Managing Change at the United Nations: Lessons from Recent ... · PDF fileOCTOBER 2015...

OCTOBER 2015

Managing Change at the United Nations:Lessons from Recent Initiatives

FRANCESCO MANCINI

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

FRANCESCO MANCINI is a non-resident Senior Adviser at

the International Peace Institute and Adjunct Associate

Professor at Columbia University and the National

University of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew School of Public

Policy.

Email: [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank Won-soo Kim, currently

Under-Secretary-General and Acting High Representative

for Disarmament Affairs and the former Assistant Secretary-

General for Change Implementation, and Atul Khare,

currently Under-Secretary-General for Field Support and

the first Assistant Secretary-General for Change

Management, for their inputs and thoughtful feedback

during the drafting of this paper. Much gratitude goes to

Steven Siqueira, Senior Political Affairs Officer in the

Department of Political Affairs and former Change

Management and Change Implementation team member for

his contribution to the analysis and insights on the latest

developments related to the change management and

implementation processes in the United Nations Secretariat.

The author would also like to thank the other members of

the Change Management, and later Change Implementation

Teams, including Yee Woo (Eddie) Guo, Johannes Huisman,

Vivian van de Perre, Madhushree Chatterjee, Janet Wieser,

Denise Wilman, Igor Shpiniov, Utku Teksoz, Anne-Marie

Beausejour, Rosanna McCoy, Michelle Douglas-Sweeney,

Kharasotra Grenier, Joelle Sciboz, Yvonne Knoepfel, and

Sunho Hwang. Many of them have reviewed drafts of this

paper and provided substantial inputs and suggestions.

Adam Lupel, Marie O'Reilly, and Marisa McCrone at the

International Peace Institute provided valuable guidance

throughout the process.

The contents and conclusions of this paper remain the

responsibility of the author.

Cover Photo: UN headquarters in New

York City, USA, August 21, 2014.

© iStockphoto.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this

paper represent those of the author

and not necessarily those of the

International Peace Institute. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit of

a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Director of Research andPublications

Marisa McCrone, Assistant ProductionEditor

Suggested Citation:

Francesco Mancini, “Managing Change

at the United Nations: Lessons from

Recent Initiatives,” New York:

International Peace Institute, October

2015.

© by International Peace Institute, 2015

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Change at the UN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Waves of Reform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

PRE-COLD WAR REFORM INITIATIVES

POST-COLD WAR WAVES OF REFORM

Wave I: An Agenda for Peace and a More Action- Oriented Approach

Wave II: Institutional Change

Wave III: The Millennium Declaration, the Brahimi Report, and the Challenges of Globalization

Wave IV: The World Summit Outcome Document and a Move toward Long-Term Reform

Wave V: The Strengthening of Peacekeeping, Political Affairs, and Development Agendas

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s ChangePlan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

THE FIVE-YEAR ACTION AGENDA

THE CHANGE PLAN

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

Lessons Learned from Past Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Conclusion: Ensuring the UN SecretariatIs Fit for Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

1

Executive Summary

As the United Nations celebrates its seventiethanniversary this year, the organization facesgrowing systemic stresses placed on it by emergingglobal challenges and rapidly shifting political andsecurity dynamics. Such challenges have sparked arenewed interest in reform.This report examines past initiatives for change

within the UN, as well as obstacles to reforms andtheir implementation. The report illustratesexamples of successful processes of institutionaltransformation and highlights six waves of UNreform that have occurred since the end of the ColdWar, including Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’sChange Plan of 2011.By exploring how reforms were managed in the

past and the reasons for their success or failure, thereport detects the challenges and opportunities foreffectively managing change at the UN. This isparticularly relevant at a time when the system hasundergone a series of major policy reviews thathave produced a host of recommendations forreform. The report argues for a model of contin-uous improvement, rather than one specificinstitutional change or new process, and offers anumber of recommendations to manage reformeffectively at the UN:1. Clarify the vision for the Secretariat: Change

requires a clearly articulated strategic visionfrom the secretary-general. The vast majorityof reforms have been initiated by theSecretariat, and even when the secretary-general is mandated by member states, he/sheneeds to lead the Secretariat with a clear vision.

2. Encourage support from member states: It isimportant for the secretary-general and othersenior officials to engage member states inbuilding a rationale for reform, as well as indeveloping concrete proposals. Differentrepre sentatives of member states will havedifferent interests, and this will always bevariable, but tracking and making use of theseinterests can help the Secretariat push a reformagenda. While outreach to the New York-basedpermanent missions is a natural and necessarystep for the Secretariat, the secretary-generaland his senior officials must also engage incapitals, including both ministries of foreignaffairs and finance (particularly in Geneva

Group countries). The Secretariat should notbypass the permanent missions; however,consultations with capitals can help toovercome impasses in New York and gobeyond political hurdles that assume peculiardynamics at UN headquarters.

3. Involve the General Assembly: The GeneralAssembly, through its president, should be anally of the Secretariat in building consensusamong member states, given the critical role ofthe Fifth Committee. For this reason, reformsshould also be timed to leverage the abilities ofa consensus-building president of the GeneralAssembly. “Groups of friends” (regionallybalanced selections of champions frommember states), organized in thematic workinggroups or informal committees, can be usefulin advancing important changes and can beeffective to guarantee continuity across succes-sive terms of General Assembly presidents.

4. Establish buy-in of the Secretariat: Forreforms to be implemented, the buy-in of theSecretariat is needed from the early stages ofconception. Mobilizing senior management isimportant but not in itself sufficient, sincedirector and working-level staff are key toimplementing changes. Since the Secretariatdoes not have an established mechanism todrive the process of change forward, “agents”of change need to be identified, supported, andmade responsible for implementation. Whilethere are dynamic change agents across thebureaucracy, inertia and resistance to change isstrong. It is therefore important to identifyaccountable focal points for change within theSecretariat both at the senior and middlemanagement levels to ensure the implementa-tion of reforms, while also providing peersupport to encourage progress across theboard. Providing a supportive environment forthese change agents is key, as fighting bureau-cracy cannot be accomplished alone.

5. Engage staff unions: Engagement of thevarious staff unions, particularly at thebeginning stage of reforms, is important—asthey have direct lines to member states and aregiven a voice in committee sessions on issuesthat involve staff (such as mobility and flexibleworking arrangements). Building credibilityand trust with these elected representatives of

2 Francesco Mancini

staff can go a long way to building trust withmember states, and the reverse is also true.

6. Ground high-level panels in political realities:In times of disunity and uncertainty, blue-ribbon panels composed of former statesper-sons and experts can help generate new ideasand break logjams, as was the case with theHigh-level Panel on Threats, Challenges andChange in 2004. At the same time, these panelsneed to consider the political context in whichthey operate, to avoid producing a wish list thatcannot obtain consensus regarding nationalinterests and the politics among memberstates.

7. Test ideas and launch trial balloons: The useof unofficial white papers and speeches by boththe secretary-general and other senior officialshave proven to be a successful means of testingideas with member states. These may need tobe used more often and more dynamically.Using the “third UN” of think tanks, academicinstitutions, and civil society fora to float ideasshould also be tried more often. Official papersand documents that get tied up in the formalcommittee structure of the General Assemblytend to be counterproductive, especially in theearly stages of developing a vision.

8. Create legislative hooks: Specific mandatesthat respond to the General Assembly’s role inthe oversight of the management and adminis-tration of the organization are helpful, andshould be exploited—most ideas worthpursuing have already been suggested, andmany have even been mandated. Reformscome in waves because evolution from conceptto implementation must follow the appropriatelegislative process, which takes time. Trying tocircumvent this is counterproductive—so five-and ten-year plans, aligned with the GeneralAssembly’s own budget cycles, are preferable toshort-term rhetorical statements that set highexpectations but then yield little in the shortterm.

9. Work through the debates in the FifthCommittee: The Fifth Committee should onlyreceive proposals once they have been fullyauthorized by a relevant General Assemblyresolution. Leaving substantive details for theFifth Committee to iron out is a recipe for

disaster in non-administrative matters. Thiswas a major issue for the Change Plan, whichcontained ideas for both the administrative andpolicy sides of the Secretariat, without havingthe ideas on the policy side (for example onlearning and training) vetted and approved bythe appropriate General Assembly committees.

10. Target the focus for member states: Broadpackages of reforms can have a strongrationale, but member states like to pick andchoose. It may be better to promote ideas thatmake sense in their own right and then activelypush for them, rather than trying to lump toomany dissimilar changes together. This isanother clear lesson emerging from the ChangePlan, which was very heterogeneous in itsrecommendations. Not all elements of acomprehensive reform package are equally ripeor politically acceptable at one given point intime. Therefore, a targeted focus may bepreferable, but this becomes a judgement callfor the senior leadership team.

11. Avoid the term “reform”: The word reform isoverused and politically charged at the UN. Ofcourse, it depends on the particular historicalmoment, but today it is probably better to talkabout strengthening, enhancing, streamlining,or adapting the UN toward the non-mutuallyexclusive aims of providing more “value for themoney,” “more impact on the ground,” and/or“more effective support to member states andtheir people.”

12. Manage expectations: Decades of UN reformhave shown that modest and incrementalresults are achievable. The UN has navigatedthrough decades of geopolitical changes,because it is ultimately a highly adaptiveorganization. However, some changes, particu-larly those that directly upset old powerbalances or national interests of groups ofstates, are difficult to make happen. It isadvisable to keep expectations realistic. To besuccessful in sensitive reforms will requirededicated and patient senior-level attentionand some degree of “management jiujitsu”where flexibility and re-directing opposingforces are paramount.

13. Message for change: The value of internal andexternal communication is often under-

MANAGING CHANGE AT THE UNITED NATIONS 3

1 On selection of the secretary-general, see, for example, the 1 for 7 Billion Campaign, or The Elders' Stronger UN Initiative. On recently proposed reform agendas,see for example, the International Peace Institute’s Independent Commission on Multilateralism, available at www.icm2016.org , The Hague Institute for GlobalJustice and The Stimson Center's Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, or the Ralph Bunche Institute’s Future of the UN Development System .

estimated and under-resourced. It is better toavoid trumpeting problems for which there areno reasonable answers but to focus, instead, onsolutions that can garner general agreement, ifnot consensus. Consistent support andexchange with the spokesperson’s office andthe Department of Public Information forinternal communications is certainly war -ranted, and dedicated communications strate-gies for staff, member states, NGOs, the press,and key public influencers need to be prepared,updated, and frequently used.

Introduction

“I have no doubt that forty years from now weshall be engaged in the same pursuit. How could weexpect otherwise? World organization is still a newadventure in human history.”

Dag Hammarskjöld, 1956

Seventy years after the founding of the UnitedNations (UN), the world is still talking about itsreform. With Ban Ki-moon’s second termapproaching its end in 2016, the questions of howthe new UN secretary-general will be selected andwhat his or her agenda should be in the first fewyears are receiving greater attention.1 This reportfocuses on how reforms were managed in the past,with a particular focus on the 2011–2013 period,which was important as it straddled Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s first and second terms, atime when he, like previous secretaries-generalbefore him, had the opportunity to propose newapproaches to global problems, buttressed bycritical institutional and personnel changes tomodernize the way the UN acts in a rapidlychanging international system.The report explores improvements in the way the

Secretariat is working, successful initiatives, and afew setbacks. The lessons of how things were doneand why they succeeded or failed are worthlearning, particularly as the current secretary-general looks to implement some of therecommendations from the various review

processes conducted in 2015, such as the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, andbefore the next wave of innovations are launched inJanuary 2017, with the start of a new UN secretary-general’s term and another chance to get “worldorganization” right. The international system is evolving rapidly, and

in addition to global vehicles for multinationalcollaboration to address global problems, regionaland thematic organizations are playing increas-ingly important roles. This experiment in globalcollaboration around meeting tables rather than onbattlefields dates back only about 100 years to theearly days of the League of Nations. Yet today,among this chorus of actors, the UN has become anecessary, but not always in itself sufficient, actor—one of the best fora open to international policy-makers, given its universal membership, its charter(which is, in essence, an intergovernmental treatythat binds its member states under internationallaw), its global brand, and its credibility with manyof “we the peoples.” At the same time, as the UNmarks its seventieth birthday, soul-searchingquestions remain unanswered. The SecurityCouncil, often incapable of delivering solutions tomajor crises, is increasingly less representative ofan evolving geopolitical context. Peacekeeping isoverstretched, but its budget and number of troopshave been balloning over the years. Issues ofaccountability, impact, and efficiency damage theworld body’s reputation and prevent it fromserving both the interests of its member states andtheir people.To ensure that the UN is fit for purpose for the

new generation of challenges, decision makers incapitals and in New York need to apply a model ofcontinual change, equipping the organization andits governing bodies with more flexibility to adapt,grow, and reform over time. Doing so will permitthe organization, its staff, and its constituents to bebetter prepared to address emerging challenges,political change, and shifting security threats—partnering with thematic and regional organiza-tions and other actors where appropriate, andguaranteeing that the Secretariat and the organiza-tion it serves evolve.

www.icm2016.org

4 Francesco Mancini

The argument posited here favors a culture ofchange and flexibility—accepting more trial anderror, moving the organization forward by growingand shedding staff and programs as the needsmerit.2 These goals are ends in themselves and canlead to success in the face of specific challenges. Asthe organization and its member states cannotknow what “black swan” is descending over thehorizon, a model of continuous improvement atthe UN is the best model, so that it can tack andchange course when the conditions warrant.Regular programmatic and functional reviews ofthe UN’s main organs and offices can be a means ofaccomplishing this over a prolonged time.Nevertheless, managing change will be one of the

defining challenges for the organization in thetwenty-first century. The organization hasdemonstrated it can adapt with the support ofmember states and staff, and now all of the UN’sconstituencies need to allow the organization tocontinue to grow, shed, and re-organize to be at itsmost effective. This report begins by outlining briefly what

managing change means in the UN Secretariat,stressing the complexity of a reform process, withits multiple stakeholders, intricate politics, andbureaucratic turfs. Subsequently, it briefly reviewsthe early efforts of change in the Secretariat beforethe end of the Cold War, and then presents fiveseparate waves of reforms between 1992 and 2007.It later addresses, for the first time, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Change Plan, which wasinitiated in 2011. It reviews both the drafting of thechange proposals, as well as the process used toimplement them. The paper concludes withthirteen lessons learned from the recent history ofUN reform, which the author hopes can informfuture attempts in adapting the world body tocontinuing shifts in global power dynamics,changing political and security environments, andemerging global challenges.

Change at the UN

For the UN Secretariat, change is not a single event.It is instead a process that requires concertedefforts to align conflicting interests of nearly 200stakeholders (its member states) and a large,

multinational bureaucracy, spread across fourglobal headquarters, five regional economiccommissions, and roughly thirty field-basedpeacekeeping and political missions. Including UNagencies, funds, and programs in this dynamicadds another layer of complexity. As theirinfluence in international affairs grows, civilsociety, academic institutions, think tanks, andphilanthropic organizations—the so-called “thirdUN”—also need to be taken into consideration. Given this complicated landscape, the “how” of

change is as important as the “what.” Unless aprocess is carefully designed, executed, and tracked,reform proposals risk remaining only on paper. Infact, the road to the cemetery of UN reform is pavedwith reports. The excitement triggered by blue-ribbon panels and civil society leaders quicklydissipates, as ideas for reform need to sift throughthe national interests represented in the GeneralAssembly, and its Fifth Committee, which isresponsible for all administrative and budgetaryissues governing the UN Secretariat. Here, govern-ment delegates, organized into voting blocs (i.e.,Group of 77; European Union; Canada, Australia,and New Zealand (CANZ); Russia; USA; Japan),trade proposals until they reach an acceptableresult, stripped of some faults and virtues, thatfinally gets gavelled by a succession of exhaustedambassadors chairing the Fifth Committee andthen by the General Assembly. The importance of the financial element should

not be underestimated. Every reform process has tocontend with budget battles over modest sums ofmoney (when compared to what states spend ontheir own militaries, for example), serving as aproxy for political fights between the developingcountries that dominate the General Assembly andthe large contributors that tend to dominate theSecurity Council and the Secretariat. Mastering thisdynamic has been elusive, resulting in repeatedfinancial crises throughout UN history. This rather haphazard process of change, driven

by diverging national interests, diplomaticcompromises, and financial politics, has little timefor data and analysis of what works and what doesnot. It should not come as a surprise that the resultsof diplomatic and political compromises often turn

2 Studying how software and technology companies innovate and succeed (while often failing) can be helpful for the UN in this regard.


out to be suboptimal when measured for effect,leaving the Secretariat exposed to claims ofincompetence. While UN Charter amendments are very rare

and difficult to achieve, the UN is not frozen intime.3 It has proven remarkably adaptable, surviv -ing innumerable crises, geopolitical shifts, andhostile political contexts. Since the end of the ColdWar, scores of high-level panels, governmentalstudies, and individual scholars have put forwardhundreds of proposals. Successive secretaries-general have engaged in frequent bouts of self-examination, offering their own reform agendas.4Some have produced significant changes in organi-zational terms, including several changes of the UNSecretariat structure and the creation of new bodiessuch as the Peacebuilding Support Office, theOmbudsman and Mediation Services, the EthicsOffice, and the Secretary-General’s Policy andManagement committees. Others have producedsignificant changes in doctrinal and normativeterms, as in the case of implementing the “respon-sibility to protect” principle or the protection ofcivilians. New administrative procedures have alsobeen introduced, including a new internal justicesystem in the Office of Administration of Justice tostreamline internal dispute resolution, theadoption of international accounting standards tomake UN budgets easier to understand andcompare to other public sector entities, moretransparent procurement procedures, a frameworkfor staff mobility, and new resource-planning tools. In 2011, the Secretary-General’s Change

Management Team undertook a study of previousreform processes and concluded that 70 percent ofthe proposals made by secretaries-general since1992 have been implemented to varying degrees, afairly positive success ratio for an organization ofthe size and complexity of the UN.5

Within this basic understanding of what consti-tutes change at the UN Secretariat, there have been

at least five major waves of reform since the end ofthe Cold War, where “major” refers to cross-sectoral changes, not limited to one or twothematic or management areas. Several otherreforms in particular areas, such as peacekeeping,peacebuilding, human rights, human resources,procurement, or information technology, havebeen implemented as part of these broader waves ofreform, many of them stemming from the 1997reform proposals discussed in the next section.

Waves of Reform

PRE-COLD WAR REFORM INITIATIVES

Although this report focuses on the period since1992, significant changes were made to theSecretariat by each secretary-general before the endof the Cold War. Secretaries-general have generallyused their first months and years to reform theSecretariat to meet their management styles,political windows of opportunity, and substantivedemands by member states. Thant Myint-U andAmy Scott wrote an excellent brief history ofSecretariat reform from 1945 to 2006.6Much of theoverview in this section is taken from their work. The first secretary-general, Trygve Lie (1946–

1952), had to establish the location, the building,and the first complement of staffing. In 1950, hehad laid out an ambitious Twenty-Year Programmefor Achieving Peace through the United Nations,7but the Korean War heightened Cold War tensionsand made his plans moot. His Secretariat had eightadministrative and substantive departments,headed by assistant secretaries-general. The focusof the organization at the time was on collectivesecurity, as member states recognized that special-ized agencies, such as the World Health Organ -ization (WHO), the UN Educational, Scientific andCultural Organization (UNESCO), the Interna -tional Labour Organization (ILO), and the Foodand Agriculture Organization (FAO) wouldconcentrate on more technical and functional areas

3 A charter amendment must be adopted by a vote of two thirds of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective national constitutionalprocesses by two thirds of the member states, including the P5 (Article 108). It has been used on three occasions only: twice in 1963 to increase the size of thememberships of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and a third time to further increase the membership of ECOSOC in 1973.

4 For a comprehensive and concise review of UN reform, see Edward C. Luck, Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress (Academic Councilon the UN System, 2003).

5 "Compilation of Reform Proposals, 1992-2011," internal, unpublished study by the UN Secretary-General’s Change Management Team. The study was limited toproposals from previous secretaries-general. Harvard Business School professor John Kotter claimed (in 1996) that nearly 70 percent of large-scale changeprograms do not meet their goals. See John Kotter, Leading Change (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).

6 Thant Myint-U and Amy Scott, The UN Secretariat: A Brief History (1945–2006), New York: International Peace Academy, 2007.7 United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-Year Programme for Achieving Peace through the United Nations, UN Doc. A/1304, July 26, 1950.

6 Francesco Mancini

of international cooperation. However, the role ofthe Secretariat had already started to be confused inthese areas given its secretariat role for theEconomic and Social Council, which wanteddetailed and technical reporting on such issues astransport, refugees, and human rights. All this wasfurther compounded by the introduction of theExpanded Programme of Technical Assistance (thepre-cursor of the UN Development Programme)and the first regional economic commissions. Interms of senior appointments, Lie sought to bringthe views of the five permanent members of theSecurity Council (the P5) in-house by appointingsenior nationals of those countries to his group ofeight assistant secretaries-general, especiallyimportant at the time when there were nopermanent missions in New York. Dag Hammarskjöld (1953–1961) focused his first

months on reorganizing the Secretariat, andreplaced most of the eight assistant secretaries-general he inherited from Lie. He was personallyinvolved in reform efforts, drafting many of thepapers himself, presenting a report on the“Organization of the Secretariat” at the end of 1953that called for a freer hand by the secretary-generalfor the recruitment and termination of staff. Muchof his report was approved by the GeneralAssembly. Hammarskjöld reorganized the seniorechelons of the Secretariat, appointing six under-secretaries-general, while centralizing administra-tive and financial authority (legal, treasury,personnel) in his office. The idea of peacekeepingstarted under Hammarskjöld, with the first UNEmergency Force (UNEF I) authorized in 1956following the Suez Crisis, and later the UNOperation in the Congo (UNOC). Opposition byFrance and the Soviet Union to the growing UNoperation in the Congo led to severe financial crisesas the budget for that mission skyrocketed and thetwo P5 members refused to pay their shares. By1959, there was a growing feeling thatHammarskjöld had centralized too muchauthority, and the General Assembly called for areview of the organization of the Secretariat. U Thant (1961–1971) met the same pressures as

Lie and Hammarskjöld to appoint senior staff fromthe P5. He agreed to appoint eight principal advisers

at the level of under-secretary-general, who camefrom the USA, the Soviet Union, Brazil,Czechoslovakia, France, India, Nigeria, and theUnited Arab Republic (the name of the countryformed from the brief union of Egypt and Syria).This group met monthly with the secretary-general,but for a year or so only. As the first secretary-general from a non-Western country, Thantchampioned a robust development agenda, but bythe late 1960s the growth in functions had resultedin more than thirty-four senior staff around theworld. Thant proposed reducing these to elevenunder-secretaries-general reporting directly to him,who would serve as a cabinet with an overview of theUN’s activities, while there would be more assistantsecretaries-general, focused on departmentalresponsibilities only. He also pushed the administra-tion and finance functions out of his office and overto an under-secretary-general for finance andadministration, reversing Hammarskjöld’s effort tocentralize these functions. The General Assemblyapproved these changes.Kurt Waldheim (1972–1981) hired the first

woman at the assistant secretary-general level, andalso recognized the need for younger staff, submit-ting the first long-term recruitment plan, includingproposals for the first National CompetitiveRecruitment Exam that set a certain benchmark forincoming staff and has effectively led to greatergeographic diversity. On the economic and socialside, Waldheim was asked by the General Assemblyin 1974 to commission a group of experts torecommend structural changes to enhance UNeffectiveness in economic cooperation—this groupcalled for the consolidation of all funds for technicalassistance into a single development entity.Although this initiative was not successful due todivisions in the membership, it did lead to theappointment of a director-general for developmentand international economic cooperation, who wassupposed to be senior to the agency heads and the other under-secretaries-general. Waldheim“remained lukewarm” to this idea and, as a result,the actual impact on coherence was marginal.8 Alsooccurring during the 1970s was the first wave ofmajor international conferences on the environ-ment (1972), population (1974), women (1975),

8 See Myint-U and Scott, The UN Secretariat, p. 67.


9 See ibid., p. 74.10 United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, Un Doc. S/23500, January 31, 1992.11 United Nations, An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/47/277, June 17, 1992.12 United Nations, An Agenda for Development, UN Doc. A/48/935, May 6, 1994; United Nations, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/50/60, January 3,1995; United Nations, An Agenda for Democratization, UN Doc. A/51/761, December 20, 1996.

13 UN General Assembly Resolution 47/120 (December 18, 1992, and September 20, 1993), UN Doc. A/RES/47/120.

human settlements (1976), and employment (1976).Javier Pérez de Cuellar (1982–1991) tried at the

beginning of his first term to gain control ofpersonnel decisions and depoliticize theSecretariat. However, his first months werecrippled by a financial crisis. A General Assemblypanel of eighteen countries recommendedsweeping changes including reforms of the budgetprocess, the introduction of the Committee onProgramme Coordination and a 25 percent cut inthe number of assistant secretaries-general andunder-secretaries-general.9 He appointed a careerUN official as a special coordinator for reform inSeptember, 1986, then in November, he firedeleven under-secretaries-general and assistantsecretaries-general, which created space for newblood at the top. Human rights responsibilitieswere transferred to Geneva, and the Department ofPublic Information was significantly streamlined.Pérez de Cuellar also attempted to strengthen theUN’s analytical capacity by establishing an Officefor Research and Collection of Information(ORCI). This initiative failed, as no attempt wasmade to bring in new capacities to this office,instead serving Secretariat staff were expected todeliver on challenging new responsibilities.POST-COLD WAR WAVES OF REFORM

Wave I: An Agenda for Peace and aMore Action-Oriented Approach

The most radical change in the Secretariat’s organi-zation since the times of Dag Hammarskjöldhappened during the first two years of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s term in 1992 and1993. In the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall andthe end of the Cold War and bipolarity in theinternational system, the Security Council met inJanuary 1992 for the first time at the level of headsof state and government. It adopted a chairman’sstatement inviting the newly appointed secretary-general to prepare “analysis and recommendationson ways of strengthening […] the capacity of theUnited Nations for preventive diplomacy,peacemaking, and peace-keeping.”10 In record time,Boutros-Ghali issued the “Agenda for Peace” in

June, an agenda-setting document for the UN’s rolein the maintenance of international peace andsecurity.11 UN member states spent monthsdebating the Agenda, and the General Assemblyadopted many of its recommendations. TheAgenda defined the concept of “post-conflictpeacebuilding,” made reference to Chapter VII ofthe UN Charter to justify the use of force withoutconsent of the parties involved, and emphasizedthe role of early warning, preventive diplomacy,and peacemaking. Boutros-Ghali also produced an“Agenda for Development” in 1994, a “Supplementto an Agenda for Peace” in 1995, and a morecontroversial “Agenda for Democratization” weeksbefore the end of his term as secretary-general in1996.12 None of these documents, however, were asinfluential as his Agenda for Peace.The General Assembly adopted many of the

suggested actions of the Agenda for Peace inResolution 47/120 that was discussed over 1992 and1993, and passed in two parts during separate sessionson December 18, 1992, and September 20, 1993.13

With relative harmony reigning at the SecurityCouncil, Resolution 47/120 led to significantimprovements in the way the UN’s peace andsecurity architecture worked, and emboldened anew generation of international civil servants to bemore action-oriented in their approach topeacemaking. In the Secretariat, Boutros-Ghali again attempted

to streamline the senior ranks. He had twenty-eightunder-secretaries-general reporting to him whenhe first arrived but unilaterally abolished eighteenposts, including the director-general forDevelopment and International EconomicCooperation originally created by the GeneralAssembly under Waldheim’s tenure. He placed allunder-secretaries-general and assistant secretaries-general on one-year contracts to ensure compli-ance with his instructions and some degree ofaccountability.Organizationally, the three departments of

Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), PoliticalAffairs (DPA), and Peacekeeping Operations

8 Francesco Mancini

(DPKO) were created out of several smaller officesand programs, essentially creating organizationalsilos. DPA was seen as the political and strategicoffice, while DPKO was seen as operational. DPKOsubmitted papers to the secretary-general’s officethrough DPA for a time, although this laterchanged. DPKO’s role was focused on specificcountries and achieving specific goals in each, whileDPA’s role of conflict prevention was moreamorphous.The demise of the Cold War generated consider-

able exuberance as several new missions werelaunched to end conflicts in places previously off-limits to the UN because of great power rivalry(e.g., the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia[UNTAC], the UN Protection Force[UNPROFOR] in the Balkans, the UN Operationin Mozambique [UNUMOZ], and the UNAssistance Mission for Rwanda [UNAMIR]).Three times more peace agreements were negoti-ated and signed during the 1990s than in theprevious three decades combined, and the UN was

starting to play a significant role in implementingthese agreements. More important than the change in structures

was the change in attitude and culture—the UNSecretariat was being increasingly charged withsubstantive responsibilities for conflict prevention,peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, which engen -dered a more action-oriented working culture,particularly in DPKO. For example, given thedifficulty in getting headquarters-focused adminis-trators to move human and material resources overcontinents in short time frames, field support andfield personnel units were moved directly intoDPKO, bringing operational and substantive issuesunder a single leader, thereby accelerating decisionmaking and deployments. Even with these changes, multiple, often simulta-

neous deployments, some successful and others lessso, started to show the inherent problems of aheadquarters–based organization more familiarwith organizing and servicing conferences thanurgently deploying troops, police, and civilians to

Table 1: Main issues tackled by Resolution 47/120

On peacefulsettlement of disputes

On early warning andfact-finding

On preventivedeploymentOn postconflictpeacebuilding

“Decides to explore ways and means for a full utilization of the provisions of theCharter whereby the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peacefuladjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which is deemed likely to impair thegeneral welfare or friendly relations among nations.”“Recognizing the need to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations for early-warning,collection of information and analysis […]. Encourages the Secretary-General to set up anadequate early-warning mechanism for situations which are likely to endanger themaintenance of international peace and security. […] Invites the Secretary-General tostrengthen the capacity of the Secretariat for the collection of information and analysis toserve better the early-warning needs of the Organization […]. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue, in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations,to bring to the attention of the Security Council, at his discretion, any matter which in hisopinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, together withhis recommendations thereon […]. Recommends to the Secretary-General that he shouldcontinue to utilize the services of eminent and qualified experts in fact-finding.”“Acknowledges the importance of considering, on a case-by-case basis, the use ofpreventive deployment.”“Acknowledges the usefulness of the proposals of the Secretary-General contained inparagraphs 55 to 59 of his report entitled “An Agenda for Peace,” particularly inrelation to the range of activities for post-conflict peace-building; Emphasizes thatpost-conflict peace-building should be carried out in accordance with the Charter ofthe United Nations, in particular the principles of sovereign equality and politicalindependence of States, territorial integrity, and non-intervention in matters that areessentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.”


14 UN General Assembly Resolution 51/231 (June 13, 1997), UN Doc. A/RES/51/231, and UN General Assembly Resolution 51/239 A (June 17, 1997), UN Doc.A/RES/51/239 A, were subsequently bundled under United Nations, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, UN Doc. A/51/950, July 14, 1997.

15 United Nations, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, UN Doc. A/51/950, July 14, 1997.16 UN General Assembly Resolution 52/12 A (November 12, 1997), UN Doc. A/RES/52/12 A; and UN General Assembly Resolution 52/12 B (December 19, 1997),UN Doc. A/RES/52/12 B.

17 Kofi Annan, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 2000.

several far-flung war-torn regions of the globe.More dramatically, the genocide in Rwanda and themassacres in Srebrenica, both of which occurredwhile blue helmets were deployed in theater,resulted in much soul-searching particularly onhow the UN responds politically, operationally, andmilitarily to peace and security challenges.Wave II: Institutional Change

In his first term as secretary-general, Kofi Annan, acareer UN staffer and the former head of bothhuman resources and peacekeeping, commissioneda set of extensive reforms beginning in 1997.Having served as the secretary-general’s represen-tative to the former Yugoslavia, Annan was verysensitive to the contradictions and challenges theUN Secretariat faced. He commissioned MauriceStrong, former secretary-general of the successfulUN Conference on Environment and Developmentin Rio in 1992, as executive coordinator for UNreform. Strong chaired a steering committee ofsenior officials to develop and implementproposals and monitor progress. Proposals were tabled in June and July 1997 in

two parts; the first dealt with administrative andmanagement reforms, and the second involvedmore wide-reaching policy and institutionalreforms.14

The secretary-general suggested to the presidentof the General Assembly that these reforms shouldproceed along two tracks, the first implementedunder the authority of the secretary-general, whilethe second would require a longer-term program ofreform to be guided and ultimately decided bymember states. He presented the reforms person-ally to the General Assembly in July, to allow forenough time for delegations to respond throughtheir statements in the September General Debate.He made a case under the new General Assemblyagenda item 168, “United Nations Reform:Measures and Proposals,” for considering thereforms in an integrated manner, given theinterconnected nature of his proposals.15

In its resolutions from November and December

1997, the General Assembly adopted several of thesecretary-general’s proposals, including thoserelated to • the creation of a new deputy secretary-generalposition,

• the designation of a UN humanitarian assistancecoordinator,

• the creation of the Development Account, and • a revolving credit facility to improve cash flow.16

Outstanding issues on the secretary-general’sreform agenda were referred to General Assemblycommittees, in particular the Fifth Committee. Wave III: The Millennium Declaration, theBrahimi Report, and the Challenges ofGlobalization

At the end of March 2000, Secretary-General KofiAnnan released a non-paper “We the Peoples: TheRole of the United Nations in the 21st Century.”17Prepared ahead of the Millennium Summit, thespecial designation of the fifty-fifth session of the UNGeneral Assembly (September 6–8, 2000), the reportoutlined a vision for the UN in the age of globaliza-tion. In it, the secretary-general offered an actionplan to make globalization work more justly, and thereport contained numerous specific program initia-tives. The concept of the Millennium DevelopmentGoals was introduced here, drawn from the variouscommitments made through the focused UNsummits and conferences of the 1990s. These initia-tives were coupled with administrative and manage-ment reforms at the UN itself to strengthen thebureaucracy’s ability to implement against revitalizedmandates. The secretary-general also introduced theidea of “sunset provisions” on mandates, andchallenged member states to conduct a thoroughmandate review process to eliminate dated mandatesso the deck could be cleared for new challenges.At about the same time, Secretary-General

Annan commissioned a panel, chaired by LakhdarBrahimi, to take a comprehensive look at the gapsin peacekeeping. The panel’s report, known as theBrahimi Report, in August 2000 offered a number

10 Francesco Mancini

of recommendations to further advance the goalsoriginally set out by Annan’s predecessor in an“Agenda for Peace,” addressing some of the issuesthe world body had confronted during the 1994Rwandan genocide and the 1995 Srebrenicamassacre.18

The UN Millennium Declaration, which was theoutcome document of the Millennium Summit inSeptember 2000, took up many of the recommen-dations and acknowledged member states’ collec-tive responsibility to uphold the principles ofhuman dignity, equality, and equity.19 The declara-tion validated the Brahimi Report and called on theGeneral Assembly to consider it expeditiously. Italso set in train certain quantitative benchmarks insuch areas as poverty eradication, primaryschooling, HIV prevention, maternal health,gender equality, and sustainable development thatwould ultimately become the MillenniumDevelopment Goals. The secretary-general followed up on the

Millennium Declaration with a road map tosupport its implementation, which proposedstrategies to meet the goals established in thedeclaration, bringing together best practice fromboth member states and the UN system.20 In thesection on “Peace, Security, and Disarmament,” thereport proposed strengthening rule of law andpromoted the rapid entry into force of the RomeStatute, the treaty that established the InternationalCriminal Court. It also sought to replace theculture of reaction with one of prevention. On thedevelopment side, the Millennium DevelopmentGoals were introduced in an accompanying annexas a means to bundle the various commitmentsunder the development agenda. Environmentalconservation, protection of the vulnerable, humanrights, and governance issues were also included inthe road map with specific initiatives. This road map led to two General Assembly

resolutions in 2002 and 2003,21 which essentially

endorsed the proposals and asked for regularreporting—this was the most that probably couldhave been expected from the Assembly given that,at the same time, the politics in the GeneralAssembly and the Security Council were gettingmore complex in the wake of the US-led operationsin Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Wave IV: The World Summit OutcomeDocument and a Move toward Long-Term Reform

Seeing it as his last attempt at comprehensivereform, in the aftermath of the managerial andethical issues raised by the Volcker Report on the“oil-for-food” program and the invasion of Iraq,Secretary-General Annan commissioned a panel ofeminent experts, the High-Level Panel on Threats,Challenges and Change, which published its reportin December 2004 with a comprehensive set ofideas for UN reform.22 The secretary-generalresponded to the panel’s recommendations withhis report, “In Larger Freedom: TowardsDevelopment, Security and Human Rights for All,”published on March 21, 2005.23 This reportprovided the basis for wide-ranging debates overthe summer, ultimately leading to the WorldSummit Outcome Document, published onOctober 24, 2005.24

While effectively establishing such innovativestructures as the Peacebuilding Commission andthe Human Rights Council, and a new norm, the“responsibility to protect,” the OutcomeDocument, which was agreed to by all 191 memberstates at the time, also asked the secretary-generalto come back to the Assembly for further consider-ation of the conditions and measures necessary forhim to carry out his managerial responsibilitieseffectively. Member states also committed to areview of all mandates older than five years,triggering an extensive, multiyear mandate reviewprocess in the General Assembly, which benefittedfrom an in-depth analysis by the Secretariat.25

18 United Nations, Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305–S/2000/809, August 21, 2000.19 United Nations, UN Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/55/2, September 8, 2000.20 United Nations Secretary-General, Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/56/326, September 6, 2001.21 UN General Assembly Resolution 56/95 (January 30, 2002), UN Doc. A/RES/56/95; and UN General Assembly Resolution 57/144 (February 26, 2003), UN Doc.A/RES/57/144.

22 United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc. A/59/565, December 2, 2004.23 United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN Doc. A/59/2005, March 21, 2005.24 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 (October 24, 2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/1.25 Ibid., para. 163(b).

The secretary-general responded with his report,“Investing in the UN,” where he laid out measuresto “…enable future Secretaries-General to carry outtheir managerial responsibilities effectively, as wellas measures to enable the Organization as a wholeto make better use of its managerial and humanresources.”26 The report sought to “…combine thenon-going reviews of oversight systems and internaljustice…with major reforms in six other broadareas….” The twenty-three proposals coveredhuman resource reform (including proposals onharmonizing contracts and staff mobility), leader-ship, information and communicationstechnology, service delivery (i.e., outsourcing),budget and finance, governance, and changemanagement. The change management proposalsincluded proposals for a staff buy-out to fully re-invigorate the Secretariat. The secretary-general’s report was met with

some scepticism and a fair bit of alarmist language,reflecting the divisions in the General Assembly.Nevertheless, the resolution established a “legisla-tive hook” for accountability and did ask forfurther reports and data in a number of the areasthat the secretary-general was trying to advance—effectively launching a decade of activity in all theseimportant areas.27 Subsequent, more technical,resolutions on program planning, humanresources reform, procurement reform, and otherissues continued along these new tracks.Wave V: The Strengthening ofPeacekeeping, Political Affairs, andDevelopment Agendas

At the time of Ban Ki-moon’s appointment assecretary-general in 2007, nine new peacekeepingoperations had been approved in three years withnearly three-quarters of the UN’s assessed budgetdedicated to peacekeeping and managed by oneunder-secretary-general. Recognizing this manage-rial overstretch and the budget imbalance,Secretary-General Ban proposed splitting thepolitical, rule of law, and military elements fromthe administrative and logistical elements in

DPKO, creating a Department of Field Support. This concept was supported by the General

Assembly,28 which then called for a detailed reportthat was tabled on April 13, 2007.29 This report wasfairly bold, requesting an additional 495 postsunder the peacekeeping support account budgetover the previous year, in order to reset the ratio ofheadquarters to field personnel at 1:100, consid-ered a manageable ratio in the Brahimi Report toensure oversight, lessons learned, and effectivemanagement. The report proposed the establishment of a second

regional division for Africa and seven IntegratedOperational Teams (IOTs), to improve coordinationamong the Office of Operations, Field Support,Military, and Police divisions—equipping the Officeof Operations to carry out its role of integrator,representing “…a major step forward towards the‘matrix-management’ approach to mission planningand management recommended in the 2000Brahimi Report.”30 Through the regular budget,several new senior posts were established, includinga new under-secretary-general for Field Support(reporting to the under-secretary-general for DPKO,a unique arrangement) and new assistantsecretaries-general for the Office of Military Affairsand for the Rule of Law Unit. In its resolution, theGeneral Assembly broadly accepted the proposals.31

At the same time, the secretary-general sought tostrengthen DPA by merging disarmament andpeacebuilding into its structure. However, thiseffort was rejected vociferously by member states.The Group of 77 (G-77) was adamant aboutkeeping Disarmament Affairs as an independententity, and middle powers, which had fought hardto establish a stand-alone peacebuilding architec-ture to coordinate the activities of major UNdepartments and the international financial institu-tions, were loath to see it folded into one of thedepartments it was supposed to coordinate. Thesecretary-general instead proposed having theDepartment for Disarmament Affairs become theOffice for Disarmament Affairs, headed by a high


26 United Nations Secretary-General, Investing in the UN, UN Doc. A/60/692, March 7, 2006.27 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/260 (May 16, 2006), UN Doc. A/RES/60/260.28 UN General Assembly Resolution 61/256 (March 22, 2007), UN Doc. A/RES/61/256.29 United Nations, UN Doc. A/61/858, April 13, 2007.30 United Nations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 198-217 describe the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) concept, which later became the IOTs, essentiallyintroducing a matrix style of management into DPKO.

31 UN General Assembly Resolution 61/279 (August 1, 2007), UN Doc. A/RES/61/279.


representative for disarmament, and leaving thePeacebuilding Support Office as it was establishedin 2005.32

A separate effort was launched later in 2008 tostrengthen DPA, focusing the membership on theimportance of the prevention of violent armedconflict; this was realized over 2008 and 2009, withthe addition of forty-nine new “regular budget”posts and the establishment of two new units, theCounter-Terrorism Implementation Task Forceand a Policy and Mediation Division. In addition,two large regional divisions (Asia-Pacific, andEurope and Latin America) were split into four(Europe, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and MiddleEast and West Asia). On the peacekeeping side, the reform strategies

titled “Peace Operations 2010” and the “NewHorizon” initiative addressed outstanding issuesfrom the Brahimi Report, which had itself enableda five-fold increase in operations since 2000. The“New Horizon” initiative was tabled as a non-paperin 2009 with a focus on political strategy, missionplanning, faster deployments, role clarity, crisismanagement, and improved field support.33 TheGlobal Field Support Strategy (GFSS) was oneelement to develop from this policy agenda and wasactively discussed with member states via theSpecial Committee on Peacekeeping Operations(C34) and the Fifth Committee. In the area of development, Ban implemented the

“Delivering as One” report, which aimed toincrease coordination in the development,humanitarian, and environmental areas in the field.Eight countries started as pilots in 2007. By Marchof 2014, the Delivering as One model had expandedto more than thirty-five countries and was widelyconsidered as a new operating procedure forcoordination. The establishment of UN Women in2011 was another important structural reform thatenjoyed the strong support of the secretary-generaland member states, consolidating four bodies (theOffice of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues andthe Advancement of Women, the Division for theAdvancement of Women, the UN DevelopmentFund for Women, and the UN InternationalResearch and Training Institute for the

Advancement of Women) into a single organiza-tion led by an under-secretary-general. Ethics reform also continued under Ban, who

took an active role in financial disclosures andsenior management compacts and reviews. Growthof the Ombudsman’s Office and the review of theAdministration of Justice also took place duringthis period.

Secretary-General BanKi-moon’s Change Plan

Beside the reforms mentioned above fromSecretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s first year inoffice in 2007, the Secretariat acted cautiously onfurther proposals, having experienced first-handthe “reform fatigue” that had set in among themembership. A widespread feeling existed in theSecretariat that, after a particularly active decade ofreforms, the UN system needed some time toabsorb and digest the changes—to urge anythingrevolutionary during the first term would becounterproductive. The membership was alsodivided in the wake of the oil-for-food scandal andthe subsequent reports, investigations, andreforms. Under the circumstances, it felt a need tolet individual yet important reform efforts, such ason ethics, enterprise resource planning, and humanresources, move forward without trying to proposeyet another comprehensive round. Nevertheless, the global challenges the UN was

facing were growing increasingly complex andintertwined. While coping with the repercussionsof the 2008 financial crisis, and successive failedrounds of international trade and climate changenegotiations, the secretary-general was confrontingcrises in Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of theCongo, Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, and SriLanka. This was further compounded by thehumanitarian consequences of natural disasters,such as Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, and theearthquake in Haiti, where the terrible suffering ofthe local population weighed heavily, as did the lossof 102 UN staff from the UN Stabilization Missionin Haiti (MINUSTAH). Terrorist attacks on theUN compounds in Algiers and Abuja resulting in

32 UN General Assembly Resolution 61/257 (March 22, 2007), UN Doc. A/RES/61/257. 33 UN DPKO and DFS, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, July 2009.


significant UN losses further complicated thesituation. The secretary-general and his teammoved from crisis to crisis, trying to extinguishfires, not able to focus on strategic planning or newcomprehensive reform efforts. But effective long-term planning and strategic

approaches were required to deal proactively withthe challenges before the UN. New approacheswere needed on multiple fronts, from sustainabledevelopment and climate change, to conflictprevention and humanitarian assistance. Therecurrence of conflict was of particular concern,with 90 percent of the civil wars since 2000occurring in countries that had experienced a civilwar in the previous thirty years.34 UN interven-tions, rather than being sequential by moving frommediation of a peace agreement to peacekeeping,peacebuilding, and early development, often had toinclude all of the above in different configurations.At the same time, the aftermath of the Arab Springcreated a new wave of countries in need of supportfor their political and economic transitions.Through the first term, there was a realization

that the immensity of the challenges required a re-invigorated UN. However, the secretary-generalneeded partners among key member states tolaunch a meaningful reform process, and theinternational system was itself in the midst ofseismic shifts. The rise of Brazil, Russia, India, andChina (the so-called BRIC countries) and emergingpowers such as Turkey, Indonesia, and Mexicomeant a more diverse group of actors and a widerrange of interests to be aligned as US unipolaritywaned. As the American and European economiesstarted to plummet in the wake of the 2008financial crisis, prominent scholars and expertsstarted to speak of multiple poles of authority and aregionalization of power that could make the verycentralized UN irrelevant. The return of Russia as acounterweight to Western Europe and the US wasalso significant, starting in Georgia in 2008, butfollowed by periodic vetoes and heated SecurityCouncil discussions over Myanmar, Libya, Syria,and more recently, Ukraine. Still, on less heatedcrises, Council unanimity was possible, as seen in

Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, and the Central AfricanRepublic.35

Demonstrating the fluidity of today’s geopoliticallandscape, these trends seem to have reversedsomewhat over the course of Ban’s tenure, with anongoing economic recovery in the US and itsenergy self-sufficiency, the relative economicslowdown of emerging powers, and the chilling ofpolitical transitions in the Arab world. To thiscomplex and volatile new world disorder, the UNhas learned that it needs to adapt.As often happens, crisis presents opportunities

for change. While the 2008 financial crisisincreased the pressure on the Secretariat for budgetcuts by some large donors, two specific crises mayhave encouraged more strategic thinking: first, themass atrocities in Sri Lanka, as the government wasbringing to conclusion a two-decade-long civil warwith a military victory in 2008/2009; and, second,the upheavals in Tunisia, which started the so-called Arab Spring at the end of 2010. In the case of Sri Lanka, the question that predom-

inated was how the UN Secretariat and other organssuch as the Security Council failed to act in the wakeof the unfurling disaster, where thousands ofcivilians were killed at the hand of their owndemocratically elected government. In the case ofthe Arab Spring, the UN was markedly out of touch.As the then UN High Commissioner for HumanRights, Navi Pillay, pointed out later in 2012,Even as events were unfolding, we read…thatTunisia showed ‘remarkable progress on equitablegrowth, fighting poverty, and achieving good socialindicators,’ that it was ‘…on track to achieve theMDGs…’ was ‘…far ahead in terms of governance,effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption andregulatory quality…’ was ‘…one of the mostequitable societies…’ ‘a top reformer,’ and that ‘…thedevelopment model that Tunisia has pursued overthe past two decades has served the country well.’36

THE FIVE-YEAR ACTION AGENDA

All of these interconnected challenges, coupledwith the secretary-general’s own bid to secure re-election, led to a concerted effort to bring together

34 World Bank, 2011 World Development Report (Washington, DC, 2011), p. 2.35 On Security Council dynamics and the continued possibility of unanimity, see Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, “Conclusion:The Security Council and a World in Crisis,” in The UN Security Council in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, andBruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2015), p. 830.

36 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Address by the High-Commissioner for Human Rights at the Jacob Blaustein Institute forthe Advancement of Human Rights,” 2012, available at www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11807&LangID=e .

www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11807&LangID=e


various reform streams into a coherent narrative.The process, which ultimately produced the Five-Year Action Agenda,37 was initiated by thesecretary-general, under the direction of AssistantSecretary-General for Policy Coordination andStrategic Planning Robert Orr. In support of this action agenda, a joint policy

and management committee meeting was held onApril 2011 launching a change managementprocess to deliver a strengthened organization thatserves its member states and beneficiaries moreeffectively and efficiently. The process was dividedinto six categories: Programme Effectiveness,Human Resources, Information and Communi -cations Technology, Procurement and CommonServices, Innovation in Business Processes andGoverning Body Processes. The process drew fromprevious legislative mandates, engagement withmember states, senior management, and staff.The secretary-general first spoke of five genera-

tional opportunities in September 2011, including(a) achieving sustainable development, “connect -ing the dots” among climate change, the food crisis,water scarcity, energy shortages, women’sempowerment, and global health issues; (b)preventing and/or mitigating the effects of man-made and natural disasters; (c) making the world asafer and more secure place; (d) supportingcountries in transition, ensuring that human rightsand basic dignities are fully respected; and (e)empowering women and youth. These goals, together with proposals for reform

under each of them, were presented to memberstates in a non-paper in January 2012, which alsooutlined two enablers, partnerships and a strength-ened UN.38 Strengthening the UN included fivespecific initiatives: (a) ensuring the more effectivedelivery of mandates and doing more withinrecognized resource constraints through innova-tion and change management initiatives; (b)building a modern workforce supported by a globalSecretariat; (c) making the UN more open, flexible,and accountable; (d) launching a second genera-tion of “Delivering as One”; and (e) enhancing thesafety and security of UN staff.

THE CHANGE PLAN

Following the April 2011 joint meeting of themanagement and policy committees, the secretary-general charged Deputy Secretary-General Asha-Rose Migiro with change management, giving herbroad responsibilities for management andadministration. Atul Khare, a former Indiandiplomat, special-representative to the secretary-general, and DPKO senior official, was asked tolead a seconded Change Management Team(CMT) through the end of 2011, reporting to thedeputy secretary-general. He requested second-ments from all departments and received staff fromthe Department of Management, Office of InternalOversight Services (OIOS), DPA, DESA, DPKO,the Department of Field Support (DFS), and theDepartment of Public Information. The deputy secretary-general convened a change

management senior advisory group of assistantsecretary-generals (ASGs), including the ASG forStrategic Planning, the deputy chef de cabinet, andASGs from DFS, the Office of Human ResourceManagement, the Controller’s Office, DPA, theOffice for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs, UNDP, and the Chief InformationTechnology Officer, and wrote to all departmentheads immediately after the April 2011 meeting,asking for recommendations on potential changeinitiatives.Departments canvassed their staff and sent back

a number of ideas. By keeping the request open toall ideas, most departments’ responses pointed tothe left or the right, suggesting fundamentalchanges in other departments or areas whilehoping their own work would be left undisturbed.One of the most popular suggestions was overhuman resources reform, from other departmentsdirected at the Department of Management. Otherpopular suggestions included streamlining budgetprocedures, improving IT functionality, properlyapplying existing and expanded flexible workarrangements, and reducing bureaucracy generallythrough new, collaborative working methods.The call for submissions yielded several hundred

ideas, and each was vetted by the Change

37 United Nations, The Secretary-General’s Five-Year Action Agenda, January 25, 2012.38 Ibid.


Table 2: Twelve fast-track change initiatives approved by the secretary-general inNovember, 2011

Fast-Track Initiative Status

1. Establishment of ChangeManagement Network

Implemented; stand-alone network fully operational as of December31, 2011, now meeting quarterly largely on digital secretariat initia-tives

2. Implementation of digitalsignature

Not yet implemented; new policy still under development; will bealigned to Umoja implementation

3. Evolution of PaperSmartmeetings

Implemented; guide issued; online portal developed; use expanding

4. Reinvigorating the PublicationsBoard

Implemented; Secretary-General Bulletin issued; publications beingreduced

5. Increasing the use of virtualcommunication technologies

Implemented; internal communications issued; implementationcontinues under digital Secretariat initiative

6. Establishment of a new travelpolicy

Implemented; administrative instructions issued following approvalby General Assembly; now in use

7. Establishment of online databasefor evaluations

Not implemented; resources could not be identified

8. Expedited recruitment formilitary and police

Implemented; new policy in place at end of 2012

9. Harmonization of trust fundoverheads

Implemented; draft policy approved

10. Expanding flexible workingarrangements

Implemented; pilot of expanded flexible working arrangementslaunched; use by staff is increasing

11. Revision of supplier registra-tion process

Implemented; introduction of “Basic Registration” level to targetvendors from developing countries by March 31, 2012

12. Increased procurementoutreach via mobile application

Implemented; new UN Procurement Division mobile applicationlaunched

Management Team (CMT). Using a matrixassessing potential impact and capacity toimplement, the CMT reviewed the proposals anddetermined which might be fast-tracked, whichwould require some additional work and thedesignation of a process owner, and which wereunlikely to succeed. Applying a universal formulato each proposal allowed the CMT to rank eachproposal and to choose those proposals that had abest chance of success. This methodology could becompared to the DICE methodology championedby some business consulting firms that assess fourspecific factors with regard to any change initiativeto assess its potential for success.39 The CMT useddifferent variables (buy-in, owner ship, and degreeof difficulty) but essentially followed this method-ology.Twelve of the ideas submitted scored high

through this process and were fast-tracked,submitted for feedback to the assistant secretary-general-level advisory group, and endorsed by thesecretary-general in November 2011. All twelvehad specific process owners. Ten of them wereimplemented over the course of 2012/3, while twodid not receive the necessary degree of support andbuy-in to become reality. One of the key fast-trackinitiatives was the establishment of the ChangeManagement Focal Points Network, a group offocal points selected by their respective leaders tohelp present and implement ideas for improvingthe way the UN Secretariat worked. This forummet monthly for about two years, and now meetsquarterly, focused on the implementation of adigital Secretariat initiative.In addition to the twelve fast-track initiatives, the

CMT’s analysis vetted other ideas which required alittle more preparation, and were ultimatelybundled together with the fast-track opportunitiesover the autumn of 2011. The CMT worked withprospective process owners to ensure buy-in andimplementation, while also developing an overar-ching vision for the plan. During this same period (summer and autumn of

2011), Atul Khare visited permanent representa-tives of member states to explain the approach ofthe CMT and many of the suggested proposals.While these individual briefings were appreciated,many member states, felt that the proposals werenot being duly consulted through the regularprocesses of the General Assembly and the FifthCommittee in charge of Administrative andBudgetary Affairs. The draft Change Plan, containing a total of

sixty-one recommendations, was presented to thedeputy secretary-general and the assistantsecretary-general-level change managementadvisory group in November 2011. Afterintegrating comments and suggestions, the finalplan was presented to the secretary-general onDecember 24, 2011. He endorsed the plan andasked Atul Khare to stay on to implement it, butsince Khare was unable to do so, the secretary-general asked his Deputy Chef de Cabinet KimWon-soo to take over ad interim, and he was laterappointed as assistant secretary-general for ChangeImplementation. The secretary-general shared the Change Plan

with his senior management group of departmentand agency heads and, following their inputs,approved the final document.40 The agreed visionwas for “[a] modern, engaged and efficientSecretariat, transparent and accountable in itswork, responsibly stewarding resources to deliverhigh-quality results, building confidence in the UNand its ideals.”41

The achievement of the vision relied on four keydeliverables: 1. enhancing trust and confidence; 2. engaging staff; 3. improving working methods; and 4. rationalizing structures and functions.The four deliverables were in line with the

“Strengthening the UN” enabler of the Five-YearAction Agenda, but since they were the result of agrassroots exercise involving staff, managers, and


39 For a full description of the DICE methodology, see Harold Sirkin, Perry Keenan and Alan Jackson, “The Hard Side of Change Management,” Harvard BusinessReview, October 2005. The four factors include project duration (D), particularly the time between project reviews; performance integrity (I), or the capabilities ofthe dedicated project leaders and teams; the commitment (C) of both senior managers and the staff whom the change will affect the most; and the additionaleffort (E) required by employees who will need to cope with the change.

40 United Nations, The Change Plan: Proposals by the Change Management Team to the Secretary-General (New York, December 2011), available atwww.un.org/sg/pdf/the-change-plan.pdf .

41 Ibid., p. 12.

www.un.org/sg/pdf/the-change-plan.pdf


42 See the specific language in UN General Assembly Resolution 66/257 (April 12, 2012), UN Doc. A/RES/66/257, section II, para. 8.

member states, there were some variations, whichled to confusion by concerned departments in theimplementation phase. The sixty-one initiativesthat were bundled under each of these four deliver-ables ranged considerably in scope and intendedeffect. The Change Plan had some concrete initia-tives with process owners and implementationplans, such as those related to procurement orflexible working arrangements for staff, and othersthat were widely shared principles but neededfurther work to develop, such as the need forfunctional reviews or the implementation of thethree signature rule. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

The process of implementing many of therecommendations in the Change Plan was moredifficult than its drafting. The secretary-generalwrote to all permanent representatives in February2012, suggesting that many of the initiatives couldbe implemented under his authority. In defendingindividual proposals before the AdvisoryCommittee on Administrative and BudgetaryQuestions and the Fifth Committee, experts fromthe Department of Management and otherSecretariat officials started using the Change Planas definitive policy, when it had no independentlegislative standing, other than having beenendorsed by the secretary-general and the seniormanagement group as a type of “white paper” thatwas then distributed to permanent missions butnever formally submitted to any of the organiza-tion’s legislative bodies for debate or endorsement. The presumption and lack of communication

around the actual status of the various changeinitiatives was unsettling to a number of delega-tions, and the financial politics that dominated theGeneral Assembly’s Fifth Committee took over inthe spring of 2012. The Geneva Group of largecontributors had been pushing throughout theperiod for cost-saving reforms, given the pressurefor financial austerity in their capitals. The G-77was focused on the effective implementation ofdevelopment-related mandates and did not see theneed for cost-cutting. Recognizing these sensitivities, the Change Team

tactically narrowed its focus on program effective-ness, since no member state would argue against

better program delivery. One of the Change Plan’srecommendations also made the case for relocatingstaff positions from UN headquarters in New York,Geneva, and Vienna closer to the principal“clients” of UN programs in the field, but, ratherthan gaining the support of the G-77, this proposalupset host countries such as Switzerland. Still, the struggle continued in the Fifth

Committee, which is the purse-holder of the UNbudget process. To better understand thechallenges of advancing reforms at the UN, a shortdigression to explain the dynamics of the FifthCommittee is required. A perennial battle in the Fifth Committee

concerns the degree of the secretary-general’sauthority, which began in the 1960s when the USand Europe lost majority control over the GeneralAssembly, due to the decolonization process thatlead to many new member states from Africa andAsia. The Geneva Group of large UN donorssupports more authority delegated to the secretary-general because they feel they have more controlover him through extra-budgetary resources andother levers. The G-77 wants to see the authority ofthe secretary-general limited, to ensure heimplements mandates issued by the GeneralAssembly, with the appropriate accountability andoversight that their numeric majority allows. The secretary-general’s letter to the membership

and the subsequent debates over the Change Planran aground over these two rocky shoals.Ultimately, the Fifth Committee, in a late-nightsession on April 9, 2012, requested the secretary-general to submit for consideration and priorapproval any proposals or measures related totwenty-nine of the sixty-one recommendations.This meant, for all intents and purposes, that theAssembly acknowledged that the other thirty-twocould proceed.42

This division was somewhat arbitrary, as theChange Team had recognized that many of thesixty-one recommendations would need GeneralAssembly support, but the resolution was meant todemonstrate to the secretary-general and majorcontributors that they had to be more careful inasserting the authority of the secretary-general, orrisk losing this authority altogether. Privately,

many delegates said they wished the Secretariatwould move forward on the necessary changes andreport through the regular budgetary channels,rather than loading the Fifth Committee withquestions of policy in substantive areas with whichit was not equipped or designed to address. Nevertheless, the General Assembly resolution

provided the secretary-general with a legislativebasis or hook for moving forward on the approvedchange initiatives, and that allowed the ChangeImplementation Team, under the leadership ofAssistant Secretary-General Kim Won-soo, to startworking with the departments on the implementa-tion and the tracking process. For its part, thesubstantive Five-Year Action Agenda waseffectively mainstreamed into the secretary-general’s budget proposals by including many ofthe aspects in the secretary-general’s annual reportfor 2013.The original idea of Khare and the CMT was to

table a set of workable proposals that could behanded off to the new senior team to be appointedat the start of Ban’s second term in January 2012, inparticular to the new deputy secretary-general, thechef de cabinet, and the under-secretary-generalfor Management. These senior staff could havethen made their own assessment of what wasfeasible and able to be moved to the implementa-tion phase.This strategy might have been effective if three

conditions had been met. First, the new seniormanagement team would have needed to beappointed at the start of Ban’s second term.Regrettably, the hiring process and vettingprocedures with member states took up much of2012, paralyzing any real action for almost one yearuntil the new management team was in place.Second, the three new senior managers were nevermade explicitly responsible for the implementationof the Change Plan. Two of the three (deputysecretary-general and under-secretary-general formanagement) were from outside the organizationand were not familiar with the change process thathad been underway since the start of 2011, nor withthe fact that the plan had been vetted and endorsedinternally by an advisory group, the senior manage-ment group, and the secretary-general himself.Third, and most importantly, the debate over theChange Plan in the General Assembly erupted inthe spring of 2012, demonstrating that there was

simply no consensus or political will within themembership of the organization on changemanagement. Given these realities, the Change Plan was

effectively re-opened for the remainder of 2012 and2013. While the Change Implementation Teamsought to keep a focus on implementing thoseelements under the Change Plan approved in theGeneral Assembly Resolution 66/257, a simulta-neous drafting process started involving focalpoints throughout the Secretariat that yieldedmultiple new versions of a change agenda. Thisdrafting process involved convening experts andsenior officials in six clusters: (a) peace andsecurity; (b) human rights and internationaljustice; (c) development; (d) administration andmanagement; (e) learning, training, and research;and (f) partnerships.While ultimately no final paper was published

given the general lack of both political will andconsensus within the membership and concernthat a comprehensive push or large-scale reformdrive might upset progress on specific tracks, suchas staff mobility and enterprise resource planning(Umoja), the exercise of bringing together expertsfrom various departments allowed ideas to bediscussed among middle and senior managers inthe Secretariat in these six areas. Among memberstates, an informal group in support of continuouschange emerged and started meeting regularly. TheChange Team was essentially dissolved in mid-2013, with seconded staff returning to their homedepartments, although a small cell continuedtracking implementation.According to the Change Implementation

Team’s most recent tracking charts, 60 to 70percent of the Change Plan has now beenimplemented. This is a good score, but this internalassessment should be subjected to an external orOIOS-led evaluation to ensure an independentreview. Still, forward movement on enterpriseresource planning and staff mobility are just twokey achievements that will have a lasting impact onthe way the Secretariat works, allowing futuresecretaries-general to have greater visibility over allresources in real time, and more flexibility to movestaff to work on emerging priorities. Mobility couldalso start to break down the silos that have beenbuilding since 1992, with staff moving morefrequently across departments and locations.


Of course, the quest for change at the UNSecretariat continues at the time of this report’spublication. Peacekeeping and special politicalmissions are the subject of a new High-levelIndependent Panel on Peace Operations, whichreleased its report in the summer of 2015. And theUN peacebuilding architecture has also beensubjected to its own high-level review. In-depthreviews in other areas, such as women, peace, andsecurity, are also underway. The secretary-general’ssynthesis report on the post-2015 agenda bundlesall the work that was produced under this themesince the June 2012 conference on sustainabledevelopment, and proposes a way forward for thepost-2015 agenda. Both UNDP and the Office ofthe High Commissioner for Human Rights haveundergone in-depth functional reviews, and manyof the ideas emerging from these processes seem tobe in line with those suggested in the Change Plan.

Lessons Learned from PastReforms

As seen through this review of change initiatives inthe UN Secretariat since 1992, and in particular thelatest attempt by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,the “how” is as important as the “what.” Words willnot become deeds, unless the Secretariat gets thepolitical process right. Financial considerationsalso play a pivotal role, as debates on UN reformoften become a proxy for political battles amonggroups of member states. In light of the experiences reviewed above, the

following lessons can be drawn for those seeking tomanage change effectively at the United Nations:1. Clarify the vision of the Secretariat: Change

requires a clearly articulated strategic visionfrom the secretary-general. The vast majorityof reforms have been initiated by theSecretariat, and even when the secretary-general is mandated by member states, heneeds to lead the Secretariat with a clear vision.The Change Plan sought to establish this visionbut there was not enough time spent onbringing the key constituencies to agreement,and some member states even questioned if itwas the role of the chief administrative officerto articulate such a vision, since the memberstates are supposed to be in charge.

2. Encourage support from member states: It isimportant for the secretary-general and othersenior officials to engage member states inbuilding a rationale for reform, as well as indeveloping concrete proposals—using thegroupings and committees that already exist inNew York, namely, the Fifth Committee, theGeneral Assembly, the Committee forProgramme and Coordination, and the regionalblocs, notably the G-77, the European Union,the African Group, and JUSCANZ, as these areessentially the voting blocs that take decisionsforward through the Fifth Committee.Different representatives of member states willhave different interests and this will always bevariable, but tracking and making use of theseinterests can help the Secretariat push a reformagenda. While outreach to the New York-basedpermanent missions is a natural and necessarystep for the Secretariat, the secretary-generaland his senior officials must also engage incapitals, including both ministries of foreignaffairs and finance (particularly in GenevaGroup countries). The Secretariat should notbypass the permanent missions; however,consultations with capitals can help toovercome impasses in New York and gobeyond political hurdles that assume thepeculiar dynamics at UN headquarters.

3. Involve the General Assembly: Gone are thedays when the Security Council alone couldmandate reforms (as it did for the Agenda forPeace in 1992). The General Assembly,through its president, should be an ally of theSecretariat in building consensus amongmember states, given the critical role of theFifth Committee. For this reason, reformsshould also be timed to leverage the abilities ofa consensus-building president of the GeneralAssembly. “Groups of friends” (regionallybalanced selections of champions frommember states), organized in thematic workinggroups or informal committees, can be usefulin advancing important changes and can beeffective to guarantee continuity across succes-sive terms of General Assembly presidents.

4. Establish buy-in of the Secretariat: For reformsto be implemented, the buy-in of the Secretariatis needed from the early stages of conception.Mobilizing senior management is important


but not in itself sufficient, since director andworking-level staff are key to implementingchanges. Since the Secretariat does not have anestablished mechanism to drive the process ofchange forward, “agents” of change need to beidentified, supported, and made responsible forimplementation. In the latest Change Plan,when a “process-owner” was identified, theinitiative had a higher chance of success. Whilethere are dynamic change agents across thebureaucracy, inertia and resistance to change isstrong. It is therefore important to identifyaccountable focal points for change within theSecretariat both at the senior and middlemanagement levels to ensure the implementa-tion of reforms, while also providing peersupport to encourage progress across the board.Providing a supportive environment for thesechange agents is key, as fighting bureaucracycannot be accomplished alone.

5. Engage staff unions: Engagement of thevarious staff unions, particularly at thebeginning stage of reforms is important—asthey have direct lines to member states and aregiven a voice in committee sessions on issuesthat involve staff (such as mobility and flexibleworking arrangements). Building credibilityand trust with these elected representatives ofstaff can go a long way to building trust withmember states, and the reverse is also true.

6. Ground high-level panels in political realities:In times of disunity and uncertainty, blue-ribbon panels composed of former statesper-sons and experts can help generate new ideasand break logjams, as was the case with theHigh-level Panel on Threats, Challenges andChange in 2004. At the same time, these panelsneed to consider the political context in whichthey operate, to avoid producing a wish list thatcannot obtain consensus regarding nationalinterests and the politics among memberstates.

7. Test ideas and trial balloons: The use ofunofficial white papers and speeches by boththe secretary-general and other senior officialshave proven to be a successful means of testingideas with member states. These may need tobe used more often and more dynamically.Using the “third UN” of think tanks, academicinstitutions, and civil society fora to float ideas

should also be tried more often. Official papersand documents that get tied up in the formalcommittee structure of the General Assemblytend to be counterproductive, especially in theearly stages of developing a vision.

8. Create legislative hooks: Specific mandatesthat respond to the General Assembly’s role inthe oversight of the management and adminis-tration of the organization are helpful, andshould be exploited—most ideas worthpursuing have already been suggested, andmany have even been mandated. Reformscome in waves because evolution from conceptto implementation via the General Assembly’sFifth Committee must follow the appropriatelegislative process, which takes time. Trying tocircumvent this is counterproductive—so five-and ten-year plans, aligned with the GeneralAssembly’s own budget cycles, are preferable toshort-term rhetorical statements that set highexpectations but then yield little in the shortterm.

9. Work through the debates in the FifthCommittee: The Fifth Committee should onlyreceive proposals once they have been fullyauthorized by a relevant General Assemblyresolution. This was a major issue for theChange Plan, which contained ideas for boththe administrative and policy sides of theSecretariat, without having the ideas on thepolicy side (for example on learning andtraining) vetted and approved by theappropriate General Assembly committees.

10. Target the focus for member states: Broadpackages of reforms can have a strongrationale, but member states like to pick andchoose. It may be better to promote ideas thatmake sense in their own right and then activelypush for them, rather than trying to lump toomany dissimilar changes together. This isanother clear lesson emerging from the ChangePlan, which was very heterogeneous in itsrecommendations. Not all elements of acomprehensive reform package are equally ripeor politically acceptable at one given point intime. Therefore, a targeted focus may bepreferable, but this becomes a judgement callfor the senior leadership team.

11. Avoid the term “reform”: The word reform isoverused and politically charged at the UN. Of


course, it depends on the particular historicalmoment, but today it is probably better to talkabout strengthening, enhancing, streamlining,or adapting the UN toward the non-mutuallyexclusive aims of providing more “value for themoney,” “more impact on the ground,” and/or“more effective support to member states andtheir people.”

12. Manage expectations: Decades of UN reformhave shown that modest and incrementalresults are achievable. The UN has navigatedthrough decades of geopolitical changes,because it is ultimately a highly adaptiveorganization. However, some changes, particu-larly those that directly upset old powerbalances or national interests of groups ofstates, are difficult to make happen. It isadvisable to keep expectations realistic. To besuccessful in sensitive reforms will requirededicated and patient senior-level attentionand some degree of “management jiujitsu”where flexibility and re-directing opposingforces are paramount.

13. Message for change: The value of internal andexternal communication is often under-estimated and under-resourced. It is better toavoid trumpeting problems for which there areno reasonable answers but to focus, instead, onsolutions that can garner general agreement, ifnot consensus. Consistent support andexchange with the spokesperson’s office andthe Department of Public Information forinternal communications is certainlywarranted, and dedicated communicationsstrategies for staff, member states, NGOs, thepress, and key public influencers need to beprepared, updated, and frequently used.

Conclusion: Ensuring theUN Secretariat Is Fit forPurpose

The year 2015 was pivotal for the UN. In additionto the previously mentioned reviews on peaceoperations and the peacebuilding architecture, theSecretariat was engaged in a process that

established a new global development agenda forthe next fifteen years. A three-year intergovern-mental process that included massive consultationswith civil society, the private sector, and citizensaround the globe, produced a new, universal, andcomprehensive set of goals around which to focuscollective efforts at the UN and in each memberstate. Interestingly, this new sustainable develop-ment agenda includes the promotion of “just,peaceful, and inclusive societies” across the world. Will the UN be “fit for purpose,” and, if not, what

changes will be needed? The Chief ExecutivesBoard is already looking at this question, using the2012 Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review(QCPR) of Operational Activities for Developmentto build further on the “Delivering as One”approach.43 One possibility that has been raised isto merge some of the larger development agenciesinto a single UN Development Agency, with asingle management board elected by the Economicand Social Council, although structural reformssuch as this would take years. While streamliningoperational costs, reducing duplication, andincreasing impact in the field and accountability,some of the flexibility of the system would be lost.Arguably, the same arguments can and could bemade for humanitarian agencies.The secretary-general’s peace operations panel

has explored how best to meet the challenges facingthe organization’s peace and security fieldoperations, including both peacekeeping andspecial political missions. The panel’s report putforward more than 100 recommendations,including the creation of an additional deputysecretary-general position for peace and security, areasonable alternative to the issue of merger orrealignment of DPA, DPKO, and the PeacebuildingSupport Office.44 This is an idea drawn directlyfrom the 2004 High-level Panel on Threats,Challenges, and Change, and it only shows howgood proposals have been around for a long time,without meeting enough political support. It seemshard to imagine that Secretary-General Ban willlaunch such a radical reform in his last year inoffice. However, the issue of departmental collabo-ration needs to be seriously tackled if the secretary-


43 UN General Assembly Resolution 67/226 (January 22, 2013), UN Doc. A/RES/67/226.44 United Nations, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace—Politics, Partnership, and People: Report of the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,June 16, 2015.

general is to receive the best possible advice onpolitical matters, given the complexity of the issuesand the need for regional and global solutions thatrequire input from many different Secretariatoffices. The secretary-general released his ownreport in early September that picks up some politi-cally “low-hanging” proposals to be implementedin 2016.45 Beyond the bureaucratic fixes, the list ofwhich has been getting longer over time, the realcall of these latest reports, including theIndependent Advisory Group’s peacebuildingreview, is for a change in the mindset toward amore flexible and responsive world body. The veryterm “peace operations” is now used to indicate thefull spectrum of UN responses in peace andsecurity, from troop deployment to “light” goodoffices. To achieve the flexibility needed to adapt toa fast-moving and evolving world, bureaucraticand political silos will need to be broken down. Mergers of the Office of the High Commissioner

for Human Rights with the Rule of Law Units ofUNDP and DPKO into an integrated third pillarfocused on human rights and governance is alsobeing suggested by advocates of a stronger voice forboth rule of law and human rights, but the work ofthis pillar needs to be integrated well with peace,security, and development, so once again, the issueof interconnecting the silos is paramount. On the administrative and management side, the

maintenance of two separate bureaucracies tomanage headquarters versus field staffing, procure-ment, IT, and logistics is now redundant given staffmobility and single contracts. A merger andstreamlining of the departments of Managementand Field Support might be an option, creating fivenew technical offices, possibly led by assistantsecretaries-general rather than under-secretaries-general. Global financial resources, global humanresources, global IT, global procurement, andglobal real estate and logistics could all reportdirectly to the secretary-general or to anempowered chief of staff or deputy secretary-general for operations, whose own office could bestrengthened by the resources made availablethrough these mergers. The assistant secretary-general of finance would also be in charge, as she isnow, of all financial resources and could be charged

by member states with producing a single budgetthat brings together all regular, peacekeeping, andtrust fund accounts into a more readable andtransparent budget plan and annual report. Offshoring the transactional elements of each of

these global units to global service centers or hubsin the developing world could both lower costs andincrease the investment in the organization bysome emerging powers. The global field supportstrategy supporting DPA and DPKO field missionshas pioneered the way forward on this, as havesimilar efforts in the Office of the UN HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UNChildren’s Fund (UNICEF), and UNDP. Aligningthese efforts would yield significant benefits, butmay be a step too far as it would require theadoption of common enterprise resource planningsoftware and other common standards across theSecretariat and all the agencies, funds, andprograms, which would be a monumental effort.In the end, “where” the offices work (the

structures or architecture) is probably lessimportant than “how” they work. New IT andsocial media tools (i.e., internal online communi-ties, desktop video conferencing, digital diplo -macy) and a spirit of collaboration rather thancompetition between and among departments,agencies, funds, and programs can fundamentallyalter program effectiveness. This makes standard-izing technology and other platforms among thesecomponents critical, as well as incentivizing collab-oration over competition in performance reviews. The process of decision making and crisis

response in the Secretariat and across agencies,funds, and programs continues to plague theorganization, as the policy and managementcommittee processes, first established in the 1990sunder Kofi Annan, has started to fray given the lackof staffing and the limited bandwidth available tosenior managers with overflowing agendas. Theestablishment of a more robust cabinet-stylesecretariat in the secretary-general’s office, mergingall such stand-alone units, perhaps merged with theChief Executives Board machinery, could beenvisaged and may be able to reduce both thenumber of meetings with duplicate agendas, priori-tizing both urgent and important decisions. Such


45 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General: The Future of United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/70/357-S/2015/682, September 2, 2015.

an office would also require the necessary resourcesto track decisions and hold senior managersaccountable for implementation. Holding seniormanagers accountable is a key reform that simplyrequires more discipline, not member stateapproval. The Human Rights Up Front initiative isa cautious step in this effort.Too many UN staff are based in three of the four

UN headquarters in New York, Geneva, andVienna. As the administrator is now doing atUNDP, the next secretary-general will likely needto change this ratio over time, perhaps throughbetter use of attrition in New York, Geneva, andVienna and re-assignment of posts to UN locationsin Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut, Nairobi, andSantiago. The use of regional service centers couldbe expanded, and, ideally, countries will compete toserve as UN hubs offering incentives; this wouldensure a more reliable and steady flow of talentfrom all these countries into the UN staff pool. Ingeneral, the ratio of administrative and supportstaff to substantive staff remains out of sync andwill have to be addressed.On the political front, the Secretariat will need to

extend its links to those new, stable, and emergingmiddle powers, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia,Mexico, Poland, Republic of Korea, South Africa,and Turkey, both for political and financialreasons. One possibility is to hold more bilateral

political or economic consultations with thesecountries at the under-secretary-general level—although admit tedly this could become onerousover time given the already charged travelschedules of the UN’s senior management teams.Another alternative is to fashion a type of informal“consultative council” of permanent representa-tives from some of these countries, as U Thant did.Today, this group might include the rotating chairsof the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, theAfrican Union, the League of Arab States, theUnion of South American Nations, and otherregional groups to provide a counterweight to theinfluence exercised over the secretary-general bythe P5. As Security Council reform remains adistant objective, finding a credible and meaningfulway to engage with emerging powers will befundamental to the success of the next secretary-general and the future of the UN. Overcoming institutional silos and reaching out

to emerging powers, without forgetting the UN’straditional supporters, will help the Secretariat toforge an institution that more accurately reflectsour globalized world and is more “fit for purpose.”This is in the interest of member states, as the UNhas proven over the past seventy years to be areliable lender of last resort for global public goodsin the face of a turbulent and unpredictable world.


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