Managing the Automobile: Empowering Angelenos to shift their travel behavior

Concept Paper Developed by Metro Office of Extraordinary Innovation (OEI)

Prepared by:

Austin Stanion, UCLA Luskin

Tejus Shankar, UCLA Anderson

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Contents

Problem Statement .................................................................... 3

Literature Review ....................................................................... 7

Incentives to Shift Travel Behavior .................................................... 7

Road Decongestion Pricing ................................................................ 8

Case Studies .............................................................................. 10

Incentives to Shift Travel Behavior .................................................. 10

Road Decongestion Pricing .............................................................. 13

Metro Assets and Limitations ................................................... 17

Agency Assets .................................................................................. 17

Agency Limitations .......................................................................... 18

Opportunity Areas .................................................................... 20

Conclusion ................................................................................ 22

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Problem Statement

The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro) seeks proposals for

turnkey that align with our Strategic Plan Vision 2028 goals to test and implement pricing

strategies to reduce traffic congestion. Specifically, Metro is interested in piloting programs that

will use incentives to shift residents from driving alone to more sustainable transportation

options (including carpool /vanpool, transit, walking and biking) or to shift from driving at peak

periods to non-peak periods. Metro is also interested in pilot concepts to price preexisting

capacity, with an interest in solutions for both local streets and freeways. Metro seeks pilot

pricing concepts that use new technologies and that have the potential to be scaled into

permanent programs.

Through the implementation of automobile management solutions, Metro aims to

accomplish the following goals:

1. Improve Roadway Performance: Solutions should improve roadway speeds and flow

rates, allowing more people to get where they need to be more efficiently.

2. Promote a Broader Mobility Menu: Solutions should encourage residents to select the

mode of transportation that meets their needs while promoting more sustainable

transportation options (including carpool/vanpool, transit, walking and biking) over

driving alone.

3. Improve Average Speed of Transit Services: Solutions to manage the automobile should

improve speeds of bus service by reducing congestion on major bus routes. Improved

management of the roadways will help Metro riders to get where they need to go faster

by improving road throughput, and potentially prioritizing transit vehicles.

Solutions to address these concerns and achieve the goals above should be submitted

through Metro’s Unsolicited Proposals process (defined in “Agency Assets” section below).

Proposals will be reviewed by Metro’s Office of Extraordinary Innovation.

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Introduction

Los Angeles County consistently ranks as one of the most congested cities in the United

States. While waiting in traffic has become an expectation for many residents, there are

solutions. Effectively managing the automobile by incentivizing drivers to shift their travel

behaviors and charging drivers for using roadways at peak times can improve mobility across

the region.

This paper explores the implementation of automobile management strategies across

the world, identifying the lessons learned to be incorporated into the design and development

of pilot programs for Los Angeles County.

Methodology

To explore the opportunities of automobile management solutions that will improve

roadway performance, promote a broader mobility menu, and improve average speed of

transit services, this paper will investigate the following topics:

1. Incentives to Shift Travel Behavior- encourage individuals not to drive on congested

roads at peak hours. To defer driving during peak periods, drivers can be provided an

incentive (access to Metro services, reward points at local businesses, or even cash) to

postpone their automobile trip to a less congested time or use transit instead of driving.

2. Road Decongestion Pricing - charge automobile users for access to roads, thereby

inducing a reduction of vehicles on the road during peak times. Historical pricing

solutions have often used a flat price structure, but to be most effective, pricing should

respond to demand in real-time.

This investigation will include background defining the root causes of traffic congestion

in Los Angeles County, case studies from agencies/cities that have had success using pricing to

curb the automobile and recommendations of potential opportunity areas.

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Background

In Spring 2018 the Metro Board of Directors approved the Metro Vision 2028 Strategic

Plan which puts forth ambitious goals towards improving mobility and access throughout the

region. One of these goals is to test and implement pricing strategies to reduce traffic

congestion.

Managing congestion is not just a priority for Metro, but also for county residents.

According to a polli conducted by University of Southern California, traffic is the number one

concern of LA County residents, ahead of crime and personal finances.1 To put congestion in

context for Los Angeles County, the studies below shed light on the region’s traffic congestion:

- High Rates of Driving Alone / Low Public Transit Usage: According to the INRIX

global traffic scorecard, 77 percent of Angelenos drive alone to work and only 9

percent take public transit.2

- Large Number of Congested Corridors: According to the American Highway Users

Alliance, LA County has 6 of the top 7 worst bottlenecks in the US including various

sections on I-405, I-10, US-101, and I-110.3

- Increased Peak Period Congestion: According to Texas A&M’s Urban Mobility

Scorecard, the Los Angeles metropolitan statistical area ranks the worst in the

country for the travel time index (TTI). LA has a 1.43 TTI meaning that an hour trip in

no traffic would take 1.43 hours in peak traffic.4

Further, congestion costs time and money to LA County residents and produces negative

health impacts to residents. The cost of lost time and productivity due to congestion in LA

County comes out to $13.3B per year.5 LA is estimated to have 454 premature deaths per year

due to poor air quality and pollution from congestion resulting in an estimated $4.0B cost to

society6. The health risks are greater to those living near congested areas who tend to be

disproportionally poor.7

i The survey consisted of 1,500 residents of Los Angeles County fielded online from September 14th to 24th, 2015

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Transit adoption can be a solution to improve congestion; however, Metro buses

currently operate in the same congested traffic conditions resulting in increased variability and

delays:

- Deteriorating Performance: With the increase of congestion, buses tend to have

worse on-time performance and increased headways.8 Since 2005, the average

speed of Metro buses has decreased by 2 mph and is on the decline as LA has

become more congested.9

- Customer Dissatisfaction: Slower buses create frustrated riders. According to

Metro’s Summer 2017 Customer Satisfaction Survey, customers are unsatisfied with

reliability of bus headways, total trip time by bus, and slow speeds of buses.

- Decreasing Ridership: When riders are unhappy, they stop riding. According to a

study recently done by UCLA, per capita public transportation trips have been

declining in the Southern California region since 2007, with Metro’s ridership

experiencing the largest of the declines in the region 10.

Metro, with the support of the LA County region and its residents, needs to develop

more sustainable methods to improve its services so that public transportation is a relevant,

viable, quick, and efficient option for all residents in the region.

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Literature Review

Incentives to Shift Travel Behavior

Changing the way that a person travels in their day to day life is not an easy task.

However, behavioral incentives can "nudge”ii individuals to try new behaviors that could reduce

traffic congestion.

The TravelSmart program in Perth, Australia provided participants with free trail bus

tickets and information such as timetables and maps. The study found that participants with

the information found a positive shift to walking and biking by 5.5%.11

A Bikebuster program in Aarhus, Denmark provided volunteer suburban commuters

with a free bike and bus pass for a year. Over the course of a year in an uncontrolled study

(which drew in those likely who were willing to make a behavior shift), participants reported a

shift of 25% of weekday trips.12

Similarly, the parking cash out program in California studied eight Los Angeles

employers that paid their employees who did not drive to work the cost of parking that

employer would have otherwise subsidized. Driving alone to work dropped from 76% to 63%,

carpooling rose from 14% to 23% and walking / biking increased by 1%.13

Although there have been a number of experiments showing that incentives can change

travel behavior, it is important to remember economist Anthony Downs’s principle of “triple

convergence”. Downs explains that attempts to reduce traffic congestion are often short-lived.

If speeds on a roadway improve significantly, drivers are likely to take notice and change their

behavior accordingly. Travelers change their mode, time of travel, and route (triple

convergence) to take advantage of the decongested roadway. Before long, the road is just as

crowded as it was before the decongesting intervention. Downs predicts that most traffic-

easement projects are unlikely to address congestion, but admits that pricing roads during peak

times might counteract the forces of triple convergence.14

ii Nudge theory, which was recently awarded a noble prize in economics, proposes influencing behavior in a predictable way without coercion.

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Road Decongestion Pricing

Another approach to enabling behavior shift is through charging a fee to drive on

congested roadways. Decongestion pricing has been implemented in a few cities (see case

studies) and has decreased congestion substantially. Since congestion does not occur

throughout the day but rather at certain times, pricing is used to help supply meet demand.

Economists generally believe that transportation charges should reflect the marginal social cost

of each trip. During peak hours, a new vehicle joining existing traffic imposes a social cost on

other drivers by increasing congestion.15 Peak hour travel should come at a higher cost to

drivers than off-peak travel.

In implementation, decongestion pricing mechanisms include road pricing, facility

pricing, cordon pricing, and comprehensive pricing.16 Road pricing charges tolls to drive on

specific roads or lanes at certain times of the day and usually is a cost based on vehicle miles

traveled. Facility pricing charges a toll when a vehicle passes through a specific point like a

bridge. Cordon pricing charges a toll to enter a specific area (such as highly congested

downtown area). Comprehensive pricing tolls all roads in a specific area and is a combination of

cordon pricing and road pricing.17 These forms of decongestion pricing have different uses and

goals and likely a combination of the pricing mechanisms can be useful to achieve congestion-

reduction.

While decongestion pricing has proven to be effective to decrease traffic flow, critics

argue that it is not equitable. The concept of variable priced lanes faces particular criticism.

Some argue decongestion priced lanes provides an option for the wealthy to escape congestion

while the less well-off must still suffer through traffic.18

However, proponents of decongestion pricing argue that this policy is actually socially

progressive in nature. To drive, one needs to be able to afford a car - the price of the vehicle

and the cost of operating (insurance, maintenance, gas). Low income people are less likely to

own a car, and rely on public transportation and thus do not benefit from access to free roads.

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Professor Manville at UCLA describes: “free roads might be more accurately described as a

subsidy to the affluent that some poor people enjoy”.19 With improved flow of traffic, those

who do take public transportation will have improved travel times and gain benefits from road

pricing. Considering how most of our resources are priced based on supply and demand, roads

should not be an exception to this rule. By enabling supply to match demand, road space can

enable trip shifts from peak times to less congested times, create modal shifts to public

transportation, and encourage carpooling.20 Pricing the roads can also lead to additional

revenue that can be reinvested to improving transit options.

Congestion pricing is not easy to implement, and key political challenges need to be

addressed. Key criteria to implement decongestion pricing include building public acceptability,

linking the additional revenue to regional goals and objectives, working with various

stakeholders / enabling interagency collaboration, and sustaining public support.21

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Case Studies

Incentives to Shift Travel Behavior

Bangalore / Stanford

In 2009, Dr. Balaji Prabhakar of Stanford University created an experiment in

partnership with a Bangalore-based tech company, Infosys, to see if monetary incentives could

shift commuter behavior.22 INSTANT (Infosys Stanford Traffic) Project monitored when Infosys

employees arrived to work. Those employees who arrived before the morning rush hour were

given credits toward a weekly lottery in which employees could win the equivalent of over

US$240.

Although Infosys funded this lottery system to incentive its employees, the company

calculated that the program might actually save money in the long term. Most of Infosys’s

employees arrived to work by company-chartered busses rather than private automobile.

Infosys estimated that the extra cost of fuel for these buses idling on congested roads was

equivalent to US$300/day. Infosys decided to divert these funds to incentivize employees

rather than pay for extra diesel in idling buses.

The INSTANT Project experiment lasted for 27 weeks. During that time, the number of

employees arriving before rush hour doubled, and the average employee commute fell from 71

minutes to under 60 minutes. Over 1,900 employees participated in the pilot, and Infosys spent

about US$51,840 on the pilot.23 Although the INSTANT program experiment was successful at

reducing average commute times, after the experiment (and monetary incentives) ended,

average commute times rose as employees reverted to old habits of commuting during rush

hour traffic.

Taking lessons learned from INSTANT, Dr. Prabhakar brought this incentive model back

to Stanford University, and in 2012 launched the Capri Program. With funding from a US

Department of Transportation grant, Capri allows parking permit holders at Stanford to earn

incentive points for finding alternatives to driving into campus during peak hours. These

alternatives include walking, biking, transit, or driving off-peak. The program uses RFID

technology to detect when participants’ vehicles enter Stanford’s campus and award credits

toward a lottery for prizes when participants avoid rush hour.24

As of 2014 (two years into the Capri Program) about 4,000 individuals (half of all eligible

employees and students) were participating in Capri, and about 15% of the trips taken by

participants shifted away from rush hour.

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While Dr. Prabhakar piloted some of the first software solutions to incentivize

behavioral change with to avoid congestion, it should be noted that a number of companies

have emerged in the past few years to incentivize employees to change their travel behavior,

including IncenTrip, RideShark, and RideAmigos. While these companies each provide a unique

suite of services, they share the focus of helping employers, campuses, and agencies manage

commuting behavior of their employees, students, etc.

Key Takeaways:

1. Lottery reward systems are one cost effective way to incentivize behavioral change.

Dr. Prabhakar’s experiments in Bangalore and Stanford demonstrate that individuals

are willing to change their travel behavior simply for a chance to win a monetary

incentive.

2. The Bangalore and Stanford experiments targeted single campuses/employers,

rather than an entire traffic system. Due to the effects of induced demand and

“triple convergence” (discussed above), these experiences likely had little effect on

long-term regional traffic congestion in their cities, but did help individuals avoid

congestion by commuting off-peak.

3. When Infosys ended their lottery incentives program, employees reverted back to

their prior commuting habits. Short term pilots can help us understand the return

on investment of incentive programs; however, programs will need to continue for

long-term change.

Netherlands

From 2009-2010, The Netherlands implemented four programs and experiments to

reduce congestion, known as Spitsmijden. Using overhead road cameras to read license plates,

the Netherlands highways agency identified regular commuters along routes where the agency

was expecting future delays and congestion, for instance due to planned road maintenance or

construction.25

The highways agency invited these commuters to participate in a program with

incentives of 2 to 7 Euros per day to avoid specific roads during peak hours. The agency

monitored study area roadways with overhead cameras. If a participant’s vehicle was not

detected during peak hours, the agency would provide a financial reward. Researchers noted

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that although the highways agency paid individuals who participated in the program, the

agency also avoided significant costs through the Spitsmijden programs by avoiding the high

costs of complicated traffic management around construction sites, including the costs of

expedited construction, while also avoiding the political backlash that can come from congested

roads.

All four Spitsmijden experiments had a major effect on travel behavior along their target

corridors, with 20-50% of participants changing their departure time, taking another route, or

shifting to another transportation mode. Larger financial rewards per trip yielded a greater shift

in travel behaviors, but researchers observed diminishing marginal returns as reward payments

increased.

It should be noted that the Spitsmijden programs were not intended as a long term

solution to regional traffic congestion, but rather to provide temporary relief along target

corridors. These corridors were usually traffic bottlenecks with few alternative routes.

Therefore drivers could not simply drive around the target area and still receive the reward.

Furthermore, researchers also observed that in some cases, Spitsmijden incentives

merely shifted congestion to earlier and later times, creating new peaks. Researchers suggest

implementing a gradual pricing structure (rather than a single cut-off time) to spread out peak

traffic.26

Key Takeaways:

1. The Spitsmijden experiments offer compelling evidence that financial incentives

offered to targeted individuals (those known to commute frequently on a corridor)

can have a significant, albeit short term, impact on traffic reduction.

2. Paying 2 to 7 Euros per trip created a significant cost for the Netherlands highways

agency, but the agency also avoided the costs of heavy congestion and delays during

roadway construction and closures.

3. Higher financial payouts resulted in a greater reduction in traffic congestion, but as

payout amounts increased, their marginal impact on traffic reduction lessened (a

principle known as diminishing marginal returns).

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Road Decongestion Pricing

London

London’s Decongestion Pricing program began in 2003, covering 8 square miles of the

city’s heavily congested central business district. The city used more than 650 closed circuit

cameras to record vehicle license plates within a cordon zone. The pricing was initially effective

between 7:00am and 6:30pm (later changed to 6:00pm). Outside of these times, there is no

charge to enter the cordon area.

The charge to enter the cordon zone was initially set at £5 (about US$8 in 2003), and in

in 2005 was raised to £8 (about US$15 in 2005). The charges are applied automatically based on

license plate, with no need for transponder technology on the vehicle itself. Drivers have one

day to pay the charge to avoid a late fee, and can pay electronically, by phone, or in select

shops equipped with a “paypoint”.

Within the first year of implementing decongestion pricing, traffic within the cordon

zone was reduced by 15%, traffic delays were cut by 25%, and travel speeds increased by 30%.

The initial cost of setting up the program was £161.7 million (about US$258.7 million in

2003). As of 2008, the revenue from the decongestion pricing was £250 million, the cost to run

the program was £130 million and after other charges the net income was £89 million (about

US$500 million in revenue, US$260 million in costs, and US$178 million in net income in 2008

dollars).27

Key Takeaways:

1. Unlike the other decongestion pricing systems described below, London charges a

flat fee, £8, to enter the cordon zone during the effective hours (7:00am-6:00pm). A

flat fee may be easier for the public to understand compared to pricing based on

time of day.

2. London’s camera-based system requires no technology or hardware on vehicles

themselves (transponders), but required drivers to pay within 1 day of crossing into

the congested zone.

3. Of the programs studied in this paper, London operates the most profitable (£89

million per year or US$178 million in 2008) decongestion pricing system as well as

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the most expensive per crossing (£8). The system brings in significant revenue for

the city to invest in public transportation, but also creates a heavy burden for

London drivers.

Singapore

Singapore’s Congestion pricing program began in 1975 with a system called the Area

Licensing Scheme, or ALS. The ALS established a 2 square mile area in the central business

district as a “Restricted Zone”. Vehicles entering the restricted zone between 7:30am and

9:30am paid a charge of S$3.0 (about US$1.30). Over the next two decades, the ALS underwent

a number of changes, including extending the restricted hours to 10:15am and increasing the

fee to enter the restricted zone.

During the operation of the ALS, the number of vehicles entering the restricted zone fell

from 74,000 to 41,200, a 44% reduction. Speeds in the restricted zone during the AM peak

increased by 20% or more, including for public transit vehicles such as buses

The initial cost of setting up the ALS was about S$500,000 (about US$210,000). The

annual revenue from the ALS was S$6,800,000, the cost to run the program was S$600,000 and

the net income was about S$6,200,000 (about US$2,833,000 in revenue, US$250,000 in costs,

and US$2,583,000 in net income).

In 1998, Singapore replaced the ALS with Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) which charges

drivers a variable amount based on time of day, location, and type of vehicle. The charge per

crossing can range from zero to about US$4.00. These prices are reviewed and adjusted every

quarter. All vehicles traveling through a pricing location is required to have a transponder with

a stored value card. As of 2008 there were about 300,000 pricing transactions every day.

The capital cost of the ERP system was S$200 million (US$110 million in 1998), half of

which went toward purchasing and installing 1.1 million vehicle transponder units. In the early

2000s, the annual revenue from the ALS was more than S$150 million (US$100 million in 2005)

The ALS and ERP have not only kept the urban core of Singapore mostly free of

congestion even as income and employment increased dramatically in the city, but these

programs also allowed Singapore to avoid major road infrastructure investments. Singapore has

saved an estimated S$1.50 billion (over US$1.0 billion) in avoided construction and

infrastructure costs due to the city’s traffic management program.28

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Key Takeaways:

1. Singapore has the oldest and most advanced comprehensive congestion tolling

system in the world. Their system should be a model for other cities, but it is

important to recognize that other countries may have significant political and

cultural hurdles preventing the implementation of Singapore’s level of decongestion

pricing.

2. Singapore’s Electronic Road Pricing program requires every vehicle entering the

restricted zone to have transponder hardware installed. This comes with a number

of benefits, including automatic payments through the transponder, but also creates

a “barrier to entry” for new vehicles and may cause privacy concerns.

3. By managing traffic in its central district has avoided decades of infrastructure costs

and has instead invested in high quality public transportation in these areas.

Stockholm

Stockholm launched its decongestion pricing program in 2006. Stockholm is unique in

that the city implemented congestion pricing by a popular vote after a six month trial. Research

after the vote found a relationship between time savings, cost increases, and likelihood to vote

in favor of the pricing referendum. Voters who valued their time savings over the increased cost

were likely to vote for the program, while voters who valued the financial cost over faster travel

times voted against the program. The results suggest that a 10% decrease in commute time

increased the likelihood of an individual to vote in favor of decongestion pricing by 2%.

However, a 10% increase in the incremental cost of travelling decreased the likelihood of an

individual to vote in favor of decongestion pricing by 4%.29

The decongestion charges were in effect on weekdays from 6:30am to 6:30pm. Prices to

enter the cordon zone were set at 10 SEK for off peak times, 15 SEK for “shoulder” times (just

before and after the peak), and 20 SEK for peak times (US$1.33, US$2.00 and US$2.67

respectively at 2006 rates).

With the implementation of decongestion pricing in Stockholm, overall traffic to and

from the inner city declined by 10%-15%. Stockholm also experienced a significant decrease in

atmospheric pollution as a result of the program, with a 10-14% reduction in Carbon Dioxide,

7% reduction in NOXs and a 9% decrease in harmful particulates.

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The initial cost of setting up the program was 3.0 billion SEK ($410 million). As of 2008,

the revenue from the decongestion pricing was 760 million SEK, the cost to run the program

was 220 SEK and the net income was 500 million SEK (about US$100 million in revenue, US$30

million in costs, and US$70 million in net income).30

Key Takeaways:

1. Stockholm is the only city to have implemented decongestion pricing through a

public vote. Stockholm’s process should be considered as a model for other city’s

concerned about gaining public support for pricing programs.

2. Stockholm’s program can use either transponder hardware technology or license

plate camera. This gives drivers the ability to choose the method that is most

convenient for them, but may create additional capital and operational costs to

accommodate both forms of payment and technology.

3. Stockholm has the cheapest program for drivers, less than US$3, but also the longest

payback period (the timed needed for net incomes to pay back initial costs), 4 years.

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Metro Assets and Limitations

Potential partners should be aware of both the assets and expertise that Metro can

provide, as well as the constraints Metro faces as a public agency. Successful proposals to

manage the automobile should take advantage of Metro’s existing resources while also taking

into account the agency’s limitations and operating requirements.

Agency Assets

Metro ExpressLanes – Created in 2008 as a collaboration between USDOT, CalTrans,

and Metro, the ExpressLanes on the I-110 and I-10 freeways have served as a pilot for

decongestion pricing. In addition, improving bus flow has proven to increase both bus

speeds and boost ridership. For instance, when Metro Silver Line buses shifted to high

occupancy toll (HOT) lanes, not only did bus speeds improve, but also bus ridership

increased by 52% in the mornings.31

Operations Management – Metro operates diverse services across the LA region, most

notably, Metro Bus and Metro Rail services.

Drivers and Maintenance Workers – Metro has strong relationships with experienced

vehicle operators and maintenance workers, including relationships with prominent

labor unions.

Public Infrastructure and Rights of Way – Metro has exclusive access to public

transportation infrastructure and rights of way across Los Angeles County.

A Suite of Traveler Incentives – Metro can provide a number of perks to riders as

incentives to shift travel behavior, including: technical assistance to large

employers/campuses to establish on-campus programs (including but not limited to U-

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Pass/B-TAP/E-TAP programs, Bike Share For Business, vanpool facilitation), TAP credit,

transit passes, bikeshare passes, EV charging, parking vouchers, and HOV lane access.

Metro Design Studio and Metro Brand – Metro has an in-house design studio and

marketing team who are in charge of promoting Metro’s services, events, and brand.

Media Platforms & Apps: Metro Youtube, Instagram. Twitter, Snapchat and Facebook

channels and the various Metro App’s (Go Metro) can share information, and advertise

events and contests.

Unsolicited Proposals Process- Metro’s Unsolicited Proposals process allows potential

partners to submit their ideas to Metro’s Office of Extraordinary Innovation for review.

Once a proposal is submitted, Metro can decide to move the project forward with the

proposer, or through a competitive procurement process (usually an RFP).

Agency Limitations

Federal Regulations – As a public transit agency, Metro must adhere to Federal

Transportation Administration (FTA) regulations, as well as other federal laws and

guidelines. This includes mandates such as providing transportation services for those

with disabilities (the Americans with Disabilities Act), avoiding discriminatory impact by

race (Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI), and mitigating disproportional environmental

impacts on low income and minority populations (Executive Order 12898).

Procurement Process – Metro is a steward of public funding and must adhere to a

standard procurement process for potential vendors and partners. Visit

business.metro.net for more details about our procurement process.

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Transit Access Pass (TAP) – Metro, along with 23 other transit agencies in the region,

uses an outside vendor, known as TAP, to manage our riders’ stored value transit cards

and payment terminals for metro bus and rail. TAP provides great convenience for our

riders, but also comes with limitations. Solutions to manage the automobile that impact

payment or rider tracking should be aware of the capabilities and limitations of the TAP

technology.

Labor Contracts – Metro employees highly trained teams of transportation

professionals, many of whom belong to labor unions with long-term contracts. Potential

partners should be aware of how Metro’s labor contracts might affect a proposed

project.

Political Considerations - Metro is ultimately responsible to voters of LA County and

their elected officials. Potential solutions to manage the automobile should recognize to

political aspect of Metro’s work and the agency’s accountability to the public.

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Opportunity Areas

Metro is open to all ideas for projects to managed the automobile and achieve our goals

of improving freeway performance, encouraging transit use, and increasing the speed of Metro

bus service. With these goals in mind Metro has identified three general “opportunity areas” as

potential starting points for projects to manage the automobile.

Dedicated Rights of Way – Metro is interested in solutions that leverage the agency’s

existing right of way access, as well as solutions that create additional rights of way for

transit vehicles. Potential projects for managing the automobile might:

- convert existing mixed-traffic lanes or into HOV or HOT lanes, with an emphasis

on enabling Metro buses to bypass traffic congestion.

- reconfiguring Metro’s existing rights of way to maximize vehicle throughput

and improve transit vehicle speeds.

ExpressLanes Network – Metro is looking for ways to improve upon and expand its

ExpressLane Network. Potential projects for managing the automobile might:

- help Metro expand ExpressLanes into a regional network.

- implement technology to verify number of passengers in a high occupancy lane.

- improve enforcement of ExpressLanes violations.

Managing Curb Space – a major contributor to congestion on LA’s arterial streets is the

interaction between vehicles and curb space. This includes buses pulling into bus stops,

Transportation Network Companies picking up and dropping off riders, and automobiles

looking for parking. Potential projects for managing the automobile might:

- improve the ability of Metro buses to re-enter traffic lanes after a bus stop.

- manage TNC pick up and drop off to minimize congestion effects

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Solutions for Freight – LA County is home to a diverse industrial sector, including two of

the largest ports in the United States. And while transportation of freight is critical to

the regional economy, freight travel often intersects with passenger travel, adding to

congestion on roads and slowdowns on regional trains. Potential projects for managing

the automobile might:

- create incentives to freight drivers to travel off-peak or on less congested roads

- prioritize freight vehicles with cargo over empty vehicles and empty containers.

- separate freight travel from passenger travel to decrease congestion and

increase safety.

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Conclusion

In order to pursue the mission of providing a world class transportation system for the

people of LA County, Metro will test and implement pricing strategies to reduce roadway traffic

congestion. Metro is interested in solutions that provide incentives for users to shift their

behavior away from driving at peak times, as well as solutions that introduce equitable

decongestion pricing.

Metro seeks innovative proposals from potential partners which take into account past

experiments with pricing and incentives while also considering the unique context of Los

Angeles County. Proposals should address one or more of Metro’s goals to manage

automobiles:

1. Improve roadway performance,

2. Promote a broader mobility menu, and

3. Improve the average speeds of transit vehicles.

The people of LA County deserve better mobility options than driving alone through

heavy traffic. LA Metro will empower individuals to move swiftly and easily through LA County

by incentivizing behavioral shift while also pricing overused road infrastructure. But Metro can’t

do it alone. We look forward to working with partners on new innovative projects, because at

the end of the day, we’re on this ride together.

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Endnotes

1 (USC Dornsife, 2015) 2 (Cookson & Pishue, 2017) 3 (American Highway User Alliance, 2015, p. vii) 4 (Texas A&M Transportation Institute, 2014) 5 (American Highway User Alliance, 2015, p. viii) 6 (Levy, Buonocore, & von Stackelberg, 2010) 7 (Manville & Goldman, 2017, p. 4) 8 (Taylor, 2018) 9 (National Transit Database, 2018) 10 (Manville, Taylor, & Blumenberg, 2018) 11 (British Medical Journal, 2004) 12 (British Medical Journal, 2004) 13 (Shoup, 1997) 14 (Downs, 2004) 15 (Vickrey, 1992) 16 (Orr & Rivlin, 2009, p. 2) 17 (Orr & Rivlin, 2009, p. 6) 18 (Prasch, 2004) 19 (Manville & Goldman, 2017, p. 2) 20 (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2009) 21 (Federal Highway Administration, p. chap 5) 22 (Johnston, Theresa, 2014) 23 (Merugu, D., Prabhakar, B. S., & Rama, N. 2009) 24 (Prabhakar, Balaji. Personal Communication, May 8, 2018) 25 (Donovan, Stuart. Personal Communication, August 22, 2018) 26 (Donovan, S. 2010) 27 (Bhatt, K., Higgins, T., & Berg, J. T. 2008) 28 (Bhatt, K., Higgins, T., & Berg, J. T. 2008) 29 (Harsman, B., & Quigley, J. M. 2011) 30 (Bhatt, K., Higgins, T., & Berg, J. T. 2008) 31 (Pessaro, 2015)

24

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