Machiavelli's Paradox_Trapping or Teaching the Prince

8/3/2019 Machiavelli's Paradox_Trapping or Teaching the Prince

1/13

Machiavelli's Paradox: Trapping or Teaching the Prince

Author(s): John Langton and Mary G. DeitzReviewed work(s):Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Dec., 1987), pp. 1277-1288Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962589 .Accessed: 03/01/2012 20:12

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

The American Political Science Review.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=apsahttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1962589?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1962589?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=apsa


2/13

MACHIAVELLI'S ARADOX:TRAPPINGORTEACHINGTHE PRINCEIn The Discourses Machiavelli extolled the virtues of republicangovernment, yet in The Prince he advised the ruler on how to perpetuate autocratic rule.What accounts for this paradox? Mary Dietz argues that Machiavelli sought to deceivethe prince, trapping him into actions that would destroy his rule. John Langton con-tends, in contrast, that Machiavelli was seeking to teach the prince how to govern sothat the autocratic state could evolve into a republic.

In his most substantialwork, The Discourses on the First TenBooks of Titus Livius, Machiavelli de-fends the idealsof republicangovernmentby arguingon historicalgroundsthat themost stable, solid, and humane stateshave been founded on social equality,political iberty, rule of law, popularelec-tions, and mixedconstitutionsembodyinga system of checks and balances. Yet inhis best known book, The Prince,Machiavelli lays out an elaborate,"Machiavellian"program for acquiringand retainingautocraticpower and thusseems to encouragea form of practicalpolitics that vitiates the realizationof hispoliticalvalues.Students of political theory have pro-posed quite a few diversesolutionsto thisparadox. The prevailing view, it seemsclear, is that Machiavelli s actuallyseek-ing in The Prince to teach an absoluterulerhow to use his power to reform acorruptandfeeble state andthereby o laythe foundation for the emergenceof aviablerepublic.In otherwords, accordingto the dominant interpretation,Machia-velli regards heabsolutismhe encouragesin The Prince as the necessary precon-dition for the establishmentof the kindof republicanismhe endorses in The

Discourses.MaryDietz (1986)rejects hisandotheravailableattempts o reconcile hepoliticsof The Prince and the values of The Dis-courses as unpersuasive. Instead, sheadvances hecontention hat ThePrince sactuallya "politicalact," "anact of decep-tion," a piece of "duplicitousadvice,"designedto restore a republic n Florenceby trickinga "gullible and vaingloriousprince,"Lorenzo de Medici, into imple-menting policies that would "jeopardizehis power and bring his demise" p. 781).This is a novel and provocativethesis,but afteranalysisand reflection t strikesme as implausibleand misleading. It ispredicatedon a selective,misguidedread-ingof therelevant extsandaninadequateconstrual of both Machiavelli's funda-mental values and his theoretical inten-tions. In exposing these flaws in Dietz'sargument,I want to suggest that a par-ticular"nationalistic"ersionof the domi-nant view of therelationshipbetween ThePrince and The Discourses offers a muchmore tenableinterpretationhan the oneshe devises.Dietz (p. 782) essentially views ThePrinceas a well-disguised rap. The "textitself providesareas of 'solidground,'orfirm advice a new prince . . . can rely

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWVOL. 81 NO. 4 DECEMBER1987


3/13

American Political Science Review Vol. 81upon to gain and maintain power." Buthidden amid this solid counsel are" 'ditchesand pitfalls' n the form of sub-versive directives,"concealedby "prom-ises of power, glory and popular sup-port." My impression, n contrast,is thatThe Prince s too long, too historical,tooinvolved, indeedaltogethertoo judiciousfor this to be the case. Puttingit anotherway, why is the solid groundaround theputativepitfalls so well prepared-and soextensive?

Machiavelliexamines many topics inThe Prince, particularly n the area offoreignaffairs,whichhaveno directbear-ing on the problemof maintainingpowerwithina state. And he does so in a rigor-ous, bureaucratic "issues-and-options"style. Why did he not simply relate thesolid counsel in a more straightforward,uncomplicatedway? Indeed, if his goalwas to bring Lorenzo down, why didMachiavelli not just write a short,snappy, meretricious memorandumonhow to govern Florence instead of adensely packed handbook on realpolitik(which, by the way, a gullible and vain-glorious prince would probably notperuse)?The answer,I think it is clear, isthat Machiavelli'spurpose was instruc-tion, not deception.Of course, it can beretortedhere that the most effective trapalwayslooks likesomethingelse, and thisexplainsall thewell-tended"firmground"around the pitfallsin ThePrince. But aretherereally consciously preparedpitfallsin the text?Or, to put the questionin amore manageable orm, Does The Princecontain any advice not consonant withwhat Machiavelli teaches in TheDiscourses?Dietz contends that Machiavelli putsfour main suggestions n ThePrince thathe hopes will induce Lorenzo to dig hisown political grave: (1) that he shouldreside n thecity of Florencetself; (2) thathe should strive to gain the favor of thepeople; (3) that he should not build anyfortresses;and (4) thathe shouldcreate a

civilian militia or mass-based nativearmy.Letus examineeach prescriptionnturnto determinef it has a sinister ntent.

Residingn a ConqueredCity(Florence)As Dietz points out, according toMachiavelli, if a new prince wants toeffectivelygoverna republiche hasseizedor conquered,he should either "destroy

it" or "reside n it" (pp. 782-83). In TheDiscourses Machiavelli (1950, 183-84),1repeats the advice about destroyingcon-queredcitiesor provinces n orderto rulethem securely, but he explainshere thatthe destructionof a society in thiscontextmeans the reorganizationof its govern-ment, the redistribution f its population,and the restructuring f its stratificationsystem. In other words, Machiavelli isapparentlyquitesincerewhen he advisesLorenzo hat he has an option:to solidifyhis rulein Florencehe candestroythe cityor reside in it. What if Lorenzo hadchosen the formeroption, which Machia-velli himself (1950, 184) describesas "thebest means of holding a principality"?Why presentan option here, thus givingLorenzoa chanceto follow a pathleadingaway from the pitfall?Indeed,would anyof Machiavelli's therallegedpitfallsbeeneffective, if Lorenzo had elected to"destroy"Florence?But what about the less radicaloptionof residencewithinthecity as a "meansofsecuringpossession"? s thisa trap?Dietzconstruesthe suggestionto be a ploy toinduce Lorenzoto abandon his countryvilla and take up residencein the city,wherehe could be moreeasily found anddestroyedby a vengefulFlorentinepeoplestill deeplyimbuedwith republican enti-ments(p. 783). Now, thisargument urnson the assumption that the mass ofFlorentineshad not forgotten"the nameof liberty"-that they were, in fact,ardent republicans,just waiting for the

1278


4/13

Machiavelli'sParadoxopportunity to break the shackles ofprincelyrule.Indeed,Dietz'swhole thesisrestson the assumptionthat "the Floren-tines had becomeaccustomed o a repub-lic," that "inFlorence, he idea of libertywas deeply rooted in political tradition"(p. 784).Yet, she herselfquotes(p. 785)apassage from Machiavelli's History ofFlorencewhere he statesthat "libertywasunknown" n thecity. Moreover,Machia-velli contends in The Discourses thatrepublicanvalues, traditions,and institu-tions were never strongly developed inFlorence.Thecity had its "origin n servi-tude,"and then

when afterwards he opportunityoccurredforher to gainher iberty na measure, hebeganbymakinga constitution hatwas a mixtureof herold andbadinstitutionswith newones,and con-sequentlycould not be good. And thus she hasgone on for the two hundredyearsof whichwehaveany reliableaccount,withouteverhavingagovernment hatcouldreallybe called a repub-lic. . . And although Florence repeatedly gaveampleauthority,by publicand freesuffrage, o afew of hercitizens o reform hegovernment, ettheseneverorganized t for thegeneralgood, butalwayswitha view of benefitingheirownparty,which, instead of establishingorder n the city,only tended to increase the disorders.(1950,239-40)The specificimplicationof thispassageis that Machiavelliclearly does not seeFlorence s a hotbedof republicanism ndcertainlydid not write The Princeunder

the illusion that most Florentineswerechafing o regain heir ost liberty.Indeed,all theevidenceof TheDiscourses eads tothe conclusionthat Machiavelliregardedhis countrymenas largely "corrupt" nd"effeminate" 1950, 284-85, 369, 491).They were not a dangerous, rebelliousmass in his estimationand the actualhis-toryof Florence fterthefallof therepub-lic in 1512fully confirmsthis view.The broader implication of Machia-velli'sassessmentof his nativecity is thatit explodesDietz'sclaimthat the purposeof The Princewas to "restore" he pre-vious Florentinerepublic(pp. 781, 794;see also Machiavelli1950, 111). Machia-

velli did not think the old republicwasworth restoring: ts constitutionwas notgood anditscitizens,elitesas wellas com-mon people, generally ackedcivic virtuein the sense that theirpropensitywas toput theirprivateinterestsbefore the gen-eral good. He wanted the city reorgan-ized, reformed,revitalized,and this, heemphasizes, requires the labor of anabsolute ruler (1950, 110-11, 138-39,166-67d, 170-71). Buteven that was notsufficient,because romMachiavelli's er-spective, no Italiancity-state, no matterwhat form of government it possessed,was really a viablegeopoliticalentityin aworlddominatedby largeabsolutistking-doms. The only viable entity was theentire country of Italy, united under astrong (ultimately republican) govern-ment. As Machiavelli observed at onepoint in TheDiscourses,

A countrycanneverbeunitedandhappy,exceptwhen it obeyswholly one government,whethera republicora monarchy,as is thecaseinFranceandSpain;andthe solecausewhy Italy s not inthesamecondition,and s notgovernedby eitheronerepublicoronesovereign, s theChurch....The Church, then, not having been powerfulenoughto be able to masterall Italy,norhavingpermitted nyotherpowerto do so, has beenthecause why Italy has never been able to uniteunderone head,buthasalwaysremainedundera numberof princes and lords, which occasionher so manydissensionsandso muchweaknessthatshebecamea prey not only to thepowerfulbarbarians,but of whoeverchose to assail her.(1950,151-52)

GainingPopularSupportAs Dietz relates, there is probablynomore frequentlyrepeatedpiece of advicein ThePrincethan that "therulershouldalwaysstrive to gainthe favor of thepeo-ple" (p. 783). Machiavellinot only re-iteratesthis advice again and again butoffersapparentlyprudentsuggestions orimplementing t (1950, 64-67, 85). Howcan practicaladvice about gaining pop-ularsupportbe a trap?Dietz's conjecture s that Machiavelli'sreal view of thematter s just theopposite

1279


5/13


6/13

Machiavelli'sParadoxary troops (1950, 44-46, 48, 51-52,77-78). For Dietz, this piece of advice isperhaps Machiavelli'smost treacherouspitfall: "The new prince who arms hissubjects may . . . easily make himself amark for overthrowby creatingthe veryinstrumentof his own destruction,name-ly, a civilian militia" (p. 786). Nowobviously,armingand traininga substan-tial body of citizensmay "facilitateplots,incite insurrection,and inspire rebels."Butwhat leads Dietz to maintain hat thisis whatMachiavelliactuallyhoped wouldfollow from hisadvice?She seems to offertwo arguments.On the onehand,sheinti-mates thatMachiavellihad a highestima-tion for the republicancommitmentsandrevolutionarypotentialof hiscountrymen(pp. 786-87); but this, as I have triedtodemonstrate,does not appear to be thecase. On the otherhand, she implies thatMachiavelliknew that few successfuldic-tators or princeshad actuallyarmedtheirsubjects,and that, in fact, Lorenzo'sowngrandfather, Lorenzo the Magnificent,had actually disarmed the citizens ofFlorence n orderto secure his dictatorialposition. Nothing more graphically re-veals Dietz's carelessreadingof the rele-vant texts and her misconstrual ofMachiavelli'svalues than this argument.According o Dietz, "whenMachiavellidiscusses such virtuous new princes asFrancescoSforza .. or CesareBorgia ..he makes no mention of their havingarmed their subjects, doubtless becausethey did not. His bold claimthat 'historyis full of such examples'[of new princeswho armed theirsubjects] s followed byno examplesat all" (p. 786). But in pointof fact, Machiavellicitesmany examples,includingthe case of CesareBorgiahim-self! As he explicitlypointsout (1950, 51),Borgiafound his mercenarytroops "un-certain to handle, unfaithfuland danger-ous." He therefore"suppressedhem andrelied on his own men.... [Thereafter,]his reputation. . . constantlyincreased,and he was never so highly esteemedas

when every one saw that he was the solemasterof his own forces."Perhapsevenmore damagingto Dietz's argument, inchapter21 of The Prince, a mere threepages after the point where Machiavelliclaimsthat"history s full of examples" fnew sovereignsarmingtheir subjects,hediscusses the case of his contemporary,"Ferdinand,King of Aragon, the presentKing of Spain."As Machiavelliobserves(1950,81-82), "Ferdinand.. mayalmostbe termed a new prince because from aweak king he has become for fame andglory thefirstkingin Christendom,andifyou regardhis actionsyou will find themall very great and some of them extra-ordinary.... Hewas ablewith themoneyfrom the Churchand the people to main-tain his armies, and by that long war[with the Moors] to lay the foundationsfor his militarypower, which afterwardsmadehim famous."ForMachiavelli,thisis a particularly instructive example,because Ferdinanddid for Spain exactlywhat Machiavelli exhorts some "re-deemer" o do for Italyin the famouslastchapterof ThePrince.Although it now seems almost super-fluousto say it, TheDiscourses s actuallyfull of examples of absolute rulerswhocreated popularlybased armies-Tullus,Pelopidas, Epaminondas, the "currentKing of England" (1950, 175-76). Inencouraging Lorenzo to establish acivilian militia, Machiavelliwas hardlyattempting o deceive andruin the Floren-tine dictator;instead he was articulatingone of his deepest convictions, namely,that "princesand republics of modemtimes as have no national troops fordefense or attack ought well to beashamed of it; for . . . if there are nosoldiers where there are men, it is notowing to any naturalor local defect, butsolely to the fault of the prince"(1950,175).Dietztries to make herargumentaboutthe duplicitouscharacterof Machiavelli'sadvice by focusing exclusively on ques-

1281


7/13

American Political Science Review Vol. 81

tions of domestic politics and internalpower. Butboth ThePrinceand TheDis-coursesaddressas well the other dimen-sion of realpolitik, internationalaffairs.And on this subject f there s onemessagewhichMachiavelliwantsto drivehome, itis the utterfolly of beingwithouta strong,indigenousarmy in a world filled withviolent and voracious states. Again andagain in The Discourses, MachiavellidescribesFlorenceas "feeble,"and sheflounders n this execrableconditionpre-cisely because, having few troops of herown, she reliesheavily on cowardlymer-cenaries (1950, 212-14, 285, 317, 369,385, 491). WhenLorenzo heMagnificentdisarmed he Florentinepeople, he com-mitted, from Machiavelli'sperspective,aheinous political crime. Creating andmaintaininga civilian militia poses risksto a prince'sregime, but being withoutsuch a force guarantees his country'sdegradation,subjugation,and inevitableobliteration.

Political Values,Theoretical IntentionsDietz'sthesisrests substantiallyon theassumptionthat Machiavelli'sonly deepvaluesare"republicanismnd liberty" p.794). But Machiavelli was also a pas-

sionate nationalist. Indeed, if the lastchapterof ThePrinceis a sincerecry forrisorgimentoand not, as Dietz suggests,one more piece of "bait" o trap a vain-gloriousLorenzode Medici (p. 796), thenit seems clear that the national unifica-tion, security, and glory of Italy wereamong Machiavelli's most cherishedvalues. The destructionof Lorenzoandthe restorationof a small,feeble,corrupt,and badly organizedFlorentinerepubliccould do nothing for the achievementofthese nationalisticaspirations.The estab-lishment of a viable Italian state could,however, set the stagefor the reintroduc-tion and evolution of republican nstitu-

tions. If thiswas Machiavelli's iew andifhe sharedit with friendsand associates,thenit is no wonderthathe was not givena governmentalpositionin the (ultimatelyweak and short-lived)Florentine epublicthat emerged in 1527 after 15 years ofMedici rule. The problem was not somuchthatMachiavellihad soughta posi-tion with Lorenzo but that he hadbecome, in termsof his partisancommit-ments, an Italiannationalistratherthanmerelya Florentine epublican.

In Machiavelli'sestimation, the firststep in the processof creatinga nationalstate in Italy had to be the emergenceofsome autocratic eaderwho possessedtheknowledge-and the motivation-to ac-complish in Italy what Ferdinandhadachievedin Spain.But this is only one aspect of whatMachiavelli wants. In The Discourses(1950, 116-17, 129-30, 166), he discloseshis conviction that the Roman republicstands as the historicalmodel of what astate should be. What Machiavelliulti-mately hopes to foster throughhis writ-ings is the rebirth n Renaissance taly ofthe Romanrepublic n some modernizedform. Viewedfrom this perspective,ThePrince and The Discourses are easilyreconciled.After a rulerhad carriedoutthe "moral"and practicalprogramout-lined in ThePrince-that is, afterhe hadsecured control over a particularcity-state, developed a strong, popularlybased army, driven "barbarian"orcesfrom Italy, and extendedhis controloverthe country-he could turn to The Dis-courses,perhapsnearthe end of his reignand under Machiavelli's own personalguidance, to learn how to give his newpolitical creation the republicaninstitu-tions and culturewhich would make itstable, long-lived and humane, thus en-suringits greatnessand the prince's(andMachiavelli's) ltimateglory(seeMachia-velli 1950, 145).

WhetherMachiavelliactuallybelievedthat Lorenzo de Medici was up to this1282


8/13

Machiavelli'sParadoxstupendous ask, there s no questionthathe hoped he mightbe and that he wouldhire Machiavelli as chief consultant forthe project. It is not too farfetchedtosay that Machiavelli wanted to do forLorenzowhat CountCavourdid for KingVictorEmmanuel I in the late 1850s. Insum, Machiavelli was not trying todeceiveand ruin Lorenzo;he was tryingto educatehimabout theopportunity or,the demands of, and the glory to begainedfrom, the unificationand politicalregenerationof Italy. This, of course, isnot a novel thesis, but it has the merit ofbeing much moreplausible han the argu-ment concocted by Dietz.In criticizing he kind of reconciliationof The Prince and The Discourses pro-posed here, Dietz suggests that Machia-velli was too politicallyastute to entertainthe naive belief that the "heroicpolitics"of a full-fledged, Machiavellian rulerwould "somehow 'give away' to masspolitics, that the death of the prince[would] lead to the rise of the republic"(p. 780). But a moment's reflection onwhatwe knowaboutthebroadtrajectoryof Europeanpolitical evolutionwill showthat this view, far from being naive, isincrediblyprescient.Absolutismservedasthe precondition or the establishmentofthe modem nation-state, which in turnpermittedherise of mass politics.Indeed,this is what eventuallyhappened n Italy.Alas for Machiavelli,he was 350 yearsaheadof his time.

JOHNLANGTONWestminsterCollege

Perhaps, as Garret Mattingly onceremarked, the puzzle of Machiavelli'sPrince "has taken up more time andenergy than it deserves"(Plumb 1961,190).Nevertheless,Machiavelliremainsatheorist ripe for controversy, and ThePrince continues to fascinate and invitecompeting nterpretations. n responseto

my interpretation f ThePrince as an actof political deception whose advice isintended to trap and destroyLorenzodeMedici,JohnLangton esurrectshestapleview of the nineteenth century. ThePrince, he states, is a cry for nationalself-determination, nd Machiavellihim-self is an Italiannationalist,rather han anardentrepublican.His familiar nterpreta-tion rests upon two generalclaims:first,that The Prince is a sincere and straight-forward"handbookon realpolitik,"writ-ten in a "rigorous,bureaucratic, issues-and-options' style," and second, thatMachiavelli ntendedthe "heroicpolitics"of the (nationalist)princewouldgive way(under Machiavelli's guidance) to therepublicanpolitics of the Discourses.Since I addressed he second argumentat some length in my article and sincenothingnew hasbeenaddedto it by Lang-ton, I will not reiteratemy criticismof the"from-heroic-to-mass-politics"iew here.Suffice t to say thatI still findunconvinc-ing the notion that Machiavellibelievedthat a Mediciprince,once secure,wouldselflessly endow his regime with repub-lican ordini, thereby hasteninghis ownpolitical demise. Langton's first claim,however-that The Prince containshonest nationalistadvice-challenges myinterpretationmore directly. Let me turnto our particular disagreements overMachiavelli's"advice,"after resituatingthe generalproblemhistorically.

FlorentineRepublicanismAt the center of my interpretationofThePrinceas an act of politicaldeceptionstand two key arguments:a historicalone, that Florentine epublicanismwas aliving realitywhen Machiavelliwrote histreatise, and a biographical one, thatMachiavelli remained a republicannotjustfrom1498to 1512but throughouthislife. The latter argumentgives him theimpetusto plot against the Mediciauto-crat; the former gives him reason to

1283


9/13

American Political Science Review Vol. 81believe that the political environmentwould be hospitable to an overthrow ifonly the conditions to hasten such anevent were in place. Langtoncasts doubton both of theseargumentsby contendingthat after 1512 Florencewas hardly a"hotbed of republicanism"and perhapsnot accuratelyviewed as a city deeplyrooted in republican raditionsat all. Fur-thermore, Machiavelli himself "did notthink that the old republic was worthrestoring"; nstead, he thought Florencewould be better served by an absoluterulerwho would "reorganize,eform,andrevitalize"t in orderto unifyItaly.Thus,on two counts-for the city and forMachiavelli himself-republicanism be-comes a dead letter, and "nationalism"risesin its stead.Theseare indeedbold claims.As Lang-ton notes, by questioningthe republicantradition in Florence and Machiavelli'spolitical preferences, he challenges thevery context upon which my interpreta-tion depends.But is he correct?As we know from the discoveriesof agenerationof scholars,from Hans BaronandJ. R. Hale, to Quentin SkinnerandJ.G. A. Pocock, Florentine hinkers n thefifteenth century developed a politicaltheorycelebratingherepublicandealsofliberty, civic equality, and an arms-bearingcitizenry(Baron1961;Hale1977;Pocock 1975; Skinner1978). At the veryleast then, Florence eemsto have been a"hotbed"of republican deas. Moreover,thanksto the labors of recenthistorians,we know that Florencewas also a city ofstrong civic republican practices-of"substantial ndlasting"oppositionto theMedici stretching back to their firstregime in 1434, and of constitutionalisttraditionsespousing equality before thelaw, elections by lot, and freedom ofspeech(Brucker 969;Hale1977;Najemy1982;Rubinstein1968; Schevill1936).Langtoncommentsupon none of thisprevious scholarship (not even to rejectit). What he does declare is that "the

actualhistoryof Florenceafter the fall ofthe republic fully confirms" that theFlorentineswere disinclined o attempt toregaintheir liberty. But to what "actualhistory"doesherefer?Thenewlyrestoredrepublic of 1527 may indeed have been"weakand shortlived,"but it was never-thelessbornof a popularrebellionagainstthe Medici lords, fully in keeping with atradition of republican ervorand citizenopposition between 1434 and 1458 andagainin 1466, 1478, and1494, theyearofPiero de Medici's overthrow. Hale,Rubinstein,and Schevill ably trace thestory of popularunrest in the city afterthe returnof Lorenzo. And if the Floren-tinepropensity o revoltrequiresany fur-therconfirmation,we also have Machia-velli's own words. InadvisingPope LeoXon "reforming"Florence, Machiavelliemphasizes he volatility of the city after1512, warningthat

the whole general mass of Citizens. . . are neversatisfied-and whoeverbelievesotherwise s notwise-unless you restore, or promise to restoreto themtheirAuthority....The general mass of FlorentineCitizenswillneverbe satisfiedexcept the (Council)Chamberbe reopened.... Therefore it is the better pro-ceeding that You open it with securemethodsandmeans,and thatYou takeaway fromwho-everwasyourenemy,theopportunityo reopenit againstyourwill and with the destruction ndruin of your friends. (quoted in Pansini1969,635)The pictureMachiavellipaints for PopeLeo reveals a citizenry that cannot castasidethe memoryof its ancient iberty.Itdoes not portray,as Langtonwould haveit, a populace mmune o thepromiseof arepublicand incapable of reclaiming tsrepublican traditions. What Langtonasserts, then, simply flies in the face ofhistorical,textual,and politicalevidence.Langton also emphasizes, and withreason, the critical attitude Machiavelliadopted towardhis native city as well ashis frequentattacksuponits factionalism,its politicalcorruption,and its failuretoachieve a stable governmentakin to the

1284


10/13

Machiavelli'sParadoxone he so admired n ancientRepublicanRomeand enviedin Venice.Certainlynoone, least of all Machiavelli,everclaimedthat Florence was the pristine image ofrepublicanism; he city was at best char-acterized by constant fluctuations be-tweenautocraticandrepublican ule. Butdo Machiavelli'srealistappraisalsmean,as Langtonclaims, that he had no interestin restoring he republicand instead wel-comed the arrival of a state-buildingprince?I find no evidence of it.

Inthe firstplace,Machiavelli's riticismmay be takenat face value-as evidenceof his refusal to bow to idealisticvisionsand his awarenessof what theFlorentineswereup againstwith regard o theirpolit-ical survival. Without question, as heacknowledges n his History of Florenceand in reference o the Pazzi conspiracy,there were times in which "liberty wasunknown"n Florence.Theperiodof 1478-when theMediceanreactionagainsttherepublicanrevival of 1466 was in fullswing-was certainly one such period.Likewise,Machiavelliwas, withoutques-tion, worried about the inabilityy ofthose cities "bornin servitude" o effectsuccessful republican regimes. But no-where-including in the passageLangtontakesas evidence of Machiavelli'sdisdainfor republicanism n Florence-does hesay thatFlorencewould be betteroff gov-ernedby anabsoluteprincewithnational-ist aspirations. As Hale has observed,neither Machiavelli nor his contempo-raries were asking themselves, "ShouldFlorencebegovernedby a republican on-stitution or by an absolute prince?"Rather, Machiavelli'sconcern was withthe question, 'What qualitiesshould ourrepublic howthe outsideworld,and howcan our sick state have its vital tonerestored?" (Hale 1961, 181). Thus,Machiavellidoesnot think,paceLangton,that oncedestroyed,a republic s best notrecoveredbut ratherthat once destroyed(oroverthrown),a republic acesitsgreat-test difficultyandpoliticsits most impor-

tant challenge-the restoration of itsliberty and civic virtis.As hewritesof Romein the Discourses,"in a great republicthere are constantlyevils occurringrequiringremedieswhichmust be efficaciousin proportionto theimportanceof the occasion" (1950, 538).Much the same couldbe saidof Florence,a far less gloriousrepublic o be sure,buta republic nonetheless and in need of"efficaciousremedies" to restore it tohealth. This is the issue thatMachiavelli,

as political theorist, political actor, andFlorentinepatriot,faces head on with his-torical creativityin the Discourses,withdetailed advice about the restoration ofrepublicanordini n "Reforminghe Stateof Florence," nd with craft and cunningin The Prince.

Pitfalls in The PrinceThe force of Langton'scriticism turnsupon a general thesis about Machiavelliand Florentinerepublicanism hat lacksbiographical,historical, and textual sup-port. I will return to this in closing. Butnow, what of his specific countersto the"pitfalls" uncover in The Prince, espe-cially regarding he Mediciresidence,thecivilian militia, and the building of fort-resses?I am afraidthat none of Langton'scounters succeed, much less do theyrequire abandoningan interpretationofMachiavelli'spiecesof advice as trapsforthe Mediciprince.On the issue of residence,Machiavelliadvises Lorenzoeither to destroythe cityor reside in it. The first choice, far fromleading away from the "pitfall,"actuallydraws the prince toward it. The destruc-tion of Florence,as Machiavelliknows, isan outrageoussuggestion and a practical

impossibility.It renders he truly danger-ous secondchoice-residing in the city-as the only attractive alternative.Thus,Machiavelliwould give Lorenzo the illu-sion of choice even as he narrows the1285


11/13

American Political Science Review Vol. 81prince'srangeof possibilities.This is howMachiavelliusually conceives of thecom-plex world of choices and deceptions;consider also Ligurio'sploys in Mandra-gola, wherehe oftenplays an outrageouschoice off againstone that seems reason-able to old Nicia but one which willactuallycompromisehim.As to thedangerof residing n the city,we mightrecallthat the historyof repub-lican upheavals in Florencewas in partone of thepeople's akingandretaking hePalazzoMedici,which was vulnerable omass action in a way the Medici villas inthe Tuscan hills were not. PerhapsMachiavelli fondly remembered theousterof Piero in 1494, when a vengefulFlorentine populace drove the familyfrom the palazzo, dragged Donatello'sJudith romthefamily gardens,and set itupbeforethepalaceof theSignoriawithanewinscriptionwarningwould-betyrantsand praisingcivic liberty. Such an event-of practicalpoliticalas well as symbolicimportance-could not have occurredhad the Medici prince been fortifiedbeyond the city walls. As Machiavelliunderstood, to oust a prince a peoplemust have not only the spiritbut also theopportunity o get at him.The matterof Machiavelli's dvicecon-cerning "whom to arm" is even moreimportant. I argue that in advisingLorenzoin chapter20 to "keephis sub-jects armed" and make "partisans"ofthem, Machiavellisets still another trap.He lays thegroundwork ora new Floren-tine civilian militia that could contributemightilyto the destructionof the Mediciregime. To convince Lorenzo that newprinces regularly arm their subjects,Machiavelli appeals to history but he(uncharacteristically)ffers no historicalexamplesat all to illustrate he aptnessofhis advice. Thus, he presents he warrantof history to Lorenzo,but the warrant sin facta sham,for theadvisor knows thatthe practice he describes as routine fornew princes is rare.

Langton,however,claims thatMachia-velli offers at least two examples (inchaps. 5 and 21) of new princes whoarmed heirsubjects.InCesareBorgiaandFerdinand f Spain,Machiavelliallegedlyprovides models whom Lorenzo can usefor the course of action outlinedin chap-ter 20. Leavingaside theobvious question-if Borgiaand Ferdinandwere such goodexamples, why did Machiavellinot men-tion them in Chapter 20?-let us turninstead to a more vital question: areBorgia and Ferdinand, n fact, examplesof new princes who "always had theirsubjects armed?"On this score, I wouldsuggest that it is Langtonwho advancesthe "careless reading." His misreadinghingeson what shouldbe the obvious dif-ferencebetween a "civilianmilitia"of thekind Machiavelli ecommends o Lorenzo,and a "privatearmy"or "national roops"which he credits Borgia and Ferdinand,respectively, with establishing. To putthis otherwise,Machiavellisurely appre-ciates that in the Romagna (the greatestsource of mercenaries)Borgiareliesupon"his own men" and that in Spain Fer-dinand taxed the people to build up hismilitary might. As a result, neither wasbeholdento foreignsoldiers.ButnowheredoesMachiavelliequatetheiractionswiththe creationof an arms-bearing itizenry.And it is the latter that he counselsLorenzo to createin chapter20, when inessence he advises the rearmingof a for-merly republican ity. Thus, theexamplesof Borgiaand Ferdinandare neitheraptnor relevantin this context. In fact, theexample of Borgia could be counter-productive, so Machiavellidoes not men-tion him, just as he does not mention ilMagnifico, Lorenzo'sgrandfather,who,disarmed the Florentines and was themost successfulof all the Medicilords.

These examplesare important.Never-theless,I think thatby seizingupon them,Langton ultimately dodges the mostimportant question of all. RegardlessofwhetherBorgiaor Ferdinand it thebill, is1286


12/13

Machiavelli'sParadoxMachiavelli's dviceon armingone'ssub-jects helpful counsel for a Medici inFlorence?Langtonhimself concedes that"creating and maintaining a civilianmilitiaposes risks to a prince'sregime."Preciselysol But in admittingas muchhesimplybegs the crucialquestion;he doesnot resolve it, nor does he persuasivelychallenge the contextual and historicalevidence I present in order to revealMachiavelli'sdeception.To counter my interpretation ofMachiavelli'sadvice on fortresses,Lang-tonturns o theDiscourses,and notesthatthere,too, Machiavelli s charyof fortressbuilding and urges that the prince relyinsteaduponthe good will of his subjects.He seemsto imply that on matterswherethere is no contradictionbetween ThePrince and Machiavelli'sother writings(especiallythe Discourses)there must beno deceptionat work in The Prince.I seeno reason to accept such an interpreta-tion, unlessone assumes(asI do not) thateverything Machiavelli expresses else-where can be read as the "truths" hatexpose the "lies"of The Prince. If, how-ever, this is Langton'spresumption,heneeds to be moreconsistent n his applica-tion of it, andacknowledgenot only thosepassagesthat seemto point to a samenessin Machiavelli'sadvice, but also accountfor those passageswhere strikingcontra-dictionsappear.Hemakesno attempt,forexample, to explain the advice againstfortressbuilding in The Prince in termsof Machiavelli's letter to Guicciardini,where Machiavelliequatesthe successfulMediceanconquest of Florencepreciselywith the buildingof a fortezza. Nor-totake another example of importanceinmy essay but unacknowledgedby Lang-ton-does he confrontthe counselagainstliberality n The Princewith Machiavelli'streatmentof it in the History of Florenceas a valuableMedicean actic to maintainpower. Nor does Langtontry to explainhow Machiavelli'sdictate to Lorenzoto"buildupon the people"and be wary of

the nobility squares with his straight-forward comment to Pope Leo that aprincein Florence"despoiledof Nobilitycannot sustain the burden of the Prin-cipality,"and thus mustcreate a "middlegroup"between himself and the generalpublic (Pansini 1969, 620). By simplyasserting that the latter is a "strainedinterpretation,"Langton again sidestepsthe intriguingand difficult ssues. He cer-tainly offersno explanation or them.Pitfalls aside, Langton's nterpretationfails finally to confront the methodo-logicalpremisebehindmy readingof ThePrince-that genuinelyhistoricalstudy isthe indispensablepreconditionfor inter-pretingpolitical texts of the past. Otherthan a few (unsubstantiated)assertionsabout Florentinerepublicanism,Langtonoffers no historical reading of Machia-velli's treatise and uses descriptionstheauthor could not in principle haveacceptedas his. So, for example,we aregiven the nineteenth-centuryanguageof"nationalist spirations" r the twentieth-century conception of a "viable geo-political entity." Furthermore,Langtonwould have us accept an ahistoricaldescription of The Prince and the Dis-coursesas works of political iterature.Asnoted, he describes he formeras writtenin a "bureaucratic'issues-and-options'style,"andrhetoricallyhe askswhy, if myinterpretation s correct, did Machiavellinot simply write a "short,snappy, mere-tricious memorandum?"But these areanachronisms.The bureaucraticmemo-randum and the "whitepaper"were notliteraryoptions in the fifteenthcentury,and within the existing genre of theMirror of Princes tracts The Prince isremarkably hort and snappy.In his conclusion, Langtonshifts froman ahistoricalto a suprahistorical nter-pretationof Machiavelli's ntentions.Hepraises the Florentine epublican or hav-ing the prescience to anticipatenothingless than "the political evolution" ofEuropedown throughthe nineteenthcen-

1287


13/13

American Political Science Review Vol. 81tury. Among its lesserfaults, this creditsMachiavelliwith a visionof politicalcrea-tion as a linearprogress,a viewhe didnothold nor could have held. To the con-trary,his own clearlyexpressedvision ofthe cyclical movement of glory, decay,and regeneration, or anacyclosis, hasmore to do with the revolutionof orderand disorderthan with the evolution of"mass" from "absolutist" politics(D'Amico1984, 132). Even more troub-ling, however, is Langton'sevidentwill-ingness to subscribeto an overly simpli-fied view of Europeanhistory-only toreconstitute Machiavelli's contributionboth to it and to political thought moregenerallyas a grandmomentin the telosof the modem nation-state.Writing his-tory backwards,Langtonwould have usunderstand Machiavelli as "350 yearsahead of his time"!Commentatorsmaywell takeissue withthisor thatinterpreta-tion of ThePrince,including he "politicsof deception" findthere.ButIwould liketo suggest that we can makeheadway inour controversiesover the meaning ofMachiavelli's little treatise only if wereturn it to the period in which it waswrittenand examineMachiavelli's nten-tionswithinhis own time, not aheadof it.

MARYG. DIETzUniversityof Minnesota

ReferencesBaron, Hans. 1961. Machiavelli: The RepublicanCitizen and the Author of The Prince. EnglishHistorical Review 299:217-53.Brucker, Gene. 1969. Renaissance Florence. Berke-ley: University of California Press.D'Amico, Jack. 1984. Order from Disorder: Machia-velli on "Cyclicity." Canadian Journal of ItalianStudies 7:132-47.Dietz, Mary G. 1986. Trapping the Prince: Machia-velli and the Politics of Deception. AmericanPolitical Science Review 80:777-99.Hale, John Rigby. 1961. Machiavelli and the

Renaissance. London: English University Press.Hale, John Rigby. 1977. Florence and the Medici.London: Thames & Hudson.Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1950. The Prince and theDiscourses. Trans. LuigiRicci and Christian Det-mold. New York: Modern Library.Najemy, John. 1982. Machiavelli and the Medici:The Lessons of Florentine History. RenaissanceQuarterly 35:551-76.Pansini, Anthony. 1969. Niccolo Machiavelli andthe United States of America. Greenvale, NY:Greenvale.Plumb, John H. 1961. The Italian Renaissance.New York: American Heritage.Pocock, John G. A. 1975. The MachiavellianMoment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Rubinstein, Nicolai. 1968. Constitutionalism andMedici Ascendency. In Florentine Studies. ed.author. London: Farber & Farber.Schevill, Ferdinand. 1936. History of Florence fromthe Founding of the City through the Renais-sance. New York: Ungar.Skinner, Quentin. 1978. The Foundations of ModernPolitical Thought. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press.

1288

Machiavelli's Paradox_Trapping or Teaching the Prince

Documents

Transcript of Machiavelli's Paradox_Trapping or Teaching the Prince