Managing Market Abuse briefing 16/07/15
Transcript of Managing Market Abuse briefing 16/07/15
Managing market abusePractical responses to regulatory pressure
Bovill briefing | London | 16th July 2015
Mark Spiers, Mike Booth, Beth Cazalet
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Today we’ll be looking at…
• the UK rules in this area – an overview
• the respective roles of compliance and front office teams
• obligations for controlling access to inside information
• effective and proportionate use of pre-trade controls
• how to effectively conduct post-trade surveillance.
Why think about Market Abuse now?
The FCA is focusing on the asset management industry more
The FCA has a greater appetite to pursue criminal convictions
or issue public sanctions
Reputational and financial risk continues to be a concern
Regulatory change over the last few years has taken
resources away from monitoring
MAD II is on the horizon
FCA Market Abuse Thematic Review
Source: Bovill analysis of TR 15-01, the larger the word the more times it has been used (removed the words - information, inside and firm)
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Abusive behaviours
Insider dealingImproper
disclosure
Manipulating
transactions
Manipulating
devicesDissemination
Distortion and
misleading
behaviour
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Criminal and Civil regime
Maximum criminal penalties:
• unlimited fine
• seven years imprisonment.
Civil disciplinary regime allows the FCA to impose:
• unlimited fine
• public statement about the behaviour
• injunction requiring the person to stop the abusive behaviour
• order for restitution – where the individual is required to return or make
good any profit made from the abusive behaviour
• require the payment of compensation to victims.
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Qualifying investments & prescribed markets
Qualifying investments Prescribed markets
• transferable securities
• units in collective investment
undertakings
• money-market instruments
• financial futures contracts, including
equivalent cash-settled instruments
• forward interest rate agreements
• interest rate, currency and equity
swaps
• options
• derivatives on commodities
• + more
Defined as UK Recognised Investment
Exchanges, all other regulated markets in
the EEA and OFEX.
Auction Platforms (meaning a platform on
which auctions of emissions allowances
are traded) are also considered
prescribed markets.
Details of Recognised Investment Exchanges
are available at: fsa.gov.uk/register/exchanges.do
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Market abuse
Insider dealing
Improper disclosure
Manipulating transactions
Manipulating devices
Dissemination
Distortion and misleading behaviour
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Insider dealing
“Where an insider deals, or attempts to deal, in a
qualifying investment or related investment on the basis
of inside information relating to the investment in
question."
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Inside information
Information of a
precise nature
Not generally
available
Relating to an
issuer or
qualifying
investments Would, if
generally
available, be
likely to have a
significant
effect on price
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Improper Disclosure
“When an insider discloses inside information to another
person otherwise than in the proper course of the exercise of
his employment, profession or duties.”
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Manipulating transactions
“Behaviour that consists of effecting transactions or orders to
trade (otherwise than for legitimate reasons and in conformity
with accepted market practices on the relevant market) which:
• give, or are likely to give, a false or misleading impression
as to the supply of, or demand for, or as to the price of, one
or more qualifying investments; or
• secure the price of one or more such investments at an
abnormal or artificial level.”
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Manipulating devices
“Behaviour that consists of effecting transactions or orders to
trade which employ fictitious devices or any other form of
deception or contrivance.”
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Dissemination
“Behaviour that consists of the dissemination of information by
any means which gives, or is likely to give, a false or
misleading impression as to a qualifying investment by a
person who knew or could reasonably be expected to have
known that the information was false or misleading.”
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Distortion and misleading behaviour
“Behaviour that (not falling within the definitions of
Manipulating Transactions, Manipulating Devises or
Dissemination):
• is likely to give a regular user of the market a false or
misleading impression as to the supply of, demand for or
price or value of, qualifying investments; or
• would be, or would be likely to be, regarded by a regular
user of the market as behaviour that would distort, or would
be likely to distort, the market in such an investment.”
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Market abuse
Mark Stevenson
Deliberately manipulated gilt price
hoping to sell to the Bank of England
as part of Quantitative Easing.
£662,700
Banned
Michael Coscia
Using his own algorithm he placed
thousands of false orders (layering)
taking advantage of price movements. £600,000
David Einhorn
Instructed the sale of shares in
Punch Taverns on the basis of inside
information£3 million
Paul Milsom
An approved person with sensitive and
valuable information – betrayed trust
by disclosing inside information
relating to forthcoming transactions.
£245,000
plus 2 years
in prison.
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Controlling access to inside information
If one person has it
I assume everyone
has is
If one entity in the
group has it I assume
the whole group has
it
I use the investment
analysts as a buffer
between the inside
information and the
Manager
I have a designated
person responsible for
dealing with soundings
There are data
read restrictions
in system
I tell everyone
I have Chinese
walls between
teams
The network
drives are only
accessible by
particular people
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Where do the responsibilities reside?
1. Identifying
inside
information
2. Preventing
market
manipulation
3. Detecting
market
manipulation
4. Lifting trade
restrictions
5. Conducting
surveillance
6. Keeping the
insider /
restricted list
7. Approving
PA deals
9. Oversight of
MAR
technology
solutions
8. Implementing
MAR
controls
What are we trying to do?
• Treat the Clients Fairly / Conflicts of Interest
• Protect the markets from abuse
• Protect the firm from regulatory disciplinary action
• Look good in due diligence reviews
Monitoring for market abuse – the goal?
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The Broking
Arm of an
Investment
House
A Corporate
Finance
Department
Secure
Printers
publishing
offering
documents
Asset
Manager
using OTC
products
Dick:
Doesn’t PA
deal
because he
has “skin in
the game”
by owning
his fund.
Navinder:
Sole trader
using HFT
strategy
Harry:
PA deals
frequently but
whose
requests are
often denied
Sue:
IT contractor
assisting
with the
servers
The biggest risk?
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Identifying your risks
Do you understand
the potential abuse
areas surrounding
your
client and PA deals?
Do you
understand the
systems you
have in place
to carry out
client and PA
deals?
Do you understand the
MAR controls that you
have in place when
carrying out client and PA
deals?
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Discussion of pre-trade controls
Insider
dealing
Designated person
maintains the
restricted list
Restrictions coded
into trade order
system
Staff training
Hard blocks
implemented
Regular
attestations in
relation to PA
dealing
PA dealing
approval process
Informal
attendance by
compliance at
investment
meetings
Market
manipulation
Second pair of
eyes review pre
trade
Position limits
coded into the
trade order system
Clear statement of
the trading
strategy
Separate dealing
desk
Exception
reports based
on your risks
produced
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Discussion of post-trade controls
Insider
dealing
Review of dealing by
security and separately by
staff – it makes it easier to
see who is doing what!
Double checking whether PA
dealings were as approved
(receiving broker confirms)
Review trading
around market
events (or the other
way round)
Reviewing holding
periods of PA and
client trades
Reviewing stated
dealing rationales
against trading
patterns
Marketing
manipulation
Trading pattern reviews
(volume, sales vs.
purchases, time of cancelled
transactions)
Separate dealing deskReviewing
exception reports
Reviewing out
performance
Thinking about your controls
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How do I know that the controls we put in place are working – especially if
they are automatic system controls?
When were the automatic control rules last reviewed and updated?
Are our automatic system controls based around guideline restrictions and
PA dealing requests or do they also consider client deals and manipulating
transactions?
What are the exception reports actually telling me about particular
individuals or desks?
Am I seeing any correlation between phone calls or Bloomberg chat and
dealing that is a concern?
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Thinking about your controls
Market abuse may be a “one-off” event, but just as likely to be on-going.
Look out for:
• “Forgetting” to get PA deals approved
• PA dealing in securities that are clients’ investable universe but not in
client portfolio
• What has happened in the market or sector the security is based in
• Dealing in derivatives based on securities in clients’ portfolios
• Volumes of cancelled transactions
• Dealing frequency
• Transactions outside agreed parameters or strategy
• Trading after stop list block.
• Widens inside information and disclosure definitions
• Harmoises insider dealing and unlawful disclosure
• Widens market manipulation applicability
• Legislates for market soundings
• Widens requirements for suspicious transaction and order reports
(STORs)
MAD II – selected impacts
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Market abuse control framework
Managing the risk insider information is not
identifiedA
Controlling access to insider informationB
Pre-trade controlsC
Personal account dealingD
Post trade surveillanceE
TrainingF
A
B
E
Mark
et in
form
atio
n
Investm
ent m
anag
em
ent firm
Bro
kers
/ dire
ct a
ccess
Preventative controls Detective controls
Com
plia
nce
C
D
F