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04/09/2012
1
© 2012 The Actuarial Profession www.actuaries.org.uk
GIRO Conference and Exhibition 2012 Juggling uncertainty the actuary’s part to play
GIRO Conference and Exhibition 2012
Cyclophilia: an analyst’s view of the pricing cycle
Chris Hitchings
Keefe, Bruyette & Woods Ltd
04/09/2012
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Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Investors do not like P&C insurance
• P&C insurers have not been a good long-term investment
• Underperformed by 45% over past 25 years
• Periods of out-performance have been short, often associated
with problems elsewhere.
2
45
55
65
75
85
95
105
115
125
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
European Non-life insurers rel. to the equity markets
Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Why? – one reason is a long-standing profit cycle
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US P&C industry 1920-2011
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Underwriting/EP
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Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Why? – features of the cycle
• A ‘business cycle’ like any other; but much worse
• Product issues:
– Competing products identical (and perceived to be)
– No substitutes; no utility to additional consumption
• Market issues:
– No capacity constraints – easy of entry/exit
– Capacity can be dependent on financial markets
• Industry issues:
– Margins are uncertain
– Easy for companies to delude themselves that they are profitable
– They discover they are not only after a delay
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Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Economics of the cycle - demand
• Supply/demand curves:
• Shows market clearing price determined by intersection
• Increased capacity represented by a shift in the supply curve
• Inelastic demand:
– No substitutes
– No utility to additional consumption
• Generates steeper demand curve
• A given change in supply gives a larger change in price 0
10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Market demand
Old
market
supply
New market supply
Market
clearing
prices
reduce
more
0
10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Market demand
Old
market
supply
New market supply
Market
clearing
prices
reduce
5
04/09/2012
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Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Economics of the cycle - supply
• Competing products identical
• No short-run supply constraint
• Individual competitors perceive a
‘kinked demand curve’
– If price raised, no-one follows so
demand collapses
– If price reduced, all follow so
market demand curve
– Causes extreme price instability
and tends to exacerbate cycle
• Even with some ‘brand loyalty’, still a
demand curve kink (lower chart)
0
5
10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Market demand Market supply
Indidual competitor demand curve (down-cycle) (up-cycle)
Market clearing price
0
5
10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Market demand Market supply
Indidual competitor demand curve
Market clearing price
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Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Margin uncertainty – US P&C reserve development by year of origin
7 © 2011 The Actuarial Profession www.actuaries.org.uk
Good years get better; bad ones get worse
-10
-5
0
5
10
20102009200820072006200520042003200220012000199919981997
Prf
t/los
s fr
om p
rior
yrs
%
Year of origin
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
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Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Margin uncertainty – the drivers of reported results
8 © 2011 The Actuarial Profession www.actuaries.org.uk
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11E
Reported U'writing/EP Reserve release/EP Price index (RH scale)
Prices fallbut margins rise
because reserves
released
Prices risebut margins lag
because reserves
need bolstering
??
Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Uncertainty of margin – Why?
• Insurers do not just cut prices in
order to grow
• They target growth in segments
believed as exceptionally profitable
• The target involves tweaks to
cover/criteria to broaden appeal
• Other insurers are pursuing similar
but not identical strategies
• Buyers will go with cheapest quote
• The enlarged sample may have
different characteristics from the
pricing basis
• Insurer A specialises in motor for
over 60s:
– Discovers clients with sports
cars profitable so trims rates
• Insurer B specialises in sports cars:
– Discovers clients in rural areas
very profitable so trims rates
• Insurer A succeeds but client base
is more city oriented so has more
theft/vandalism claims
• Insurer B succeeds but client base
is younger than he assumed
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Theory Practice
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Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
And market prices, thus, fall faster than renewal price indices suggest …
10
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ZFS US Commcl CIAB US Commercl
Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
How to recognise a turn in the cycle (1)
• It is not what they say but what
they do!
• Actual price rises suggest insurers
would prefer to lose all market
share rather than keep writing (the
kink in the demand curve)
• Suggests panic as prior year
problems emerge
• Initial estimates of reserve
problem too optimistic since hard
to believe technical pricing could
have got it so wrong
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-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul
Market ScoutAverage rate change - US commercial
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Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
How to recognise a turn in the cycle (2 - actuarial)
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38
40
42
44
46
48
50
20112009200720052003200119991997
Y1 paid/ initial incurred
Y1 paid/ latest incurred
high paid/incurred
suggests optimistic
initial reserving
low paid/incurred suggests
cautious initial reserving
?
Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
External estimates are negative
13
($0.7)($0.9)
($0.3)
$0.8
$2.1
$1.8
$2.3
$0.1
($3.1)($3.3)
($4.0)
($3.0)
($2.0)
($1.0)
$0.0
$1.0
$2.0
$3.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
KBW Estimated Accident Year Redundancy (Deficiency) at Year-End 2009
04/09/2012
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Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Can the cycle be ameliorated?
• Tendency of P&C industry to ruin
itself every 7-9 years was
unpopular with companies
• Cartels were popular up until 1970s
• UK market was very stable until its
cartels (tariffs) disappeared in 1969
(motor) and mid-80s (fire)
• Since then, highly cyclical
• Governments sometimes regulated
prices (Germany, US)
• Regulation in US peculiar since its
aim was to keep prices low
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90%
95%
100%
105%
110%
115%
120%
125%
130%
19
61
19
64
19
67
19
70
19
73
19
76
19
79
19
82
19
85
19
88
19
91
19
94
19
97
20
00
20
03
20
06
Motor tariff collapses Fire tariffs abolished
Very bad winter
Mortgage indemnity
UK market COR 1961-2007
Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
How to maximise returns
• P&C is an industry where the good years are good and the bad years are
bad.
• The trick of P&C insurance is to grow in pricing upturns and shrink in
downturns.
15
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Average 22 good years
Average 20 bad years
Average equal weighted
50% 100% 150%
Average return on earned premiums for US P&C industry 1970-2011
Average if volumes in good years increased by:
04/09/2012
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Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Lloyd’s insurers manage it
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KBW Lloyd’s universe premium growth and US cycle
-18
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
Lloyd's premium growth US U/w result (RH scale)
Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
And significantly outperform the industry
• Long-term track record of the best
Lloyd’s businesses is better than
anything else in the P&C market
• Second chart shows record of
mainstream insurers (green),
Bermudans (pale blue) and Lloyd’s
(orange)
• Bermudans make better returns in
good years but worse returns in
bad years
• Lloyd’s makes good return in good
years; average in bad
17
80%
90%
100%
110%
Am
lin
Catl
in
His
co
x
Beazle
y
* P
art
ner
Re A
IG
Han
no
ver
RS
A
Ev
ere
st R
e
ZF
S
Sw
iss R
e
Mu
nic
h R
e
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
130%
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Avge Amlin, Catlin, Hiscox Avge AIG, RSA, ZFS, Munich Re
Avge Everest, Partner
Average combined ratio 1994-2011
04/09/2012
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Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
The few Lloyd’s businesses which do try to grow in cyclical downturns pay the penalty
18
Amlin
Beazley
BRIT
Catlin
Chaucer
Hardy
Hiscox
Kiln
Novae
Omega
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
-60 -30 0 30 60 90 120
CO
R o
/perf
orm
1998-2
002
Growth 1993-98
Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
But only because specialty and primary insurance market works that way
• Primary insurers like high volumes and low risk
– This can be priced statistically and underwritten mechanically
• Specialty insurers write higher risks, lower volumes
– This requires technical pricing and individual underwriting
• In a cyclical downturn, primary insurers grow by raising their risk appetite
• In a cyclical upturn, they retreat to their ‘core business’
19
Speciality
insurers
Ris
k
Primary
insurers
Volume
04/09/2012
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Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Prognosis for this cycle: Reinsurers have behaved more rationally?
20
Reinsurance US Primary
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
US PropCat Non-US Cat US Casualty
Katrina
NZ/Japan
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
... collapse of Lehman
... low interest rates
... RMS11
Prices will rise ... post Katrina
Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
They have not been rewarded by it … but perhaps that is why …
• This may reflect that Reinsurers did vary badly in the previous
cycle trough
• They are thus more lowly valued
• They are thus under less pressure to grow
21
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Euro P&C US P&C Lloyd's Euro Reins Berm Reins
Current average price/BV
04/09/2012
12
Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Could modern technology solve the cycle?
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1
10
100
1000
10000
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
US Total Margin % Computer Speed MHz (RH scale)
If so, we might have expected it to have done so already …
Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Questions or comments?
Expressions of individual views by
members of The Actuarial Profession
and its staff are encouraged.
The views expressed in this presentation
are those of the presenter.
23 © 2011 The Actuarial Profession www.actuaries.org.uk
04/09/2012
13
Please refer to important disclosures and analyst
certification information on pages 24-25
Important Disclosures
24
RESEARCH ANALYST CERTIFICATION: I, Chris Hitchings, hereby certify that the views expressed in this document accurately reflect my personal views about the subject companies and their securities. I
also certify that I have not been, and will not be receiving direct or indirect compensation in exchange for expressing the specific recommendation in this document.
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certification information on pages 24-25
Important Disclosures, continued...
25
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