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The information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the media or any person not authorised to receive it.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY

LAND WARFARE DOCTRINE

LWD 2-0

INTELLIGENCE

This publication supersedes Land Warfare Doctrine 2-0, Intelligence, 2008.

© This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission from Land Doctrine Centre, Army Knowledge Group, Tobruk Barracks, PUCKAPUNYAL VIC 3662.

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Issued by command of the Chief of Army

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AUSTRALIAN ARMY

LAND WARFARE DOCTRINE

LWD 2-0

INTELLIGENCE

© Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army) 2014

28 October 2014

C. J. RuleColonelCommandantDefence Command Support Training Centre

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CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

1. This document contains Australian Defence information. All Defence information, whether classified or not, is protected from unauthorised disclosure under the Crimes Act 1914 (Commonwealth). Defence information may only be released in accordance with the electronic Defence Security Manual.

2. This publication is not to be released outside of the Australian Defence Organisation without approval from the Release Authority. Requests for release of this publication are to be submitted to SO1 Doctrine, Land Doctrine Centre.

3. When this information is supplied to Commonwealth or foreign governments, the recipient is to ensure that it will:

a. be safeguarded under rules designed to give it the equivalent standard of security to that maintained for it by Australia;

b. not be released to a third country without Australian consent;

c. not be used for other than military purposes;

d. not be divulged to a non-Defence organisation unless that organisation is sponsored and cleared by an accepted Defence organisation (‘sponsoring’ means giving an assurance that the organisation has a need to know for Defence purposes; ‘clearing’ means guaranteeing for security); and

e. not be downgraded or declassified without Australian Government approval

Released to: .........................................................................................

Released by: .........................................................................................

.........................................................................................(Signature and Appointment)

Date Released: .........................................................................................

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AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE

1. Proposals for amendments or additions to the text of this publication should be made through normal channels to the sponsor. To facilitate this, there are amendment proposal forms at the back of this publication.

2. It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the undermentioned amendment lists have been made in this publication.

3. All superseded Amendment Certificates should be retained at the rear of the publication for audit purposes.

Land Doctrine Centre, Army Knowledge Group is responsible for the management of this publication. The sponsor of this publication is Commandant Defence Command Support Training Centre. The doctrine contained herein was approved on 28 October 2014.

Amendment List

Produced ByPublication

Amended ByDate

AmendedNumberDate of

Endorsement

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

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DISTRIBUTION

The distribution list for this publication can be obtained from Land Doctrine Centre, Army Knowledge Group, Puckapunyal. Addressees are responsible for internal distribution within their organisation.

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PREFACE

Aim

1. The aim of this publication is to describe intelligence in the conduct of land warfare.

Level

2. This publication is the basic reference on intelligence, for use by the following:

a. commanders and operations and intelligence staff in all headquarters and units,

b. intelligence units, and

c. units with intelligence and information collection roles and tasks.

3. This publication is designed to provide intelligence practitioners and non-intelligence personnel with a basic theoretical understanding of the intelligence process and the relationships, interactions and responsibilities of intelligence staff. It provides an overview of such subjects as intelligence relationships with operations staff, the operation of the all-source cell, and collection planning and management. It further provides an introduction to the range of specialist sources and agencies available for collection in support of operations, and the applications and tools to assist intelligence staff in the production and dissemination of intelligence.

4. Further details on intelligence as a product of staff and analytical effort, especially intelligence preparation of the battlespace, and further details on intelligence as an activity within the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance collection system, are available in Land Warfare Doctrine 2-1, Intelligence Staff Duties.

Scope

5. This publication outlines intelligence theory and roles, and the tasks and responsibilities of intelligence staff and units. The scope includes:

a. the conduct of intelligence;

This publication supersedes Land Warfare Doctrine 2-0, Intelligence, 2008.

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b. intelligence theory;

c. roles, responsibilities and organisations; and

d. intelligence functions in the land environment.

Associated Publications

6. This publication should be read in conjunction with other publications and documents, in particular:

a. Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 2.0, Intelligence;

b. Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.7, Collection Operations;

c. Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power;

d. Land Warfare Doctrine 2-1, Intelligence Staff Duties;

e. Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0, Operations;

f. Land Warfare Doctrine 5-1-4, The Military Appreciation Process;

g. Land Warfare Procedures - Intelligence 2-1-5, Field Security; and

h. Land Warfare Procedures - Intelligence 2-1-8, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.

Doctrine Online

7. This and other doctrine publications are available via the Doctrine Online website located at: intranet.defence.gov.au/armyweb/sites/Doctrine-Online. Paper copies may be out of date. Doctrine Online is the authoritative source for current doctrine. Users are to ensure currency of all doctrine publications against the Doctrine Online library.

Gender

8. This publication has been prepared with gender-neutral language.

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CONTENTS

COVER 1

TITLE PAGE 3

CONDITIONS OF RELEASE 4

AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE 5

DISTRIBUTION 6

PREFACE 7

ILLUSTRATIONS 11

TABLES 12

GLOSSARY 13

ABBREVIATIONS 17

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1-1

NATURE OF CONFLICT 1-1

INTELLIGENCE 1-2

PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE 1-4

CHAPTER 2. INTELLIGENCE THEORY 2-1

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 2-1

DIRECTION PHASE 2-2

COLLECTION PLANNING 2-6

THE COLLECTION PHASE AND COLLECTION MANAGEMENT 2-6

TASKING SOURCES AND AGENCIES 2-10

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PROCESSING PHASE 2-11

ANNEX A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE FORMAT

ANNEX B THE ADMIRALTY VALUATION GRADING SYSTEM

ANNEX C INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS METHODS AND TECHNIQUES FOR INTEGRATION AND INTERPRETATION

ANNEX D GUIDE TO BRIEFING FORMATS

CHAPTER 3. ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND ORGANISATIONS 3-1

INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE 3-1

TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE 3-5

STAFF FUNCTIONS, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 3-6

LAND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES 3-7

CHAPTER 4. INTELLIGENCE STAFF FUNCTIONS AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 4-1

INTELLIGENCE STAFF FUNCTIONS 4-1

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ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 2–1: THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 2-1

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TABLES

TABLE 2–1: EXAMPLES OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 2-3

TABLE 2–2: ADMIRALTY GRADING SYSTEM 2-16

TABLE 2–3: DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE 2-18

TABLE 2–4: EXAMPLE OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC 2-19

TABLE 2–5: EXAMPLE OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC 2-20

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GLOSSARY

1. The principal source for Australian Defence Force terms and definitions is the Australian Defence Glossary located at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms. Terms and definitions contained within this publication are in accordance with the business rules, guidelines and conventions for the Australian Defence Glossary at the time of its release.

adversaryA party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged.

assumptionA supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander, in the process of planning, to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action.

battlespaceThose geographical, physical and virtual areas; that includes the traditional domains of land, air and sea, space, the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace, which are of concern to a commander.

centre of gravityCharacteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.

collectionIn intelligence usage, the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements.

collection managementIn intelligence usage, the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results and re-tasking, as required.

counterintelligenceThe aspect of intelligence devoted to destroying the effectiveness of hostile foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information

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against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations, equipment, records or material against sabotage.

deceptionThose measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce behaviours prejudicial to their interests.

espionageThe systematic use of spies by a government to discover the military and political secrets of other nations.

essential elements of friendly informationKey questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness.

field intelligenceAn umbrella term describing the general intelligence collection activities conducted by intelligence personnel within a defined area of operations. This may rely heavily on, but is not limited to, the exploitation of low grade human sources.

field securityAn umbrella term describing the local security support provided by intelligence personnel within an area of operations or rear area. It includes, but is not limited to, the provision of advice and supervision of operations security, movement security, personnel security, counter-sabotage security and field censorship.

force protectionAll measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force.

human intelligenceA category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.

imagery intelligenceIntelligence derived from the exploitation of imagery, acquired by photographic, radar, electro-optical, infra-red, thermal and multi-spectral sensors, which can be hand-held, ground-based, seaborne, or carried by air or space platforms.

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indicatorIn intelligence usage, an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action.

information requirementsIn intelligence usage, those items of information regarding the enemy and their environment which need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander.

intelligence estimateThe appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption.

intelligence preparation of the battlespaceA systematic and continuous process that analyses threat and environment, in time and space, during the military appreciation process and the conduct of operations.

intelligence requirementAny subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence.

operations securityThe process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces.

possibleIn intelligence usage, a term applied to the classification of intelligence or information reported by one independent source that was derived from some other source.

probableIn intelligence usage, a term applied to the classification of intelligence or information reported by two independent unrelated sources. Note: No more than one source may be solely based on analytical judgment.

reconnaissanceA mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

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securityThe condition achieved when designated information, materiel, personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as well as against loss or unauthorised disclosure.

security intelligenceIntelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile organisations or individuals who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.

signals intelligenceThe generic term used to describe all intelligence derived from exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum, and comprises communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence.

specific orders or requestsThose orders or requests used to generate planning and execution of a collection mission or analysis of data base information.

stakeholderA person, entity or organisation with a pecuniary and/or significant interest or influence in a particular issue.

subversionAction designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its citizens.

terrorismThe unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.

threatA potential event or intention that could adversely affect the security of a facility, asset or function.

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ABBREVIATIONS

1. The principal source for Australian Defence Force abbreviations is the Australian Defence Glossary located at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms. Abbreviations contained within this publication are in accordance with the business rules, guidelines and conventions for the Australian Defence Glossary at the time of its release. The following abbreviations are used throughout this publication; however, commonly used terms have been presented in their abbreviated format throughout the publication and have not been included in this list

ADFIS Australian Defence Force Investigative ServiceAH advanced humanAO area of operationsAOE analysis of the operating environmentASC all-source cellCCIR commander’s critical information requirementCI counterintelligenceCM collection managerCOG centre of gravityDIS Defence intelligence systemEW electronic warfareFE force elementFI field intelligenceFS field securityGIS geographic information systemHUMINT human intelligenceIA information actionsIPB intelligence preparation of the battlespaceIR intelligence requirementISE intelligence support elementISP intelligence support planISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissanceOPSEC operations securityPSYOPS psychological operationsRFI request for information or intelligenceRI regional intelligenceSANDA sources and agenciesSOR specific orders or requestsTF task force

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

SECTION 1-1. NATURE OF CONFLICT

1. Conflict is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous, and therefore is chaotic. This chaos is the result of the complex interaction of friction, danger, uncertainty and chance – the enduring features of war – and is strongly influenced by human interaction and physical terrain. Warfare continues to be fundamentally influenced by challenges magnified by the interaction between chance, emotion, and the pursuit of rational objectives. Intelligence is a primary tool in understanding and making effective use of the information that is being projected from within the contemporary operating environment.

2. It is the commander’s direction of intelligence effort and integration of the broader intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) framework that will ultimately achieve decision superiority. Intelligence plays a leading role in achieving the following:

a. Asymmetric Advantage. Conflict has always involved one side seeking an asymmetric advantage over the other by exploiting surprise, the creative use of technology or novel methods of operation. Effective intelligence systems provide the basis for understanding where and how to achieve asymmetric advantage.

b. Challenges of Land Warfare. The challenges of land warfare will develop and evolve quickly. Intelligence will play a key role in gaining control of a situation and consequently reducing risk for the commander. Commanders must maintain an operational mindset at all times. Intelligence sources will be vital in the identification and analysis of:

(1) Multidimensional Battle. Conflict will be conducted in and from the air, land, sea and space; in the electromagnetic spectrum; in cyberspace; and in the perceptual domain. Intelligence feeds from within and across the multidimensional battlespace will be paramount to mission success.

(2) Perception Battle. The battle for the hearts and minds of domestic and international audiences is a decisive element of warfare. This battle requires a combination of effective information actions (IA) and information dominance.

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(3) Information Battle. Warfare in the contemporary operating environment will normally require land forces to fight for, and not necessarily with, information. As a consequence, situational understanding will flow from physical interaction with the problem rather than from remote analysis. Success in the information battle is critical to generating information dominance and enabling force agility and adaptability in the competitive learning environment of the complex battlespace.

(4) Density of Battle. The battlespace is becoming increasingly non-contiguous. The combination of advanced sensors, communications and weapons means that the exposure of forces will lead to their rapid destruction. To avoid this, combatants are forced to either avoid detection or, if that is impossible, make discrimination between targets and non-targets so difficult that stand-off engagement is not practicable.

(5) Pace of Battle. As a rule, conflicts will be long and battles short, intense and bloody. The challenge for intelligence is to balance the information requirements with the rate of effort and the pace of battle.

(6) Soldier’s Battle. The current battlespace is more complex than the battlefield of the past. The disaggregation of the battlespace places more responsibility on junior commanders within the intelligence community and will require them to operate at levels not previously appreciated.

(7) Homeland Battle. Protection of the homeland cannot be separated from the conduct of operations offshore. Tactical actions taken by the enemy in the zone of immediate operations will seek to create strategic outcomes on Australian territory. This will require a continuous monitoring by intelligence agencies across both the domestic and international environments. The use of shared intelligence will be paramount to ensure coverage of all intelligence requirements (IR).

SECTION 1-2. INTELLIGENCE

3. ADDP 2.0, Intelligence is the authoritative text for intelligence.

4. Intelligence in a land context is the product of knowledge and understanding of the terrain, weather, activities, capabilities and intentions of an actual or potential threat or any other forces with which the Army is

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concerned. Intelligence is fundamental to the planning and conduct of operations through all dimensions of conflict as it allows the commander to gain control of the threat and mastery of the environment, consequently reducing risk.

5. Intelligence provides the commander with the following:

a. knowledge of the battlespace,

b. warning of the development of hostilities, and

c. an assessment of stakeholder and threat capabilities and intentions.

6. Intelligence informs the commander of changes to the threat and environmental situation, enabling decision advantage and enhanced lethality. Intelligence will inform force adaption and weighting of effort and orchestration across the lines of operation.

Intelligence and Information

7. In different contexts the term ‘intelligence’ can refer to the organisation performing the intelligence staff function; the activity associated with the conduct of the intelligence function; or, more commonly, the product or output which fulfils the role and aims of the function.

8. There is an inherent distinction between information and intelligence, as follows:

a. Information. Information is data that has been processed to provide meaning but has not been analysed to provide meaning with respect to implications for the operation.

b. Intelligence. Intelligence is the product resulting from the processing of information concerning individual and group beliefs, customs and norms; foreign governments; hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements; and battlespace environments specific to areas of actual or potential operations.

9. Intelligence is the result of the intelligence cycle – direction, collection, processing and dissemination.

10. There are three types of intelligence, as follows:

a. Basic Intelligence. Basic intelligence is intelligence on any subject which may be used as reference material for planning and as a basis for processing subsequent information or intelligence.

b. Current Intelligence. Current intelligence is intelligence which reflects the current situation at the strategic, operational or tactical levels.

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c. Estimative Intelligence. Estimative, or predictive, intelligence is that which is forward looking: identifying, describing and forecasting adversary capabilities and the implications for planning and executing ADF operations.

SECTION 1-3. PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE

11. The organisation, activities and production of intelligence are optimised by several guiding principles. Fundamental to these principles is the fullest possible understanding of the adversary. This includes knowledge of the adversary’s goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, method of operation, vulnerabilities, and sense of value and loss. Intelligence staff must understand the adversary’s character, culture and customs. They must develop and continuously refine their ability to think like the adversary in order to advise on the adversary’s likely perceptions, reactions and responses to friendly actions.

12. Basic Principles of Intelligence. The basic principles of intelligence are outlined as follows (joint intelligence principles are dealt with in ADDP 2.0, Intelligence):

a. Commander’s Role. The commander must utilise the available intelligence effort to inform adaptive action and enable intelligence-led operations.

b. Centralised Control. Intelligence must be centrally controlled and coordinated to avoid duplication of effort and gaps in collection, provide mutual support, ensure security of sources, ensure efficient and effective use of limited resources in accordance with the commander’s priorities, and ensure the effective provision of technical direction to intelligence staffs and agencies.

c. Responsiveness. Intelligence must be responsive to the needs of commanders, their staffs and the chain of command. Support to the commander must be anticipatory and precise. Intelligence organisations must also be capable of responding rapidly and flexibly to changes in the operational situation or environment and redirecting the collection effort accordingly.

d. All-source Approach. The most useful and complete assessments are usually achieved by fusing data from multiple sources. To avoid being deceived by analytical errors or adversary deception, personnel should use all-source techniques that permit the development of corroborating data. An all-source approach develops complementary data where information from one source

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confirms and augments information provided by another. This provides a higher level of confidence in the intelligence product.

e. Continuous Review. Intelligence products, including factual data, conclusions and forecasts, must be continuously reviewed and, where necessary, revised, taking into account all new information and comparing it with what is already known.

f. Timeliness. Information or intelligence must be available in a timely fashion to enable personnel to gain maximum benefit from its use.

g. Objectivity. Any temptation to distort information to fit previous assessments or preconceived ideas must be resisted. The temptation to tell commanders what they want to hear must also be avoided. Intelligence must convey the uncertainties that are inevitable in assessments and must not imply a false degree of confidence.

h. Accessibility. Information and intelligence must be readily accessible, both for users, since the best intelligence is useless if it is not available, and for intelligence staff, since the essence of intelligence processing – the conversion of new information into intelligence – is comparison. Information and intelligence must be stored in a form that allows a rapid and flexible response to queries.

i. Source Protection. In collecting information, sources must not be employed on tasks where their loss would be disproportionate to the value of the information they provide or are seeking to collect. Similarly, in the dissemination of intelligence, sources and methods must be protected to avoid compromise and subsequent loss of collection ability.

j. Balance. The structure and activities of intelligence staffs must be balanced, bearing in mind the key elements:

(1) An appropriate balance must be struck between the requirement to protect sources and the need to ensure the widest possible dissemination of intelligence to those with a ‘need to know’. In essence, this involves a command decision on the balance between the protection of the source and the satisfaction of users’ IR.

(2) A balance must be struck between collection and production activities and the effort devoted to the various types of intelligence, such as basic intelligence (including database maintenance), current intelligence and estimative assessments.

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(3) A balance must be struck and a clear distinction made between fact and judgment (assessment) in intelligence reporting.

(4) Intelligence production agencies must strike a balance between the competing demands of customers, who will range from national level decision-makers through strategic level commanders to operational and tactical level commanders.

k. User Awareness and Confidence. Intelligence organisations and staffs need to liaise closely with users in order to ensure that user requirements are clearly understood and met in a timely and preferred manner, bearing in mind the key elements:

(1) a high degree of confidence that requirements are being met not only in terms of the finished product provided to the user, but also in terms of collection requirements being satisfied and intelligence databases being maintained to support the intelligence capability; and

(2) a general awareness of the intelligence process and the broad capabilities and limitations of intelligence sources and agencies (SANDA).

Characteristics of Effective Intelligence

13. Effective intelligence is intelligence that meets the commander’s needs. In order to achieve this, intelligence products must have the following characteristics:

a. Relevance. Intelligence must support the commander’s mission, concept of operations and IR.

b. Usability. Intelligence products must be in a format that can be easily used and must highlight the significance of the information or intelligence they contain.

c. Timeliness. Intelligence products must be available in sufficient time to enable decisions to be made and executed.

d. Accuracy. Intelligence must be factually correct and indicate the degree of confidence in assessments and judgments.

e. Objectivity. Intelligence must be unbiased, undistorted, and free from political influence or constraints. Intelligence methodology and products must not be directed or manipulated to conform to a desired result, preconceptions of a situation or adversary, or a predetermined objective or institutional position.

f. Availability. Intelligence must be readily available to those who need it.

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g. Completeness. Intelligence should be as complete as possible, using all available information to meet customers’ requirements and provide a full understanding of the situation.

h. Clarity. Intelligence should be clearly presented to avoid the chance of misinterpretation by the user.

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CHAPTER 2

INTELLIGENCE THEORY

SECTION 2-1. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

1. The intelligence cycle is a planned, methodical and logical process through which information is collected, converted to intelligence and disseminated to users. This is a continuous process and is applied at all levels. The intelligence cycle, depicted in Figure 2–1, involves four phases of activity: direction, collection, processing and dissemination.

Figure 2–1: The Intelligence Cycle

2. The purpose of using a theoretical model of the intelligence cycle is to aid understanding of the logic of the process and introduce the varied activities that contribute to intelligence production. In practice, the intelligence cycle is applied throughout the intelligence staff process.

Customer/UserEstimates Warnings

Basic intelligenceCurrent intelligence

Commander’s missionCommander’s guidance

IR

Update

Deliver

Prepare

Select

Manage requirements

Plancollection

Tasksquares

and agencies

Interpret

Integrate

Analyse

Evaluate

Collate

SANDA

Collectand deliverinformation

Diss

emina

tion

Direction

Collection

Proce

ssing

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When applied at the tactical level in support of operations planning, the intelligence staff process is known as intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). IPB is the intelligence staff process designed to provide critical inputs to staff planning and the MAP. Its principal function is to provide an analysis of the operating environment (AOE) and the intelligence estimate, and to assist in collection planning. The IPB is discussed in detail in LWP-INT 2-1-8, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.

3. Simultaneous Nature of the Process. The model is cyclic in nature, since intelligence requires constant review and updating if it is to remain current and relevant to the commander’s needs. This cycle of direction, collection, processing and dissemination is presented sequentially, simply to illustrate the logical flow of the process. The process is a continuous one, however, and all phases occur concurrently. Viewed simply, the intelligence cycle is constantly in motion.

SECTION 2-2. DIRECTION PHASE

4. All intelligence functions are conducted to support the commander. The commander, in turn, provides direction to the intelligence staff based on the mission, intent and concept of operations. This direction is most often given as a series of questions, or IR, about adversaries or the environment. The commander’s IR initiates the intelligence cycle and forms the key measure of effectiveness of the intelligence system. If intelligence staff have to make assumptions about the commander’s IR, the commander must confirm them as soon as possible. In addition to this initial direction, the commander must provide new direction for the intelligence cycle when the situation or mission changes.

5. Intelligence Requirements. IR are questions the answers to which fill gaps in the commander’s knowledge and understanding of the environment or adversary forces. IR should be associated with decision points relating to friendly COA. Thus IR form a part of the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), along with friendly force information requirements and essential elements of friendly information. The commander’s IR will vary according to the level of command, the nature of operations, the environment, the characteristics of the threat and the commander’s mission. Because of their importance, IR have a stated priority in the task of planning and decision-making; however, certain IR may be allocated a priority according to the significance of the decision they support. Such IR are often referred to as priority IR.

6. Establishing Intelligence Requirements. IR may be generated from two sources. They arise directly when the commander poses questions that

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require responses from the intelligence staff, or they may be identified as part of the intelligence estimate. Regardless of who initiates IR or how they are identified, they should be presented to the commander and approved by them.

7. Information Requirements. Once the IR are determined and prioritised by the commander, the intelligence staff decide how the commander’s IR are to be met by determining what information is required. Information requirements are simply the elements of information needed to produce the intelligence that will answer the question posed by the IR. An IR may generate multiple information requirements or, if the IR itself is a simple one, it may translate directly into a single information requirement. Information requirements may be identified by discussion with the HQ staff as a result of an intelligence estimate or as a result of the IPB process. Gaps in the knowledge base of intelligence staff will themselves generate information requirements; however, such information requirements should be prioritised and resourced in accordance with their value against the commander’s potential requirements. In other words, intelligence staff do not collect for their own benefit.

Characteristics of Good Intelligence Requirements

8. Examples of good IR are shown in Table 2–1. While there are no standard IR, good IR have the following characteristics:

a. They ask only one question.

b. They focus on a specific fact, event or activity.

c. They provide the intelligence required to support a single decision.

Table 2–1: Examples of Intelligence Requirements

Will the enemy use chemical on our reserve force before it leaves Assembly Area KOOKABURRA? Potential information requirements may relate to the movement of chemical agents and so on.

Will the enemy defend Objective COCKATOO using a forward slope defence? Information requirements may relate to the positioning of enemy FE, defensive works and so on.

Will the threat reserve tank reach Phase Line SPARROW before 270900KMAY14? Information requirements may relate to the location of the tank battalion over several other phase lines.

How is the X militia group likely to react to a vote against independence? Information requirements may relate to military build-up, militia command rhetoric and so on.

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Linking Requirements and Intelligence Assessments

9. Initial Guidance. Early in the direction phase, in response to the commander’s initial requirements, the intelligence staff provide an AOE and an intelligence estimate. Both items are produced from existing information and intelligence. The staff will be directed to initiate the IPB process from which the AOE and the intelligence estimate are developed. The initial products serve to guide the next iteration of the intelligence cycle in addressing the specific requirements of the current mission.

Analysis of the Operating Environment

10. The AOE examines the characteristics of the environment and is aimed at determining how the operating environment may affect the conduct of friendly and adversary operations. It is the conceptual framework, and main product, of the first two steps of IPB. Analysis may include coverage of terrain, hydrography, climate and weather; cultural, religious and political aspects; infrastructure; economic factors; the law of armed conflict and the laws of the sea; and psychological factors and their impacts.

Threat Estimates

11. ‘Threat estimate’ is an all-encompassing term for specific written products such as threat assessments, intelligence estimates and counterintelligence (CI) estimates, and verbal briefs on the threat to the land force. Thus the ‘estimate’ describes the conceptual framework for, and main product of, the last two steps of IPB. As interpretation tools, threat estimates provide advice to users on specific adversary capabilities, intents and vulnerabilities. As an output of processing, these estimates also drive the direction and collection process by identifying gaps in knowledge and assumptions and the need to confirm judgments.

12. Intelligence Estimate. The intelligence estimate is an appraisal of a situation to determine the COA open to the threat forces or stakeholders and the probability of the threat or stakeholder adopting a particular COA.

13. The intelligence estimate must be dynamic and able to respond to changing operational circumstances and the evolving intelligence needs of the commander.

14. Threat Assessment. Produced initially at the strategic level, threat assessments become more focused at the tactical level to apply specifically to an area of operations (AO).

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

15. IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analysing threats and the environment, considered in the dimensions of space and time. It is

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designed to support staff planning and is integral to the MAP. IPB helps the commander apply maximum combat power at decisive points in time and space by means of the following:

a. describing the operating environment and the effects of that environment on both friendly and adversary operations;

b. determining the adversary’s likely COA, including its intelligence collection activities; and

c. assisting in the planning of friendly collection activities to confirm unknown information, associated with a COA, about the environment and threat.

16. The four steps of IPB (further detailed in LWP-INT 2-1-8, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace) are as follows:

a. Step 1 – define the battlespace environment;

b. Step 2 – describe the battlespace effects;

c. Step 3 – evaluate the threat; and

d. Step 4 – determine adversary COA.

Higher Level Intelligence Support

17. Higher level intelligence staff should provide assistance to lower level intelligence staff prior to their commencement of IPB. This assistance will be provided via a distributed intelligence system that provides access to Australian intelligence community products. Such products include military capability studies and assessments, intelligence estimates, threat assessments, CI estimates, and other operational and strategic level IPB products. Higher level intelligence staffs should provide assessments, no matter what form they take, on the following:

a. the nature of threats and adversary objectives;

b. adversary military and non-military capabilities;

c. limitations and constraints on adversary actions;

d. potential adversary concepts of operations, including an assessment of how the adversary’s military and non-military capabilities might be employed;

e. timeframes, including those for operational milestones, lead times and sustainability;

f. environmental effects; and

g. threats to the security of essential elements of friendly information, personnel and materiel.

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18. Intelligence Responsibilities. Higher level plans (intelligence support plans [ISP] or intelligence annexes to OPORD) will also designate areas of intelligence responsibility for subordinate commands. This will include reporting requirements and the potential allocation of resources to enable collection against higher tasks.

SECTION 2-3. COLLECTION PLANNING

Collection

19. Collection is the exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of information to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence. Collection activities answer the commander’s IR while making the best use of scarce assets. Collection is a continuous activity and is controlled and coordinated at the highest practicable level using a collection management system specific to the theatre of operation. The specifics of collection management are detailed in LWD 2-1, Intelligence Staff Duties and ADDP 3.7, Collection Operations.

20. Redundancy. Central to collection is the principle of redundancy. Duplicate or different assets capable of answering the IR can compensate for the loss or failure of one collection asset. Moreover, different types of collection capabilities may be needed so that information from one source type can be tested or confirmed by others.

21. Timeliness. Collection planning must consider the time in which assets can collect information. Their ability to report it, the time required for processing, and the time required by a commander to make and execute a decision based on this information or on intelligence are also major considerations.

SECTION 2-4. THE COLLECTION PHASE AND COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

Collection Phase

22. The collection phase of the intelligence cycle involves the collection and reporting of information, combat information and intelligence by SANDA to meet specific orders or requests (SOR). Collection management is conducted throughout this phase to ensure that, as the mission or situation changes, tasking is changed so that information requirements are met by the most appropriate SANDA.

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23. Collection Manager. The collection manager (CM) is responsible for the management of the collection phase of the intelligence cycle, including:

a. coordination and control of collection tasks and requests;

b. monitoring and evaluation of reporting to ensure the timely satisfaction of IR; and

c. updating collection planning and tasking in response to new, changing or unsatisfied IR.

Collection Management

24. The intelligence staff maintain a check to ensure that appropriate information is being collected, monitor the collection effort to ensure the ongoing appropriateness of the allocation of assets to tasks, and seek additional opportunities for collection. The intelligence staff also evaluate the performance of SANDA to assess reliability, noting the circumstances under which they are most productive, as an aid to future tasking and identifying collection capability gaps and the development needs of sources.

25. Effective Collection Management. Effective collection management requires the following:

a. a comprehensive understanding of the characteristics, capabilities and limitations of SANDA;

b. the thorough documentation of all tasks and SANDA in a single system;

c. the acceptance that new, changing or unsatisfied tasks will modify initial tasking; and

d. continuous monitoring of the time element of each task.

26. Collection planning and management occurs in the all-source cell (ASC) and is the responsibility of a dedicated CM. However, collection planning is not conducted in isolation and a collection planning group is often formed within a formation HQ to determine the ability of its organic assets to meet the commander’s IR and to synchronise collection assets. Ideally, at brigade HQ level and above, the collection planning group should include the following personnel;

a. a COFS/senior operations representative;

b. a senior intelligence officer;

c. the CM;

d. an offensive support representative or artillery intelligence LO;

e. an RAAF LO;

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f. an aviation LO;

g. an electronic warfare (EW) LO or representative;

h. an engineer intelligence LO;

i. a representative from units under a command status which allows them to be tasked for collection purposes; and

j. other appropriate representatives, including an RAN LO, and representatives from the police, customs and Border Protection Command.

27. Legality. The CM is responsible for ensuring that the ROE, command directions and other administrative or legal restrictions on collection activities are adhered to. When sensitive collection tasks are authorised, clear guidance must be given on the parameters of the activity.

Collection Planning Process

28. Collection Plan. Having identified the information requirements or indicators necessary to answer the IR, and having checked existing intelligence and information holdings to see what is already available, the intelligence staff begin the process of planning the collection of information to fill the remaining knowledge gaps. The collection plan is simply a plan for methodically gathering information to satisfy all the information requirements. It expands on an indicator by adding time and location details to produce SOR; for example, for the IR ‘where the enemy’s main body will cross the river’, one information requirement may be where river crossing points are being prepared. An indicator would be the direction of movement of bridging equipment, and one of the SOR would be to report bridging equipment in a particular location at certain times.

29. Collection planning considers the capability, limitations and availability of SANDA that can satisfy the information gap. This will include consideration of which SANDA are organic to the command and can be directly tasked and which are non-organic and from which information may be requested. The collection plan may be developed using a collection worksheet to help structure the formulation of SOR and their assignment to specific SANDA.

30. Generically, a collection plan should show the following:

a. the commander’s IR;

b. the information requirements, indicators and SOR;

c. all available SANDA;

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d. all SANDA capable of meeting the SOR, with an indication of those which are to be tasked;

e. the form of reports and the time by which they are required; and

f. which information has or has not been collected so that all available sources may be re-tasked to meet new or as-yet unsatisfied information requirements.

31. Effective Collection Planning Considerations. When planning collection, sufficient time must be allowed for briefing SANDA on the task, collecting the information, delivery of the information to the processing unit or staff, processing the collected information and disseminating the intelligence. Collection planning must also take into account a broad range of factors such as SANDA capabilities and/or limitations and availability. Such factors are detailed in the section on the collection phase of the intelligence cycle. Collection planning is a continuous process. SANDA must be re-tasked with information requirements that might stem from the following:

a. a changing operational situation,

b. information and intelligence flowing from the original tasking, or

c. information or intelligence from one source or agency that cues collection efforts by others.

32. Effective Collection Planning. Effective collection planning is directly related to the implementation of the intelligence principles of centralised control, systematic exploitation, responsiveness and source protection. In addition, it provides the following benefits:

a. Economy of Effort. The centralised control of collection, driven by the commander’s IR, ensures that each collection activity can answer the maximum number of information requirements and that, aside from the requirement for redundancy, there is no duplication.

b. Control of Source Workload. While the most appropriate source should be tasked, effective collection management takes into account source workload and possible performance degradation due to overtasking.

c. Source Evaluation and Development. The capabilities of all sources vary according to the tasks they are assigned and the situations in which they operate. The CM continuously evaluates the success of each source, noting the circumstances under which it is most productive and generates the highest quality information. Sources can then be tasked to best effect and, where possible, given additional training and equipment to develop their capabilities.

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d. Synchronisation. The synchronisation of ISR assets is a process which:

(1) analyses information requirements and intelligence gaps;

(2) evaluates available assets (internal and external);

(3) determines gaps in the use of those assets;

(4) recommends ISR assets controlled by the organisation to collect on the CCIR; and

(5) submits requests for information or intelligence (RFI) for adjacent and higher collection support.

33. The intelligence staff, with staff participation, synchronises the entire collection effort. This includes all the assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units, higher echelon units and organisations, and intelligence reachback into a unified effort. This is achieved through centralised planning and decentralised execution, which optimises the integration of ISR operations into the commander’s scheme of manoeuvre and fire.

34. The S2, or requirements manager, produces the ISR synchronisation plan. The ISR synchronisation plan must be produced in conjunction with the S3’s ISR plan. The collection strategies, which are designed not only to collect the intelligence but also to deliver it on time, are entered onto the ISR synchronisation plan.

35. The ISR synchronisation plan (often depicted in matrix format) is a product the S2 uses to ensure that collection tasks are tied to the unit’s scheme of manoeuvre in time and space and to effectively link reconnaissance and surveillance to manoeuvre. The ISR synchronisation plan is typically constructed in matrix format. The S2 uses the ISR synchronisation plan to synchronise available assets to collect on the CCIR. The S2 also uses the ISR plan, along with the ISR overlay, to brief ISR operations as required by the unit’s battle rhythm. The ISR synchronisation plan is maintained and developed based on the current intelligence running estimate, enemy situation overlay, stated requirements, and event template or matrix.

SECTION 2-5. TASKING SOURCES AND AGENCIES

36. Specific Orders and Requests. The G2/S2 staff tasks or requests appropriate SANDA to collect the necessary information. Information requirements are levied on organic assets as SOR. They may be included in the intelligence annex to the OPORD or in the ISP, or levied as separate

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tasks as they arise. Those IR or information requirements that must be passed to non-organic assets for satisfaction may also be advised in the intelligence annex to the OPORD in the ISP or advised separately in the form of an RFI. A guide to the RFI format is provided in Annex A.

37. Difference between a Source and an Agency. The difference between a source and an agency is dependent on the ability of the asset to conduct processing. If the asset is not capable of processing information into intelligence, it is a source. If the asset is capable of processing, including first line processing, it is an agency.

38. Types of Sources and Agencies. There are two types of SANDA, as follows:

a. Controlled. Controlled SANDA can be tasked by intelligence staff for collection purposes.

b. Uncontrolled. Uncontrolled SANDA (eg, refugees) provide information but cannot be tasked by intelligence staff.

39. Tasks. SANDA are tasked in accordance with their command status. Tactical collection assets under command or in direct support will normally be tasked in orders authorised by the commander and issued by the operations staff. Exceptions may include:

a. the delegation of authority to task assets, such as intelligence units, to the intelligence staff; and

b. the establishment of a separate tasking process, such as through LO, for specific SANDA.

40. Requests. IR to and from higher and flanking units and formations are conducted as RFI.

41. Civil Sources. Where civil SANDA are able to meet military information requirements, specific authorisation must be given and arrangements made to allow requests and reports to be passed and received.

SECTION 2-6. PROCESSING PHASE

42. The processing phase of the intelligence cycle is depicted in Figure 2–1. Processing is the production of intelligence through the collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of information and other intelligence. While the steps in the processing phase may be concurrent, any one piece of information or combat information is processed as follows:

a. Collation. Collation involves the logging, recording and meta-tagging of incoming information. It includes database

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integration, geodetic storage, map and chart marking, electronic or manual filing, and cross-referencing.

b. Evaluation. Evaluation is the appraisal of an item of information in terms of its credibility and the reliability of the reporting SANDA. Evaluation is done progressively through the processing phase as new information is compared to processed information to determine similarities or differences.

c. Analysis. Analysis is the separation of information into its component parts.

d. Integration. Integration is the grouping of related elements of analysed information with the aim of establishing patterns and relationships.

e. Interpretation. Interpretation is the phase in which the meaning or implication of information is determined. This interpretation is done in relation to current knowledge.

Processing Systems

43. The processing system may be as simple as a well-marked map with overlays based on estimates, the collection plan and geographic characteristics, supported by a sheaf of log sheets in a binder. Alternately, it may consist of a complex computer system with interactive databases, a geographic information system and a digital imagery catalogue. Whichever system is used, it should ensure that a logical flow of activity takes place in the intelligence office and that all steps in the processing phase are completed.

44. Requirements. The minimum requirements for a processing system are as follows:

a. a system for recording the receipt of information;

b. a method which uniquely tags each piece of information for accounting, retrieval and integration purposes;

c. a system for the visual display of spatially related information, including:

(1) locations,

(2) military symbology, and

(3) a legend;

d. a system for the recording and display of non-spatially related information, including the order of battle, equipment and biographical data, as well as the linkages between people, organisations and events;

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e. a system for the storage of structured textual information;

f. a system for the storage of unstructured textual information; and

g. a system which allows the cross-referencing of information to information or intelligence in any format.

Collation

45. Collation involves the following activities:

a. logging and recording:

(1) acknowledgement of receipt (if required);

(2) manipulation into a suitable form (if required);

(3) tagging; and

(4) recording in the Intelligence Log;

b. dissemination of time-critical information;

c. display (if required); and

d. filing.

Logging and Recording

46. Information may require manipulation into a suitable form to allow the processing phase to proceed efficiently. Examples of this process are the data entry of voice messages, the electronic scanning of documents and the conversion of database formats.

47. Intelligence Log. Regardless of its form, the tool used for logging is the Intelligence Log. This log provides a permanent chronological (by time receipt) record of all incoming information and outgoing reporting. In terms of content, the log may record the entire contents of incoming or outdoing information, a summary or merely contain a cross-reference to a filing location. The minimum contents of an Intelligence Log are as follows:

a. a unique serial number or tag;

b. the date-time group in which the report was received;

c. the date-time group for the occurrence of the incident;

d. the originator;

e. the content of the report;

f. the action taken by the intelligence staff; and

g. remarks, including any comment or assessment.

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48. The order of receipt of information will often be different from the order of its occurrence. As information is logged and recorded in order of receipt, the collation system should include a capability to re-sequence information into the order of occurrence. This enables time-related patterns to be detected, integrated and interpreted.

Processing Time-critical Information

49. The collation process must identify and disseminate information and combat information that is of immediate and obvious significance. Therefore, it is processed initially by the current intelligence cell in order to determine those pieces of information which are time-critical to the current battle before being sent through to the ASC S22 or S25 functional areas for further processing. This dissemination takes precedence over the administrative aspects of the collation sub-phases. After initial dissemination, time-critical information should be processed normally.

Display

50. A number of displays may be used in the collation phase of the processing step. These include:

a. Master Intelligence Map. Collation of information onto the master intelligence map is the fundamental system for the display of the threat situation. Other pictorial displays (using overlays or a series of separately marked maps) may be derived from patterns of indications depicted on the master intelligence map.

b. Environmental Displays. Information on the environment, including such areas as terrain, infrastructure and demographics, may require special displays. Conventional military maps can be augmented with geo-located and gridded imagery of key infrastructure and threat locations, various scale maps and plans of urban areas.

c. Geographic Information Systems. Geographic information systems (GIS) provide an expedient tool for the processing, analysis and display of all geospatial data. GIS enable personnel to fuse information from various sources, including imagery and existing mapping databases, to create geospatial intelligence. GIS products include three-dimensional overviews, line-of-sight analyses and mobility studies.

d. Time Event Patterns. A graphic record is maintained of the date and time of each relevant event, collection or serious incident in the AO or area of interest.

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51. Effective Display. Effective display requires the following:

a. Doctrinal Symbology. Symbology and the use of colour must conform to doctrine. It may be necessary to augment doctrinal symbology in certain situations. As a minimum, any augmentation must be recorded in a legend and, when feasible, standardised within a command or theatre.

b. Comprehensive Depiction. The display should be understandable with minimal additional reference; however, it should allow reference to be made to the underlying information if that is desired. Information of unknown or doubtful accuracy must be annotated as such.

c. Marginal Clutter. An effective display must avoid clutter and only depict relevant detail. Overlays may assist in this regard.

Filing

52. A filing system is a means for information and intelligence storage and retrieval. Each unit will have SOP on the information management process or business rules for storing information. In a brigade, for example, the CM may be the hub for the storage of disseminated intelligence products. Released products are disseminated to appropriate points of contact as well as the CM. The CM files these products in a logical file structure and uses them to answer the CCIR. Similarly, all intelligence products sent to the higher HQ intelligence cell are filed in the same structure.

53. File and folder systems may replicate the PMESIIPT format, as follows:

a. P = Political;

b. M = Military;

c. E = Economic;

d. S = Social;

e. I = Informational;

f. I = Infrastructure; and

g. PT = Physical Terrain.

54. Files may be saved in these folders using a naming convention for easy retrieval, for example:

a. YYMMDD_Unit/originator_Type of Report_Security Classification; or

b. 130520_1RAR_INTREP001-13_RESTRICTED.

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Evaluation

55. The aim of evaluation is to determine the likelihood that a piece of information is correct. By assessing the credibility of the information and the reliability of the reporting SANDA, intelligence staff can judge how much weight to give the information during integration and interpretation.

56. Evaluation is conducted using the Admiralty Grading System. This system is an alphanumeric indication of the degree of confidence that may be placed in an item of information. The system indicates the degree of reliability of the SANDA, expressed as a letter ranging from A to F, and the degree of credibility of the information, expressed as a number ranging from 1 to 6. The combination of a letter and number is the evaluation grading for each item of information. The Admiralty Grading System is summarised in Table 2–2 and additional notes are provided in Annex B.

57. When information is reported, evaluation gradings should be included where possible.

58. Evaluation usually occurs concurrently with collation activities. Intelligence staff should ensure that the information is evaluated before it is recorded, particularly before the information is used to amend or update a database. An initial evaluation of time-critical information can be made as it is received; however, the commander must be informed of its incomplete evaluation and any resulting risk. As soon as possible after initial evaluation, formal evaluation should occur.

Table 2–2: Admiralty Grading System

Analysis

59. Doctrinally, analysis is the detailed examination of information and its separation into component facts or inferences; however, the term ‘analysis’ is also used colloquially as a generic term for the processing

Reliability of Source Credibility of Information

A Completely reliable 1 Confirmed by other sources

B Usually reliable 2 Probably true

C Fairly reliable 3 Possibly true

D Not usually reliable 4 Doubtful

E Unreliable 5 Improbable

F Reliability cannot be judged 6 Truth cannot be judged

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phase of the intelligence cycle. Even within intelligence staffs, the term ‘analyst’ refers to a person who conducts all the phases of the processing.

60. Analysis involves the recognition and extraction of component facts or inferences from often complex reports. Even a simple report will usually contain information components indicating the time of the report, the time of the incident, the location, the nature of the activity and the extent of the activity. Each fact or inference needs to be isolated so that it can be integrated and interpreted.

61. The analysis process includes the standardisation of data elements; for example, allied sources might report distance in miles rather than kilometres and subordinate units may report locations as grid references rather than as latitude and longitude.

Integration

62. Integration involves the consolidation of component parts of information, isolated during the analysis step, with other information and previously produced intelligence. This process of grouping like fact or inference reveals patterns and relationships that are the basis for subsequent interpretation. Examples of the tools that analysts can use in the integration process are provided in Annex C.

63. Integration may be a quick mental process involving the addition of one piece of new information to an existing intelligence picture, or it may be a lengthy process of merging a large amount of data. The most reliable intelligence is developed through the integration, in this context often referred to as fusion, of information from different SANDA.

64. In general, any integration method that presents data visually will aid the mind in recognising meaningful patterns and relationships. Integration tools often have interpretation applications and may include:

a. marked maps and overlays,

b. link diagrams,

c. association matrices,

d. activity charting,

e. flow charting,

f. graphs,

g. electronic databases, and

h. time lines.

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Interpretation

65. The last phase of the processing step, interpretation, is the most important. Automated processing systems can conduct a significant amount of collation, analysis and integration; however, interpretation requires the input of the human mind. Interpretation is essentially a mental discipline and should be based on known information and intelligence, experience, common sense and logic. From a military perspective, interpretation requires a thorough knowledge and understanding of the threat. Examples of the tools that analysts can use in the interpretation process are provided in Annex C.

66. Interpretation can be simplified into the following three parts:

a. Identification. Who, what are, where is it?

b. Activity. What is it doing?

c. Significance. What does it mean and what will occur next?

67. In practice, interpretation is the drawing of inferences and making of assessments from reported information. These inferences and assessments can be wrong or can be misled by deception. In situations where no interpretation is possible, further collection should be conducted.

68. Degree of Confidence. Assessments are not rated using the Admiralty Grading System. Instead they are qualified by terms such as ‘probable’, ‘likely’, ‘possible’ or ‘unlikely’. In all cases the commander needs to be made aware of uncertainty and, where appropriate, of alternative interpretations. The degree of confidence ‘certain’ would only apply to assessments made in hindsight. Table 2–3 defines the degrees of confidence used in assessments.

Table 2–3: Degree of Confidence

Logic

69. Logic is the method by which a deduction can be drawn from a set of facts. From an intelligence perspective, it is the method by which intelligence conclusions and assessments are made from information, and the way in which an analyst will arrive at answers to IR.

Levels of Confidence

Unlikely Possible Likely Probable Certain

<15% >15% >50% >75% >95%

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70. Inductive Logic. Inductive logic is the process whereby an assessment is made that goes beyond the supporting facts. As such, inductive logic is inherently predictive, involves a degree of risk and should be the primary focus of the interpretation process: if the supporting facts are true, the assessment is also probably true. However, when the assessment is based partially on assumption or on information of dubious reliability, the assessment is less likely to be true. In all cases, the commander must be made aware of the risk associated with the assessment and, where appropriate, of alternative assessments. Assessments should be qualified by the use, in order of decreasing probability, of the terms ‘probable’, ‘likely’, ‘possible’ and ‘unlikely’. An example of inductive reasoning is provided in Table 2–4.

Table 2–4: Example of Inductive Logic

71. Deductive Logic. Deductive logic is the process whereby an assessment is made that does not go beyond the supporting facts: if the supporting facts are true, the conclusion must also be true. If deductive logic is used to draw a conclusion, that conclusion is rarely predictive in nature. Deductive logic is therefore not predictive and its main use in the interpretation process to is provide conclusions for use as facts in the making of inductive assessments. An example of deductive logic is provided in Table 2–5.

The Kalos Independence Movement in Kalos Province (fictitious province of a fictitious country) is being supplied with weapons.

Information obtained

Several expatriate Kulbanos (a neighbouring country) civilians are reported to be living in the Province, where they have been assimilated into the community.

Information obtained

David Vessellu, a known international arms dealer, regularly travels to Kulbanos and meets with Suzie Mussellwell, a member of the Kulbanos expatriate community living in Kalos Province.

Information obtained

Suzie Mussellwell has attended four of the six Kalos Independence Movement rallies held in the last two years. She is a businesswoman with an import/export business.

Information obtained

Some Kulbanos expatriates living in Kulos Province are involved in weapons smuggling.

Assessment

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Table 2–5: Example of Deductive Logic

Testing of Competing Hypotheses

72. It is possible for more than one assessment to be made from the range of known facts. In this case, all potential assessments are known as hypotheses and further information is required to confirm or refute them. Ideally, the testing of hypotheses should be done by a formal process which includes the collection of additional information; however, all potential hypotheses will be graded on their likelihood based on analysts’ experience and situational knowledge. The advantage of the formal testing process is that it considers a wide range of possibilities, collects additional information to increase the probability that the final assessment will be true, and provides an audit trail to show what was considered and how a decision was reached.

73. The formal testing process involves each hypothesis being considered against known facts, often the indicators associated with a particular threat COA, and a judgment being made as to whether these facts confirm or refute that hypothesis. The absence of certain facts that would likely be identified if a hypothesis were true should also be considered. Hypotheses should be tested in order of their decreasing probability and are only discounted once proved false.

An IED was detonated along patrol Black at 150610GMAYXX, resulting in 2 KIA and 1 WIA.

Fact

The known IED-manufacturing cell in AO Redfish is the Salundin Cell.

Information obtained

Salundin Snr was observed moving along patrol route Black in vicinity of the explosion site at 150500GMAYXX.

Information obtained

Forensic evidence was collected post-blast and fingerprints from fragments of the device were a match for Salundin Snr’s fingerprints, collected on a separate occasion.

Fact

The IED was manufactured by the Salundin Cell and Salundin Snr was involved in the construction of the IED.

Conclusion

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Interpretation Considerations

74. Objectivity. The most important consideration for the interpretation of information is the intelligence principle of objectivity. In amplification of this principle, analysts must be aware of any potential for bias, including:

a. Cultural Bias. This bias is the inability to perceive the situation as the threat perceives it.

b. Organisational Bias. This bias involves the tendency to present interpretations deemed most acceptable to the commander.

c. Personal Bias. This bias involves the tendency to apply interpretational methods that were successful in the past without considering their appropriateness for the current situation.

d. Cognitive Bias. Cognitive bias includes:

(1) a preference for information reported in vivid and concise terms regardless of accuracy and reliability,

(2) deferral of interpretation due to a perceived lack of information, and

(3) a preference for information that supports a previous assessment and the disregarding of ambiguous or conflicting information.

75. Accountability. The interpretation process should record the way the analyst reaches a conclusion or assessment, making it possible to reconstruct these processes. This assists in maintaining continuity during operations and the justification of any conclusion or assessment that is questioned by the commander.

76. Resources. The resources available will affect the quality of conclusions and assessments. Resources that contribute to efficient and effective interpretation include:

a. sufficient numbers of trained and experienced staff,

b. the time available,

c. sufficient relevant information,

d. a collation system which provides ready access to information tools to assist in interpretation, and

e. appropriate equipment.

77. Need for Reinterpretation. A possible danger in the development of a highly refined adversary COA is that the complexity of these models can hide the fact that they are unconfirmed predictions, and that the threat may not act in this manner. It is extremely difficult for the mind to accept

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information that conflicts with an accepted assessment or decision that has been made. Intelligence staff must be willing to recognise when ambiguous or conflicting information is reported. If reinterpretation reveals that an original assessment was totally or partially wrong, intelligence staff should brief the commander as quickly as possible, especially if a decision has been made based on that incorrect conclusion or assessment.

Dissemination (Select, Prepare, Deliver) Phase

78. Dissemination is the timely conveyance of information or intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who need to use it. The frequency of routine dissemination should be established so that it is consistent with the commander’s decision-making process, the staff working routine and the flow of other intelligence reporting.

Select

79. The selection of relevant information and intelligence requires a thorough knowledge of the commander’s IR, the operational plan and the situation. Intelligence staff must be aware that the absence of information or intelligence about threats or the environment may be as worthy of selection for dissemination as their presence. The following factors should be considered when selecting information and intelligence for dissemination:

a. answers to IR;

b. answers to requests for intelligence/information;

c. indicators of unusual or unexpected adversary activity, including location, size, movement and activity;

d. indicators of friendly and adversary deception activities; and

e. indicators of friendly operations security (OPSEC) breaches.

Prepare

80. Choice of Suitable Media. The choice of the most suitable means for dissemination will depend on the type of intelligence being disseminated, time constraints, the available means of communication and the recipient’s requirements. Reports must be concise, but not at the expense of relevant material, and a compromise may be needed between medium and content to ensure timely delivery. Dissemination may be effected by the following media:

a. database,

b. verbal,

c. written,

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d. graphic, or

e. multimedia.

81. A clear differentiation must be made between information obtained, facts and their interpretation, bearing in mind the following, in particular:

a. Written reporting should differ from interpretation by the use of the format ‘comment: … comment ends’.

b. Verbal reporting should differ from interpretation by the use of a phrase such as ‘We assess that …’.

c. Graphic reporting should differ from interpretation by the use of doctrinal symbology or through a legend.

d. Multimedia reporting should differ from interpretation by the use of an appropriate combination of written, verbal and graphic techniques.

e. Where there is uncertainty in interpretation, this must be clearly indicated by the use of terms such as ‘probable’, ‘likely’ and ‘unlikely’.

82. Intelligence should be classified at the lowest level and downgrading instructions should be included. Where possible, intelligence should be sanitised in accordance with security instructions to allow dissemination to the lowest level practicable.

Deliver

83. The intelligence principle of timeliness encompasses not only the time required for processing and dissemination, but also consideration of the time necessary to make and execute a decision based on the received information or intelligence. While current intelligence will often have immediate tactical or operational value and needs to be passed by the fastest means possible, basic intelligence will usually be of low priority.

84. Information and intelligence should be disseminated by secure means consistent with its security classification and the intelligence principle of source protection. Sensitive SANDA should establish rapid sanitisation procedures to allow risk management of the dissemination of time-critical information.

85. Delivery in a Hierarchical or ‘Push’ System. Distribution within a hierarchical system requires that the originator determines who is to receive the intelligence and by what means.

86. Delivery in a Distributed or ‘Pull’ System. A fully functional distributed system provides instant access to any product in the system. The originator’s responsibility for dissemination does not extend beyond

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placing the intelligence onto the system within the required timeframe. The users of the system are then responsible for finding the information and intelligence that satisfies their IR.

Intelligence Products

87. Intelligence products are all forms of outputs of the intelligence cycle. They encompass intelligence reports and assessments, oral briefings and intelligence databases.

Database

88. Database construction and maintenance is a fundamental product for intelligence staff. A database represents the sum total of the knowledge of the unit on the adversary in its operating environment. A key measure of the effectiveness of an intelligence section is the quality of its database. All data, information and so on acquired by the intelligence section must be archived for future reference. Databases can include many formats, and to be useful must have robust business rules to ensure that information is readily retrievable and to provide the appropriate level of security.

Briefings

89. Briefings permit the discussion and clarification of information, intelligence and assessments. They are quick and, when appropriately supported by briefing aids, easy to assimilate. Verbal briefings should comply with the following:

a. follow an appropriate format (see Annex D);

b. be focused on the requirements of the customer(s);

c. clearly differentiate between fact and assessment; and

d. cover only the period since the last briefing to the same customer(s).

90. The function of the brief will vary depending on the customer requirement; however, briefs usually fall into one of the following categories:

a. Information Brief. Information briefs are designed to provide information and basic intelligence and are often referred to as background briefs. An assessment is not required in an information brief; however, where it is likely to be of value to the audience, regardless of how broad it may be, it should be included. Guidelines for the format of information briefs are provided in Annex D.

b. Decision Brief. Decision briefs are used in situations that require a command decision. Intelligence staff may use a decision brief when seeking assets for collection tasks. Guidelines for the format of decision briefs are provided in Annex D.

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c. Mission or Task Brief. Mission or task briefs are used to verbally task SANDA.

d. Staff Brief. Staff briefs are scheduled periodically to inform the commander and for the exchange of information between staff to ensure a coordinated effort. Staff briefs differ from other briefs in that all the functional staff elements brief sequentially. The COFS usually presides over the staff briefing while the commander provides guidance and makes decisions as required. The frequency, timings and sequence of staff briefings is stated in SOP. Types of staff briefings include:

(1) Intelligence/Update Brief. These briefings are scheduled, and regular briefings are usually held at least once a day to update the commander and staff on the situation and to brief future intentions. In this brief, intelligence staff provide information on events during the period and provide predictive threat and environmental assessments.

(2) Staff Assessments. A staff assessment involves staff presenting assessments in their area of responsibility, culminating in a commander’s decision to adopt a specific COA. The most common forms of staff assessment are the IPB briefs that are given as part of the MAP. This type of brief is detailed in LWP-INT 2-1-8, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.

(3) Orders. Intelligence staff may be required to provide briefings on the intelligence aspects of a commander’s verbal orders, such as the collection plan.

e. Handover/Takeover Brief. During operations and exercises, HQ staff employ a shift system of duty. A handover/takeover brief is used to ensure continuity of knowledge and assessment. A guide to the format of a handover/takeover brief is provided in Annex D.

f. Back Brief. The back brief is a brief in which staff state their understanding of orders and instructions and the implications of such.

91. Styles of Brief. Briefs may be presented as a scheduled activity or as an impromptu requirement. The distinction is largely a matter of the time available for preparation. The two different styles are outlined as follows:

a. Formal Briefs. A formal brief is a scheduled briefing given to fulfil a specific function. A formal brief is normally given at a set place and time to a predetermined audience. These briefs require a significant amount of time for the preparation of content and briefing aids.

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b. Impromptu Briefs. Impromptu briefs are unscheduled briefs to meet an immediate requirement. Preparation for an impromptu brief is often done mentally, and the visual aids employed are those that are readily available. When tasked to provide an impromptu brief, intelligence staff may request a short preparation time, if required, to ensure that the brief uses a logical sequence, including all relevant information, and is predictive.

92. Preparation of a Brief. All intelligence briefs must conform to the principles of accuracy, brevity and clarity. In addition, they must use correct military terminology, distinguish between fact and assessment, focus on the function of the brief, and, where possible, be predictive. The general process for preparing a brief is as follows:

a. analyse the function of the brief,

b. analyse the audience,

c. select the material for the brief,

d. construct the brief in a logical order or in accordance with an established sequence,

e. clear any assessment with the senior intelligence officer,

f. prepare aids to support the brief,

g. prepare the location for the brief,

h. conduct a rehearsal, and

i. deliver the brief.

93. Relating Assessments. Intelligence briefings must distinguish between information obtained, which may not have been corroborated by any other sources, fact (which is a known piece of information determined to be such through corroboration, science or other forms of evidence proving the information to be true beyond doubt) and assessment, and measures of assessment likelihood should be included, as follows:

a. Assessment is distinguished from information obtained and fact by the use of a phrase such as ‘we assess that…’.

b. An example of a measure of likelihood is the use, in decreasing order of probability, of the terms ‘probable’, ‘likely’, ‘possible’ and ‘unlikely’.

c. Specific pieces of information, rather than assessments, should have their likelihood expressed using a grading based on the Admiralty Grading System.

94. Coordination. The intelligence staff should coordinate the contents of their brief with the functions of other staff, primarily operations staff, to

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ensure that there is no duplication and that there are no events of which the other is unaware. Preferably, intelligence and operations staff members will rehearse their briefs together. A guide to briefing formats is provided in Annex D.

Written Orders and Reports

95. Many of the formats for written orders and reports will be stated in SOP. Threat assessments are contained in LWP-INT 2-1-5, Field Security. LWD 2-1, Intelligence Staff Duties contains the format and notes on the compilation of the written primary intelligence orders for the following products:

a. the intelligence estimate, including:

(1) AOE;

(2) analysis of the situation, stakeholders and threat forces, including the centre of gravity (COG) construct;

(3) threat group capability analysis; and

(4) COA analysis;

b. the ISP or intelligence annex to the OPORD; and

c. intelligence products, including INTREP, INTSUM and SUPINTREP.1

Graphic and Multimedia Reports

96. Graphic and multimedia reports represent an extremely effective method for disseminating intelligence products, provided that they meet the requirements for timeliness and useability, that the presentation does not distract attention from the content, and that the format is compatible with the existing communication means. The following are examples of graphic and multimedia reports:

a. INTREP, SUPINTREP or INTSUM reports produced as electronic overlays;

b. basic intelligence on countries, military capabilities, equipment and the environment in specific AO, incorporating video, audio and three-dimensional interactive images;

c. current intelligence, such as reconnaissance, incorporating digital images, full-motion video and audio into an electronic document; and

1. Intelligence report, intelligence summary and supplementary intelligence report.

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d. debriefs reported using video and audio to supplement written reports.

Annexes:

A. Request for Information or Intelligence Format

B. The Admiralty Valuation Grading System

C. Intelligence Analysis Methods and Techniques for Integration and Interpretation

D. Guide to Briefing Formats

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 2

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE FORMAT

1. RFI will normally be disseminated via intelligence and command support systems; however, they may be submitted through any means available. A structure has been developed that defines the headings or fields for the standard RFI format to be used throughout the land intelligence community when automated RFI tools are not available. Mandatory fields (to be completed for all RFI) are shown in bold type. Optional fields, which are not bolded, are used to articulate specific needs, assist RFI managers in processing the RFI, and assist producers and collectors in answering the request. The standard headings and fields are as follows:

a. Classification (indicate security classification of the RFI)

b. RFI Number (enter unique RFI number)

c. Task Type (indicate whether standing, short-term or specific requirement)

d. Country

e. Thematic Subject

f. Subject (enter subject of RFI)

g. Background (provide context and conditions in relation to request, including references if appropriate)

h. User Organisation (identify ultimate recipient of RFI response, this being the user rather that the intelligence staff who generate the RFI; the requesting intelligence staff are identified in the requester’s details field at the end of the RFI)

i. Date of Request

j. Statement of the Requirement (describe intelligence or information required, including time period for which the product is required and format of response)

k. Imagery Requirement (if imagery is required, specify details of coordinates, format, number of copies)

l. Classification of the Response (enter desired classification of the response)

m. Purpose of Requirement (indicate purpose or reason for requirement; this might be as simple as stating the operation name

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in which the customer is involved or the type of product for which an analyst is requesting the information)

n. Suspense Date (enter date by which product or answer is required; this should include advice of the latest time intelligence of value, if applicable)

o. Impact Statement (indicate impact on customer if requirement is not satisfied)

p. Sources Checked (indicate which sources have already been checked or consulted)

q. Possible Sources (suggest sources if known)

r. Priority (identify priority relative to other RFI from that originator)

s. Comments (enter any additional information that will aid the producer in satisfying the requirement [eg, a special format or product medium], delivery requirements, or information that will aid collectors, such as known threats in the subject area)

t. Point of Contact (provide point of contact information for analyst or intelligence staff member generating the RFI)

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 2

THE ADMIRALTY VALUATION GRADING SYSTEM

1. Explanation of Sources’ and Agencies’ Reliability Grading. The degrees of confidence for SANDA reliability are assessed as follows:

a. A – Completely Reliable. This refers to tried and trusted SANDA which can be depended upon with confidence.

b. B – Usually Reliable. This refers to SANDA which have been successful in the past but for which there is still some element of doubt in a particular case.

c. C – Fairly Reliable. This refers to SANDA which have occasionally been used in the past and upon which some degree of confidence can be based.

d. D – Not Usually Reliable. This refers to SANDA which have been used in the past but which have proved more often than not unreliable.

e. E – Unreliable. This refers to SANDA which have been used in the past and have proved unworthy of any confidence.

f. F – Reliability Cannot be Judged. This refers to SANDA which have not been used in the past or for which there is insufficient information to make an assessment.

2. Evaluation of Sources’ and Agencies’ Reliability. SANDA reliability should be evaluated according to the type of information reported and the circumstances in which it was collected. The CM maintains SANDA profiles, which provide a history and aggregated reliability evaluation. The evaluation of SANDA should include the following factors:

a. Capability. Did the SANDA have the access and opportunity to collection in formation at first hand? For technical SANDA, were the equipment performance characteristics appropriate for the task and consistent with the reported results?

b. Origin. If the reporting SANDA are relying on second-hand observations, are the original SANDA of the information identified, and how many intermediaries (opportunities for transmission error) has the information passed through? Have the reporting SANDA provided fact or hearsay?

c. Competence. Are the SANDA competent by virtue of training, experience or knowledge to report and comment accurately on the sort of information provided? To what degree could the SANDA be

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subject to deception? To what degree have the SANDA made assessments from information? Are the distinctions between fact, conclusion and assessment clear and logically sound?

d. Objectivity. Is there potential for bias, emotion or prejudice to have coloured or distorted the reported facts and inferences?

e. Motivation. What motivated the report? Is loyalty or integrity an issue?

f. Performance Record. How reliable have the SANDA been in the past?

3. Explanation of Sources’ and Agencies’ Credibility Grading. The credibility of an item is an assessment of its accuracy. While it is not always possible to state whether information is true or false, the relative accuracy of an item may be assessed by comparing it with confirmed or unconfirmed information. A determination of credibility should not be based on the assessed COA or the expected pattern of events but on what fact indicates is actually occurring. The intelligence principle of objectivity is paramount. The degrees of confidence for information credibility are as follows:

a. 1 – Confirmed by Other Sources or Agencies. This refers to information that has also been supplied by different SANDA.

b. 2 – Probably True. This refers to information the credibility of which is supported by the quantity and quality of previously received information.

c. 3 – Possibly True. This refers to newly reported information that does not conflict with the previously reported behaviour pattern of the threat but for which there is insufficient confirmation to establish any higher degree of likelihood.

d. 4 – Doubtful. This refers to information that tends to conflict with the previously reported or established behaviour pattern of the threat.

e. 5 – Improbable. This refers to information that contradicts previously reported information or conflicts with the established threat behaviour pattern to a marked degree.

f. 6 – Truth Cannot be Judged. This refers to any new piece of information for which there is no basis for comparison with any known threat behaviour pattern. This rating should only be used when the accurate use of a higher rating is impossible.

4. Independent Evaluation. Reliability and credibility must be considered and assessed independently. For example, information which is assessed as being probably true and is reported by a usually reliable source or

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agency is given a B2 evaluated grading; information from the same source or agency about which the truth cannot be judged is given a grading of B6.

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ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 2

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS METHODS AND TECHNIQUES FOR INTEGRATION AND INTERPRETATION

1. Army intelligence analysts use a variety of methods and techniques to assist in the processing of information into actionable intelligence. This annex gives guidance on the most commonly used intelligence analysis methods and techniques.

Pattern Analysis

2. Description. Pattern analysis is a complex technique to transform data on specific entities into usable information from which analysts can derive human behavioural patterns of activity to either explain an event or allow for predictions based on identified patterns. The technique is based on the principle of cause and effect; that is, any identified effect has precursor causes. While cause and effect analysis is not within the scope of this publication, the premise is based on the reality that humans act in observable, definable, identifiable and exploitable patterns of activity. In situations where the threat has no doctrine to drive operations, pattern analysis is critical to determine threat methods of operation.

3. Understanding Data. Pattern analysis is based on data, and a large amount of it. Unfortunately, the problem for contemporary analysts is not a lack of available data but the exact opposite. In the contemporary operating environment there is more data than anyone can even describe, let alone use. The key to pattern analysis is determining the key data attributes that are required, which can then be inserted during the collection process. An ‘attribute’ is a single piece of information that cannot be broken down further, such as a geographic location. A ‘data object’ is a predetermined set of attributes; for example, analysts might seek to build objects described as ‘people’ where the attributes selected for collection are name, date of birth, place of birth, nationality, age, gender, geographic location and so on.

4. Objects and their associated attributes are necessary to build effective databases. A database stores and sorts objects and their attributes in ways that are relevant to the task at hand. In other words, there is no magic formula that describes the ideal database with its objects and attributes. How the database is constructed should be informed by the priority IR as determined in the IR management process. An effective description of objects and attributes will significantly inform the collection management process by establishing the real scope of collection that is required to satisfy RFI.

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5. Once a body of objects and associated attributes has been collated to a volume and quality appropriate to the analytical task, it is usually transformed into a visual product such as a time event chart, incident chart, time line and so on. In interpreting the data, analysts are seeking to identify new and emerging patterns of human behaviour in the AO. This is based on an expert knowledge of previously established patterns of normality. A normalcy pattern is a recorded understanding of the events that occur routinely in the AO; for example, ‘stand to’ occurs at first and last light in most armies or market day operates every Thursday morning in the local village. Changes to the normalcy pattern are ‘alert’ indicators.

6. In addition to normalcy patterns, analysts should seek to develop an understanding of previous threat patterns of activity, often called methods of operation. This understanding enables analysts to identify patterns as they recur. A highly developed understanding should enable the analyst to get into the threat decision cycle earlier than an analyst with a superficial knowledge.

7. Patterns of interest to the intelligence staff are ordered, regular relationships between two or more of the following objects with typical attributes, as follows:

a. geographic location – coordinates (using the military grid reference system or geographic coordinates), place name, region, state or province, country, hemisphere, continent and so on;

b. time – year, month, day, data, hour, season, moon phase, cultural date and so on;

c. activity – military, civilian, insurgency/terrorism event, cultural, religious, historical and so on;

d. people – name, date of birth, place of birth, gender, age, education, address (various types), place in threat hierarchy and so on;

e. military elements – identification, type (artillery, infantry, naval, paramilitary, etc.), weapons, equipment, vehicles, locations and so on;

f. sequence of events – start point (time/event/participants), intervening points, end point and so on;

g. interval of activity – time and/or geographical separations or relationships and so on; and

h. trigger or catalyst – the cause of the human behaviour at various points in the pattern.

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8. Considerations. The key considerations for pattern analysis are as follows:

a. Selecting the Elements of the Pattern Being Investigated. The objects and attributes that are to form the basis of analysis must be carefully chosen; otherwise a significant research and collection effort can be wasted searching for a pattern that does not exist. Similarly, effective selection of objects and attributes may uncover less-obvious patterns that are hidden in the data.

b. Transforming the Data. In this step, analysts remove unnecessary or corrupt pieces of information and reorganise the data into something useful, such as:

(1) location plus time attributes to produce a movement pattern,

(2) people plus location plus time attributes to produce an activity pattern, and/or

(3) trigger plus activity plus time attributes to produce a sequence-of-activity pattern.

c. Visualisation of Correlated Data. Frequently the volume of data means that analysts find it difficult to see patterns. By integrating data into a visual display analysts are more likely to be able to assimilate the information and discern patterns relevant to the problem at hand. There are many forms of visualisation; those found to be useful include:

(1) Map Plotting. The correlation of activities or events with locations will visualise concentrations and absences of human activities. Map plotting when correlated with time plotting assists in identifying movement patterns and trends.

(2) Charting. The correlation of time with activities can show time interval and sequence patterns. LWP-INT 2-1-8, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace contains an example of a time event chart and a pattern/time analysis visualisation method.

(3) Graphs. Graphs can be useful in identifying trends in quantitative data; for example, numbers of reinforcements moving into an AO or numbers and volumes of artillery fires can be correlated with doctrine to provide indicators of future intent.

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d. Exploiting the Pattern. Patterns can be exploited in a number of ways:

(1) Explain Current Developments. When elements of a known pattern are recognised, the significance of current developments can be explained.

(2) Predict Future Events. When elements of a known pattern are recognised, future events associated with that pattern can be predicted, though with degrees of uncertainty. The identification of new patterns or departures from norms is the basis of indicators and warnings.

(3) Element Identification. When signature methods of operations within patterns are recognised, activities may be linked to a military element, group or person.

(4) Cueing Collection Activities. Having identified a pattern, collection assets can be cued to confirm or refute assessed threat COA and to collect more data in order to achieve greater knowledge dominance in the battlespace.

Stakeholder Analysis

9. Description. Stakeholder analysis is used to identify persons (stakeholders) associated with an issue and determine their power, influence and interest in issues or problems relevant to the commander’s mission. It is complementary to force field analysis. The key to stakeholder analysis is determining the importance of individuals or groups within the relationships that are relevant to current or planned operations. The application of stakeholder analysis can significantly reduce uncertainty for decision-makers if applied early in the mission or when there is a need to clarify the consequences of possible change.

10. Considerations. The purpose of stakeholder analysis is to identify human entities (individuals, organisations, enterprises, etc.) that may have a role in, or effect on, current or planned military operations. Analysts seek to identify individuals or groups who would be affected by the operation, who have any interest in operational success or failure, or who have influence or power within the battlespace. Although stakeholders may be individuals or groups of people, the ultimate purpose is to develop lines of communication with individuals. In this regard it is essential to identify the correct individual stakeholders within a stakeholder organisation. The technique is applied as follows:

a. Identify Stakeholders. Analysts use the brainstorming technique to identify all possible stakeholders relevant to the mission.

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b. Prioritise Stakeholders. Analysts take the long lists of people and/or organisations and classify them by their power and influence in the AO. Generally this is achieved by using a quadrant matrix to visualise the degrees of power and influence. A typical grid would reveal:

(1) high-power, interested people – these are those the force must fully engage with and make the greatest efforts to satisfy;

(2) high-power, less interested people – the commander is likely to engage with these people to keep them satisfied, but not so much that they become bored with our message;

(3) low-power, interested people – these people should be kept adequately informed to ensure that no major issues arise, and can often be very helpful with the detail of specific operational outcomes; and

(4) low-power, less interested people – these people are subject to monitoring, but not in ways that cause them to become disinterested as a result of excessive communication.

c. Understanding and Mapping Key Stakeholders. Analysts delve more into the background of the key stakeholders in order to discern how each is likely to feel about and react to our operations. In addition, effect-based operations planners need to know how best to engage and communicate with them. Key questions that assist in this process are:

(1) What real or emotional interest do they have in the outcome of our work? Is it positive or negative?

(2) What motivates each most of all?

(3) What information do they want from our force?

(4) How do they want to receive information from us? What is the best way of communicating our message to them?

(5) What is their current opinion of us? Is it based on good information?

(6) Who influences their opinions generally, and who influences their opinion of us? Do some of these influencers therefore become important stakeholders in their own right?

(7) If they are not likely to be positive, what will win them around to support our outcomes?

(8) If we do not think we will be able to win them around, how will we manage their opposition?

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(9) Who else might be influenced by their opinions? Do these people become stakeholders in their own right?

11. Analysts should understand that the best way of answering these questions is to talk to stakeholders directly. People are often quite open about their views, and seeking their opinions is often the first step in building a successful relationship. Analysts visualise the understanding they have gained on a stakeholder map. This facilitates identifying which stakeholders are expected to be blockers or critics, and which are likely to be advocates and supporters of our objectives.

Link Analysis

12. Description. The purpose of link analysis is to reduce and organise large volumes of data to enhance the derivation of actionable intelligence. Link analysis is used to identify and define the scope and nature of relationships (or links) between entities. A link may be communications, transportation, associations, transactions or a material transfer. An entity is something that has a distinct, separate existence, although it need not be a material existence. A person is an entity, and so is a group of people, a vehicle, a phone, a URL, a computer, a weapon, a building, a place or even an intangible such as an ideology. Entities are often called ‘nodes’.

13. Link Chart. The outcome of link analysis is a link chart which depicts the linkages between interests or entities, individuals, events, organisations, or other interests or entities of intelligence interest. In contemporary operations, the diagram is often constructed using the symbol pallet on a computer application, or it can be hand-drawn. In reality, link charts are simply collation tools the correct interpretation of which requires a subject matter expert. They are used by analysts to engage visual and mental capacities, to facilitate an understanding of relationships between entities, and to develop hypotheses. Through visualisation, the technique may achieve the following:

a. find matches in data for known patterns of interest,

b. find anomalies where known patterns are violated,

c. unveil new patterns of interest,

d. derive assumptions,

e. inform the collection management process by identifying information gaps, and

f. provide an audit trail.

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14. Considerations. Relationships in link analysis are generally described as follows:

a. Centrality. Analysts measure network activity using the concept of degrees – the number of direct connections to and from an entity. Centrality is based on the notion that the entity with the most direct connections in the network is likely to be the most active entity in the network, often described as a connector or hub. The common wisdom in networks is ‘the more connections the better’. This is not always so. What matters most is where those connections lead to and how they connect the otherwise unconnected.

b. Betweenness. In this construct an entity may have fewer connections but be better positioned, say between two important entities. In this case the subject entity may play the role of ‘broker’ in the network. An entity node with high betweenness has great influence over what flows, and does not flow, in the network.

c. Closeness. While some entities have fewer connections, the patterns of their direct and indirect ties allow them to access all the entities in the network quickly. They are close to everyone else and in a good position to understand the whole of the network.

15. Network Descriptions. There are simple ways to describe elements of networks, including:

a. Centralised Network. A centralised network is dominated by one very central node, or a few of them. If these nodes are removed or damaged, the network quickly fragments into unconnected sub-networks. A highly central entity can become a single point of failure. A network centralised around a well-connected hub can fail abruptly if that hub is disabled or removed. A less centralised network has no single points of failure. It is resilient in that many entities or links can be removed while allowing the remaining nodes still to reach each other over other network paths.

b. Network Reach. It is considered that short links are more important to the network. One or two or, on rare occasions, three links are the key paths. It is a stretch to believe that more links add much to the overall effectiveness of a network. It is more important to be able to determine who is associated with the target of interest, what knowledge they have and who can be realistically reached.

c. Network Integration. Networks are often measured using the shortest paths. It is erroneous to assume that information or influence flows along the network’s shortest paths only. In reality networks operate via direct and indirect shortest and near-shortest

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paths. Links between entities can occur in many known and unknown ways.

d. Boundary Spanners. Entities that connect their group to others usually end up with high network metrics. Boundary spanners are well-positioned to be influencers, since they have access to ideas and information flowing in other groups. They are in a position to combine different ideas and knowledge, found in various places, into new actions.

e. Peripheral Players. Inexperienced analysts may view the groups or entities on the periphery of a network as not being very important. The reality is that peripheral players are very likely to be connected to networks that are not currently mapped. Those entities may have a personal network that is of key importance to future operations.

Force Field Analysis

16. Description. Force field analysis is based on the theory that the majority of situations that humans find themselves in are held in quasi-stability by a balanced combination of restraining and promoting forces. The purpose of the technique is to identify the forces or factors that shape, define, influence or exist in support of or in opposition to an issue or problem relevant to the mission. Force field analysis is complementary to the stakeholder analysis technique. The proper application of this technique gives depth to analysis, and enables decision-makers to take advantage of forces that support their position while reducing the impact of opposing forces. In intelligence analysis, identifying these forces and understanding where this balance exists gives us situational awareness and enables us to provide the commander with critical information for decision-making. Force field analysis is very valuable because it is counterintuitive, in that commanders are generally more comfortable with attending ‘promoting’ forces, which they can strengthen. However, it is often more effective to minimise or eliminate restraining forces first. Force field analysis complements stakeholder analysis.

17. Considerations. Force field analysis is best carried out by a small team of experts in the situation, although it can be conducted by an individual. The application of this technique involves the following:

a. defining the issue/problem as clearly as possible;

b. graphically representing each motivating and restraining factor as forces relevant to the issue being analysed;

c. rating the relative strength of these forces by assigning a value to each one; and

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d. scoring and interpreting the outcome to ascertain which are stronger – supporting or restraining forces.

18. Force field analysis is simple to use, and presents the positive and negative sides of a situation in a way that permits easy comparison. It is a useful technique for looking at all the forces for and against a plan, as it ensures that people think together about all the aspects of an issue and helps them weigh the importance of these aspects in order to decide whether a plan is worth implementing.

Scenario Analysis

19. Description. Scenario analysis is a means of identifying a range of different but equally logical and plausible futures. It can be integrated into decision-making by ensuring that a process of learning about and from the future will be connected to the decision and any subsequent action. As intelligence problems frequently involve exploring future possibilities or making an assessment of how events could combine to produce some future situation, this technique is valuable. Future thinking problems fall into the categories of ‘severely random’ or ‘indeterminate’ where scenario analysis is one of the few analytical methods that can be applied to their resolution. A further advantage of this method is that it provides the analyst with a series of indicators that point to the emergence of a particular future.

20. What are Scenarios? Scenarios are descriptive narratives of plausible alternative projections of a specific part of the future. It is customary for several scenarios to be produced at the same time and, depending upon the approach used, these would number in the range of three, four or five. Each individual scenario is then a unique projection of one possibility for a potential future. Scenarios should not be confused with the forecasts used when trying to determine how various predictable trends may combine to produce a predictable future. Scenarios will always be speculative possibilities, and can never purport to be a predictable certainty or even likelihood.

21. Considerations. To look into the future analysts need to have an understanding of both the past and the present. Time should be seen as a continuum, not as three separate segments pigeonholed as past, present and future. History is all too frequently dismissed as an irrelevance, but in reality the present is the inheritance of decisions taken in the past. Knowledge of the past identifies driving forces and key trends, how they have evolved and what impact they have had. Knowledge of the present should cover those same driving forces and their metamorphosis as well as identify any emerging trends. From that point analysts can then consider how the factors will further evolve, or be affected or joined by other driving forces, and what impact they will have in the future. This

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process of considering the evolution of trends and driving forces will permit the analyst to identify the indicators that signal the emergence of a particular future. These recognisable precursors could be, for example, the occurrence of particular events, an observable attitude change or the emergence of enabling technology.

22. Approaches. Two methods may be used in scenario analysis, though neither is better than the other; their use is determined by the nature of the problem. ‘Future forward’ may be of greater value when the problem has only a few key variables, and ‘future backward’ may be more appropriate when there is a need to reduce the complexity of a range of key variables. These methods are detailed as follows:

a. Future Forward. This method produces sets of plausible futures based on an analysis of present forces and their likely evolution. Future forward is less structured than future backward and relies largely on the patience of a team to continue their deliberations until a consensus is reached. This approach also has two variants:

(1) Significant Events. This variant of the future forward approach starts by identifying significant future events or plot elements. It then poses questions concerning what may bring about the identified events and the possible consequences. By discussing significant events in this way, the team can build a scenario that can be used to explore current decisions. This process is useful, but it is unsystematic and requires creativity and imagination.

(2) Official Future. This variant begins by producing an official future which is probably the one which command/management believes will actually eventuate. Such official futures are usually non-surprising and non-threatening, featuring no changes to current trends, no crises and continued stability. After identifying the key driving forces and trends that produce the official future, it is a relatively simple process to determine which bring to bear the greatest influence. The team is then required to brainstorm just how these key driving forces and trends could interact in different ways to produce a number of different possibilities.

b. Future Backward. Future backward involves the production of a number of possible scenarios for the future, and then requires the team to produce a number of supporting narratives to explain how each end state has come about. This approach is somewhat more structured than the future forward approaches in that it most commonly uses a simple two-axis matrix to immediately produce the fundamentals of four scenarios.

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23. Elements of a Scenario. Scenarios provide a description of a particular end state at a specified future time. More importantly, they also give a descriptive narrative on just how a particular end state has eventuated. Scenarios logically weave together identified driving forces and trends into the fabric of a plot which then leads to the final end state. These elements of a scenario – the driving forces and trends, logic, plot and end state – are each of significance, as it is more important to understand the dynamics of the future (ie, under which combination of circumstances a particular end state is reached) than it is to aim for 100 per cent accuracy in the end state itself.

Scenario Analysis Process

24. The process for scenario analysis involves selecting a team for their knowledge, experience and understanding of the problem to be addressed. Problem formulation and determination of the parameters addresses the need for focus and internal consistency. Not all scenarios will be concerned with decision-making, as they are also a valuable tool in assessing possible futures in terms of risk and opportunity. Analysts have to assess the degree of volatility. Essentially, if the analyst is looking at a relatively stable situation it may be possible to produce realistic scenarios well out into the future; however, if the situation is unstable or inherently volatile, it may only be possible to produce scenarios covering the shorter term.

25. It is important to treat time as a continuum. In order to track key trends and driving forces over a period to explore the possibilities of future evolvement, the analyst will have to decide how far to delve into the past. Generally analysts look back twice as far as it is intended to cast their scenarios forward. Having set the ground rules, analysts identify trends and driving forces. The trends and driving forces are the most significant elements in the development of narratives, as it is the interaction of these forces that produces the different but equally plausible outcomes. When analysing trends and driving forces, analysts identify which of them appear to be inevitable or predetermined, as these are unlikely to vary significantly in any of the scenarios.

26. The next area for consideration in this process is the identification of trends that would define or significantly change the nature or direction of scenarios. This assessment is coloured by the degree of uncertainty concerning the effect of a trend, and the degree of importance. It is likely that some scenarios will contain logical consequences of forces that are both very important and very uncertain. Through these processes each different and challenging scenario plot will emerge. When the scenarios are complete they will provide a series of stories as to how a number of possible futures have come about. It is important to note that the scenarios

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are not forecasts of what is believed will occur, but merely projections of possibilities.

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ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 2

GUIDE TO BRIEFING FORMATS

Information Brief

1. A suggested format for an information brief is as follows:

a. Introduction:

(1) Greeting, including briefer identification

(2) Security classification

(3) Purpose and scope of the brief

(4) Explain any briefing aids

b. Body:

(1) Present the information in a logical sequence, usually including:

(a) A review of the situation

(b) Current factors affecting the situation, concentrating on threat and environment factors that affect military operations

(2) Be prepared to answer questions at any time

c. Conclusion:

(1) Concluding statements

(2) Provide an assessment of the significant factors affecting the situation, including future environmental effects on military operations and threat COA

(3) Ask for questions

(4) Restate the security classification

(5) Announce the next briefer, if any

Decision Brief

2. A suggested format for the decision brief is as follows:

a. Introduction:

(1) Greeting, including briefer identification

(2) Security classification

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(3) Purpose and scope of the brief, including a statement describing the decision to be made

(4) Explain any briefing aids

b. Body:

(1) State the situation requiring the decision

(2) Describe each significant factor in the situation

(3) Describe the possible solutions to the situation

c. Conclusion:

(1) Summarise the situation

(2) Summarise the possible solutions

(3) Make a recommendation on the solution to be adopted or the decision to be made

(4) Ask for questions

(5) Restate the security classification

(6) Announce the next briefer, if any

Handover/Takeover Brief

3. A suggested format for a handover/takeover brief is as follows:

a. The threat portion of this brief should be the same as for an intelligence brief (see LWP-INT 2-1-8, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace) with the addition of:

(1) Any intelligence or job specific information or intelligence particularly regarding the collection plan

(2) Ongoing threat activity or operations

(3) Tasks to be achieved

(4) Non-routine briefings, meetings or visits

(5) Actions to be taken in specific situations

b. Friendly:

(1) Changes to the friendly mission or intent

(2) Changes to friendly order of battle or groupings, particularly when it affects collection or reporting

(3) New orders or instructions

(4) Location of LO or other key personnel

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c. Questions

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CHAPTER 3

ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND ORGANISATIONS

SECTION 3-1. INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

1. An intelligence architecture constitutes the organisational framework, infrastructure and arrangements necessary to support Defence activities. Well-considered intelligence architecture will identify functions, personnel resources and systems in advance of operational deployment and be articulated in the ISP.

2. The architecture must be designed in conjunction with the planning of a particular campaign, operation or activity. The design of the architecture may change over the conduct of an operation. This may include a requirement for different intelligence force elements (FE) and intelligence staffing for different phases. The resulting intelligence architecture must describe the tasking authorities for all collection and processing activity and the links to superior, subordinate and flanking commands. Factors to be considered in intelligence planning for the architecture to support the activity (which will most likely occur at the joint level) include:

a. the likely type of intelligence activities to be conducted, such as field intelligence (FI), CI, field security (FS), psychological operations (PSYOPS) and intelligence activities;

b. the types of intelligence support to be received from national and allied assets, such as signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, geospatial information and services, and how these are to be integrated into the joint task force (TF) intelligence system;

c. the C2 relationships for intelligence FE, such as control retained by COMD JTF/J2 or intelligence FE allocated down to tactical level;

d. augmentation and the need for additional personnel resources;

e. logistics, including movement requirements for intelligence assets and sustainment for specialist equipment;

f. an intelligence deployment plan and the need to establish an intelligence capability early;

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g. the need to structure for continuous operations and the possibility of changing intelligence FE components over time;

h. communications requirements; and

i. the capabilities and limitations of the collection disciplines in the potential AO.

Division of Responsibilities Within an Intelligence Architecture

3. The division of responsibilities between strategic, theatre and operational intelligence agencies and elements is important when considering early deployment, collection planning, ISP, command relationships and intelligence crossover points.

4. Early Deployment. The deployment of the full intelligence architecture may be phased, but the commander of a joint inter-agency TF must ensure that there is a viable intelligence organisation at the outset of an operation and the operational movement plan must reflect this need. Where operations or contingency planning is constrained by limited information, the early deployment of collection assets is often vital. Such deployment will often need to precede the deployment of the main force.

5. Collection Planning. Collection planning takes into account the capabilities and limitations of collection assets and the availability of assets, and balances these factors in determining how best to answer the commander’s IR. Collection planning therefore influences intelligence architecture planning and the communications infrastructure needed. It also results in direction to conduct information collection tasks.

6. Intelligence Support Plan. The medium for articulating the intelligence architecture and directing the intelligence effort is the ISP. ISP may be issued separately or as an intelligence annex to an OPORD or operations instruction. In addition to establishing the intelligence architecture, liaison, reporting framework and coordination arrangements, the ISP focuses, prioritises and initiates intelligence and CI activity in support of IR and CI aims. CI guidance may be issued separately in a CI plan. ISP usually also indicate IR. In short, the ISP must provide enough specific information for subordinate, lateral and supporting commands to start operating.

7. Command Relationships. The division of staff and production responsibility between levels of command and agencies needs to be clearly articulated for day-to-day activity in Australia as well as on deployed operations. The division of responsibility needs to be articulated in the ISP, and this includes responsibility for the production of estimates, plans and threat assessments. As the operation progresses through various phases, the division of responsibility will change. The points at which these changes occur are known as intelligence crossover points.

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8. Intelligence Crossover Points. Intelligence crossover points are the nexus at which one component of an intelligence system assumes intelligence or analytical primacy for a particular situation or operation. Crossover is recognition that, as the activity or operation matures, the most appropriate organisation to conduct various parts of the intelligence cycle will change. This change is best effected if it is agreed in advance and promulgated in the ISP. Acceptance of primacy for intelligence support to an activity at the operational level may not equate to primacy for analysis and production at the strategic level.

Australian Intelligence Community

9. The Australian Army intelligence capability is an integral component of, and reliant on, what is termed the Australian intelligence community. The Australian intelligence community includes:

a. intelligence oversight and coordinating committees;

b. national intelligence agencies;

c. the Defence intelligence system (DIS); and

d. implications for allied relationships.

10. A detailed synopsis of the Australian intelligence community can be found in ADDP 2.0, Intelligence.

Australian Defence Force Investigative Service

11. Within the Australian Defence Force Investigative Service (ADFIS), intelligence staffs and agencies at all levels operate as part of a distributed intelligence system; that is, each element contributes information and intelligence to the system according to its capabilities and allocated responsibility for intelligence production. The various elements also draw on the system according to their needs. ADFIS provides intelligence support for the planning and conduct of operations. It represents the intelligence capability of Defence. The role of the DIS is to provide intelligence support to ADF commanders and their staffs at all levels for the planning and conduct of operations, and to satisfy intelligence needs of Defence decision-makers, allies and other customers. The DIS also provides intelligence assessments to support the strategic development of Defence (long-term planning, future capabilities, etc.). The Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation has technical control of ADFIS and the authority to adjust responsibilities and resources to meet changing circumstances.

12. ADFIS encompasses joint, single-Service and Defence intelligence elements, activities and procedures. It spans the spectrum of command from the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and spans the spectrum

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of conflict by providing an intelligence capability and structure to support operations in peace, crisis and conflict. The intelligence system that supports Defence extends beyond Defence in terms of its constituent components and may also support other customers besides Defence.

13. ADFIS involves the interaction of diverse components to produce and share intelligence. The components of ADFIS are as follows:

a. the Defence Intelligence Organisation;

b. the Defence Signals Directorate;

c. the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation;

d. the Defence Security Authority; and

e. ADF intelligence and CI staffs and FE at all levels of command, including joint TF.

Intelligence Organisation

14. Operational Requirement. The land intelligence operator capability is able to provide intelligence support elements (ISE) to land and joint force commands. During major conflict, prolonged operations offshore or in defence of Australia, there may be a requirement for an ISE to provide specialist intelligence capability for the operational level commander. Such intelligence support must be provided without detriment to tactical commanders and ideally would be provided by a force intelligence capability. If required, an ISE could be combined with RAN and RAAF specialist intelligence capabilities into a force intelligence group.

15. Employment. The employment of intelligence capabilities is detailed in LWD 2-1, Intelligence Staff Duties. In general, an ISE by its ability to do the following:

a. provides deployable FI, exploitation, CI, psychological activities and FS support to commanders;

b. deploys independent detachments (as required) with organic wheeled mobility and communications;

c. provides task-orientated ISE to two or more FE, such as joint inter-agency TF on independent operations;

d. implements processing and collection management required in support of their own operations and only augment supported HQ staff in specialist advisory roles;

e. operates selected detachments covertly;

f. is supplemented by specialist elements from other organisations or allied forces;

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g. operates as part of ADFIS, and is interoperable with Defence, government and civil agencies and ABCA partners; and

h. maintains liaison with other organisations in accordance with tasking.

SECTION 3-2. TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE

16. Generic Tactical Intelligence Staff. Like their strategic and operational counterparts, tactical intelligence organisations and staffs provide intelligence and CI support to the tactical commander. In contrast, however, these intelligence staffs and organisations will usually not be joint. The composition of the tactical intelligence capability will be determined by the level and organisation of the HQ it supports, as follows:

a. At TF level and above, the tactical intelligence staff should include:

(1) a senior intelligence officer who is one of the principal staff officers on the HQ;

(2) an element which produces intelligence staff work, including estimates and plans; and

(3) an ASC, detailed in Chapter 4, which includes:

(a) a collection planning and management element,

(b) a processing element, and

(c) a CI element.

b. At battlegroup level, the senior intelligence officer will probably also perform the roles of CM, chief analyst, and staff officer. The other members of the intelligence section will support these roles. Specialist intelligence collection capability may have collection and analytical staff allocated to assist in collection management and processing tasks relevant to the steerage of their assets in support of higher collection management direction.

Task Force Intelligence Staff

17. The basic building block of land operations is the TF. Australian TF may operate independently (often as a joint inter-agency TF), be grouped with other FE under a joint operational HQ, participate in an ABCA coalition, or participate in non-ABCA collective security operations.

18. Role. The role of the TF intelligence staff is to provide intelligence and CI support to the commander and their staff.

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19. Characteristics. The TF intelligence staff is able to do the following:

a. conduct 24-hour operations in a tactical environment,

b. conduct all tasks simultaneously, and

c. access and process strategic and operational intelligence at the highest classification.

SECTION 3-3. STAFF FUNCTIONS, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

20. The intelligence function exists to support the commander. The intelligence staff are responsible for assessments of stakeholder capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions, and for assessment of their impact on operations. They are also responsible for CI and providing intelligence advice to planning.

21. Intelligence staff must at all times provide predictive, comprehensive and unbiased assessments. Intelligence staff are vital to the process of ensuring that decision-makers at all levels are aware of facts, assessments and gaps in intelligence.

22. Role of the Intelligence Staff. The role of intelligence staff at all levels is as follows:

a. to provide intelligence support to the commander; and

b. to provide intelligence for use by subordinate, higher and flanking formations and units.

23. Responsibilities. Intelligence staff are responsible for the following tasks:

a. the management and coordination of the intelligence function;

b. the provision of relevant, usable, timely and accurate intelligence on adversaries and the environment by:

(1) the maintenance of basic and current intelligence records;

(2) the preparation of intelligence and CI inputs to the MAP;

(3) the preparation and management of a collection plan;

(4) the processing of collected information, combat information and intelligence; and

(5) the dissemination of information, combat information and intelligence;

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c. the control of attached intelligence units and intelligence representatives;

d. the provision of policy advice and training on all aspects of intelligence and CI;

e. the provision of intelligence support to IA planning, including:

(1) nodal analysis products as required,

(2) psychological activities,

(3) EW,

(4) physical destruction,

(5) deception,

(6) OPSEC, and

(7) advice and warning on security threats to materiel and personnel;

f. the coordination of language interpretation;

g. the conduct of liaison with allied and other service and civilian intelligence agencies; and

h. the provision of advice on, and management of, arrangements for the preliminary exploitation of captured personnel, documents and materiel.

SECTION 3-4. LAND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES

24. Generic Land Intelligence Collection Capabilities. Land intelligence collection capabilities for the Australian Army are provided by a variety of capabilities, comprising different specialisations and across a number of corps. No single corps has sole responsibility for all land intelligence collection capability.

25. Specialist land intelligence collection capabilities are generally distributed across the following areas:1

a. intelligence units;

b. EW/signals intelligence units;

c. surveillance and target acquisition units;

1. Generic unit names (without the unit designator) are referred to due to changes to orders of battle, naming conventions and the creation/disbandment of units.

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d. geomatic survey sub-units;

e. reconnaissance units/sub-units, including;

(1) cavalry, and

(2) rotary wing;

f. engineering reconnaissance sub-units;

g. CBRN detection units;

h. regional surveillance units; and

i. special operations forces.

26. These capabilities would work closely with air, aerospace, maritime, Defence geospatial, Defence signals, and Defence intelligence organisations. Additionally, close operational relationships should exist with specialist intelligence agencies that comprise part of the Australian intelligence community.

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CHAPTER 4

INTELLIGENCE STAFF FUNCTIONS AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Intelligence staff functions and intelligence activities, as defined in Chapter 2, are described as follows:

a. Intelligence Staff Functions. Intelligence staff functions encompass the intelligence staff process that provides input to decision-making processes, intelligence planning, liaison, requirements and collection management, production, and the management of intelligence assets.

b. Intelligence Activities. This encompasses those activities conducted by intelligence personnel for information collection or CI purposes.

SECTION 4-1. INTELLIGENCE STAFF FUNCTIONS

2. The intelligence staff process is a generic term encompassing the various activities and specific processes involved in providing intelligence support to the commander. Associated with this are a number of staff functions.

3. Staff functions represent the practical implementation of the intelligence cycle, which is an ongoing process. Staff functions enable the continuous flow of intelligence and intelligence planning advice to be provided to the commander. When focused specifically in support of operations, the intelligence staff process includes IPB.

4. A key output from the IPB staff process is a formalised, structured assessment of stakeholders that could impact on the activity.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace and the Military Appreciation Process

5. The MAP is the logical decision-making process that includes the analysis of all the relevant factors in a situation and the coordination of all staff functions in the development of the most appropriate plan of action. The MAP consists of four consecutive steps, with IPB forming an integral and continuous function. The relationship between the MAP and intelligence is fully described within LWD 2-1, Intelligence Staff Duties.

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6. IPB is a systematic process for analysing the adversarial, non-participant and stakeholder environments, considered in the dimensions of space and time. When conducting an IPB, assessments should be considered across the physical, human and informational domains.

7. The IPB is designed to support staff planning and prepare the foundations for informed military decision-making within the MAP. IPB is a processing medium through which intelligence staff provide an assessment of environmental effects on operations and an estimate of the capability and intent of all stakeholders, and in particular adversary stakeholders.

8. IPB incorporates all intelligence product development and interpretation directed to support planning. Additionally, IPB interaction with the MAP creates the commander’s IR, which drive collection, processing and dissemination within an operational context.

9. IPB helps the commander to apply maximum combat power (whether this be kinetic or non-kinetic) at decisive points in space and time, as follows:

a. by describing the operating environment (human, physical and informational) and the effects of that environment on both friendly and adversary operations;

b. by assessing the adversary’s likely COA, including adversary intelligence collection activities, the adversary’s COG and the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities;

c. by assessing other stakeholders’ likely COA, including intelligence collection activities, their COG and critical vulnerabilities; and

d. by managing collection to meet the commander’s decision requirements relative to gaps in knowledge or the triggering of the commander’s decision points.

10. The relationship between IPB and the MAP as a staff process is fully described in LWD 2-1, Intelligence Staff Duties.

Outputs and Inputs

11. IPB outputs constitute the intelligence inputs to the MAP. The four steps of the MAP each receive inputs from all steps of the IPB process, and specific IPB outputs may support more than one MAP activity.

12. IPB products include:

a. AOE,

b. the intelligence estimate,

c. the CI estimate, and

d. threat assessments.

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13. IPB products also provide key information that can be included in an ISP or intelligence annex to an OPORD. Further information on the relationship between IPB outputs and MAP inputs is described in LWD 2-1, Intelligence Staff Duties.

Relationship between Intelligence and Other Staff

14. Relationship with the Commander. The intelligence function exists to support the commander, who drives the process by providing guidance. The intelligence officer is one of the principal staff officers on a HQ and must gain and maintain the commander’s confidence by providing effective intelligence.

15. Relationship with Operations and Plans Staff. The relationship between the intelligence and operations staff is symbiotic. Intelligence staff need to understand both current and planned operations in order to anticipate IR and to focus their efforts. Similarly, operations staff rely on intelligence staff to provide the knowledge of the threat and the environment required for the planning and conduct of operations. Co-location of operations, plans and intelligence staff is vital.

16. Relationship with Combat Service Support Staff. Intelligence support for CSS includes the provision of basic intelligence on the AO and the conduct of CI activities in the rear area in support of force protection and rear area security. CSS staff advice may be required when the threat’s logistics capability is being assessed (ie, in the production of logistics intelligence).

17. Relationship with Offensive Support Staff. All forms of offensive action, including manoeuvre, fire planning, close air support, electronic attack and PSYOPS, must be synchronised within the HQ. During IPB, the intelligence staff assess the adversary’s COA, vulnerabilities and COG, and provide advice on the decisive time and place for the possible engagement of the threat’s high-value targets. These assessments are confirmed during wargaming.

18. Relationship with Artillery Intelligence Staff. Artillery intelligence results from the collection and processing of all available information on adversary indirect fire systems. Artillery staff with a surveillance and target acquisition role, including intelligence, are usually part of the offensive support cell at TF level and above. The surveillance and target acquisition staff are the principal advisers to the intelligence staff on the adversary’s artillery assets and provide the interface between the offensive support cell and the ASC. As part of this interface, the surveillance and target acquisition officer is usually located in the ASC to allow the rapid engagement of identified targets.

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19. Relationship with Engineer Intelligence Staff. Engineer intelligence provides information and assessments of terrain, the effects of weather on terrain, and adversary engineer capabilities, including; mobility, countermobility and survivability. Hence, engineer staff support the terrain analysis aspects of the AOE, and efforts should not be duplicated between engineering and intelligence staffs. At planning or orders groups, the engineer’s brief should detail specific aspects of terrain that are critical to operations. At TF level and above, an engineer intelligence LO will normally be appointed and act as the principal engineer adviser to the intelligence staff.

20. Relationship with Geomatic Engineers and Military Geographic Information Staff. Geomatic engineers have the capability to prepare and provide terrain information for intelligence and other purposes, including IPB. Geomatic engineers can provide the battlespace visualisation tools that enable the depiction of adversary schemes of manoeuvre and vulnerabilities. Military geographic information provides a critical input for the generation of a fused spatial intelligence product that underpins all command support systems and processes. The high-volume printing capability of geomatic engineer assets may also be employed in the production of PSYOPS material.

21. Relationship with Military Police Staff. MP are a valuable source of information due to their tasks of criminal investigation, escort of POW, liaison with civil police and refugee screening operations. It should be noted that MP investigations are conducted from a different perspective to CI activities. MP will seek to solve a crime and lay charges. CI personnel seek to neutralise threats to security and exploit the situation to counter hostile intelligence collection, espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. This may involve controlling rather than punishing those involved. Commander’s guidance must be sought to determine the desired outcome.

22. Relationship with Electronic Warfare Staff. At battalion level and above, an EW LO will normally be attached when an EW asset is in support. The EW LO is the EW adviser for the commander, and in this capacity also provides EW advice to the intelligence staff. Most EW efforts are in electronic support which, as a primary sensor system, is driven by the collection requirements of the CM. Hence, EW has a close tasking association with intelligence staff, and their processed product (through embedded intelligence operators supporting EW activity) is fused in the ASC. At TF level, an EW coordination centre will be established in the ASC. The EW coordination centre is responsible for the coordination and dissemination of EW products and signals intelligence.

23. Relationship between Intelligence and Surveillance. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas,

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places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. Surveillance is an integral part of collection. Its primary purpose is the gaining of information which can be processed into intelligence to support the planning and the conduct of operations. Surveillance may also cue reconnaissance, target acquisition and engagement. There are two main types of surveillance, as follows:

a. Wide Area Surveillance. This is the systematic observation of large areas in order to detect threat presence and activity. It is generally undertaken by sophisticated, often fixed sensors such as over-the-horizon radar, search and rescue, air defence systems or by satellites.

b. Focal Area Surveillance. This is the systematic observation of smaller areas of significance in order to detect threat presence and activity. Surveillance assets employed within focal areas can include specialist units, such as regional force surveillance units, ground surveillance radar or aerial platforms. Focal area surveillance is routinely integrated with reconnaissance and target acquisition in order to support the immediate engagement of a target.

24. Intelligence Liaison. Intelligence staff may be required to liaise with flanking HQ, coalition partners, police, local authorities, civilian intelligence organisations, and other government or non-government groups. Effective liaison requires the following:

a. direction of liaison effort to those organisations that can best facilitate achievement of the commander’s mission,

b. sound professional knowledge and thorough situational understanding,

c. proper security and sanitisation, and

d. effective communications.

25. Liaison Personnel. The following types of intelligence LO may be appointed:

a. Military Intelligence Officer. A military intelligence officer is an officer on secondment to a police or civilian intelligence organisation and, by definition, is not a dedicated LO. However, the military intelligence officer develops knowledge of the AO, population, infrastructure and the threat, which can be passed to the appropriate military intelligence staff.

b. Intelligence Liaison Officer. An intelligence LO is attached to a deployed force for intelligence liaison duties. The intelligence LO provides a link between the commander and local government and non-government agencies, providing a reciprocal flow of

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intelligence. An intelligence LO would normally deploy into the AO prior to the deployment of units.

All-source Cell

26. The mission of the ASC is to focus collection resources and to produce and disseminate intelligence to support the commander’s decision-making process. The ASC works for the senior intelligence officer on the supported HQ, who directs its effort according to the commander’s guidance. The ASC supports current operations and contingency planning simultaneously.

27. Organisation and Components of an All-source Cell. Although the size and organisation may vary with the levels of command, the intelligence functions of collection, processing and dissemination determine the organisation of the ASC.

28. Coordination. The requirement for restricted access to the ASC due to the classification of material must be balanced against the need for coordination with other elements of the staff. Coordination is achieved through the following:

a. close or virtual proximity to the commander, operations, planning and offensive support elements;

b. personal contact, facilitated by adequate security clearances;

c. effective procedures and systems for the passage of information and near-real-time situation awareness by the HQ and staff;

d. a secure interface between command and intelligence information systems to enable reachback to national and theatre agencies;

e. regular conferences, briefings and orders groups; and

f. liaison.

Intelligence Activities

29. Intelligence activities include:

a. FI;

b. advanced human (AH) intelligence;

c. exploitation activities;

d. FS activities;

e. psychological activities;

f. screening and debriefing activities; and

g. regional intelligence (RI).

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30. Each activity is briefly summarised in the following paragraphs. The intelligence activities are fully explained in LWD 2-1, Intelligence Staff Duties.

Field Intelligence

31. FI is the acquisition of intelligence through ground reconnaissance, liaison and human source exploitation. This is achieved by the use of specialist personnel deployed to support a commander in the conduct of operations. The early deployment of FI to an AO ensures, through the domination of the AO and local knowledge, that the deployed force commander and supporting staff will receive adequate warning of impending threats to the deployed force which are of a local nature.

32. Subsequent FI activities in the established AO will ensure that the understanding and awareness of the situation in that particular AO is continually updated. This is achieved through expanded operator knowledge and the continuing development of community contacts. This provides the commander with timely intelligence advice regarding specific threats to their own forces as well as other activities within the AO.

33. The size and composition of the deployed force, the nature of the operation, the commander’s mission, the complexity of the battlespace and the capability and intent of the threat force will determine the composition and structure of the deployed FI element.

34. FI activities are not conducted in isolation. They form a part of the coordinated intelligence effort, which includes FS and OPSEC, exploitation, EW and IA.

Advanced Human Intelligence (Counterintelligence)

35. AH intelligence is that aspect of intelligence devoted to destroying the effectiveness of hostile foreign intelligence service activities and to the protection of information against espionage; individuals against subversion and installations; and equipment, records or materiel against sabotage. This is achieved through both defensive and offensive means throughout the continuum of conflict by specially trained personnel in order to support the conduct of ADF operations. AH intelligence complements EW, PSYOPS, OPSEC and operational deception and is one of the contributors to IA.

36. AH is a multi-disciplined function designed to detect, identify, assess, counter, neutralise, exploit or control adversary collection asset activities, and incorporates counter-human intelligence (HUMINT), counter-signals intelligence and counter-imagery intelligence at all levels of operation from national to tactical. CI is both a defensive and offensive component of operations. Defensive AH focuses on protective security measures, such

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as physical security or personnel security, while offensive AH is focused on the conduct of operations with the specific aim of exploiting, neutralising or degrading an adversary’s ability to collect, process and disseminate intelligence. Defensive AH measures are primarily in the FS domain.

37. The application of both offensive and defensive AH measures from the earliest aspects of an operation will allow the ADF to disrupt adversary collection efforts and deny adversary commanders access to valuable intelligence that would enable the execution of successful operations against the ADF.

38. As an operation matures, the continued employment of AH measures will contribute significantly to the ongoing force protection of deployed ADF elements in a given AO through monitoring of the intelligence threat and the development of timely and appropriate COA. AH activities may include the continued development and maintenance of counter-HUMINT networks, surveillance, counter-surveillance, support to security investigations, inter-agency liaison and development of AH countermeasures as part of the military deception counterintelligence effort.

Exploitation

39. The exploitation of personnel, materiel and documents is a source of potentially valuable information. Every effort should be made to exploit these sources to the fullest extent.

40. The aim of exploitation is the timely extraction of information of intelligence value from personnel, materiel and documents, and the efficient dissemination of that product.

41. Past operational experience has highlighted the value of exploitation operations and rapid dissemination of the intelligence obtained. It is important that exploitation operations are carefully planned and executed to ensure that the maximum amount of information is obtained in the minimum amount of time.

42. While exploitation is primarily an intelligence responsibility, its effectiveness will depend greatly on the cooperation of non-intelligence staff and units in facilitating the collection, safe custody, administration, and rapid evacuation of captured personnel, documents and materiel.

Field Security (Protective Security)

43. FS is the provision of physical security advice and security intelligence support to the deployed commander in an operational environment. This support is achieved through the collection and analysis of security

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intelligence as well as the provision of protective security and OPSEC advice.

44. Within the operational environment, and particularly in joint operations, security (as one of the principles of war) and force protection (as a key component of capability) assume a higher degree of importance than in other areas. From an Australian perspective, FS should, therefore, always be considered in a joint and multinational context. FS should provide the framework for comprehensive protection of the deployed force to conserve its fighting strength and, therefore, achieve its mission with minimum casualties in both personnel and equipment.

45. FS is not conducted in isolation. It forms part of a coordinated intelligence effort, which includes specialist AH assets, FI, exploitation, EW and information operations.

46. The composition and structure of the deployed force, the nature of the operation, the commander’s mission and the sophistication, capabilities and intent of the threat force will determine the composition and structure of a deployed FS element. The minimum number of people within an FS detachment will normally be four.

47. The utilisation of FS staff at all stages of the planning process will ensure the effective application of appropriate protective measures for a deployed force and its commander.

48. The achievement of security for ADF operations, exercises and activities is a command responsibility. Both AH and intelligence processes are central to achieving security as they identify actual and potential espionage (including intelligence collection), sabotage, subversion and terrorism. The AH activities also counteract such threats and, in addition, allow them to be manipulated or controlled. Security is achieved through the collective measures of the friendly force, the implementation of protective security measures and the conduct of OPSEC and AH processes. The FS and specialist AH capabilities are not automatically amalgamated as a single capability brick. FS activities will generally cue follow-on specialist AH operations. This may lead to a subsequent joint FS/CI activity.

Psychological Activities

49. From studies of modern history, it is widely recognised that the psychological dimension of conflict is as important as the physical. When imposing national strategic and military objectives upon a target area, that audience’s perceptions and attitudes have the ability to shape the outcome of a conflict or war.

50. The aim of psychological activities is to influence and shape the attitudes and behaviour of a target area in an effort to persuade adversary, neutral

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and friendly parties to behave favourably in accordance with national and military objectives. Psychological activities operate as a continuum, functioning during peace, conflict and war.

51. Psychological activities support all types of military activities within an operation, including conventional warfare, peace support and SF activities. In doing so, psychological activities create a force multiplication effect while also providing a degree of force protection to deployed units and various stakeholders.

52. Psychological activities are recognised as an essential element in national and military conflicts and operations. They are also a critical element of information operations and provide commanders with a non-lethal means of persuading belligerents to behave in a favourable manner in the achievement of national goals. Psychological activities should be considered as critical elements of manoeuvre within a nation’s combat power. The psychological impact of the battlespace is an important consideration in the planning of any military or diplomatic activity. Through the effective employment of psychological activities, a commander can achieve a decisive tactical advantage.

Screening and Debriefing

53. Screening and debriefing can be tailored to provide support to a variety of scenarios and may be conducted in support of strategic, operational and tactical objectives. For instance, a debriefing element could be tailored to debrief Australian nationals returning from an area of interest in a relatively benign environment, such as a domestic or international airport. Alternatively, the same element could be structured to provide screening support to cordon and search, vehicle checkpoint or refugee/line crossing in a tactical environment. Accordingly, the size and scope of screening and the intelligence support provided will vary.

54. Screening refers to the process of identifying who has information required by commanders (articulated in the intelligence collection plan) and who is willing to provide that information within the timeframes set by the intelligence CM. The purpose of screening is to identify individuals or groups who are of interest to HUMINT collection and AH activities.

55. Debriefing is the process by which information is elicited either from individuals who are willing to voluntarily provide information in response to questions asked or, in the case of exploitation, from people whose will to resist the questioning process has been broken. The purpose of debriefing is to systematically extract information of value to commanders at all levels from civilians and military personnel who have been identified by the screening process as having the required information.

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56. Within the context of land intelligence collection, both screening and debriefing can be conducted by personnel from the intelligence unit who have been trained to conduct tactical questioning, FI, exploitation, FS, AH intelligence or RI. In all cases, screening and debriefing are either primary or secondary tasks for each of those intelligence collection capabilities.

Regional Intelligence

57. RI is not a new form of intelligence activity. It has existed in one form or another since World War II. Historically significant examples, including the Navy Coastwatchers of the South-West Pacific and South-East Asia during World War II, can be thought of as akin to contemporary RI.

58. RI is a form of HUMINT collection undertaken by ADF intelligence operators in northern Australia and Australian offshore territories. They are focused primarily around defence of Australia tasks, but they may also include Defence Force Assistance to the Civil Community and Defence Force Assistance to the Civil Power.

59. RI is usually conducted in order to collect intelligence over broad areas; however, it is also suitable for collection of specific information from focal areas. RI shares many features of FI activities and gains its information from a variety of community contacts, civilian agencies and the like. RI is conducted in order to gain intelligence on a variety of Defence and support to government tasks. RI is capable of providing low-cost intelligence collection to both tactical and operational level commanders who are conducting broad area surveillance tasks.

60. RI is based almost entirely on the intelligence gained from interaction with the local community and the raising and exploitation of civilian reporting networks. RI is differentiated from FI by the fact that collection and contact is more overt than that of FI. When planning and conducting RI, current HUMINT and FI procedures and doctrine are a useful guide.

61. RI tasks are currently performed by all three Services of the ADF. Navy Coastwatchers, Air Force airbase reporting networks and Army RI capabilities all perform RI collection tasks.

62. RI can be conducted by suitably trained members of the ADF, acting overtly, during peacetime or during periods of heightened tension. RI is possible during periods of security crisis; however, their conduct must be modified in order to protect civilian sources and lightly armed operators from enemy forces.

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