Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9%...

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Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Transcript of Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9%...

Page 1: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Managerial EconomicsJack Wu

Page 2: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now

from price-based competition to marketing-based competition”,

Andrew Conway, Morgan Stanley

Coke vs. Pepsi, 1999

Page 3: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Competitive DilemmaPepsi

Raise price Discount

Raise price

C: 3, P: 3

C: 0, P: 5

Coke Discount C: 5,

P: 0 C: 1, P: 1

What should Coke do?

Page 4: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Strategic Situationsparties actively consider the interactions with

one another in making decisionsgame theory -- set of ideas and principles to

guide strategic thinkingsimultaneous actions: strategic formsequential actions: extensive form

Page 5: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Dominated Strategygenerates worse consequences than another strategy, regardless of the choices of the other parties

never use dominated strategy

Page 6: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Nash EquilibriumGiven that the other players choose their Nash equilibrium strategies, each party prefers its own Nash equilibrium strategy

• No one is willing to deviate unilaterally from a Nash equilibrium

Page 7: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Solving for Nash Equilibriumeliminate dominated strategies, then check

remaining cells“arrow” technique

Page 8: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Coke and Pepsi GameNash equilibrium: for both parties, “raise

price” is dominated by “discount”. but discounting is bad for both -- if only they

could agree somehow to raise price. Coke and Pepsi stuck in this situation for four

years until November 1999.

Page 9: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Radio FormatsMerkur

Lite AC no change

Jupiter

Hot AC J: 60,

M: 40

J: 60,

M: 40

no change J: 70,

M: 30

J: 50,

M: 50

Page 10: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Radio FormatsFor Merkur, “Lite AC” is dominated by “no

change”; so consider only “no change”, assuming Merkur chooses “no change”,

Jupiter should choose “Hot AC”.

Repeat using “arrow technique”.

Page 11: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Out of Nash EquilibriumWhat if another player doesn’t play Nash equilibrium strategy? Nash equilibrium strategy may not be best still don’t use dominated strategy

Page 12: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

No Nash equilibrium in pure strategies

Competitor.com

NBA NHL

NBA W: 4, C: 3

W: 3, C: 4

We.com NHL W: 3,

C: 4 W: 4, C: 3

Where to advertise?

Page 13: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Randomized Strategieschoose among pure strategies according to

probabilitiesmust be unpredictableExample: retail market random discountExample: where to advertise_ We.com: ½ NBA and ½ NHL_ Competitor.com: ½ NBA and ½ NHL

Page 14: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Evening News:

TVB

7:30pm 8:0pm

7:30pm A: 1, B: 1

A: 3, B: 4

ATV 8:0pm A: 4, B: 3

A: 2.5, B: 2.5

Page 15: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Coordination and CompetitionPrime time for news is 8:0pm; second best is

7:30pm; since audience is limited, get maximum

viewership if two channels schedule at different times.

Question: which station gets 8:0pm? Situation has elements of

coordination -- avoiding same time slot competition -- getting the 8:0pm slot

Page 16: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Zero/Positive Sumzero-sum games: pure competition -- one

party better off only if other is worse offpositive-sum games: coordination -- both can

be better off or both worse offco-opetition: competition and coordination

Page 17: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Adopting Database SoftwareSol

IBM Oracle

Venus

IBM V: 1.5,

S: 1.5

V: 1,

S: 1

Oracle V: 1,

S: 1

V: 1.5,

S: 1.5

Page 18: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Focal PointNash equilibriummultiple Nash equilibria

Page 19: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

SequencingGame in extensive form – sequence of moves:

nodesbranchesoutcomes

Page 20: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Extensive Form: Equilibriumbackward induction

final nodes intermediate nodes initial node

Page 21: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

TVB

ATV

ATV

4, 3

2.5, 2.5

1, 1

3, 4

8:00

7:30

7:30

8:00

7:30

8:00

TVB, ATV

TV News: Sequential Moves

Page 22: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Strategic MoveAction to influence beliefs or actions of other parties in a favorable way

•credibility– first mover advantage– second mover advantage

Page 23: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Examples Examples: Evening TV news -- both stations want to move first: which one can?

Use strategic move, eg, contracts with advertisers to deliver news at 8pm.

Famous Chinese general: after crossing a river, burnt his ships -- strategic move to force soldiers to fight harder.

Issue: Is the move credible? Will it convince the other players?

Advantage doesn’t always go to first mover; In war, better to see opponent’s move, and then take action, eg is enemy

moving south or north? new product category -- let competitor test the market and educate the

customers

Page 24: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

consumer

Litho

LithoMake prints

Do not

Buy

Do not

Make more prints

Do not

(1) serial number (2) destroying the plate(3) other solution?

Lithographer

Page 25: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Conditional Strategic Movesthreatspromises

Page 26: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Morgan Stanley:“Shareholder rights plan”

If any party acquires 15% or more of company’s shares, other shareholders get right to buy additional shares at 50% discount. Impact on hostile bidder?

Page 27: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Shareholder Rights PlanThis shareholder rights plan is a threat to

potential bidders: most hostile bidders begin with small stake; with shareholder rights plan, if bidder acquires

more than 15%, then rights triggered, and bidder will be diluted.

Nickname: poison pill. Actually works against shareholder rights -- by

entrenching existing management.

Page 28: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Sharon

Hilda

acquires 100,000shares

doesn’t bid

does not

activates rights

Hilda loses on initial stake + cost of takeover rises

Poison Pill

Page 29: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

Union

Employer

reject union demand

accept

do not

strike Lose current wageand possibly gain infuture wage

Maintain current wage

Why are strikes rare inAmerican professional football?

Strike

Page 30: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

AnswerStrike is a threat: must be credible, otherwise employer will

not raise wage; for threat to be credible, expected gain from strike in future

wage > loss of current wage.

American professional sports: football -- players have very short careers; if they strike for

one season, reduce professional careers by 20-25%. baseball -- long playing careers; strikes more common

Page 31: Managerial Economics Jack Wu. Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now from price-based competition.

depositor

bankmaintains deposit

run

Promise

withdraws deposit

remains solvent n.a.

?