Maimonides' Letter on Astrology

Maimonides' Letter on AstrologyAuthor(s): Ralph LernerSource: History of Religions, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Nov., 1968), pp. 143-158Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1061885 .

Accessed: 27/12/2013 15:16

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Historyof Religions.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 27 Dec 2013 15:16:26 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1061885?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


Ralph Lerner MAI M O N I D E S' LETTER ON ASTROLOGY

Maimonides' letter on astrology (also known as the letter to Marseilles or the letter to Provence) draws attention to itself because of the variety and importance of the themes it treats. The master of concise and precise speech was able to convey something of his teaching on the sources and criteria of belief, judicial astrology, astronomy, the areas of agreement and conflict between philosophy and the revealed Law, and the Messiah-all within the confines of a letter of about two and a half thousand words.1 What is more, he was able to supply yet another remarkable instance of his theological-political understanding, an understanding that informed not only what he taught but how he taught.

Some features of the letter, though merely external, are nonetheless noteworthy. There appears to be but one other letter (as distinguished from legal responsum) addressed by Maimonides to a community-or at least no others have come down to us-and that other letter is addressed to the very community to which the letter on astrology was sent, the community of scholars at or in the vicinity of Lunel. Both letters begin with the verse: "Who is she that looketh forth as the dawn, fair as the moon, clear as the sun,

1 Alexander Marx (ed.), "The Correspondence between the Rabbis of Southern France and Maimonides about Astrology," Hebrew Union College Annual, III (1926), 311-58. The Hebrew text, with variant readings, appears on pp. 349-58; my references are to page and line numbers of this edition. My English translation of the letter appears in Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (eds.), Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 227-36.

143



Maimonides' Letter on Astrology

terrible as an army with banners ?" (Song of Songs 6:10). Whether this is a case of Maimonides' nodding2 or a deliberate repetition need not detain us here. In any event, the second letter to Lunel lets us know who-is the referent of "she" in the biblical verse: it is "the holy congregation,"3 a phrase that might be applied to Israel as a whole (cf. Num. 16: 3) or to the brotherhood of truly estimable scholars. The extent and quality of the Lunel rabbis' perplexity about astrology may well be typical of the holy congregation's perplexity about such matters. They need help in distinguishing genuine from spurious science. They even need help in recognizing that their multiple inquiries are reducible to one issue, the credi-

bility of the statements of the astrologers. It is to this problem that Maimonides turns, but with reluctance. In a sense his letter is

superfluous, for it deals with an issue on which he had already stated his position. The mere fact that the rabbis had raised the

questions that they had was evidence that "the compilation we have made of the statutes of the Torah, which we entitled Mishneh Torah, has not reached you." Maimonides' reply is perhaps a needless repetition, "for we have made this entire matter clear" in that work, copies of which had already reached Sicily and prob- ably would reach the Provengal rabbis before this letter did

(349:10-17). Moreover, Maimonides' letter is from his point of view not only redundant but coerced. "The deity knows that if Rabbi Pinhas4 had not sent a messenger who urged me till I was ashamed and did not leave my presence until I had written it, I would not be replying now since I have no leisure" (357: 21-358: 1). Despite these unpromising externals-neither addressees, themes, nor circumstances were such as to excite great new efforts- Maimonides proceeds to add to and to elucidate his earlier

teachings. The letter on astrology begins with a brief introduction in which

Maimonides praises his questioners for their avidity in pursuit of science, even while informing them that a special letter from him on this particular subject is redundant. The bulk of the letter, which follows, appears to fall into six parts of uneven length, each

opening with the words, "Know, my masters," or, "And know, my masters," and once simply, "Know." Of this total of seven parts, the last (354:23-358:2) is about as long as the first five parts

2 Marx (ed.), op. cit., p. 331, n. 36. 3 Abraham Lichtenberg (ed.), Qobes teshubot ha-Rambam we-iggerotaw (herein-

after cited as "Qobes") (Leipzig, [1859]), Part II, p. 44a. 4 Marx (ed.), op. cit., p. 327, n. 24, identifies this intermediary as a communal

judge of Alexandria and a native of Provence. 144



History of Religions

together (349:1-352:14); the central section, with its uniquely imperative beginning (352:15-354:22), deals with the crucial themes of creation and particular providence.

Having already informed his questioners that, although their inquiry's "boughs are many, they are all branches of a single tree, which is their common root: namely, all the statements of the astrologers, the stargazers" (349:10-11), Maimonides is obliged to supply the rabbis with some standards for weighing evidence. His argument begins at the beginning, with the question: What is trustworthy? There are but three bases for belief: (1) a man's reasoning, which provides him with a clear proof (as in arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy); (2) the evidence of the senses;5 and (3) a tradition received from the prophets or the righteous. At this point we cannot say that Maimonides ranks these sources of belief. In any event, his account here is not identical with other statements he had made on this theme. In his Logic, Maimonides distinguished four kinds of propositions or judgments, the truth of which requires no proof: (1) sense perceptions, (2) primary intelligibles, (3) conventions, and (4) traditions. Of these, only the first two are not subject to dispute among normal human beings. Precisely because conventions and traditions differ from one people to another, they cannot strictly be said to be rational. What the logicians call "apodictic" are things known through one of three ways: (1) by means of a healthy sense, (2) through primary intelligibles (e.g., that the whole is greater than the part) and secondary intelligibles (e.g., geometric theorems and astronomic calculations, whose demonstrations rest on premises most of which are close to being primary intelligibles), and (3) through experience.6 In replacing experience with tradition, Maimonides' letter

5 One "knows with certainty that this is red," one "tastes," "feels," "hears," and "smells" (350:4-6). Seeing is believing, we say, meaning thereby the especially close connection between sight and conviction, the greater (not absolute) reliability of that sense; "evidence" is primarily what is present to the eye. Consider Isaac's blessing of Jacob. According to Maimonides' restatement of Jewish law, one who is totally blind is ineligible to serve as a member of any court; moreover, only one who can see may give evidence in a court of law.-Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin, II. 9; 'Edut, IX. 12.

6 Israel Efros (ed. and trans.), Maimonides' Treatise on Logic (New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1938), chap. viii. Joseph Albo's discussion of the things whose truth needs no proof is parallel to, but not identical with, Maimonides' account. Albo has a four-part division: (1) primary intelligibles (corresponding to Maimonides' primary and secondary intelligibles), (2) sense perceptions, (3) experience, and (4) nimshakhot, a term carrying the sense of con- tinuing, repeated, generally known truths (e.g., that Rome, Jerusalem, and Babylon were great inhabited cities, though no longer so). Proofs based on primary intelligibles (as in geometry) and on the senses (as in physics) undoubtedly are true, for these are cases where the cause is known, identified, and understood. Proofs

145




invites the reader to consider the varieties of experience and especially the problem of the credibility of a tradition about an experience. The Guide of the Perplexed bears powerful but softly spoken testi- mony of Maimonides' misgivings. "There are many things in existence that are clear and manifest: primary intelligibles and things perceived by the senses and, in addition, the things that come near to these in respect to their clarity."7 Beyond this realm we are subject to doubts and uncertainties; within this realm we may fall victim to fantastic notions arising out of ignorance or wishful thinking. The discussion of the giving of the Ten Commandments at Mount Sinai avoids any discussion of a specifically religious experience. The first two commandments were heard by the Children of Israel just as they were heard by Moses, the Master of those who know. "For these two principles, I mean the existence of the deity and His being one, are knowable by human speculation alone. Now with

regard to everything that can be known by demonstration, the status of the prophet and that of everyone else who knows it are

equal; there is no superiority of one over the other."8 Even admit- ting the existence of religious experiences would not circumvent the problem of credibility, for, as already remarked, there is a variety of such experiences, each claiming to be authentic while being in part incompatible with the others. Moreover, such experiences-indeed, the highest of such experiences, that of

prophesying-can be understood in the sober terms applied to the

analysis of lesser men's behavior. Prophets are distinguished from

philosophers or men of science, on the one hand, and legislators and

soothsayers, on the other, by combining in their persons the per- fections peculiar to each. The perfection of the prophet's imagina- tive faculty, through which his mantic operates, comes through the

prior perfection of his rational faculty: "This is the truth that is believed by whoever chooses to be equitable toward himself."9 Prophecy, still less lower forms of understanding, is not to be viewed as mystical. A reasonable man will keep these distinctions

based on experience, where the cause is hidden or unclear (e.g., magnetism), are similarly not to be doubted at all.-Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-'ikkarim, ed. and trans. Isaac Husik (5 vols.; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1946). I, 17 (147:1-148:17). The principles of the Torah were verified beyond a doubt by experience (150:11-12) or were made evident through the senses (151:5-6); the "root" of revelation or divinely given Law belongs to the class of nimshakhot heard from the mouths of all the nations (151:16-17). Consider Albo's discussion in I, 21, leading to the conclusion that the Torah is divinely revealed (175:5-6).

7 Guide of the Perplexed, I. 51 (57b Munk). The translation is that of Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

8 Ibid., II. 33 (75a). See also Albo, op. cit., I, 17 (152:3-6). 9 Guide, II. 37 (80b-81a), 38 (82b-83a).

146




clearly before him as he considers the grounds for his being con- vinced of any particular "fact." Failure to do so sets one on a career of folly.

In fact, the ancestral Jews forsook the paths of glory for the paths of folly. "The simple believeth everything" (Prov. 14:15). Indifference to, or ignorance of, the criteria of credibility leads all but a few individuals, "the remnant whom the Lord shall call" (cf. Joel 3:5), to commit the grossest forms of self-delusion. Men hold themselves wise because they have studied thousands of books of nothingness or emptiness. Others, following their lead, fancy that whatever is written in books is true, especially if the books are old (350:11-20). The consequences of such folly become truly awful when an entire community succumbs to this "great sick- ness."

This is why our kingdom was lost and our Temple was destroyed and we were brought to this: for our fathers sinned and are no more because they found many books dealing with these themes of the stargazers, these things being the root of idolatry, as we have made clear in "Laws Concerning Idolatry." They erred and were drawn after them, imagining them to be glorious science and to be of great utility. They did not busy themselves with the art of war or with the conquest of lands, but imagined that those studies would help them. Therefore the prophets called them "fools" and "dolts." And truly fools they were, "for they walked after confused things that do not profit" [350:21-27].

Folly brings its own punishment. In this case, the greatest folly brought the greatest punishment.10 Astrology is here not con- demned as idolatry, as the greatest transgression of the will of that jealous God who said, "Thou shalt have no other gods before Me" (Exod. 20:3). Rather, astrology is here seen as a stupid distraction from useful and necessary actions. This political judgment is a sufficient condemnation.ll

10 See ibid., II. 36 toward the end (80a). 11 The amalgamated quotation of I Sam. 12:21 and Jer. 2:8 with which

Maimonides closed the passage reproduced above appears twice in the Guide- III. 29 (64b) and 49 (119b)-in each case in a context condemning idolatry on the grounds that it turns men's attention from what needs doing. See also Moses Narboni's Commentary on the Guide, III. 49 (ed. J. Goldenthal [Vienna, 1852], p. 64a), where the letter on astrology's political account of the destruction of the Jewish commonwealth is cited.

The straightforward identification of astrology and idolatry made in this letter cannot be sustained. If the two were simply identical, then all idolaters would be believers in astrology, and idolatry could easily be dismissed as altogether non- sensical. Yet Maimonides goes on, in this very letter, to show that the wise men of the Gentile nations despise the views of the astrologers and that some of the former even believe in creation ex nihilo. The manner of argument adopted in this letter brings the Torah and philosophy much closer to one another than is the case in the Guide.

147




The pronouncement of Maimonides' final judgment concerning astrology is postponed or interrupted by a brief excursus in which he establishes his credentials to speak on this matter. He flatly declares that he has total mastery of what might be called the professional literature of judicial astrology and, more broadly, of idolatry: "It seems to me there does not remain in the world a composition on this subject, having been translated into Arabic from other languages, but that I have read it and have understood its subject matter and have plumbed the depth of its thought" (351:3-6). This is not likely to be an idle boast, for in confessing to have read any of the idolatrous books, Maimonides is confessing to have transgressed a divine injunction.12 Yet this is in fact far from being a mea culpa; it is precisely because of his prior total immersion in the books of the idolaters that Maimonides is able to see farther and more clearly into some of the darkest scriptural passages. His earlier training was a necessary preparation for the task described in this letter as follows: "I already have a great composition on this subject in the Arabic language [namely, the Guide of the Perplexed] with lucid proofs for every single commandment." By studying astrology or the ways of the idolaters, Maimonides was able to identify the basis of all the commandments (351:6-8). What at the outset appears to be mysterious or due to mere fiat proves on closer examination to be intelligible. The first, the leading negative commandment, is to prevent the very thought from arising that there is any other god than the Lord.l3 In the Guide Maimonides went so far as to maintain that "the first intention of the Law as a whole is to put an end to idolatry"-even to its memory.l4 Although he did not, in that work, make so bold as to declare unambiguously that he had explained every single commandment, he came close to saying that. The introduction to the Guide's thematic discussion of the commandments of the Torah promises that "only very few commandments will remain whose cause has not been clear to me up to now." At the conclusion of that discussion Maimonides could say that he had virtually given reasons even for the few commandments that were not fully explained. He could say that because he had a ready explanation for what was otherwise inexplicable: "Every commandment or prohibition of the Law whose reason is

12 Mishneh Torah, 'Aboda Zara, II. 2 (67b4, ed. M. Hyamson [H.] [Jerusalem: Boys Town, 1965]; 219:12-13, ed. S. Lieberman [L.] [Jerusalem: AMosad Harav Kook, 1964]).

13 Mishneh Torah, Negative Commandment No. 1 (9b25 [H.]; 34:2-3 [L.]). 14 Guide, III. 29 (64a).

148




hidden from you constitutes a cure for one of those diseases [that is, idolatrous opinions and practices], which today-thank God- we do not know any more." If Maimonides' knowledge of Sabian doctrines and Amorite usages had been derived from direct observation and not based largely on hearsay-on what he had "heard from books"-his explanation would have been complete to the last detail.15 Even so, he was able to lay bare the founda- tions.

Maimonides unqualifiedly rejects the claims of the judicial astrologers. The very roots of judicial astrology have been refuted; far from being a science, it is a stupidity, a falsehood, and a lie. The nations that presumed to call it a science were the Chasdeans, Chaldeans, Canaanites, and Egyptians. Perhaps it suffices to say that that was their religion in those days. At any rate, we learn from the Guide that these nations were devoid of anything that could truly be called science. They were dedicated, above all, to the spurious, to idolatry and magic.16 The "genuinely wise men of the nations," the philosophers, the men of science, recognizing these delusions for what they were, heaped scorn upon the claims of the astrologers. Moreover, these wise men of Greece and Persia,17 not leaving it at mere assertion and counterassertion, produced "lucid and correct, faultless proofs" refuting the entire position of the astrologers, root and branch. Having been given the lie by reason, the claims of judicial astrology may be put aside. Maimonides does not find it necessary to repeat what the philosophers have proved (351:10-23, 355:13-15).

There is, of course, a genuine science of the stars. Just as one must turn to the wise men for a refutation of the astrologers' position, so must one turn to the compositions of the wise men of Greece, Persia, and India18 to learn something of this "exceed-

15 Ibid., III. 26 end (59a), 49 end (119a-b). Only a very small portion of the idolaters' literature was translated or even extant.-Ibid., III. 29 (66b). 16 Ibid., III. 29 (66a), 37 beginning (78a). It was out of such a morass of error that Abraham arose. In the beginning, so to speak, all the world was Sabian.- Ibid., I. 63 (81b); Mishneh Torah, 'Aboda Zara, I. 3 (66b12 [H.]; 216:36 [L.]). 17 Maimonides had on an earlier occasion characterized the Syrians, Persians, and Greeks as the most expert and learned of the nations, in contrast to the Amalekites, Canaanites, Assyrians, Babylonians, and Romans. All are intent on countering God's will by destroying His Torah, but the former group of nations attempts this through speech while the latter resorts to arms.-Abraham S. Halkin (ed.), Moses Maimonides' Epistle to Yemen (New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1952), 8:8-19. Compare Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, sec. 53, in Lerner and Mahdi (eds.), op. cit., p. 76.

18 With this addition, Maimonides' letter refers to a total of seven nations: four of them were sunk in stupidity and error, while three harbored true science. The Jews remain outside both groups. (See also 353:25.) Speaking of seven nations calls to mind the seven idolatrous nations occupying Canaan before the Jewish

149




ingly glorious science." It might be noted in passing that India and the Hindus are the remnants of the once-universal community of Sabians to the extirpation of whose opinions and actions the Torah was largely dedicated.19 Through the study of the scientific compositions of these wise men, the amazing is made intelligible, that is, no longer amazing. Maimonides' examples of phenomena predicted or explained by astronomy fall into two classes: those dependent on the motion of celestial bodies relative to one another and those dependent on the relative positions of an observer on earth and a celestial object. Mentioning these matters with the utmost brevity is part of Maimonides' plan, for he is here (as else- where) only explaining the chapter headings or main points of "those matters that are the mystery of the world" (352:2-14).20

The central section of the letter begins in this singular fashion: "Know, that all the wise men of the Gentile nations-and they are the great philosophers, men of intellect and science-were all in accord that the world has a Governor" (352:15-16). Even the polite form of address is dropped, for a moment, as the master Maimonides explains to the rabbis the area of agreement and dis-

agreement between the Torah or revealed religion and the opinions of the philosophers. The philosophic consensus breaks down only when the sublunar sphere, our lower world, is the subject of discussion. Maimonides thus sweeps aside, without a word of notice, all those who denied that there is a god who causes or governs the world.21 The controversy about the sphere gives rise to a threefold division of opinion among the men of science. (1) Most of them hold to the view that the world is pre-eternal and sempiternal; an un-

changing God and an unchanging world always have been and

always will be together. (2) Another view held by one or some of

conquest whom the Jews were commanded to destroy utterly. If idolatry con- sisted solely of the superstitious follies of the astrologers and their kind, the rejec- tion and even extirpation of such opinions would pose no special problem. But as the dissimilarity of the "seven nations" of the letter on astrology indicates, it might be more proper to distinguish idolatry narrowly understood (the worship of images and heavenly bodies) from gross superstition. See the discussion in Leo Strauss, "Notes on Maimonides' Book of Knowledge," in Studies in Mysticism and Religion Presented to Gershom G. Scholem (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967), pp. 279-80.

19 Guide, III. 29 (62b), 46 beginning (lOlb). 20 The quoted expression occurs in Babylonian Talmud, Hagiga, 13a. On two

of the occasions on which Maimonides used these words in his writings, he made it clear that the esoteric presentation of certain subjects was both an unavoidable necessity and a duty: Guide, III. 22 (45a); Mishneh Torah, Yesode ha-Torah, II. 12 (36b15-16 [H.]; 104:62-63 [L.]). See Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952), pp. 46-58.

21 See Guide, II. 13 beginning and toward the end (27a, 29a), 32 beginning (72b); letter to Rabbi Hisdai ha-Levi, beginning, in Qobes, Part II, p. 23a.

150




them is that God created heaven and earth out of some common pre-eternal matter. (3) Finally, there is the position of one or some of the philosophers-a position identical with that of the prophets- maintaining creation out of nothing. "Now the great controversy is over this point, and this is the very point that Abraham our father discerned" (352:20-353:3). This account of the varieties of philosophic opinion concerning the creation or pre-eternity of the world resembles other accounts Maimonides gave of those opinions, but it is not a simple repetition. The most famous is the one occurring in Guide, II. 13, where Maimonides presents another threefold division, again excluding the Epicureans and their like, but not limiting it to philosophers. (1) The first opinion is that of the believers in Moses' Law: creation out of nothing. This corresponds to the third opinion in the letter on astrology. Abraham was led to this opinion by his speculation and proceeded to pro- claim it in public. But it is not Jews alone who are adherents of this view; one or some of the men of speculation may be found considering creation ex nihilo as something obligatory for God, rather than as an impossibility.22 (2) "The second opinion is that of all the philosophers of whom we have heard reports and whose discourses we have seen." According to this view there can be neither generation out of nothing nor corruption into nothing. Earlier in the Guide (1.71 [96a]), Maimonides had said that the philosophers were of divided minds even on this point, but here the philosophers are shown as united in maintaining the impossibility of creation out of nothing; indeed, this is the issue (according to the Guide) on which philosophers and believers in the Torah part company. There are lesser divisions among the philosophers. Some maintain, as does Plato in the Timaeus, that both heaven and earth are subject to generation out of, and corruption into, a pre- eternal and sempiternal matter.23 This corresponds to the second opinion in the letter on astrology. (3) Others-namely, Aristotle and his followers and commentators-share the premise of those holding the second opinion but go beyond them in maintaining that neither heaven, time, motion, nor the first matter of the sublunar sphere is subject to generation and passing away. According to this opinion, which corresponds to the first opinion in the letter on astrology, "this being as a whole has never ceased to be as it is at present and will be as it is in the future eternity."24 Another and

22 Guide, II. 13 first opinion and ending (27a, 28a, 29b). See also ibid., II. 19 end (45a).

23 Ibid., II. 13 (28a-b). 24 Ibid., II. 13 (28b-29a). Compare Maimonides' division of the opinions con-

151




still more comprehensive classification of opinions concerning creation and pre-eternity is to be found in Maimonides' letter to Rabbi Hisdai. (1) The pre-Platonic sects of philosophers denied God's existence, while maintaining the pre-eternity of the world and the absence of any Governor of the sphere. This is an opinion ignored in the letter on astrology and all but ignored by the discussion in the Guide.25 (2) Later sects of philosophers acknowledged both God and the creation of the world, "like the opinion of Moses our Master." (3) Other latter-day sects of philosophers acknowledged God, while maintaining the world's pre-eternity and denying that God is its purposive creator. According to this opinion, God is the cause and the world is the effect, but in the manner of the relation- ship of a candle to its light or of a pillar to its shadow. This last opinion appears to be closest to the first opinion in the letter on astrology, that is, the opinion identified in the Guide as that of Aristotle and those who follow him. But what corresponds to the second class in the letter to Rabbi Hisdai? Maimonides' great terseness has obscured the line separating Plato from Abraham. In the letter to Rabbi Hisdai, Maimonides is intent on showing that on either premise-creation or pre-eternity-a cause superior to the sphere is assumed. But in the Guide, the distinction between creation out of nothing and creation out of pre-eternal matter is critical; no one who is precise in his speculation will mistake "our

opinion" for "his [Plato's] opinion."26 According to the letter on

astrology, creation out of nothing by a primordial God is the root of the Torah; "whoever does not acknowledge this is guilty of radical unbelief and is guilty of heresy." Maimonides refers the Proven9al rabbis to his "great composition in Arabic." There, in the Guide, he has already "shattered all those proofs that the

philosophers advance as proving that the world was not created"; moreover, he has "resolved all the great difficulties that they have raised against us" for maintaining creation out of nothing (353:5-10).

The "wise men of the world, from the earliest antiquity down to

cerning prophecy, which are said by him in Guide, II. 32 (72b-73b), to correspond to the opinions about the eternity of the world or its creation in time: (1) the opinion of the vulgar-pagans and Jews, (2) the opinion of the philosophers, (3) the opinion of "our Law"-"identical with the philosophic opinion except in one thing."

25 See n. 21 above. 26 Guide, II. 13 end of second opinion (28b). It is, however, possible to mistake

certain rabbinic sayings in the Midrashim as indicating belief in eternity a parte ante in accord with Plato's opinion, or even Aristotle's.-Ibid., II. 26 (56a-b), 30 (66b-67a).

152




now," fall into three "sects," which we, departing from Mai- monides, may call the Aristotelian, the Platonic, and the creation ex nihilo positions.27 All three agree that everything that comes into being in the sublunar world does so through a power flowing from the deity, through the spheres and stars, upon this lower world, thereby causing every species of thing to come into being. "Just as we maintain that the Holy One (blessed be He) performs signs and wonders through the angels, so do these philosophers maintain that all these occurrences in the nature of the world come through the spheres and the stars." The difference, it would appear, is merely in terms. At any rate, Maimonides is able to refer his addressees to his previous explanation (in the Guide), where he has shown that this philosophic position is true, is not harmful to religion, and is compatible with what the rabbinic sages of the Midrash may be understood to have maintained. "There is no controversy whatever between the sages of Israel and the philosophers on these matters" (353:11-26).28

No such harmony prevails on the subject of particular providence. All three philosophic sects-that is, those for whom the nature of the world and the species in it are set by a power from the spheres and stars-are as one in maintaining that what befalls an individual human is due, not to justice, but to chance. No cause coming from above, no natal constellation, no nature will over- power the workings of chance. From the philosophic or scientific standpoint, there is no difference between the violent death of a human, a mouse, or a spider, or between a roof's collapsing upon someone or a rock's falling upon a tree or another rock, or between men's warring over a great kingdom or dogs' warring over a carcass. Man, beast, trees, minerals-all are governed by chance. Provi- dence extends to the species, according to this view; "the being of all the species29 and the things comprehended in the entire world- in which there is not the activity of a living30 soul-all of this stems from the power of the spheres whose root, in turn, comes from the Holy One." Herein lies the controversy, for the true religion teaches that what happens to individuals, far from being due to

27 We cannot call the latter the biblical sect for the reason that Maimonides thought it necessary to add that the position maintained by the third sect was equally that of "all the prophets" (353:13). This is a clear statement that the prophets are not to be counted among "the wise men of the world" (353:11), let alone among "the wise men of the Gentile nations" (352:15) or "the philosophers" (353:25, 354:1). See n. 18 above.

28 See Guide, II. 6 and 10, and n. 26 above. 29 Reading ha-minim, as four manuscripts have it, rather than hamonim ("multi-

tudes"). 30 Correcting a misprint in the text (354:12) to read hayah.

153




chance, is in fact a just decree and a divine judgment. Indeed, it is "a root of the religion of Moses our Master" that "everything" befalling a man is of this character. Hence the Bible warns, "If ye walk with me in the way of chance, . . . then I will walk with you in the fury of chance" (Lev. 26:21, 28).31 The believers in chance are promised as terrible a punishment as the believers in judicial astrology (354:1-22).

In contrast to the Guide, where creation or pre-eternity is seen as the great central issue, the division in this letter between the true religionists and the philosophers turns on particular providence.32 The bulk of the last and longest section of the letter on astrology is devoted to this theme. Maimonides begins with the common ground, with that root of the Mosaic religion which all the philosophers acknowledge: namely, "that every action of human beings is left to them and that there is nothing to constrain or draw them" (354:24). This is not to deny that men's natural inclinations are significant or that they differ; but it is to say that whatever freedom man has been given is his to use as he will.33 The conflict with the philosophers arises out of their insistence that what

happens to men is like what happens to beasts. According to the letter on astrology there are three positions: (1) The philosophers maintain that it is simply fortuitous that any particular individual's circumstances are as they are. "There is no nature in the world and no power emanating from a star that caused this individual to be or not to be thus." In other words, providence does not extend to the individual but only to the species to which he belongs.34 (2) Those believing in judicial astrology view an individual's situation as permanently fixed by the power of the

sphere at the time of his birth. The details of this opinion are all too well known among Maimonides' addressees; their having taken these follies seriously is the very occasion for this letter. (3) "The

31 See also Guide, III. 36 (77b). Maimonides concludes this section of the letter on astrology with the talmudic dictum: "There is no death without sin and no affliction without transgression" (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat, 55a). In the light of the discussion in Guide, III. 17, one cannot simply and without argument identify Maimonides' position with what "the multitude of our scholars" maintain (34b, 35a).

32 Guide, II. 6 end (18a), 13. In effect, then, the conflict between philosophy and the Torah is minimized by Maimonides in the letter on astrology. If creation of the world is seen as the issue separating philosophers and believers, then that division or conflict is much more fundamental and consequential than if the issue is particular providence.-Ibid., II. 25 end (55b); and see n. 11 above.

33 See Strauss, "Notes on Maimonides' Book of Knowledge," op. cit., p. 282; Guide, II. 40 beginning (85a-b); Mishneh Torah, De'ot, I. 2 (47a22 [H.]; 139:22 [L.]), Teshuba, V. 2 (86b23-87a3 [H.]; 312:8-313:12 [L.]).

34 355:4-7; cf. 353:20-21. See Guide, III. 17 second opinion (31b-33a). 154




true way upon which we rely and in which we walk" is identical with the first or philosophic position, but where the philosophers say that the individual's situation is due to chance, we say that it is a divine decree and judgment, perhaps unintelligible to the merely human mind, but nonetheless just. "This is a root of the religion."35 Of these three positions, the first two are false "according to us," but they are known to be false in different ways (and, one may add, with different degrees of certitude). The astrologers' position is given the lie by reason; the lucid proofs of the philosophers have refuted the claims of the Chasdeans, Chal- deans, and their associates. Over and beyond this, the astrologers' position is a falsehood according to us because of the religious tradition-that is, on grounds distinct from those established by reason. The religious tradition presupposes the falsity of the astrologers' assertions, for there would be no utility in any particular commandment-indeed, the Torah as a whole would be superfluous-if the individual were not free to obey or disobey.36 Of the first position, that of the philosophers, who maintain that whatever befalls a man is due to chance, Maimonides says that it, too, is "a falsehood according to us because of the religious tradition" (355:20-21). While reason can show that the astrologers are merely mouthing nonsense, it cannot show that there is particular providence. Tradition supplies assurance where reason falls short of supplying demonstration.37 But there are at least apparent discrepancies between what the tradition asserts or promises and what we can observe with our senses: the wicked have been seen to prosper, while the pious perish. It is remarkable that Mai- monides can dispose of this problem without an explicit word about immortality. The sufferings of the righteous may be due to an iniquity or transgression unknown to the observer; hence there may be no discrepancy at all. Or it may be that the innocent

35 355:22-356:7. Cf. the brief discussion of a man's or a family's changing fortunes in Guide, III. 35 fourth class (75b), where nothing is said of God's justice. The opinion that is pronounced in the letter on astrology to be the true way corresponds to the fifth opinion about providence discussed in Guide, III. 17 (34b-35a), and to the second opinion, Eliphaz', in the interpretation of the Book of Job as given in III. 23 (49a). Maimonides' own adherence to this opinion must be qualified by his distinctions between "our opinion, I mean the opinion of our Law," and "what is believed by some of our latter-day scholars" and "what I myself believe about this." See ibid., III. 17 fifth opinion (34b, 35b-36a) and 23 (49b-50a). 36 355:13-20. On this congruence of Greek philosophy and the Torah, see also Maimonides' Eight Chapters, chap. viii (Arabic text, ed. M. Wolff [Leiden: Brill, 1903], pp. 27-28; Hebrew trans., ed. J. Gorfinkle [New York: Columbia University Press, 1912], pp. 43-44).

37 Particular providence is not the only doubtful point. Mishneh Torah, 'Aboda Zara, II. 3 (67b15-22 [H.]; 220:23-29 [L.]).

3-H.O.R. 155




suffer now "in order to inherit something even better than this.38 The summary of the matter is that our mind cannot grasp how the decrees of the Holy One (blessed be He) work upon human beings in this world and in the world to come" (356:7-9).

We appear to have come to an impasse. Fundamentally there may be only two positions-the opinion of "the community of those who adhere to a [religious] Law" and "the opinion of the philosophers"-and yet neither may be demonstrably true or false.39 This, we may say, is an extreme case, the extremely difficult case. At the opposite extreme is the extremely easy case, where all men of science or knowledge agree, for example, that the stargazers' position is a lie. Maimonides well knows that the Talmud and Midrash can be searched and made to yield passages that seemingly adopt the astrologers' opinions. This poses no special problem for him, as he disposes of such dicta of the rabbinic sages on any of four grounds, which equally diminish and exalt the significance of such remarks and speakers.40 By barely perceptible steps Maimonides is led to the case where hard and fast lines are not drawn (unlike the question of creation or pre- eternity) and yet where tradition and reason point in different directions. In this, the central case, it is tradition that must yield. As with scriptural verses that cannot be taken literally, so, more generally, tradition is to be understood in the light of reason and the senses. "A man should never cast his reason behind him, for the eyes are set in front, not in back" (356:10-19). In his Treatise on Resurrection, the object desired by him and by the elect is con- trasted by Maimonides with that desired by the vulgar. The latter delight in putting the religious Law and reason at contradictory poles, while the former seek to understand everything (or as much as possible) as natural.41 Recourse to the miraculous and super-

38 This opinion is that of Bildad the Shuhite (according to Maimonides' interpretation of the Book of Job) and corresponds as well to the position of the Mu'tazilites.-Guide, III. 23 (49a-b), 17 fourth opinion (33b-34a). The positions of Job's three companions are scorned by Elihu, whose opinion Maimonides does not identify with any of the older philosophic or religious opinions concerning providence.-Ibid., III. 23 (50a-b). Elihu introduces the notion of an angel interceding two or three times to restore an invalid to the best of states. Cf. 353:19-21 of the letter on astrology, quoted above in my text between nn. 27 and 28.

39 Guide, III. 21 end (44b). 40 On the one hand, the debate preceding the establishment of a law ought not

to be reopened; nor, in a case where reason has proved something, is it proper to rely on the words of one who might not have understood. On the other hand, the seemingly astrological statement may be an allusive speech; or the speaker may have spoken as he did "with a view to the times and the business before him" (356:13-16).

41 Joshua Finkel (ed.), Maimonides' Treatise on Resurrection (New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1939), 22:9-19.

156




natural is Maimonides' last resort. The sources of belief, which Maimonides discussed earlier in the letter (350:1-7), may now be reconsidered in a somewhat different light. Reason, sense percep- tion, and tradition were there stated to be the reliable bases for

declaring something to be so. Two of these, like the eyes, look forward. The past, or rather the received version of the past, ought to be understood in a way that does not do violence to what we can understand and see. The effect of this argument is to compel the tradition to give an account of itself before the bar of reason. Some sources of belief are more fundamental than others or are presupposed by others. This is not to reduce God to human size. There is still the extreme case where Maimonides must para- phrase the prophet: "For His ways are not like our ways, neither are His thoughts like our thoughts."42

Some confusion in the Proven9al rabbis' hearsay account of the Epistle to Yemen elicits a restatement by Maimonides of the circumstances that led to his composing that letter (356:21-357:13). The episode may be summarized as follows: an ignorant, god- fearing man leads a people ignorant of the signs of the Messiah into political punishment. We are presented with a latter-day re- enactment of ancestral ignorance and punishment.

The concluding lines of the letter on astrology repeat and ela- borate upon the metaphor used in the opening lines.

I have already told you that all the details of your inquiries on this subject are all branches of a single tree. I myself command you, out of my knowledge: "Hew down the tree and cut off its branches," and so on [Dan. 4:11]. Plant in its stead the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and eat of its goodness and its fruit, and put forth your hands and take also from the tree of life. The Holy One (blessed be He) will absolve us and will absolve you for plucking off its fruit and for eating our fill of its goodness until we live forever. Amen [357:14-18].

The idolatrous tree is to be replaced by another tree in a manner analogous to the way in which the Torah contradicts idolatrous practices and beliefs.43 It may be that the tree of knowledge will never stand fully revealed before man-that may be in the nature of things44-and yet the goodness of that imperfectly perceived tree can be enjoyed. As for putting forth one's hand and eating of the tree of life, why that was the very prospect that occasioned man's expulsion from Eden (Gen. 3:22-23). Maimonides' authority

42 356:2-4. Cf. Isa. 55:8 and Guide, III. 20 (43a). 43 Guide, III. 30, 37, 45, 46, 48, passim. 4 Ibid., II. 30 (71a).

157




for assuring his addressees that the transgression will be absolved remains unknown. What is clearer is that Maimonides believed that man, and man alone, could distinguish good from evil and choose between them.45 The astrologers' follies wholly or largely eliminate the realm of freedom and to that extent reduce man's stature and significance. If it is necessary to err, it would be wisest to err in the opposite direction. Maimonides would not have dis- sented from Albo's judgment that in the case of all human actions -those that are absolutely free, those that are a mixture of

necessity and freedom, and even those that are absolutely necessary or decreed-"diligence and effort are useful and necessary." Albo's interpretation of Ps. 127:1l-"Except the Lord keep the

city, the watchman waketh but in vain"-is in full accord with the letter on astrology. "But if the Lord does keep the city, the watchman does well to wake, for divine help comes with human watchfulness and effort but not otherwise." The ancestral Jews who lusted after false gods, the contemporary Jews who ignor- antly believed the lies of the astrologers and false messiahs, perhaps men generally-all needed to learn the same lesson: "We

ought to exert our efforts in all [things] as though they were absolutely free, and God will do as He sees fit."46 If this was only a hypothesis, it was one without which man could not live a human life.

45 Eight Chapters, chap. viii (Wolff, p. 31; Gorfinkle, p. 47). 46 Albo, op. cit., IV, 6 (45:16-17, 46:11-14; 49:3-6, 13-14).

158



Maimonides' Letter on Astrology

Documents

Transcript of Maimonides' Letter on Astrology