MALAYSIA’S PULL-OUT FROM THE (IMT) IMPLICATIONS TO PEACE AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN MINDANAO

MALAYSIA’S PULL-OUT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING TEAM:

IMPLICATIONS TO PEACE AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN MINDANAO

Abhoud Syed M. Lingga

No. 2008-01

Institute of Bangsamoro Studies

Institute of Bangsamoro Studies Discussion Paper No. 2008-01 May 2008

The Discussion Papers are preliminary versions of policy and research papers circulated to elicit comments. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily of the IBS.

Malaysia’s Pull-Out from the International Monitoring Team: Implications to Peace and the Peace Process in Mindnao By Abhoud Syed M. Lingga

Abhoud Syed M. Lingga is the executive director of the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies. He holds two master degrees in Islamic Studies and Education. He participated in a number of trainings, among which are on conflict prevention and peacebuilding conducted by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research; human rights and people’s diplomacy by the Diplomacy Training Program of the University of New South Wales, local government and civil society by Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, and various trainings on leadership and management. For some years he had been Associate Professor at the Mindanao State University in Maguindanao and lecturer at Cotabato City State Polytechnic College and Sultan Kudarat Islamic Academy Foundation College. His research interests are on Bangsamoro right of self-determination, conflict management, human rights, sustainable development, and Islamic education. As accomplished author and writer, he has published numerous articles in local and international journals. He is also an active member of various non-government organizations, and has served in management capacities in various public and private sector organizations.

The Institute of Bangsamoro Studies (IBS) is a non-profit and non-government institution the functions of which are to carry out research on Bangsamoro history, culture, politics, economy and contemporary affairs; conduct trainings to capacitate the youth, women and the poor; and render community services to poor and conflict affected communities.

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Institute of Bangsamoro Studies Hadji Daud Bldg., Campo Muslim Cotabato City 9600, Philippines

Telefax: +63-64 4213551 Email: [email protected]

Institute of Bangsamoro Studies Discussion Paper No. 2008-01

MALAYSIA’S PULL-OUT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL

MONITORING TEAM: IMPLICATIONS TO PEACE AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN MINDANAO1

Abhoud Syed M. Lingga

Introduction

Last April 21, 2008, the Foreign Minister of Malaysia Rais Yatim made an unexpected announcement that his government will not send peace monitors once the mandate of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) will expire on September 9, 2008. Three days later, Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, he is also the defense minister announced that the “phased withdrawal” starts on May 10, and 21 contingents leaving on that date. 2 The schedule of departure of other contingents to be determine later. The announcement causes concern that it might has effect on peace in Mindanao. The uncertainties of the situation once the Malaysian monitors depart were expressed both by the GRP and MILF. General Rodolfo Garcia, chief government negotiator with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), said, "There's no guarantee of continued stability on the ground in the south if the Malaysians pack up their bags and go home." 3 Mohagher Iqbal, chief MILF negotiator, was quoted by media to have said,” I don’t want to paint a gloomy scenario, but the pull back of the Malaysian international monitoring team members gives a very grave signal to everyone.”4 The Mindanao People’s Caucus raise the alarm that, the “pullout of the IMT led by the Government of Malaysia will clearly have dire consequences on the lives of people in the conflict-affected areas.”5 The concerns are valid because Malaysia is facilitating the on-going negotiations between the government and the MILF, leading the IMT and contributed around seventy percent of its personnel. Because of these concerns, there is pressing need to look into the possible implications of Malaysia’s decision to pull-back its contingents in the IMT. To contribute to the discussions, I will attempt to look into the implications of Malaysia’s pull-out to the continued presence of IMT in Mindanao; to the security situation in conflict-affected areas; and the peace process. My views are basically derived from the history of the conflict and the peace process, supplemented by my little knowledge on Bangsamoro affairs. I am not privy to

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what the conflicting parties are thinking about, which to greater degree determine the future trajectory of the conflict that makes views like that of mine insignificant.

Roles of the IMT in the Peace Process The role of the IMT is primarily to provide support to the peace process. While the peace panels negotiate to achieve peace, it is essential that ceasefire is in placed and sustained to provide space to build confidence among conflicting parties. So the presence of the IMT is necessary to keep the negotiations going and to preserve achieved gains. Specifically, the tasks of the IMT are to observe and monitor implementation of cessation of hostilities and the socio-economic development aspects of signed agreements; conduct field verifications to validate any reported violations of the cessation of hostilities; coordinate closely with GRP and MILF Coordinating Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and the Local Monitoring Teams on conduct of field verifications and validation of reported ceasefire violations; and report to GRP Peace Panel and MILF Peace Panel the findings of verification/validation of reported violations of ceasefire. Probably, learning lessons from the 2000 war that ceasefire without monitors on the ground cannot hold, the GRP and MILF negotiators in 2001 agreed “to invite representatives of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to observe and monitor the implementation of all GRP-MILF Agreements.”6 This was reiterated in the agreement on the “Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001” and this time other than the OIC, Indonesia, Libya and Malaysia were specifically mentioned to be invited. The agreement states, “The Parties hereby invite representatives from the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), in particular Indonesia, Libya and Malaysia.” Invitations were sent but the OIC and Indonesia were not keen on the idea. The urgency of third party monitors was felt when the Philippine government violated again the ceasefire when on February 11, 2003 it started bombarding Boliok (two adjoining villages with same name and located in Pikit and Pagalungan) and the surrounding communities, the day Muslims all over the world were celebrating eid el adha (feast of sacrifice). That would had put a stop to the negotiations if not of the interventions of Malaysia because the MILF threatened to withdraw from the peace talks in protest against the GRP violations of the ceasefire. The Malaysian facilitator was able to convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table and after their March 27-28, 2003 meeting, the two parties agreed “to improve the existing mechanism or monitoring of the cessation of hostilities including the composition of an observer/monitoring group as

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provided for in the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001.” At this time Malaysia, Brunei and Libya agreed to contribute contingents to constitute the monitoring team. The terms of reference on the deployment of peace monitors was approved on September 8, 2004 in Kuala Lumpur and the implementing guidelines to the TOR on October 4, 2004 in Metro Manila. Generally, the IMT mission in Mindanao is successful and has contributed significantly in sustaining the ceasefire and in helping create the environment for continued trust in the negotiations. After the deployment of the IMT, clashes between government and MILF forces declined significantly from 698 and 559 incidents in 2002 and 2003, respectively, to only 15 in 2004, 10 in 2005, 13 in 2006, 7 in 2007, and one in the first quarter of 2008.

Ceasefire related and non-ceasefire related incidents 2002-2007

Year Ceasefire Related

Non-Ceasefire Related

2002

698

0

2003

559

0

2004

15

11

2005

10

5

2006

13

32

IM

T Presence

2007 7

5

Source: Data provided by MILF CCCH Owing to significant reduction of armed encounters between government and MILF forces, the IMT was able to undertake humanitarian services other than its task of monitoring the ceasefire. Its Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) had undertaken 33 outreach programs treating 10,654 patients.

5


0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

2002 2003 IMT MI 2004

IMT MII 2005

IMT MIII 2006

IMT MIV 2007

IMT MIV 2008

698

559

15 10 13 7 10 0 11 8 32 5 7

Ceasefire RelatedNon-Ceasefire Related

CEASEFIRE RELATED/NON-CEASEFIRE RELATED INCIDENTSFROM 2002 - PRESENT

The relative peace experience in conflict-affected areas after the deployment of the IMT brought about also substantial economic growth in the region. The following is summary of the gains achieved since the deployment of the IMT in 2004:7

• Increased participation of civil society organizations in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement;

• Increased partnership of some BIAF-MILF elements and Maguindanao CVO in community development works and in the settlement of rido;

• Improved awareness of some local government unit executives to the GRP-MILF ceasefire agreement and support to the ceasefire;

• Significant decrease in armed skirmishes between the GRP and MILF forces results to an upward trend in economic indicators in Mindanao;

• Armed hostilities in the conflict prone areas effectively contained; • Relative peace in Mindanao allows the peace negotiating panels to tackle

substantive issues of the peace negotiations; • Accelerated relief, rehabilitation and implementation of development

projects; • International participation and support stepping up; and • Increased level of trust and confidence among BIAF and AFP combatants,

and to the ceasefire mechanisms due to its effectiveness in containing the armed clashes.

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DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GRDP) GROWTH RATES (R-IX – ARMM)

0.00

50,000,000.00

100,000,000.00

150,000,000.00

200,000,000.00

250,000,000.00

CY 2002 CY 2003 CY 2004

GROWTH RATES (CORRECTED)

(as of August 05)

REG. 02-03 03-04 GROWTH DIFF.

R-IX 8.2 12.6 4.4 R-X 10.7 13 2.3 R-XI 9.8 15.8 6 R-XII 9.7 15.1 5.4 ARMM 5.9 17.7 11.8

Source: Presentation of GRP Peace Panel Chairman Silvestre C. Afable, Jr., September 20, 2006

The tenure of the IMT is not open-ended. The mandate is to be renewed every year. Even before the end of the mandate, the IMT may suspend or terminate its mission if the field situation becomes dangerous and life threatening to its members; if the GRP or MILF, or both, fail to fulfill their commitments and

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responsibilities to the peace process; or if there is lack of support by both parties towards any IMT reports.

Why Malaysia Pulling Out

“Because there is a need for us to indicate that we cannot be there forever... both parties must work closely together to thresh out a peaceful solution, and to underline the seriousness of the situation, we have decided to withdraw some of our peace-keepers,” Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak said.8 He also said, “We need to show that we cannot and we should not be there as part of the International Monitoring Team indefinitely. There has to be some degree of finality in terms of our presence there.”9 Datu Othman Abdul Razak was more specific when he said that it is “meant to send a signal” to the Philippine government to speed up efforts to sign a formal peace agreement with the MILF.10

These are some of the reasons coming from officials in Kuala Lumpur why Malaysia is pulling out its contingents.

Malaysia’s exasperation is understandable. The talks are now eleven years old, and for the last seven years Malaysia is patiently facilitating the negotiations. Malaysia’s involvement started when President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office in 2001 she immediately sought the assistance of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to resume the stalled negotiations. The MILF withdrew from the negotiations after the government waged an all-out war against the MILF in 2000. At the start, the MILF was reluctant to resume the talks not after the emissaries of Prime Minister Mahathir made several trips to the camp of the late MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim.

With the facilitation of Malaysia, the GRP and MILF reached agreements on security, and rehabilitation and development issues. Substantial issues on ancestral domain were already resolved in the consensus points. What will follow is a memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain before discussion on the comprehensive compact can begin. We have not heard much from government why the delay in signing the approved draft of the memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain other than general statements coming from Secretary Jesus Dureza who said that “the government, while committed to push the peace process forward, is not delaying but doing due diligence in completing the government's final draft of the ancestral domain agreement to ensure that it is implementable and defensible from attacks of unconstitutionality.”11 On the side of the MILF, its Committee on Information made available to media a paper entitled, “Summary of Events Leading to the Pullback of the IMT

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and Crisis in the GRP-MILF Peace Talks,” which explains why the negotiations are not moving forward. The paper, among others things, states:

“1. On December 15-17, 2007 supposed 15th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks, the government presented two drafts Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on ancestral domain, one uncleared version (15 pages) and the other cleared version (8 pages) but still footnoted “subject to additional inputs” which were to come from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Both drafts especially the second one drifted too far from the consensus points on the four strands of ancestral domain, namely, concept, resources, territory, and governance, which the Parties have jointly and painstakingly “crafted, agreed, and signed” since more than three years ago in December 2004. This irrational approach or duplicity caused the abortion of the talks. The MILF peace panel refused to meet their counterpart, saying “it served no purpose” after the government deliberately tinkered with the consensus points. Instead, it provided the GRP peace panel with all the signed documents on ancestral domain, reminding them that they were not honoring what they have agreed and signed; and “2. After settling all the remaining minor issues related to the four strands of ancestral domain, thanks to the shuttle of Datuk Othman bin Abdulrazak, Malaysia's chief facilitator of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks, between Manila and Darapanan, Sultan Kudarat, Shariff Kabunsuan on February 19-22, 2008, the Philippine government created a legal team to examine the legality or constitutionality of the agreed Draft Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). This is another weird move that serves no purpose except to delay the talks and tax the patience of the Malaysian Government, if not to insult its facilitator outrightly. Like the MILF peace panel, the GRP peace panel, is clothed with authority to bind and commit its Principal. Oftentimes, before every talk begins, each panel has to show their credential attesting that they are really empowered to commit and bind their respective principals. In actual practice, the GRP peace panel and the MILF peace panel, even if they have their respective mandates, never decided on major issues except after getting clearance or guidance from their respective principals. So, why is there a need for the government to create the legal team, after it clothed its peace panel with the power and authority to commit and bind the government in the talks, if not for dubious reasons and nothing more? Why has the government to be diligent only now, to borrow the argument of Secretary Jesus Dureza, when the Parties are ready to sign the MOA?”

Malaysia is withdrawing its contingents not because of the poor performance of the IMT but because of the slow movements in the negotiations. The trouble in the on-going talks, according to Datuk Othman’s, “is that things are not moving in the talks,” and this is because the “ball is in the (Philippine government’s) court, but they have been sitting on it.”12

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Implications to IMT Since around seventy percent of the personnel are from Malaysia, the immediate effect of Malaysia’s pull-out is the reduction of peace monitors in the field. Following the report that around 21 Malaysian peacekeepers will leave on May 10, the IMT is closing down four team sites in the following areas: Team Site 2 based in Iligan City, Team Site 3 based in Zamboanga City, Team Site 4 based in General Santos City and Team Site 5 based in Metro Davao. Only team site 1 and the headquarters in Cotabato City will remain open. This means no more peace monitors on the ground in Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Sibugay, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, South Cotabato, Sarangani, and Davao provinces. From May 10 to September 9, 2008, the number of IMT monitors will be reduced significantly and their presence will be in Cotabato City only. This certainly diminishes the capability the IMT to respond to crises situation, especially when it will happen in areas far from Cotabato City. The head of mission and the deputy are from Malaysia. The head of mission usually holds the rank of major general. After Malaysia’s pull-out the Brunei and Libya’s contingents will have to decide who will be the head of mission, and none of the remaining officers is a general. This means downgrading of the status of the head of mission. A head of mission with lower military rank will have difficulty relating with commanders in the field with high military ranks.

IMT Tour of duty

Mission Date IMT-I October 10, 2004 – September 10, 2005 IMT-II September 11, 2005 – September 8, 2006 IMT-III September 9, 2006 - September 03, 2007 IMT-IV September 4, 2007 – September 9, 2008

Once Malaysia’s pull-out of its contingents will be completed, the mandate of the IMT will also expire. Unless the mandate is renewed, which have to be decided jointly by the GRP and MILF, the Brunei, Libyan and Japanese contingents will have to leave. It will not be possible for them to stay in the field without the mandate. The renewal of the mandate needs the joint approval of the GRP and MILF, which will be possible only when the GRP and MILF will meet. Neither the GRP nor MILF can act on it unilaterally.

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Composition of IMT-IV

Country Military Civilian Total

Malaysia 38 3 41 Brunei 10 10 Libya 3 4 7 Japan 1 1

Total 51 8 59 The GRP, as revealed by General Garcia, would like to invite other countries to join the IMT as government's way of "correcting the situation, doing damage control, making necessary adjustments and moves,"13 but it cannot act unilaterally. Decisions to invite other countries have to be made jointly by the two parties. For Malaysia to reconsider its decision, the GRP and the MILF have to jointly make the request. To invite other countries to join the IMT and to renew the IMT mandate need approval by the two parties. These actions can only be made when the negotiations resume. On this aspect the MILF position is clear that discussion on the IMT issue is contingent upon the progress in the negotiations. To the MILF, the issue is not the pull out of the Malaysian peace monitors but “the very sincerity and true intention of the Government to pursue the Peace Talks”.14 In response to the verbal request of Gen. Garcia conveyed through Gen. Tan Sri Dato’ Sri Abdul Aziz bin Hj Zainal, Chief of Defense Force of the Malaysian Armed Forces, for the GRP and MILF peace panels to meet in Kuala Lumpur to discuss Malaysia’s pull-out, Mohagher Iqbal said: “the exploratory talks in Malaysia could only resume if there is a commitment that the two parties shall tackle the ancestral domain issue based on the consensus points and that the issue confronting the IMT can be tackled as a secondary agenda matter.” But to resume the talks “only for the purpose of discussing the IMT pullout, a big no way,” Iqbal emphasized.15

Implications to Security Without third party monitors on the ground, it will be difficult to sustain the ceasefire. Even if Brunei, Libya and Japan will not pull out their contingents, the IMT will have only 18 personnel and five of them are civilians. With this number the IMT will certainly face difficulties in responding to clashes that might occur.

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The first formal ceasefire agreement between the GRP and MILF after the start of the formal negotiations between the two parties was on January 27, 1997. The truce was agreed upon to prevent the conflict in Buldon from spilling over to other areas. The conflict started when the AFP attempted to intrude into what the MILF claimed as perimeter defense of Camp Abu Bakre. The coverage of the interim cessation of hostilities was limited in the municipality of Buldon and its immediate environment. The truce that binds all forces of the GRP and MILF to observe was inked on July 18, 1997 in Cagayan de Oro following the massive military operations of government forces in the municipalities of Pagalungan and Sultan sa Barongis in Maguindanao and Pikit in Cotabato Province. The ceasefire was holding until the government launched the all-out war against the MILF in year 2000. In March 2001, the two parties recommitted to observe the ceasefire after the MILF agreed for the resumption of the talks. But after two years, government forces attacked again MILF positions in Boliok. Third party facilitator was not involved at the start of the negotiations. From 1997 to 2000, no third party was involved in the negotiations and there was no ceasefire monitor present on the ground. From 2001 to 2003, Malaysia facilitated the talks but no third party was monitoring the observance of the ceasefire. From 2004 to the present, Malaysia continues to facilitate the talks and the IMT contingents are on the ground. At the time when no third party ceasefire monitors are on the ground, we experienced two major wars, other than hundreds of minor clashes between the GRP and MILF forces. From 1997 to 2000 we experienced one major war that displaced an estimated 932,000 people,16 and from 2001 to 2003, we had again another war that dislocated 393,039 people.17 From 2004 to the present, we have not experienced war and ceasefire-related incidents dramatically declined. Without the IMT, or even if it is still there but with reduced personnel, the risks of increased violent encounters between GRP and MILF forces will be high. Past experiences also shows the possibility of another major war to happen is something that cannot be dismissed. The capability of the GRP and MILF Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) to manage eruption of hostilities is doubtful. The CCCH was already in placed since 1997 but was unable to prevent the two major wars and hundreds of clashes between GRP and MILF forces. A case in point is on April 27, 2000 the peace panels met until late in the evening and signed the Aide

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Memoire that enumerated the steps to be taken to defuse the tensions along Ramos highway near Camp Abubakre, but the CCCH was unable to prevent the military attack on Camp Abubakre at dawn the following day. A resumption of hostilities will certainly impact on the economy. If it will happen at the time of rising prices of rice and oil, the poor will be badly affected as government resources will be diverted to war efforts. Representative Emylou "Lala" Talino-Mendoza (1st Dist., Cotabato province) has similar view. She said: "God forbid but if this happens again, the civilians, who have not yet fully recovered from the effects of the war in 2003, would be the first and biggest casualty. Children, the aged and women will be trooping to congested evacuation centers.”18 A break down of the ceasefire will also have an effect on investments since there will be no guarantee that the conflict will be contained in small areas in Mindanao, even if government will assure us that it can limit possible spill over.

Implications to the Peace Process Although Malaysia has no plan to abandon its role as facilitator in the GRP-MILF talks,19 the pull-out of its contingents will have effect to the peace process. Malaysia’s high profile presence on the ground reinforces people’s confidence in the peace process, and their absence will inevitably have impact on that confidence. What I am afraid of is when people lost confidence in negotiations as conflict resolution mechanism, other options will be opened for them to pursue their aspirations and to seek redress of their grievances. This may happen if population in conflict-affected areas experience negotiation fatigue. Dragging the negotiations too long that might tax peoples’ patience is risky. Although what is being highlighted is Malaysia’s pull-out but it put also into focus the negotiations. The peace talks have been dragging on for eleven years, and Malaysia’s involvement is now seven years. Malaysia’s position that there should be closure to the negotiations is understandable for they cannot stay here forever and continuously police the behaviors of government and MILF forces. On the other hand, Malaysia’s pull-out might encourage the parties to hasten the process of reaching agreement on ancestral domain. It might also call the attention of the President for her to exercise the political will, beyond statements, to resolve the conflict to the satisfaction of the Bangsamoro people. If President Arroyo can personally take interest in handling the on-going GRP-MILF negotiations, probably it will hasten the process because the peace talks will be free from the gridlock of bureaucratic decision making.

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Way Forward

No doubt that with the presence of the IMT on the ground we experience relative peace. Clashes between forces of government and the MILF were significantly reduced. Although the IMT is not leaving, but the decision of Malaysia to pull-out its contingents undoubtedly will place the IMT in weak position to respond to crisis. On September 9, 2008 the mandate of the IMT will expire. Even if the other three countries want to stay but they cannot if the there is no mandate. The way out from this situation is for the GRP and MILF to resume the negotiations, and tackle the draft memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain because it is the reason why Malaysia decided to withdraw its contingents. To push the peace talks forward, government has to honor its commitments in the consensus points and the compromised agreements reached during the shuttle diplomacy of Datu Othman last February. I understand that the MILF is not asking anything more than what were previously agreed upon. Government due diligence is understandable, which should have been done before it agreed on the consensus points, but should not be made as reason to undo what were already agreed because it places government sincerity in bad light in the eyes of the Bangsamoro and the international community. Once the negotiations will be resumed, the two parties, in addition to the discussion on the draft MOA, can request Malaysia to reconsider its decision, and the likelihood for reconsideration of the decision is great. The renewal of the IMT mandate will be assured if the two panels meet. Even the idea of inviting other countries to join the IMT can be decided by the two parties.

NOTES

1 Paper presented during the “Round Table Discussion on Malaysian’s Pull-Out from the International Monitoring Team (IMT): Implications and Responses” organized by the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies and the Institute of Autonomy and Governance with the support of Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on May 6, 2008 at Estosan Garden Hotel, Cotabato City. 2 http://www.gmanews.tv/story/91380/Malaysia-to-start-pulling-out-its-peacekeepers-next-month 3 http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=115830 4 http://www.tribune.net.ph/headlines/20080424hed4.html 5 http://www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4288&Itemid=190 6 Section A (3) of the Agreement on Peace Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Tripoli, Libya, June 22, 2001.

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http://www.gmanews.tv/story/91380/Malaysia-to-start-pulling-out-its-peacekeepers-next-month

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=115830

http://www.tribune.net.ph/headlines/20080424hed4.html

http://www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4288&Itemid=190


7 Undated power point presentation made available to the author. 8 http://www.tribune.net.ph/headlines/20080425hed4.html 9 http://www.tribune.net.ph/headlines/20080428hed2.html 10 http://www.philstar.com/index.php?Headlines&p=49&type=2&sec=24&aid=20080502103 11 http://www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4272&Itemid=247 12 http://www.philstar.com/index.php?Headlines&p=49&type=2&sec=24&aid=20080502103 13 http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/news/view_article.php?article_id=132461 14 “Official Statement,” Moro Islamic Liberation Front, August 28, 2008. 15 http://www.luwaran.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=695 16 World Bank, Social Assessment of Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao (Summary). Pasig City: World Bank Office Manila, 2003, pp. 12-13. 17 Abhoud Syed M. Lingga, “Statement delivered during the 21st session of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Population,” Geneva, Switzerland, July 21-25, 2003. 18 http://www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4310&Itemid=190 19 http://www.philstar.com/index.php?Headlines&p=49&type=2&sec=24&aid=20080502103

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http://www.philstar.com/index.php?Headlines&p=49&type=2&sec=24&aid=20080502103



http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/news/view_article.php?article_id=132461

http://www.luwaran.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=695



MALAYSIA’S PULL-OUT FROM THE (IMT) IMPLICATIONS TO PEACE AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN MINDANAO

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