or flows in a zone of sat-uration between land surfaces

GWe: gigawatts electric, i.e., 1 billion (109) watts or1,000 megawatts

half-life: time required for a radioactive substance tolose 50 percent of its activity by decay. After a periodequal to 10 half-lives, the radioactivity has decreasedto about 0.1 percent of its original value

head cnd of the fuel cycle: mining, milling, enrich-ment, and fabrication of Uoz fuel

high-level waste (HLW): highly radioactive materialresulting from chemical processing of spent fuel torecover usable uranium and plutonium; contains fis-sion products, traces of uranium and plutonium, andother TRU elements. Originally produced in liquidform, HLW must be solidified before disposal

high-level radioactive waste: high-level liquid wastes,products from solidification of high-level liquid waste,and irradiated (spent) fuel elements, if discardedwithout reprocessing

hydrofracture: a process of producing undergroundopenings by injection of fluids (usually water) at pres-sures greater than the weight of the overlying rockand soil

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency—estab-lished as an autonomous member of the United Na-tions, the IAEA currently includes over 100 partici-pating countries. It is located in Vienna, Austria

ICRP: International Commission on RadiologicalProtection—located in Sutton, Surrey, England

igneous: rock formed through solidification of partiallymolten materials

immobilization: treatment and/or emplacement ofwastes to impede their movement

induced radioactivity: radioactivity produced in cer-tain materials as a result of nuclear reactions, par-

ticularly the capture of neutrons, which are accom-panied by the formation of radioactive nuclei

INEL: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory—nearIdaho Falls, Idaho

INFCE: International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evalua-tion—established in 1977, INFCE includes approx-imately 50 countries and four international agencies.The purpose of the INFCE was to prepare an evalua-tion of the nuclear fuel cycle. The final report wasissued in March 1980

in-situ: in the natural or original locationinterim storage: temporary storage with the intention

and expectation that radioactive materials will be re-moved for subsequent treatment, transportation, orisolation. Limited interim storage is defined by theNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as 20 yearsrenewable at the option of NRC. Extended interimstorage would be such storage for a very long (30 +years) and relatively open-ended, undefined period.

IRG: Interagency Review Group on Nuclear WasteManagement— established by President Carter(March 1978) to formulate recommendations for themanagement of radioactive waste. Chaired by DOE,the IRG included 14 Federal agencies

irradiation: exposure to any form of radiationisolation: the placement of radioactive materials so that

contact between the waste and humans or the envi-ronment is highly unlkely for a specified period oftime

isotopes: atoms of the same element which contain dif-ferent numbers of neutrons in their nucleus. Isotopeswhich decay spontaneously emitting radiation arecalled radioisotopes.

kilo: a prefix indicating 1,000 (103) times the affixedunit, abbreviated (k)

kilogram: kg = 1,000 grams = 2.2 poundskwh: kilowatt-hour, a unit of energy generation or con-

sumption in a given hourleaching: the process of extracting a soluble component

from a solid by the percolation of a solvent, such aswater, through the solid

long-lived nuclides: radioactive isotopes with half-livesgreater than 30 years

low-level waste (LLW): radioactive waste not classi-fied as high-level radioactive waste, transuranicwaste,, spent nuclear fuel, or byproduct material asdefined in Section 1 le(2) of the Atomic Energy Actof 1954, amended

LWR: light water reactormetric ton (MT or tonne): unit of weight; 1 MT =

1,000 kilograms = 2,205 poundsmill tailings: see uranium mill tailingsmrem: millirem, one-thousandth of a remMTHM: metric tons of heavy metal (nuclear fuel)

App. H—Glossary, Acronyms, and Abbreviations ● 341

MTU: metric tons of uraniummonitoring: measuring the quantity and type of dis-

charges or migration of radioactive waste from awaste management facility, chemical, or biologicalcharacteristics of the site and the surrounding area

MOX: mixed oxide fuel (uranium and plutoniumoxides)

MRS: monitored retrievable storagemultibarrier: a system using the waste form, contain-

er, canister, overpack, and emplacement medium asmultiple barriers to isolate the waste from the bio-sphere

MWe: megawatt electric (1 MW = 1 million watts),a unit of the rate of energy production or con-sumption

MWt-d/MTHM: megawatt (thermal) days per metricton of heavy metal, a measure of burnup

nanocurie (nCi): one billionth of a curie (10- 9Ci),equivalent to 37 disintegrations per second

NAS: National Academy of SciencesNASA: National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationNCRP: National Council on Radiation Protection and

Measurement—located in Bethesda, Md., this is anongovernmental not-for-profit council chartered byCongress

NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act of 1969neutron: an uncharged particle in a nucleus; of slightly

greater mass than a proton; highly penetrating. Un-like the absorption of alpha, beta, or gamma radia-tion, the capture of neutrons by a substance can causethis substance to become radioactive

NFS: Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.NRC: Nuclear Regulatory CommissionNTS: Nevada Test Sitenuclear radiation: particulate and electromagnetic ra-

diation omitted from nuclei. Important nuclear radia-tions are ionizing radiations

nuclear reaction: neutron reactions with materials thatcause fission with the simultaneous release of energy

nuclear safety: the application of technical knowledgeand administrative control to prevent an unplanned,uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction

nuclear waste: this term is usually used interchangeablywith radioactive waste (see waste, radioactive)

nucleus: the inner core of an atom, consisting primar-ily of neutrons and protons, which makes up almostthe entire mass of the atom, but only a minute partof its volume

nuclide: an atom characterized by the number of neu-trons and protons and sometimes by the energy statein its nucleus

OCRWM: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Man-agement, DOE

ONWI: Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, BattelleMemorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio

ORNL: Oak Ridge National Laboratoryoverpack: secondary or additional external containment

of packaged radioactive wastepartition: to separate one element from others; in proc-

essing operations, the separation of elements such asuranium and plutonium

permanent storage: storage used as a means of provid-ing final isolation, with no intentions of ever retriev-ing the waste

plutonium: a radioactive element with an atomic num-ber of 94. Its most important isotope is fissionablePu-239, produced by neutron h-radiation of U-238

PNL: Pacific Northwest Laboratory—operated by Bat-telle Northwest Laboratories at Richland, Wash.

pool: a concrete chamber filled with water to provideshielding for irradiated fuel elements

PWR: pressurized water reactor: a reactor system thatuses a pressurized water primary cooling system;steam formed in a secondary cooling system drivesturbines to generate electricity

R&D: research and developmentrad: radiation absorbed dose: a unit of absorbed dose

of ionizing radiation, equivalent to the absorption of100 ergs of radiation energy per gram of absorbingmaterial

radioactive: unstable in a manner shown by sponta-neous nuclear disintegration with accompanyingemission of radiation and particles

radioactive decay: the spontaneous transformation ofone nuclide into another or into a different energystate of the same one, accompanied by the emissionof alpha or beta particles and/or gamma rays

radioactivity: the rate at which radioactive material isemitting radiation, given in terms of the number ofnuclear disintegrations occurring in a unit of time.The common unit of radioactivity is the curie (Ci)

radioisotope: a radioactive isotope of an element

radionuclide: a radioactive nuclide

RD&D: research, development, and demonstration

reactor (nuclear): a device in which a fission chain re-action can be initiated, maintained, and controlled

rem: roentgen equivalent man: a quantity used in ra-diation protection to express the effective dose equiv-alent for all forms of ionizing radiation; the doseequivalent in reins is numerically equal to the ab-sorbed dose in rac!s multiplied by the quality factor,the distribution factor, and any other necessary mod-ifying factors

reprocessing: dissolving spent reactor fuel to recoveruseful materials such as thorium, uranium, and plu-tonium. Other radioactive materials are usually sep-arated and treated as waste

re-racking: the replacement of existing fuel storageracks in storage basins with racks of modified design


to increase the amount of spent fuel that can be storedin the basins

repository (Federal): both a site and attached facilitiesdesigned for final isolation of radioactive materials

retrievability: capability to remove waste from its placein storage; the method and rate of removal and thesubsequent location of the waste must satisfy retriev-ability criteria

risk: the product of an event’s frequency and its conse-quence, yielding an estimate of the expected dam-age rate; e.g., population dose per year from a speci-fied event

roentgen: a unit for measuring gamma or X-ray radi-ation; the roentgen is defined by measuring the ef-fect of the radiation on air. It is that amount ofgamma or X-rays required to produce ions carrying1 electrostatic unit of charge in 1 cubic centimeterof dry air under standard conditions

seismicity: the tendency for the occurrence of earth-quakes

shale: laminated, easily fractured sedimentary rock pro-duced from clay

shielding: a material interposed between a source of ra-diation and personnel for protection against the dan-ger of radiation; common shielding materials are con-crete, water, and lead

shipping cask: a specially designed container used fortransporting radioactive materials

short-lived nuclides: for purposes of waste isolation,a relative term generally defined as radioactive iso-topes with half-lives no greater than about 30 years,e.g., CS-137, Sr-90, Kr-85, II-3

spent nuclear fuel: nuclear reactor fuel that has beenused to the extent that it can no longer be used ina nuclear power plant without reprocessing

storage: operations designed to provide isolation andeasy recovery of radioactive materials; storage relieson continuous human monitoring, maintenance, andprotection from human intrusion for a specified pe-riod of time

storage basin: a water-filled, stainless steel lined poolfor the interim storage of spent fuel

technologies: specific methods for implementing con-cepts; an example is storing spent fuel in a metal cask

tectonics: a branch of geology dealing with the broadarchitecture of the upper part of the Earth’s crust.Plate tectonics considers a small number (10 to 25)of large, broad, thick plates (blocks composed of areasof both continental and oceanic crust and mantle),each of which ‘‘floats’ on some viscous underlayerin the mantle and moves more or less independentlyof the others and grinds against them like ice floesin a river

terminal isolation (final isolation): placement of high-

level wastes into a repository with no intention of re-covering the emplaced material in the future

ton: English unit of weight, 1 ton = 2,000 pounds (1short ton)

tonne: metric unit of weight, 1 tonne = 1,000 kg =2,205 pounds (1 metric ton or 1 long ton)

transmutation: conversion of one element into anotherby bombarding it with a nuclear particle

transportation: movement of materials between sites(intrasite movement is not considered); this includesalternative methods for packing, handling, and trans-porting waste materials and plutonium compounds.Concepts include all conventional methods of landand water transport required by the waste manage-ment sytem

transshipment: shipping spent fuel from one reactorbasin to another reactor within the utility system withavailable space

TRU: transuranictransuranic elements: elements with atomic numbers

greater than 92, including, among others, neptuni-um, plutonium, americium, and curium

transuranic waste (TRU waste): waste materials con-taminated with U-233 (and its daughter products),certain isotopes of plutonium, and with nuclides withatomic number greater than 92. In order to be clas-sified as TRU waste, the long-lived alpha activityfrom subject isotopes must exceed 100 nCi/g of wastematerial independent of the level of beta-gamma ac-tivity. This waste, which can vary greatly in its spe-cific gamma activity, is produced primarily from re-processing spent fuel and from the use of plutoniumin the fabrication of nuclear weapons

tritium: a radioactive isotope of hydrogen containingtwo neutrons and one proton in the nucleus, with anatomic weight of 3

tuff: a rock formed of compacted volcanic ash and dust;it is usually porous and often soft

USGS: U.S. Geological Survey, DOIuranium mill tailings: waste material resulting from

the processing of ores for the extraction of uranium;the word tailings means the remaining portion of me-tal-bearing ore after some of the uranium has beenextracted

uranium: a naturally radioactive element with theatomic number 92 and an atomic weight of approxi-mately 238. The two principal naturally occurringisotopes are the fissionable U-235 (O. 7 percent of nat-ural uranium) and the fertile U-238 (99. 3 percent ofnatural uranium)

uranium dioxide (U02): stable chemical compound ofuranium and oxygen; this is the compound for mostpower reactor fuel

waste immobilization: the process of converting waste

App. H—Glossary, Acronyms, and Abbreviations ● 343

to a stable, solid form that encases the radionuclidesto prevent or slow their migration to the biosphere

waste management: the planning, execution, and sur-veillance of essential functions related to the controlof radioactive and nonradioactive waste, includingtreatment, solidification, initial or long-term storage,surveillance, and isolation

waste, radioactive: equipment and materials (from nu-clear operations) that are radioactive or have radioac-

tive contamination and for which there is no recog-nized use or for which recovery is impractical

water basin: a specially designed and operated waterpool for storing, cooling, and shielding spent fuelelements

WIPP: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: near Carlsbad, N.Mex., a non-NRC-licensed facility for disposal ofTRU wastes resulting from national defense activi-ties and programs

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Index

*Allied General Nuclear Services (AGNS), 67, 68, 84Atomic Energy Commission, 83, 84

British Central Electricity Generating Board, 63

Carter administration, 87, 92Congress:

committees involved in radioactive waste management,34

Congressional Budget Office, 11Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84, 86

definitions, 26Department of Energy (DOE), 3-16, 28, 34, 39, 44, 50,

52, 54, 58, 61, 64, 69, 70, 71, 73, 78, 93, 103-111,120, 123, 130, 137-141, 155-172, 179

Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, 11,159

Department of Transportation (DOT), 34, 62, 63

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 33, 44, 46, 48,54

Federal institutional issues, 155-172Federal interagency coordination, 168organization of the Federal Waste Management Agen-

Cy, 158-168alternative means of financing and management, 162Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management,

11, 159program funding, 155-158

history of waste management, 83-96development of Federal waste management policy and

programs, 83early history (1945-75), 83recent history, 85

problems for waste management policy, 88complicating factors, 90key policy issues, 88

Interagency Review Group, 87International Commission on Radiation Protection

(ICRP), 30, 45

legislation:Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 86London Dumping Convention, 1972, 50Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 3, 4, 6,

8-17, 28, 35, 55, 58, 99-111, 117, 132, 155, 182,245, 264-326

Ocean Dumping Act, 50

Major events in waste management history, 233-244monitored retrievable storage (MRS), 3, 5, 15, 56, 104,

124, 334

Mission Plan, 3, 12-17, 106, 115-151achievable initial plan, 115

major advantages, 116implementation program, 129-150

high-confidence siting plan, 132present siting program, 129waste management technology development program,

141waste management plan, 117-129

repository loading schedule, 4, 12, 117repository siting program, 4, 13Technology Development Plan, 5, 14

National Academy of Sciences, 63, 84National Research Council, 69National Waste Terminal Storage, 86Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 5, 15, 30, 33,

34, 42, 43, 44, 48, 58, 63, 64, 69, 88, 91, 117,130, 137

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 8-17, 83, 99-111, 182,245, 264-326

institutional measures, 11radioactive waste management mission plan, 11single-purpose Waste Management Office, 11waste disposal fee, 11

relations with States and Indian Tribes, 10impact compensation, 11

waste management policy, 8final isolation of nuclear waste, 8interim storage of spent fuel, 9

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 52

performance requirements for a geologic repository, 327policy analysis: NWPA, 99-111

key elements, 99-100Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 101-111

procedure for establishing a repository for commercialnuclear waste, 329

radioactive waste: its nature and management, 21-36forms of radioactive waste, 24institutional aspects of waste management, 33-36

Federal activities, 33coordination and management, 34funding, 34policymaking, 33regulation, 33

international activities, 36non-Federal involvement, 35

public involvement, 35nature of, 21-23

amounts of radioactive waste, 28hazards of radioactive waste, 29

comparison of nuclear waste to uranium, 29comparison of radioactive and other toxic waste, 32

347

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nuclear fuel cycle, 23backend of fuel cycle, 25front end of the fuel cycle, 24reactor operation, 24

nuclear reactions, 21effects of radiation, 22fission, 21radioactivity, 21

radioactive waste management policymaking, 199-232acceptable safety levels for a geologic repository, 218context of, 200coping with interdependence, 227defining radioactive waste, 204Federal-State relationship, 221linking reactor operation with the development of

techniques for radioactive waste disposal, 224search strategy for sites, 212storage, 206utilizing knowledge of the Earth sciences, 209waste package, 215

Reagan administration, 88, 92

Sandia National Laboratories, 63spent fuel projections, 331State and public concerns, 175-195

equity in siting waste facilities, 188prevention and mitigation of impacts, 184

impact mitigation, 186State concerns about safety, 184

public involvement, 190States’ concerns, 175

equity, 176Federal credibility, 177waste management impacts, 176

State involvement in waste management decisions, 177facility siting decisions, 178-184policy development and oversight, 177

study of alternative institutional mechanisms, 3, 6, 16

technology of waste management, 39-80integrated waste management system, 73-80

interrelationships, 79system impacts, 74

cost, 78distribution of impacts, 79health effects, 74

nonradiologica.1 impacts, 74transportation, 76

reprocessing, 67-73for waste management, 68

effects of plutonium recycle, 71operations and costs, 69status of, 67

waste disposal, 39-55comparison of disposal, 53

ability to retrieve waste, 54cost, 54potential international complications, 54relative degree of safety, 53technology status, 53type of waste, 54

mined geologic repositories, 39cost, 49safety, 44technology, 39

other disposal technologies, 50deep hole disposal, 51ice sheets, 52rock melting, 51space, 52subseabed disposal, 50transmutation, 53well injection, 51

waste storage, 55-61comparison of interim storage technologies,cost, 60

flexibility, 59safety, 58status of technology development, 58

interim storage technology, 56dry storage, 57water-filled basins, 56

waste transportation, 61-67cost, 67risk analyses, 64safety, 62

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 58, 120

U.S. Geological Survey, 138

58

Waste management system issues resolved in NWPA, 245

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Managing the Nation's Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste

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