Managing changes in Civil Aviation - ATC Guild guild seminar 2011...ground instructor, a licensed...
Transcript of Managing changes in Civil Aviation - ATC Guild guild seminar 2011...ground instructor, a licensed...
PAST – Imperfect
PRESENT – Tense
FUTURE – Clouded by
lack of Transparency
Mumbai Agathi
Surat
Lengpui Mangalore Kanpur
Cochin
Trichy
Lengpui
Indian Safety collage - 2011
Guwahati
Cochin
?
J. Randolph "Randy" Babbitt”
FAA Chief
“My number one priority is to focus on safety.
This is a business where one mistake is one too many."
Right Professional for the job
Former Airline pilot and the head of Air Line Pilots Association
Right Professional for the job
Former, Director of the Air Navigation Bureau at the
International Civil Aviation Organization; U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), focusing on air traffic
management and control
A certified air transport pilot, a certified flight and
ground instructor, a licensed airframe and power plant
mechanic, and a qualified FAA control tower
operator.
William Voss CEO of the Flight Safety Foundation
NTSB Identification: OPS11IA401
WASHINGTON FLIGHT PROGRAM
Incident occurred Wednesday, March 23, 2011 in Arlington,
VA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/17/2011
unable to establish contact with the supervisory
controller working alone in the control tower. Two air
carrier aircraft landed during the period without tower
contact
Postincident investigation revealed that the
controller on duty had the necessary
preconditions for the development of
fatigue at the time of the event, specifically
acute sleep loss in the 24 hours before the
event and circadian disruption as a result
of working the midnight shift.
The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this
incident as follows:
The tower controller's loss of
consciousness induced by lack of sleep,
fatigue resulting from working successive
midnight shifts, and air traffic control
scheduling practices
Proactive Action by an “Independent”
investigation board and a Safety system
where Safety is the priority
What we have is a Reactive Procrastination
where „Commercial & Political interests”
outweigh Safety
Govt. of India should recognise due importance of ATC profession and accord special status to it preferably by examining the feasibility of de-linking ATC from the normal organisational set-up and creating an independent cadre to be governed by separate provisions. Justice Lahoti
The Darkroom Boys
The responsibility of a pilot-in-command is
limited to the safety of his aircraft and passengers
on board thereon, that of the controller extends to
all the aircraft (and passengers) under his control
at any given time
Justice Lahoti
25th June 2011
AIE flight makes a steep approach and
a hard landing at Mangalore. The
captain decides to take off again but
the copilot slams the brakes and the
aircraft manages to stop by the end of
the runway. Almost repeats the crash
sequence of AIE 812
Rate of Descent
4000 feet per minute
Rate of Descent
4000 feet per minute
Rate of Descent
> 1000 feet per minute
Rate of Descent
600 feet per minute
ILS Glide Path
AX 812 descends at 4000 feet per minute up to 600 feet and maintains more than
1000 feet per minute up to 60 feet before rounding off to reduce the Descent Rate
06:04:29
EGPWS Forty
06:04:30
EGPWS Thirty
06:04:31
EGPWS Twenty
06:04:32
EGPWS Ten
AX 812 descends 10 feet for every second from Forty feet up to Ten
feet but floats for the next 8 seconds before touching down
The COI chose to ignore this vital fact
The failure of the COI to be transparent in
identifying ALL the factors that contributed
to the crash, prolongs the dangerous flight
conditions
On track, On Glide path
The crew were experienced and the
Russian Air Force Radar controller
was highly trained
60 m above the glide path and 130 m to the left of runway centerline,
the Controller of Landing Zone called: ―
‖FOUR on track, glide path‖
4.6 km from the threshold of RWY26
35 m above the glide path and 100 m to the left of runway centerline,
the Controller of Landing Zone called: ―
‖THREE - on track, glide path‖
3.5 km from the threshold of RWY26
20 m above the glide path and 80 m to the left of runway centerline,
the Controller of Landing Zone called: ―
‖TWO - on track, glide path‖
2.5 km from the threshold of RWY26
Report of the Polish Authorities
According to the Polish report the main cause of accident was trial approach and the descent below the allowed altitude at an excessive rate of descent in bad weather conditions, in conjunction with late execution of the go-around procedure
Report of the Polish Authorities
Circumstances that led to this are
incorrect training of Polish Pilots but
also wrong work of Russian Air
Traffic Controllers who gave bad
information to crew of Tu-154m
Radar
Datum 1
Radar
Datum 2 Horizontal Aircraft
Position
Positional Discrepancy ≈ 100m -
3000m
Datum 2 Datum 1
Precision Approach Radar
Defense airfield charts are based on
EVER-MD Coordinates and not on
WGS 84 as laid down by ICAO
Use Of GPS In Non-WGS84
Reference Datum Airspace
In non-WGS 84 airspace, the local
datum (position basis) used to survey
the navigation data base position
information may result in significant
position errors from a survey done
using the WGS 84 datum
Airbus & Boeing
To the pilot, this means that the
position of runways, airports,
waypoints, or navigation aids, may not
be as accurate as depicted on the map
display and may not agree with the
GPSposition.
Are Airlines being safe and the
Regulator ensuring safety when a
Precision approach is permitted to
be conducted in unsafe conditions
with untrained crew who have no
SOPs ?
MM 1000ft above
Airport
elevation
Typical Schedule for Deceleration on
Three-Degree Glide Path from Outer Marker to
Stabilisation Height ( 1000 feet )
OM
Deceleration
Segment
( 10kts / nm )
VMAX at
OM=160kts
VAPP at
1000ft= 130kts
3 6
Source- Flight Safety Foundation
With Speed of 160 kts at 4 nm and in Tailwind
conditions, the aircraft cannot be in Stabilised
condition by 1000ft AGL
1.3 Thrust reversers also provide additional stopping force on wet and slippery runways along with added safety and control margins during aborted takeoffs and landings.
• 5.1 The flight crew shall be mentally prepared to land without using thrust reverser and bring the aircraft at low power low drag with
clean configuration.
• 6.2 It will be the sole responsibility of the
airport operator to maintain the data pertaining
to landing of aircraft without application of
thrust reverser..
Spoilers Deployment-
Automatic or
Manual within 2 seconds
Wheel brakes within 1 second
Reverse thrust within 2 seconds
Landing Advisory data assumptions
Threshold Crossing height 50feet
Speed Vref
1000 feet
Touch down
With heavy rubber deposits in the touchdown
area at Delhi, the Environment Circular will
result in a disaster in wet conditions
Calicut continues to be an Unlicensed field
A0372/10 – CALICUT AIRPORT IS LICENSED
FOR PUBLIC USE FM 29TH JUN 2009 AND VALID
UPTO 26TH JUN 2011. 25 FEB 12:50 2010 UNTIL
PERM CREATED 25 FEB 14:03 2010
"Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College”
"Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise."
Thomas Gray's poem (1742)
We need a new
perspective a mindset
change to prevent the
Horoscope from
becoming a
Horrorscope
Mumbai Agathi
Surat
Lengpui Mangalore Kanpur
Cochin
Trichy
Lengpui
Guwahati
Cochin
?