A Subsidy—But for What?A Madisonian Perspective on “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy”

--------Jesse M. Crosson

University of Michigan – Political Science 701/495Dr. Arlene Saxonhouse

12/16/2013

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In a 2006 paper entitled “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy,” Richard Hall and Alan

Deardorff develop a novel theory about the way in which lobbyists operate in the US Congress.

As suggested by the title, Hall/Deardorff argue that, rather than current models of “persuasion”

and “exchange,” lobbying works as a subsidy for those congressional offices that share a

particular interest’s policy position(s) . And while seemingly more benign than artful persuasion

or outright vote-buying by seasoned lobbyists, the process in actuality compromises the equality

of representation without compromising individual representatives.1 Sadly, they say, as particular

interests possess unequal capacities for subsidy, certain issues and positions receive greater

priority, and the “equality principle” suffers as a result. But despite the centrality of the equality

principle in Hall/Deardorff’s normative analysis, many of America’s most famous political

theorists have, while maintaining a deep concern about interest groups, rejected the “equality

principle” as the fundamental aim of self governance. Perhaps most notably, James Madison,

Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay argue in The Federalist Papers that the fundamental aim of

representative government lies not in reflecting the fleeting “heats and ferments” of the people,

but in promoting the “public good”—security and prosperity—for members of society.

Such a fundamental difference in basic normative assumptions, of course, suggests an

altogether different—and heretofore unexplored—perspective on the implications of lobbying as

legislative subsidy. How might Madison view Hall/Deardorff’s findings? How, if at all, might a

shift in focus from the “equality principle” to the “public good” alter one’s conclusions about

such lobbying? This paper examines these questions in light of Madison’s discussion of faction in

Federalist No. 10 and concludes that, while lobbying as subsidy may bode well for certain

readings of Federalist No. 10, the notions of confirmation bias and political particularism likely

render it a danger to Madison’s proposed safeguards against faction.

FEDERALIST 10 – MADISON’S TEMPLATE FOR COMBATTING FACTION

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As noted above, this paper will address lobbying as legislative subsidy in view of perhaps

the most famous discussion of organized interests in the Federalist, Madison’s discussion of

“faction” in Federalist No. 10. According to Madison, a faction is defined as “a number of

citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated

by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to

the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”2 Note here, as highlighted above, that

Madison’s introduction of faction does not revolve around “representation,” per se. Rather,

factions cause danger to a community insofar as they infringe on rights or, more commonly, the

interest of the community on the whole. Regardless of faction’s source of danger, however,

Madison famously attributes the “violence of faction” to the very nature of humankind. Writes

Madison, “the latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every

where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil

society.” For this reason, he writes, “The friend of popular governments […] will not fail,

therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is

attached, provides a proper cure for [the violence of faction].”3 Himself a “friend of popular

government” and a Framer of the Constitution, Madison develops just such a plan Federalist No.

10 and argues that the Constitution provides an opportunity to put the plan into action.

Broadly speaking, Madison suggests two basic remedies for factionalism, both inherent to

truly republican government: the enlightened statesman4 and “extending the sphere.” Of the

former, Madison writes, “the effect [of republicanism] is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge

the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose

wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country.”5 Unlike pure democracy, which

subjects society to the most dangerous intrigues of a majority faction, republicanism—that is,

representative, popular government—provides a mechanism for “refining” the views of the

public. That mechanism—chosen citizens “whose patriotism and love of justice” preclude

“temporary or partial considerations”—serves as republicanism’s first line of defense against

factions, preventing factious measures from becoming law or further fermenting in the public

sphere.6

But while enlightened statesmen may arise to fight faction, not all representatives will so

diligently serve the public interest. As Madison warns, “men of factious tempers, of local

prejudices, or of sinister designs, may intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the

suffrages and then betray the interests of the people.”7 How can a republic prevent such an

occurrence? Fortunately, Madison replies, republics’ ability to govern large polities provides a

solution to this problem. According to Madison, the advantages of a large republic are two-fold.

First, large republics prevent the election of the sort of corrupt leader mentioned above. Says

Madison, “as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than

in the small republic, it will be more difficult to for unworthy candidates to practice with success

the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried.”8 But besides the coordination issues

caused by an extensive, well-populated republic, large republics protect against faction in a

second, vital way: through the diversification of interests. That is to say, as republics grow in size,

so too does the number and diversity of the interests of the citizenry. “Extend the sphere,”

Madison says, “and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less

probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other

citizens.”9

1 Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff, "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy," American Political Science Review 100, no. 1 (February 2006): 81.2 Hamilton, Jay, Madison, The Federalist Papers, edited by George W. Carey and James McClennan, Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund (2001): No. 10, ¶ 2. 3 Ibid, ¶ 7. 4 Insofar as the term “statesman” is used, it is meant only as a direct historical reference to Madison’s original term and not in any gendered sense.5 Ibid, ¶ 16. 6 Ibid.

Thus Madison offers two basic solutions for the problem of factions subverting the public

good: the guidance of enlightened statesmen and the inherent complexity of an extensive

republic. The Constitution, Madison thought, provided both of these benefits, and if the American

states wished to tame the “violence of faction,” they would do well to ratify the new Constitution.

The actual effectiveness of Madison’s plan, of course, remains a complex empirical question not

addressed in this paper. But, as noted above, Madison’s normative goal of protecting the “public

good” through the anti-faction solutions he proposes provides an alternative framework from

which to evaluate Hall/Deardorff’s findings in “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.” How might the

Hall/Deardorff’s conception of lobbying alter the effectiveness of the enlightened statesman

and/or the extensive republic? This paper will proceed by examining the implications of lobbying

as legislative subsidy for each of Madison’s proposed solutions for faction.

THE ENLIGHTENED STATESMAN: SUBSIDIZING WISDOM OR VEILING BIAS?

As noted above, Madison’s first solution for faction comes through the wisdom of

enlightened statesman. Thus, a central concern emanating from lobbying as legislative subsidy

for Madison lies in the extent to which such subsidies increase or decrease a statesman’s

enlightenment. To address this concern, a bit more detail about the system of legislative subsidy

will provide needed clarity. According to Hall/Deardorff, lobbying as legislative subsidy

capitalizes on one major challenge with which legislators must cope daily: limited resources.

Indeed, despite the exponential growth in the number and complexity of federal laws in the past

few decades, legislators must cope with strict limitations in congressional staff, budget, and even

time (particularly given their need to frequently visit their home district). Consequently, while

legislators may espouse strong convictions on any number of issues or policy initiatives, they

may dedicate resources to only a handful of them. Sensing this scarcity of resources, lobbyists

capitalize on the situation by providing the very resources—political information, policy research,

and occasionally, money—that preclude legislators from pursuing a given issue. Lobbyists do not

contribute such resources blindly, however. Rather, they subsidize the views of those legislators

with which they most agree. That is, if a given legislator would in fact pursue a desired policy if

only he/she possessed greater resources, lobbyists will provide a matching grant to the

legislator’s staff—in hopes that the legislator will fight for their common policy interest.

Regardless of how “enlightened” a particular legislator may be, every member of

Congress must cope with resource scarcity. Metaphysics being what they are, no legislator can be

in more than one place at a time; and as much as they may like to do so, they cannot add hours to

a day, either. Consequently, the challenge of resource scarcity threatens the potential effectiveness

of the enlightened legislator as a force against faction: how can she enact the policies she favors,

if she must pick and choose only a small subset of priorities? Moreover, if an enlightened

legislator can only pay full attention to a handful of issues, how can she fully monitor for the

violence of faction throughout the policy spectrum? Perhaps, at least in one sense, lobbying as

legislative subsidy offers way of escape for the enlightened statesman from the predicament of

resource scarcity.

As Hall/Deardorff remark in their paper, contemporary politicians often claim that

lobbyists are not “agents of corruption;” rather, they say, “they help us do our job.”10 For years,

reporters, pundits, and citizens have scoffed at this answer, Hall/Deardorff remark. But when

viewed in light of the intense constraint of resource scarcity, this response seems far more

plausible. For indeed, if lobbyists offer a matching grant of political information, policy analysis,

or merely legislative “grunt work”—all without actually changing the views of the enlightened

legislator—then lobbying simply works to subsidize enlightenment. Imagine Enlightened

Legislator A believes that America needs four basic policy reforms this legislative cycle: tariff

10 Hall and Deardorff, "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy," 81.

protections for nascent American industries, property tax reform for farmers and ranchers, purity

regulations for foreign cotton imports, and increased funding for garrisons on the frontier.11

Roughly speaking, A has prioritized the issues as follows: tariff protections, cotton regulations,

frontier garrisons, and property tax reform. But, A has determined that all of these issues

absolutely require action this cycle, lest the political window for one of them closes.

Complicating things further, A anticipates she will face a strong electoral challenging following

this legislative cycle, so she plans to spend much of her time campaigning. Needless to say, A has

a problem: how can she address these four major policy reforms, while also defending her

congressional seat—all with extreme limitations in staff and budget?

Luckily for A, the American Association of Cotton Growers offers her some help. They

have been watching her lately, they say, and they feel that her brilliant cotton-purity policy

initiative will solve the problems that unfair foreign competition has caused their farmers in

recent years. Their office, they tell her, is prepared to provide her with hundreds of person-hours

worth of research and political intelligence from the cotton industry—and all A has to do is put

the information into action. Naturally, A is ecstatic: she may now push her brilliant cotton-purity

legislation without sacrificing precious hours on the campaign trail. The Cotton Growers may

have acted solely in their own self-interest in this scenario; but, in doing so, they actually

subsidized the brilliance and wisdom of Enlightened Legislator A and her policy initiative.

To this point, it would appear that lobbying as legislative subsidy, as a solution to the

problem of resource scarcity, enhances Madison’s “enlightened statesman” solution for faction.

However, the conception of the enlightened statesman thus far has veiled an important

assumption about “enlightenment:” that it is a “characteristic” or “state,” and not a process. To be

sure, some legislators, upon taking office, enter Congress with a better understanding of public

affairs than others. But regardless of one’s entry-level knowledge of public affairs, very few

legislators possess the requisite knowledge to attain “enlightenment” immediately upon entering

office. Though public affairs have grown immensely more technical and complex since the days

of the Founding, Madison himself seems to acknowledge the “gradual” nature of enlightenment

throughout the Federalist, particularly when arguing for the duration of federal officials’ terms.

When defending the biennial election of representatives in Federalist No. 53,12 for instance,

Madison remarks, “No man can be a competent legislator, who does not add to an upright

intention and a sound judgment, a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to

legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information, […] [a]nother part

can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station.”13 At least

according to this discussion of US representatives, Madison acknowledges that legislators will

not likely enter Congress as “enlightened statesmen.” Rather, he says, legislators will gain a

significant portion of their enlightenment “on the job.” Thus, Madison concludes, “The period of

service ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical

knowledge, requisite to the due performance of service.”14

How does this view of enlightenment affect one’s conclusion about lobbying as legislative

subsidy in the context of Madison’s enlightened statesman? In the first place, assuming a

legislator does not enter Congress with full enlightenment, she may accept subsidies either not

fully understanding the implications of an issue/policy or not knowing about a particular point of

view at all. This is precisely the problem that Lawrence Lessig underscores in a recent book

entitled Republic, Lost. Speaking of his own lobbying experience, Lessig reflects, “[t]he most

striking feature of those exchanges was not that members disagreed with me. It was that members

didn’t understand that there was another side to the issue. They have never even heard it.”15 Like

Hall/Deardorff, Lessig worries about incomplete or unequal exposure because it could (according

to Lessig, it in fact does) lead to incomplete and unequal representation of all Americans in

Congress. But incomplete exposure may prove no less dangerous to Madison’s enlightened

legislator and her pursuit of the public good. Suppose for instance that Enlightened Statesman A’s

cotton-purity legislation, despite its near-perfect design carries with it one negative externality: it

will, over the next 5 years, skyrocket cotton prices for the average American consumer. Suppose

further that the cotton lobby understands this externality and, though cotton profits have remained

at all-time highs of late, choose not to mention it to A. After all, should A find this out, she would

rescind her support for the legislation and explore other ways to address the cotton-purity issue—

an action that would certainly not serve the interests of the cotton lobby. Thus, in the system of

lobbying as legislative subsidy, the public good suffers: even though Enlightened Statesman A

wishes to achieve cotton purity and protect consumers in the process, the incentive structure

inherent to legislative subsidy has prevented her from doing so. Of course, one need not accept

that A would in fact rescind her support for the legislation, in the face of the economic

information detailed above. Instead, suppose that her district includes a strong contingent of

consumer advocates and activists—supporters that pushed cotton-purity to the top of her priority

list in the first place. Supposing the legislation passes and prices skyrocket, one might expect that

the consumer advocates to grow angry and abandon A—causing her to lose reelection. Here

again, the public good suffers: the subsidy A receives has led her—a great, enlightened American

leader—directly out of a job as a member of Congress.

Clearly, under certain circumstances and conceptions of enlightenment, Madison’s

enlightened statesman loses his/her effectiveness at combating faction in a system of lobbying as

legislative subsidy. But there is yet another factor inherent to politics and public affairs that could

also endanger the enlightened statesman: confirmation bias. Indeed, no matter one’s level of

enlightenment, great satisfaction attends the confirmation of one’s ideas and opinions—

particularly in an arena as competitive as the political arena. Perhaps then, even when confronted

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with information that contradicts an enlightened statesman’s position on a particular issue, he/she

will refuse to update his/her beliefs. Instead, citing the influx of subsidy for his/her original

position, the enlightened statesman may hold fast to his/her original convictions—even if, in

actuality, those views do not represent the true public good. Here again, lobbying as legislative

subsidy lessens the effectiveness of the enlightened statesman at fighting faction—this time by

confirming the overwhelmed legislator’s inherent biases.

In the end, while one may not find confirmation bias a realistic threat to a truly

“enlightened” statesman, the threat of incomplete information—particularly under a “process”

conception of enlightenment—undoubtedly harms the effectiveness of an enlightened statesman

to protect society against the violence of faction. Thus, under the Madison’s conception of

faction, lobbying as legislative subsidy does in fact present problems for society. And depending

on how “enlightened” a legislator may be when he/she enters office, that negative effect may

prove more or less deleterious to the public good.

EXTENDING THE SPHERE: INTEREST DIVERSIFICATION OR A DESCENT INTO

PARTICULARISM?

While lobbying as legislative subsidy may serve as a threat to the enlightened statesman,

Madison suggests a second solution to the violence of faction: “extending the sphere.” The

premise of extending the sphere, as noted above, is simple: extensive republics not only render

the election of devious legislators more difficult, but they also diversify interests such that

maleficent coalitions may not form. But barring the unforeseen annexation of Canada, America is

not likely to expand significantly in the foreseeable future. How, then, could lobbying as

legislative subsidy affect this particular solution to injurious faction?

To arrive at an answer, one need first draw a distinction between two kinds of faction:

majority and minority factions. By definition, every faction works against the public interest. But,

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according to Madison, majority factions or coalitions of factions—that is, factions and coalitions

that may actually enact their dangerous agenda—constitute the largest threat to a republic. Says

Madison, “[i]f a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican

principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views […]. When a majority is included

in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling

passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens.”16 Even though factions

may form coalitions on particular issues (in order to attain a majority), an extensive republic, by

diversifying interests, not only renders particular coalition blocs smaller and/or more specific, but

it also decreases the probability that these specific blocs will form stable and successful coalitions

with any frequency. In other words, extensive republics decrease the occurrence of majority

factions. Could lobbying as legislative subsidy somehow add to this process of diversification? In

a word, if one takes some level of lobbying as “given,” the answer to this question may be “yes.”

Consider the alternative models of lobbying, highlighted at the outset of this paper:

“exchange” and “persuasion.” Exchange theory, perhaps the most cynical view of lobbying,

involves the literal buying of votes, according to Hall/Deardorff. As they state in their paper, “[i]n

political science and economics, the principal class of models assume that interest group agents

and legislators engage in mutually beneficial if implicit trades, typically campaign contributions

for votes.”17 The other model Hall/Deardorff describe, that of persuasion, involves more

“strategic information” than money. Under this model, lobbyists take advantage of legislator

uncertainty about public opinion and reelection by providing “private information about

constituency views” and “us[ing] it to persuade legislators that electoral self-interest lies in taking

group-friendly positions.”18 Instead of vote-buying, lobbyists in the persuasion model attempt to

convince uncertain legislators that positions consistent with their particular interest will bode well

for that legislator’s reelection.

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While Hall/Deardorff underscore a number of logical and empirical problems with these

theories, one particularly problematic theme runs through both models: the incredible difficulty a

lobbyist would face in achieving any “results.” As Hall/Deardorff point out, thousands of

lobbyists are paid—quite lucratively—each year to represent the interests of all sorts of groups

across the country. Were lobbying success so difficult (and rare), would these groups bother

paying so many full-time lobbyists? Consider the exchange model, for example. If members of

Congress were indeed selling votes, would not one expect quite a high price for such votes, given

the exorbitant price tag associated with modern US elections?19 Consider also the persuasion

model. Given Congress’s far-reaching power and the complexity of modern politics, would not

one expect a member’s multiplicity of information cues—such as the White House, his/her

political party, congressional leaders, local political leaders, etc.—to drown out any marginal

effect a single lobby may have on a member’s vote choice?20

These challenges, Hall/Deardorff claim, severely limit the explanatory power of the

exchange and persuasion models of lobbying—suggesting that another model may offer a better

explanation. That model, they believe, is lobbying as legislative subsidy. Rather than spending

large amounts of money “vote-buying” (with no enforcement mechanism, once the money is

already donated) or dedicating time and resources in a futile effort to persuade busy lawmakers,

lobbyists (as noted throughout this paper) can provide legislative subsidies to a member’s staff.

Legislative subsidy “lowers the bar” for influence in a number of ways. First, it is cheaper than

one might expect vote-buying to be—in fact, while it implies paying the lobbyists, it implies no

monetary cost beyond that. Second, legislative subsidy implies no arduous persuasion. Instead,

lobbyists under the subsidy model only target legislators who already share their position.

Could this potential “lowering of the lobbying bar” have any effect on Madison’s extend-

the-sphere solution to faction? At least at first blush, when compared to the exchange and

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persuasion models, lobbying as legislative subsidy benefits Madison’s extend-the-sphere solution.

That is, if lobbying as legislative subsidy does in fact imply a lower “bar” than the other models,

one may presume that a greater number and diversity of interests may lobby Congress at any

given time. If so, as Madison suggests, faction leaders will encounter increasing amounts of

difficulty in assembling consistent faction coalitions powerful enough to actually subvert the

public good. Thus, if lobbying as legislative subsidy does in fact lower the lobbying bar, then it

has (in comparison to the other models) encouraged the very characteristics (numbers and

diversity) that allow the extensive republic to combat faction. If so, then perhaps it may, despite

its potentially negative implications for the enlightened statesman, in fact bode well for the public

good and Madison’s solutions for faction.

This conclusion, of course, rests on one’s assumption that lobbying is simply a reality of

popular government. In other words, this paper does not mean to suggest that lobbying as

legislative subsidy in itself is “good” for extending the sphere. Rather, if one presupposes that

lobbying will occur, this paper argues that lobbying as legislative subsidy may prove better for

the public good and extending the sphere than other models of lobbying. This assumption seems

reasonable in light of Federalist No. 10. After all, if faction is “sewn into” human nature, then is it

not reasonable to assume that those factions will inevitably attempt to exercise influence through

lobbying? Moreover, had Madison believed that factions would not attempt to lobby, would he

have classed them among the great dangers to republics and spent time devising

solutions/responses to that danger? Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that Madison

anticipated some level of lobbying of the federal government. If so, then perhaps lobbying as

legislative subsidy implies the most benign of possible mechanisms for interest-group influence.

Then again, perhaps it does not. In fact, perhaps Madison’s extend-the-sphere solution is

itself mistaken in its underlying assumptions. Under Madison’s extend-the-sphere solution,

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Madison appears to conceptualize lobbyists as competitors, particularly for legislators’ time.

Indeed, regardless of how related or unrelated a particular group of factions may be, they

nonetheless compete against one another for the ear and effort of a given legislator. Under this

sort of system, extending the sphere (with its numbers and diversity) would undoubtedly prevent

domination by factions. For indeed, as a large group of individual interests competes for the

attention of a particular legislator, their efforts are likely to cancel one another out. Moreover,

given the intense competition associated with such a common goal and large numbers,

collusion/cartelization would prove incredibly difficult: how would such diverse interests find

any common ground upon which to build a coalition, much less prevent cheating, even if they

could build a one?21

But suppose interests may affect Congress by another means besides “winning” in a vast

competition for attention. That is, instead of competing for attention with a wide range of

interests, is there another means of affecting legislators’ actions? In a word, yes: by rendering a

particular policy request as specific and esoteric as possible, lobbyists may shrink their field of

competition substantially. Imagine again the enlightened-but-embattled Legislator A. As noted

earlier, Legislator A wishes to pass cotton-purity legislation, as well as tariff reform, property-tax

reform, and increases in funding for frontier garrisons. Suppose Lobbyist B would like to gain a

competitive advantage for her clients—a group of enterprising Virginia farmers, the majority of

whom reside in Legislator’s A’s congressional district—by carving out some special property-tax

exemptions. Lobbyist B could achieve this goal by subsidizing major property tax reform for the

whole US. But, in doing so, she would compete for agenda space with the lobbyists supporting

each of A’s other causes: cotton purity, frontier safety, and tariff protectionism. Rather than

risking this level of competition, Lobbyist B could instead pursue a different strategy: submitting

pre-drafted, geographically specific legislation to A’s congressional office. The benefits of such a

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strategy are two-fold. First, the geographic (and topical) specificity of the legislation shrinks the

field of competition. Rather than competing for agenda space with major interests, B will now

encounter significantly less agenda competition (or pushback to the bill’s actual substance), given

the legislation’s ultra-specificity. Second (and just as important), B’s specific legislation will

provide A an easy opportunity to please some rather important constituents back home—

increasing her already questionable reelection chances. Clearly, then, B would seem to have an

incentive to provide this sort of specific service to A. And indeed, outside this hypothetical world,

the trend toward this sort of particularism is well documented.22

How does this sort of strategy apply to lobbying as legislative subsidy? Simply put, under

Hall/Deardorff’s model, B’s provision of specific legislation itself constitutes a subsidy—and one

that may not fly in a less extensive republic. That is, while A’s staff may never have found the

time or resources to determine the sorts of policies that would please B’s clients, research the

current property tax code in the area, and draft effective legislation, B’s staff has done all of this

legislative “grunt work” for A. And given that A already wishes to pass some pro-farmer

property-tax legislation, B is merely subsidizing A’s preferences.

This all suggests an important potential danger for Madison’s extend-the-sphere solution.

Suppose that B does not have the public’s best interests at heart (shocking!); and while she

realizes that her legislation may harm other members of society, she still pushes it on A.

Assuming A goes along and passes the legislation, the public good shall suffer—all because

lobbying as legislative subsidy provided a means for B to draft nearly irresistible legislation. In

this instance, whereas Madison anticipated that extensive republics would imply more issue

competition, such republics appear actually to incentivize the sort of particularism that, as in this

example, harmed the public good. How does such an incentive arise? As noted above, the intense

competition itself associated with agenda control in an extensive republic incentivized B’s

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descent into particularism.23 Thus, perhaps even more so in an extensive republic than a non-

extensive one, lobbying as legislative subsidy encourages potentially deleterious, particularistic

legislation. Indeed, on the issue of competition and diversification, Madison appears to have

overlooked the fact that competition within issue areas matters just as much (if not more, in an

extensive republic) than competition between them.

Legislative particularism begotten by legislative subsidy implies at least one additional

problem: if all lobbyists descend into particularism, the potential for collusion between interests

actually increases, not decreases as Madison seems to suggest. How could this be so? Primarily,

through the process of “logrolling.” The phenomenon of “logrolling,” though often defined in a

variety of different ways, implies a sort of reciprocity at its most basic level: ‘if you support my

bill, I’ll support yours.’ Traditionally, logrolling has become most often associated with

particularlistic legislation (often, pork-barrel projects)—and for good reason: if a particular

legislator has absolutely no stake in a particular bill’s substance (and will therefore not be held

accountable for his actions either in favor or against it), then he/she stands only to gain by

supporting it. For, if one supports someone else’s esoteric legislation in Congress, that member

will return the favor by supporting one’s own esoteric legislation in the future. And so the pattern

continues. Rather than a “coalition” in the traditional sense (or the sense that Madison seems to

imply), then, particularism allows for a coalition of logrolling. Such coalitions are incredibly

stable because, by their nature, they defy electoral responsiveness. Consequently, insofar as

extensive republics encourage particularlistic legislative subsidies (as suggested above), they

actually encourage, rather than discourage, the creation of potentially factious coalitions.

CONCLUSIONS

This examination of lobbying as legislative subsidy has left Madison’s Federalist-10

solutions in a strange and difficult predicament. Under certain sets of assumptions, lobbying as

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legislative subsidy seems actually to enhance the mechanisms behind Madison’s solutions. For

the enlightened statesman, lobbying as legislative subsidy may allow for a subsidization of

enlightened policies themselves. And for extensive republics, lobbying as legislative subsidy

seems to multiply the number and diversity of interests competing against one another,

strengthening the anti-faction effects of extending the sphere. Under another set of assumptions,

however, lobbying as legislative subsidy seems to severely harm the effectiveness of Madison’s

solutions: subsidies could result in an enhancement of confirmation bias and a rise in

particularism.

Where does this leave lobbying as legislative subsidy, with regard to Madison’s

discussion of faction? Like many political phenomena, the “goodness” or “badness” of lobbying

as legislative subsidy for protecting against factions seems to depend on the particular scenario.

With regard to the enlightened statesman, the nature of lobbying subsidies seems to be a function

of a given legislator’s level of enlightenment before entering office. If in fact a legislator already

possesses a detailed, flawless agenda that will benefit the public before entering office, then

lobbying as legislative subsidy may help this legislator enact his/her agenda. However, insofar as

one conceives of enlightenment as an ongoing process and most legislators as on-the-job learners,

one is led to worry more or less about the confirmation-bias potentiality of legislative subsidy.

With regard to extending the sphere, the nature of lobbying subsidies is no less contingent on

particular circumstances. Indeed, insofar as lobbying as legislative subsidy multiplies the number

and diversity of interests in competition for legislators’ attention, one may find it beneficial to the

fight against faction. But, insofar as one expects such multiplication to devolve into particularism,

one may conclude that lobbying as subsidy actually encourages factious behavior.

In full view of decades of acquired knowledge about Congress, the outlook would appear

bleak for Federalist No. 10, if in fact Hall/Deardorff’s model holds true. Indeed, each election

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cycle, humorous stories arise about the difficulties of freshman members of Congress assimilating

into their new job. (Serving in Congress is rarely as easy as it looks!) Moreover, as Mayhew,

Fiorina, and countless other congressional scholars document, particularism has become the norm

in Congress—and logrolling a common practice. If true, these facts certainly spell trouble for

Madison’s solutions to faction, in light of lobbying as legislative subsidy. But perhaps even

beyond this conclusion, another more far-reaching one arises. That is, whereas one must accept

the equality principle to accept Hall/Deardorff’s conclusions about lobbying as legislative

subsidy, one need not accept this premise (albeit a common and popular one) any longer, in order

to worry about lobbying in America. Instead, even from a “public good” (or even, dare I say,

Burkean) perspective on representation, lobbying as legislative subsidy present serious challenges

for republican governance and the influence of interest groups

Notes:

7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, ¶ 18. 9 Ibid, ¶ 19. 11 Perhaps these are the sorts of issues that interested legislators in Madison’s day?12 The norm at the time was annual—not biennial elections. Madison did not believe that annual elections gave legislators enough time to settle in to their new job, and so he spent a sizeable amount of time in the Federalist explaining the advantages of biennial election.13 The Federalist Papers, No. 53, ¶ 5.14 Ibid. 15 Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress--and a Plan to Stop It (New York: Twelve, 2011), 147.16 The Federalist Papers, No. 10, ¶ 11. 17 Hall and Deardorff, "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy," 70.18 Ibid, 71.19 In actuality, the increase in PAC spending associated with major votes in Congress is only about $130-180, according to a study cited in Hall/Deardorff’s paper. This fact, they say, would seem to point away from an exchange theory of lobbying, for that this price, even the most “impoverished reader of political science journals” could afford to hire a lobbyist every now and again.20 Hall and Deardorff, “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy,” 71.21 This sort of coordination problem is commonly referred to the “collective action problem,” popularized by economist Mancur Olson. This problem is particularly challenging for “large groups” (as Olson refers to them), which seems to accord with Madison’s underlying logic. 22 See, for example, David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974)23Extensive republics also serve to hide particularistic actions. That is, the larger the republic, the less likely wasteful or otherwise harmful particularistic actions will be detected.