Macondo Report 20042011

The Gallowglaich “Human salvation lies in the hands of the creativelymaladjusted” – Martin Luther King.

Macondo Report 20042011.doc 20th April - 2011 of 33

The Deepwater Horizon Blowout at Macondo Well MC 252

The Role of Complex Shallow Geology - GasHydrates and Shallow Water Flows

The Deepwater Horizon Blowout at Macondo Well MC 252

Title: The Role of Complex Shallow Geology – Gas Hydrates and ShallowWater Flows

Report Reference: Macondo Report 20042011

Date of Issue: 20th April 2011

Distribution: Various

Prepared By: K Gallowglaich

Rev No. Date

Rev 0 20th April 2011



Table of Contents

1.0 Background .................................................................................................................51.1 General .........................................................................................................51.2 MC 252 Macondo Location .........................................................................51.3 Rig Explosion...............................................................................................61.4 Pre-Drilling Site Assessment......................................................................71.5 Estimates of Reservoir Size .......................................................................81.6 Assessment of Flow Rate Estimate ...........................................................8

2.0 Potential Well Collapses and Failures..................................................................82.1 The Hazardous Nature of Macondo ...........................................................82.2 Gas Hydrates ...............................................................................................92.3 Shallow Water Flows.................................................................................11

3.0 Well Collapse Precedents ......................................................................................123.1 URSA Mississippi Canyon........................................................................133.2 AIOC South Caspian ACG ........................................................................13

4.0 Macondo Blowout Assessment ...........................................................................145.0 Conclusions...............................................................................................................166.0 Glossary .....................................................................................................................17

6.1 Gas Hydrates .............................................................................................176.2 Shallow Water Flows.................................................................................176.3 Geohazards................................................................................................17

7.0 Formal Reports and Books ...................................................................................187.1 Formal Reports ..........................................................................................187.2 Books .........................................................................................................19

8.0 References and Links .............................................................................................208.1 References .................................................................................................208.2 Online Article Links...................................................................................238.3 Miscellaneous Undated.............................................................................27

Appendix A List of Associated Attached DocumentsAppendix B Inherent BP Management FaultsAppendix C BP Development of Riserless DrillingAppendix D “Six Steps That Doomed The Rig”



Executive SummaryThe recently published National Commission Report to the US President and BP’s own earlierAccident Investigation Report dated 8th September 2010 focused almost entirely on the failings ofequipment and processes on the drilldeck of the Deepwater Horizon, the seafloor BOP andassociated equipment and the sequence of errors and mistakes made in drilling and cementing upof an almost completed well. The reasons for the equipment failures at seabed and on the drilldeckand the errors and shortcomings of the drilling and completions activities are not covered here andhave been extensively covered elsewhere, particularly in the March 2011 DNV report (Ref. H) onseafloor equipment, BOP and casing failures.

The fact is that BP were drilling at Macondo MC 252 in an area of well known and documentedgeological hazards (known in the industry as “Geohazards”), which included extensive beds offrozen gas (or methane gas hydrates) and a number of layers of artesian overpressured sands(known as Shallow Water Flows [SWF]) where liquefaction and washout could cause casingcollapse due to drilling disturbance if such drilling were carried out in an uncontrolled or rapidfashion with no account taken of the potential for SWF problems.

The word “geohazard” is not mentioned once in either of the above reports.

It is this author’s contention that the primary reason for the blowout and subsequent disaster isrooted in the fact of BP’s decision to drill the MC252 well at such a high risk geologically hazardouslocation, using inappropriate drilling and well completion techniques and drillpipe with aninadequate wall thickness. This cannot be directly proved, but there is a large amount of evidenceavailable suggesting the well casing may have fractured due to SWF, leading to liquefaction, loss oflateral support to the string, casing buckling, collapse and damage/fracture. Large quantities ofalready melted methane gas from surrounding or lower level hydrate formations may then haveflowed into a badly flawed cement annulus surrounding the well and flowed up to seabed where theenormous pressures and forces damaged the drillpipe and BOP to the extent that it was effectivelydestroyed.

The presence of gas hydrates and SWF in this Mississippi Canyon shelf edge zone has been welldocumented by the MMS, BP and other operators. A research site location on gas hydrates (forpotential future energy use) is nearby. This type of incident was not new to BP. Previous welldocumented casing buckling problems resulting from SWF problems at the nearby BP/Shell URSAsite over a decade ago This incident was a forerunner and warning to Macondo. The MMS risk mapfor the GoM shows Macondo to be in an area where there was previous evidence of SWF at otherwells in the MC block. BP, Shell and other operators in the GoM have generated numerous publicdomain documents which refer to SWF and gas hydrate risks in this area. BP (and not Transoceanor Halliburton or Cameron or any other organisation) took the decision to drill one of the world’sdeepest wells in such conditions in the way that it did.

In addition, serious similar problems were experienced by BP in recent years in the South CaspianAIOC PSA (Gunashli-Azeri-Chirag) area. Fortunately neither the URSA or Azeri casing bucklingincidents led to the blowout explosions as seen at MC252, probably due to lesser (or no) amountsof dissociated gas hydrate being present and the use of drill pipes which were buckled but notfractured or breached.

It is noteworthy that following the Caspian incident, BP developed systems for drilling riserless (so-called Managed Pressure Drilling) following the South Caspian and URSA problems, but thesewere not adopted at Macondo, almost certainly due to the high costs of implementation, or becausethe BP attitude in Houston was that the well could be drilled using the same techniques aspreviously adopted in the GoM.



This report concludes that BP were probably aware of the high geological risks involved inappraisal well drilling at Macondo. If they were not, then they should have been. Their managementwere prepared to accept these risks, as they have done in the past, due to the high potentialfinancial rewards of success. There would have been a tacit acceptance that blowouts could occurbut that the conventional well drilling and completions techniques used in conjunction with a“standard” BOP and seabed control equipment spread would deal with them as had occurred in thepast. This is the prevailing and dominant management culture within excessively profit drivenorganisations such as BP which now operate globally in a fashion which is occasionallycontemptuous of the requirements of local regulating government authorities and which can have adisproportionate effect upon the operation of those organisations and the individuals within them.

It is essential that the full story of what happened at Macondo is determined by the relevantregulatory authorities in order that any future drilling operations in such hazardous areas areproperly assessed and carried out. To date this has not been the case and geohazard and well sitereports and the approvals process had become semi-automated and cursory.

It should be determined whether or not the Macondo well still holds the potential for continued flowsof hydrocarbons over the coming years from a breached casing below seabed, as evidenced byseveral instances of seabed seeps which are clearly not natural, as claimed.

A Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution article in Science dated August 2010 presented theresults of subsurface hydrocarbon survey using an autonomous underwater vehicle and a ship-cabled sampler, of a seabed plume of hydrocarbons some 4.8 km from the Macondo location:

Our findings indicate the presence of a continuous plume of oil, more than 35kilometers in length, at approximately 1100 meters depth that persisted for monthswithout substantial biodegradation. Samples collected from within the plume revealmonoaromatic petroleum hydrocarbon concentrations in excess of 50 micrograms perliter. These data indicate that monoaromatic input to this plume was at least 5500kilograms per day, which is more than double the total source rate of all natural seepsof the monoaromatic petroleum hydrocarbons in the northern Gulf of Mexico.

The Macondo well is very likely still leaking hydrocarbons through a ruptured casing string at depththrough seabed fissures and cracks. The hope to date has been that these will self-seal and stop.

“Human salvation lies in the hands of the creatively maladjusted” – Martin Luther King.



1.0 Background1.1 GeneralThis note summarises independent research into the Macondo MC252 Deepwater Horizon disasterin the Gulf of Mexico [GoM], based upon information freely available in the Public Domain and onthe internet. It attempts to provide an explanation as to what may have occurred below seabed,focussing on the geological reasons as to why the blowout occurred in a well drilled in aconventional fashion that was under completion, that is, it had already been drilled to close to thefull target depth. Where did all the gas come from and should BP have taken special measures orused different techniques in order to mitigate against possible blowouts and drilling problems whichthey had experienced at a nearby site in the late 1990’s at URSA, where wells were lost andabandoned at great cost. More seriously, why were these lessons not learned and was anythingdone differently at Macondo which would illustrate that BP were not operating in a risky andcavalier fashion in attempting to drill down to a very substantial oil reservoir prospect.

1.2 MC 252 Macondo LocationThe Deepwater Horizon was a semi-submersible, dynamically positioned mobile offshore drillingunit (MODU) that could operate in waters up to 8,000 feet deep and drill down to a maximum depthof 30,000 feet. The rig was built in South Korea by Hyundai Heavy Industries. The blowoutpreventer (BOP) Stack, built by Cameron, was in use on the Deepwater Horizon since thecommissioning of the rig in 2001.

The rig was owned by Transocean, operated under the Republic of the Marshall Islands flag, andwas under lease to BP from March 2008 to September 2013. At the time of the incident, the rig wasdrilling an exploratory well at a water depth of approximately 5,000 feet in the Macondo Prospect.The well is located in the Mississippi Canyon Block 252 in the Gulf of Mexico, some 50 miles SW ofthe Mississippi Delta.

The original Initial Exploration Plan [EP] Ref. OCS-G-32306 dated February 2009 (Ref. 7) wasreceived by the MMS and deemed submitted and under review on 10th March 2009. This plan wasfor the drilling and temporary abandonment of two wells A and B. It should be noted that Section2.2 of this document indicates that only standard water based (seawater or barite) or synthetic(internal olefin, ester) drilling fluids were planned to be used. Further, Section 2.7 states “A scenariofor a potential blowout of the well from which BP would expect to have the highest volume of liquidhydrocarbons is not required for the operations proposed in this EP.”

Section 3.1.1 of the EP “Geological Description” contains only the phrase “Proprietary Information”and no details are provided as part of the publically available EP. Structure contour maps,geological structure cross-sections and shallow hazard reports and assessments listed were notmade available publically at the time of submission, nor are they believed to have been madepublic since the rig explosion and oil leak.

The risk of encountering shallow gas was ranked as “Moderate” for two sand prone sequenceswithin the middle and lower portions of “Unit 6”, although no further details or cross-sections areshown in the publically available version of the EP.

Much of the remainder of the EP is standard phraseology used in several previous BP GoM EP’s,indicating that BP did not consider the Macondo location as unusual in any way, requiring specialmeasures or particular drilling and completion measures to be adopted.

On October 21, 2009, the Transocean Marianas semisubmersible rig arrived on location to spud anexploration well on the Macondo prospect. Several days later drilling commenced, but was haltedon Nov. 28, 2009, when the semisub underwent repairs for damage caused by Hurricane Ida. BPleased another rig, the Deepwater Horizon semisub to complete drilling operations on the well. The



Deepwater Horizon semi-submersible commenced operations in February 2010 and had recentlyterminated drilling at a depth of just over 18,000 feet (5,486 meters).

1.3 Rig ExplosionThe well had been drilled in water over a mile deep, and its total depth from the surface was over18,000 feet. It was the first well to be drilled in this prospect, by a consortium of three oilcompanies, headed-up by the multinational BP.

On the evening of April 20, 2010, the crew was preparing to temporarily abandon the well they hadbeen drilling for the past 73 days. The previous night, the final steel casing – a so-called productionlong string – had been cemented in place, and the crew had tested the outcome of that “cementjob” only a few hours earlier to confirm the well’s integrity with a series of pressure tests. Such testsare routinely performed to ensure there are no leaks and critically to ensure that the well does notflow when the heavy mud, used to control the well while drilling, is removed. At around 2140 hoursthat night mud suddenly began erupting from the well, pouring over the drill floor and quicklyshooting up above the height of the derrick. It was driven by hydrocarbon gas that had leaked intothe well unnoticed and was rapidly expanding as it approached the surface. Too late, the crewrealised the well was out of control. They took steps to try to contain it and divert the erupting gas,but their actions were to no avail. Within minutes the gas had spilled over the rig, reached theengine room and ignited, causing the first of two catastrophic explosions.

Prior to the loss of well control, the Upper Annular was closed as part of a series of two negative orleak-off tests. Approximately 30 minutes after the conclusion of the second leak-off (negativepressure) test, fluids from the well began spilling onto the rig floor. At 21:47 the standpipe manifoldpressure rapidly increased from 1200 psig (8.4 MPa) to 5730 psig (40 MPa). The first explosionwas noted as having occurred at 21:49. At 21:56 the Emergency Disconnect Sequence was notedto have been activated from the bridge. This was the final recorded well control attempt from thesurface before the rig was abandoned at 22:28.

No satisfactory official explanation has yet emerged for several reported events immediately prior tothe blowout that appeared to defy the laws of physics. Particularly puzzling was the lack of anadequate explanation for the pressure and flow anomalies during the final negative test, the criticaland final check to ensure the well was secure and could be circulated to seawater. Even the mostextensive analyses done on the disaster yet, BP’s own Deepwater Horizon Accident InvestigationReport and the National Commission Report to the President, which largely relied on BP’s analysis,made incorrect assumptions and drew various erroneous conclusions by misinterpreting keyevents. Careful analysis of these and other data widely available in the public domain, includingofficial investigation transcripts, however, provides the only logical explanation. In fact, it providesnot just an explanation for the anomalies but also a unique insight into the genesis of the blowout.

Appendix D consists of the graphic summary “Six Steps That Doomed The Rig”, includes asummary of events which led to the loss of the Deepwater Horizon.

Control of the well was lost, and the subsequent fires continued to burn for approximately 36 hours.The rig sank on April 22nd, 2010. From shortly before the explosions until May 20, 2010, when allROV intervention ceased, several efforts were made to seal the well. The well was permanentlyplugged with cement and supposedly “killed” on September 19, 2010.

Information available publically suggests that in addition to the 6 errors and failures outlined inAppendix D, the following aspects contributed towards the blowout and subsequent problems:

1) Substandard, or very close to it, casing was used that under the circumstances wasinappropriate. and fragile. There is evidence that the drill casing wall thickness wasquestioned prior to drilling the well and it appears that the decision to go ahead was very



much “business as usual” and that any blowouts would be handled in the usual way duringdrilling, if they occurred.

2) At least one major casing segment seal was not installed, and the remaining seals mayhave been completely blown with oil and gas was coming up the inside of the casing, aswell as the outside of the casing between the casing and well bore walls in the rock.

3) BP specified a light and fluffy foam cement and, additionally, and there are likely to havebeen significant breaches and voids making the cement job weak and prone todisintegration.

4) Even at best, the cement is in the upper depths of the well bore where the natural geologicrock structure is weakest,. The oil and gas, which has a natural well pressure ofapproximately 85 MPa is likely to have eroded and corrode through and around the cementand the porous well bore rock.

5) Having been attached to the Deepwater rig by the riser, and perhaps also the drill string,when the rig exploded, shifted and sank, it put various pressures and forces throughattachment to the BOP, in turn attached to the well casing head which may have beencompromised making it even looser and more susceptible to 2 and 4 above.

6) The BOP, to the extent it had restrictions present initially, was probably eroded andseverely compromised by the long term flow of gas and oil upwards and then the causticflow of drilling mud in the opposite direction from the attempted Top Kill. It is totally fuckedway worse than it even was initially.

The BP report generated in September 2010 postulated that the large volume of gas which movedupwards to drilldeck level and exploded could only have been generated at the target depth [TD]reservoir level (base) of the already completed well. This is considered unlikely, but is logical if it isassumed that there had been no well casing fracture or breach higher up in the drillstring.

Despite publication on 8th September 2010 of the official BP internal report into the incident, it is theauthor’s contention that the full story is still being withheld to date from the public and the USGovernment, particularly with regard to the details of the upper (shallow) geological formationsplanned to be drilled through.

1.4 Pre-Drilling Site AssessmentThe pre-drilling site assessment for the Macondo Prospect at Mississippi Canyon 252 included:

a) a regional shallow hazards survey and study carried out in 1998 by KC Offshore, anindependent business development company;

b) a high resolution 2D seismic data along with 3D exploration seismic data collected by FugroGeoservices in 2003, and mapping of the block by BP America in 2008 and 2009.

Although quoted in the well application subsequently approved by the MMS (Ref. 7), these siteassessment survey reports do not appear to have been made available publically or to investigativecommittees and should be immediately. Based on those results and the shallow stratigraphicpicture and gas hazard assessments contained therein, BP made the decision to drill a test well atthe site. Generally, oil companies lease mobile offshore drilling units [MODU] to drill test orappraisal wells. In the case of the Macondo Prospect, the Deepwater Horizon rig, an ultra-deepwater dynamically positioned, semi-submersible offshore oil drilling rig, was the MODUselected.



1.5 Estimates of Reservoir SizeThe plan filed with the Minerals Management Service called for the well to be drilled to a targetdepth [TD] of 18,000 feet, which would be used later as a subsea oil producer.

As to how much oil was estimated to be at the MC 252 site, during his testimony to the USCongress, BP executive Tony Hayward stated that the original estimate was that the well heldabout 2.1 billion gallons of oil. In their permit to drill the well, BP estimated the worst case flow at162,000 barrels or 6.8 million gallons per day. Both BP and the Flow Rate Technical Groupsubsequently estimated that 35,000 to 60,000 barrels per day were leaking from the well.

The flow rate has been factor in determining how much oil was spilled and how much BP will befined for spilling it. The Flow Rate Technical Group includes scientists from U.S. Coast Guard,National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,Regulation and Enforcement, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and outside academics.

1.6 Assessment of Flow Rate EstimateThree days after a capping stack was installed on the well on July 12, 2010, the choke valve wasclosed and oil stopped flowing into the Gulf. Three different teams from Department of Energy(DOE) labs used pressure measurements recorded as the valve was closed to yield the mostprecise and accurate estimation of flow from the Macondo well: 53,000 barrels/day at the time justprior to shut in. The teams assigned an uncertainty on that value of ±10% based on their collectiveexperience and judgment. The flow rate immediately prior to shut in was then extended back to dayone of the spill using a U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) model simulation for the rate of depletion ofthe reservoir calibrated by pressure data from the well integrity test to produce an estimate of theflow rate as a function of time throughout the incident. The net result was a time-varying flow rate,announced on August 2, 2010, that decreased over the 87 days from an initial 62,000 to a final53,000 barrels per day, for a total release of 4.9 million barrels of oil, before accounting forcontainment. The estimated uncertainty on these flow values was also ±10%.

2.0 Potential Well Collapses and Failures

2.1 The Hazardous Nature of MacondoDetailed descriptions of what happened during the well completion phase and immediatelyafterwards at Macondo have been provided elsewhere. Clearly a number of mistakes were madeand the situation on the rig was dire, in terms of decision making, lax procedures and inexperience.However that is not the subject of this document. What has not yet been presented or described inany detail by BP or others, including at least 3 independent investigative committees, is the shallowgeological and geohazard condition down the shallow well section which led to the blowout oncompletion of the well and not during drilling operations, which is more usual.

The fundamental issue is that serious questions should be asked about the BP decision and thesubsequent MMS agreement as regulatory authority, to drill the Macondo well at the locationselected, at a potentially extremely profitable high yield reservoir to considerable depth, usingconventional long drillstring techniques. This decision was taken without any special measuresbeing put in place , as the BP well plan signed off by the MMS indicates (Ref.7). This seems to runcounter to several publications generated in previous years by BP in-house experts and others forsimilar depth wells and water depths in the GoM in regions of potential SWF, such as the offshoreMississippi Canyon. Neither does the methodology selected to drill the well seem to reflect any“lessons learned” from the previous costly incidents at URSA or in the South Caspian.



A Haliburton "Wells and Completions" presentation dated November 2009 (Ref. 22) is indicative ofthe risks that were regularly being taken in deepwater regions and shows clearly that the industrywas still almost working blind using inappropriate techniques without any real understanding ofwhat they were dealing with geologically or geochemically in these sorts of deepwater shelf edgeenvironments.

A Marathon Oil internal document dated 12th October 2010 generated for “internal trainingpurposes” provides a detailed comparison between the original well design and that actuallyinstalled. This also indicated sand units at depths of approximately 1000 and between 2000 and2500 feet below seabed, of Pleistocene and Pliocene ages.

The ongoing BP line of argument on Macondo seems to be to attempt to focus attention wholly onthe equipment failures and lapses which occurred related to equipment at seabed and at decklevel, such as the ongoing saga of the "BOP" and associated control systems etc. and theHalliburton foam cement inadequacies.

That is all understandable to those who have worked in the oil industry over the last 15 years haveincreasingly seen. The reality of what actually happens is somewhat different to the delusionportrayed in documentation. Following the Macondo incident, an "Open Letter" (Ref. 53) waspublished by an environmental activist, Mr. Dan Zimmerman based in California, who hadpreviously warned the US MMS at the end of 2009 about the potentially severe drilling risksoffshore California in a detailed and informed report (Ref. 52) which appears to have gone largelyignored at the time..

At Macondo the following two major geological hazards (or “geohazards”) were known to beprevalent in the vicinity, which were well understood by BP internal and other experts in theindustry:

a) Gas hydrates (frozen methane) [GH]: (see Refs. 4 to 6, 23, 24, 28, 36 to 39 and 45). Anarticle in the UK Guardian newspaper dated 20th May 2010 (see “Links”) suggested thatmelted (commonly known as “dissociated”) gas hydrates were a factor and this is almostcertainly the case. This is the only likely feasible source for such a large quantity of gasgenerated at such pressure and in such a large quantity so rapidly. Upon melting, gashydrates expand to 64 times their original volume and if confined, within a sand layerbounded above and below by impermeable layers, can build up a large pressure on thebackside of any well.

b) "Shallow Water Flow" [SWF]: (see Refs. 2, 3, 11 to 15, 17 to 21, 28,29, 39, 40 to 43, 49 and51). SWF are a recognised GoM phenomenon related to sand layers containing heightenedwater pressures above hydrostatic The reasons as to why these pore water pressures arehigh is still debated, and may result from artesian water pressures generated onshore, orlocked in pressures due to high rates of sedimentation prevalent in river delta areas. Whathas not been discussed however is the potential risk zones in certain areas of the GoM whichare well documented and mapped by the MMS (see Ref. 47 - MMS SWF Map]).

2.2 Gas HydratesGas hydrate zones are known to have been drilled through around the world on numerousoccasions. The situation at Macondo may have been made exacerbated by the presence of zonesof Shallow Water Flow [SWF] in the well stratigraphy in tandem with SWF’s. the use of a thin walledcasing and a very badly carried out cement seal..

However, what remains to be explained is the reason why this blow-out did not get contained likemany others in the past, but was so utterly disastrous. This particular exploration well was drilled inthe Mississippi Canyon area at 1.521 m Water depth in an area well known for Gas Hydrates and



SWF. Geologically however the sedimentology of this area is very challenging. Shallow Water flowsin the Mississippi Canyon and Ursa areas are well known and documented (see Refs. listed abovefor SWF plus BP publications Refs. 25 and 34). The high risks taken simply went too far, as itinevitably was always going to when special measures were not being taken on a well that wasgoing badly wrong and had started costing a lot in time and therefore money.

The BP “Washington Briefing” document of 24th May 2010 (Ref. 9) goes into great detail on the wellcasings and set-up, BOP and equipment. There is no mention at all of the specific geologicalstratigraphy, SWF’s or gas hydrates, This lack of information on what happened at depth is in linewith ongoing BP attempts to portray the incident as a seabed equipment and cement job failure,when the reason was almost certainly casing damage, buckling and subsequent collapse/failurefollowed by gas hydrate dissociation (melting) and a major blow out which wiped everything out atseabed level, and possibly may have done so, faulty BOP or otherwise.

There is little to no mention of gas hydrates in the subsequent formal reports on the DeepwaterHorizon incident, including the following four major independent reports

1. US National Commission: Report to the President, January 2011. (Ref. A).

2. US National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council: Interim Report November2010. (Ref. B).

3. Center for Catastrophic Risk Management, University of California, Berkeley: Deepwater HorizonStudy, July 2010. (Ref. C).

4. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)/U.S. CoastGuard (USCG): Joint Investigation Team Reports. (Ref. D and F).

Methane hydrate migration into any well bore can occur after the drill string has passed through theMH bearing formations. The fact that there was a kick a month before the explosion at about 2,000ft. highlights this potential and is the depth that needs to be considered as the source of the hydratedissociation. The area that the DWH was operating in is known for cold temperatures underneaththe seabed, with the hydrate stability zone existing for over 3,000 ft.. It is also in area known forboth biogenic and thermogenic hydrates. The Mississippi Canyon is a fan that has beenaccumulating a biogenic source, Mississippi River sediments, for millions of years.

A US Congressional Research Service report dated May 2010 by P. Folger (Refs. E) recognisesthat gas hydrate dissociation may have had a role to play at Macondo (p. 5):

“Indeed, gas hydrates may have had some role in the original blowout. If a sufficient amount of methanewere present in the seafloor sediments, gas hydrates could have formed at the temperatures andpressures in the sediments 1,000 or perhaps 1,500 feet below the seafloor at the Deepwater Horizondrill site (depending on the geothermal gradient—how rapidly the earth changes temperature with depthin that part of the Gulf of Mexico). As discussed in the text of this report, drilling and well completionactivities may have disturbed hydrate-bearing sediments, resulting in depressurization or heating thatcould have caused the hydrate to dissociate into a gas. If the gas were able to enter the wellborethrough some defect in the casing or cement, it may have contributed to the anomalous gas pressureinside the wellbore that led to the April 20 blowout. Pending an analysis of the causes for the blowout,however, it is currently unknown whether gas hydrates were involved.”

It is noteworthy that the Gulf of Mexico Joint Industry Program [JIP] into gas hydrates consists ofthe following members:

Chevron ConocoPhillips Halliburton



JOGMEC MH21 (Japanese Consortium) MMS - Minerals Management Service Reliance Industries Ltd. Schlumberger TOTAL KNOC (Korean National Oil Company) StatoilHydro

BP and Shell are notable absentees from this list. The Chevron led JIP has as one of its objectives:

“Steering technology advances through collaborative research so that a better understanding isachieved of the safety hazards involved in drilling and producing oil and gas through hydratecontaining sediments in deepwater GOM”.

The work of the JIP is summarised in a recent paper by all participants (Ref. 4 to 6) and at:

http://gomhydratejip.ucsd.edu/News/Recent_Publications/

http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/FutureSupply/MethaneHydrates/2009GOMJIP/index.html

Considerable knowledge and expertise has been gained from this substantial frontier work, carriedout from 2005 onwards, the results of which were published over the period 2005 to 2008 (Refs 4 to6). To what extent the results of this research were adopted by BP and Halliburton at Macondo is aquestion that requires an answer. In particular, the conditions at the JIP Alaminos Canyon 818 siteshould be compared to those prevalent at Macondo MC 252 in order to determine whether or notthe well was likely to have encountered high saturation gas hydrate or not and to what extent BPinvestigated and assessed the likelihood of this occurring. The final site tested in May 2009 by theGoM Gas Hydrates JIP during Leg II was in roughly 4900 ft of water within the East Breaks (EB)992 and Alaminos Canyon (AC) 21 protraction areas. This area is known as the “Diana” sub-basin,and contains several prolific oil and gas fields. The targets for JIP Leg II were shallow sandpackages that occur approximately 600 feet below the seafloor and 800 feet above the inferredbase of gas hydrate stability. The sands are distributed widely across AC 21 and adjoining areasand are almost certainly those that caused SWF problems at the nearby URSA site.

2.3 Shallow Water FlowsShallow water flow [SWF] is a serious drilling hazard encountered across several areas of the Gulfof Mexico.. Numerous incidents have occurred in which intense shallow water flows have disrupteddrilling, added millions of dollars to the cost of a well, or caused a well to be abandoned. In onesurvey of 74 offshore wells, Alberty and colleagues (Refs. 2 and 3) found that only 34% of the wellsdid not encounter problems related to SWF and that steps taken to prevent or remediate SWF canadd at least $2 million to the cost of a well. A 1998 Joint Industry Forum reported that 97 of 123wells in deepwater GoM in 1997 experienced SWF problems and 30 did not reach target depth.

In a paper published in 1999, Eaton of Shell (Ref. 18) commenting on problems caused by SWF atthe nearby URSA site in the GoM stated that:

“Shallow flow sands can cause problems ranging from preventing full well evaluation to loss of alldevelopment wells at a site. Drilling massive shallow sands underbalanced can cause large washoutsleading to casing buckling. Minimizing lost returns during drilling and running and cementing casing isessential to preserve site integrity”.



It is almost a certainty that sands likely to exhibit high levels SWF were present at Macondo andthree such layers were identified in the approved MMS well plan, although identified as of “low tomoderate” risk. This would be confirmed by the contents of the detailed pre-drilling well site surveyslisted in the BP Initial Exploration Plan, which is available in the public domain (Ref. 7). There are 3documents of relevance which have not been disclosed by BP to date, to the author’s knowledge,listed in Section 3.1.1, entitled “Geological, Geophysical, and H2S Information(250.214,250.215,250.244 and 240.245)

1. A regional shallow hazards survey and study of MC208, MC252 and MC296 and portions ofsurrounding blocks conducted by KC Offshore in 1998 for Texaco Exploration and Production Inc.(Texaco) using HR2D seismic data integrated with 3D exploration seismic data;

2. A shallow hazards report for MC252 and MC296 and vicinity produced by Fugro GeoServices, Inc.(Fugro) in 2003 for Dominion Exploration and Production Inc. (Dominion) based on exploration 3Dseismic data - the seafloor mapping area for this report covered all of MC252 and MC296, whereas thesubsurface mapping area only covered the southern half of MC252 and the northern half of MC296;

3. A site-specific Shallow Hazards and Archaeological Assessment for the proposed wellsite and mooringpattern was commissioned by BP and produced by C&C Technologies (C&C) in 2009 based on AUVdata acquired during January 2009 over a larger area. This was submitted to MMS with the InitialExploration Plan (Control No. 9349).

Copies of the 1998 KC Offshore report were submitted to the MMS in support of the Texaco EPdocumentation for five proposed wells (A through E) with surface locations in MC252 (Plan ControlN 6521, approved 16 July, 1999) and copies of the 2003 Fugro report were submitted in support ofthe Dominion EP documentation for four proposed wells (A through D) with surface locations inMC252 and MC296 (Plan Control N7743, approved 29 May, 2003).

None of the formal reports generated to date in explanation of the Deepwater Horizon incident andblowout have mentioned or referenced any of these 3 reports, which should provide crucialinformation regarding the shallow top-hole section at the Macondo well which may have contributedto the subsequent SWF related well fracture.

The MMS approved permit application to drill, dated 26th May 2009 (Ref. 48) mentions potentialSWF sands and that BP should “Use caution while drilling because of possible shallow gas at 4370feet to 4820 feet BML. Please use caution while drilling because of a moderate potential shallowwater flow at1832 feet to 1944 feet, 3202 feet to 3367 feet 3761 feet to 3958 feet and 4372 feet to4618 feet BML.”

These sand layers were assessed to have “Moderate Potential for SWF”. It should be noted thatthe shallow gas zone lies below the sand layers.

3.0 Well Collapse PrecedentsTwo major drilling well collapse problems have occurred in the past for BP, at the URSA project inthe GoM (Refs. 21 and 50) and at the South Caspian AIOC West Azeri site (see Refs. 26, 27 and38 and “Links”). Although in both cases serious blowouts were prevented, the problems causedwere extremely costly to the company. It might have been expected that some lessons should havebeen learned from these two occurrences, with these carried forward to other future projects.However in large globally operating organisations such as BP, this does not always happen. Theincidents in the South Caspian were dealt with by expertise within BP’s UK Sunbury and Aberdeenbases, whereas it is well known in the business that BP’s Houston operation runs quiteindependently at times from their operations elsewhere, mainly a legacy from the BP-Amocomerger.



3.1 URSA Mississippi CanyonWhile drilling in the shallow subsurface interval, many companies have penetrated shallow sandbodies (primarily late Pleistocene slope channels) that are overpressured in relation to theunderlying and overlying stratigraphic section (Refs 11 and 40 to 42).

Drilling was often carried out using a single mud weight and when the overpressured sands arepenetrated, drilling fluid leaks into the hole causing many unexpected problems. The delays indrilling and problems associated with these sands have been recognised for a long time, and causesignificant increases in drilling costs.

Casing buckling as a result of SWF caused the serious abandonment of several wells and theentire location at the URSA field in 3,800 ft. Water depth during 1998 to 1999. The field underliesMississippi Canyon blocks 808-810, 852, 853.to the West of MC 252 (Refs. 21 and 50). A subseaproduction template was placed on the seafloor. While drilling the template for development wells, ashallow, overpressured sand was penetrated which collapsed or "liquified", which reduced thelateral support to casings ultimately causing buckling of casing that had already been drilled andcemented. The casing had not been designed with a wall thickness sufficient to deal with such anevent. This may have been deemed to be too expensive, but ultimately would have been farcheaper than the losses subsequently sustained (reputedly. USD 100 M but almost certainly muchmore). The Tension Leg Platform site was eventually abandoned with 21 partially drilled wells lost.

At URSA it eventually became quite obvious that several casing strings compressed, and hadbuckled under compressive load due to their self-weight and loss of lateral support to the pointwhere many had to be abandoned. The probable cause was the liquefaction (collapse) of sandlayers and subsequent crimping compression of drill strings as the overlaying shale units shifteddownwards as the lower sands lost strength. There are several references in the public domain onthis subject, including those by BP internal experts on this subject (see Refs.2, 3, 21 and 50).

Several other wells drilled near the Mars, Ursa and Europa basins within the Mississippi CanyonArea, have experienced varying degrees of shallow water flow problems. For example, two wellsdrilled in Block MC 849 penetrated overpressured sands within the shallow section, causingcatastrophic shallow water flow. Both wells were subsequently abandoned (Ref. 11).

Despite extensive published experience in the Mississippi Canyon area and at URSA, BP do notappear to have taken this historical evidence fully into account in planning the drilling of MC 252, oridentify and mitigate against SWF.

3.2 AIOC South Caspian ACGDocuments available in the Public domain and numerous references (e.g. see Refs. 26, 27, 38 andAppendix C) describe in detail incidents in the South Caspian Sea in 2003 where several wellcasings were buckled at the AIOC West Azeri location which had to be abandoned andrepositioned at huge cost due to a slightly different geohazard problem set (weak/unusualoverburden clays, tophole overpressures, highly saline pore fluids, shallow gas and mudvolcanoes). A further near miss occurred on a gas reinjection well at the next door Central AzeriPlatform on 17th September 2008 when 211 personnel had to be evacuated following gas alarms.The avoidance of gas ignition was lucky. These expensive lessons were either learned andforgotten or ignored.

Within the Azerbaijan International Operating Company [AIOC] South Caspian Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli [ACG] prospect in the late 1990’s, there had always been concern about geohazards inthe ACG and Shah Deniz PSA offshore areas. These include mud volcanoes, active faults,underwater slope failures, shallow gas, highly saline conditions and very weak upper formationlayers (Ref. 38). At ACG several wells were lost due to compression and buckling collapse at a



location known as West Azei on a "flagship" BP project known as Azeri-Crag-Gunashli [ACG] inAzeri waters, during 2003 to 2005. This serious problem was not excessively publicised by BP andits partners and the eventual cost was suggested to be approximately USD 250 M .

It was subsequently found that several casing strings had buckled and collapsed, causing delaysand extra remediation costs. Historically, the upper sections of the wells in the West Azeri field ofthe Caspian Sea were drilled conventionally with seawater and gel sweeps. However, seawaterwas found to destabilise the highly reactive soil formations in the surface interval, resulting inunacceptable movements of the 20-inch diameter casing. Further examination identifiedmechanical and chemical destabilisation of the reactive shallow soils as the root causes of thisinstability.

The West Azeri Pre-drill Template consisted of twelve well slots in a 2.8m by 2.6m grid spacing. Inabout 120m water depth (see Appendix C). The plan had been to install 10 wells, drill and completeone well – then batch set the remaining nine 30” casings followed by the next well section 20”casing. However during the Summer of 2003 BP drilled one well and completed parts of nineothers in the template., when drillers determined that segments of same casings had movedlaterally more than a metre creating significant doglegs in the casings at depths of about 150m to160m below mudline. The main deformation was found to be limited to an approximate 10m verticalsection, with up to 1.5m of lateral movement and 24 deg/30m doglegs. The West Azeri pre-drilltemplate was abandoned and the platform location moved with new wells drilled with weighted mudfrom seabed. Subsequently 21 wells were successfully drilled at West Azeri, east Azeri and atDeepwater Gunashli using a dual gradient mud recovery system as part of a pre-drill program. Thissystem of riserless drilling was developed for the South Caspian and subsequently adapted fordeeper water (see Appendix C).0

Pages 93 to 96 of Ref. 49 provide some indication of the problems which occurred at Ursa andWest Azeri in the late 1990’s and 2003- 2005 respectively. There is more data available in thepublic domain regarding both cases. Did BP as a global corporate organisation learn their lessonsfrom these two problem locations and adopt those lessons subsequently in their GoM deepwaterprograms? More specifically, why was the deepwater riserless mud return [RMR] drilling systemwhich was trialled successfully offshore South East Asia during 2008 and which has as a majorobjective the avoidance of SWF problems not used at Macondo. Further details on thedevelopment of the RMR drilling system by BP and others is included as Appendix C.

4.0 Macondo Blowout AssessmentThe drilling had stopped at the time of the blowout and preparations were underway to seal off and completethe well immediately prior to commencing production. So where did the huge quantity of gas comefrom that caused the massive gas surge? The answer may lie in the possibility that the casingalmost certainly fractured at some depth. A general picture emerges which has been postulated bya number of commentators, although not in any of the official formal reports to date. Duringcompletion, the curing of the cement external to the drill casing probably caused an increase intemperature around the well in excess of that normally experienced. This may have been due tochemical reactions occurring as a result of the particular additives used in the lightweight foamcement adopted. This almost certainly will have led to a melting of in-situ gas hydrates over somedepth and across a certain distance from the well, leading to an increase in gas pressure in a zonesurrounding the well, since the gas would have had “nowhere to go”. However such an increasewould be unlikely to have led directly to a fracture of the steel casing.

The March 2011 DNV Report on the Blowout preventer failure (Ref. H) indicates that the pressurelevel in the wellbore rose from 8.4 MPA to over 40MPa immediately prior to the recording of the firstexplosion and that the drillpipe close to seabed buckled due to the massive forces generated as a



result of the subsequent rush of fluid upwards., This buckling and damage near seabed did notallow the BOP to function correctly. This sudden pressure increase is interpreted in several reportsas have been as a result of failure of seals at the well base. This is unprovable, but a logicalconclusion to arrive it if one assumed the full well length was not compromised. However it isconsidered very possible that the final negative leak-off test which very unusually allowed seawaterto displace drilling mud to approximately 8,300 ft. below seabed caused such a large drop inpressure within the drillstring that melted GH gas was pulled into the casing, which then rushed withincreasing force towards the BOP. The pathway taken by this gas influx is of course unknown, but itis very likely to have occurred at weak points in the casing, such as at joints damaged duringcompression of the casing due to SWF compression buckling, or indeed through fractures orbreaks in the steel casing wall itself.

It is postulated that whilst drilling through the artesian water pressured sand layers/units prevalentin the area, there may have been a weakening/buckling of the casing over a certain depth. At somepoint in time, the casing may have buckled in a similar fashion to that reported at the BP/Shell Ursalocation nearby, which was drilled in similar geological/geohazard conditions and in similar waterdepths suing very similar drilling techniques (see previous listed Refs.).

The cement pack around the casing, has been shown to have been clearly inadequate (Refs. 22and 35 ) with the cementing poorly carried out. These cement packs around drill pipes ofdecreasing diameter with depth are highly likely to contain voids and pathways through which highpressure melted gas hydrate could ultimately have migrated, perhaps to a zone around theweakened casing within the SWF sand layers/units. In general, SWF sands in this part of the GoMare likely to lie above gas hydrate layers. When the switch was made from heavy drill mud toseawater at the time of the final negative leak-off test,, the reduction in fluid pressure inside thewellbore may have caused the methane hydrate sourced gas to flow into the casing through casingruptures and then rapidly up the inside of the casing leading to the dramatic catastrophic rush ofgas through the BOP subsequently observed. Consequently, oil under pressure from the deeperreservoir would have welled up and continued to flow, not only to the seabed at the well location,but through the casing fracture(s) and out into formation. Refs. 31 to 33 tell the story of what couldultimately happen and the fact of the “race against time” when it was perceived that a bottom kill ofthe damaged well was the only real hope of blocking off the flows.

The above scenario was strongly suggested in the articles by Lynch (Refs. 31 to 33) and Lim (Ref.30) and based upon available evidence that there were/are fractures in the seabed from which oil isseeping, indicating that there may be pathways from the well out into the surrounding formation.This may be the reason BP were subsequently drilling the relief wells so deep, well beyond anypossible fracture point. There is plenty of suggestion from commentators that there is and wasevidence of several seafloor seeps that BP attempted to cover up or explain away as “naturalseeps”. It should be relatively straightforward to analyse historical seep evidence and locationpatterns with the post Macondo situation and discount this.

No detail has been provided by BP on either the shallow well section “top-hole” geologicalstratigraphy, geological well logging taken during drilling, two site survey reports listed in the initialExploration Plan (Ref. 46) or the location specific geohazard report which is generated as requiredby the MMS for all locations..

Several operators have expressed the opinion that they would not have carried out drilling atMacondo in the way that BP chose (Shell, Exxon, Marathon). This sort of “after- the-event”comment is to be expected of course, but there may be some truth in the statement.

It is considered essential that the possibility of a casing fracture having occurred as a result ofshallow water flow sands leading to loss of support and buckling is investigated fully byindependent experts. Furthermore, the possibility of melted gas hydrates subsequently flowing into



the well should be assessed. If this is deemed to have occurred, then the Macondo well mayremain compromised and would then have the potential to resume hydrocarbon flow from reservoirlevel at some time in the future via pathways already generated as a result of flows out to seabedleak points.

5.0 ConclusionsIt is considered that the arguments contained within the official BP Accident report, the USPresidential report and the Interim National Academy of Engineering/NRC reports to the effect thatthe root cause of the MC 252 Deepwater Horizon disaster was wholly due to equipment and wellcement problems is only part of the Macondo story. These problems are claimed to have beenalmost entirely the fault of BP appointed Contractors and something BP could have done nothingabout, essentially an environmental unforeseen, in unusual frontier conditions. However, this typeof high risk drilling operation has been carried out previously in the GoM and the risks were knownand have been well documented. The complacent arrogant, secretive, insular, somewhat indolentattitude frequently observed within many oil companies is a contributing factor.

However, the ultimate reason for the disaster was the fact that drilling was taking place at Macondoat all, through high risk geohazards, weak formations, shallow gas and very probably gas hydratesaturated formations. Documents which would illustrate precisely what was planned to be drilledthrough appear not to have been made available by BP, namely, section “top-hole” geologicalstratigraphy, geological well logging taken during drilling, two site survey reports listed in the InitialExploration Plan.

The results of the equipment and onboard decision making together with the decision made by BPto drill at the location in the first place led directly to the events of April 20th 2010 and thesubsequent dreadful and horrific environmental consequences.

Based upon evidence to date available in the public domain and the March 2011 DNV Report, itmay be concluded that it is almost certain that buckling and fracture of the drillpipe occurred atsome depth below seabed, probably as a result of drilling disturbance leading to lack of lateralsupport to the drillstring. The liquefaction and washout of three sand layers is likely to haveoccurred. These layers were listed as present in the MMS Macondo well application at veryspecific depths. The MMS approval to drill was clear in the requirement to exercise “care” in drillingat Macondo due to the presence of shallow gas and |S|WF sand layers. The risk attributed to thesegeohazards was assessed by BP to be “low” or “low to moderate”. It is unclear as to how thisassessment was arrived at.

Gas hydrates melted as result of the warming of these zones due to the cementing then rushed intothe cement and subsequently through the drillstring fractures and up through the internal fluid toseabed at high force and velocity, buckling the drillpipe and damaging the BOP and associatedequipment.

Further detailed investigations into the SWF/Gas Hydrate issues prevalent at Macondo are urgentlyrequired in order to determine how risky the location at Block 252 in Mississippi Canyon actuallywas, compared to other sites previously drilled nearby. A fully independent team of drilling, wellsand completions geologists and engineers should be appointed to review the geohazard situation atMacondo in detail. The well site reports which have not been made available and which are notlisted in any formal report to date should be obtained for review.

It is absolutely crucial that this assessment is performed independently and urgently in order todetermine the likelihood of further flows from a fractured casing which may lead to reactivatedhydrocarbon seeps in the future from reservoir level along pathways already generated during the 3months when oil and gas was leaking from the ruptured wellhead.



It is to be hoped that the US National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council andJoint BOEMRE/US Coastguard reports due for publication in June/July 2011 will get to the bottomof this eventually. It should certainly be the case that every well drilled offshore the USA would thenbe carefully monitored and assessed. It may be argued that all future drilling operations above acertain water depth and/or under certain geohazard conditions should be drilled using RMR drillingsystems.

The reasons as to why BP did not adopt “Managed Pressure Drilling” systems in the GoM,developed following earlier incidents in the South Caspian should be determined.

Finally, it is not only in the GoM where severe SWF and GH geohazard risks exist. These areknown to be present in many other deep water continental shelf areas, in West Africa, Alaska, theCaspian Sea and the Far East, for example. The risks of another similar blowout occurring togetherwith the consequences are too awful to contemplate and checks and restrictions are required if asimilar incident(s) is not to happen again.

6.0 Glossary

6.1 Gas HydratesNatural gas hydrates (a type of “gas clathrate”) are solids that form from a combination of water andone or more hydrocarbon or non-hydrocarbon gases. In physical appearance they resemblepacked snow or ice. Gas molecules are "caged" within a crystal structure composed of watermolecules. Clathrates are substances in which molecules of one compound are completely "caged"within the crystal structure of another.

Gas hydrates are stable only under specific pressure-temperature conditions. Under theappropriate pressure, they can exist at temperatures significantly above the freezing point of water.The maximum temperature at which gas hydrate can exist depends on pressure and gascomposition.

6.2 Shallow Water FlowsShallow Water Flows and Overpressures (SWF) occur at depth in the GOM, leading to the followingproblems:

– Casing and Cement Brine Flows - Well Cross flows (many)

– Casing Squeeze Collapse in Over-pressured Sands (e.g. Ursa)

– Excess PP - Low Effective Stress - Drilling Induced Liquefaction

A common definition of shallow water flow found in engineering papers is “water flowing on theoutside of structural casing to the ocean floor,” (Hardage et al, Ref. 23)

6.3 Geohazards

“A condition of the earth’s surface, a process-response system, or an event occurring in thatsystem, of a geological, hydro-geological or geomorphological nature that poses a threat tohuman beings or their activities. The cause of the hazard may be natural or anthropogenic andan existing hazard may be reactivated or made worse by human activity”. Doornkamp (1989)



7.0 Formal Reports and Books7.1 Formal Reports

Ref. Title

A US National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling

Deep Water; The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Report to the President, January2011, p.398

www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/

B US National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council

Interim Report on Causes of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig Blowout and Ways to Prevent Such Events”.Committee for the Analysis of Causes of the Deepwater Horizon Explosion, Fire, and Oil Spill to IdentifyMeasures to Prevent Similar Accidents in the Future; National Academy of Engineering; National ResearchCouncil, November 16th 2010, p.29.

www.nap.edu/catalog/13047.html [Final Report Due in June 2011]

C Center for Catastrophic Risk Management, University of California, Berkeley.

Progress Report 2, Deepwater Horizon Study, July 15th 2010, p. 42.

http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/deepwaterhorizonstudygroup/dhsg_articles.shtml

D The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)/U.S.Coast Guard (USCG) Joint Investigation Team

The Official Site of the Joint Investigation Team

www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/site/3043/ [Final report Due 27th July 2011]

E US Congressional Research Service

“Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Selected Issues for Congress”, Curry L. Hagerty, Coordinator Specialist inEnergy and Natural Resources Policy and Jonathan L. Ramseur, Coordinator Specialist in EnvironmentalPolicy, July 30, 2010, p. 29.“Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Actions and Issues”, Curry L. Hagerty, Coordinator Specialist inEnergy and Natural Resources Policy and Jonathan L. Ramseur, Coordinator Specialist in EnvironmentalPolicy, January 28, 2011, p. 10.“Gas Hydrates: Resource and Hazard”, Peter Folger, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy,May 25th 2010, p.9.

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

F BOEMRE Presentation

“Perspectives on Deepwater Drilling Safety and Blowout/Spill Containment”Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Hosted Forum, September 13, 2010 - Lafayette, LA, p.17.



www.boemre.gov/forums/documents/Panel_II_Presentation_4_lafayette.pdf

G BP Accident Investigation Report

Deepwater Horizon; Accident Investigation Report, September 8th 2010, p. 191 plus Appendices.

www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdfwww.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report_Executive_summary.pdf

H DNV Report on Blowout Preventer

Final Report for United States Department of the Interior Bureau OF Ocean Energy Management,Regulation and Enforcement; Washington DC 20240. “Forensic Examination of Deepwater Horizon BlowoutPreventer”, Contract Award No. M10PX00335, Volumes I and II (Appendices). Final Report. Report No.EP030842, 20th March 2011.

www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/3043/1047291/1/DNV%20Report%20EP030842%20for%20BOEMRE%20Volume%20I.pdfwww.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/3043/1047295/1/DNV%20BOP%20report%20-%20Vol%202%20(2).pdf

J US Department of the Interior

National Incident Command, Interagency Solutions Group, Flow rate Technical Group: Assessment of FlowRate Estimates for the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well Oil Spill, March 10th 2011, p.30.

www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=237763

7.2 Books

Per Holand, (1997), “Offshore Blowouts Causes and Control”, Gulf Publishing Company, Houston, Texas, August1997, p. 176.

Tom Bower (2010), ““Oil: Money, Politics, and Power in the 21st Century”, Barnes and Noble, June 2010, p. 516.

Bob Cavnar (2010), “Disaster on the Horizon: High Stakes, High Risks, and the Story Behind the Deepwater WellBlowout”, Chelsea Green Publishing, White River Junction, Vermont, October 2010, p. 248.

Stanley Reed and Alison Fitzgerald (2011), “In Too Deep; BP and the Drilling Race That Took it Down”, Bloomberg.January 2011, p. 248.

Peter Lehner and Bob Deans (2010), “In Deep Water: The Anatomy of a Disaster, the Fate of the Gulf, and EndingOur Oil Addiction”, October 2010, p. 176.

Loren C. Steffey (2010), “Drowning in Oil: BP & the Reckless Pursuit of Profit”, McGraw-Hill, November 2010, p. 256.

William Freudenberg and Robert Gramling (2010), “Blowout in the Gulf: The BP Oil Spill Disaster and the Future ofEnergy in America”, MIT Press, p. 240.

Danielle M. Birkin and Jonathan J. Asher (2011), “Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Related Issues”, Nova SciencePub. Inc., April 2011, p.

Williams, H. (2011), “A Fatally Flawed Well”, April 2011, p. 166.

Carl Safina (2011), “A Sea in Flames: The Deepwater Horizon Oil Blowout”, Carl Safina. Crown, p. 352.



8.0 References and Links

8.1 References

1. Abbott, K. W. (2010), “Statement to House Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources Hearing ,June 17, 2010, p. 13.

2. Alberty, M. W., M. E. Hafle, J. C. Minge and T. M. Byrd, "Mechanisms of Shallow Water Flows andDrilling Practices for Intervention," Proc. Offshore Tech. Conference, Houston, Texas, Paper No. OTC8301, 1997.

3. Alberty, M., "Shallow Water Flows: A Problem Solved or a Problem Emerging," OTC Paper No. 11971,2000 Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, Texas.

4. Birchwood, R., Singh, R., and Mese, A. (2008), “Estimating the In-Situ Mechanical Properties ofSediments Containing Gas Hydrates”, Proc. 6th Int. Conf. on Gas Hydrates. Vancouver, BritishColumbia, Canada, July 6-10, 2008.

5. Birchwood, R. A., Noeth, S., Tjengdrawira, M.A., Kisra, S.M., Elisabeth, F.L., Sayers, C.M. , Singh, R.,Hooyman, P.J., Plumb, R.A., Jones, E., and Bloys, J.B. (2007), “Modeling the Mechanical and PhaseChange Stability of Wellbores Drilled in Gas Hydrates by the Joint Industry Participation Program (JIP)Gas Hydrates Project, Phase II. Presented at the Society of Petroleum Engineers Annual TechnicalConference and Exhibition, Anaheim, California 11-14 November 2007 SPE Paper No. 110796.

6. Birchwood, R., Noeth, S., Hooyman, P., Winters, W., and Jones, E. (2005), “Wellbore Stability Model forMarine Sediments Containing Gas Hydrates”, Proc., American Association of Drilling EngineersNational Conference and Exhibition, Houston, TX, April 5 - 7, 2005. Paper No. AADE-05-NTCE-13.

7. BP Exploration & Production Inc. (2009), “Initial Exploration Plan, Mississippi Canyon Block 252, OCS-G-32306, p.53. [Public Information Copy; Information Witheld].

8. BP Exploration & Production Inc. (2010), “Supplemental Exploration Plan, Mississippi Canyon Block252, OCS-G-32306, p.60. [Public Information Copy; Information Witheld].

9. BP Exploration & Production Inc. (2010), “ Washington Briefing: Deepwater Horizon Interim AccidentInvestigation”, 24th May 2010, p.48.

10. Brainard, R.R. (2006), “A Process Used in Evaluation of Managed-Pressure Drilling Candidates andProbabilistic Cost-Benefit Analysis”, Proc. Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, Texas, May 1st

4th 2006, Paper No. OTC 18375-

11. Bruce, R. McKeown, J. Sargent, T. and Garrett, R. (2003), “Mitigating The Shallow Water Flow Risk AtMississippi Canyon 849: A Team Approach”, Offshore Technology Conference, 5th May – 8th May2003, Houston, Texas.

12. Bruce, R. McKeown, J. Sargent, T. and Garrett, R. (2004), “A Team Approach to Mitigating ShallowWater Flow Risk”, Baird Petrophysical Inc. Online Magazine, April 20th 2004.[www.bairdpetro.com/Noble_EW_849/WorldOil_com%20-%20Online%20Magazine%20Article%20Features%20-%20Apr-2004.htm]

13. Bruce, R., Bowers, G. and Borel, R. (2001), “Well Planning for Shallow Water Flows and Overpressures- The Kestrel Well”, OTC Paper No. 13104, Proc. Offshore Technology Conference, 30th April – 3rdMay 2001, Houston, Texas.

14. Bruce, R., Borel, R. and Bowers, G (2001), “Well Planning for SWF and Overpressures at the KestrelWell”, The Leading Edge Vol. 21, Issue 7, 669 (July 2002); doi:10.1190/1.1497321,

15. Byrd, T., Schneider, J., Reynolds, D., Alberty, M., Hafle, M., "Identification of 'Flowing Water Sand'Drilling Hazards in the Deepwater Gulf of Mexico," OTC Paper No. 7971, Proc. Offshore TechnologyConference, Houston, Texas, 1996.

16. Camilli, R., Reddy, C.M., Yoerger, D.R., Van Mooy, B.A.S., Jakuba, M.V., Kinsey, J.C., McIntyre, C.P.,Sylva, S.P. and Maloney, J.V. (2010), “Tracking Hydrocarbon Plume Transport and Biodegradation at



Deepwater Horizon”, Science, Vol. 330 No. 6001 pp. 201 – 204, 8th October 2010, Published Online 19August 2010.

17. Campbell, K.J. (1999), “Deepwater Geohazards; how Significant are they?”, The Leading Edge; April1999; Vol. 18; No. 4; p. 514-519. Fugro GeoServices, Houston, TX, United States.

18. Eaton, L.F. (1999), “Drilling Through Deepwater Shallow Water-Flow Zones at Ursa”,by L.F. Eaton,Shell Deepwater Development Inc., SPE 52780, 1999 SPE/IADC Drilling Conference, Amsterdam, 9th –11th March 1999.

19. Flak, L.H. (1997), “Well Control: Ultra-Deepwater Blowouts - How Could One Happen”, OffshoreMagazine, Vol. 57, Issue No. 1, 1997, p.4.

20. Flemings, P.B., Huffman, A., Thomson, J.A. Maler, M.O. and Swarbrick, R.E. (2000), “Overpressureand Fluid Flow Processes in the Deepwater Gulf of Mexico: Slope Stability, Seeps, and Shallow WaterFlow”, Ocean Drilling Program Proposal, p.60.

21. Furlow, W. (1999), “How One of the Biggest Fields in the US Gulf Almost Got Away”, Offshore, Volume59, Issue 5, p.2.

22. Halliburton (2010), “9 7/8" X 7" Production Casing Design Report; BP America Production Company,Macondo #1”, Ref. HAL 0010592, p. 20.

23. Hardage, R.A., Remington, R. and Roberts, H.H., (2006), “Gas Hydrate— A Source of Shallow WaterFlow?”, Leading Edge, May 2006, p. 634 – 635.

24. Hutchinson, D.R., Shelander, D., Dai, J., McConnell, D., Shedd, W., Frye, M., Ruppel,C., Boswell,R.,Jones, E., Collett, T., Rose, K., Dugan, B., Wood, W., Latham, T., ”Site Selection for DOE/JIP GasHydrate Drilling in the Northern Gulf of Mexico”, Proceedings of the 6th International Conference onGas Hydrates (ICGH 2008),Vancouver, British Columbia, CANADA, July 6-10, 2008.

25. Jeanjean, P., Hill, A. And Thomson, J. (2003), “The Case for Confidently Siting Facilities along theSigsbee Escarpment in the Southern Green Canyon Area of the Gulf of Mexico: Summary andConclusions from Integrated Studies”, ”, Proc. Offshore Technology Conference, 5th – 8th May 2003,Houston, Texas, OTC Paper No. 15269.

26. Kay, S, (2005) “Borehole Squeezing in Soft Clays”, Proceedings of the International Symposium onFrontiers in Offshore Geotechnics, ISFOG-05, Perth, Australia.

27. Kay, S., Goedemoed, S.S. and Vermeijden, C.A. (2005), “Influence Of Salinity on Soil Properties“,Proceedings of the International Symposium on Frontiers in Offshore Geotechnics, ISFOG-05, Perth,Australia.

28. Katsube, T.J., Horkowitz, K.O., I. Jonasson, I, Piper, D. and Issler, D., (2005), “Seal Mechanisms inShallow Sediments: Implications for Shallow-Water Flow and Gas-Hydrate Hazards, Poster Pres., Geol.Survey of Canada.

29. Kolstad, E., Mozill, G. and Flores, J.C. (2004), “Deepwater Isolation, Shallow-Water Flow Hazards TestCement in Marco Polo”, Offshore Magazine, January 2004, p. 76 – 80.

30. Lim, B.K. (2010), “The Root Causes of BP’s Oil Spill and the Imminent Threat of More Oil RelatedDisasters”, Online Article, 1st July 2010, p.8.

31. Lynch, M. (2010), “Halliburton Issues Statement on Deepwater Horizon Incident”, GLG Analysis 2ndMay 2010, p. 1.

32. Lynch, M. (2010), “Picture Becoming Clearer on BP Deepwater Horizon Incident”, GLG Analysis 3rdMay 2010, p. 1.

33. Lynch, M. (2010), “ Little by Little, Facts Emerge Regarding Deepwater Horizon Accident”, GLGAnalysis 7th May 2010, p. 1.

34. Mannaerts, H., Guidroz, W., Schersel, C., Weiland, R., Taylor, M. and Care, B. (2007), “the Role ofROV Technology in Offshore Shallow Geohazard Observation and Monitoring: EnvironmentalStewardship in the Gulf of Mexico” Proc. 6th Int. Offshore Site Investigation and Geotechnics Conf.:



Confronting New Challenges and Sharing Knowledge, 11 – 15 September 2007, London, UK, pp. 13 –20.

35. Marathon (2010), Findings and Conclusions Prior to Published Inspection of the Subsea BOP”, InternalMarathon Oil Company Presentation, 12th October 2010, p.60.

36. McConnell, D.R. and Kendall, B.A. (2002), “Images of the Base of Gas Hydrate Stability, NorthwestWalker Ridge, Gulf of Mexico”, Proc. Offshore Technology Conference, 6th – 9th May 2002, Houston,Texas, OTC Paper No. 14103.

37. Milkov, A.V., Sassen, R., Novikova, I. And Mikhailov, E., (2000), “Gas Hydrates at Minimum StabilityWater Depths in the Gulf of Mexico: Significance to Geohazard Assessment”, Gulf Coast Association ofGeological Societies Transactions, Vol. 1, 2000,, p.217 – 224.

38. Offshore Magazine (1998), “Mud Volcanoes Top Hazards for Future Azeri Operations”, Pennwell.March 1998, pp. 38 – 41.

39. Offshore Magazine (2001), “Well Control and Testing: Walking the Tightrope Between Pore Pressureand Fracture Gradient”, Pennwell, Vol. 61, Issue 8, p.6.

40. Ostermeier, R. M., J. H. Pelletier, C. D. Winker, J. W. Nicholson, F. H. Rambow, and K. M. Cowan, K.M.(2000), ” Dealing with Shallow-Water Flow in the Deepwater Gulf of Mexico”, Proc. OffshoreTechnology Conference, Houston Texas, 2000, OTC Paper No. 11972.

41. Ostermeier, R. M., Pelletier, et al., "Dealing with Shallow Water Flow in the Deepwater Gulf of Mexico"The Leading Edge , Vol. 21, pp. 660 - 668, 2002.

42. Pelletier, J. H., R. M. Ostermeier, C. D. Winker, J. W. Nicholson, and F. H. Rambow, 1999, ShallowWater Flow Sands in the Deepwater Gulf of Mexico: Some Recent Shell Experience: 1999 InternationalForum on Shallow Water Flows Conference Proceedings, October 6th – 8th 1999, League City, Texas,USA.

43. Smith, M. A., (2002), “Geological Controls and Variability in Pore Pressure in the Deep-Water Gulf ofMexico, in A. R. Huffman and G. L. Bowers, Eds.,Pressure Regimes in Sedimentary Basins and theirPrediction: AAPG Memoir 76, p. 107–113.

44. Society for Underwater Technology, (2004), “Shallow Geohazards and the Impact on Drilling WellControl”, SUT Presentation Aberdeen May 2004, p. 37.

45. Tahmourpour, F. (2009)“ Halliburton Presentation: Deepwater Cementing Consideration to PreventHydrates Destabilization”, AADE Chapter Meeting, 18th November 2009, p. 25.

46. United States Govt. Memorandum (2009), “Initial Exploration Plan; OCS-G323306 Block – 252Mississippi Canyon Area, BP Exploration & Production Inc., Wells A & B.

47. United States Dept. of the Interior. Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico, OCS Region, (2009),“Updated SWF Risk Map on 4/15/2009 15th April 2009.

48. United States Dept. of the Interior. Minerals Management Service, (2009), “Application for Permit to Drilla New Well; Form MMS 123A/123S, Lease G2306, Area/Block MC 252, ref. BP-HZN-CEC018022, p.29.

49. US National Science Foundation, (2009), “Seabed Sediment Pore Pressure: Genesis, Measurementand Implications for Design/Analysis”, US National Science Foundation Workshop Partnerships forInternational Research and Education (PIRE) Program Project "Developing International Protocols forOffshore Sediments and their Role in Geohazards: Characterization, Assessment, and Mitigation" FinalReport Prepared by Thomas C. Sheahan Northeastern University, PIRE Project Co-PI and Don J.DeGroot UMass Amherst, PIRE Project PI, August 2009, p. 114.

50. Winker, C.D. and Stancliffe, R.J. (2007), “Geology of Shallow Water Flow at Ursa: 1. Setting andCauses” Proc. Offshore Technology Conference, Houston Texas, 30th April – 3rd May 2007, OTC PaperNo. 18822.



51. Winker, C.D. and Stancliffe, R.J. (2007), “Geology of Shallow Water Flow at Ursa: 2. Drilling Principlesand Practice”, Proc. Offshore Technology Conference, Houston Texas, 30th April – 3rd May 2007, OTCPaper No. 18823.

52. Zimmerman, D. (2009), “2010-2015 Oil and Gas Leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf “, NorthcoastOcean and River Protection Association (NORPA), PO Box 1000, Trinidad, CA 95575 ; Letter To: Ms.Renee Orr, Chief, Leasing Division, Minerals Management Service, MS 4010, 381 Elden Street,Herndon, VA 20170-4817, 26th August 2009, p.59.

53. Zimmerman, D. (2010), “An Open Letter to the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, Especially BP“, June2010, p.2.

8.2 Online Article Links

1. 30th April 2010 ; Drilling Ahead

http://www.drillingahead.com/forum/topics/transocean-deepwater-horizon-1

2. 30th April 2010; FDL Article on Halliburton Presentation.

http://seminal.firedoglake.com/diary/44349

3. 6th May 2010; Drillers Club. Garry Denke and Oorwullie

http://drillingclub.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=wellcontrol&action=display&thread=4837&page=22

4. 11th May 2010 ; Halliburton - Higgins Blog.

http://blog.alexanderhiggins.com/2010/05/11/halliburton-prepared-testimony-gulf-oil-spill-senate-hearing/

5. 14th May 2010; WSWS.ORG Various.

http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/may2010/spil-m14.shtml

6. 16th May 2010; BP Insider CBS Eyewitness Account.

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/16/60minutes/main6490197.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody

7. 20th May 2010; Guardian Newspaper Article on Gas Hydrates.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/20/deepwater-methane-hydrates-bp-gulf

8. 21st May 2010; The Oil Drum: What Caused the Deepwater Horizon Disaster.

http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6493

9. 24th May 2010; Sassoon Article on Zimmerman Report.

http://solveclimatenews.com/news/20100524/investigator-warned-mms-2009-about-deepwater-gas-blowouts-gulf-mexico?page=3

10. 26th May 2010; New York Times ; BP Used Riskier method to Seal Oil Well Before Blast

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/us/27rig.html



11. 31st May 2010: Fox News: BP Was Concerned About Well Control Six Weeks Before Incident.

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/05/31/bp-concerned-control-weeks-incident/

12. 4th June 2010; Lessons Left Unlearnt from 2003 Gulf of Mexico Near Spill.

http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6543

13. 7th June 2010; Empty Wheel - BP Well Bore And Casing Integrity May Be Blown, Says Florida’s Sen.Nelson.

http://emptywheel.firedoglake.com/2010/06/07/senator-nelson-says-bp-well-integrity-may-be-blown/

14. 7th June 2010;Mother Jones - "The rig's on fire! I told you this was gonna happen!"

http://motherjones.com/blue-marble/2010/06/rigs-fire-i-told-you-was-gonna-happen

15. 8th June 2010; Leaked White House Document – Higgins Blog.

http://blog.alexanderhiggins.com/2010/06/08/breaking-news-leaked-white-house-document-exposes-bp-gulf-oil-spill/

16. 9th June 2010; GIS Institute Letter.

http://thegisinstitute.org/letter/

17. 13th June 2010; The Oil Drum.

http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6593#comment-648967

[See: dougr on June 13, 2010 - 3:17am]

18. 14th June 2010 ; Washington Post Article .

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/14/AR2010061404375.html

19. 16th June 2010: gcaptain blog inc. Dougr: Ruptured/burst disk subs.

http://gcaptain.com/forum/offshore/4805-deepwater-horizon-transocean-oil-rig-fire-115.html

20. 17th June 2010; Bloomberg Article on February Macondo Struggles.

http://preview.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-17/bp-struggled-with-cracks-in-gulf-well-as-early-asfebruary-documents-show.html

21. 19th June 2010; Faulty Well Design Highlights Importance of Redundancy.

http://www.rationalwalk.com/?p=7590

22. 23rd June 2010; Washington Post: Joel Achenbach; Each day, another way to define worst-case for oilspill.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/22/AR2010062205391_pf.html

23. 23rd June 2010; Market Oracle; Richard Feinberg; Deepwater Horizon: the Worst Case Scenario.



http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article20554.html

24. 29th June 2010; BNet Sinkhole Seabed Collapse.

http://industry.bnet.com/energy/10005034/apocalypse-in-the-gulf-could-a-sinkhole-swallow-the-deepwater-horizon-well-and-bp/

25. 7th July 2010: Ursa-Princess Waterflood Project.

http://mentaljudo.blogspot.com/2010/07/ursa-princess-waterflood-project.html

26. 18th July 2010; Seabed Seep.

http://www.zerohedge.com/article/breaking-seep-found-near-blownout-well-bp-not-complying-government-demands-more-monitoring

27. 18th July 2010; NWO Fighters.

http://www.nwofighters.org/the-truth-about-the-gulf-oil-spill-and-facts-to-back-it-up/

28. 19th July 2010; Wily Network: Oil Seeping from Seabed Near Blownout Well.

http://wilynetwork.com/2010/07/19/oil-seeping-from-seabed-near-blownout-well-bp-stonewalls-government/

29. 21st July 2010; Shell Deepwater Expert Points to Flaws in BP’s Well Design.

http://www.rationalwalk.com/?p=8436

http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/bp-shell-and-the-design-of-deep-wells/

Joe Leimkuhler and John Hollowell Presentation.

http://www.aifestival.org/audio-video-library.php?menu=3&title=639&action=full_info

30. 2nd August 2010; Nola.com - Blow-By-Blow Animation.

http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/deepwater-disaster/index.ssf

31. 4th August 2010 ; Ian Yarrett; Newsweek.

http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/the-gaggle/2010/08/04/what-the-new-report-on-the-gulf-spill-really-says.html

32. 19th August 2010; PBS Newshour: Gulf Oil Plume Map Adds to Debate Over Spill's Undersea Impact.

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/08/scientists-map-deepwater-horizon-oil-plume.html

33. 20th August 2010; Alexander Higgins Blog, Seafloor Fractures. R. Bea and B. Cavnar

http://blog.alexanderhiggins.com/2010/08/20/bp-gulf-oil-spill-seafloor-fractured-bad-oil-leak-years-relief-succeeds-3174/

34. 5th September 2010; Nola.Com; Colossal Failures 5 Errors 6 Steps.



http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/09/5_key_human_errors_colossal_me.html

35. 8th September 2010; Guardian Article on BP Report.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2010/sep/08/bp-oil-spill-report-live

36. 13th September 2010; BP Oil Spill Could Slash Number of Offshore Operators.

http://en.rian.ru/business/20100913/160573433.html

37. 23rd September 2010; Economist Article: Where Did All the Spilled Oil Go?

http://www.economist.com/node/17095664

38. 24th September 2010; Zerohedge, Seabed Seeps.

http://www.zerohedge.com/article/bp-oil-well-dead-what-about-nearby-seeps

39. 24th September 2010; Naked Capitalism, Seabed Seeps.

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/09/guest-post-bp-oil-well-is-dead-but-what-about-the-nearby-seeps.html

40. 6th October 2010; BK Lim Root Causes.

http://bklim.newsvine.com/_news/2010/10/06/5243368-rov-evidences-confirming-worst-case-geological-scenario-in-bps-macondo-disaster-part-iia-of-root-causes

41. 10th October 2010; Times-Picayune Profits Over Safety.

http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/10/bp_put_profits_over_safety_an.html

42. 26th October 2010; ProPublica Article – Jeanne Pascal.

http://www.propublica.org/article/bp-accidents-past-and-present

43. 29th October 2010; NY Times Halliburton 6 Page Report.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/30/us/30halliburton.html?_r=1&emc=tnt&tntemail1=y

44. 2nd November 2010; Economist Article on 40 Billion Costs and Legal Aspects.

http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/11/bp_after_spill&fsrc=nwl

45. 11th December 2010; Macondo Picasso Dreams.

http://www.picassodreams.com/picasso_dreams/2010/12/the-macondo-well-compelling-arguments-for-a-disaster-in-making.html

46. 5th January 2011; CommonDreams.org; David Hammer: Oil Rig Blowout Stemmed From SystemicManagement Problems, Oil Spill Commission.

http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2011/01/05-7

47. 6th January 2011 2010: Economist; Lessons not Learned.



http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/01/bp_and_deepwater_horizon_spill&fsrc=nwl

48. 6th January 2011 2010: Economist, Too Complex to Sue.

http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/01/bp_spill_report

49. 14th January 2011: BK Lim Letter to Congressmen.

http://bklim.newsvine.com/_news/2011/01/14/5843400-a-letter-to-congressmen-on-bp-mega-oil-spill-in-the-gulf

50. 4th April 2011; News 24: BP to Resume Deepwater Drilling

http://www.news24.com/SciTech/News/BP-to-resume-deepwater-drilling-20110403

51. 19th April 2011; The Maritime Executive: The Macondo Well: What Really Happened and LessonsLearned.

http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/the-macondo-well-what-really-happened-and-lessons-learned

52. 22nd April 2011; BMAZ Empty Wheel: DOJ Sits On Its Thumbs A Year After Macondo’s Mouth Of HellRoared

http://emptywheel.firedoglake.com/2011/04/22/doj-sits-on-its-thumbs/

53. 26th April 2011; David Hammer Common Dreams.org: Oil Rig Blowout Stemmed From SystemicManagement Problems, Oil Spill Commission Says.

http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2011/01/05-7

8.3 Miscellaneous Undated

54. Project Gulf Impact Video Clips.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsHl3kn63ZA

55. Australian CBS Documentary

http://wilynetwork.com/2010/07/16/australian-cbs-report-on-bp-oil-spill-censored-at-bp’s-request/

56. Planet for Life [[email protected]]

http://planetforlife.com/dwphysics/index.html

57. US House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Site.

http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2043:chairmen-send-letter-to-bp-ceo-prior-to-hearing&catid=122:media-advisories&Itemid=55

58. Wikipedia Macondo Timeline.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill#July

59. Offshore Magazine May 1999 ; Near Miss » URSA Article.



http://www.offshore-mag.com/index/article-display/24979/articles/offshore/volume-59/issue-5/news/production/how-one-of-the-biggest-fields-in-the-us-gulf-almost-got-away.html

60. World News Daily Information Clearing House; Rarely Seen Pictures Of The DevastatingConsequences Of The BP Disaster.

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article25926.htm

61. Wikipedia Oil Spills List.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_oil_spills

62. Berkeley National Commission Testimony Interviews.

http://calmap.gisc.berkeley.edu/dwh_doc_link/Testimony_Interviews_Hearings/National_Commission/

63. Merlin Database Link.

http://merln.ndu.edu/index.cfm?type=section&secid=270&pageid=35

64. Prof. Robert Bea : Berkeley Database.

http://calmap.gisc.berkeley.edu/dwh_doc_link/

65. UK House of Commons Report: “UK Deepwater Drilling - Implications of the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill -Energy and Climate Change”

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmenergy/450/45002.htm

63. NETL Methane Hydrates Site

http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/FutureSupply/MethaneHydrates/newsletter/newsletter.htm

Encyclopedia of Earth

64. http://eoelivestage.trunitydev.net/article/Stopping_the_spill:_the_five-month_effort_to_kill_the_Macondo_well?topic=50359

Dr. K. Gallowglaich - 20th April 2011



Appendix A List of Associated Attached Documents

a) 1997 Flaks Blowout Article

b) DougR The Oil Drum 13th June 2010

c) BP Initial Exploration Plan MC 252 29977

d) BP Supplemental Exploration Plan MC 252 Relief Wells

e) Bill White - Understanding BP Blowout and Implications

f) BKL Congress 1

g) BKL Congress 2

h) BK Lim-Root-Causes-of-BP-Style-Disaster-Imminent-Threats-of-More-Part-1

i) Bloomberg 17062010 Cracks - BP Battling Early as February

j) BP Presentation - Macondo Well

k) DZ MMS-2008-OMM-0045-7183.1

l) Dan Zimmerman Open Letter to the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry

m) Deepwater Isolation Marco Polo

n) EATON JPT September 1999

o) HAL-Production.Casing.Design.Report.4.15.2010

p) Hardage et al Leading Edge May2006

q) Katsube et al NR Canada

r) Lynch Picture Becoming Clearer on BP DWH 03052010

s) Lynch DWH Events 07052010

t) Lynch Halliburton-Statement DWH 02052010

u) Macondo Plume 1

v) Macondo Plume 2

w) Marathon Macondo Incident 12th October 2010

x) M.A. Smith MMS 2002 – SWF

y) MPcp Risk Management Guideline

z) Deepwater Horizon - Methane Hydrates

aa) Milkov et al 2000

bb) Mississippi Canyon SWF Risk Map

cc) Statement of Kenneth W. Abbott June 17 2010

dd) Tahmourpour Deepwater Cementing



Appendix B - Inherent BP Management FaultsThe technical competence and expertise within BP and other oil companies has been whittled away over the last20 years due to short term cost cutting at times of low oil price and as a result of a deliberate tactic to transferresponsibilities and liabilities onto external consultants and contractors. BP has probably been the worst offendersince their former Chief Executive Lord Browne initiated a series of massive staff cuts and redundancies followinghis managed merger with Amoco in 1998- 1999. This reduction of in-house capabilities and experience and thetransfer of risk to contractors across the board is a major contributing factor behind what happened at Macondo.It is entirely possible that BP’s in-house expertise in this part of the GoM in such geologically riskyconditions was overridden.

BP as an organisation appear not to have learned from two similar serious incidents(URSA and South Caspian)and others described in the literature and operations at Macondo were carried out as if they had not previouslyoccurred. The reasons for this go to the core of the problem. BP have shed so many technical in-house staff inthe last 20 years that there are very few remaining. There are a handful of individuals within the company whoknow the background to URSA, West Azeri and the risks involved in drilling at locations such as Macondo.However, there is no obligation for projects or “business units” to call upon these internal resources and no powervested in those individuals for them to force things to be done differently, even if they perceive or suggestinternally that the potential problems or risks are too great.

There are inherent problems inherent to companies operating in such “fast track” high risk conditions, outsourcingmost of the work to Contractors and with few meaningful internal checks and controls. This has been revealedregarding lack of document checking and control on the nearby GoM BP Atlantis project. There are often detaileddocuments in existence (as was the case on Macondo), but what is actually done in the field sometimes bearslittle resemblance to what is stated should be done. Many desk bound managers delude themselves intoseriously believing that what is written in Project Management Plans and Internal Guidelines etc. is what actuallyhappens, and few of them have been out in the field or offshore. There are always insufficient people fromregulatory authorities to check what is happening and major activities simply become “rubber stamp” approved.

The author has observed that within BP there is a tendency towards a culture of risk and decision avoidance byindividuals, regardless of the purpose of the meeting. It is often impossible to determine who is ultimatelyresponsible and accountable for the operation(s) being discussed. Evidence for this exists in the very BP reportof 8th September 2010. It’s roots lie in the deliberate policy over the last 20 years to shift as much responsibilityand liability as possible onto Contractors, in order to “add value”, whilst simultaneously reducing in-house staffnumbers. This has led to BP staff having roles as managers and administrators, available to be used as acorporate lubricant in maintaining relationships with larger numbers of Contractor staff in the “embedded roles”within joint operator/contractor teams much beloved as a mode of operating now in the oil industry.

When reading the records and testimonies of individuals on the Deepwater Horizon relating to activities offshoreprior to the Macondo incident, it is clear that decisions were being taken “on the hoof” by people with a lot ofrelevant experience, but in conjunction with individuals back in offices in Houston, mostly by e-mail and withvirtually no reference to the original well design or to in-house BP or MMS procedures or guidelines.

The ultimate “paydirt” at MC252 was a prize of 50 to 100 million barrels of oil (BP estimate), which for anextraction success ratio of 30% may have been worth USD 1500 to 3000 million. Small beer in relation to say, theTiber prospect nearby but worth it all the same. This guesstimate is based on USD 100 a barrel. As the oil pricecontinues to climb in the coming years, this black gold fortune was worth the risk taken by BP’s “management”. Itwas certainly worth ignoring their tiny teams of in-house technical experts, following the massive staff culls of theglobalising megalomaniac cost slashing Lord Browne, post Amoco merger. Stock sales by BP managersincluding Mr. Hayward immediately prior to the Macondo incident seem very dubious to say the least.

Recent claims made by BP that the company has fully absorbed all the “Lessons Learned” from MC252 alreadyhas a very hollow ring. This lip service phrase much used and abused within oil companies should usually betaken with a massive pinch of salt. More likely is that BP senior management assumed they had been learnedand that mitigation measures would have been put in place by others and they implicitly accepted the risks, as inthe past. It is now time for appropriate organisations and national governments to urgently check the activities ofthese arrogant, complacent corporate cowboys, at a time when we hear of BP partnerships in Russia and India,fresh exploration activities in Alaska and Australia and fresh plans to drill in deeper waters off high geohazard riskcontinental shelf edges. The culture of almost paranoid secrecy within BP has to be seen to be believed.

There is some sympathy in the oil and gas industry for those few dedicated professionals within BP who haveworked hard on their behalf for many years and decades. However "cost-cutting" and "rationalisation" in the last20 years in order to maximise profit and shareholder and "management" returns have led to this disaster. BPmanagement risked it all yet again one more time and finally lost. However the prize was too great at a time whenBP was and is desperate to discover and develop new reserves in increasingly difficult regions and conditions.



Appendix C - BP Development of Riserless DrillingFollowing severe and expensive drilling problems experienced by BP in 2003 at the West Azeritemplate in the South Caspian (Refs. 1 to 3), a decision was taken to develop a system of riserlessdrilling in order to avoid such problems in the future. The company AGR Subsea developed a TopholeDrilling Package names Riserless Mud recovery System [RMR] which enables drilling the topholesection using weighted inhibited drilling mud, leading to improved hole stability, reduced wash outs,improved well control both with regard to shallow gas and shallow water flows [SWF].

A field trial was conducted in December 2004 following the establishment of a Joint Industry Project[JIP] was established funded by the Norwegian Research Council, Statoil-Hydro and AGR in order toqualify the RMR technology for use in up to 450 m water depths.

The RMR system was used on 15 wells at the BP West Azeri problem site (see previous) and inDeepwater Gunashli and Shah Deniz in the South Caspian. By mid-2007 28 wells had been drilled onBP projects in the South Caspian using this technique, as well as at Sakhalin offshore Russia,specifically to avoid potential problems related to geohazards. By 2007, Shell E&P and the BPAmerica Production Company had joined the original Demo 2000 JIP, with the specific aim to“develop, manufacture and perform a field trial of an RMR system for use in 5000 ft. of water depth inthe GOM” (see Refs 5 to 8).

Subsequently a large-scale field trial was conducted from a deepwater semisubmersible offshoreSabah, Malaysia, in September 2008. A joint industry group comprising AGR Subsea, BP America,Shell and the Norwegian Research DEMO 2000 [the original RMR JIP] program and supported byPetronas undertook this work.

The group set out to advance subsea mud return technology from its established commercial marketof shallow-water applications, 1,800 ft (549 m) or less, to deepwater depths and drilling requirements.Novel equipment and deployment methods were designed, developed, delivered, tested and provenon a demanding schedule.

The shallow water (< 450 m) version of RMR has been used commercially since 2003 on more than100 wells worldwide. The most common reasons for using the system include:

To maintain stability of shallow formations by allowing economic use of an inhibited water-base drilling fluid, which is returned to surface, treated and re-used.

To control shallow water and gas by applying a quality weighted mud system and thoroughvolume monitoring, thus allowing detection and reaction via mud weight to control the influx.

To extend depth of surface casing by improving the borehole quality through economic use ofa more effective drilling fluid, maintaining appropriate borehole pressure by adjusting mudweight based on gains/losses observed, and reducing the logistical requirement to transportlarge volumes of disposable mud.

Conformance to environmental regulations by providing a practical alternative to a riser andpin connector to meet “zero discharge” regulations.

Statoil was the first operator in the GoM to adopt the RMR system, which has been used on theDiscoverer Americas drill ship on the Statoil-operated Krakatoa prospect. The RMR system allows thecirculation of mud, reducing the total consumption and discharges to sea to a quarter of the amountcompared with conventional methods. The cost of mud and the transportation to the drill ship aresignificantly reduced and technology allows deeper drilling depths for shallow casing strings, againreducing the overall drilling time per well. Minimising the number of casing strings in deepwater drillingwhere you may run out of options.

Statoil currently has two drilling units in operation in the Gulf of Mexico. RMR technology hassuccessfully been used by Statoil on the Norwegian Continental Shelf in 19 operations over the pastyears. As a partner with BP in the South Caspian and with BP America a partner in the successfuldevelopment of the RMR technique, the question must be asked as to why it has not been adopted in



the GoM by BP in general and at Macondo specifically, in view of the known severe potentialgeohazard related drilling problems that might be encountered at location, specifically related toshallow water flows , a weak unstable formation and gas hydrates, all common to the South Caspian?

If the RMR system was not considered to be available or suitable for use at Macondo (for whateverreason), when it was used extensively by BP in the South Caspian and at Sakhalin (Ref. 4) then it isarguable that the Macondo well should not have been drilled where and when it was, using muchriskier conventional almost outdated techniques. Could it be that BP in Houston were not fully awareof the RMR developments or rejected its use on cost grounds or as an “unknown step-out for theGoM”? BP are generally not as innovative as Statoil.

References1. AGR Drilling (2009), “RMR Case Study 1: BP Uses RMR to Solve West Azeri Hole Instability

Problems”, p.2.

2. Alford, S.E., Asko, A., Campbell, M., Aston, M.S. and Kvalvaag,E. (2005), “Silicate-Based Fluid,Mud Recovery System Combine to Stabilize Surface Formations of Azeri Wells”, Proc.SPE/IADC Drilling Conference, 23-25 February 2005, Amsterdam, Netherlands, Paper No.92769-MS.

3. Alford & Asko (M-I Swaco), Stave, R. (AGR Subsea), “Riserless Mud Recovery System andHigh Performance Inhibitive Fluid Successfully Stabilize West Azeri Surface Formation”, 2005Offshore Mediterranean Conference, Ravenna, March 2005, Paper No. OMC 038.

4. Brown, J.D., Urvant, V.V., Thorogood, J.L., and Rolland, N.L., 2007. Deployment of a RiserlessMud Recovery System Offshore Sakhalin Island. Presentation 105212, SPE/IADC DrillingConference and Exhibition, 20–22 February 2007, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

5. Cohen, J. (2009), “Mitigation of Shallow Hazards Using a Riserless Mud Recovery System”,AGR Drilling Presentation to American Association of Drilling Engineers, Deepwater & EmergingTechnologies Group Shallow Hazards; January 27th, 2009, p. 20. [www.agr.com/Our-Services/Drilling/RMR-Riserless-Mud-Recovery-System/]

6. Hannegan, D.(Weatherford International) and Stave, R. (AGR Subsea Inc), (2006), “The TimeHas Come to Develop Riserless Mud Recovery Technology’s Deepwater Capabilities”, DrillingContractor, September/October 2006, p.

7. Smith, D., Winters, W., Tarr, B., Ziegler, R., Riza, I. and Faisal, M. (2010), “New DeepwaterRiserless Mud Recovery System Opens Door to Deepwater Dual-Gradient Drilling”, DrillingContractor May/June 2010. [www.drillingcontractor.org/new-deepwater-riserless-mud-recovery-system-opens-door-to-deepwater-dual-gradient-drilling-5313].

8. Stave, R.; Farestveit, R.; Høyland, S.; Rochmann, P. O.; and Rolland, N. L. (2005)“Demonstration and Qualification of a Riserless Dual Gradient System”, Proc. OffshoreTechnology Conference, Houston, 2nd -5th May 2005 OTC Paper No. 17665.



Appendix D: “Six Steps That Doomed The Rig”

Source: Emmet Mayer III – The Times-Picayune, New Orleans

Macondo Report 20042011

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Transcript of Macondo Report 20042011