Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation

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Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 ’1



The Pok Rafeah Chair

Public Lecture Series

J.H. Mittelman. 1997. Globalisation, Peace and Conflict. ISBN 967-

942-397-2

J.H. Mittelman. 1999. The Future of Globalisation. ISBN 967-942-

449-9

Yoshihara Kunio. 2001. Globalisation and National Identity. ISBN

967-942-540-1

Yoshihara Kunio. 2001. The Rise of China: Its Effect on East Asia.

ISBN 967-942-595-9

Joan M. Nelson. 2007. Education in a Globalizing World: Why the

Reach Exceeds the Grasp. ISBN 978-967-942-811-7

J.M. Nelson. 2007. Fast-Growing Nations, Globalization and Social

Policy. ISBN 978-967-942-828-5

Anthony Milner. 2011. Malaysia’s Dominant Societal Paradigm:

Invented, Embedded, Contested. ISBN 978-967-942-961-9

Anthony Milner. 2011. Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the

Nation. ISBN 978-967-942-994-7

Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 03:22 „2



The 8th Pok Rafeah Chair Public Lecture

Institute of Malaysian and International Studies

Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

delivered on 14 July 2011

PENERBIT UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA

BANGI 2011http://www.penerbit.ukm.my

Anthony Milner




Cetakan Pertama / First Printing, 2011

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transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanicalincluding photocopy, recording, or any information storage and

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Diterbitkan di Malaysia oleh / Published in Malaysia by

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Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Milner, Anthony

Malaysia monarchy and the bonding of the nation / Anthony Milner.1. Monarchy--Malaysia. 2. Malaysia--Kings and rulers. I. Title.

352.2309595

ISBN 978-967-942-994-7




Abstract

A recent, major study on the ‘development of Malay Kingship’

speaks of the ‘socio-political revival’ of Malay monarchy that is

currently taking place in this country. There is talk, says the book,

of a rejection of the ‘Westminster-style constitutional monarch’and the advancing of another type of ‘Southeast Asian monarchy

perfected by the Ruler of Thailand.’ This lecture considers these

propositions, and then examines Malaysian monarchy from three

directions. The first concerns the powers of the Rulers, or rather

how the Rulers’ powers have fared during the last two centuries.

The second examines the changing ideology of Malaysian

monarchy – an important topic that has been much neglected. The

third deals with the specific issue of whether the Malaysian Rulers

ought best to be understood as ‘Malay Rulers’ or ‘Rulers.’ It is

particularly in this last section of the Lecture that the issue of the

‘bonding of the nation’ will be examined. This issue is of central

importance in a research project being undertaken this year at

IKMAS under the auspices of the Distinguished Pok Rafeah Chair

in International Studies.




Abstrak

Suatu kajian utama yang baru diterbitkan mengenai ‘perkembangan

Kerajaan Melayu’ menceritakan kebangkitan semula secara sosio-

politik monarki Melayu yang sedang berlaku di negara ini. Buku

tersebut menyentuh ura-ura penolakan sistem raja berperlembagaangaya Westminster dan memajukan sistem jenis lain, iaitu ‘monarki

Asia Tenggara yang disempurnakan oleh Raja Negeri Thai.’

Syarahan ini membincangkan pandangan-pandangan ini, dan

kemudian meneliti monarki Malaysia dari tiga sudut. Sudut pertama

merujuk kepada kuasa Raja, dan khasnya tertumpu kepada

penilaian perkembangan kuasa Raja sepanjang dua abad yang lalu.

Sudut kedua meneliti perubahan ideologi monarki Malaysia – suatu

topik penting yang kurang diberi perhatian. Sudut ketiga

membincang isu spesifik samada Raja-raja Malaysia perlu

ditakrifkan sebagai ‘Raja-raja Melayu’ ataupun ‘Raja-raja’ sahaja.

Pada bahagian akhir Syarahan ini khususnya, isu ‘kesepaduan

negara’ dibincangkan. Isu ini adalah amat penting kepada projek

penyelidikan yang sedang dikendalikan oleh IKMAS tahun ini di

bawah payung Kursi Kecemerlangan Pok Rafeah dalam bidang

Kajian Antarabangsa.




The Honourable Vice Chancellor

The Honourable Deputy Vice ChancellorsFellow Deans and Directors

Fellow Professors, Associate Professors and Lecturers

Fellow students

Fellow dignitaries

And respected audience

A recently-published survey of the history of ‘Malay Kingship’ –

Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian’s Palace, Political Party and Power

(2011) – has the potential to re-open a productive discussion about

the present and possible future role of monarchy in Malaysia. It is

a reminder too that Malaysia is characterized internationally not

only by its classically plural society, but also by monarchy; by the

structure of prerogatives, ranks and ceremonies that accompanies

not one but nine Rulers. The significance of monarchy, and the

way that significance has changed over time, is of course a topic

that reaches beyond Malaysian studies – and a topic that has

attracted cultural anthropologists as well as historians and political

scientists. One lesson emerging from this academic analysis is that

an important distinction needs to be made between royal power

and the socio-cultural role of the institution of monarchy. In the

Malaysian case, aspects of this latter role, dating back to the pre-

colonial history of this region, have the potential to assist modern

monarchy in the task of building a sense of national community. It

is well known that this task is at present a priority in Malaysia.

In her new work, Kokbua, a senior, Malaysia-based historian

who previously wrote a major study on Thai-Malay relations in

the 17th and 18th centuries (1988) – refers to a current “socio-




8 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation

political revival” of “Malay kingship” (xxii), with the growing

importance of “proactive and participating constitutional rulers”

(391). She writes of the “rejection” of the idea of the “Westminster-

style constitutional monarch” and the call for “another type of

constitutional monarchy” – a monarchy that is “akin to the concept

and practice of the Southeast Asian monarchy perfected by the

Ruler of Thailand since the 1970s” (408). Kobkua’s observations

will come as a surprise to many around the world who have taken

an interest in Malaysian matters. Academics have buried Malaysian

monarchy over and over again over the years. Before Britishintervention, particularly in the West-coast sultanates, rulers are

seen to have failed to maintain order in the face of large-scale

Chinese immigration (Cowan 1961; Trocki 2007: 162). Then, in

the ‘colonial period’ – according to Rupert Emerson’s much-cited

1937 account – the “actual substance of power” passed from the

hands of the rulers to the British (1968: 211). The classic study on

the pre-colonial state system on the Peninsula – John Gullick’s

Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya – in a sense

tempered the drama of this observation by arguing that in reality,

on the eve of British control, the sultan’s role in his State had not

consisted in “the exercise of pre-eminent power” (1965: 44). Somehave argued that the Japanese did more damage than the British to

the monarchy. Kobkua herself says the “position and prestige” of

the rulers now “went into steep decline” (2011: 122; Cheah 1988:

20). According to Cheah Boon Kheng and others, the Malayan

Union crisis that followed the Japanese Occupation was decisive

in the fortunes of Malaysian monarchy; the “Malay people” now

made “their wishes and ‘Will’ felt over their rulers” (Cheah 1988:

26). According to Ariffin Omar, “the Malayan Union events

provoked a revolutionary change in Malay thinking.” For a

“growing number of Malays, the sultanates were no longer the

central point of the Malay world-view,” and “the interests of therajas were subordinated to the demands of Malayism” (Ariffin

1993: 52-53). The UMNO leadership now replaced the rulers as

the “real or substantive protector of the community” (Chandra

1979: 64).

The next stage of this apparent decline – and here we might

be beginning to wonder if there could be any further distance to




Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 9

fall – is said to be the Federal Elections of 1955, in which the

United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and its allies won

all but one seat – a result that, according to Kokbua herself, meant

the governing Malay party had now “finally and convincingly

replaced the rulers as true representatives of the Malays” (Kobkua

2011: 281). There was, of course, a Constitutional confrontation

between Parliament and Monarchy in 1983 and here again the rulers

are often portrayed as the losers (e.g. Cheah 2002: 209). Finally,

when the Federal Parliament “abolished the royal immunity from

suit” in 1993, the legal historian Andrew Harding judged that “theveil of mystique which has always surrounded royalty in Malaysia”

was “drawn aside” (Harding 1996: 61). The “forces of populism”

had “demonstrated amply their superiority to the forces of

feudalism,” and Harding noted “the declining position of the Rulers

in the Malaysian polity” (79).

Down the Rulers have tumbled, down and down, at least

according to this narrative – and yet now Kobkua challenges us

with the argument that monarchy is enjoying a ‘socio-political

revival.’ In this lecture, I will respond to Kobkua’s challenge by

reviewing the role of monarchy from three different angles. First,

I will discuss the issue of royal power – and ‘power’ is a wordKobkua uses often – and in particular offer my own account of the

historical context of current royal assertiveness. Secondly, I will

examine the ideology of monarchy, or – more precisely – the

dramatic ways in which the understanding and presentation of

monarchy in Malaysia has changed over the last two centuries.

This is a topic that has been neglected in Malaysian studies,

including in Kobkua’s book. My third and final concern – to put

the question succinctly – will be to ask whether, when Malaysians

are weighing up the usefulness or otherwise of their political

heritage, too much attention is given to ‘Malay monarchy’ rather

than ‘monarchy’. This final issue brings me back to the topic of my first ‘Pok Rafeah Lecture’: the ideological challenge

Malaysians face in their racially-divided, ‘plural society’: the task

of ‘bonding the nation.’





Power

The preoccupation with ‘power’ in much historical and social-

science writing can be analytically limiting as well as fruitful.

Nevertheless, I shall attempt an historical overview that focuses

on power, and it is a narrative that suggests there is really nothing

new about the current royal activism in Malaysia. Emerson, as

I’ve said, described the British as taking the ‘substance of power’

from the Rulers, leaving them to indulge only in “pomp and

ceremony” (1968: 140). I shall return to the matter of ceremony, but the claim about the loss of power is repeated often by historians

(including Kobkua) (see Milner 1986: 6; Kobkua 2011: 85). John

Gullick’s detailed research has produced a more nuanced analysis.

He points out (as does Kokbua) that the Rulers of the Unfederated

Malay States (Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, Johor) were able to

maintain a greater independence from British officials, but even

in the case of the Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negeri

Sembilan, Pahang) Rulers possessed a significant degree of agency.

Gullick writes of a “tacit bargain by which the colonial regime

secured (the) support and advice” of the Rulers (1992: vi): he notes,

for instance, that at one point the Perak and Selangor Sultans hadsuccess in insisting (in a dispute over gambling farms) that the

Governor did not possess the constitutional power to overrule their

decisions (52-53). Rulers also made themselves heard in such areas

as law and education.

The Rulers appear as well to have retained their legal

sovereignty in the British period. Legal cases involving the Sultan

of Johor (in the 1890s), the Sultan of Kelantan (in the 1920s) and

the Sultan of Pahang (in the 1930s) all confirmed that the Rulers

were sovereign rulers of independent states and immune from

jurisdiction in British courts (Mohamed Suffian 1972: 32-33). With

respect to the people themselves, Kokbua goes so far as to insistthat they continued to see their Rulers as “the state supreme

authority” and believed the “British were there because of royal

wishes, and nothing else” (Kobkua 2011: 85-86). This would seem

to be an exaggeration, but there is evidence of various types to

suggest continuing royal authority. In the State Councils of the

colonial period, for instance, “Malay members … often proved





reluctant to express an opinion before knowing the view of the

Sultan” (Smith 1995: 145). The testimony of opponents of royalty

is also instructive. Thus, some Malay activists claimed that it was

fear of the Rulers that deterred many Malays from engaging in

politics (Roff 1994: 230; Milner 2002: 260-261).

The Rulers were certainly active in religious administration

– for instance, in creating religious councils and regularizing legal

systems. Some studies have seen such initiatives as a form of

compensation for surrendering other powers (Yegar 1979: 264 Roff

1994: 72). After all, the original British agreements with the Rulershad specifically nominated religion and custom as areas in which

they would not need to take British direction. Another

interpretation, however, would stress that Rulers had paid close

attention to religious issues long before British intervention, and

that new developments in Islamic religious practice – emerging in

large part independently of the processes of British intervention –

required careful royal handling. As the legal historian, Abdullah

Alwi, has explained; the colonial-period sultans were forced to

“adjust to a changing environment” that included the “threat of

Wahhabism” as well as the European advance (1980: 12; Milner

2002: 217-218).My impression, therefore, is that the Rulers were far from

passive during the colonial period. However, it is hard to accept

that the “Malay masses” were “quite oblivious” to the “drastic

change in administrative structure of their world and the political

misfortunes suffered by their individual monarchs” (Kobkua 2011:

85-86). One British official noted in 1891 that Malays had become

“far less submissive,” and there were also reports that the people

no longer squatted by the roadside when a ruler passed (Gullick

1987: 79). The capacity of Rulers to punish crime and formulate

laws also began to be restricted in the opening decades of the British

era (294). Cheah Boon Kheng has commented that in the colonial period there was a “demystification of the Malay ruling class,

especially of the Malay rulers…” (1988: 19): this would seem to

me to suggest an alteration in the Rulers’ position that went beyond

a reduction of power.

Kobkua’s stress on the impact of the Japanese Occupation

does make sense. Cheah Boon Kheng has explained that the state





Councils set up in 1944 had the Sultans as mere “vice-chairmen

and advisers to the Japanese governors;” and in general “the Sultans

found the loyalty of their subjects not as reliable as before the

war” (1988: 20). Although the Japanese eventually followed the

earlier British administrative policy of working through royal

courts, at the beginning of the Occupation they did seem prepared

to remove traditional rulers in Southeast Asia (Kobkua 2011: 105).

They also offered various administrative opportunities to the

commoner Malay leaders who were beginning to be rivals of the

Rulers (Kobkua 2011: 106; Milner 2011: 149-150). Following theJapanese victory, some of these activists “swaggered about in the

villages and in government offices, throwing their weight around

as if they were the government:” (Kratoska 1998: 110). Again the

issue seems to be about appearance as well as ‘real power.’ How

would commoner Malays respond to the Johor Ruler being

“reprimanded for leaning on his stick before Japanese officers”

(Stockwell 1979: 11)? Kobkua conjectures that it would have been

“a cultural and political shocking experience” for the “average

Malay” to witness “his Ruler performing self-demeaning exercises

such as bowing in the direction of the Imperial palace as a mark of

homage to the Emperor” (2011: 109).As noted in the opening of this lecture, the narrative of the

decline of royal power next tends to move to the dramatic Malayan

Union period, in which a potent Malay movement developed in

opposition to British plans to impose a new constitution on the

country – a constitution which many saw as sidelining both

monarchs and Malays in the planning of a future independent

Malayan state. The Rulers are often seen as weak in having

submitted to the constitutional changes. Former Prime Minister

Mahathir has recalled that “many of us felt betrayed by our Rulers”

(2011: 109). In the political struggle that then led to the British

back-down, the Rulers are likely to be portrayed as passive, simply

realizing that “their only choice” was to “back their people’s

demand for a Federation” in which Malay interests would be

protected (Mahathir 2011: 140). Then UMNO – which is described

as taking over real leadership of the Malay community – is given

the credit for the decision to “to retain the rulers as constitutional

monarchs” in the Constitution of the new, independent Malayan

state (Cheah 1988: 26).





Kobkua considers that the battering the Rulers received during

the Japanese period may have been one factor influencing their

willingness to surrender to British demands that they support the

Malayan Union (125). However, her book also includes evidence

that the Rulers were far from passive in this period – as does Simon

C. Smith’s careful study of British relations with “the Malay

Rulers” from 1930 to 1957 (Smith 1995; also Smith 2006). It is

clear from the documentation that some of the Sultans struggled

against the British demands from the outset, even though they faced

the threat of being forcibly removed from their thrones (Smith1995: chapter 3; Kobkua 2011: chapter 4). Their determined

opposition clearly influenced the British decision makers – and

the Sultan of Perak even presented an alternative constitutional

template, a federal scheme that anticipated the structure eventually

adopted for the independent Malaya/Malaysia (Kobkua 2011: 149).

In the period leading up to Independence (Merdeka) in 1957,

the Rulers demonstrated political leadership in other areas also.

Apart from fighting against Malayan Union in London as well as

at home (Kobkua 2011: 176), they pressed the British on such

matters as immigration (especially from China), and the timing of

self government (Kobkua 2011: 219-221). The competition between Rulers and commoner politicians in the political arena

was sometimes blatant. The Sultan of Kedah was especially

determined to “eradicate(e) UMNO influence from his state” and

“sought to declare the organization illegal and dismiss its supporters

from government service” (Smith 1995: 176). The competition

was acute between the Rulers and Dato Onn bin Jaafar (the first

leader of UMNO), and in 1949 a meeting of Menteri Besar –

probably at the behest of the Rulers – rebuked Onn for allowing

this to be made public (Smith 1995: 177).

Onn had gone so far as to speak (in 1949) of “ways and means

of ending feudal rule” (Smith 1995: 176) – and in resigning fromthe leadership of UMNO in 1950, he admitted that under his

presidency any UMNO proposal would face royal opposition (179).

It is possible too that opposition from the Rulers helped to defeat

the new Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) which Onn initiated

in 1951 (179). In forming a further party in 1954 (Party Negara),

Onn changed his approach to monarchy, promising to uphold the





position of the Rulers in the future Malaya, and even presenting

himself as their defender against UMNO (181). The new UMNO

leader Tunku Abdul Rahman was more consistent in identifying

the political advantage in supporting not undermining the Rulers.

In later years he recalled that “at all costs I wanted to avoid having

a split with the Rulers” (Smith 1995: 183). In the Malayan Union

struggle, even left-wing Malay activists – who might be expected

to have been fundamentally anti-feudal – found themselves in the

anomalous position of rallying popular sentiment by demanding

the restoration of royal sovereignty (Stockwell 1979: 76).The British certainly took the Rulers seriously as political

protagonists in the years between the War and Independence. As

one senior official put it in March 1946, “we have not weaned”

the Rulers – “particularly in the Unfederated States” – from an

“active and dominating role in the political field” (Smith 1995:

145). A principal theme in Simon Smith’s study, in fact, is the

effort made by Colonial Office officials in London to turn the Rulers

into ‘constitutional monarchs’ – seeking to avoid, for instance,

British governmental statements that admitted the restoration of

their sovereign status after Malayan Union was replaced (70, 100-

101). Key officials in Malaya tended to see things differently,warning that the Sultans were determined on the issue, and if they

were not satisfied “Malays of every walk of life and political colour

would range themselves behind the rulers” (97; 105). The Sultans,

it should be said, won their point with the British (109) – as they

did on other matters such as a proposed Prisoners Removal Act,

legislation over gambling, and the determining of ethnic

components in the public service (107-113). In 1951, the Legal

Adviser of the Colonial Office in London gave the opinion that

the Rulers were not yet constitutional rulers and that such an

outcome could only be achieved in “gradual stages and by

persuasion on the political rather than the purely legal merits”

(Smith 1995: 146).

The Ruler and the Constitution

I have noted the suggestion that the great UMNO victory of 1955

removed the Rulers as the ‘true representatives of the Malays.’





There is plenty of evidence (presented by Kokbua and others),

however, that the Rulers remained politically potent in the years

and decades after 1955 – and this record is important if we wish to

establish the historical context of royal activism of today. The

UMNO leadership has tended to suggest, for instance, that the

Rulers only achieved the role they possess in the Independence

Constitution as a result of UMNO generosity, including the UMNO

pledge “to protect their interests and to uphold their role

prerogatives…” (Tunku Abdul Rahman, cited in Kobkua 2011:

279; see also 319, 322; Cheah 1988: 26). However, detailed recordsnow available of the process leading up to the 1957 Constitution

indicate that the Rulers were often effective political actors.

Royal contributions to the deliberations of the Reid

Commission – established in 1956 to draw up proposals for the

Independence Constitution – stressed the “very real tie” between

Ruler and subject. The Rulers’ legal representative also argued

that the Conference of Rulers (first established in 1948) should be

given executive powers recognizing the Rulers’ “political

importance” – including powers to deal with boundary issues

(Smith 1995: 152). The Reid Commission resisted this, but Smith’s

study gives the impression that it never fully came to grips withthe role of the Rulers – failing even to include the ‘Conference of

Rulers’ in the draft constitution (158). The Rulers were far more

successful in dealing with the Working Party appointed to deal

with unresolved issues in the Reid Report. This group, which

included political, Government and Rulers’ representatives, advised

that the Rulers remain heads of Islam in their states (158); also,

despite resistance from both the British administration and the

UMNO leadership, the Working Party supported the Rulers’

proposals for the role of the Conference of Rulers, including giving

the Conference powers relating to State borders, the position and

privileges of the Rulers themselves, and the appointment of Supreme Court judges and members of the Election and Public

Services Commissions. The Conference, the Working Party agreed,

could also deliberate on matters of national policy, though the

Rulers’ constitutional advisers were expected to be present (Smith

1995: 159; Fernando 2007: 169-170).





Joseph Fernando’s recent monograph on the ‘making of the

Malayan Constitution’ provides a fine illustration of the Rulers’

tenacity in these negotiations. When the deliberations in the post-

Reid Commission Working Party turned to financial provisions,

for instance, UMNO and its political allies refused to meet the

Sultans’ demands regarding revenue provisions for the States in

the new Federal arrangement. The Rulers then announced they

would not attend future Working Party meetings, and the Alliance

leaders were so “shocked by the boycott” that they agreed to a

compromise, granting the States “a greater degree of financialautonomy than the original Reid proposals would have allowed…”

(Fernando 2007: 172-4).

It is this type of detailed archival research that brings to light

the degree of royal agency in the constitution-making process.

Former prime minister Mahathir’s recent account of this period is

also revealing of what was seen to have been at stake in a real

contest between monarch and commoner politician. If the “issues

of protocol and status of the Rulers” had not been “settled to (the

Rulers’) satisfaction,” observed Mahathir, a confrontation might

have erupted, and there were “feudalists among the rakyat

(subjects) who would throw their weight behind the Rulers at any price…” (2011: 149).

As to the Constitution itself, I am not qualified to make a

legal analysis, but certain aspects do strike me as significant. In

particular, I have the impression that the role of a Ruler goes well

beyond that of the British monarch, or an Australian governor.

Apart from giving the Rulers the power of choosing one of their

number as King (or Yang di-Pertuan Agong), the Constitution

makes clear that “no proceedings shall be brought in any court

against the Ruler of a State in his personal capacity.” The Rulers

also continued to possess the power of pardon, and at both State

and Federal levels legislation is said to require the assent of theRuler (Smith 1995: 159). The Constitution recognizes the right of

a Ruler to “act in his discretion” in the appointment of a Menteri

Besar, and in “any function as head of the Muslim religion or

relating to the customs of the Malays” (Mohamed Suffian 1972:

275). Members of the Conference of Rulers are also able to “act in

their discretion” in relation to certain state boundary issues, and





in “the advising on any appointment” [Constitution Article 38 (6)].

The Conference may in addition “deliberate on matters of national

policy,” although in doing so the Rulers are supposed to be

“accompanied by” the Prime Minister and Menteri-Menteri Besar

[Article 38 (3)]. Finally, no “law directly affecting the privileges,

position, honours or dignities of the Rulers” is allowed to be passed

“without the consent of the Conference of Rulers” [Article 38 (4)].

Listed in this way, the provisions of the Constitution would

seem to envisage genuine substance in the role of the Ruler (Azlan

Shah 1986: 79). In the negotiations over the Constitution in 1956Tunku Abdul Rahman had urged that the Rulers be given no

political functions (Smith 1995: 150), but he reflected in 1981

that they now enjoyed “more rights than they had once enjoyed in

British colonial days, at least as far as the former Federated Malay

States are concerned” (quoted in Azlan Shah 1986: 81). In this

respect, legal scholar H.P. Lee has pointed out that, like it or not,

the “constitutional system in Malaysia” simply does not “accord

with present-day notions of parliamentary democracy” (1995: 37).

The legal language of the Constitution – at least for a non-

lawyer – tends to be opaque, and explanatory essays can therefore

be helpful in understanding the practical implications of what iswritten. To take just two dimensions of the Rulers’ role, Professor

Ahmad Ibrahim pointed out long ago that in practice Sultans have

a “great deal of influence on the appointment of religious officials,

especially the Mufti, and the direction of religious affairs in the

State,” including in “the issue of fatwas or rulings on the Muslim

religion and law” (Ahmad Ibrahim 1978: 59). Secondly, with regard

to advising on senior public appointments (including legal and

military appointments), the former Lord President of the Federal

Court of Malaysia, Raja Azlan Shah, has explained that “one can

safely say that the views of the Rulers play a very important role

…” (Azlan Shah 1986: 88).Two further matters in the Constitution interest me. The first

concerns an amendment of 1971 that makes it necessary to have

the consent of the Conference of Rulers before changing in any

way the constitutional provisions relating to national language and

to the “special position of the Malays” [Article 153 (1)], (Harding

2007: 121-122). Much has been written on the Constitution’s





specific provisions for ‘the Malays’ (and also the “natives … of

Sabah and Sarawak”), and the inter-communal negotiations and

compromises that lay behind these provisions. The 1971

amendment seems significant at several levels. As former Lord

President Raja Azlan Shah has pointed out, by insisting that not

just a Parliamentary vote but also the consent of the Conference

of Rulers would be necessary to alter these provisions, “the Malays

feel safe” (1986: 88). However, the amendment also seems to have

implications for the role of the Rulers, enhancing their authority.

True, the Constitution itself bestows this responsibility on theRulers, but there is a hint too of an extra-constitutional significance.

As the former Lord President explained, the Rulers’ Conference

ought to act “on advice in these matters,” but their agreement to a

change would not “be obtained easily,” and any government “trying

to force these issues on the Rulers would be courting trouble as

the Malay masses would definitely back the Rulers when it comes

to the question of preserving their special privileges” (1986: 88).

The second matter that strikes me in the Constitution is Article

181 (1), which states that “subject to the provisions of this

Constitution,” the “sovereignty, prerogatives, powers and

jurisdiction of the Rulers … as hitherto had and enjoyed shallremain unaffected” [Article 181 (1); Gillen 1994: 7]. The legal

scholar, Andrew Harding, has warned against concentrating on

“important prerogatives outside the constitution,” noting that

“many aspects of the Rulers’ powers under the Constitution” are

still “imperfectly understood” (1996: 72). However, this clause is

a reminder that although the Constitution may place limits on

Malaysian monarchy it does not encapsulate that institution.

Monarchy is clearly assumed to be something more than ‘the

provisions in this Constitution.’ In the words of Former Lord

President Raja Azlan Shah, it is “a mistake to think that the role of

a King, like that of a President, is confined to what is laid down bythe Constitution. His role far exceeds those constitutional

provisions” (Azlan Shah 1986: 89).

I shall return to the perplexing issue of what is the real nature

of this monarchy. But the question clearly reaches beyond legal

formulations – as Clive Kessler (1992: 144) and Mumammad

Kamil Awang (1998: 314), and others, have noted. It recalls, for





instance, former Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman’s suggestion

that the throne is the “symbol of divinity on earth and whoever

occupies it is the chosen one of God” (cited in Kobkua 2011: 334),

or the recent comment of former Prime Minister Mahathir that

Malays are still “very feudal in their thinking” (2011: 452). Rulers,

Mahathir suggests, wield “considerable influence, being backed

by strong Malay traditions or adat ” (2011: 564). Even when a

Prime Minister or Menteri Besar disagrees with the request of a

Ruler he – like other Malays – tends to find it “difficult to say ‘no’

to (his) Rulers” (2011: 452-453). Tunku Abdul Rahman, it should be added, made similar observations (Harding 1996: 76n).

Probing the extra-constitutional dimension of monarchy in

Malaysia, I think next of the genealogical links some sultanates

are said to possess with the great emperor of Srivijaya (based in

South Sumatra from the 7th century), who was believed to wield

magical powers. The word daulat – suggesting supernatural power

– is still sometimes associated with the Rule and his royal regalia.

We may recall too the influence of Indian (including Buddhist)

traditions of kingship, and the range of Islamic (including Persian)

thinking about the spiritual dimension of monarchy that began to

gain influence in the 14th century. Rajas may not always have been liked as individuals – subjects would sometimes abandon an

unpopular Ruler to become the subject of another – but in some

Malay writings, as I will discuss at a later point, a royal subject

appears to be presented almost as a portion of the body of the

Ruler. It is possible that the maxim ‘the Ruler and Subject can

never be divided’ – which continues to be employed in some

quarters today – reflects this ancient sentiment (Gullick 1965;

Milner 1981; Milner 1982; Muhammad Kamil 2000; Ariffin 1993:

52).

Royal Assertiveness

Considerations about the extra-constitutional dimension of

monarchy are of obvious importance when we come to discussing

the ideology of Malaysian monarchy – but they are clearly

significant too in trying to pin down the real powers and influence





of these Rulers. Since 1957 numerous developments indicate that

the attempt to convert the Rulers into ‘constitutional monarchs’ –

in which the British Colonial Office engaged – has not been

effective. Crises, of course, have received most attention in

accounts of the exercise of royal power. Rulers have appointed

Menteri Besar who have not been the first choice of the governing

party; other Menteri Besar have resigned after losing a Ruler’s

confidence. Legislation has been rejected; senior public

appointments (including at the highest levels of the legal system)

have been changed because of royal opposition (Azlan Shah 1986;Smith 1995: 205; Kobkua 2011: 346-347; 349-350; Lee 1995: 39

n.8). In Selangor, in 1992 the Ruler and the Menteri Besar clashed

over the nomination of individuals for royal titles – a contest which

the Ruler won (Kobkua 2011: 351-352). In Kelantan, the last Sultan

made a number of seemingly-effective interventions in the political

process, including in 2002 (Kobkua 2011: 352-353; Harding 1996:

76).

What we know less about is the informal and often quiet

influence that the Rulers exercise. Former Lord President Raja

Azlan Shah has commented that “one cannot deny the role played

by the Rulers behind the scene” (1986: 79). “It is well known,” hesays, “that in submitting a candidate for appointment as Menteri

Besar the party always takes into consideration his acceptability

to the Ruler.” Party leaders, in fact, “should be complimented for

their willingness to give in to avoid and to solve major

constitutional crises with Rulers” (81). In some instances, Rulers

have communicated their moral confidence in speaking of the

exercise of such influence. While “the king acts on the advice of

the head of government,” explains the now Sultan Azlan Shah,

“he should not grant any approval if the advice given does not

reflect justice….” “In the spirit of a constitutional monarch,” he

adds, “a king has a role in giving advice and opinion, offeringencouragement and motivation, and giving reminder and rebuke”

(Kobkua 2011: 386n).

A royal moral authority is sometimes expressed in very public

ways. Just as the Council of Rulers can deliberate on major national

issues, so Rulers speak out on these matters. Over many decades,

speeches by Rulers at their own Birthday celebrations, and other





public events, have been reported in the media. In recent times,

the Sultan of Selangor has talked about corruption, emphasizing

the damage it does to the attractiveness of Malaysia for foreign

investors (Kobkua 2011: 380-381). The Sultan of Trengganu has

been a pioneer in establishing (and funding) the Sultan Mizan Royal

Foundation, which has parallels with the Royal Thai Foundation,

and is designed to alleviate poverty, undertake research and

publication on history, culture and religion, as well as promote

education and heritage crafts (Mohamed Anwar et al. 2009: 376,

396; Kobkua 2011: 399-400). Kobkua draws attention to the particular contributions of the Raja Muda (Crown Prince) of Perak,

Raja Nazrin Shah, who has commented on such issues as “judiciary

reform, national unity, the supremacy of the constitution, Islam,

the sanctity of citizenship for both Malays and non-Malays alike,

and of course, the role and significance of the monarchy in Malaysia

“(Kobkua 2011: 381-382). The Raja Muda, who makes clear that

the Rulers do not seek “executive power,” has also spoken of them

as a “source of reference” in times of “crisis among the rakyat ”

(Kobkua 2011: 385; Nazrin Shah 2011).

Tabling these decades of royal assertiveness and influence

is, first, a reminder that there is nothing new about the currentroyal activism detailed in Kobkua’s book. Such royal behaviour

might best be understood as an integral part of the Malaysian

governmental system. The role of the Rulers might not ‘accord

with present-day notions of parliamentary democracy,’ but it is

strongly supported in influential quarters. A later Lord President,

Tun Haji Mohd. Salleh Abas, for instance, has commended the

idea of a Ruler taking action if a “Menteri Besar is known to be

corrupt.” “Under such circumstances,” he says, “no Ruler could

be expected to remain silent, as he has a clear moral duty to perform

– to protect the public” (Mohd. Salleh 1986: 5). The presence of

strong royal sympathies in the wider community is alluded to again by former Prime Minister Mahathir, in his comment this year that

politicians feel “constrained” because “any overt show of disrespect

for the Malay Rulers would cause a lot of Malays to be resentful

to them (the politicians)” (2011: 454).

Clashes between various Prime Ministers and monarchy,

however, are well-known – and go back to the time of Tunku Abdul





Rahman (e.g. Kobkua 2011: 341, 387-388; Mahathir 2011: 453).

The Mahathir Government engaged in two quite dramatic attempts

to limit royal powers. First, there was the 1983 ‘constitutional

crisis,’ when the King refused to sign government legislation that

would in particular affect the powers of both the Yang di-Pertuan

Agong and the State Rulers to block legislation. The atmosphere

was tense. Rallies were held on behalf of both Prime Minister and

Rulers – and some Rulers even refused to fly the national flag.

Media articles supporting the Prime Minister ridiculed the Sultans

and their dynasties (Milner 1991: 108). The eventual compromisewould seem to have offered some satisfaction to the Rulers. The

clauses of the Government’s Amendment which were designed to

limit the powers of State Rulers were dropped, and the limits on

the powers of the King were softened. The King, it is true, can

now only delay rather than block legislation, but he has the

opportunity to contribute to the legislative process by giving his

reasons for delay (where the Bill is not a money Bill). Also, in the

view of H.P. Lee, the King might even have obtained “an enhanced

role” at a time when the Government fails to obtain a two-thirds

majority (Lee 1995: 32-33).

In 1992, the Mahathir Government tackled royal legalimmunity. For the Government – in Kobkua’s words – “the

unspoken buzzword seemed to be ‘control’” (2011: 364). The 1957

Constitution had stated that the King “shall not be liable to any

proceedings whatsoever in any court” and that no court proceedings

could be brought against “the Ruler of a State in his personal

capacity” (Gillen 1994: 7). The Government now proposed

constitutional amendments that would limit the Rulers’ personal

legal immunity, and also their powers of pardon, and in addition

qualify the restrictions on freedom of expression with respect to

accusations against a Ruler. A special court would also be created

to deal with cases involving Rulers.The Rulers refused to consent to these constitutional changes,

and a public struggle then took place, with the Government drawing

attention to a list of allegations against Rulers (Kobkua 2011: 361),

while opponents of the changes – including the Opposition Parti

Semangat 46 – insisted that the whole institution of monarchy was

in danger. Eventually, the Rulers agreed to compromise. A Special





Court was created to try cases concerning a Ruler – but proceedings

may only be taken against a Ruler in his private capacity (Harding

1996: 78). The compromise included the provision that a Ruler

charged with an offence in the proposed special court would cease

to exercise his functions as Ruler. Also, if convicted and sentenced

to more than one day’s imprisonment, he would cease to be the

Ruler of the State (Gillen 1994: 15). One legal specialist has

described these modifications as “relatively minor” (16), but

presumably they were aimed at insuring the continued sovereignty

of the Ruler, in institutional if not personal terms. Andrew Hardinghas judged that in this 1992 crisis, “the standing of the Rulers”

was “considerably reduced” (1996: 79). As we have noted,

however, Kobkua’s new book speaks of a current ‘socio-cultural

revival’ of monarchy, and there has been plenty of other evidence

that royal assertion of power – so evident in the 1940s and 1950s,

and in later decades – has continued in the last few years.

Thinking back in particular to the comments of the former

Lord Presidents and Prime Ministers, I am reminded again of the

extra-constitutional dimension of monarchy – the ‘sovereignty,

prerogatives, powers and jurisdiction of the Rulers’ that is limited

by but not defined in the Constitution. Did the constitutionalreforms of 1984 and 1992, one might ask, have a significant impact

on this extra-constitutional authority, or on that informal influence

that allows Rulers at times to play a critical part in key public

appointments and even decisions? What this discussion of ‘power’

brings home, I think, is that the current royal activism in Malaysia

is nothing new. Even in the colonial period there is plenty of

evidence of Rulers taking initiatives to influence public policy.

They were far from passive in the face of British determination to

impose the Malayan Union and they were strategic and effective

in the deliberations that led to the Merdeka Constitution. Since

Independence, Rulers have made many decisive interventions inthe political process and their continuing, informal influence in

public affairs is strongly attested to. To use Kobkua’s phrase again,

‘proactive and participating constitutional rulers’ are not a new

phenomenon. They are an established feature of the Malaysian

governmental system.





Ideology

In considering this exercise of royal power I come back again and

again to the question of what this kingship really is. The term

‘power’ often seems inadequate. Kobkua’s analysis makes this

plain, but she does not develop the discussion. She does not focus

on the idea of kingship and how it may have changed over time. At

one point Kobkua writes of the decline of “the powers and position

of the Malay monarchs” during the British period (2011: 85); at

another she refers to “the foundation of traditional Ruler-subjectsrelations” having “survived … under the British residential system”

(Kobkua 2011: 114). The ‘foundation,’ then, is something distinct

from ‘powers’ – and she goes on to say this ‘foundation’ was

undermined during the Japanese period (114). By ‘foundation,’ I

think she is referring here to the socio-cultural role the institution

of the Ruler played in the life of the royal subject, and it is certainly

difficult to sum this up in terms of the quantification of power. A

British official in 1927 may have been thinking along similar lines

when he observed that the Rulers were “a real and to my mind

essential asset.” But for the Rulers, he suggested, “the Malays

would become a mob” (Ghosh 1977: 304). Similarly, at one pointTunku Abdul Rahman argued that “without the protecting influence

of these Rulers the Malays would lose whatever semblance of

belonging they might have in the land of their birth…” (cited in

Kobkua 2011: 264n). Again, much more is going on in this sentence

than a consideration of degrees of political power.

Academic analysis over the last few decades has reminded

us of the social and cultural significance of monarchy in Southeast

Asia and elsewhere in the world – stressing in some cases that

even when the Ruler himself/herself may seem weak, the royal

institution can be vitally important in the life of the community

(e.g. Geertz 1980; Milner 1982: Thongchai 1994; Fujitani 1998;Drakard 1999; Cannadine 2001; Day 2002; Peleggi 2002; Bellah

2003). The Emperor of post-Meiji Restoration Japan, for instance,

lived “above the clouds” – leaving others to exercise “real power”

– but he was also understood to be the “axis of the state” (Bellah

2003: 34-35; Fujitani 1998: chapter 6). In the Malaysian case the

view has already been noted that a sultan of pre-colonial times





often did not exercise ‘pre-eminent power.’ We will examine the

character of this pre-modern kingship, but what I also wish to stress

is the far-reaching change that has taken place in Malaysian

monarchy over the last 200 years. It is misleading, I will suggest,

to speak of monarchy today as a ‘traditional institution.’ It has

pre-colonial features, but also quite modern (certainly colonial-

period) dimensions. It is a complex institution, but its complexity

may be helpful in considering how useful monarchy might be in

the future planning of this country. Let us consider, therefore, just

a few dimensions of the kingship or kingdom that operated on thePeninsula in say, 1800. My observations are based primarily on

the writings produced in the royal courts, supplemented sometimes

by descriptions from foreigner outsiders.

In certain cases, Rulers did give the impression of exercising

considerable power; often they did not. But the social and what

we might today call the psychological significance of the monarch

was fundamental. The word that most approximated to ‘kingdom’

was kerajaan, and it meant literally ‘the condition of having a

raja.’ The Ruler was the linchpin of the community. He was the

head of religion in his community; custom (adat) was said to rest

‘in his hands.’ The laws of the polity were seen to “come down tous” via the ruling family (Milner 2002: 148). The polity’s

‘historical’ writings constructed the past in the idiom of ‘the raja’

and his genealogical heritage. The subject – the rakyat – seems to

have been conceptualized almost as a part of ‘the Raja.’ A

community without a Ruler was said to be in a condition of utter

confusion (huru-hara). The maxim ‘the Ruler and subject can never

be divided,’ it might be argued, possesses a literal truth within the

kerajaan ideology (Gullick 1965; Milner 1982; Milner 2011:

chapter 3).

This observation is underlined too when we consider that the

Ruler was a Ruler – a focus of community and identity in himself – not the ‘Ruler of a state,’ a territorially-defined state. He did not

describe himself in his letters, for instance, as the ‘Sultan of Perak.’

The rakyat was the subject of a Ruler not a State. The kerajaan

was conceptualized in terms of the personal relationship between

Ruler and rakyat – not Ruler and a specific race – and foreigners

were often surprised by how uninterested Rulers seemed in the





of one status or another might be housed or clothed. Wealth was

conceived as flowing from the Ruler, as a product of patronage.

Wealth was not seen as an end in itself, but one way of accumulating

subjects. In this ‘kerajaan economics,’ the accumulation of

independent, private wealth was perceived by the royal court as a

political threat, and was necessarily discouraged among the Ruler’s

rakyat. It is thus not surprising to find that sultans were often

described by foreigners as the great traders in their polities, or that

foreigners sometimes complained about the ‘plundering’ of would-

be rich subjects by the ‘Raja’s men.’ They did not understand thatthe aligning of status and material wealth in the kerajaan was a

duty of the Ruler (Milner 2003[a]).

When we think about the kingdom or kerajaan of 1800 in

these terms, it seems to me that it is just not tenable to assert, as

Kobkua does, that ‘the foundation of traditional Ruler-subjects

relations’ was maintained during the colonial period; or to stress,

as Roger Kershaw has done, “the importance of continuity of the

monarchy itself” (2001: 18; see also Roff 1994: 256; Muhammad

Kamil 1998: 314). Elements survived – as I will suggest; but the

ancien regime came under sustained attack, and the royal courts

themselves undertook far-reaching, ideological renovation. I havewritten in the past about this transformation of Malaysian monarchy

(Milner 2003) – and about the importance of acknowledging the

occurrence of epistemic rupture in Malaysian and other history

(2002) – but should emphasise here that the British brought to the

Malay Peninsula powerful new concepts of state, government, race,

progress, time and so forth. They endorsed a new, colonial

knowledge – and this knowledge project has attracted much

scholarly interest (e.g. Shamsul 1998; Milner 2002). Within a few

decades the royal courts were employing the new thinking to

remodel the sultanate. In Johor and Perak, for instance, they began

to constitute ‘the state’ as a specific territorial entity. Surveying or mapping of territory was important in this – and described as a

novel enterprise in court-related writings of the time. In Johor a

state constitution was created (in 1895), and an interesting aspects

of this text is the way it translates ‘constitution’ as ‘undang-undang

tuboh kerajaan.’ The word tuboh conveys ‘body, in the anatomical

sense.’ The constitution seems therefore to be conceptualized as





giving ‘body’ to the kerajaan, and presumably the ‘State of Johor.’

In this way it becomes possible to think of ‘the state’ as an entity

independent of the Ruler – a truly revolutionary transition, at least

from the perspective of the old kerajaan ideology (Milner 2002:

215-216).

In such a ‘state’ the Ruler could no longer be the linchpin,

the centre around which all else is articulated. The ceremonies

that define the Ruler-subject relation also had to lose some of their

urgency. In certain ways ceremonies were actually elaborated

during the colonial period (partly under the influence of Britishroyal practice) (Gullick 1987: 33, 347; Gullick 1992: 236), but

they could not have the meaning they once possessed. One Malay

author in 1925 noted that “nowadays the royal ceremonial and

sumptuary regulations are fading” (cited in Milner 2003: 183).

The Ruler’s ‘work’ was to move into new areas: he began to be

praised in new ways, judged for the contribution he made to his

‘State.’ In texts from early 20th century Johor and Perak, Rulers

were now complimented for introducing ‘modern’ institutions, for

“modernizing education,” for “improving the lives” of their

subjects, for caring for the different races in their State, and for

helping to unite the Malay race. They were praised for being“careful and conscientious” in their administration. Such key terms

or expressions as ‘government,’ ‘modernity,’ and ‘administrative

diligence and energy’ – and soon ‘development’ and ‘progress’ –

begin to contribute to a new royal discourse, and to challenge the

dominance of a language concerned largely about ceremonial,

custom, language, manners and status (Milner 2003; Milner 2002:

chapters 8 and 9).

As represented in the new royal court writings, the Rulers of

the late 19th and early 20th century were impressive administrators

– and often subtle diplomats. They were reformers, claiming

leadership of their State community (with its component races) ina time of challenge – a time when the Rulers had to deal with

British administrative and ideological demands, new religious

thinking from the Middle East, and increasing immigration

numbers. There is a suggestion here of a performance-based

monarchy – some royal texts could now be read almost as election

manifestos. These new Rulers, the product of a fresh epistemic





era, may not have had the same pivotal, ideological role in their

subjects’ lives and mentality as their kerajaan predecessors

possessed. But in considering Kobkua’s claim that there is currently

in Malaysia an attempt to “revive the monarch’s role” – giving

Rulers “active participation in the affairs of the nation” (xxiii) –

the story of the reconstruction of Malayan monarchy during the

colonial period is vital. To a large extent the new ‘participating

constitutional monarchs,’ whom Kobkua describes as gaining

support today, are the heirs not of the ‘traditional’ rajas or sultans

of 1800, but of the colonial period, new Rulers.It is for this reason that we should be wary of using the word

‘traditional’ in reference to Malaysian monarchs today (Muhammad

Kamil 1998: 314), or of placing too much stress on the ‘continuity’

of the institution. During the colonial period, the Rulers could not

be said to have maintained their position “at the very centre of all

aspects of life in the state” (Kobkua 2011: 85-86). Their centrality

at the end of that time was by no means the centrality they held in

1800. What we can ask, however, is whether there ways in which

that old kerajaan ideology continues to shape modern Malaysia?

Does it assist us to understand the ‘sovereignty, prerogatives,

powers and jurisd iction of the Rulers’ which the FederalConstitution promises to respect? Does it throw light on the

informal power or influence which Rulers are reported as exercising

in matters of state? Such questions bring us back to an issue raised

in my first Pok Rafeah lecture – whether we should now accept

that ‘colonial knowledge’ is the real ‘baseline knowledge’ for

modern Malaysia (Shamsul 1998: 49), or are some concepts from

the pre-colonial era still potent? The historian, Muhammad Yusoff

Hashim, has suggested that the “element of spirituality” in royal

sovereignty today only exists “as a belief amongst a small section”

of the community (1991: 281). Few are likely to fear the

supernatural wrath of the Ruler’s daulat . But when Tunku AbdulRahman wrote of the ‘semblance of belonging’ which the Rulers

continue to give their people, then we do get a sense of the 1800

Ruler as linchpin, holding a defining role in his community. We

do so again, when the Raja Muda of Perak refers today to the

unifying role of monarchy, and its capacity to provide a sense of

historical identity and continuity (Smith 2006: 134; Kobkua 2011:





384). I shall return to the issue of precisely how unifying that

monarchical role can be.

Before probing further the matters of unity and identity,

however, it should be noted that the influence today of the old

kerajaan ideology is not necessarily restricted to the possible

shaping of current conceptualizations of monarchy. What

sometimes is termed feudal thinking has been seen to influence

attitudes to political authority in general. Syed Hussain Alatas

(1972), Chandra Muzaffar (1979), Shaharuddin Maaruf (1984) and

Clive Kessler (1992) – all pioneers in this line of investigation – have examined the impact of royal ‘tradition’ in shaping attitudes

toward loyalty, ‘followership,’ heroism and ceremony. In my own

work, I have been interested in the influence of old kerajaan ideas

on current Malay approaches to entrepreneurialism, so-called

money politics, top-down political leadership, the concept of the

‘plural society,’ and the manner in which the bangsa Melayu has

been propagated as a focus of identity and loyalty (Milner 2011:

chapters 7 and 8; Milner 2003a; see also Johnson and Milner 2005).

The continuing importance of reputation (nama, and related terms)

in Malay thinking seems also to warrant closer attention (Karim

1992: 7).In the case of modern monarchy itself, the old kerajaan

influence is to be encountered naturally in the continued

prominence of royal titles and royal ceremonies in Malaysia – by

most international standards, this country really is marked by its

elaborate monarchialism – but perhaps most of all, I would suggest,

in the depicting of Rulers as a focus of identity and community.

Former Lord President Salleh Abas calls the King, the Yang di-

Pertuan Agong, “a symbol of unity” (1986: 4). The Ruler of Pahang

has been described as a “symbol of the unity of the people” of his

State (Shariff Ahmad 1983: xvii, 32). ‘Symbol’ (simbol) is a

relatively new word, and its use here is a reminder of how far removed we are today from the kerajaan of 1800. The kerajaan

Ruler of that time was not conceived a ‘symbol’ – his claim was to

be the real basis of unity, the actual centre around which all else

was articulated. But the claim to symbolic unity is still a strong

one, and the question I wish to turn to now is how comprehensive

is this unity which the Ruler is expected to promote. It can be





Aceh; and the Rulers of Pontianak and Perlis possess Arab origins.

Even in the clothing they wore, rulers displayed a flexibility

regarding ethnic identification. In the early nineteenth century,

Johor ruler Husain dressed his sons in “Tamil fashion, wearing

wide trousers and Indian gowns” (Abdullah 2009: 275); and Sultan

Abdul Hamid of Kedah (1882-1943) “almost invariably wore

western-style suites in preference to Malay dress,” though on

ceremonial occasions he tended to dress in a Siamese-style uniform

(Sheppard 2007: 4; 8-9). With respect to high officials in the

kerajaan, at the opening of the seventeenth century the DutchAdmiral Matelieff reported that a Peguan (from present-day

Burma) was one of “the highest councilors” to the Ruler of Kedah

(Commelin 1969: 46). An eighteenth-century Kedah ruler had as

his “King’s merchant,” a “deep cunning villainous Chuliah,” who

was given the title “Datoo Sri Raja” (Steuart 1901: 15, 18). In

mid-nineteenth century Kedah the ruler gave a noble title to a Hakka

leader, who was “accorded a high place on State Functions”

(Gullick 1992: 372-373); later in the century Kedah’s Sultan Abdul

Hamid appointed a “well-known and much-respected Chinese

businessman” as “State Treasurer,” with a “royal office … sited in

an extension to the palace” (Sheppard 2007: 4-5). In Pahang aboutthe same time, a “Tamil Indian” was the “treasurer and tax

collector” (Gullick 1965: 52), and earlier in the nineteenth-century,

Johor Sultan Husain had an influential Indian advisor called Abdul

Kadir bin Ahmad Sahib, who was given the title ‘Tengku Muda’ –

and sometimes dressed in the Tamil manner, and sometimes in

Malay attire (Abdullah 209: 275).

As to the subjects of the rulers, they tended to be described

just as rakyat rather than as members of races or ethnic groups.

The self-classification ‘Malay’ – used to refer to a trans-sultanate

racial unity – is a relatively modern innovation in Island Southeast

Asia. Its growing use was particularly influenced by the propagationof European thinking about ‘race’ from the end of the 18th century

Milner 2011: chapters 4 and 5). The term ‘Malay,’ of course, had

long been associated with the Melaka polity, and the sultanates

connected with Melaka, but the idea of a specific ‘Malay race’ – a

race with which one identifies, and to which one owes loyalty –

was something that emerged primarily in the colonial period. The





subjects of the pre-colonial Ruler would in some situations identify

with a geographic location, usually a river – calling themselves,

for instance, ‘orang Kemaman’ or ‘orang Muar ;’ but the larger

community with which they identified was not a race but a specific

kerajaan. It was possible to live outside the kerajaan; and I have

suggested elsewhere that the formation of communities from China

in particular – communities that lived separately from the Ruler’s

subjects, and did not operate by kerajaan rules in their social and

economic lives – are in a sense a precursor of the ‘plural society’

configuration that was consolidated in colonial Malaya (Milner 2003a). Nevertheless, the kerajaan itself does not appear to have

been conceptualized in specifically racial or ethnic terms.

Even in the British period many subjects of rulers on the

Peninsula continued to call themselves ‘Minangkabau’, ‘Bugis’,

‘Baweyan’ or ‘Javanese’. Apart from ‘Orang Asli’ and others,

‘Chinese’ might also be subjects of a ruler. We continue to see this

in the colonial period, when people of many backgrounds were

either British subjects (if born in Melaka or Penang) or “a subject

of a Ruler” (Mohamed Suffian 1972: 207; Emerson 1964: 509).

They continued to be considered subjects of rulers right up to the

period of nation-state building following the Second World War (Ratnam 1965: 72). In a 1931, legal case involving a Chinese man

(Ho Chick Kwan), whom the British wanted the Sultan of Selangor

to banish, Ho was described as a “natural born subject of the Ruler

of the State of Negri Sembilan,” and his adopted mother (Lui Ho)

described herself as owing “true allegiance to His Highness the

Sultan of Selangor” (Ho Chick Kwan v The Hon’ble British

Resident Selangor, criminal appeal no. 11 of 1931).

British racializing of the Sultanates was evident even in the

early 19th century, when the official British presence was limited

to Penang. Thomas Stamford Raffles and John Leiden – at that

time planning Britain’s future role in the Archipelago – conceptualized the different Sultanates as members of “a general

Malay league” that might be placed “under the protection” of a

British governor (Raffles 1991: 25). When British intervened

administratively in the Peninsular Sultanates, commencing with

Perak in 1874, they identified a special Malay responsibility for

the Rulers. The new British advisers – or ‘Residents’ – were to be





powerful, but the areas of “Malay Religion and Custom” were to

be left to the Rulers (Gullick 1992: 2). British officials also

cooperated with the Sultans in the formulation of policies

specifically designed to benefit ‘The Malay Race in the FMS,’ to

quote the title of a memo written in 1906 (Burns 1971: 5).

Pronouncements from the royal courts themselves in the

colonial period, it should be noted, continued to stress the

responsibility of the Ruler toward all his subjects. An early 20 th

century Johor text – the Hikayat Johor – lauds Johor’s Sultan Abu

Bakar (1885-1895) for “looking after the Chinese subjects livingin the state.” There is also mention of Chinese and Indians

welcoming him home from an overseas journey (Milner 2002: 214).

In a later Perak coronation document, again we see a Ruler reaching

out to non-Malays, stressing in a speech that he had “not forgotten

the help” that “other races in the state” had given “in making Perak

wealthy and prosperous.” At the coronation itself, not only Malays

but also Chinese, Ceylonese, Indians and Japanese made formal

declarations of loyalty to the new Ruler. Sultan Abdul Aziz, so the

text stresses, “does not distinguish between his subjects” (Milner

2002: 243-244).

In a valuable, somewhat left-wing account of British Malayaon the eve of the Japanese invasion, the activist Ibrahim Yaacob

referred to a Kelantan Ruler bestowing a prestigious title on a

Chinese merchant and observed that the Johor state council building

looked like a Chinese audience hall because it was decorated with

Chinese writing. When Ibrahim Yaacob asked what the writing

was about, he was told that it recorded the personal service of

wealthy Chinese people to the Ruler (Milner 2002: 261). Ibrahim

was sympathetic neither to Rulers nor to the influx of Chinese and

Indians, whom he saw as pressuring ‘the Malays’ in economic and

other areas (263). He would have known that Rulers could form

alliances with these groups. John Gullick, in his detailed historicalresearch on the Rulers in the colonial period, has described how

business activities with both Chinese and Europeans tended to draw

Rulers into the “non-Malay, official and business world, which

was beginning, by the 1920s if not before, to dominate Malaya”

(1992: 213-214; 131 n. 125). Apart from provoking Ibrahim Yaacob,

this personal experience would have reinforced a Ruler’s sincerity





in thanking these ‘races’ for the help they gave to making his State

‘wealthy and prosperous.’

Despite such royal affirmations of inclusiveness, however,

the royal courts were also positioning themselves with respect to

the ‘Malay’ movement. The Hikayat Johor , mentioned above,

stresses the Sultan’s special concern for his “subjects of the Malay

race” (Milner 2003: 179); the later Perak text indicates the Perak

Ruler’s concern about “uniting our race (bangsa),” and about the

Malays being “left behind” by other races in the development of

the Perak state (Milner 2002: 242-243). There is a claim toleadership being conveyed in such statements, and it should be

understood in the context of a general royal wariness. The Rulers

appear to have understood well that those promoting the bangsa

Melayu were advocating a focus of identity and loyalty that could

compete with monarchy; race also carries an implicit egalitarianism

that has the potential to rival the essential hierarchy of monarchy.

It is certainly the case that some prominent advocates of race –

proponents of the ‘bangsa Melayu’ – right back to Abdullah bin

Abdul Kadir in the early 19 th century, were determined critics of

specific Rulers and even of the institution of monarchy (Milner

2002: 15; Ibrahim Yaacob 1941: 6, 58).Ibrahim Yaacob’s pre-War survey of British Malaya refers to

royal opposition to the ‘Malay’ movement. Some royal courts held

“firmly to the old feeling and strongly oppose the new desire to

unify the Malay people.” In Kedah, members of the ruling elite

had opposed the formation of a Malay association on the ground

that Kedah “possesses a raja;” in Perak royal opposition initially

discouraged the use of the term ‘Malay’ in the name of an

association intended to promote unity (Milner 2002: 269-270). In

Selangor, there was certainly a ‘Selangor Malay Association,’ but

it was led by a member of royalty and was utterly deferential toward

the ruler (Smith 2006: 128). Looking to sultanates beyond thePeninsula, D.E.Brown’s study of Brunei notes that Sultanate’s

suspicion of “ethnic distinctions,” and the insistence that “all

indigenous groups enjoyed the common status of subject of the

Sultan” (Brown 1970: 4, 9). In mid-20th-century East Sumatra, it

was reported that the kerajaan leadership (in such sultanates as

Deli, Langkat and Asahan) “never cared for the suku Melayu” (the





Malay ethnic group), fearing competition from potentially-

influential ‘Malay’ associations (Ariffin Omar 1993: 78).

How best then to handle the growing Malay movement?

Discourage it, or position oneself in a leadership role? These were

questions Rulers faced. It was in the immediate post-war years, in

the struggle against the Malayan Union, that they were pressed

most strongly to identify with the Malay movement. At that time

more than ever before, it can be argued, monarchy was racialized.

The Japanese Occupation had sharpened further the tension

between ‘Malays’ and ‘Chinese’ in particular, and the movementagainst the Malayan Union was perceived to be fundamentally

‘Malay.’ The Rulers, as suggested already, were far from passive

in the struggle against the British, and ‘Daulat Tuanku’ (‘Power to

the Ruler’) continued to be a rallying cry (Stockwell 1979: 71).

But Cheah Boon Kheng (1988) and Ariffin Omar (1993) have

demonstrated how strongly ‘Malayism’ began to compete with

monarchy in the process of the Malayan Union debate, and how

popular the declaration ‘ Hidup Melayu’ (‘Long Live the Malays’)

became. While some Sultans continued to take the ‘Malay’

movement head on – we have noted the determination of the Kedah

Ruler to “eradicate(e) UMNO influence” from his State – the Sultanof Pahang spoke of ‘we Malays’ and the Sultan of Perak declared

that he spoke “as a Malay not as a Sultan” (Ariffin 1993: 104).

In the period leading up to Independence, at the time the

Rulers were determined to help shape the constitution for the new

nation, they also took pains to advocate a range of Malay causes.

They spoke up on such topics as Asian immigration, Malay land

reserves, and the protection of Malay economic interests (Kobkua

2011: 149-150, 152). In 1951, during the Malayan Emergency –

when the British were concerned to improve the living conditions

for Chinese who might potentially join the terrorists – the Rulers

warned that “it is very essential to reassure the Malays that theyare not being neglected and forgotten” (Smith 1995: 111, 113, 116).

In these and other ways the Rulers presented themselves (in

Kobkua’s words) as “credible and respectable champions and

guardians of the Malays” (183).

The 1957 Federal Constitution itself conveys the impression

of allocating the Rulers a specific Malay role. In Article 153 (1),





the King is given the responsibility “to safeguard the special

position” of the Malay (and “natives” of Sabah and Sarawak), and

also “the legitimate interests of other communities….” This might

appear ethnically even-handed, but public focus has tended to be

placed on the Malay dimension – probably because the establishing

of the Malay ‘special privileges’ is often considered “the most

unusual feature of the Malaysian Constitution” (Harding 2007:

120). The amendments to the Constitution in 1971 (which I have

already discussed from another angle) reinforced the impression

of a privileged Ruler-Malay community linkage, in that any changeto the Malay special position requires the consent of the Conference

of Rulers, as well as a two-third’s parliamentary majority. The

stress on Malay interests rather than the interests of ‘other

communities’ in discussing this royal power (see, for example,

Malaysian Mirror , 21 October 2010) is not helpful to the promotion

of royal inclusiveness. Nor is the fact that press statements on this

issue, issued by the ‘Conference of Rulers,’ tend to refer to the

Rulers only as ‘Malay Rulers’ (Kobkua 2011: 424-426).

The racializing – the ‘Malayizing’ – of the Rulers can be

seen in many other areas in the post-War public discourse of

Malaysia. It takes place when Rulers are described as the ‘symbol’or ‘cement’ assisting to hold the Malay race or racial feeling

together (Ariffin 1993: 53, 102; ); or (in the 1980s) when the senior

Malaysian legal official, Tun Haji Mohd. Salleh bin Abas, writes

of “Malay rulership” as “the nub of Malay custom” (1986: 13).

The racializing is happening again in current school history texts,

which describe all the old Peninsular sultanates as ‘kerajaan

Melayu’ – despite the fact that none of the early royal court writings

use the phrase, and in these writings the term ‘ Melayu’ would

appear to be linked essentially to Melaka and sultanates closely

linked with the Melaka ruling family (Ahmad Fawzi 2010: 123,

129; “Malay Concordance Project” http://mcp.anu.edu.au/).We also see the Malayizing of the Ruler in royal statements.

When the Sultan of Perak spoke ‘as a Malay not as a Sultan,’ he

said too that “we are Malays and must not lose our customs and

religious practices, which are our prized possessions” (Ariffin 1993:

104). Customs and religion – which in the past, as I have noted,

were presented as being ‘in the hands of’ the ruler’ (Milner 2002:





101) – would now appear to have been recognized by the Ruler

himself as being grounded in the ‘Malay race.’ The point is made

with even more clarity in a coronation document of 1971 from the

royal court of Pahang. Here the Pahang monarchy’s customs and

ceremonial – which once would have been of vital importance

merely because they were royal customs and ceremonial – are now

presented as significant because they are a “branch of Malay

culture” and a reflection of the “national characteristics of the

Malay people (bangsa Melayu)” (Anon 1971; see also Milner

2003b: 188-189).

Trans-Racial Residue

Although the Rulers are referred to frequently as ‘Malay Rulers’ –

even, as I have said, in pronouncements from the ‘Conference of

Rulers’ – it must also be said that the residue of an earlier trans-

racial substance has survived. Looking back half a century, we see

this residue when the Rulers favoured a multilingual system of

school education, and not just the learning of Malay and English

(Kobkua 2011: 216); or when Chinese people recall that in May1969 – at a time of acute inter-racial crisis – the Sultan of

Terengganu and other Rulers took steps to protect their non-Malay

subjects. We see it in a different sphere when new Malay

‘commoner’ entrepreneurs express resentment at having to compete

in business with Rulers who act through Chinese intermediaries

(Kobkua 2011: 364). There is an important political gesture toward

the trans-racial again in a special press statement from the

Conference of Rulers in October 2008. Here the Rulers explain

that the “institution of the Rulers” is a “protective umbrella ensuring

impartiality among the citizens.” The statement explains the Rulers’

“constitutional role” respecting the so-called “Social Contract” between Malays and non-Malays, and assures “non-Malays” that

there is no need to “harbour any apprehension or worry over their

genuine rights…” (Kobkua 2011: 425-426).

To be even-handed in politics or business is important in

reaching beyond the Malaysian race divide, but perhaps even more

important is evidence that the institution of monarchy itself can





still be racially-blind. The fact that the Federal Constitution itself

uses the term ‘Rulers’ not ‘Malay Rulers’ (though the present-day

Constitutions of the different States require Rulers to be ‘Malay’)

(Legal Research 1998) ought to be reason for optimism. It is also

a positive sign when a Sultan is described by his supporters – in

the case of Pahang – as a “symbol of the unity of the people

(rakyat )” (and not just the Malay race, or bangsa) (Shariff Ahmad

1983: xvii, 32); or, in the case of Kelantan, as the “umbrella

sheltering” the people (rakyat) (Mohd. Zain Saleh 1987: 14; also,

in Perak, Nazrin Shah 2011). The term rakyat – used again by theSultan of Selangor when he speaks of his State’s “citizens,

regardless of ethnic background and faith” ( New Straits Times, 7

Jan 2011) – may convey to some a memory of ‘feudal’ times, but it

is without doubt racially inclusive. It denotes now – as it did 200

years ago – a community bonded together through ‘subjecthood.’

Here we might return to the matter of ceremony. In pre-

colonial times, as we have seen, ceremony – titles, sumptuary laws,

elaborate and lengthy public ceremonies – was vital in defining

the kerajaan hierarchy, giving each person a place. Today, policing

by the immigration and citizenship administration of the nation

state is the first concern. Nevertheless, the Malaysian community – as I have noted – continues to be characterized by formalized

hierarchy and public ritual. Nine Rulers, an elaborate structure of

Tun, Tan Sri, Dato’ Sri and Dato’, and vast numbers of lower awards

and medals – such an array of titles and distinctions, combined

with an immensely busy calendar of public occasions and

celebrations at Federal and State level, all convey this striking

‘monarchialism.’ And just as the word ‘rakyat ’ conveys both

hierarchy and inclusiveness, so the royal ceremony has a capacity

to bond. The birthday celebrations for the different Rulers are

perhaps the time when the continued trans-racial character of

monarchy is most evident. Thus, at the Sultan of Perak’sCelebration in April 2011 the recipients of the high honours

included a leading businessman whose father was Goanese and a

wide range of Chinese and Indian people – from academia, the

media and the arts, as well as the business community (Chandra

Sagaran, “Sultan heads Perak honours list,” New Straits Times, 19

April 2011).





I am speaking here of course of the ‘bonding of the nation:’

an issue that has been of central concern in a research project under

way at IKMAS this year. In taking note of the great tenacity of the

race-based societal paradigm in Malaysia, we have examined a

series of attempts to introduce alternative social concepts that might

transcend race. These attempts typically turn out to become

entangled in racial or communal thinking. In considering the

historical heritage of ideas in this country, in fact, the old kerajaan

turns out to be one of the few societal paradigms that have a claim

to the attention of those hoping to build a more inclusive Malaysia.In the last century, as I have discussed, monarchy has become

embroiled in race issues, but it also contains an ideological residue

– if we can disassemble ideology in that way – that is racially

inclusive or, perhaps more accurately, racially blind.

Conclusion

In this lecture, I have examined monarchy, first, in terms of the

power rulers have wielded over time. I noted here that in post-

Independence Malaysia the ‘proactive and participatingconstitutional’ (of whom Kokbua writes) are not a recent

development; they have been more or less the norm. Whether or

not this conforms to the principles of Westminster democracy, such

a monarchical role seems to be an established part of the system in

this country. Secondly, I have suggested that in ideological terms

modern monarchy is a fundamentally different institution from

the kerajaan polity of some 200 years ago. The heirs of the modern

‘participating constitutional rulers,’ I argue, are really the

performance-based administrator royals of the colonial period,

rather than the pre-colonial, ‘traditional’ Sultans.

When we reach back to pre-colonial times to consider the possible current relevance of the historical heritage, we see that

the importance of the kerajaan ruler did not rest on the wielding

of administrative power. In this sense, one might reflect, historical

origins provide no particular justification for authoritarianism.

Nevertheless, the identity-giving function of the pre-colonial ruler

– as the linchpin of his community in the most profound sense –





does reinforce monarchy’s claim to present-day relevance. When

we think in socio-cultural terms, the great continuing theme of

monarchy in this country – reaching back to the earliest Malay-

language records – is its capacity to provide what one prominent

royal spokesman has referred to as “social glue” (Nazrin Shah

2004: 6).

In the final section of this lecture I have asked whether there

is historical support for believing that this unifying role of kingship

can transcend ethnic division. Here my analysis has diverged

somewhat from the views of others. I argue that Malaysia’smonarchy is not in historical terms a narrowly ‘Malay’ institution.

The stress on its Malayness is really a product of the colonial period

and the decolonization process. The kerajaan of pre-colonial times

was not racially defined in this way, and it could therefore provide

a solid foundation for giving monarchy today an even stronger

role in the bonding of the nation. Given the current importance of

identifying ideological substance that might support a 1Malaysia

vision, this is no mean claim.

AcknowledgmentI am grateful for advice from the following (though I have not

always taken their advice): Abdul Rahman Embong, Peter

Borschberg, Michael Coper, Philip Koh, Lee Kam Hing, Lee Poh

Ping, Claire Milner, Abdul Halim Ali, Mohd. Annuar Zaini, Ng

Tze Shiung and Helen Ting.




4




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Anthony Milner

Anthony Milner is the 4th holder of the Distinguished Pok Rafeah

Chair in International Studies at the Institute of Malaysian and

International Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

He is Basham Professor of Asian History at the Australian NationalUniversity, and a Professorial Fellow at the University of

Melbourne. He is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences

in Australia. His books on Southeast Asia include The Malays

(Wiley-Blackwell, 2008, revised, paperback edition, 2011; Czech

translation, 2010), The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya

(Cambridge University Press, 1995, revised, paperback edition,

2002), Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial

Rule (The Association for Asian Studies, 1982; Thai translation,

2008), and (co-ed) Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries

(1986). His other publications include co-editing Australia in Asia

(3 volumes, Oxford University Press, 1996-2001) and Reviewingthe Orient; Artists, Scholars, Appropriations (Harwood Press,

1994).

Professor Milner has held visiting appointments at The

Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National University

of Singapore (as Raffles Visiting Professor of History), Tokyo

University of Foreign Studies and Humboldt University. He is

International Director and Board Member at Asialink, University

of Melbourne, and Co-Chair of the Australian Committee of the

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. He is a

member of the Advisory Council of the Australian Government’s

Australia-Malaysia Institute and has held previous governmentappointments on the Foreign Affairs Council and the Australia-

Thailand Institute, and as a Panel Member for the Australian

Research Council.

Professor Milner’s academic roles have included Dean of

Asian Studies at the Australian National University (1996-2005),

Member of the University Council (2000-2002), and Director of


Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation

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